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ABOUT FACE OR STRATEGIC RETREAT: DIVERGENT PATHS TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION AFTER MILITARY REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA BY ROSANNA TAVAREZ A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the Sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida May 2013
ii | Page Acknowledgments The thesis process has not been an easy one. It took several sleepless nig hts watching the sunrise from my window w hile still staring at the computer screen and a pile of books from the night before. I must say that after seeing the finished product, every moment of angst, anger, stress, and anxiety were well worth it. I would like to begin by thanking my parents, Elb a and Fausto, for always encouraging me to keep going even when the end was nowhere in sight. It was not easy to hear me complain for weeks at a time, but look it is over! I did it! Thank you for everything you have done for me and for helping me become t he person I am today. I would also like to thank my girls who always knew that baked goods and coffee would help moderate thesis stress. To Chelsea Co rarito, Tessa Grasel, Stephanie Cadaval, and Laura Libby you have all been amazing friends and I truly fe el blessed to have had you all in my life during my time at New College. I would also like to thank Dr. Barbara Hicks for all of her guidance throughout this thesis process and my undergraduate career. Dr. Hicks has molded me into a true academic through h er vigorous writing ethic and her level of expectation. I thank her for not hiding under a table when I would show up to her office perplexed about my thesis in need of her unparalleled skills in transforming my muffled thoughts to structured ideas. Without her help, this thesis would still be in its beginning stages. Ms. Worldwide
iii | Page Table of Contents Acknowledgements List of Tables and Figures .. .iv Acronyms v Abstract .. v i Chapter 1: Democratic Theory and Military Regimes in South America .. 1 The Transition Process 3 Democracy 7 Consolidation 11 Historical Overview of the Military Regime in South America 13 Project Outline 18 Chapter 2: Back to the Barracks: the Cases of the Argentine Proceso and Pacted Transition 2 1 Argentina 22 Uruguay 41 Conclusion: Two Different Patterns of Sudden Transitions from Military Rule to D emocratic Governance 55 Chapter 3: Democracies with Authoritarian Remains: The Cases of Chile and Brazil 62 Chile 63 Brazil 80 Conclusion: Two Different Pattern s of the Gradual Removal of the Armed Forces from Government 10 1 Chapter 4: The Road Not Taken: Sudden versus Gradual Remov al of the Armed Forces to Promote Democratic C onsolidation 10 6 Gradual vs. Sudden: An Incomplete Analysis 10 8 A Different Story: The Role of Military Hierarchy 11 3 Grassroots Consolidation Efforts 116 Works Cited ... 121
iv | Page List of Tables and Figures Tables Table 3. 1 Military Participation in the Chilean Cabinet, 1973 1986, 67 Figures Figure 2. 1 Annual Military Expenditures in Argentina, 34 Figure 2. 2 Military Expenditures in Relation to Gross Domestic Product in Argentina, 34 Figure 2.3 Democracy Index in Argentina, 2006 2011, 40 Figure 2. 4 Changes in Military Expenditures Overtime in Uruguay, 50 Figure 2. 5 Democracy Index in Uruguay, 2006 2011, 54 Figure 3. 1 Military Expenditures in Chile, 1972 1989, 69 Figure 3 2 Armed Forces Personnel in Chile, 77 Figure 3. 3 Democracy Index in Chile, 2006 2011, 79 Figure 3.4 Military Expenditures in Brazil, 1973 1995, 92 Figure 3.5 Democracy Index in Brazil, 2006 2011, 100 Figure 4.1 Democr acy Index for the year 2011, 116
v | Page Acronyms ARENA National Renewal Alliance Party of Brazil ( Aliana Renovadora Nacional ) CAL Legislative Advisory Commission of Brazil ( Comisin Asesora Legislativa ) IMF International Monetary Fund JCJ Council of Joint Commanders in Chief of Uruguay ( Junta de Comandantes en Jefe ) JOG Council of Official Generals of Ur uguay ( Junta de Oficiales Generales ) MDB Brazilian Democratic Movement ( Movimento Democrtico Brasileiro ) PDN Politics on National Defense of Bra zil ( Poltica de Defensa Nacional ) PDS Democratic Socialist Party of Brazil ( Partido Democrtico Social ) PMDB Brazilian Democratic Movement Party PRN Proceso de Reorganizacin Nacional de Argentina RESDAL Latin American Society and Defense Network ( Red de Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina ) RSC Revolutionary Supreme Command of Brazil SADEN Secretariat for National Defense of Brazil ( Secretaria de Assessoramento de Defensa Nacional ) SNI National Information Service of Brazil ( Serviio Nacional de Informones )
vi | Page ABOUT FACE OR STRATEGIC RETREAT: DIVERGENT PATHS TOWARDS DEMOCRATIC CONSO LIDATION AFTER MILITARY REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA Rosanna Tavarez New College of Florida, 2013 A BSTRACT Transitions to democracy have always been complicated processes with various facets that m ust be analyzed to determine their c a u s e s duration s and outcomes This research project examines the transition process e s of four countries in South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. These countries all transitioned from military regimes to democracy in the latter half of the 1980s and have since attempted to consolidate democracy. This study seeks to determine whether a sudden removal of the armed forces from governmental positions or a gradual removal of officers during the transition process promotes democratic consolidation mor e effectively. Each case study traces the structure of the military regimes, the transfer of power, the transition process, and the democratic consolidation process to determine the effects that the timing of the removal of military officials can have on consolidation. After comparing all four case studies, it was evident that the timing of the removal of officers had no system a t ic effects on the consolidation process. However, the existence of a strict military hierarchy before the transfer of power from th e military government to civilian officials did have a positive effect on democratization In comparison to cases where the military was fragmented and h a d a nonhierarchical structure the c o u n t r i e s t h a t h a d hierarchica l militaries today have higher sc ores on the democracy index.
vii | Page It can be inferred that transferring power from military regimes with strict hierarchical structures may lead to the development of a more unified state and a more stable political arena because these regimes are able to make credible c ommitments during the transfer that may facilitate the c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f d e m o c r a c y Due to the varied interests of faction s within a fragmented regime, nonhierarchical m i l i t a r y g o v e r n m e n t s are un able to create pacts with representatives of the new democratic government during the trans ition because the military government cannot decide on a unified platform for its removal. The cleavages present in the military regimes seem to continue into the democratization process of these countries o f t e n c a u s i n g p o l i t i c a l p o l a r i z a t i o n t h a t d e l a y s f u l l d e m o c r a t i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Sciences
1 | Page Chapter 1 Democratic Theory and Military Regimes in South America The urge to save humanity is almost always a fa lse front for the urge to rule. H.L. Mencken There have been numerous transitions from military regimes to democracies across the globe. Questions arise as to what caused these transitions, how they occurred, and what made the governments following these periods of transition differ from one another. In the Latin American cases, transition from military rule to democracy teworthy changes outright fear ceased to be employed as political currency. Competition substituted for monopolized political decision making, and 8 1 ). Democracy has been the form of government all countries in South America have attempted to consolidate. Perhaps this is because democracy is po rtrayed as the worldwide goal for developing
2 | Page countries, the only road towards stability and the development of society (Dalton, Sin and Jou 2007 ; Diamond and Morlino 2004, 21 ). at establishing democratic governments. Determining the differences in these stages of democracy has led to numerous discussions that ran g e from what a precise definition of democracy should be to what specific features a consolidated democracy should have While those debates are of primary interest to sch olars, the questions driving them are central to regime change: what makes a polity democratic and how can new transitional governments mitigate the challenges they face in order to consolidate resilient democratic regimes? Thus, this study examines the in itial stages of a transition to understand the long term development of the democratic process. Analyzing the transition process of each country, particularly the terms agreed upon to cede power from one regime to the next, could illuminate factors that ei ther promoted full democratization or prevent ed democracy from taking root The ultimate objective of a rights of its citizens and to deliver other basic services that citizens demand Stepan 1996, 11). The governments of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay have all professed goals of attaining these ultimate objectives of democracy as they attempt to consolidate their countries For the purpo ses of this study, three measures of consolidation were investigate d to determine the influence the sudden and gradual removal of officers from the government had on democratic consolidation after the military regimes. The
3 | Page consolidation of each country was assessed examining political stability, civil and polit ical liberties, and the establishment of a functioning government. The moment in which officers were dismissed from government positions was used as a specific example that represents the larger effects the timing of events can have on democratization and was used to outline i mpacts on the transition and the consolidatio n processes of these countries. T he results of this study however, demonstrated that the explan atory factor, sudden versus gradual dismissal of the military from government, did not conclusively affect the consolidation process. On the contrary, it was the existence of a hierarchical military before the transfer of power that played a larger role in determining the quality of democratic consolidation in these cases. The Transition Process Linz and Stepan (1996) provide a def initional standard for a completed transition that will be used as a roadmap to delineate specific elements of a transition that must be examined : A demo cratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular vote, when the government de facto has th e authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. (Linz and Stepan 1996, 1) Using the standards defined by Linz and Stepan, t he transition st ages of these case studies commence w ith the transfer of power from military rule to a civilian elected government.
4 | Page O nce a civilian president has been elected freely and fairly into the presidency the transition will be on its way towards w orking to establish democratic principles in the state The study will use the simplest standard of a completed transition, the inauguration of a democratically ele cted president, to establish the beginning of the democratic state. The transition process es of these cases will be deemed completed once three specific areas have been tackled : 1) officers have been removed from positions with decision making capabilities in the government ; 2) civilians hold oversight capabilities over the military budget; and 3) accountability for human rights has been achieved Using these characteristic s to pronounce the end of a transition will allow a focus on the actual process of consolidation (Schedler 2002, 103). The Value of the Opposition When a country starts moving away from an authoritarian past, to democracy [is] characterized as a dynamic interaction between authoritarian leaders seek ing to maintain their rule and a 179). During the transition process, both new civilian leader s and the officials of the previous regime are given a chance to outline their prerogatives and expectations for the coming government. H owev er, these circumstances may change in cases where the previou s regime is overthrown or collapses. Ultimately, incumbents have three choices when challenges to a military regime emerge and they must act quickly if they wish to maintain control:
5 | Page They may simply repress dissent. They may agree to liberalize under the illusion of keeping things under control, but normally things get out of control. They may agree to hold elections under the condition of obtaining certain institutional safeguards commonly including property rights, military autonomy, and impunity from judicial prosecution. (Schedler 2002, 104). At le ast one of these three paths can be traced through the transition of each case guiding the decisions of officers in power who wish to preser ve control of the transition process. Two of the four cases being evaluated, Uruguay and Brazil, essentially employ methods of a controlled or pacted transition where leaders explicitly discuss terms to move power from the hands of military officers to civ ilians. In Chile, the armed services dominated the transition process leaving civilians with very little bargaining power I n Argentina, civilians had an upper hand due to the defeated state of the military Pacted transition processes can have both positiv e and negative effects on democratic consolidation depending on the conditions agreed upon by involved parties. Scholars like Swaminathan believe that there is a point in the life span of an authoritarian y the existing status quo emerge as dissat 1999, 179). These contenders begin to organize publicly opposing government policies in order to promote political competition that essentially leads to liberalization. Under these conditions, if the competition gains the support of the people they acquire negotiating leverage that obligates politicians to a ddress their discontent. The loss of popular support can lead regime officials to consider meeting with oppositional parties and it can facilitate pacted transitions resolution of challenges to the authori 1999, 181). acceptant leaders on both sides (military and civilian sides) are le ss willing to avoid conflict, but risk averse
6 | Page leaders are more willing to consider other alternatives such as negotiations and peaceful in positions of power can be beneficial to understanding the timing of events and the nature of a transition (whether there will be conflicts or negotiations) The roles played by the leaders of the government in both th e transition and consolidation phases of each case study will be analyzed. Elite Manipulation Aside from a focus on the roles of presidents and generals during a transition, other studies have expanded the role of influential actors to include the elite class as a whole. Elite manipulation of the political arena is an other factor that can be used to threat to democracy comes from elites the army, groups such as the wealthy who benefitted most under the old regime, and who are seen as basically arbitrary decisions made by elites. Using popular support as a base for democratization, the people could guide those in power to transition to democracy (306). Similar to the argument proposed by Swaminathan (1999) that oppositional forces can generate change rallying the populace to support their platform, Brender and Drazen (2009) argue that the people can direct the platform of elites by per suading them to act. interest in overthrowing democracy, their ability Brender and Drazen 2009, 309). In other words, elites can only go as far as society allows them to
7 | Page if the general populace is able to mobilize properly. These two arguments illustrate the reciprocal relationship between civil society and elites in the transition process Democrac y Democracy is a term with several definitions and sub catego ries that requires a description of defining democracy that include s free and fair elections, suffrag e for citizens, freedom of expression, constitutional accountability of the government and the populace along with a few ot her elements (Dahl 1982, 11). T his study also considers lippe Schmitter and Terry Karl: Popularly elected officials should be able to exercise their constitutional powers without any interference from other unelected officials, and 2) the officials in power must be able to govern without constraints imposed by some other overarching political system. (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 81 82; l 1996, 35). Together, the requirements defined by Dahl, Schimitter, and Karl create a workable list of elements characteristic of an effective democracy Collier and Levitsky (1997) incorporate similar el typical of many studies that examine the third wave of democracy. Moreover, these elements have been used by The Economist Intelligence Unit as components taken into consideration when determi
8 | Page (Democracy Index 2012, 31 33) These characteristics will be used throughout this study as measures for democratization in each country. Obtaining a Functioning Government item on the initial democratization agenda would relate to political society that is, the creation of the autonomy, authority, power, and Three of the four countries being studied have yet to achieve the necessary attributes to constitute a democratic political society as defined by Linz and Stepan. Studying how political society shifted in favor of popularly elected civilians during the transition processes allows for the roots of democracy to be analyzed Democrac y in a presidential system is in the simplest of definitions, only achieved once a civilian has been popularly elected to the presidency O nly then can the attainment of a lively political society be discussed as a central goal of a functioning democratic government description of a lively political society is synonymous with presentation of the that political actors are sub ject to different forms of accountability: electoral accountability and accountability of government actions expressly ensuring that constituents have the ability to use legal means to prevent, redress or punish illegal actions perpetrated by officials (20 04, 37). Government accountability is promoted through the establishment of a lively political society that legitimizes and determines the quality of democracy.
9 | Page The lack of a vigorous and self assertive society or the incapacity or unwillingness of certa in state institutions to exercise their prescribed authority over other state institutions (especially elected officials) is a telltale sign of low Defending government authority and political openness is an integr al component of the democratization process and is necessary for the maintenance of an effective administration. Human Rights and State Legitimacy One of the principle components of a democratic government is the establishment democratic rule of law ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of acco untability which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain s Since the installment of a legitimate rule of law is necessary for consolidation, new democratic governments must confirm that they are working towards incorporating the rule of law in the every day working s of the bureaucracy e xplicitly demonstrating a shift aw ay from authoritarianism. implementation of a rule of law to consolidat e democracy, Donnelly (2006) explores the relationship between the rule of law and the protection of human rights. He the protection of individ ual rights supports the develop Donnelly 2006, 38). idea that the ability to prosecute officers is essential to the development of a democratic state because it would increase the legitimacy of the state
10 | Page When discussed in relation to the theory of democracy, the rule of law entails that there exists a legal system that is itself democratic, in three senses: 1) It upholds the political r ights, freedoms, and guarantees of a democratic regime; 2) it upholds the civil rights of the whole population; and 3) it establishes networks of responsibility and accountability which entail that all public and private agents, including the highest of st ate officials, are subject to appropriate, legally established controls on the Establishing a a task of the new democratic governments in B razil, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay all have faced the choice of whether to prosecute officers who committed crimes. The elected civilian administrations had to dec ide whether the prosecution of officials of the previous regime would either guarantees of the de mocratic re destabilize the nation. Securing the civil liberties of the people is in and of itself an essential component of the democratization process take the defense of individual freedoms a step further by linking it to the valid ity of laws t hat extend s the scope of legitimacy holding persons accountable for violations against the liberties of the people as a means of validat ing the legal institutions of the state. Diamond and Morlino nstitutions and officials [must] hold one Thus, i nstitutional accountability can facilitate the institutionalization of governmental legitimacy that includes defending the civil liberties of the people. This study will explore how accountability for human rights violations influenced the democratization processes of countries in South America Assuming they could maintain stability, countries that advocat ed the rights of their people by prosecuting officers who committed human rights violations developed more legitimate state s because the government upheld the rule of law. Whereas, countries that did not hold
11 | Page officers responsible had to work towards gaining government accountability and legitimacy later on in the transition process to avoid social conflicts and military resistance to the transition. Especially in countries that had previously been ruled by the military the new democratic government has to preser ve the rule of law to legi timize their authority restoring civil liberties to the people and pro viding justice. P reserving the rights of the people is a key marker used to distinguish the new democratic regimes from their authoritarian predecessors. Consolidation Acc ording to Linz and Stepan a consolidated democracy is reached when five conditions are met: a free civil society, an autonomous political society, rule of law, a useable bureaucracy, and an institutionalized economic society (1996, 7). Of these five arenas, the cas e studies will give emphasis to establishing a rule of law, an autonomous political society a lively civil society and a useable bureaucracy. The Economist Intelligence Unit uses indices to evaluate these factors of democracies across the globe, although useable bur ea ucracy with the establishment of a functioning government (The Economist 2012, 31 33) For the most part, both sources emphasize the need to establish a free political society in order to consolidate (Linz and Stepan 1996, 8; The Economist 2012, 25). Correspondingly, the three measures of consolidation in this study are political stability, functioning government, and political and civil liberties for the electorate.
