AN ARRANGED MARRIAGE? Non-Governmental Development Organizations, State Capacity, and Education in Kenya and Tanzania

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Title: AN ARRANGED MARRIAGE? Non-Governmental Development Organizations, State Capacity, and Education in Kenya and Tanzania
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Staebler, Anne-Sophie
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2013
Publication Date: 2013


Subjects / Keywords: Education
Development Studies
State Capacity
Non-Governmental Development Organizations
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: Non-governmental development organizations have assumed an increasing role in the education sectors of developing countries. Through case studies of Kenya and Tanzania, this study explores the reasons behind the increased involvement of these organizations, as well as the effects of their presence on the capacity of the state to provide education services. This analysis not only provides insight into relationships among actors who are indispensable to development, but also examines issues that affect government capacity to provide services and to oversee non-state actors engaged in similar activities. Examination of contextual, historical, and empirical data in these two cases indicates a cycle of policy initiatives and constraints that undermine government capacity and reveals issues that must be resolved in order to improve prospects for effective development of these countries' educational sectors.
Statement of Responsibility: by Anne-Sophie Staebler
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2013
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

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Source Institution: New College of Florida
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Permanent Link:

Material Information

Title: AN ARRANGED MARRIAGE? Non-Governmental Development Organizations, State Capacity, and Education in Kenya and Tanzania
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Staebler, Anne-Sophie
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2013
Publication Date: 2013


Subjects / Keywords: Education
Development Studies
State Capacity
Non-Governmental Development Organizations
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: Non-governmental development organizations have assumed an increasing role in the education sectors of developing countries. Through case studies of Kenya and Tanzania, this study explores the reasons behind the increased involvement of these organizations, as well as the effects of their presence on the capacity of the state to provide education services. This analysis not only provides insight into relationships among actors who are indispensable to development, but also examines issues that affect government capacity to provide services and to oversee non-state actors engaged in similar activities. Examination of contextual, historical, and empirical data in these two cases indicates a cycle of policy initiatives and constraints that undermine government capacity and reveals issues that must be resolved in order to improve prospects for effective development of these countries' educational sectors.
Statement of Responsibility: by Anne-Sophie Staebler
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2013
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2013 S7
System ID: NCFE004871:00001

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AN ARRANGED MARRIAGE? Non-Governmental Development Organizations, State Capacity, and Education in Kenya and Tanzania BY ANNE-SOPHIE STAEBLER A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida April, 2013


May we never cease to learn May we never cease to grow Education is not filling a pail, but the lighting of a fire. unknown I've made a huge mistake. Gob Bluth ii


Acknowledgements The greatest undertaking of my undergraduate career could never have become a reality without the love, support, and inspiration of the most amazing people I could ever wish to have in my life. Whether they have been with me from birth or for the past few years, each of them has had an impact on who I am today, and I wish to thank them. My mother, Patricia Staebler, and my brother, Maximilian Staebler, are without a doubt the two most important people in my life. They are responsible for the person I have become. My mother has always supported me in every decision and encouraged me to pursue my passion, no matter how strange it seemed at first. She has never held me back, trusting me to make my own choices, yet never leaving my side when I made mistakes and came crying back to her. The best friend in the world, the most caring, understanding and passionate individual that ever walked across its earth, she has shown me what it is to struggle without giving up and helped me grow into a content, driven individual who is poised to take on the world. Without my brother, I would not be half the person I am today. He has kept me grounded and shown me the most beautiful example of what it is to struggle without giving in to fear or hatred. His passion for life, love and learning, his steadfast loyalty to the people in his life, and ultimately his ability to forgive have been the greatest gift a sister could ask for. My confidant, my partner in crime, my darling baby brother. A source of inspiration and hope, and the reason for my passionate pursuit of knowledge and life, Donald Falls is both mentor and friend to me, and I am beyond thankful for his influence. He showed me what it is to be a scholar, guiding me through high school and challenging me intellectually and personally. Without him, I would not be where I am today. At a time when I was alone, he was a friend, and when I was seeking direction, he was a beacon of guidance and support. The plans I discussed with him have long since changed, but the path he showed me has never faltered. He showed me that I alone shape my journey, and that as long as I carried with me compassion, a desire never to cease growing, and a thirst for intellectual pursuits, the journey would be the destination. To all of you that have been a friend to me, thank you. Some of us no longer speak, and some of you are halfway across the world, but each and every one of you has allowed me to grow, to learn, and to love. Most especially I want to make my love and appreciation known for Mallory Fenn, Matthew Blackowiak, Clare Letmon, Tom McKay, Andrea Jarret, Mark Ishman, Will Livingston, Zach Eidelman, Olivia Levinson, Elizabeth Sockol, and Antonia Welke. Each of you has brought light into my life and shown me parts of myself I never knew were there. You will forever be a part of who I am. Thank you to anyone who has allowed me the opportunity to refine ideas about my thesis by telling them about my research, and an even bigger thank you to anyone who allowed iii


me to complain and cry about my thesis. Thank you also to the most helpful and understanding librarians and the staff of the Jane Bancroft Cook Library. To my amazing, intimidating, and life changing professors, thank you for calling me out when I was wrong, for challenging my understanding every step of the way, and for giving me the gift of an incredible education and the opportunity to discover my passion in life. You all gave me every opportunity to succeed and opened doors I never knew existed. Most importantly I would like to thank my thesis committee members, Dr. Tarron Khemraj, Dr. Erin Dean, and Dr. Barbara Hicks. Tarron Khemraj revealed to me the human side of economics, helping me to reconcile my critical views with reality and showing me alternatives in development. He has been an indispensable part of my undergraduate studies, providing advice and support whenever it was needed. I will also forever be grateful to Erin Dean for helping me to nurture my passion for development and taking me under her wing. She allowed me to follow my passion down my own path, trusting me to be more than a student by letting me pursue interests on my own and challenging me to think more critically. Most of all, I wish to thank Barbara Hicks, my advisor throughout my thesis process and the majority of my time at New College. She has consistently challenged me to be a better student and has been the biggest supporter of all my endeavours, helping me to achieve my goals even when I believed myself to be incapable. Her fierce passion for academia, the tireless efforts to help students, and her steadfast faith in my ability to succeed will continue to inspire me throughout my life and I am unendingly grateful for her dedication. iv


Table of Contents List of Abbreviations vii Abstract ix Introduction 1 Chapter One: Understanding NGDOs and Relationships with Development Actors 8 Defining NGDOs 9 Classifying NGDOs 13 Issues Facing NGDOs 18 Accountability 19 Maintaining Autonomy and the Development Agenda 23 NGDOs and Relationships 25 Relationships with Donors 26 Relationships with Government 32 Latin America and Asia 34 Africa 35 The New Policy Agenda 41 NPA Effects on NGDO Government Relationships 42 Effects on Service Provision 45 Chapter Two: Education and Development in Kenya and Tanzania 49 Education in the Developing World 50 Conditionality and Dependency: Opening the Door for NGDOs 51 Impacts on Educational Quality 54 Non-Formal vs. Formal Education 55 Long-Term Impact on Education Service Provision 56 History of Education and Development in Kenya and Tanzania 58 Tanzania 60 1961 to 1990 62 1990 to Present 70 Kenya 75 1963 to 1989 78 1990 to Present 83 Summary 88 v