12 | Page presents an alternative view on consolidatio n theory. He even a goal for democratic states because most countries in the world have not and some will not reach that point. By narrowing the view of a study to singularly look at measures of consolidation, he believes that scholars have looked over details in the democratization process omitting information that would otherwise be valuable to the study of diverse Given that c ountries operate through both formal and informal venues that together create a fully functioning society focusing only on formal institutions can also l eave details of the policy making process unnoticed, particularly the role of undiplomat ic networks These networks ca exchanges, patronage, nepotism, and favors to action that, under formal rules of the 40). stresses the importance of info rmal settings in the political process and in focus of this study, but ma y well have influenced government decisions and actions in these countries. Consolidation wi ll be discussed in reference to states realizing an auto nomous rule of law that guarantees the rights of the people a functioning government, and a stable political sphere. Instances of popular protests used to measure political stability can either be ta ken to characterize moves away from establishing a rul e of law or as a demonstration of the principles of democracy at work because the populace has an opportunity to protest without fear of repression. Thus, political stability will be
13 | Page considered in the evaluation of the quality of democracy that plays a role in the consolidation processes of th e s e case studies Public demonstrations can be used as both positive and negative measure of the quality of a democracy. They can proval of the government and can destabilize the political arena or p rotests can accentuate the ineffectiveness of the government as it fails to meet the needs of the people without necessarily destabilizing the country. This study will present instances o f popular protest to then determine w hether it affected political stability, functioning government both or neither since it would affect different measures of consolidation T he Project Outline section will go into further detail explaining the three el ements of consolidation (political stability, functioning government, and civil and political liberties) and how they will be traced in each case study to reveal the effects of sudden versus a gradual removal of officers o n the consolidation processes. Historical Overview of Military Regimes in South America The majority of studies on military regimes use a regional approach to analyze cases because a focus on one region limits the number of competing factors that could explain the democratization proce ss. Countries in South America share similar periods of colonization, developmental features, and ethnic ties that vary slightly from case to case. T his study will only look at the military regimes of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Brazil to keep as many v ariables constant as possible. As the focus of this study is on the effects
14 | Page of the timing of the removal of officers on consolidation, maintaining some historical variables constant allows for a greater focus on the military regimes themselves and their tr ansitions. With regards to the removal of military personnel from government positions after the transition to democracy, Argentina and Uruguay both had an abrupt removal of the military from the bureaucracy On the other hand, Chile and Brazil experienced a successive eviction of the armed forces from positions in government. Shared Misfortunes in the Second half of the Twentieth Century As one identifies the characteristics of military regimes it is practical to first disc uss the common attributes and to then move into dis cussion on how the cases are different from one another. While each country has differing political processes and me thods of governing, Silva describ es how the region as a whole experienced similar periods of dev elopment. He summarizes literature on South American history as: Generally circumscribed to one of the following five periods: the process 1870s; socioeconomic and political turmoil during the 1930 depression; the military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s; and, finally, the contemporary democratic era (Silva 2001, 3). These countries have all experienced the e ffects of military rule along with continuous economic instability that has plagued the region. While this region has shared many historical characteristics, states have ultimately had very different methods of transition Historically, the establishment of democracy in this region has negatively impacted attempts at consolidatio n The armed services in Latin America were es tablished by Europeans to oversee the inhabitants of their colonies which makes the military the oldest institut ion in the
15 | Page region. Philip describes how the military was the most stable of the institutions wh en compared to the government and the judiciary because of seniority and their professional histories as heroes of independence ( 2001, 75). In some countries, independence was only achieved with the help of the military which gave the institution a high d egree of legitimacy and accountability. Military officials were seen as heroes who freed the p eople from European oppression. Having had a fluid history of war that dates back to the time of caudillos in the 1800s, the military had been strictly used for warfare and did not generally get involved in the political s phere. Governing was left to officials in the state apparat us and the military headed its own affairs with little interference from the civilian sector this was a strategy call 3; Fuentes 1999, 19). It was not until the latter half of the twentieth century that the division of spheres became blurred as the military got involved in politics and civilians sought to keep the armed forces u nder their control From the 1920s to the 197 0s however officers of the armed forces in reference to military and security issu es (Philip 2001, 72). The military ran its day to day affa irs without the direct involvement o f civilian officials. It was due to this historically acceptable independence of the armed services institution that military usurpation of the executive branch d uring times of instability was not generally perceived as a threat in the region. As these countries approached stability and war became less frequent, the government began engaging in the institutional affairs of the military and guiding the agenda of the armed forces.
16 | Page Then, in the late 1960s to 1970s, social and economic instability were rampant across Latin America and it was difficult for politicians to gain the support of the people. T he military repeatedly stepped forward in several countries of this region to take control of the government to Again, large sectors of the populace often did not object to military interference because the armed forces were a sign of stability, order, and structure traits l the early 1970s the inabilities of civilian governments to control inflation or deal successfully with serious social and Whereas the government was perceived in most cases as being corrupt, the military had long been recognized as a respectable institution and as the guardian of the people (Arceneaux 2001, 6 8). The Influence of Patrimonialism In South America, governments managed state affairs in a patrimonial manner characteristic of their imperial histories This governing strategy is still commonly used al though it is not as pronounced as it has been in the past Patriarchy is a dominant feature in this region because ex tensive inequality allowed elites to heavily influence government decision making and to hold most if not all, available government positions. Men of the elite class acted as patriarchs who sought to make decisions for those of lower rank Being that the lower classes were independently make decisions that could impact the government, the elite class took it upon themselves to govern the country. (Philip 2001, 79 80)
17 | Page The great majority of Latin American conflicts have or igins in class based struggles. There have been several cases where individuals of lower economic status have rebelled against the patriarchs to gain access to the political realm that had been closed off to them (Philip 2001, 80). Freidman notes that e lites have still generally maintained influential roles in the political arena (1991, 251) He states that the governmen t still operates using this top down approach that preserves the patrimonial characteristics of these governments I strong leadership tradition and a persistent situation of crisis have combined in such a way as to enhance the relative weight of the executive vis has held a great deal of power in influencing the majority of governmental decisions as presidents have ingrained their role as patriarchs in the political culture of the region. The military has also been associated with the patrimonial element of government as it was one of the most le gitimate institution s The professional nature of the armed forces allowed it to establish a strong support system in comparison to that of the executive branch. Since the armed forces act ed as protectors of the nation with a mission to e nsure the safety a nd endurance of the country officers were given the ability to act as patriarchs. Thro ughout history, the military guardians of the state that gave them authority The military usually had the support of the population when it employed coups to solve internal conflict (Arceneaux 2001, 7). With the government and the military affairs in the latter half of the twentieth century officers became more involved in the political process to advocate their interests and to ensure that the military budget r emain ed steady. By the
18 | Page 1980s (Philip 200 1, 74). The mid 1900s marked a shift in the doctrine of the armed forces as officers were increasingly associated in political processes and the government tried to take co ntrol of military prerogatives. In the latter half of the 1900s, however, S outh America was plagued by numerous military regimes as politicians attempt ed to consolidate their autonomy over all institutions that changed the rules of the political game that had been established for decades clouding the disti nction between military as government and military as institution Project Outline The cases that will be analyzed in this study are Argent ina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile. These countries all transitioned from military rule to democracy in the 1980s and a ttempted to complete their respective transition processes into the 1990s To measure democratic consolidation the following factors will be investigated: 1) government accountability in terms of employing oversight capabilities on other institutions (an effective checks and balances system); 2) liberties for the people to allow for the growth of civil and political society (outlined by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index ; and 3) political stability. Political stability will be evaluated by examining any occurrence s of popular p rotests or other distinguishable events that directly challenged the legitimacy of the government Political stability goes hand in hand with imparting a sense of security and
19 | Page the implementation of democratic princi ples that will benefit the electorate. As Donnelly he advancement of the rule of law within a particular country depends on democracy, each country will need to govern autonomously to uphold the rule of law. Government accountability is essential to the attainment of consolidation thus the facets of accountability (electoral accountability, political stability and the development of a lively civil societ y ) will all be examined in each country of this study This study will follow the transition process es of these cases to determine when officers were removed from the government apparatus, when civilians attained control of the military budget, and whether officers were held accounta ble for human rights violations. A transition will be completed when these three characteristics have been addressed in each case study. To assess the consolidation process the effects of a sudden and gradual return of o fficers to the ba rracks will be traced starting from the transfer of power (from military rule to the new democratic regime) up until the completion of the transition to illustra te whether they differ in their paths to consolidation. The study is proposed to gain insight on the effects that the timing of military retreat from government has on democratic consolidation. Chapter 2 examines the cases of Arg entina and Uruguay two countries that experienced a sudden removal of the armed forces. The se abrupt case s focus on the full withdrawal of the military during the transition process which should allow for greater instances of consolidation S ince elected officials do not need to compete with officers in the political arena they should experience a rapid implementation of democratic principles in the state that can pave the way for consolidation
20 | Page Chapter 3 will demonstrate two cases, Brazil and Chile, where military personnel were slowly removed from the government structur e The analysis in this chapter will predominately study the terms of the transition that granted officers the ability to maintain their governmental positions and policy influence The negotiation processes of these regimes are important because they demo nstrate how strong military governments are able to preserve prerogatives as part of the transfer of power. Since the armed forces in these countries maintain areas of influence, it is expected that they would have a prolonged transition that hinders the c onsolidation process. The final chapter Chapter 4, will compare all four case stud ies to determine the effects the timing of the removal of consolidation processes of these countries will be examined to determine whether the swift removal of officers does positively affect the consolidation process.
21 | Page Chapter 2 Back to the Barracks: the Cases of the Argentine People should not be afraid of their government. Governments sh ould be afraid of their people. Alan Moore, V for Vandetta In Argentina and Uruguay, the military presence in the bureaucracy was removed at the time of the initial transition, a factor differentiating these cases from those in the following chapter. To analyze the impact a sudden removal of the armed forces had on the consolidation process the degree of military influence follo wing the transfer of power from military rule to the democratically elected president will need to be assessed. Government oversight of institutions will need to be evaluated to determine whether elected officials were able to uphold a system of checks and balances essential to the installment of a democracy. Accountability of the civilian administration will be examined in e ach case study to establish how it influenced and /or affected consolidation. P olitical stability will also be taken into account. A fu nctioning government must be able
22 | Page to ensure the stability of the government through the implementation of effective and efficient policies to promote democrati zation This chapter will determine whether an immediate removal of officers from state bureaus p romotes or hinders democratic consolidation. While both Argentina and Uruguay removed military influence from the decision making positions in the state before the transfer of power, they present two unique transition paths I n the former military rule pr actically collapsed after the armed services were defeated in war. In the later Uruguay experienced a pacted transition process in which military officers coordinated with civilians to determine the concessions each party would make to ensure a smooth tra nsfer of government from the hands of officers to elected officials. With a full removal of officers from government positions and a shift in oversight from military persons to civilians during the transition to democracy, the results of these cases should demonstrate a complete subordination of the military institution. The armed forces should no longer be a prevalent threat to the political arena acknowledging that the popularly elected executive is the supreme authority in democratic countries. Governmen t accountability should be assured early on in the democratization phases of these countries. Argentina One of the main factors that differentiate the Argentine case from others is its participation in the Falkland War. The Falkland War was the final act that destroyed any
23 | Page sense of cohesion in the military as an institution, and it damaged popular support for the military as government. Post transition, the new democratic government faced the challenge of proving to the people of Argentina that they would provide justice for the disturbingly large number of human rights abuses they had suffered under military rule. Not surprisingly, by the time the transition occurred after the military defeat, the removal of armed services personnel from the political sph ere occurred without much interference from military officials because their military reputation and resources dwindled (Pion Berlin 1997, 60). From 1930 to 1983, military officers had repeatedly interfered in the political arena while arguing that govern ment officials were not running the country efficiently. Throughout this time period, numerous government legislations were heavily influenced by officers and the occurrence of military coups became the norm (Pion Berlin 1997, 46 48). Contrary to other Sou th American cases, like Uruguay and Chile, democracy in Argentina was historically unstable, unable to take root as a result of decades of competition between civilian and military political interests (Norden 1996, 78). Thus when the last military coup en ded in 1983, democracy had to begin anew and civilian officials needed to ensure they held all decision making authority so as to prevent future coups (Norden 1996, 2). Norden summarizes the failed attempts at prisings critically delayed democratic military opposition to the 1983) marked a shift from previous attempts at military rule and will be discussed to
24 | Page illuminate the process of forming a stable democratic state with civilian supremacy over the military institution. The Structure of the Proceso Regime Before the Military Junta usurped the government in 1976, President Isabel (Norden 1996, 48). As was common during times of volatility, Presiden t Martinez de Peron had ceded unlimited authority and discretion in solving the problem of insurgents to the military. President Martinez de Peron believed that, by demonstrating a strong stance in the battle against insurgents, the people would recognize her as a strong leader prepared to take on the duties of the presidency (Pion Berlin 1997, 47 48). An important document that facilitated the transition to democracy in Argentina was called the Five Points ( Los Cinco Puntos ). It was written to establish s government agreed not to interfere with the military hierarchy specifically in the promotion and demotion process (Norden 1996, 44). All active duty genera ls signed the military gained executive decision making capabilities in the state. The degree of discretion allotted to the armed forces resulted in a completely different scenario then the one President Martinez de Peron had projected. By giving the military a strong level of influence they were able to easily gain access to key
25 | Page authorita tive bodies of the bureaucracy Officers took control of the government swiftly by assuming the executive void that the civilian presidents were not fulfilling. Having already held authority over the decision making capabilities of the state in terms of in ternal security policy, the military coup of 1976 came as no surprise to constituents, and there was little opposition from government officials ( Norden 1996, 50 53). Once the Junta was established following the military coup on March 24, 1976, it was de cided that Army General Jorge Videla would be president seeing as how the army was the largest branch of the armed forces. The Junta was placed as head of state affairs and assumed the ultimate governing role. It was composed of Army General Videla, Navy A dmiral Emilio Masseca, and Air Force Brigadier General Orlando Agosti, providing equal representation of all three security sectors. The Junta named their ascension to political power the Proceso de Reorganizacin Nacional (PRN or Proceso ), claiming to its many political, social, and economic downfalls ( Pion Berlin 1997, 53; Norden 1996, 53; Munck 1998, 55; Acuna and Smulovitz 1996, 14; Arceneaux 2001, 121). Equal Representation of the Armed Forces in Government The Junta had extensive powers that included the ability to appoint and dismiss the presi dent. The dominance of the Junta was ultimately guaranteed when they were constitutionally given final decision making capabilities in cases where the executive and legislative bodies disagreed (Munck 1998, 58). As far as the distribution of government positions was concerned, the army was designated the largest portion of state offices giving them the greatest influence in the politi cal arena. The army took the lead in terms of resources, personnel, and the support of the general population. Navy and air force
26 | Page personnel did seek to maintain equal representation for their branches in the new government structure, but they were not very successful in attaining truly equal appropriations of state positions (Norden 1996, 64; Acuna and Smulovitz 1996, 15; Arceneaux 2001, 113). The army had long held a majority in the security sector commanding the largest number of soldiers and the largest portion of resources allocated to defense. The first example of a parallel distribution of the state apparatus was seen in the composition of the Legislative Advisory Commission ( Comisin Asesora Legislativa or CAL) created to replace Congress. CAL was ma de up of nine individuals, three from each branch, who were all active duty officers. These officers would oversee legislative matters of the country including decisions for the text, in relation to the specific wording of policies, introduced by the Junta and the creation of mandates that would be sent for approval to the military Junta (Munck 1998, 58; Arceneaux 2001, 111). CAL collaborated with the Junta to put forth measures ensuring the autonomy of the military as both institution and as government. Th e Junta controlled the executive functions of the state while CAL oversaw the legislative affairs of the country. The use of military led institutions managing the government, fusion of the military institution and government structure was inevitable. Alon g with replacing Congress with CAL, the Junta substituted all provincial governors with officers of the armed forces (Acua and Smulovitz 1996, 14). Military personnel replaced civilians in governor positions across the country. The army received a majorit y share of available positions emphasizing their preponderance in the armed forces. Like CAL, the remaining vacancies were divided evenly among officers of the
27 | Page navy and the air force (Norden 1996, 63). In addition, a Cabinet of eight officials was institut ed to assist in the administration of the state apparatus. Cabinet positions were distributed evenly among the navy, air force, and the army, but unlike other institutions, the final two seats were filled by civilian officials. Before the Proceso governmen t took control, only fifteen percent of Cabinet members were military; now they were the majority (Norden 1996, 63). Nevertheless, the Cabinet was still the most diverse of the state institutions in terms of representation allocating a platform for civilia n participation in the political arena (Munck 1998, 61 62). Fragmentation among the Military Branches While the even distribution of state positions was supposed to enable each branch of the military with equal oversight capability of the government alon g with providing a sense of cohesion, in reality it ended up having quite the opposite effect. According to interests of the different branches would be protected; it did away with any institutional assuming power, mil itary interests were conflicted The army had always received more resources than the navy and the air force, and this created factionalism among the branches. Instead of presenting an image of solidarity of the armed services by apportioning equal numbers of governmental positions, the he armed forces. According to Arceneaux service lines was the greater obstacle [inhibiting] any moves toward a concentration of ities and
28 | Page goals of their individual branch, preventing the creation of a cohesive managerial unit (Munck 1998, 167). The Transition to Democracy The combination of controversial business and governmental activities, failure to lead an army in a time of war and ineffective economic strategies during spiraling inflation resul ted in a rapid transition from military rule to democracy. Since the inception of the military regime, officers had been given two paychecks: one from the state system and one from the m ilitary (Norden 1996, 65). Officers began involving themselves in the private business sector during the early years of the regime, acquiring an array of properties (Pion armed forces both as an insti tution, through budget increases, and individually, through corruption, double salaries from government positions, and war booty in the anti litical turmoil was becoming apparent, President General Jorge Rafael Videla (1976 1981) attempted to propose a plan that would unify the political views of the military. In 1978 President Videla created a 1) whether or not to set a fixed date for transition; (2) whether or not to create an official party to represent the military; (3) whether or not to restructure the traditional parties; and (4) how much to open political egotiations between the divisions of the armed forces continued as they could not agree on a political platform to present to the people.
29 | Page The military remained obsessed with the maintenance of their political power and did not allow any means of liberaliz ation or openness to occur. Even as the following president, Roberto Eduardo Viola (March 29 December 11, 1981), tried to implement political opening to gain the support of the people the military soon found a way to remove him from power (Arceneaux 1997, 339). General Leopoldo Galtieri assumed the presidency from December 22 1981 to June 1982 to promote military unity in Argentina. He had a plan to reform the government in a way that would benefit the armed forces while still maintaining a repressive appr oach towards the Argentinean people. To begin his strategy, he wanted to use the Malvinas invasion as a tool to get the security forces to work in tandem with one another but his plan backfired (343). External Influences Along with poor administrative qualities, the military regime also became unpopular because it was unable to peacefully settle disputes with Britain in the Falkland/Malvinas War. The Falkland War of 1982 was fought over which country was entitled to the territory of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas): Britain or Argentina. 1 efeat represented [by] a failure in the area in 1 Problems appeared when the British government on the island demanded that those trying to B y acknowledging that Argentine persons needed visas to enter the Falkland Islands, however, the Argentine g overnment would be surrendering its sovereignty over the territory to England. Confrontations between the governments led to the first stages of the war.
30 | Page Knowing its weak political position, the Junta should have focused on internal affairs and not on those with an extremely powerful foreign power. The military government attempted to use the Falkland War to foster the support of the people, since the Junta was failing to improve the declining economic situation and the fractionalization of the armed forces was becoming incre asingly apparent (Norden 1996, 73 74). The Junta believed that participation in the war would force all three branches to work as a collective unit in order to defeat British forces. At any rate, the military failed to coordinate well and that caused the soldiers that were sent to battle t o be ill prepared and without unified leadership. The war was ultimately lost when the United States showed its `support for Britain, and Argentina was forced to surrender. By 1983, the military Junta had completely tarn ished its own reputation and lost the support of the people and of soldiers themselves. Pion Berlin (1997) describes the atmosphere of disappointment and resentment soldiers faced when returning to Argentina after their defeat in battl e. The military was u ltimately shamed by the actions of officers during the battles Instead of providing strong leaders that were fully capable of leading an army into war, the officers that were sent to the Malvinas did not accompany soldiers to the front line. S oldiers were left to direct themselves with little to no support from senior officers (Pion Berlin 1997, 75). Upon their return, military leaders in Argentina were ashamed of the actions of the senior officers. S oldiers we re not immediately allowed to return to their home s, but were held at a base until they were fully debriefed Evidently, there were no signs of a robust unified military force.
31 | Page and subordinate role within the Argentine State, ready to hand the government over to civilians (Norden 1996, 77, 75 76; Pion Berlin 1997, 60 ). In the case of Argentina, external actors played a direct role in the fall of military government illuminating the internal struggles of the regime. Although the Falkland War was fought over land and not in an effort to overthrow the armed services, the fact that the United States and the EU dited the military government. The war left the military completely disconnected from societal interests. They had no political support and did not want to keep governing. The armed services blamed President Galtieri fo r the Argentinean defeat and the army subsequently instilled two presidents who both only held the presidency for a short period of time. The air force and withdrawing from the announced that it would assume total responsibility for the government and the replacement of air fo rce and navy representatives. They worked to negotiate with oppositional parties to officially retreat from the government in 1984. However, popular political parties were not inclined to fulfill any demands made by the armed services and they led protests all over the country to demand military removal from power (344). As an election date was decided upon, the Junta began preparing for their removal from office. They first instated the Final Document for the Military Junta ( Documento Final de la Junta Mi litar ) that stated all missing persons should be considered dead. The
32 | Page document claimed that detention centers did not exist in Argentina and should not be committed in the military rule, the Junta passed a decree ordering all personnel in government positions to since civil ians were not giving in to any negotiations (Acua and Smulovitz 1998, 16). Instead of working to gain concessions from the new government, the military focused on preserving the few alliances they had left before the presidential election. Steps towards Liberalization President Ricardo Alfonsin (1983 1989) became the first civilian leader of the democratic state, pledging to bring justice to the issue of human rights violations that with numerous coups that hindered the consolidation of democracy in the state. For decades, civilian government officials had to deal with high levels of military influence in the political arena. Consequently, President Alfonsin and his cabinet were well tendency to usurp civilian government using their channels of influence in the government apparatus. To protect the country against any coup attempts by the armed forces, the President sought to minimize the size of the military in terms of personnel and resources (Norden 1996, 78). Almost immediately after assuming the presidency, Alfonsin met with a group of concessions as officers attempted to enact measures of protection. The military regime tried to institute a policy
33 | Page of amnesty before leaving office knowing in advance that the government would veto the bill once they took office (Norden 1996, 78) As part of the pledge to completely ending the repressive rule of the Junta, the Law for National Pacification ( Ley de Pacificacin Nacional ) was deemed unconstitutional before the transition process began (Arceneaux pronounced in their initial policies. Hunter describes two domains of military leverage that must be tackled when trying to subordinate the armed forces to civilian rule: 1) civili an oversight and administrative power over military prerogatives and their missions, and 2) giving civilians the ability to determine what portion of the national budget will be allocated to expenditures of the armed services (1998, 300). These qualificat ions should be dealt with during the transition period to promote democratization. In meeting these conditions, military influence would be reduced and t he re intervention of officers in the political arena would be prevented The following subsections wil l demonstrate how both President Alfonsin and President Carlos Menem (1989 1999) worked together with the legislature to reduce what little military influence was left after the Falkland War. Military Expenditures Between 1983 and 1985, President Alfonsin successfully put forth measures that decreased military expenditures by twenty one percent in efforts to aid the Argentine financial crisis and reduce military influence (Pion Berlin 1997, 117). Figure 2.1 and 2.2 outline military expenditures in absolute value and in relation to gross domestic product
34 | Page in Argentina to illustrate the progression of the military budget from the Proceso regime decrease in military expendit ures from the period of military rule (1976 1983) to the presidency of Alfonsin (1984 1989). Figure 2.1 Annual Military Expenditures in Argentina Source : 1983 & under Alfonsin, 1984 Pion Berlin 1997 112, 118 Figure 2.2 Military Expenditures in Relation to Gross Domestic Product in Argentina Source : 1976 1983 & under Alfonsin, 1984 Pion Berlin 1997 112, 118 0.00 1,000.00 2,000.00 3,000.00 4,000.00 5,000.00 6,000.00 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 MILEX in 1986 Australes (X1000) 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 Year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 MILEX as % of GDP MILEX as % of GDP
35 | Page On average, under the rule of the military Junta, military expenditures made up four percent of the gross domestic product in Argentina (Pion Berlin 1997, 117). Cold War, the average percentage of GDP that should be allocated for armed forces expenditures should only equal two percent (Lawrence 2012). Therefore assuming that spending at least twice as much as was standard. Figure 2.2 illustrates the sharp decline in the percentage of GDP used towards military spending during the Alfonsin presidency. Military budgets declined from an estimated thirty seven percent of public funds towards the end of the Proceso to only thirteen percent by 1987 (Pion government was only allotting slightl armed services. Thus, after the transition process, the Argentine military budget resembled those of democratic states as defined by NATO. President Menem followed defense spending. President Menem privatized several military concessions (117). In support of President was passed by Congress in December of 1991. The bill required a total of thirty military industrial firms ilitary capital promote a more administration, but it also compelled for the branches of the armed forces to create a more
36 | Page harmonious force (Pion Berlin 125 126). Having to joi ntly lobby for funds in Congress, the army, navy and air force were more inclined to work together instead of upholding the divergent factions that prevailed during the times of the military regime. Restructuring the Government Following the transition to democratic rule, officers with positions in both the armed services and the government system receded back to the barracks making way for a renewed civilian state. President Alfonsin sought justice for the human rights violation s trials that not only brought the disorganization of the armed services to light, but also e xposed its corruption, President Alfonsin was able to justify removing officers from their positions in state departments. Furthermore, his administration implemented policies that greatly minimized the size of the armed forces along with reducing the sala ries of those individuals remaining in the military hierarchy. Between 1983 and 1987, the number of soldiers drafted decreased from 64,640 to a little below 25,000 demonstrating The dismissal of officers from government positions and the reduction of military salaries were not immediately accepted by soldiers but, as they did not possess enough support in the government for rebuttal, they returned to strictly participating in the military. Although the armed forces did submit to the actions of the new government, the question of human rights violations brought the threat of military intervention back to the forefront of politics. As more and more officers were being called into co urt, the military
37 | Page demanded that the government stop all trials because it was undermining the reorganization of the armed forces. The officers were afraid that if the trials persisted 17 ). As pressures from the military increased, President Alfonsin passed two acts of legislations: the Law of Full Stop ( La Ley de Punto Final ) and the Law of Due Obedience ( Ley de Obendencia Debida ) to try to maintain peace. The Law of Full Stop established a date for an end to the trials so the military, the government, and civil society could move beyond past grievances (Acua and Smulovitz 1996, 17 18). To the surprise of many, the courts began to speed up legal proceedings by convicting as many guilty pe rsons as possible before the closure of trials. In two months, over 300 superior officers had been indicted, granting a sense of justice to human rights organizations and the Argentine people (18). Nevertheless, in response to the heightened number of conv ictions, officers began organizing and demanding intervention from the already passed legislation to limit the number of individuals tried in court, he sat idly wait ing for the deadline to approach. As the number of officers who were called in to testify in the cases against their superiors increased, these soldiers revolted in what became known as the Easter Uprising ( Semana Sant a g officers took over a military compound and demanded a general amnesty for all who faced charges of human rights The President then proclaimed that democracy was not negotiable and in conjunction
38 | Page with the majority of military officers still loyal to the government, they quelled the rebellion. President Alfonsin did ultimately appease the wishes of those rebellious soldiers by passing a law that limited the number of so ldiers that could be prosecuted. The Obedience 2 (Acua and Smolvitz 1996, 18). In other words, only senior officers were susceptible to prosecution because they deliberately ordered entitled soldiers to commit crimes. The Law of Due Obedience played a significant role in minimizing the backlash egitimacy because the majority of those who were behind the uprising were lower level officers who did not want to be prosecuted for following orders from their superiors (1996, 18 19). The Easter Uprising r einvigorated the issue of military intervention to the forefront because the government was unable to suppress the uprising until at least three days after it began (Pion Berlin 1997, 71). After the transition to democracy in 1983, the military had withdrawn to the barracks and had lost most if not all of its influence in the political arena. As a result of their despotic rule, the armed forces lost the support of both the Argentinean people and the international community. For the first couple of years during the Alfonsin administration, the budget of t he armed services was largely reduced and the number of active military personnel dwindled as the government shifted its focus from defense spending to development. The military no longer played a role in the day to day decision making of state affairs. Re moving military from the bureaucracy and implementing civilian oversight over military budget should have left the armed forces 2 For more information on the Law of Due Obedience, see Crawford 1990.
39 | Page susceptible to the will of the executive. However, when officers were faced with the issue of human rights violations, the milit prosecuting those who had committed crimes against humanity. The Easter Uprising demonstrated the capability of a military unit to organize and act against the will of the executive when they felt threatened. W ith the convictions of over 300 senior officers within a two month period, the armed forces were in disarray which led them to mobilize. The fact that President Alfonsin passed the Law of Due all those involved in the first and second military junta, indictates that the armed services did maintain some influence following the transition to democracy (Acua and Smulovitz 1996, 19 20). The Argentinean case illustrated that both removing decisio n making capabilities and severing the power to determine the budget from the armed forces had not led to the complete autonomy of the executive without any military interference. Political stability was interrupted as a result of the trials against office rs for human rights violations. When measuring the effects of the sudden removal of officers from government in Argentina, the democratization process did not really benefit. The presidencies of Alfonsin and Menem were both able to execute their powers ove r the military budget by reallocating military funds towards other public service project. But, their presidencies were not able to counter popular protests. While protests can be viewed as a part of the democratization process, being that the people are f reely able to mobilize and voice their opinions, they Index over the span of five years. The prese
40 | Page important because it depicts how the political situation has recently been changing. While political participation and political culture have increased over the past four years, Argentina has scored lower in the civil liberties standard. Figure 2.3 Democracy Index in Argentina, 2006 2011 Source: The Economist 2007, 2008, 2010, 201 1 2012. Figure 2.3 shows that t he insurance of civil liberties for the electorate in a democratic state is paramount to the consolidation process. An increase in political participation occurring simultaneously with a decrease in civil liberties could mean that the government could be t rying to moderate the populaces increasing role in government contrary to what should be occurring in a consolidating state. In the case of Argentina, the democratic governments of Alfonsin and Menem led to a fairly accountable government as these presiden ts attempted to create an effective system of checks and balances. Nevertheless, the government has not been making great improvements in consolidating as they remain rather stagnant on the Democracy Index. 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 electoral process and pluralism functining government political participation political culture civil liberties
41 | Page Uruguay Uruguay has often been described as one of the most democratic nations in Latin America with a long history of civilian autonomy and an active civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996, 152; Gonzalez 1991, 3). In the twentieth century, while other countries were still working towards the attainment of political stability, Uruguay had already been (Arceneaux 2001, 184). However, f ollowing political fractionalization and economic troubles, Uruguay did fall into a period of military rule as had surrounding countries during this time period. Two characteristics of the Uruguayan military regime distinguish it from others in South America: the de facto acquisition of the executive branch by the armed forces and the pacted tr ansition process that led to the reestablishment of democracy in the country. The Uruguayan armed forces did not need to stage a coup to gain control of the two factors. Wh ereas other military regimes had to forcefully take control of government using a coup, in Uruguay it was not necessary to use force to deal with civil military quarrels. Democratic principles, for the most part, remained intact even through times where in stitutions were placed under the supervision and administration of military officers.