Chapter Three: Who is in Control? 91 Management and Administration 94 Who Does What in Education? 94 Capacity to Coordinate, Communicate, and Control 98 Policies and Issues Affecting Capacity 99 Privatization 103 Decentralization Difficulties 104 Performing Partnership 108 Motivations to Partner 109 Partnership Policies 111 Problems for Partnership 115 Expansion Efforts 120 Factors Influencing Expansion Efforts 121 Observed Effects and Consequences of Expansion 125 Enrollments and Literacy 126 Infrastructure and Inputs 127 Teaching 129 Examination and Transition Rates 130 Enrollments and Control 133 Comparing NGDO and State Provided Education 135 Summary 140 Chapter Four: Conclusion 143 Appendix A 154 Appendix B 155 References 156 vi


List of Abbreviations BEMP Basic Education Master Plan (Tanzania) CBO community-based organization CSO civil society organizations DDT District Development Trust (Tanzania) EFA Education for All ESDP Education Sector Development Program (Tanzania) ESR Education for Self-Reliance (Tanzania) ETP Education and Training Policy (Tanzania) EU European Union FDI foreign direct investment FPE free primary education GONGO government-non-governmental organization ICT information and communication technology IFI International Financial Institution INGO international non-governmental organization IMF International Monetary Fund KANU Kenya African National Union KESSP Kenya Education Sector Support Program LGRP Local Government Reform Program (Tanzania) MDG Millennium Development Goals MHEST Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (Kenya) MLA multilateral agency MOE Ministry of Education (Kenya) MOEC Ministry of Education and Culture (Tanzania) MRALG Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (Tanzania) MSTHE Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education (Tanzania) vii


NARC National Rainbow Coalition (Kenya) NCNGO National Council of NGOs (Kenya) NGO non-governmental organization NGDO non-governmental development organization NNGDO northern non-governmental development organization Novib Nederlandse Organisatie Voor Internationale Bijstand (Dutch organization for international aid) NPA New Policy Agenda QUANGO quasi-non-governmental organization PEDP Primary Education Development Plan (Tanzania) PO people's organizations SAGA semi autonomous government agencies (Kenya) SAP structural adjustment program SEDP Secondary Education Development Plan (Tanzania) SEMP Secondary Education Master Plan SNGDO southern non-governmental development organization SWAp sector-wide approach TANU Tanzania African National Union TEN/MET Tanzania Education Network /Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization UPE Universal Primary Education USAID United States Agency for International Development viii


AN ARRANGED MARRIAGE? NON-GOVERNMENTAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATIONS, STATE CAPACITY, AND EDUCATION IN KENYA AND TANZANIA Anne-Sophie Staebler New College of Florida, 2013 ABSTRACT Non-governmental development organizations have assumed an increasing role in the education sectors of developing countries. Through case studies of Kenya and Tanzania, this study explores the reasons behind the increased involvement of these organizations, as well as the effects of their presence on the capacity of the state to provide education services. This analysis not only provides insight into relationships among actors who are indispensable to development, but also examines issues that affect government capacity to provide services and to oversee non-state actors engaged in similar activities. Examination of contextual, historical, and empirical data in these two cases indicates a cycle of policy initiatives and constraints that undermine government capacity and reveals issues that must be resolved in order to improve prospects for effective development of these countries' educational sectors. Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Sciences ix


Introduction In the post-World War II era, communism became symbolic of the next great threat to peace and prosperity, prompting powerful nations such as the United States, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom to work in tandem, keeping the advance of the Iron Curtain at bay. To these nations, the key to prevention was investing in the political and economic development of underdeveloped countries. Development discourse soon focused on eliminating poverty as the primary objective, shaping subsequent policy initiatives and implementation around the idea that politically and, primarily, economically stable countries whose citizens fare well are inevitably less susceptible to the dangerous influences of communism. What began as an activity undertaken solely by governments and their various agencies has evolved into an industry of its own. Among these actors are civil society, bilateral and multilateral agencies, donors, and non-governmental development organisations (NGDOs). Today, the world is still wrestling with the problem of development, or more appropriately the lack thereof. Transitioning through different approaches to the issues of development yielded few lasting results, or at least, not the desired results. Today, the global community struggles to understand why pouring 1


trillions of dollars in resources into development initiatives failed to produce the desired result of developed nations that are economically and politically healthy. This study explores the relationship between NGDOs active as service providers in education and the governments of Kenya and Tanzania. I seek not only to ascertain what effect neoliberal policies have had on the NGDO-state relationship, but also to evaluate the impact of both the NGDO-state relationship and these policies upon the government's ability to control education service provision and the activities of NGDOs in the education sector. I argue that the advent of the New Policy Agenda, a bundle of neoliberal policies, was the catalyst for a changing dynamic between NGDOs and states, which not only had an impact on how these two actors interact with one another, but also has serious implications for government control and capacity. The impact and legacy of these policies persist into the present day, continuing to impede a healthy NGDO-state relationship and compromising state control over the education sector. It is vital to gain perspective on these issues and to better understand trends in service provision in developing countries, so as to be able to envision how services could be provided more effectively. Development should be an international priority and major changes must be made in the policies put forth by international and regional bodies; doing so requires understanding these issues. A major aspect of development initiatives, which will not disappear anytime soon, is the relationship between NGDOs and governments, and, while each case differs in a multitude of ways, the end result in most cases is far from effective and has done little to make a lasting impact on development. Searching for common factors and elements in these suboptimal outcomes is important, 2


because in finding them, we could be identifying how relationships between NGDOs and governments can become productive, so that development in turn can also become productive. Taking education as a lens with which to examine these issues is particularly useful. Education is hailed by countless scholars and governments as an essential tool for creating development and lifting people out of poverty. Developing human capital by improving basic literacy among developing populations has incredible potential for increasing individual opportunities. Yet education policies in developing countries are not without their problems or limitations, mirroring larger issues in the development arena that also depend on the interplay among different development actors. Theories regarding poor outcomes of development policy are abundant, and no singular group or event is to blame for these failures. Rather, the international system, individual states, and the development discourse as a whole are to blame. These are issues too numerous to mention, let alone explore in great detail, yet the literature on these matters point us in several distinct directions. As actors that have gained growing recognition and have expanded participation in the development process, NGDOs are subject to much academic and professional debate. Issues associated with NGDOs, such as accountability, effectiveness, and their relationships with states and donors have been researched at length. While many operate on similar principles, no two NGDOs are exactly the same, so even attempting to define NGDOs is complicated and contentious, given the abundance of opinions and evidence on the matter. 3


What is certain, however, is that NGDOs have become a vital actor in the developing world, often praised for their effectiveness and eagerness to experiment in order to achieve results. As active members of the development world, NGDOs have changed a great deal over the past decades, and, despite growing problems, NGDOs continue to receive positive recognition for their work from other actors involved in development. The number of NGDOs has skyrocketed, as has the amount of funding that is being channelled through NGDOs. Much of the praise for NGDOs is based on a few success stories, as well as assumptions about their superior accountability, effectiveness, impact, and capacity in bringing about long-term, sustainable development. Such generalizations about the attributes of NGDOs have resulted in a situation where many of the policy recommendations and decisions made by other actors in the development world have been based upon these same assumptions. Currently, NGDOs are major players in development, bequeathed with important responsibilities. However, many studies suggest that shifting some of these responsibilities has been harmful to development, due to the overgeneralizations regarding the abilities and capacities of NGDOs. One of the major policy changes that has had a lasting impact on the implementation of development policies is the New Policy Agenda (NPA), which arose in the 1980s and introduced neoliberal policies into development. Among other issues, the NPA placed a heavy emphasis on the role and abilities of NGDOs to produce progress in developing nations, bestowing upon them many responsibilities that had previously belonged to the state, such as service provision, policymaking at the local level, and disaster relief. 4