42 | Page Autogolpe In the late 1960s, Uruguay began experiencing the same economic hardships plaguing other countries in Latin America, resulting in skyrocketing inflation rates (Gonzalez 1991, 35). During these times of economic troubles, the expansive welfare sys tem that had been founded years earlier had greatly diminished the 25). As a result of an inefficient economic program in addition to numerous accusations of corruption against government officials, the military slowly began making an appearance in the political arena. The long established two party system, based on the Colorado and Nationalist parties, was being disrupted by the emergence of smaller parties like the liberal Blanco party and Civic Union ( Unin Cvica ). The future of Uruguay was in jeopardy and the military seemed like the only institution with sufficient manpower and authority to step up and assume control (Arceneaux 2001, 185; Kaufman 1979, 25 27; Gonzalez 1991, 39). On July 13, 1968 President Jo rge Maria Pacheco instituted immediate measures for security ( las medidas prontas de seguridad ) as the subversive threat made by the Tupamaros guerilla group continued to grow (Arceneaux 2001, 185). This threat to stability created an opening for military infl uence in the political sphere. Instability on the the election in 1972 failed to produce a liberal, left wing president, there was an escalation in guerilla mobiliz ation efforts. The armed services were called in to subdue the threat with considerable authority in determining how the situation would be handled. Thus, the window had been opened for the Autogolpe to occur as executive authority was passed from the pre sident to the armed services. Before these events, it had
43 | Page been decades since the Uruguayan military was called in to protect the nation. The divisions of the armed forces acted independently from one another, but in cooperation with each other. During the all three branches called the Council of Joint Commanders in Chief ( Junta de Comandantes en Jefe or JCJ) (Kaufma n 1979, 109; Arceneaux 2001, 185). The JCJ was the first official move of the military to create a unified force with a presence in politics. Since the president was the leading actor in the state, placing the country under the immediate security measure s gave him full discretion in deciding how the fight against insurgents would be handled. The president then passed along this power, an executive ability to determine war strategy to the military institution. As the guerilla movements were being annihilat ed, popular support was slowly moving in favor of the armed forces. With the support of the populace the JCJ confidently stepped away from civilian oversight and acted unrestrictedly, apart from the restraints of the Ministry of Defense (Areceneaux 2001, 186). The mandate that called upon the military to eliminate the guerilla thre at only established an end goal, but it did not specify the methods to be used to quell guerilla forces. This gap in procedure allo tted a great deal of discretion to the military as far as administrative capabilities were concerned (Gonzalez 1991, 40). gained access to more decision making authority, an authority that under a democratic government should have remained in the hands of the executive and legislative branches. By April of 1973, the security forces had established detention centers to hold some
44 | Page 2,000 guerilla memb ers they had captured as they crushed the movement (Kaufman 1979, in their internal courts. As the number of prisoners increased, members of the legislature began questioning the methods being used by officers in the detention centers and during trials. To prevent the legislature from creating a real case against the JCJ and members of the military hierarchy, officers blackmailed politicians who had been previously accused of corruption and false bookkeeping in exchange for their compliance (Arceneaux 2001, 186 187; Kaufman 1979, 68 69; Minello 1977, 589). It was under these pretenses that the government slipped into the hands of military officials. Gonzalez descri political struggles as he sought to gain the support of his party in parliament that allowed the military to assume power right under his nose (1991, 43). With no real opposing forces, following the success of the military in the antisubversive campaign, the security essentially on their own; their theoretical chief, the president, could not control even his fra turmoil, political corruption, and insurgent activities the military skillfully assumed power without generating political opposition to establish order in Uruguay. The Structure of the Military Regime From beginning to end, the military regime never placed an officer in the presidential seat nor was a Junta constituted as head of government. Contrary to what was expected, the JCJ was not used as the leading body with g overning authority, but it
45 | Page served as an advisory board. The Council of Official Generals ( Junta de Oficiales Generales or JOG) was created to indirectly oversee government activity never assuming the traditional role of a ruling Junta as seen in cases like Argentina and Chile. The JOG allowed to remain in power so long as they ensured that the prerogatives of the armed forces were met (Arceneaux 2001, 192 193). Minello summar izes the position of the did not reign but they governed ( los militares uruguayos no reinaban pero gobiernan ) demonstrating the depth of their authority (1997, 590). Mili tary Hierarchy within the Government Structure The JOG was composed of twenty eight individuals from both the military institutions and the civilian sector. Contrary to regimes like Argentina and Chile, which immediately placed officers in most, if not all, government positions, in Uruguay the armed services acknowledged that they did not have the expertise necessary to run a government effectively while still maintaining a strong security force. For this reason, civilians generally kept their posts in t he state bureaucracy (Arceneaux 2001, 193). The military placed one senior officer in each department of the state apparatus to oversee its functions and as an exercise in training military officers in state affairs (Arceneaux 2001, 195). Another factor c onsidered by scholars to explain why civilians were allowed to remain in their state positions was the fact that the armed services had no ideological motivation justifying their assumption of power. For the most part, before assuming the presidency gener als had already dealt with the subversive threat. They imprisoned
46 | Page several guerilla members and ended the internal warfare. Thus, when the military regime took control they could not count on the guerilla threat latform for their assumption of power The military had to emphasize their role as an interim government to demonstrate their interest in stabilizing the political arena that was failing to meet the needs of the people. The goal to stabilize politics deman ded that some structures remain the same so that the people were assured that the military would not commit similar mistakes to those of the regimes in Chile and in Argentina (Minello 1977, 590; Kaufman 1979, 77). Impact on Civil Society In Uruguay, as a possible consequence of the democratic traditions of the country, views of these groups, particularly those of liberals, to ensure that the mandates of the armed f orces prevailed (Kaufman 1979, 73; Gonzalez 1991, 42 ). The JOG wanted to present an image of unification throughout the nation to prevent threats to the government from flourishing. President Bordaberry attempted to make the executive branch a supreme and absolute power governing jointly with the military, thereby creating a new type of authoritarian state. In response, the JOG had him deposed because Bordaberry was directly threatening the democratic principles of the state in attempting to establish an au thoritarian form of rule (Finch 1985, 597; Minello 1977, 591; Kaufman 1979, 73). I nstilling Safegu a rds for a Democratic Future The last differentiating characteristic of Uruguayan military rule was that they prioritized the maintenance of a cohesive security sector guarding against internal
47 | Page fragmentation of the military branches. Declaring that the government would not be complete ly run by military officers, the armed services sought to preserve the legitimacy of the state because civilian participation in the state bureaucracy was not limited. With the sector in the government apparatus (Kaufam 1979, 74). Officers also avoided the institution of a caudillo 3 or strong man, as the face of government. By not allowing a single member of the armed services to be the commander of the country, officers wanted to prevent factionalism among and within the branches. the army, the navy, and the air force and promoting a harmonious government (2001, 196). The military went as far as dismissing soldiers within their institutional hierarchy to ensure that those serving were loyal to the regime. In 1977, a clause was added to the Organic Law of the Armed Forces of 1974 to allow pu rging within the armed services. commitment to preservi ng political stability and presenting a legitimate and unified state (Arceneaux 2001, 200; Kaufman 1979, 76). officers played a direct role in the decision making process of the judicial and legislative branches. By 1973, the JCJ eliminated the use of the judiciary as the armed forces relied completely on military tribunals to handle legal matters of the state (Kaufman 1979, 74). 3 For more information on caudillos and their influence in the development of Latin America, see Morner 1960
48 | Page During the Anti S ubversive War, military person nel tried guerilla members in military courts so that armed service officers could determine the sentences of those convicted. of the military regime. With the abol ition of the judicial branch, the armed services monopolized judicial authority. Before the Autogolpe the military tutelage itself was not in favor of promoting the interests of the security sector above those of the state. It was not until 1978, when the armed forces began losing some of their support base, that military doctrine was altered to pay homage to the military. While the armed services did away with the judicial branch, removed authority from the legislature, and had the president at their disp osal, the JOG was not trying to completely transform the structure of the government. Their purpose was to serve as an interim government to stabilize and restore trust to state leadership (Arceneaux 2001, 194 208). Military Expenditures As far as militar y expenditures are concerned, it was very difficult to determine whether there was a transfer of power Other cases have explicitly stated which committee would oversee the budget of the armed services immediately after the installation of the military reg ime but this was not the case in Uruguay Fluctuations in military spending have been recorded and are reproduces in Figure 2.5, but specific details as to who determined the military budget and which committee allocated the funds given to the armed services have been very hard to find.
49 | Page Linz and Stepan (1996) and Arceneaux (2001) stated that there was a decrease in military expenditures following t he t ransition period that indicated civilian involvement in the decision to minimize defense spending. However, these scholars do not overtly specify who or which board oversaw military expenses in the time of the military regime There is however a gap betwee n the creation of the Ministry of Defense in 1933 and the military regime in Uruguay with reference to which committee handled the financial affairs of the armed services. A report on Uruguay published by the Latin American Society and Defense Network ( R ed de Seguridad y Defensa de America Latina or RESDAL ) in 2010, states implication funds not that military officials determined their own budget. The remainder of the report provides a recent explanation of the defense sector, the different departments of the Min istry of Defense and an increased tra nsparency among military boards that are all positive attributes in the democratization process. Dammert explains that following the transition process, the budget was determined and audited by the General Directorate o f Financial Resources, a committee within the Ministry of Defense (Dammert 2007, 25). Figure 2.4 illustrates the changes in military expenditures from the beginning of the military regime to the early years of the Sanguinetti presidency (1984 1990). The graph demonstrates fluctuations in spending that can be associated with rising levels of political and economic instability. The highest levels of military spending occurred between 1981 and 1983 be fore the pacted transition oc curred During this time, the
50 | Page security sector was most vulnerable. The regime objective shifted from one that sought to limit civilian authority to one where officers focused on protecting military autonomy ng position was weakened due to their diminishing support base, officers did what they could to maintain some control over the transition proces s Figure 2. 4 : Changes in Military Expenditures Overtime in Uruguay Source :"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1964 1997." U.S. Department of State 1990. The Pacted Transition Process To the surprise they had lost the plebiscite of 1980 making it evident that they no longer had a popular support base. Their proposed constitution alienated groups who had previously supported the regime In response, the military sought to furthe r repress the population, particularly politicians (Gonzalez 1991, 65; Linz and Stepan 1996, 153). Having been unable to alleviate the economic situation 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 Military Expennditures million dollars current Military Expennditures million dollars Constant 1979
51 | Page and create major structural changes, the military recognized that they had no basis to remain in power and that it was time to allow civilians to take control of t he government. demanded participation in the political scene. These protests triggered discussions between the major political parties and the armed services (Gilliespie 1991, 129). Despite the constitution they had drafted, the opening for political party discussions forced military personnel to seek a pacted transition. Even though t he military remained in power for four years after their defeat in the 1982 elections the JCJ hoped for compliance from politicians in the process of negotiations (Gilliespie 1991, 175; Arceneaux 2001, 211). After several failed discussions, a breakthroug h negotiation occurred in the Naval Club Pact where in generals of the armed forces and representatives from the Colorado, Blanco, and the Civic Union ( Union Cvica ) parties came to terms on key policies that were essential to the transition to democracy (Finch 1985, 598). 4 Article 19 of the Naval Club Pact published on August 3, 1984 provided the basis of the accord with the following provisions: 1) Elections would be reinstated; 2) leftists parties were again al lowed to organize; 3) political prisoners who had completed at least half of their designated sentence would be released; 4) military persons were given the right to vote in general elections; 5) the National Security Council would remain as an advisory bo ard between the military and the government; 6) the President could choose commanders in chief of the armed services from a list of three individuals chosen by each branch to be approved by e of corpus; 8) the Appeal for Support ( Recurso de Ampar o ) was established to allow appeals to be made against military actions and government 4 For a detailed description of the pacted transition process in Uruguay see Gillipse 1991.
52 | Page decisions in an effort to prevent corruption among the institutions. (Gilliespie 1991, 177). Article 19 led to an almost complete acceptance of civil society in the political arena. The military maintained the ability to make recommendations to the new democratic government through the National Secur ity Council, and a date for elections was established. The return of liberal parties reinstituted democratic rights to an estimated 6,500 leftist politicians (Gilliespie 1991, 177). The provision to release prisoners granted 411 political prisoners the rig ht to live freely under the new democratic government. Lastly, the Appeal for Support was established to protect future Uruguayans from experiencing another Autogolpe and, as a demonstration of a pact between the parties, to enforce a check on the prerogat ives of politicians in the government (Gilliespie 1991, 175). On March 1, 1985 Julio Maria Sanguinetti was deemed the first democratically elected president following a decade of military rule. Before the JCJ handed over power, they recommended Sanguinet ti as the next presidential appointment 5 leading to Sanguinetti took office, he passed measures to decrease the number of military personnel to pre coup levels in an effort t o restore the military to its original place in the nation. The military budget was also decreased following the transition to democracy without much backlash from military officials. In accordance with the Naval Club Pact, the armed services renounced dir ect military participation in government and state positions (220). 5 For more information on military influence in the 1984 election see Linz and Stepan 1996 and Gillispie 1991.
53 | Page The military agreed to allow some transparency in institutions of the armed forces following the transition process. In a report published by the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences in Chile ( Facultadad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales ), Chile enforcing transparency in the military sector. The Ministry of Defense featured both civilians and militar y officers in committees dedicated to legitimizing both the state and the military institution (Dammert 2007, 24). The only resurgence of military interference in political affairs occurred when a group of officers were subpoenaed in 1986 for human rights violations. For two days discussions spurred wi thin the government apparatus while politicians debated whether or not they could legally prosecute officers and if so, whether they should. The armed services claimed that the Naval Club Pact contained an in formal agreement on the question of human rights violations. Generals maintained that war crimes would not be pursued, but the general public with the support of human rights associations wanted justice. In spite of the popular demand by constituents to p rosecute military officials, President Sanguinetti chose to ensure the stability of the government. Sanguinetti relayed uture in order to prevent any relapses of the previous regime (Gilliespie 1991, 219). A referendum 6 was conducted to determine whether or not amnesty should be granted, the bill for amnesty won with twenty five percen t of the electorate in approval. In tu rn, amnesty was granted to the military (Linz and Stepan 1996, 154 155). 6 For more information on the amnesty law and the referendum, see Barahona de Brito 1997
54 | Page In prioritizing democratic consolidation, the Uruguayan government officials and the electorate chose not to prosecute officers. Considering the political instability in surrounding countries such as Argentina and Chile, President Sanguinetii and his staff wanted to conserve the stability of the nation. Unlike other Southern Cone countries, the Uruguayan military did not return to the barracks broken and divided, but they remained un ified throughout their rule and after the finalization of the transition process that gave officers greater leverage in negotiations with the new government (Gilliespie 1001, 221). Known violators of human rights were promoted within the military hierarchy while the democratic government was on its way to consolidation (Arceneaux 2001, 220; Linz and Stepan 1996, 156). Figure 2.5 illustrates the progress the Uruguayan government has achieved from 2006 to 2011. Uruguay has been the only country in Latin Ameri ca to score a perfect 10 in the category of electoral process and pluralism annually based on the findings of The Economist (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012). Figure 2. 5 Democracy Index in Uruguay, 2006 2011 Source: The Economist 2007, 2008, 2010, 201 1 2012. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 electoral process and pluralism functining government political participation political culture civil liberties
55 | Page While ranking rather low in political participations they have been improving in every other category in the index. Uruguay is the only country in this study that has been categorized as a consolidated demo cracy. Ran king higher than Costa Rica, that has no military force, Uruguay is an example to its neighbors. The negotiated transition process that led to the sudden removal of the armed forces from government could certainly be a positive factor in the Uruguayan gove Conclusion: Two Different Patterns of Sudden Transitions from Military Rule to Democratic Governance experienced an immediate removal of the armed forces from governing institutions transition proces s suggests that the sudden removal from the bureaucracy is the only characteristic they share. When considering the consolidation of democracy following military rule, political stability the attainment of political and civil liberties, and governmental a ccountability are three overriding principles that must be achieved. These case studies examined whether these objectives, paramount to the c onsolidation of democracy were attained. Lingering military influence in the government may sometimes present an obstacle to the transition process following military rule and can act as a blockade to political stability. One of the conditions to achieving government accountability deals
56 | Page with the attainment of civilian control over all other institutions. To identify the characteristics of civilian control as a feature of the transition to democracy Hunter (1998) describes domains of military leverage that must be tackled when trying to subordinate the armed forces to civilian rule including: 1) Holding officers accountable for human rights violations, 2) civilian oversight and administrative power over military prerogatives and their missions, and 3) giving civilians the ability to determine what portion of the national budget will be allocated to expenditures of the armed services. ( Hunter 1998, 300) The pursuit of a ll three of these objectives led to divergent transition processes in Uruguay and Argentina. D emocratic success following the transition process, measured by the realization of government accountabil ity civil and political liberties, and political stability, were affected as presidents attempted to obtain these objectives simultaneously In Argentina, the military was weakened by its defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War against Britain. The armed s ervices were in no position to negotiate with the subsequent democratic government and the terms of their removal from the state sector were comparatively bleak. Following the presidential elections of 1983, officers voluntarily forfeited their positions i n the state and returned to the barracks as the number of troops dwindled. The military budget was evaluated by civilians and greatly reduced. Both President Alfonsin an d President Menem worked to appropriate only a sma l l percentage of public funds to the security sector. In Argentina, officers did not publicly protest the heavy decreases in their resources but they did begin to lobby in the government as did the other institutions Meeting these objectives completed Argentina initial transition process as the military institution began to take part in the democratic practices of the government
57 | Page Following the Argentinean transition, the military budget of the armed forces was supervised by civilians in the Defense Ministry (Dammert 2007, 31). What proved to be a crucial destabilizing factor in Argentina, as in Uruguay, was the issue of prosecuting officers for human rights violations. The indictment of officers became the primary threat to stability of the civilian g overnment in Uruguay and caused the Easter U prising in Argentina. The Easter Uprising demonstrated the potential of military officials to interrupt and threaten the democratic establishment. President Alfonsin employed a strong stance towards subordinating the military and allowed trial s to commence against officers thus inhibiting the attainment of p olitical stability as officers were actively protesting the government, and functioning government, as the uprising attempted to force the hand of the presidency to grant amnesty to the armed se rvices Despite his initial efforts, Alfonsin had to take ste ps to appease the armed forces and he chose to maintain stability by not directly challenging the military establishment instead of achieving security sector reform. However, it must be acknowled ged that his efforts to allow trials to continue for a short period demonstrated his goal of undermining the military institution by showing the public that officers were to blame for the injustices of the previous regime. Then during m amnesty was granted to all armed service officers for violations committed before and during the military regimes (Pion Berlin 1997, 108). However, a mnesty did not prevent the military from attempting another coup attempt in 1990 that failed because the y were unable to rally support (Pion Berlin 1997, 73). Because of their capacity to mobilize military factions, the armed forces still present ed a threat to the government. Thus, while the Argentine an government was able to complete the transition to democ racy, it was not able to maintain political stability
58 | Page that based on the analysis could be used to explain why it has not able to accomplish consolidation. Allowing officers to be the prosecuted for past crimes committed under military rule opened the door to military disruption in the political arena. The publications of the White Book in 1999 7 and a Defense Document in 2001 8 offered a shift in military doctrine towards greater methods of transparency (Dammert 2007, 24). For the first time in Argentine an history, these two documents outlined the objectives, duties, and jurisdictions of the armed forces in publicly accessible formats. Prospects for the democratization rose as the military gained accountability with these publications but there is still a lot of room for improvement. Uruguay presen ts a case where government accountability and political stability were established early in the tra nsition process that allowed the country to move from transition to consolidation within the same decade. Civil li berties and political freedoms were restored to the people upon the transfer of power after military rule. The pacted transition process in Uruguay did not come about as the result of a defeated and fragmented military, but occurred because the constituenc y voted against the military candidacy in the their removal from gove rnment and discussions with prominent political parties commenced. Both sides made concessions: the military abandone d its goal of reshaping the government structure and politicians agreed not to prosecute officers for human rights violations. 7 Pub.156850, Argentina: White Book on National Defense 1999 8
59 | Page Uruguay did not experience cases of popular protest against the government after the transition and there were no coup attem pts inhibiting stability. In the transfer of power, the armed forces agreed to return to the barracks and allowed for the reinstatement of the judiciary and of legislative departments Congress and the courts were reopened The military accepted their subordin ation to the executive before the first presidential election and supported the use of the National Security Council to communicate with the government. The military budget was also evaluated and audited by the defense ministry (Dammert 2007, 31). The Uru guayan politicians had achieved all three levels of military leverage necessary to achieve objective civilian control; the government successfully implemented democratic principles in all areas of the state inc luding the security sector. According to Linz (1996, 155). Since politicians were able to subordinate the armed forces early on in the transiti on process, they were able to move on to the task of consolidation. In contrast to the Argentinean case, they were not in constant competition with any other institution, so The sudden r emoval does not seem to explain the degree of consolidation in Argentina and Uruguay because, while both experienced a swift removal of armed service personnel from the state apparatus, they both did not lead to a consolidated state. Both cases demonstrate d civilian ov ersight of the military budget during the transition process. In Uruguay, the civilian led government did not hold officers accountable for human rights violations under military rule : they chose stability over reform. In the
60 | Page consolidation pro cess the government provided accountability for the military institution using the books on defense and increasing the transparency of the armed forces. In Argentina, the president attempted to bring justice to the people for past violations to ultimately but it resulted in political destabilization: a military faction led an uprising and the people led protests in response demanding that the government take control. It can be concluded that trials against officers are a destabilizing factor during both a transition process and the consolidation phase However, the re does not seem to be an obvious relationship between the sudden eradication of officers from the bureaucracy and the consolidation of the state. The analysis provides another possible explanation for democratic principles throughout its rule and left the executive branch to civilians through a pacted Argentina was unable to attain political stability until the early 2000s but has recently experienced instances of popular protest. D ecades after the transition to democracy have not moved Argen tina closer to achieving consolidation The protests beginning in 2010 demonstrate an increase in civil liberties and political liberties in the Democracy index. Argentina shows that political participation can b e both helpful but also harmful to the consolidation process The protests demonstrate that a functioning government has not been established, but they show that the people are able to organize and promote democratic practices in their country The protest s have not acted as indicators of instability as they have all been
61 | Page conducted peacefully. However, without a functioning government Argentina will not be able to reach democratic consolidation.
62 | Page Chapter 3 Democracies with Authoritarian Remains: The Cases of Chile and Brazil I will promote a political opening, and I will have anyone who dares to oppose it jailed and beaten. General Joo Baptista Figueirado (Brazil) Y ears of military rule can be expected to leave remnants of military influence in the government structure after the regime change, especially in cases where the armed forces are not prepared to leave their influential positions of power. This chapter presents the transition processes in Chile and Brazil, two countries where the military was not automatically removed from the bureaucracy following the initial transition to democracy. In these cases politicians sought to ensure political stability during the transition process by meeting officers half way in their demands, which required government officials to concede some areas of influence to the military. This chapter will investigate the consequences the lingering military had on the democratic processes of these countries. Was the d ecision to keep the military in the state sector detrimental to the consolidation of democracy?
63 | Page Chile Chile is an important case in the study of military regimes in South America because it demonstrates the case of a strongman who was successfully able to personalize power in both the military institution and in the government structure. General Augusto Pi nochet was both commander in chief of the armed services and President of the Chilean state. From 1973 to 1990, Pinochet ruled Chile using an extremely repressive system that limited the freedoms of the people while the Junta decided on the future of the c ountry. To fully understand the transition process in Chile, it is imperative to first discuss the bureaucracy, and to then review how the organization of the administrati on changed after the transition to democracy. The Structure of the Military Regime On September 11, 1973 civilian President Salvadore Allende was ousted from the government by a military coup led primarily by the high command of the armed forces with the help of the National Chilean Police ( carbinero s ) (Barros 2002, 36). Immediately after the coup succeeded, the Supreme Command of the Nation ( Junta de Gobierno ) was b e reestablished. This institutional body was composed of four individuals representing different branches of the security sector: the commanders in chief of the army, navy, and air force, and the director general of the National Chilean Police (36).
64 | Page Centr alizing Power in the Government Determining the supreme authority of the regime is paramount to understanding both the structure of the state and influential actors to be considered when examining the transition. While several analysts hold that Chile was ultimately ruled by General Pino chet (Weeks 2003, 1 ; Silva 2002, 376 ), some argue that Pinochet was principal ly the face of the regime but that he did not hold absolute authority. Barros (2002), for example, emphasizes the supremacy of the Junta over the presidency. Although the opposite is widely believed, under this system Pinochet could not unilaterally legislate nor mold the Junta at his whim. Pinochet intentionally designed to provide each commander with an ins titutionally unilaterally impose binding norms upon the other actors within the power bloc. (Barros 2002, 38) Nevertheless, process drives the belief that Pinochet did in fact hold a great amount of personalized power during the formulate policy. In mid 1973, the Supreme Mandate for the Nation ( Mando Supremo de la Nacin ) institutionalized the powers of the Junta, giving the commanders full oversight capabilities over all constitutional, legislative, and executive powers. The Junta fused the powers of the three branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial) into one supreme body, ensuring that military officers were in complete control of the state. But, t he state apparatus became increasingly ineffective after the branches were combined because the duties of individual institutions became blurred and it left many pertinent issues unnoticed. Consequently, the Junta sought to create a new constitution that would better enumerate the rights and duties of the Junta itself and of the judiciary and
65 | Page legislative institutions (Ba rros 2002, 49). The new constitution was supposed to cure the inept administration of assignments. The Appointment of a Pro Military Constitution: The Constitution of 1980 democracy same prerogatives they held when they took power in 1973. The constitution legally allowed the military, specifically the Junta, to retain an almost unlimited role as head of the state (Barros 2002, 167 169). The Junta announced that elections would be postponed for nine years and designated a timetable for the return of a civilian led government (1 67 168). The military projected that the nine year duration would be sufficient to stabilize ts from political manipulation and the elevation of the armed forces to the status of guarantors of the that revolved around the Junta made it difficult to transfer power once the transition process commenced (202). The 1980 Constitution expanded the control of the armed forces to penetrate all areas of government. Commanders in chief were appointed to four year terms and could no longer be removed from their positio ns by the President as was customary before the military coup. The President now had to seek the approval of the National Security Council (NSC) to remove a chief of the armed services where it was highly unlikely that
66 | Page an approval for impeachment would be granted. The NSC ultimately was created to foster discussion between the military establishment and the civilian sector in a way that could be monitored by the regime. To meet its purpose, the makeup of the NSC was half military and half civilian granting the general population a small opening for political participation. While influential, the NSC served under the will of the Junta and only executed policies that were first approved by Junta members. te or discharge any officers without the approval of the commander in chief, thereby granting greater autonomy and influence to army commanders. The removal of powers from the presidency illustrated total authority of the military in drafting the Constitut ion, while at the same time serving as a preemptive caution to protect the armed forces from future civilian Presidents. The lack of presidential interference in the military chain of command transition process. Pinochet maintained the ability to purge officers since he was both commander in chief of the military forces and President. Therefore, the new policy would only affect the future Presidents of the Chilean state (Fuentes 1999, 15 16). Infiltrating the Legislature The NSC was constitutionally able to elect four of eight senators and they consistently chose members of the security apparatus to assume these positions. The armed services used the Senate as another venue fo r assuring their s upremacy. The military saw to it that they would always have a voice in the decision maki ng capabilities of the country because officers that controlled the NSC would plant their peers in what is traditionally a representative body of civilian interests, t he Senate. Officers serving as
67 | Page Congressmen were able to bl ock amendments and policies which created gridlock in Congress that was detrimental to all reform attempts If the military were allotted equal power to that of civilians in such an influential institution like the Senate, it could potentially hinder the establishment of democratic principles in the legislature. Table 3 .1 reports the percentage of military officials in government positions from the inception of the military regime to 1987 right b efore the Presidency was handed over to a civilian led government. From the table, it is evident that the armed forces asserted their control over the civilian represented cabinet. Even after a steady decline in the number of officers occupying cabinet pos itions, the military still held nearly thirty percent of the ministerial positions at the start of 1987. In the Chilean case, the junta subdued the state's primary institutions in order to assert complete control over the whole country. Table 3 .1 Military Participation in the Chilean Cabinet, 1973 1986 (in percent) Source: Reproduced from Remmer 1988, 20.
68 | Page The Constitution of 1980 thus created many roadblocks that prevented the post transition civilian government from restructuring the political system. T he democratic process in Chile was crippled by the embedded prerogatives of the armed services, which secured the autonomy of the military by elevating the status of the Junta. Pinochet was given a lifetime seat in the Senate that could not be revoked und er any circumstances his seat was constitutionally protected. Neither the President nor a vote within the Senate could re voke his position in Congress The National Security Council was the only institution with the power to approve the removal of officers but since the NSC was dominated by the armed forces that fulfilled the wishes of the Junta it did not execute its authority to compel the early retirement of officers that could have promoted reform Military Budget The military budget is an important factor to consider when analyzing the autonomy of the armed forces in any state. Through the control of the budget, a civilian led government is able to reinforce transparency in military institutions. Without an increas e in transparency, the military can use their allocated funds to direct their own missions and objectives without the approval of the government. Forming part of the t e of the implementation of democratic principles by adding to its legitimacy and stability of the new democratic government In Chile, Pinochet and the Junta established a minimum budget for the military that could not fall below 1989 spending levels Figure 3 .1 demonstrates that in 1989 the Chilean military was allocated the highest amount of funds for defense spending in
69 | Page decades. In 1989, the budget of the armed forces was $2.581 billion dollars (in 2011 US Dollars) comprising almost 5% of the GDP ( SIPRI Database 2012). The military also allocation for expenditures of any of the national institutions, which helped to maintain its position of dominance. Figure 3 1 Military Expenditures in Chile, 1972 1989 (in millions of dollars current year prices respectively) Source :"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1964 1997." U.S. Department of State 1982, 1987, 1997. The Monetary Loophole On December 14, 1989, the first civilian President following military rule, President Patricio Aylwin, was appointed. During his presidency, Alywin tried to make various constitutional ref orms to minimize the resources of the armed forces and to limit their influence in the Senate. However, his efforts failed because the military had the 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 Military Expennditures million dollars current
7 0 | Page support of right wing parties. These right wing parties for the most part represented the interests of t he military in the government. All measures aimed at amending the constitution turned into a gridlock in the Senate or were rejected. Despite these challenges, the administration found a loophole in the policy regarding the military budget: a mandate that said the military could be allocated no less than what it had been given in 1989. President Aylwin and his advisors decided to use that number as a maximum instead of a minimum (Kohn 1997, 16 17). As the country prospered, the budget for the military was left stagnant and no longer posed a threat for the growing Chilean economy. As a result, President Alywin was able to dictate the agenda. Establishing Democracy During General Pinochet and President Aylwin. Pinochet refused to fully submit to the will of the popularly elected state retaining both an influential voice in politics through his seat in the S enate and autonomy over military affairs as commander in chief. President Aylwin believed that his inability to remove military officials from state bureaucracy inhibited the consolidation process in Chile He explained that the biggest threat to democracy was General Pinochet who could not be discharged. In Congress, right wing parties supported the General and the military, while liberal parties defended the presidency and fought for the democratic future of the country (Fue ntes 1999, 20).
71 | Page Considering that a number of retired officers retained their positions in both the Senate and in the National Security Council, any attempts to amend the Constitution of 1980 were met with extreme resis tance In 1983, military representati on in the government structure dropped to about 30%, but could not be further reduced without the approval of the NSC (Remmer 1988, 19). Since President Aylwin could not win the support of the majority of the NSC, several officers were not removed from the cabine t and they continued to obstruct political reform. The combination of right wing support security sector did not allow major political reforms to materialize. General Pinochet vs. President Aylwin: The First Confrontation was under investigation for his involvement in a check fraud scandal. Attention was being drawn to Pinochet because his son had allegedly been paid three million dollars when the military purchased a rifle making company called Projects of Integrated Sys tems Production (Weeks 2003, 66). Rumors spread that Pinochet was considering early retirement from the army. Weeks public officials [could] not conduct business wi Pinochet sent the head of the advisory committee, General Ballerino, to speak with the retirement. General Ballerino told Pinochet that the government was demanding his
72 | Page retirement. Pinochet responded by ordering all soldiers to quarter in the barracks that night (68). 9 The next morning President Aylwin met with General Pinochet to describe the The army sought to downplay the exercise while reiterating the nt emphasized the questionable nature of the exercise, making the point that Both sides walked a fine line. Pinochet wanted to reach his objectives without openly defying his own con stitution, while Aylwin did not want to give the impression that the government had no control over the army. (Weeks 2003, 69). The military institution and the civilian led government were clearly at odds with one another. Pinochet directly blocked Congre ssional investigations involving his son and attempted to show their supremacy over the other but were not doing so successfully. The transition process at this time was st ill underway. Accountability for Human Rights Violations: External Pressures External actors such as the United Nations, the United States, and the European Union all played influential roles in guiding democratization in Chile. Disappearances and sporad ic arrests were typical throughout the military regime calling the attention of accountability was a major issue to the new democratic government and to the Chilean people. The Con stitution of 1980 granted amnesty to all soldiers who committed any human rights violations from 1973 to 1978, the period when the military was establishing 9 Officers only quartered in the barracks during times of war or when they were preparing for war. No previous military leader had issued this order under o ther circumstances (Weeks 2003, 68 69).
73 | Page government and civi l society. Nevertheless, the new democratic government could not legally investigate the atrocities committed because of the blanket amnesty policy. The international community predominately the US, UN, and EU thus questioned the legitimacy of the newly elected government for two reasons: first, because the civilian led government agreed to the amnesty law upon assuming power despite the presentation of evidence against officers, and, second, because General Pinochet was still commander in chief of the mi litary (Altman, Toro, and Pineiro 2008). Having directed an extremely repressive regime with thousands of unresolved human rights violations, General Pinochet should have been removed from all positions of influence. Political reform following military rul e is crucial in order for democratic consolidation to take hold. As the US and UN questioned the capabilities and sovereignty of President institute political reform. In accordance to suggestions made by the United Nations, President Aylwin created Truth and Reconciliation Commissions where officers could come forward to speak of the crimes they committed. Those officers who came out to speak would not receive any penalty for their crimes in exchange for providing the Chilean people with a sense of closure. The military, however, rejected these commissions with a show of military force. Pinochet ordered drills to be conducted throughout the country without alerting the gov ernment beforehand. The drills were taken as a message asserting military independence from the presidency (Hunter 1998, 304). General Pinochet ordered the drills as a direct challenge to the supremacy of the civilian government, and as a reminder
74 | Page to the C hilean people that he still held a great deal of power. The demonstration raised questions as to the legitimacy of democracy in Chile because the military was still executing operations against and without the approval of elected officials. Accountability for Human Rights Violations: Internal Events Motivating Reform Another challenge to military immunity, and thus civilian supremacy, occurred under the second democratically elected President, President Eduardo Frei Ruiz Tagle (1994 2000). United States Amb assador Orlando Letelier was killed in Washington D.C. demanded that the men responsible for the murder be sentenced to prison, but the law granted amnesty to all acts committe d before 1980 which included the Letelier case. After the new democratic government was established, the US again demanded that the government arrest General Contreras and his Second in Command, the perpetrators. 10 President Frei agreed to allow the Supreme Court to try the case against General Contreras (Hunter 1998, 303 305). The decision led to heated discussions between the armed forces and the military amnesty, Gen eral Contreras was taken to a military base where other officers refused to hand him over to government officials (Hunter 1998, 305). After five months of heated debates, the army allowed police officers to arrest General Contreras and he was subsequently adjudicated and found guilty for murder. Although the US and the UN 10 A CIA investigation produced these names as those responsible for placing the bomb on Ambassador
75 | Page did not play a direct role in changing the rules of the game in Chile, they successfully pressured the Chilean government to take a stand against the wishes of General Pinochet and the mil itary. A turning point for the issue of human rights violations occurred in 1998 when the Spanish government arrested Pinochet in London for the atrocities committed under his rule. The international community helped bring justice to the Chilean people when the c onstitution prevented the Chilean government from doing so itself. Pinochet was and hostage taking are not the functions of a head of state and thus do not enjoy immu condition at the time he was returned to Chile where he was sentenced to house arrest. Pinochet had lost his appeal as an untouchable caudillo figure in the Chilean political s cene and was no longer in a position to greatly alter political processes in the country 11 President Frei created the Table for Discussion ( Mesa de Dialogo ) talks to facilitate conversations among the military, victims of abuse, and civil society groups (Heiss and Navia 2007, 183). The disclosure of inhumane acts committed by officers gave the government an upper hand in negotiation efforts between the executive and the armed forces. The arrest of Pinochet removed the pilla r that had haunted the government after the transition process. The military establishment was finally subordinated after their leader was forced by the international community to face the consequences of his actions. 11 arrest and its impact on international and domestic law, see Evans 2006.