This shift fundamentally changed which actors carry out which development tasks, and has resulted in problems on a greater scale. While the precise outcomes differ from situation to situation, relationships between governments and NGDOs have been affected by the NPA, and NGDOs have changed their approach to development and their methods of implementation. These effects, in turn, are perceived by arguably the most important actors in development the people who are dependent upon NGDOs, the state, and other actors for aid and services in order to survive. One of the main ways in which the NPA has affected NGDOs and governments is through an emphasis on the supposed efficiency of NGDOs as compared to the government. This belief prompted policymakers to propose the transfer of service provision from the government to NGDOs. Thus, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, increasing amounts of aid went to NGDOs, mainly for the purposes of service provision, and, in comparison, government shares of direct development funding have decreased. The means of providing NGDOs with money vary; yet ultimately they receive the funds that are subsequently spent on the provision of services, and, as the literature reveals, several problems arise from privatizing and contracting out essential services for the poorest people. Services now provided by NGDOs range from healthcare and food assistance to environmental relief and education, all of which are traditionally provided by the government. Privatization of services affects both the government and NGDOs, as well as the quality of services, the range of the impact of the services provided, and the overall long-term effect on development. In essence, by changing these aspects of service 5


provision, the new approach has an impact on the relationship between NGDOs and governments, and on the capacity of governments. Yet, in what ways? Is it possible to say whether these effects are predominantly positive or negative? This study explores the relationship between NGDOs and the governments of Kenya and Tanzania, focusing on service provision in the education sectors of the two countries. It ultimately establishes the presence of an external homogenizing influence that affected education in Kenya and Tanzania, who, although they share many similar traits, differ in an important aspect. The two countries lend themselves to comparison, having experienced similar historical developments and pursued similar goals for education. Their geographic position as neighbours makes them appropriate case studies that can provide insight into possible regional trends. Additionally, the dedication to education that both Kenya and Tanzania have exhibited since gaining independence, as well as the strong presence of NGDOs in both countries, makes these suitable case studies. However, they differ greatly in their ideological approach to education and the role of outside actors in the education sector, a vital aspect to consider because they experienced the same outcomes in their relationship with NGDOs and their capacity to provide education services, which suggests a predominant pattern of influence from the international community. Through an in-depth review of the relevant literature, the first chapter of this study establishes the necessary framework with which to analyze the NGDO-state relationship and the effects of the NPA on this relationship. Additionally, the effect of the NPA on service provision and government control over education services is explored at a 6


general level. Building upon this chapter, the second chapter offers a concise literature review of education in the developing world, as well the history of service provision and education in Kenya and Tanzania. The chapter includes the most recent developments in the education sector of these countries, as well as the interactions between NGDOs and the governments of Kenya and Tanzania, with an emphasis on policy changes, especially those originating from neoliberal policies. The third chapter provides detailed analysis of empirical evidence in the two cases, examining management and administration issues, partnership between NGDOs and the state, and educational outcomes. Together, the two case studies help to identify trends in the NGDO-state relations and service provision, as well as highlight the major issues in these partnerships and problems and achievements in educational development. 7


Chapter One Understanding NGDOs and Relationships with Development Actors Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have grown in size and number over the past three decades, spreading all over the world, with much of this growth occurring among development-oriented NGOs, or NGDOs. 1 The increase in numbers stems largely from cases of social conflict and tension, as well as a marked need for more effective responses to crisis situations in developing areas where traditional structures and institutions are on the verge of collapse. In many situations, neither government nor the private sector has the capacity to address and resolve immediate and lingering social issues, such as poverty, health crises, and ethnic violence (Garilao 1987, 114). To deal with the inability of governments to make progress on these problems, a proffered solution has been to expand involvement of NGDOs in the development process, allowing them to pick up where the government is unable to deliver. This seemingly simple solution is complicated by tensions that often exist between leaders of developing 8 1 The vast literature on NGOs considers organizations working in numerous fields. This study focuses on NGDOs and uses this term except when citing an author who is referring to the broader category of NGOs.


countries and the developed nations that provide them with assistance. These tensions stem from differences in values and ideology in regard to the planning and implementation of development policies. As NGDOs expanded in response to an increased need for their services, the issues facing them, such as accountability and capacity, have also grown in importance, due in part to increased interaction with and dependence on states and donors. The New Policy Agenda took shape in the late 1980s in the wake of the debt crisis and the end of the Cold War. Among other policies, its proponents promoted the idea that NGDOs are more efficient than governments in delivering vital services to citizens, thus driving up demand for NGDOs as service providers Subsequent policy recommendations were to channel aid through NGDOs instead of governments, forcing the outsourcing and contracting of services to NGDOs (Copestake 1996; Copestake and Wellard 1993; Edwards and Hulme 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Fowler 1998; Gary 1996; Leftwich 1993; Lewis 1998; Robinson 1993, 1994, 1997; Smith 1993, 327; Zaidi 1999). This shift and its consequences will be discussed at length later, but first we must establish a definition of NGDOs, the ways in which they are classified, and fundamental concepts that give insight into their presence and function in the developing world. Defining NGDOs The term non-governmental organization' did not come into general use until the United Nations (UN) formed in 1945. The organization's charter utilizes the term as a 9


means of differentiating between the participation and rights of intergovernmental agencies focused on service provision and those of international private organizations with no ties to government (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 4). Since that original definition, there have been many attempts to refine and even redefine NGDOs. Most definitions tend to have several common factors, and, within the academic and professional worlds, standards exist across accepted definitions. The United Nations refined its own conception of NGDOs in 1994, claiming they "are citizens or associations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are determined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates" (Simons 1998, 83). This is a vast definition, identifying NGDOs as being comprised of almost every kind of group, the only exceptions being private businesses, terrorist groups and organizations that engage in or advocate for violence as a political tactic, groups that have a stated purpose of deposing an existing government, and political parties or any group that is under direct control of a government (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005). These exclusions help to rule out organizations that inherently cannot be considered an NGDO. However, by ruling out what they are not, the UN has created a definition that is too broad and vague to truly convey what NGDOs are. The World Bank states that "the sheer diversity of NGOs strains any simple definition'," yet nevertheless attempts its own, echoing the UN on the assertion that NGDOs must be a private entity (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 3). Furthermore, the World Bank contends that NGDOs are private organizations that "pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the 10


interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community services" (1995, 7). Nalinakumari and MacLean further the definition, adding several elements; "NGOs can be private agencies that support international development, or indigenous or religious groups organized nationally or regionally" (2005, 2). Additionally, NGDOs can take the shape of citizen groups whose aim is to raise awareness among the public on varying issues and to influence government policy. Under this definition, "various charitable and religious associations," both national and transnational, are considered to be NGDOs if they mobilize private funds in order to use them for development purposes (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 3). Devising a proper definition entails that it is both discriminate (able to distinguish NGDOs from organizations that appear similar) and robust (inclusive of the range of organizations that would be considered NGDOs) (Vakil 1997, 2060). Thus, an appropriate approach to composing a definition is to focus on actual features of the organization the structure and the methods of operation. Vakil does so, adding to her working definition that organizations that fit the description of an NGDO namely that they are self-governing, private, voluntary, and not for-profit are also geared first and foremost toward "improving the quality of life of disadvantaged people" (1997, 2060). Gordenker and Weiss (1995) work with a similar definition, the sole exception being that they omit the quality of voluntarism from their definition, acknowledging the shift to increased professionalisation of the NGDO sector, especially in regard to NDGOs based in the global North, which have seen a growth in professional, salaried employees (Clark 1992, 151; Pearce 2000, 21; Vakil 1997, 2059). Another concept they expound 11