76 | Page The international community provided necessary pressure on the Chilean government to make moves against the armed forces and establish civilian supremacy. As ed President Aylwin to move towards discussing human rights abuses (Altman, Toro, and Pineiro 2008, 9). The military did not have enough influence in the Cabinet to dismiss the charges against General Contreras making his case the first public legal procee ding against a high commanding officer. The Chile, it was necessary to tackle the issue of human rights violations and hold officers accountable for their actions in o rder to move forward with the consolidation process. After a civilian was elected President in Chile, the government sought to achieve two goals. These were the short term goal of maintaining stability and the long term goal of establishing civilian supre macy over the armed forces. The completion of these two goals was paramount to the completion of the transition process. The Constitution of 1980 prevented the new government from implementing any major reforms and allowed the military to maintain its infl uence. Consequently, the civilian government had to pursue a gradual transition. Post Transition Chile Although President Aylwin was able to manipulate the constitution and gain some control over the military budget, he was not able to remove military per sonnel from their positions in the state bureaucracy and while still maintain ing political stability. However, Figure 3 .2 depicts a decline in the number of armed forces personnel after 1986, right
77 | Page before the transfer of power from military rule to the civilian government. The decrease more unified and professional security force that had greater chances of combating the elected government if they felt threatened. I n addition to the leftover benefits of the 1980 Constitution, the armed forces used right wing politicians to constantly impose a gridlock in Congress that prevented any changes that negatively affected their interests. Figure 3 2 Armed Forces Personnel i n Chile (thousands) Source :"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1964 1997." U.S. Department of State 1982, 1987, 1997. making capabilities, the consolidation process was delayed and the transition extended The government could not fully legitimize itself while the military as the country embarked on new deve lopment projects and the military began focusing on the development of their own resources. With Pinochet imprisoned, the armed forces initiated their own reform policies seeking to further professionalize the military and 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Armed Forces (thousands)
78 | Page depoliticize the institution. In 1997 the Chilean armed services published their very first White Book that outlined the military doctrine and objective. The White Book was amended in 2002 to promote transparency in the security sector (Dammert 2007, 24). The twenty first century has wit nessed changes in military autonomy in Chile with the appointment of the first commander in chief since General Pinochet, General Emilio Cheyre. The Table for Discussion talks led to the creation of a report that documented more than 35,000 torture victims General Cheyre also issued a public apology for the actions committed by the soldiers and officers of the armed forces during the military from the public sector as military reform became a priority (Heiss and Navia 2007, 184). The government acquired more depositions regarding the actions of the military that allowed politicians to break the legislative gridlock. Thus, constitutional reforms involving the military budget were implemented in 2005. While the military does still legally have the right to hold seats in the Senate and in other legislative bodies, their authority is deteriorating An example of this is the situation regarding the copper subsidy as a porti on of the military budget. company Coleco was funding tanks and warships for the military along with paying vacation bonuses for officers of the high command (Bennefoy 2010). The Chilean government is still investigating corruption in the armed forces in relation to money laundering scandals. The ability of the government to investigate suspicious activities
79 | Page being conducted by generals, however, demonstrates the evolving role of the security sector as subordinate to the executive. seven years. Figure 3.3 Democracy Index in Chile, 2006 2011 Source: The Economist 2007, 2008, 2010, 201 1 2012. In the 2011 Democracy Index, Chile is said to be more democratic than both Brazil and Argentina. Chile has not experienced outbreaks of popular protests following the arrest of General Pinochet. The civil liberties of the people have not been threatened and the government is moving in the right direction scoring almost a perfect ten in both the civil liberties and electoral proce ss and pluralism sections ( Democracy Index 2011 ). More recently, private law firms have been prosecuting officers for crimes the dictatorship, court dockets are filled with passed cases and hundre ds of officials have 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 electoral process and pluralism functining government political participation political culture civil liberties
80 | Page qua 2010, 80) 12 It seems that the only area where Chile is ranked rather low is in the political participation index, but with the progress the government has made in enacting political refor ms they seem to be on their way towards achieving consolidation. The Chilean people have been involved in several on the Democracy Index. The protests have not affec ted political stability in the country; democratic practices as students demand educational reforms (Edwards 2013). Brazil Brazil is the largest country in South America wi th a population of almost two 13 2002, Brazil was continuing to suffer egregious levels o f human rights abuses, many generated by the very criminal justice institutions intended to prevent and punish such twenty first century, it is necessary to analyze the poli tical situation of the Brazilian government following the transition to democracy. Brazil was freed from military rule in 12 For more information on the prosecution of officers in Chile and the implementation of both judicial and governmental accountability, see Requa 2010. 13 CIA World Factbook Brazil
81 | Page 1985, but decades later it does not seem to be on its way towards consolidating democracy. The military took control of the governme nt on April 1 st 1964 and held power for twenty one years. Unlike any of the other cases, only civilians held positions in the Brazilian legislature during the regime that granted a political opening for civilians. It was in the legislature that liberaliza tion practices began Congressmen used le gal doctrine to influence a small number of policies put forth by the military Presidents that opened small windows for reform (Arceneaux 2001, 145). Strategy coordination transpired through the legislature and was able to spread to other areas in the state apparatus. Like Chile, the Brazilian government was led by high ranking military officers who acted simultaneously as President and as army commander. For the most part, the government was run in a collegial manner (Shadmehr 2012), where decision making capability was spread throughout the military led institutions in the state system (Arceneaux 2001, 144). 14 Even though generals served a s President, commanders in Brazil wanted to protect themselves against the creation of a caudillo by using a strict systematic movement system (Arceneaux 2001, 144). Senior officers were subject to promotion, retirement, and assignment rules to prevent any one individual from retaining the same position for a significant amount of time, the result was an overall turnover rate for the state apparatus at twenty five (Arceneaux 2001, 146 147). Using these stringent measures, the army sought to prevent the poli ticization of the armed services. While the economic progress of the regime did result in the overall support of the Brazilian population the military reduced the rights of the people through both political 14 period, each player expresses a preferred decision, and the final decision is the average of the expressed
82 | Page and in some cases physical manipulation tactic s as was necessary to assume control. The security sector was extremely repressive political disappearances were not as extensiv e as those committed under General had long proclaimed a doctrine of security and development that gave them the necessary justification for intervening in the politi cal arena to save the country from its disintegrating state. Military Appropriation of the Government Following the military coup, the Revolutionary Supreme Command (RSC) was created as the governing body for the nation. This group was composed of Army Commander General Artur de Costa e Silva, Naval Commander Admiral Augusto Rademuker Grunewald, and Air Fo rce Chief of Staff Brigadier Francisco de Assis Correia de Melo (Arceneaux 2001, 144). The RSC had executive power comparable to Junta de Gobierno where these individuals proposed the major policy initiatives and goals for the state. However, i n Br azil the armed forces acted collectively which enhanced their ability to subdue the Brazilian government when it was divided along party lines. The uni ty of the military branches allowed for a feasible penetration of the state bureaucracy. The RSC passed legislation through the President, General Castelo Blanco (1964 1967) and bypassed the approval of the legislative branch. Institutional Act No. 1 was published in the early months of the regime and suspe nded the rights of the populace. It
83 | Page g ranted greater authority to the RSC by withdrawing immunity that had previously been given to Congressmen thus making officers the only individuals who had immunity in the state system Institutional Act No. 1 also transferred control over the budgetary p rocesses of the military from Congress to the RSC (Arceneaux 2001, 145). The armed services created several safeguards that would ensure their supremacy and protect them against opposition forces. President Blanco also passed Institutional Act No. 2 to le gally prohibit Presidents from serving two terms in office The term limit acted as protection for country against power hungry officers who served in the presidency ( Arceneaux 2001, 147). The need to protect the state against personalization of power was a major priority of the RSC because of the extensive list of caudillos that plagued several South American countries. Purges were conducted among all state bureaus to weed out any subversive threats (145). Military Electoral Process One distinctive charact eristic of the military regime in Brazil was the Electoral College system used to elect the President. On the basis of the top choices of each senior officer, generals of four star rank were to compile a list of three preferred candidates of their commands They were subsequently consolidated into a list for each service and finally narrowed down to a single choice for the Armed Forces. Thus, while the process of consultation would reach down to the levels of colonels, the great electors would be the seven members of the High Command of the Armed Forces. (Schneider 1971, 298 299 quoted in Instead of running popular elections, the military high command attempted to legitimize their presidential appointments by including the c hoices of armed service personnel in the nomination process. In other words, elections were held within the military institution that included the votes of generals and senior military officials. Both Schneider (1971)
84 | Page and Arceneaux (2001) claim the RSC cho se the President using this military Electoral College process. The senior armed forces personnel chose the generals that the High Command of the Armed Forces would consider for the presidency. Managing Civilians Unlike the structure of the Chilean government under military rule, the Brazilian military chiefs agreed that civilians should be left in their bureaucratic positions (Arceneaux 2001, 146). The military placed one or two officers in each department to oversee the activities that were being c onducted but they did not assume most governmental positions The military was considerably outnumbered by civilians, but they were able to maintain control of positions that influenced the decision making process. A purge was organized to remove potentia l threats from the state system and to highlight the importance of loyalty to the leaders of the regime (145). The civilian employed in over four thousand municipalities (152). Given the size of the Brazilian state, appropriating the government would have required all soldiers to be employed, but that was out of the question. The RSC had to come up with a way to utilize the civilians that worked in the bureaucracy to the ir benefit. Thus, military officers employed tactical purging mechanisms within state institutions to maintain civilian support and as a safeguard against popular protests. Military officials also used federal employees to oversee the actions of individual s who worked for the (Arceneaux 2001, 164). The purges left employees of the bureaucracy cautious not to act against the regime for fear of the extensive intelligence agenc y. The National Information
85 | Page Agency ( Serviio Nacional de Informones o r NIA) kept a close eye on those engaged in state affairs (146). By employing known opposition forces in the bureaus, the NIA was easily able to monitor their actions (Schedler 2002, 10 7). The government went as far as creating an opposition party called the Brazilian Democratic Movement ( Movimento Democrtico Brasileir o or MDB) in 1965 when the military took power. MDB serve d 150). In no other South American military regime has there been a comparable example of an oppositional party instituted and supported by the government. The regime conveniently created all the necessary channels to facilitate oppositional organization in a way that could be effectively monitored (Arceneaux 2001, 164) The Brazilian military government oversaw a system called conshelo where councils were set up across the country to enhance conversation between the general populace and state officials. In these meetings, officials would meet with the townspeople 2001, 159). The were used to create the illusion that the people were participating in the policy making process. By 1974, as part of the apertura policy there were three times as many conshelo establishments across the country that assisted in the future transition process (159). Through these venues the RSC asserted a system of strategy coordination in an effort to ensure regime stability. Despite the use of a repressive administrative system, the military high command was very effective in mirroring democratic institutional proce sses in an attempt to legitimize their rule and to maintain
86 | Page he electoral process, albeit military led, and the conshelo meetings to create a sense of popular support for the regime as the governmen t appeared to remain accountable to the needs of the people ( Arceneaux 2001, 160). The Controlled Transition Process Since officers did not assume all governmental positions, the military served more ey did not act as advocates of major reform policies attempting to create a fully militarized administration. The High Command solely implemented policies that were necessary to ensure the supremacy of the military in areas of executive decision making. Right before the transitions process military state institutions, only fifty officers were among them (Ronning and Henry 1976). The military never held the majority of positions in any bureaucratic institutio n. Officers even allowed for ten of twenty five positions in the National Security Council to be occupied by civilians. In addition, t he Brazilian Cabinet never witnessed a prevalence of armed forces personnel, and the judicial branch remained civilian fro m the beginning of the regime to the end (Arceneaux 2001, 152 153). the state. It did not matter if the department was milita ry, judiciary, or from the bureaucracy; the RS C did not hesitate to purge any institution in order to retain control of popula ce was extremely effective.
87 | Page Initial Stages of Apertura within the security sector. The factions were comprised of hard liners, soft liners, and moderates that incessantly cla shed as they debated policy initiatives. The political arena slowly evolved into one where debates among different parties became common. The doorway to democracy was opening with an increase in political competition (Arceneaux 2001, 174). Apertur a policy Couto e Silva announced their intention to promote a slow, gradual, and careful process of political liberaliza (Mainwaring 1986, 149). As apertura policy took hold, the distinction between military as institutio n and military as government became increasingly blurred and political instability was looming. The RSC and other military liberalization, which by its very nature allow[ed] greater separation between the military 6, 15 3). It was not done because there was a strong oppositional force the opposition did not yet have a prominent voice Nor was it due to a loss of military power over the state because at that time the military still oversaw an efficient regime Rather, the driving force behind apertura power that led the armed forces to believe that they coul d control the effects of the
88 | Page Expansion of the Opposition The military ultimately underestimated the success of the opposition party in the 1974 election where they won sixteen of twenty two disputed seats in the Sena te (Mainwaring 1986, 155). In response to the large win for the opposition in the congressional elections, President Erne sto Geisel (1974 1979) used an executive ord er to close Congress in 1977. During the closure, President Geisel changed electoral procedures in a way that would be favorable to the National Renewal Alliance Party ( Aliana Renovadora Nacional or ARENA), a political party created by the government in 1 964 to support and represent the views of the military Junta. The military hoped that a change in policy would secure the next elections for ARENA members (155). Congress was closed for two months, and upon its return elected representatives from the oppositional party demanded that Institutional Act No. 13 be overturned to allow a return of civil liberties to the people and to grant amnesty to exiles. 15 For the first time since the beginning of the military regime, the opposition gained a voice in the legislature. Congressmen were able to incite discussions against the repressive policies of the regime that introduced some methods of reform. Public opinion shifted as a pertura prompted the people to begin reviewing the actions executed by the RSC. In an attempt to 15 established that all political prisoners exchanged for kidnapped dignitaries were to be banished from Brazilian territory and in fact gave the executive the power to banish from Brazil for life all those considered to be inconvenient, harmful or dangerous 176, 2005).
89 | Page regain the support of the people, President Geisel granted amnesty to exiles and revoked Institutional Act No. 5 that included the suspension of key civil rights (Mainwaring 1986, 155). Right before the next presidential election, electoral la ws were again changed to bolster any support the regime had left. In November of 1981, party alliances were deemed illegal as military officials sought to break up a mounting number of opposition parties. The government again underestimated the political c apacity of the opposition. ARENA had been the leading party for many years but the divisions t hat emerged within the military between hard liners, soft liners, and moderates spread to the party. Instead of breaking up the opposition, the new electoral law s further entrenched 1985) administration attempted to combat the divisions between hard liners and soft liner s that were fragmenting the political arena (Mainwaring 1986, 157). However, almost eight years after the initiation of a pertura policy, the military was slowly losing their grip on Congress. The President was repeatedly forced to use his executive privileges to subdue the legislature and to try to guide elections. The Revival of Civil Society On the eve of what became the final presidential election under military rule (1984), m assive public protests erupted across the country. The people demanded direct presidential elections and held hundreds of demonstrations with participants in the thousands (Mainwaring 1986, 160). ARENA was renamed the Democratic Socialist Party ( Partido De mocrtico Social or PDS) in an effort to meet the demands of the people. As
90 | Page the protests resumed and the number of participants increased t he government was faced with mounting pressure from civilian officials and the general populace to act. PDS then met and discussed the possibility of s etting up negotiations with oppositional forces. The protestors were demanding that their respective Senators vote in favor of direct elections. At first all Senators demonstrated their loyalty to the regime by declar ing that they would not vote in favor of direct elections. But, their votes changed as the number of active protestors in their districts increased daily. Senators felt obliged to fulfill the wishes of their constituents to approve the bill authorizing dir ect elections. For the first time since the commencement of the regime, the army commanders could not agre e on a presidential candidate and pressure from the public did not cease ( Mainwaring 1986, 163). Negotiations began between the Democratic Front, the Democratic Alliance, PDS, the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (PMDB) and the Armed forces in 1983 to deliberate on the terms f or changing the political arena (172). The transition to democracy in Brazil has been called becau opposition parties and the social movements, [the opposition] was incapable of over transition left 14,000 retired military personnel in the bureaucracy primarily in state ministries and companies. Active duty officers kept their posts in six of the twenty two C abinet positions and the armed forces conserved its autonomy over all military affairs. Armed service officers even maintained influence over policy areas pertaining to labor
91 | Page rights, human rights, and agrarian reform three areas with fundamental ties to th e interests of the general population (Arceneaux 2001, 180). Since the military held jurisdiction in policies regarding human rights, officers saw to it that they were granted amnesty. The extent of military influence in the amnesty policy is evident in the terms it outlines. Only officers within the military hierarchy were pardoned for all previous transgressions. Those officers who were purged from the ranks under military rule were left unprotected and susceptible to arrest for any transgressions they may have committed (Arceneaux 2001, 180; Linz and Stepan 1996, 169). That is to say, active duty officers allowed for the persecution of purged soldiers who were not loyal to the regime, again enforcing the collegial aspect of the regime. With ample conces sions allotted to the armed forces in exchange for their removal from power, it was irrefutable that there would be a continuation of military influence in Brazilian politics. Economic Problems Since the Brazilian economy is the largest in Latin America, international actors were notably observant of its fluctuations. Changes in the Brazilian economy affect ed the economies of both the United States and of Europe. Therefore, these western countrie s monitored the political and economic situations in Brazil (Mainwaring 1986, 154; Smith and White 1992, 874). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) attempted to implement policies in Brazil to alleviate their economic troubles resulting from the 1973 oil crisis. However, the President did not accept the demands being made on Brazil by a third party institution. If President Figueriredo had accepted help from external actors he would have acknowledged that Brazil was in a weakened state, and it would have resulted in his
92 | Page removal from the presidency (Arceneaux 2001, 176; Mainwaring 1986, 159). At that point in time, the military still controlled the country and did not allow others to intervene 1983 period [of apertura ] inaug urated a stage of constant struggle and negotiation between regime and opposition, constant efforts by the latter to (Mainwaring 1986, 154). Figure 3.4 illustrates the stagna nt military expenditures between 1973 and 1977 that is associated with the economic crisis. Figure 3. 4 Military Expenditures in Brazil from 1973 1995 ( based on billions of dollars for each year respectively ) Source :"World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1964 1997." U.S. Department of State 1982, 1987, 1997. With the support of the RSC, President Figuerierdo lowered military expenditures, expecting to simultaneously mitigate economic problems and legitimize the the 1980s Brazil had the lowest defense budget in ilitary may be taking away from social 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 Military Expennditures million dollars current
93 | Page le gitimacy of the Brazilian state However, Figure 3. 4 commitment to low military spending did not last long as expenditures skyrocketed between 1985 and 1990, during the transition process. Post Transition Civil Military Relations in Brazil Following the transition to democracy, civilian elected presidents faced an ardent continuation of armed force leverage in the political sphere. Many years went by with very few attempts to reform the military institutions in Brazil. However, democratic consolidation cannot be achiev ed without creating an atmosphere of political stability where the President is fully able to implement policies according to interests of constituents and the decisions of the legislature. The government should hold the military accountability for the tac tics used to maintain the repressive military apparatus. Accountability promotes democratic principles in the state bureaucracy and demonstrates the executive plan of establishing legitimacy. Nevertheless, it was not until after the millennium that real re form policy was fortuitously materialized. Executive Tug o War: The Presidential Administrations from 1989 1995 Trancedo Neves became the first popularly elected civilian President of Brazil in the election on January 15, 1985. He died before taking office though, and the presidency was left in the hands of vice president Jos Sarney (1985 1990) (Mainwaring 1986, 149). Following the general elections, the constitutional assembly was eager to begin implementing reform policies that had been discussed but ne ver put into force
94 | Page under the previous regime. The assembly tried to issue a vote for the establishment of a semi parliamentary system in Brazil. These officials acknowledged the difficulties that came about as an individual attempted to govern such a large territory. In fear of another military coup, members of the assembly believed that the change in governing structure w ould lead to a more unified state (Linz and Stepan 1996, 196). Conversely, the armed services saw the institution of a parliamentary sys tem as a threat to their military prerogatives. High commanding officers met with President Sarney and successfully convinced him to appeal to the constitutional assembly. Shortly after a presidential veto of the proposed bill, President Sarney issued a st atement claiming that a change in government structure would result in limited executive authority and it was not in the best interest of the populace to make such a drastic change so early in the transition process. The unity of the security sector and th e President in rejecting this initiative proclaimed an enduring presence of military influence in the decision making procedures of the state (Linz and Stepan 1996, 169). President Sarney did not try to limit the autonomy of the armed forces. Instead of c reating one Ministry of Defense, he allowed the military to keep their authoritative powers extended over a few ministries. The continued supervision of separate ministries, Serviio Nacional de Informo nes ) (SNI), by active duty officers gave the security sector a larger range of authority. Military oversight capability was thus dispersed, rather than concentrated in only one bureau to limit military influence. The only real limit President Sarney imposed on the armed forces was a slight decrease in military expenditures that he reallocated to pork barrel projects and patronage funds (Hunter 2000, 110). During the Sarney administration, a
95 | Page failure to launch successful reform policies in Brazil led f ive out of seven people to believe that the country was run more successfully under military rule (Linz and Stepan 1996, 173). The legislature tried to implement seven different reform packages with no success, which led the people to believe that change i n Brazil was unlikely to occur without a military official in office (Linz and Stepan 1996, 169). Consecutive presidents were able to achieve political stability and subordinate es on the development of institutions and norms that effectively confine the reach and power of active 1992) al institutions of the security sector: SNI and the Secretariat for National Defense ( Secretaria de Assessoramento de Defensa Nacional or SADEN) (Hunter 2000, 112). These bureaus were previously used by the armed services to oversee the actions of civilian s who worked in government positions. Under military rule, SNI and SADEN were tools for implementing the repressive elements of the regime. Dissolving these two departments concentrated military authority in the four ministries officers still had control o ver (112). It also symbolized an evolution of the government as it shut down two major power houses of the former regime. political subordination [of the armed forces that wa s] subject to civilian control of the
96 | Page scandals of his corruptive measures to achieve politic al superiority were brought to the attention of the Senate. He was impeached in 1992. The next President, Itamar Franco (1992 1994) was faced with an unstable legislature as congressional disapproval of the actions of Collor de Mello haunted idency. Some expected political instability to return due to the lack of support for the President and economic troubles that left the government very vulnerable. threatened to inv estigate cases of corruption that involved several officials in the local were granted slight salary concessions and funding for military projects (Hunter 2000, 122 123). Prospects for Democratization: Presidential Administrations from 1995 1999 Accountability for human rights violations was not addressed until almost seven years after the military handed over the government. An estimated 1,600 people were killed during the military regime in land disputes. For years, conflicts over land have deeply divided society in Brazil that has increased inequality among the people. object of repeated v iolent attacks by illegal armed vigilantes in the pay of landowners and 16 In response to these horrors carried out by officers, only seventeen trials were conducted that led to the conviction of eight milita ry officers (Linz and Stepan 1996, 178). 16 For more information on land disputes in Brazil, see Hammond 2009.
97 | Page The issue of human rights was not a topic that could be addressed openly by the government. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 2003) attempted to approach this issue in 1996 by proposing a plan to compensate the families of those killed during the military regime (Macaulay 2007, 35) While not explicitly stating that the military had committed heinous acts, compensation was formally interpreted as an acknowledgment of the murders (Hunter 2000, 106). The milit ary tried to combat As part of the compensation program, the government paid restitution to the family of Carlos Lamarco, a former army general who led one of the guerilla groups. The Lamarco case caused the m ilitary to actively express their disapproval of the entire rebelled against the regime (Hunter 2000, 106 107). The military again protested in vain as the President held the support of both the legislature and the general populace to go ahead with the compensation program. President Cardoso assured the military that they would not be prosec uted so long as they allowed the payment of settlements to be made to the families of victims ( Hunter 2000, 114 ; Macaulay 2007, 35 ). In 1996, President Cardoso also directed the Ministry of Defense to publish the first book on defense called Politics on Na tional Defense ( Poltica de Defensa Nacional or PDN). PDN established guidelines for military prerogatives in the Brazilian state (Hunter 2000, 114 ; Dammert 2007, 24 ). It marked a shift in the policy of the armed forces from direct military involvement in the internal affairs of the country to a focus on external matters that related to national security. Notwithstanding, the defense document
98 | Page did not explicitly outlin e actual limitations on the use of armed service personnel in internal matters ( Hunter 2000, 117 ; Dammert 2007, 42 ). Twenty first Century Civil Military Affairs Towards the beginning of the twenty first century the military lost its control over separate security institutions as President Cardoso created one large Ministry of Defense military authority was finally concentrated in one department (Hunter 2008, 115). Hunter outlined some areas where the military still had room for improvement if the governm ent was working towards increasing transparency: Civilians need to make inroads into these residual spheres of military autonomy in order to extended popular sovereignty and consolidate democracy. By leaving issues like military education, socialization, and doctrine in the hands of uniformed officers who are likely to be steeped in the undemocratic traditions of the institution civilians ignore the possibility of reshaping the attitudes of people who could exert a critical impact on the future of democrac y. (Hunter 2000, 118 119). With a large decline in military autonomy over the years, the executive branch surely attained the subordination of the armed services. Officers were still given the ability to run for offices in the state apparatus, but the actions of the security sector would always be monitored through the Ministry of Defense. Several nongovernmental organizations have been monitoring human rights violations committed by the security sector in Brazil. In 1999 alone, military police killed three hundred and eighty civil ians in Sao Paulo in an attempt to ensure the safety of the people. But, in conjunction with those on duty reports, it was reported that almost two hundred people were killed by off duty police forces in the same region (Call 2002, 13) Due to the high num ber of causalities at the hand of security personnel, international organizations have for years requested that the government take action to monitor the
99 | Page actions of these military police forces. As Brazil attempts to consolidate, the existence of (Call 2002, 13) Security forces acting on behalf of a democratic government should not have such lethal tendencies. d forces to quell civil insurrections as a result of gang violence in the favela s (shanty towns) around Rio de Janerio. As the city attempts to prepare itself for the coming Olympic games of 2016, gang leaders have ordered their members to rebel against th e government. At least twenty six people have been killed due to confrontations between heavily armed gang members and police officers throughout the city (Yapp 2010). With the increase in number of wounded persons, Governor Sergio Cabral called upon the B razilian military to help regain control in the city as gangs were attempting to undermine security. eight favelas With a history o assistance from the armed forces to ensure stability within its borders. With a greater amount of gang violence occurring in larger cities, the military has increasingly been called in to supp ort police forces as they work towards establishing order in favelas across the country. Using the military to ensure stability inherently means that the government is unable to guarantee security and stability to its constituents, thus falling short of fu violence is central to the rule of law. A state loses legitimacy if it cannot provide security ent is
100 | Page to prevent further outbreaks of instability, officials must find alternative means of effectively governing the state that would not necessitate the direct involvement of armed service personnel in maintaining security. Figure 3.5 corroborates the situation in Brazil. The Democracy Index shows that Brazil has gone down in both the category of political culture and civil liberties that can be attributed to the present clash between the government and th e people living in favelas. Figure 3.5 Democracy Index in Brazil, 2006 2011 Source: The Economist 2007, 2008, 2010, 201 1 2012. Brazil has yet to make moves upwards closer to its 2006 levels where all categories, excluding political participation were at least ranked five out of ten. Brazil needs to work on improving its political culture if it want s to work towards consolidating the state. Ensuring political stability to the people is one of the main measures of consolidation along with government accountability. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 2006 2007 2009 2010 2011 electoral process and pluralism functining government political participation political culture civil liberties
101 | Page UN Commissioner for Human Rights in Brazil has stated that twenty three military police officers were convicted for their participation in the prison massacre that occurred in 1992, after the transition to democracy commenced in Brazil. These men were sentenced on April 21, 2013 and cases are now being drawn against another fifty three offic ers that may have been involved (Pouilly 2013) 17 These trails are aiding the Brazilian government s quest towards the attainment of accountability but, w ith the Brazilian government calling upon military forces to help remove people from their homes, it do es not appear that the government is being held fully accountable to its electorate a major problem hindering democrat ic consolidation. Conclusion : Two Different Patterns of a Gradual Removal of the Armed Forces from Government The cases of Chile and Bra zil exhibit instances where, following the initial transition to democracy, members of the armed services were able to continue serving in positions in the state bureaucracy. In both cases, the gradual removal of the military from government prolonged the transition and delayed the consolidation processes. In Chile, however, the government is apparently on its way to attaining an effective state without cases of political protests. The Chilean military has remained submissive since the imprisonment of Gener al Augusto Pinochet in 1998 former commander in chief and President of the military regime On the other hand, the Brazilian state seems to be 17 For more information on the 1992 Brazilian Prison Massacre, see Pouilly 2013.
102 | Page further away from consolidation as the decentralized nature of military rule in the country left various cleavages and avenues of influence that could not all be handled during the transition to democracy. Both Chile and Brazil demonstrated efforts toward s attaining transparency of the security sector through the publication of books on defense. The countries released the defense documents around the same time, Chile in 1997 (ratified in 2002) and Brazil in 1996 (ratified in 2005) (Dammert 2007, 24). The p roduction of these reports marked the evolving nature of the security sectors in each country as they were determined to implement democratic principles in all areas of the state system. These texts illustrated a shift to advance accountability in both the governments and the armed forces of these countries. While the Chilean case exhibited great difficulties in amending the Constitution of 1980 that was instituted by the military Junta, the eventual prosecution of officers for human rights violations gave the government an opening to implement political reforms. As officers who governed under military rule retired and a new generation of soldiers took command, military doctrine became more subdued in its demands on the civilian government. Elected civilian officials gained greater access to the Ministry of Defense and the Chilean Congress is seeking to amend the copper subsidy that still forms part of the military budget. Politicians believe that the automatic ten percent allocated directly to the military each year provides more funds than necessary to support the security sector. In Brazil, news articles from 2013 demonstrate a continued use of the military in the internal affairs of the state whe
103 | Page ian Special Forces Take Control ) The government still maintains control over the vast majority of the countr y but the slums are forcing officials to increase Brazilians from the slums to create new infrastructure for the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympic G ames, impoverish ed people are acting against the government out of frustration. The government is seeking to create these new state of the art arenas and hotels to host global events at the expense of the people living in these areas. The use of force to quell insurrectio ns, whether they are led by gang members or by those living in s unstable security situation, as well as involvement of the military in governing. Political stability government accountability and civil and political freedoms are the p rinciple variables used in this study to measure consolidation. In these two cases of a gradual removal of the armed forces, political stability has been reached in Chile, but Brazil is still far off from achieving this goal. In both countries, t he democratic governments have successfully been able to provide some form of accountability for their people with regards to human rights violations. The international community arrested General Augusto Pinochet which led to greater accountability for pa st injustices in Chile With Pinochet out of the way, the civilian led Chilean government had the opportunity to assume its oversight capabilities over the armed services. In Brazil, the compensation program provided a sense of closure for the people alth ough the government did not choose to hold trials against officers. However, the Brazilian Prison Massacre occurred after the transition to democracy. The fact that only Colonel Ubiratan Guimaraes was convicted for the deaths of 111 inmates in the
104 | Page Carandiru prison demonstrates that there were issues in establishing accountability. Thirteen years later, the officers involved in the prison uprising/massacre are being people therefore is rather questionable. Nevertheless, the trials have commenced and it should be acknowledge that the government is attempting to hold their constituents accountable for their actions, regardless of their affiliation with the military ins titution. Both countries have and are still experiencing some trouble in appointing a fully civilian committee to determine the budget of the armed forces. In Chile, politicians believe that the military is being appropriated too much money given that th e country is not in a state of war. Left wing Congressmen are lobbying to have the copper fund taken away from the military budget, hoping to reallocate those resources towards national development. In Brazil, the Ministry of Defense oversees the budget of the armed services, but with rising demands of the military to assist in the internal affairs of the state, the budget is largely administered by officers. Chile again is ahead of Brazil in attaining more control over the military budget while Brazil has been able to attain a civilian check on the allocation of the military budget Thus, these countries still hold idation process, but there is a clear difference between the two on the progr ess made toward that goal. The military regimes of Chile and Brazil ended in the late 1980s. Two decades after the transition to democracy commenced Brazil is still tackling with some basic measures of consolidated democracies The transition process was measured evaluating civilian oversight on the military budget; accountability for human rights violations; and the removal of officers from their government positions. The democratic g overnments in
105 | Page both countries met a great deal of resistance when trying to deal with these measures in during the early years of the transition process Consolidation is measured when political stability a free political and civil society and government accountability ha ve been achieved. Chile is making real progress in att empting to establish an effic ient check and balances system and the country has experienced no instances of serious instability after the conviction of Pinochet Consolidation is farther away from being achieved in Brazil now than it was in the early 2000s agrarian political disputes 18 and the rezoning projects in favelas. rely on the use of force to maintain control over the ir land. 18 For more information on Land Disputes and the military, see Hammond 2009.