upon is the autonomy of NGDOs; in order to be non-governmental in nature, an organization must be free from overt and superfluous interference by the state and must be unaffiliated with it (Clark 1997, 53; Sanyal 1997, 22). This condition, however, does not preclude a relationship with the state. It simply means an NGDO cannot be called such if it employs individuals who are also employed by the state, or if the NGDO itself is an office of the state. The distinction becomes blurry as NGDOs move closer to the state through contracting and the implementation of structural adjustments programs (SAPs), but retaining autonomy is vital for an NGDO to remain within its defining characteristics (Gordenker and Weiss, 1995). Mercer (2002) has researched the role of NGDOs in civil society extensively and defines NGDOs as officially established organizations that are run by an employed staff, well supported, relatively large, and in possession of many resources. Mercer's definition runs counter to the view that most NGDOs still run primarily on volunteers, not paid employees. Although the number of people working in salaried positions has grown exponentially, a problem unto its own, it has not become the norm for NGDOs. Additionally, whether they can or should be defined by possession of large amounts of funding is somewhat suspect. The assumption that NGDOs have access to vast resources is not very realistic, considering that many compete for funding and resources with other NGDOs, which would exclude many organizations that are not as fortunate, but otherwise truly fit the description of an NGDO. Likewise, defining NGDOs as large precludes the recognition of a myriad of smaller groups working in the field. 12


Trying to make distinctions, such as those made based on an organization's primary goals, brings the literature no closer to a finite definition of NGDOs. Take for instance the distinction between NGDOs who function primarily as service providers and those who take up advocacy work. Attempting to separate them on this basis, and referring to only one or the other as an NGDO does not work, especially when considering an example such as Oxfam, widely renown for its "works in development and in emergencies," as well as for being "a fierce advocate over the years for specific political action in such places as South Africa, Cambodia and Rwanda" (Smillie 1997, 563). What is clear from these definitions is that NGDOs are numerous and varying. Reaching a single definition that encompasses all NGDOs achieves very little toward creating a better understanding of what NGDOs do, but general definitions such as Vakil's do identify a class of organization types with certain basic elements and functions, namely that NGDOs are self-governing, not for-profit, and focused on improving the basic of quality of life for disadvantaged people in some fashion. A more effective approach for understanding how NGDOs function, though, is to create a classification of the types of organizations under the rather large umbrella of this concept. Classifying NGDOs A more precise approach to understanding NGDOs is to look beyond defining them, generally, and develop a taxonomy to classify them instead. A basic approach to classification is laid out by Simmons (1998), who breaks NGDOs down according to 13


their goals, their members and personnel, the sources of their funding, and their activities. NGDOs can have an entire range of possible goals, and ascertaining who benefits from these intended goals is crucial, since the benefiting party should be the main concern for NGDOs (Clark 1997; Hulme and Edwards 1997b, 20; Pearce 2000, 22). It is also important to know who the members of an NGDO are, in part to ensure the membership base is connected neither to government nor to unions and religious organization. Funding is a major issue for NGDOs, not only because resources are needed for their operations, but also because the sources of funding can become a complicated issue when relationships with other actors are taken into account. Thus, the type and source of funding is important an NGDO working with grant money awarded by a development fund will perhaps be able to stay closer to its values and goals than one that is competing for a contract from the government or private donors, potentially motivating them to change their goals in order to attain much needed funding (Clark 1997; Ebrahim 2003; Hulme and Edwards 1997b; Garilao 1987; Mercer 2002; Robinson 1997; Smillie 1997). Furthermore, temptation exists for NGDOs to engage in multiple activities simultaneously to increase resources, given that many development approaches operate on project based funding. While NGDOs can engage in a range of activities and do not necessarily need to limit themselves, taking on too much can lead to ineffectiveness and poor results; as a result of pressure to secure project-based funds, NGDOs often add another activity to their agenda, stretching themselves even further on the resources they have. 14


Potential functions and activities for NGDOs in the development framework include advocacy; information gathering and analysis; spreading information concerning issues related to healthcare, food production, sanitation, and legal matters; monitoring; service provision; conflict mediation; and consultation. The area of operation is another factor in classifying NGDOs it can be small, such as at the village level (typical of a service provider), or at the larger international level (not uncommon for watchdog NGOs and advocacy groups). Additionally, both the area of operation and the intended target constituency depend highly on the function of the NGDO (Garilao 1987; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005; Zaidi 1999). Another distinction is between Northern and Southern NGDOs (NNGDOs and SNDGOs respectively), the former being from industrialized and developed markets or countries, and the latter originating from and working in developing countries. This distinction is important because these NGDOs work in different ways and answer to different donors and members (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 5-6). The World Bank employs classifications breaking NGDOs down into two main categories: operational NGDOs, which work to design and implement development-oriented projects, and advocacy NGDOs, which dedicate themselves to defending or promoting certain causes by influencing both policy and practice (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 6). They can combine their efforts in both categories, and the classification is broadened further by splitting NGDOs into the three levels recognized by the World Bank: community-based NGDOs, which focus on a specific area such as a village or city; national NGDOs, which work in developing countries; and international NGDOs, which usually "have 15


headquarters in developed countries and carry out operations in more than one developing country" (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 6). The organizational approach to classification is also helpful, breaking NGDOs into unitary (U-form), multidivisional (M-form), and network (N-form) organizations (Anheier and Themundo 2002; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 7). According to this classification system, unitary organizations are stable, centralixed, and hierarchical; such organizations include the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders. Multidivisional organizations are difficult to define, but generally have relatively autonomous, territorial or functional nodes of organizations and include Greenpeace and the Human Rights Watch. Network organizations are primarily global public policy networks such as Friends of the Earth International (Anheier and Themundo 2002, 195). Another important distinction is made by Garilao (1987), who splits NGDOs into organizations that are either grassroots, professional, grant-making, or support-oriented. Such distinctions are vital for understanding the work NGDOs do and what capacity they have to achieve their goals; grassroots NGDOs for instance, are established at the local level and members are also recipients of services, while professional NGDOs are made up of members who are not from the benefiting community and have specific functions and interests, working with a community to provide services, advocacy, or educating people about important issue such as HIV/Aids (Garilao 1987, 3). A final method of taxonomy, created by Vakil (1997), approaches classification not on the basis of organizational types, but instead by identifying organizational attributes. According to Vakil, doing so allows for greater precision in identifying types 16


of NGDOs, while simultaneously taking "into account their multidimensional nature, addressing the need for comprehensiveness" (1997, 2062). Within this framework are two different categories of attributes essential and contingent. "Essential" refers to primary descriptors in the framework used to "identify units of analysis and to facilitate the sorting out of broad theoretical and empirical issues related to improving an understanding of NGOs" (2062). "Contingent" is a secondary descriptor, dependent upon "theoretical, disciplinary or policy perspectives and may therefore not pertain to all classes of NGOs" (2062). Essential descriptors include the orientation (i.e. welfare, advocacy, service provision) and the level of operation of an NGDO, and contingent descriptors are sectoral focuses (i.e. health, education, agriculture), as well as evaluative factors "such as accountability, participation and gender equality" (2062). One critique in regard to identifying evaluative factors as contingent descriptors is that while these are important for assessing NGDOs, they are not appropriate as categories to group them into, since all NGDOs can and should be evaluated and held accountable for their actions. There are, of course, other ways to classify NGDOs, yet the different methods all come close to an understanding of how they function and differ. By nature of classification, systems can be combined in order to allow for a more detailed taxonomy which is discriminate, yet also robust. The door is wide open for other factors to be included, yet the vital aspect of taxonomies is that they go further in helping to establish an understanding of what NGDOs are, how they work, and what they do. This study employs a mix of taxonomies, classifying NGDOs by the activity they engage in (service 17