106 | Page Chapter 4 The Road Not Taken: Sudden versus Gradual Removal o f Officers to Promote Democratic Consolidation Two roads diverged in a wood, and I I took the one less traveled by, And th at has made all the difference. Robert Frost (1920) Evaluating the effects that sudden and gradual removal s of officers had on the consolidation of democracy after military rule produced two very different results The first result was drawn preliminarily as each group was examined independently looking at the sudden cases first then at the gradual cases. Comparing Argentina and Uruguay as sudden cases and Brazil and Chile as gradual cases led to conclusions that verified the hypothesis of this study: the sudden cases had shorter tr ansition periods to fully elected rule But, as all four countries were compared in a single group another result emerged The broader analysis allowed consideration of factors beyond the effects that the timing of the removal of officers had on consolidat ion and it became evident that another feature characteristic of military regimes affected the democratization processes of these countries military hierarchy
107 | Page Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Chile experi enced transitions to democracy from military rule in the late 1980s and since then have attempted to consolidate their democratic states The se military regimes were among the most repressive in the region with the cases of disappeared and tortured victims in the tens of thousands. E ach case study commenced with an overview of the government structure under military rule. Specific features of thes e governments were outlined to explain the chain of comma nd and changes made to the executive and legislative branches. Then, t he transfer o f power was analyzed to determine whether any agreements were made between the armed forces and civilians prior to the transition. Following the first popular election, changes in the political are na were described to examine government accountability to i ts electorate. E ach case was outlined to determine whether or not governments had achieved a full t ransition based o n three elements: the removal of armed forces personnel from the state bureaucracy, civilian oversight of military budget, and accountability for human rights violations Changes in government personnel and budget oversight were used to indicate a change in civil military relations after the transfer of power Human rights were discussed to explore any repercussions that may have resulted from investigating previous crimes committed by military officers. the protection of individual rights supports the develop[ment] of law and vi c (2006, 38). Therefore, upholding the rule of law to hold officers accountable advance s the accountability of the state as a whole and thus was used as a measure of government accountability during the transition process To measure democratic c onsolid ation, the establishment of p olitical stability civil and pol itical liberties, and a functioning government were assessed in each case study
108 | Page Political stability was evaluated based on the occurrence of any events that may have p ut the legitimacy of the government to question. Cases where popular protests challenged the authority of the government suggests that political instability and complications in the achievement of a functioning government P eaceful protests addressing policies without destabilizing the regime, however, can signify c onsolidation as they demonstrate a adherence to democratic principles A functioning government was also assessed using the following variables: the effective u se of a check and balance system and electoral legitimacy To assess the promotion of political and civil freedoms as well as the achievement of fair electoral processes and functioning government, the Economist Intellig used. The Democracy Index captures changes in the se key democratic features from 2006 to 2011 and ultimately dem onstrate s whether or not these cases have remained o n the road to consolidation with the exception of Urug uay which had already reached the elevated state of government legitimacy and democratic consolidation by 1992 Gradual vs. Sudden: An Incomplete Analysis for Consolidation Scholars have argued in support of a gradual removal of officers as a stabilizing factor when attempt ing to transition to democracy. However, when evaluating the consolidation efforts of these countries the case s in which militar y personnel were not removed from government positions during the initial transfer of power resulted in
109 | Page greater instances of political instability in the transition process in the case of Chile, and in both the transition and consolidation processes of Brazil. Attempting to extract the armed forces from executive authority after they have been in power for several years is not an easy task, but when trying to establish a democratic state it is a n obstacle that must be overcome A sudden rem oval of armed forces officers from the state bureaucracy during the transfer of power allows the civilian government to make moves towards instituting democratic norms without intervention from military officers in decision making bodies. Military Retreat with the First Democratic Election Argentina and Uruguay saw expedited retreats of the military from the government which accelerated the transfers of power, but different patterns emerged in the consolidation process. In Argentina, the Easter Uprising o f 1987 almost destabilized the democratic administration. As soldiers protested against trials for human rights violations, Argentine civilians mobilized and demanded that the government do what was necessary to prevent another military coup. Under the dir ection of President Ricardo Alfonsin, those military officers who were still loyal to the state quelled the insurrection and restored order to Argentina. After the uprising, th ere were no substantial protests against the government until the twenty first century Hundreds of thousands assembled against the government of President Cristina Fernandez in 2007, 2011, and 2012 The protestors have called for changes in economic policies, action against corruption, and the rejection of proposed constitutional changes all indicators of an unconsolidated state President Fernandez has mentioned changing the constitution to run
110 | Page for a third term because she has the support of current government officials B ut as repeated protests have shown, she does not have t he support of the masses (Uki Goni 2012). The ability for the people to protest demonstrates that the country supports democratic practices. President Fernandez has not call ed in military support to subdue the protests nor have ther e been any reports of deat hs or injuries as a result of these events. While the government is enduring these demonstrations the protestors have emphasized that they do not seek to challenge the institution of democracy only the political failures of the current president and uncertainties about constitutional change Uruguay is ranked eighteen th on the Democracy I ndex published by the Economist Intelligence Unit higher than Costa Rica, a country with no standing military force (Democracy Index 2012). Since the transition to democracy the Uruguayan government has not had to deal with any popular uprisings. The elected presidents following the transition chose not to prosecute officers for previous abuses as they focused on democratization. However, the government did add ress the human rights abuses through a referendum in Congress. Popularly elected representatives in the legislature agreed that they would not prosecute officers for previous crimes emphasizing a need to move forward with the consolidation. In both these c ase s the sudden r emoval of officers resulted in a shorter transition process. While democracy in Argentina is still not fully consolidated the country does hold free and fair elections every four years, the military budget is in the hands of civilian off icials, and the rights of the people are respected and upheld Argentina has moved beyond the transition phase but still faces some challenges in consolidating the new system
111 | Page In Brazil and Chile, the military maintained key positions in the government structure following the transition to democracy. Political reform to remove the last vestiges of military influence did not gain momentum in Chile until after General Augusto Pino chet was arrested in 1998. Upon his removal, the military lost their strongman and their influence over right wing parties in Congress came to a halt. The Chilean government was able to limit the number of military officers in the government and is curren tly working towards removing the copper subsidy from the budget of the armed services. Cases are being investigated against officers who have been accused of using government funds for personal bonuses and several officers have been convicted for their pre vious human rights violations example of delayed accountability, whereby injustices have been addressed after the T he fact that the Chilean government is now actively investigating the actions of military officers exhibits the shift in civil military relations that has occurred over time. Despite the positive outlook for Chile, Brazil is not experiencing such outright democratic progress. The present s ituation in Braz il is looking w ary as an increase in military aid to local governments has raised questions about the legitimacy of the Brazilian government. Officials have claimed that violent interactions between slum residents and police forces have necessitated the use of the milita ry to ensure stability in those areas. With the global community monitoring the political situation in Brazil as the date s of the World Cup and the Olympic Games approach, the government has tried to to ensure stability. However, it is
112 | Page evident that the government has not been successful in drawing the support of the electorate for the re zoning p rojects The people feel that they are being ignored by the government as they are left without means of voi cing their disapproval. cities like Rio de Janiero and Sao Paulo demonstrate that the government is not close to the attainment of consolidation. Again and again, the governme nt has been unable to peacefully administer the country. With a large number of causalities due to violent police forces, military use of force to deal with agrarian newest involvement in the reallocation of people out of the s ums of Rio de Janiero, the legitimacy of the government in Brazil is called to question. But, the prosecution of the officers involved in the prison massacre of 1992 shows that the government is moving towards attaining accountability for human rights viol ations committed by military personnel. The officers responsible for those atrocities were military police forces that worked in the prison. The officers that were convicted in the first round of trials were part of an elite group of military police and th ose awaiting prosecution are said to be from the same unit. These two countries witnessed periods of transition where the military was allowed to remain in key influential positions for at least a decade after the first presidential election. In both coun tries, reform policies were heavily restricted until arrest in Chile in 1998, but has not been an issue after that. However, in Brazil, ensuring security is still a problem for the government because the police force alone is not able to deal with insurrections. Recent events may again bring violations of human rights into
113 | Page play in Brazil since Brazil has one of the highest rates of lethal police violence in comparison repeated involvement in land disputes that has resulted in the deaths of Brazilian civilians has led the people to believe that the government is not being completely accountable t o its people. A Different Story: The Role of the Military Hierarchy From 2005 to today, Chile and Uruguay have had no instances of popular uprisings beyond policy protests (e.g. protests led by students in Chile), while Argentina and Brazil are facing protests against their government s T he differences in quality of democracy in these cases may be attributed to the hierarchical nature of the military regimes tha t governed in Chile and Uruguay they strictly abided by the military chain of command and rem ained united throughout the transfer of power During the transition processes, the armed forces played a major role as they held a great deal of bargaining power On the other hand, in Argentina and Brazil, the regimes were plagued with fractionalization within military institution s Soldiers in Argentina remained loyal to their respective branch not extending their com mitments to other divisions in the armed services. The army, the air force, and the navy all had divergent views of how the state should b e governed and were never successful at establishing one unified force. The Brazilian regime became fragmented upon the implementation of apertura policy as
114 | Page political liberalization separated officers into three groups: hard liners, soft liners, and moderates. In Chile, Pinochet maintained an extensive system of power centralization that kept the divisions of the armed forces unified. The hierarchical nature of the military helped its leadership enforce the Constitution of 1980 that allowed for most of the However, o nce Pinochet was arrested the head of the armed services was removed a nd the military was placed on an even playing field to other state institutions with regard to resource allocation. The solidarity of the military forced political parties to create strong unions that could compete with military supporters in Congress. The hierarchy of the military branch thus assisted in the development of democratic principles in the political culture of Chilean society because it was the only way that reform policies could thrive. Brazil seems to be the furthest away from consolidation which may be attributed to the gradual removal of officers coupled with politica l fragmentation, both within military institution s and in civilian political parties during the transition. Unlike the officers of the Argentine military, t he Brazilian armed forces maintained leverage during discussions with civilian officials before the transition The Brazilian army still had the support of some elites and did not face economic turmoil when power was being transferred While the regime was able to control th e transition process, political factions present in the Brazilian military establishment cannot be ignored. At the time of the transition in Argentina, the military had just been defeated in war. They could not bolster enough support to gain concessions fr om the new democratic government. In both countries, democratization was hindered by the inheritance of a divided government.
115 | Page led nondemocratic regime of a potential obstacle to democratic this study do support that non hierarchical military regimes, like Brazil and Argentina, promote d democratic openings, my findi ngs demonstrate that these regimes do not iberalization policies occurred during military rule because of the nonhierarchical nature of the military regimes. The internal cleavages wi thin the government allowed for pockets of liberalization to develop. Once these policies were put into effect the military was quick ly forced into discussions with civilians because the democratic forum was developing. To this day these countries have s till been unable to present a strong and unified government that holds the support of the people. Their current struggles may be traced back to the original fragmented state of affairs before power was transferred from the hands of military officials to th ose of civilian representatives. Figure 4.1 illustrates the different scores each country received by the Economist Intelligence Unit in their 2012 report. Argentina scored higher than the other countries in the political participation category directly re government polls in an effort to alleviate the degrading political situation. Brazil, while scoring generally close to Chile in reference to civil liberties and pluralism, has the lowest score in political culture amo ng all four countries. Still maintaining a relatively high score in functioning government, Brazil ne eds to be closely monitored as its internal struggles may worsen. All four countries have room for improvement in the political
116 | Page participation category; nev ertheless, they all demonstrate notably high scores when comparing electoral processes and civil liberties. Figure 4.1 Democracy Index Results for the year 2011 Source: The Economist 2012. Grassroots Consolidation Efforts All in all, it can be concluded that cases with stronger hierarchical military structures may lead to greater likelihoods of civilian usurpation of power and militar y reorientation that facilitate democratic consolidation. The findings of this study alone do not present a definite conclusion as to the effects t he timing of the removal of officers has on democratization. It would be helpful to widen the scope of the study to include military regimes in countries from other regions to determine conclusively whether there is a relationship between the timing of the removal and consolidation. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 electoral process and pluralism functioning government political participation political culture civil liberties Uruguay Chile Argentina Brazil
117 | Page The comparison that included all four countries revealed that Brazil and Argentina, cases from both the gradual removal and sudden removal groups, are currently faced with actions that inhibit consolidation Political stability is one of the main components of a consolidated democracy; the fact that Brazil has not achieved stability demonstrates that it is still in the early stages of the consolidation phase Argentina has not been able to demonstrate the installation of a functioning government and thus has not been able to consolidate its democracy. Establishing that both gradual and sudden cases can lead to the c reation of both stable and unstable governments demonstrates that the length of a transition process does not automatically influence the quality of the democracy I wo uld suggest further research be conducted evalu ating the structure of military regimes, hierarchical and nonhierarchical, before the transfer from military to democratic rul e to evaluate its implications for the transition and the consolidation processes. The findings of this research study shifted the discussion to one that require s an analysis of the effects of fractionalization in the armed forces before the start of a transition process as it seems to b e related to the consolidation process of these South American countries Based on these results, the structure of military regim es principally whether officers of the high command are able to maintain the hierarchical nature of their institution before and as power is transferred to civilians has a strong influence on countries seeking to achieve a consolidated democracy in the f uture. Lin z and Stepan state that nonhierarchical militaries both promote democratic transitions and democratic consolidation (1996, 68) Their argument is based on the premise that nonhierarchical militaries facilitate the installment of democratic principles
118 | Page in society. The scattered interests of these regimes in particular make it more difficult to c ontrol the state and its people which gives civil society a window for creating change. Nonhierarchical military regim es are thus easier to overturn because they do not present a unified platform to promote their specific interests when power is being transferred from military officers to civilian representatives. Since the prerogatives of the military are removed during the transfer, the consolidation process occurs with no military interference (68 69) However, the results of this study demonstrate that nonhierarchical militaries do not facilitate the consolidation process. The cases of Brazil and Argentina suggest tha t the nonhierarchical structure of the military regimes produced internal divisions in government that were inherited by the political parties of the democratic r egimes Discussions that occurred du ring the transfer of power between top political party rep resentatives and military officials did not produce positive results for the military because its interests were scattered and differed between each division of the armed forces. The divided commitments by the armed services gave civilians an upper hand d uring the discussions, but as military interests remained disintegrated political parties inherited the fragmented governmental state of affairs. The divisions have also allowed some parts of the military to get involved in civil politics after the transit ion. For example, the Easter Uprising in Argentina where a section of the armed services acted independently of the security sector. The faction was insubordinate to superior officers and greatly disrupted the stability of the nation. The Brazilian militar y maintained several
119 | Page areas of influence in agrarian policies and the Amazon that it has largely kept into present times. more involved it is in the day to day governing, the mor e salient the issue of successful discussing hierarchical military regimes, Linz and Stepan argue that hierarchical regimes ary as institution may come to believe that their interests are best served by extrication from the mi litary as government (151). B ut they argue that military regimes that use such strict governing mechanisms may inhibit the consolidation process because the remnants of the military regime 152). T he results of this study nonhierarchical military regimes have on the democratic transition process. Nevertheless, i n reference to de mocratic consolidation this study indicates that their findings may be incorrect The hierarchical structure of the military regimes of Chile and Uruguay did not inhibit the consolidation of democracy in t hese countries rather it aided t he process Since both regimes were able to establish very strict and unified governing tactics, where the were able to m ake credible commitments with the representatives o f the new democratic government The Uruguayan Junta was able to come to terms with representatives of the political parties that expedited the transition process The decision of the Junta to remove itsel f from the political scene during the transition allowed for democracy to flourish
120 | Page without any factions of the military remaining in the political scene the military hierarchy followed the decision of the Junta and all officers exited the government. In Ch ile, once Pinochet was detained, the military as whole receded from the political scene and political reforms, as well as security sector reforms, commenced. The hierarchical structure of the military made the removal of the armed forces from the governmen t swift and acute. Due to the government s freedom in creating change, without facing a military influenced gridlock in government affairs a more consolidated state has been instituted Further literature on the structure of military regimes and its effec ts on democratization is needed to determine whether the principles that were discovered in the se case s tudies have been present in other countries as well The cases of Brazil and Argentina demonstrate that nonhierarchical military regimes may hinder the consolidation process because the cleavages present under military rule may continue into the democratization phase. The hierarchical military regimes of Chile and Uruguay show that unified regimes may lead to greater instances of consolidation. The new de mocratic governments need only counter the acts of the leaders of the previous military regimes to establish a functioning government that fosters the institution and implementation of other democratic principles in these states.
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