provision), the sector that they provide services for (education), and their level of operation (international). Issues Facing NGDOs NGDOs have many strengths in their arsenal, including close ties to grassroots and the support that comes from the ability to identify and meet the needs of constituents. These strengths make them an attractive development alternative By nature of being non-governmental, they are freer to manoeuvre and are adept at innovating, taking risks, and promoting new ideas, which governments are reluctant to do. They are often far less bureaucratic when compared to governments, and their independence should allow for greater efficiency in implementing their development agenda (Clark 1997; Ebrahim 2003; Garilao 1987; Hailey and James 2003; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005; Pearce 2000; Sanyal 1997; Smillie 1997). However, inherent restrictions can impede the ability of NGDOs to carry out work in a manner that is most effective and allows them to reach the full potential of their ascribed attributes and advantages. Accountability is a vital issue, not only because NGDOs have many accountabilities but because these often become skewed in favor of different development actors with whom NGDOs are involved. Maintaining a certain level of autonomy and dedication to the development agenda without losing funding or alienating donors and governments is another important issue. 18


Accountability NGDO accountability is "defined not only as a means through which individuals and organizations are held responsible for their actions" but also encompasses several other issues including trustworthiness, legitimacy, and transparency (Ebrahim 2003, 815). NGDOs are accountable to different actors, including the state, donors, constituents, and members. Accountability also serves as a tool to assess impact, capacity, and effectiveness, all of which are important markers of an NGDO's success in implementing long-term, positive development (Avina 1993; Chisolm 1995; Clark 1997; Fry 1995; Najam 1996; Pearce 2000; Sanyal 1997). Accountability has become a major issue for three primary reasons: the sizeable increase in the number of existing NGDOs, scandals in which some NGDOs have been involved that caused their image as a whole to lose credibility, and the increasing potential for NGDOs to become more politically active (Hailey and James 2003, 2; Naidoo 2003; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005). The lack of transparency that plagues many NGDOs is another impetus for developing accountability measures. There is an increasing tendency by some organizations to be "secretive in their decision-making processes, reluctant to be evaluated by their national NGDO partners in developing countries," and, in some cases, obscure "their real objectives, and engage in universalizing their values'" (Tandon 1991, 37). The relationships NGDOs have with other entities, such as the state and donors, also warrant accountability. Take for instance donors on whom NGDOs rely for funding. Donors require information on performance and effectiveness to ensure their funding is 19


being properly allocated. For NGDOs, "their capacity to attract support, and their legitimacy as actors in development, will rest much more clearly on their ability to demonstrate that they can perform effectively and are accountable for their actions" (Edwards 2008, 42). In order for NGDOs to continue attracting funds, as well as steering clear of accusations founded upon weak accountability, these organizations must ensure they are accountable to donors, governments, and other actors. Balanced accountability is no easy feat because some actors perceive themselves to be entitled to decisionmaking if they provide funding or other means of assistance. Donors superseding authority may prompt NGDOs to move away from downward accountability to their members and stakeholders, and to start focusing mostly on upward accountability to donors (Hulme and Edwards 1997a, 8). This potential for an actor to seize authority over others emphasizes the need for accountability to all actors who have a stake in development and are in some way or another involved with NGDOs. Accountability takes many forms; upward accountability to donors, governments, and other external actors whom NGDOs must account to for resources utilized in the implementation and completion of projects and goals, and downward accountability, which aids NGDOs in responding to concerns and needs of the beneficiaries of their work and their grassroots members. Horizontal accountability exists between NGDOs, whereas reflexive accountability is "focused either externally (striving to meet some established standards of conduct) or internally (self-motivated efforts working toward an organizational mission and values to attain the prescribed goals)" and originates from the NGDO itself (Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005, 15). External reflexive accountability 20


maintains the foundation upon which an NGDO was established, ensuring that values continue to be upheld, and internal reflexive accountability refers primarily to members, both grassroots and otherwise, who actively work with the NGDO and are not recipients of services. Finally, functional accountability refers to measuring the use of resources against immediately produced results, while strategic accountability refers to the longterm impact of an NGDOs work (Naidoo 2003). Smillie (1995b) discusses an overlooked aspect of accountability, raising the subject of internal accountability. The amount of time and resources devoted to assessing internal accountability varies greatly from one NGDO to another, depending on size and structure (Perera 1997). Usually, the smaller the NGDO, the lower the level of internal accountability, which is attributed to the dominance of founding members. Internal accountability is also affected by the relationship between an NGDO and donors. If an NGDO is desperate enough for funding, it may buckle under pressure from donors and compromise the original development agenda in order to attain additional, vital resources (Garilao 1987; Najam 1996; Pearce 2000; Robinson 1997). In cases where a donor exerts excess pressure on an NGDO and becomes directly involved in its work, an organization might make changes without consulting the rest of its members, thus losing credibility and accountability to themselves (Vakil 1997, 2065). NGDOs face increasing incentives to succumb to donors who offer them funding in exchange for adopting, or more closely following, a neoliberal development agenda. In accepting such funds for community development, reconstruction, and other projects, NGDOs open themselves up to increased accountability to those donors, especially as 21


compared to other actors. Donors who engage in this sort of pressuring behaviour tend to do so because they often have a much different idea of how an NGDO should function and what services it should provide. This increase in upward accountability detracts from necessary accountability to recipients of NGDO services. The general belief in the literature is that NGDOs have an imperative need to return to their roots' and refocus on the reason for their existence in the developing world promoting and engaging in poverty reduction on a massive scale and to become more accountable to the people who depend on their services (Hashemi 1995; Hulme and Edwards 1997a, 15, 1997b; Pearce 2000, 20). Brett (1993) argues that while NGDOs are accountable to multiple principals', most have weak accountability to their beneficiaries, since donors "often have no other alternatives from which to procure the goods or services being offered," causing them to funnel money through these organizations (Vakil 1997, 2065). Indicating his belief that this should therefore have no effect on downward accountability to stakeholders, Brett neglects to recall that, while donors have few alternatives through which to funnel their cash, NGDOs have even fewer options for securing funding, allowing donors to display a great deal of muscle in getting what they want. It is clear that NGDOs have multiple accountabilities, each important for their own reasons. On their own, accountabilities are most often weak. When they are joined together, they have a perceivable impact on behavior, yet danger arises when a certain accountability grows larger than the others. Overemphasis of accountability to a particular actor results in amplification of the aspect of an NGDOs work that most 22


pleases that actor. In most cases, this overemphasis occurs at the expense of other projects, drawing NGDOs away from their mission and the people who rely on them. Accountability is incredibly important, but it is also easily turned into a tool with which to abuse power, when in fact real and true accountability is a two-way street', where actors on both sides are held accountable. Accountability can only truly become a hallmark of NGDO effectiveness if it is adept in conveying and assessing failures as well as successes, and if it helps to maintain a certain level of influence for the other actor, without allowing abuse by them (Smillie 1997, 575). Maintaining Autonomy and the Development Agenda NGDOs should be able to implement and complete projects, provide services, interact with the community, and attain funding for their work, while also maintaining a certain level of autonomy and the ability to stay true to the original development mission. Prior to gauging autonomy, the basic NGDO agenda must first be ascertained, so as to understand which values it is trying to uphold. The primary objective of NGDOs is to be co-operative, non-violent, respectful of human rights and democratic decisions, and to incorporate these very principles into the core of their modus operandi Specific details of an NGDO's development agenda differ from organization to organization, yet in the end, the basic agenda should be focused on promoting and creating development for the benefit of the people receiving services (Edwards and Hulme 1992, 1995). Primary focus should always be upon the constituents of an NGDO, but pressure applied by donors and governments can often be negative, hindering or threatening autonomy and the ability to 23


remain true to the development agenda (Clark 1997; Garilao 1987; Najam 1996; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005; Pearce 2000; Robinson 1997; Sanyal 1997). NGDOs run the risk of endangering their autonomy in dealing with donors; the more funding a donor provides, the more an NGDO can accomplish, yet this relationship also opens NGDOs up to more interference by donors, who may feel entitled to decisionmaking powers and agenda-setting rights due to financial contributions. In a situation where an NGDO becomes reliant on one specific donor, as opposed to spreading its accountability over several different donors, the organization weakens its autonomy (Smillie 1997). Fear of losing funding and the ability to provide services is very real to NGDOs, to the point that even if a donor has not yet shown signs of interference or demanded control, the potential of losing vital resources reduces some NGDOs to meek organizations that fail to speak out against donor decisions to ensure maintenance of their independence (Edwards 2008, 48). As far as autonomy in general is concerned, NGDOs that are smaller and further removed from influence and interference of the government and donors are far more likely to maintain their autonomy. This relationship in particular pertains to NGDO-state relationships. NGDOs that originate or exist at the village level (i.e., grassroots NGDOs) do not appear to be capable of posing a threat to the regime, and often the government does not have the capacity to reach remote areas in order to monitor NGDOs or interfere in their activities (Perera 1997; Smillie 1995b). Other NGDOs, especially SNDGOs working at the national level and large NNDGOS, must exercise caution in their 24


interactions with the government so as to maintain both their autonomy and their good standing with the regime (Hulme and Edwards 1997a, 13). Obviously, autonomy is dependent upon other factors, such as the activities in which an NGDO is engaged. There are many issues to consider when building a basic understanding of NGDOs, and the definitions, classifications, and issues they face are numerous. Knowing which issues to pinpoint and to observe is important in understanding how NGDOs work and helping such organizations to reach their fullest potential. Accountability, efficacy, impact, and autonomy are all exceedingly important issues and having a better understanding of them helps in analysing and understanding NGDO relationships with donors, the state, and constituents. NGDOs and Relationships Much of the literature addressing NGDOs emphasises the powerful effect that the array of actors in the development world have upon one another, and how these relationships in turn shape outcomes. Each relationship is unique, but identifying similarities, trends, and contextual effects allows for a more comprehensive understanding of specific instances of such relationships in different developing countries. Understanding this whole complex of factors is also central to developing recommendations for improving these relationships. All actors in the development field are essential for long-term, sustainable development of the economies, political systems, and civil societies of countries all over the world. Each of these actors has differing ideas 25


about autonomy, accountability, capacity, etc., and navigating the interpretation of these issues properly is vital to understanding how relationships among these actors develop and differ, and, ultimately their effectiveness in meeting their goals (Arellano-L—pez and Petra 1994; Bratton 1989b; Fowler 1991; Gary 1996; Sheth and Sethi 1991; Sooryamoorthy and Gangrade 2001; Zaidi 1999). Relationships with Donors The relationship between NGDOs and donors is vital because NGDOs receive the bulk of their funding from donor agencies, and, having moved ever closer to their donors, they run the risk of failing to help resolve the core issues of development. Edwards and Hulme (1996a, 962) put forth four core consequences of a close relationship to donors: NGOs are encouraged to expand their scale well beyond their capacities having little long-term comparative advantage in some areas; because much of the work is based on particular projects, the advocacy and institutional developmental role of NGOs is compromised';..., their legitimacy is weakened; and, [donor dependence] shifts NGO accountability away from the grassroots, and over emphasizes short-term quantitative outputs' (Zaidi 1999, 265). Because NGDOs depend on funding provided by donors and aid agencies, they function "not much unlike the way many states function," which also receive the bulk of their funding from foreign donors, who then reserve the rights to make decisions (Zaidi 1999, 263). By taking donor money, accountability of an NGDO can become skewed because "donors assert financial control by seeking accountability for the designated purpose ... [F]unds are provided to serve policy goals and, all too often, are provided only where it can be demonstrated (or at least argued) that particular policy goals (i.e. those shared by 26


the donor) will, in fact, be pursued" (Najam 1996, 342). Donors expect NGDOs to hold themselves accountable in exchange for funding, yet accounting measures often emphasize fiscal accountability over measuring the effectiveness of a program or how well the mission goals are met. The focus on fiscal accounting poses a drain on resources, drawing funds and time away from development programs targeting issues such as sustainable agriculture, poverty eradication, and political advocacy. NGDOs become less inventive and experimental in their work, focused instead upon doing what the donor wants in order to continue receiving monetary support (Ebrahim 2003; Mercer 2002, 18; Pearce 2000, 26; Robinson 1997, 64; Smillie 1995b). Out of this dynamic emerges a patronage relationship, wherein "failure to fulfil the stated or implied responsibility can lead to a withdrawal of" financial support (Najam 1996, 344). This patronage relationship results in the puppetization' of NGOs, wherein donor dependency results in "tangible and visible projects undertaken to please potential contributors" (Najam 1996, 348). With such pressure on NGDOs to be accountable to donors, accountability is often replaced by accountancy (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 968). A poignant example of shifting accountabilities to accounting is the Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka (Perera 1997). A sizeable organization, Sarvodaya existed long before British colonization, providing community based support for a range of issues including conflict resolution between villages and the construction and operation of village schools. Functioning without foreign donors, it relied instead on volunteers at the village level to provide services through community participation. Once Sarvodaya entered into a donor 27


consortium in 1985, it began suffering the consequences of conditionality. "Jehan Perera of Sarvodaya claims that the movement was destroyed' on account of donor interference," and what began "as a partnership based upon dialogue (with donors)," soured and turned into subcontracting and the threat of sanctions in face of failed goals (Zaidi 1999, 265). Once a donor assumes the role of primary funding source, the donor will often begin to dictate how the NGDO should be run and exactly what it should be doing, which goes far beyond accounting for funds. Donors will often rearrange the structure of an NGDO and send consultants in to make recommendations. Sarvodaya, for instance, was told by Oxfam Novib, head of its donor consortium, that "development is a business. There is nothing idealistic about it. Sarvodaya should conform to a businesslike relationship with NOVIB" (Perera 1997, 162). Running an NGDO like a business entails moving away from core principles "of decentralisation, people's participation and bottom-up planning" (Perera 1997, 162). On the ground, the changes introduced by the consortium bureaucratized the entire operation, abandoning the original model of community participation and decreasing the effectiveness and impact of Sarvodaya which now had to spend a considerable amount of its budget on new procedures instead of funding development projects. Donor involvement can also lead to sectoralizing the organizational structure of the NGDO and imposing other bureaucratic measures, essentially robbing the organization of its hallmark characteristics. The potential for clashes between NGDOs and their donors due to fundamental differences in operating styles poses a problem. 28


Donors often prefer a top-down approach and have a disposition for addressing issues of development with a short-term perspective (Atack 1999; Bebbington and Riddell 1997; Fowler 1985; Gary 1996, 150; Najam 1996, 348; Tendler 1982; Vakil 1997). The essence of many NGDOs, particularly grassroots organizations, is to utilize a bottom-up approach that works with holistic development approaches, founded in voluntarism rather than professional expertise, in order to achieve development goals for the long-term (Edwards and Hulme 1996c; Fowler 1985; Vakil 1997). Situations exist in which NGDOs are not without recourse, but they must remain assertive and aggressive in their approach to donors. Instances in which donors and international aid agencies work with NGDOs in setting out the context and goals for a program or initiative allow for achieving greater transparency, because all actors can see what the others are doing, which in turn strengthens equitable accountability. While potential for strife remains in such cases, and the success depends on the political climate of the NGDO relationship with both the state and its donors, working together in creating a transparent and effective program is nevertheless an effective option that can forge bridges between actors. Such a method of cooperation is akin to true partnership, and it can help ensure a return of downward accountability due to increased transparency (Bebbington and Riddel 1997, 117). A strategy utilized by NGDOs to diminish control of donors is diversifying resources by attaining multiple donors (Ebrahim 2003). Most NGDOs want to avoid having a sole, possibly powerful donor, because such a relationship can devolve into "a form of paternalism and will lead to undue pressure" for upward accountability (Tvedt 29


1998, 160). Multilateral and bilateral donor agencies are a more appealing donor option than private donors because "what is very apparent through working with the staff of both bilateral and multilateral agencies is that these are not monolithic structures and that, while NGO criticisms will vex some within a particular agency, the same criticisms will be welcomed by others within the same agency" (Commins 1997, 153). Not all donors are averse to the idea of listening to NGDOs, and NGDOS should make their voice heard. Yet, navigating different relationships with donors is difficult, as is knowing which donor can be pressed to make changes and which donor would withdraw funding. For instance, a consortium of donors has inherent dangers, and the possibility remains that the collective donors share a similar view of development and might combine their efforts to impose upon the NGDO, as was the case with Sarvodaya. Requests for more upward accountability come by way of pressure, usually in the form of a threat to cut off funding. NGDOs must be doubly cautious of such pressure from donors, be they lone or in a group, because "[e]specially in countries where there are political and ideological conflicts, an NGO that is seen to be over-concerned with pleasing ... foreign donors" may find itself facing the wrath of a state if it views the NGDOs efforts to be flouting state authority (Tvedt 1998, 160). While the process of moving closer to donors is gradual, the move does occur, further distancing NGDOs from the state, furthering development myths, and ultimately not only failing "to resolve the problems of poverty and injustice in the world," but also making "long-term, sustainable progress more difficult to achieve" (Hulme and Edwards 1997b, 278). Moving closer to donors will eventually result in the loss of the core 30


features of what NGDOs actually are and will weaken their roots "in relation to an NGO's stated mission and values, vision and inspiration, independent voice and perspective" (Hulme and Edwards 1997b, 279). Close ties to donors pose potential for eroding government capacity to provide services en masse, causing further problems between NGDOs and the state. Donor presence that is overly influential in determining NGDO activity also poses the potential for compromised sovereignty, and a development agenda that does not sit well with the state could provoke conflict. The people who rely on NGDOs lose an ally and a voice in the organization when NGDOs lose sight of their stated mission and values due to a skewed focused on the needs of donors (Hulme and Edwards 1997b, 278). As upward accountability becomes the norm, the poor and the disadvantaged become customers as opposed to members, and the sad reality of the multiple accountabilities that NGDOs have is that the state or the donor usually wins out, leaving those in need without means to be heard (Hulme and Edwards 1997b, 280). "When conflicts over accountability arise, it becomes primarily a question of being accountable to those who can exert most power over the organization," and this is often the donor (Tvedt 1998, 162). For an NGDO, the "withdrawal of financial support is more important than withdrawal of popular support from the target group; it is possible to survive the latter, but the withdrawal of financial support is more difficult to overcome" (Tvedt 1998, 162). 31


Relationships with Government The character and quality of the relationship between NGDOs and the state in any given country is heavily contingent upon the political and economic situation, as well as historical context (Clark 1992, 153-154; Perera 1997, Wanigaratne 1997). This context shapes the stance of the state toward the presence of NGDOs, which in turn can influence the ability of NGDOs to function. The development space for any actor is reliant upon the ideology and type of regime that has a hold on power (Garilao 1987, 117). There are three types of state in this context, distinguished by their inherent legitimacy and pluralism; one extreme is a military regime that poses no pretence of popular legitimacy and is thus mostly opposed to civic activities; another regime type is a government that attained public mandate through questionable methods; and the third is a regime that enjoys popular support attained through free and fair election processes (Fowler 1997, 120). Based upon the type of regime, governments will have different responses to the types of activities in which NGDOs engage. Authoritarian regimes that attained power without popular support or through questionable means tend to be particularly wary of NGDOs, but any government may have issues with an NGDO, especially if they progress up the hierarchy of typical NGDO activities cited by Fowler (1997). These activities are: 1. delivery of services and inputs; 2. developing new technology and methods; 3. developing social innovations; 4. policy-level lobbying; 5. grassroots mobilisation and federation. (Fowler 1997, 121) The first regime type is a government-dominant model, in which the government seeks no outside help, providing both financing and delivery of services on its own. Such 32


a system is most indicative of a more authoritative regime that does not tolerate interference by NGDOs. The opposite extreme is the third-sector dominant model, in which voluntary organizations and other non-state actors provide the majority of services, common in cases of state failure (Tvedt 1998, 94). Between these poles is the dual model, where NGDOs supplement services provided by the state, working separately and without much cooperation, often with NGDOs seeking to reach those whom the state cannot reach. Finally, the collaborative model is one in which NGDOs work with the state to provide services and collaborate on development projects. Such a model is rare in its purest form, especially among developing countries, although there are varying degrees of collaboration (Tvedt 1998, 95). There are certain consistencies in the stances governments take toward the presence of NGDOs, as well as in the ways both governments and NGDOs try to navigate the relationship. These consistencies tend to present at the regional level and can provide concise images of political patterns of NGDO-state relationships. Finally, Shin'ichi Shigetomi (2002b) proposes a framework for understanding how relationships with the state are formed and affected. The framework is simple and can be applied to all countries: as economic and political space increases, so does the potential for NGDOs to engage in activities without opposition or interference, and vice versa. This framework does not offer any distinct elements of the NGDO-state relationship, in order to avoid the damaging aspects of more concrete' findings that result in pigeonholing and exaggeration. Here, the simple and versatile assertion is that three main factors will consistently play into how NGDOs manifest in any given country: 33


the characteristics of the NGDOs themselves, and the economic and political space for NGDOs. In many developing countries, the state is unable to fully provide services and resources, and, in such an instance of failure, room opens up for NGDOs to emerge as the fourth' sector, serving as agents of resource distribution, or as actors who "interfere with the existing distribution systems, making up for or correcting...shortcomings" (Shigetomi 2002b, 11). For any state, the ability to control resources and distribution is a defining element of its ability to maintain power and control over its citizens. Thus, NGDOs are often seen "as threats to their existing systems of control when they intrude into the affairs of resource distribution with the intent of making up for or taking over defective distributive functions" (Shigetomi 2002b, 12). This threat is made more concrete in the eyes of the state when NGDOs directly vocalize criticisms of the state and its system of resource distribution. Latin America and Asia Latin American countries, with a legacy of military dictatorships that still affects present situations, also have a history of repressing popular movements and inhibiting progressive social movements (Frantz, 1987; Landim, 1987; Padron, 1988). NGDOs established themselves in contrast to governing regimes, creating ties with political opposition groups, indigenous populations and the poor, making an effort to restore civil society. To this day, NGDO-state relations in Latin America remain strained, but the economic crises of the late 1970s and SAPs led to a shift of NGDO focus and an increase 34


in cooperation with governments (Bratton 1989, 584). The redemocratization wave of the 1980s has also recently opened political for greater NGDO activity. Asian countries, on the other hand, have experienced several enduring political regimes in the region that are more or less democratic in nature, presenting a political climate in which NGDOs are aided by incumbent elites who give a high priority to development programs, poverty alleviation, and egalitarian resource allocation. NGDOs in the region have encountered an environment that is open to their growth and favors collaboration, the creation of institutional linkages, and the transfer of a certain amount of responsibility for development programs into the hands of NGDOs (Bratton 1989, 584; Fernandez, 1987; Shigetomi 2002; Tandon, 1987). This situation not only ensures cooperation, but also allows the state to maintain autonomy over NGDOs in a way that does not impede the work of the NGDO, or the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state. Africa African governments on average tend to fall between these two poles in their approach to NGDOs; they are not as democratically responsive as several governments in Asia, yet are not quite as authoritarian as the military regimes of Latin America. The concepts of a decentralised state and NGDOs are fairly new to Africa, and as yet, both are still somewhat distrusted by the elites and the people (Bratton 1989b, 585; Fowler 1991). A complicated balance of power exists in African nations, where several different actors are in a consistent state of flux, each side attempting to assert its muscle to create results on the development front (Mercer 2003, 743). Most African governments are scrutinized, funded, and controlled by a combination of donors, International Financial Institutions 35


(IFIs), multilateral agencies (MLAs), foreign governments, and other international agencies (Mercer 2003, 743). The unequal power given to these other actors is exerted in part through conditionality-based lending that often entails the inclusion of NGDOs in the development process. Such conditionalities leave governments fearful that any perceived inability to achieve progress and good governance leaves them vulnerable for replacement by NGDOs (Mercer 2003, 743). In such cases, the government will often resort to certain tactics to prevent a loss of legitimacy and sovereignty to NGDOs (Fowler 1991, Gary 1996). An aspect of NGDO presence that endangers the legitimacy of the state and hinders the ability of governments to exercise their authority is the connection that NGDOs have to foreign donors (Bratton 1989b, 573; Fowler 1991, 57; Gary 1996; Mercer 1999, 2003, 748; Oyugi 2004, 19, 25-26, 48). External support and linkages by way of foreign donors, who have their own agenda and their own vision of development, constitute a threat to governments. Granted, any autonomy that NGDOs win from foreign funds is limited in scope; receiving excessive donor funds opens NGDOs up to charges of serving foreign masters' by the state, and in order to avoid endangering or worsening the existing relationship with the state, NGDOs will tread carefully and avoid promoting the donor agenda too fervently because involvement of foreign donors can be perceived as a threat (Fowler 1991, 59-61). Donors can indeed perform "a crucial role in creating a favorable climate for NGO activity, both through the general leverage of policy dialogue' and through decisions to fund individual NGOs" (Bratton 1989b, 575-576). However, the fact that all 36


types of NGDOs are "heavily dependent on grants from foreign donors" does not sit well with the state; "on the one hand, they welcome the influx of additional resources; on the other hand, they are concerned that NGOs are accountable to, and may act as proxies for" donors, far from desirable for states wishing to maintain sovereignty (Bratton 1989b, 575-576). The fear African states hold that an NGDO could threaten the legitimacy of the government is indicative of the weakness of the state (Gary 1996, 150). Both the state and NGDOs are often unsure of how to approach the issue due to lack of communication, and, in lieu of coming together to cooperate, most African governments are doing their utmost to assert some measure of control over NGDOs. Reaction to NGDO presence in Africa is politically motivated in many cases, but this motivation is often veiled by seemingly more legitimate reasons (Gary 1996, 154). For instance, the government could claim that NGDOs are abusing their status, that they pose a security problem by being active in a certain region, or that their policies do not correlate to those of the state. While more abusive and corrupt governments might fabricate such stories to continue the oppression of their people, such as in the Congo, Northern Uganda during the early 2000s, and the Sudan, many other African states have legitimate reasons to control NGDOs active in their country (Bratton 1989b). A tool African governments increasingly enact is monitoring NGDOs closely, in some cases through through coordination the requirement that NGDOs register with the government, allowing the state to approve and monitor their activities through bureaucratic procedures (Bratton 1989b, 577; Fowler 1991, 65-67; Gary 1996, 154). 37


The ability of the state to monitor NGDOs in this way is largely predetermined by the administrative capacity of the state. Intent to regulate the NGDO sector may exist, but without proper resources, tracking the activities of small-scale, geographically scattered organizations is a waste of government funds, especially for countries that are already struggling (Bratton 1989b, 575). In some countries, NGDOs are registered at different government institutions based upon the type of work they do, posing a bureaucratic nightmare that makes it nearly impossible to track their activities efficiently. Still, in a great number of cases, coordination has overarchingly positive effects. When the political climate is conducive to cooperation, coordination causes NGDOs and governments to work together in their development efforts (Bratton 1989a). A more severe version of coordination is cooptation, in which governments assert firmer control, creating an agency outside of regular institutions or taking control of an existing NGDO (Bratton 1989b; Fowler 1991, 66-67; Gary 1996, 154). The purpose is to guide' NGDOs along the path desired by the government, or alternatively, to allow governments to capture some of the funds meant for NGDOs. Capturing funds is achieved by establishing QUANGOs (quasi-NGOs) or GONGOs (government-NGOs). A QUANGO "is a publicly-sponsored NGO which is an organizational affiliate of a government ministry," and GONGOs are "nominally independent" NGDOs that are "actually under government control, [and] can be used to divert resources meant for legitimate NGOs'" (Bratton 1989b, 579; Gary 1996, 154). African governments have had little success with these methods, because both QUANGOs and GONGOs lack 38


legitimacy just as much the government, especially if the government has to resort to such measures in order to secure development funds (Bratton 1989b, 579). The only action more severe than an official take-over and a restructuring of the internal governance of an NGDO at the hands of the government is dissolution. Governments can implement dissolution procedures as a last resort, described as "convenient shorthand for a range of government interventions to impede the functions of autonomous organizations" (Bratton 1989b, 579). Essentially, a government issues a wide range of mandates, the purpose of which is to limit the freedom of an NGDO. The government can forcefully cease operations of an organization, and, in the case of a nonlocal NGDO, send it back to its country. In extreme cases, the government may prosecute NGDOs for various crimes, such as in the case of foreign and domestic NGDOs on trial in Egypt after the Arab Spring (Fadel 2012). It is perhaps remarkable that few African governments have resorted to dissolution as a solution and it is notable that in cases where it has been used by governments, the state is overall more likely "to dissolve indigenous ... NGOs, perhaps because the repercussions are easier to manage in a purely domestic arena" (Bratton 1989b, 580). Sovereign governments are reluctant to run the risk of alienating foreign donors by targeting international NGDOs through which they channel their funds. Thus governments will likely try other avenues of controlling NGDOs before resorting to dissolution. Most actions taken by African governments in relations to NGDOs are motivated by a desire to maintain sovereignty. With several different methods that employ varying degrees of control over NGDOs, states can approach each situation with the force 39


befitting the issue. Governments are not without reason for their skittish stance regarding NGDOs, especially those that originate elsewhere, because of their ties to other development actors that affect how they carry out their work and interact with government. Overall, a confident and capable government is more likely to meet an NGDO on equal ground, to cooperate and pursue joint development policies, whereas a weak, incapable government will go on the defense and attempt to restrict the movements and work of NGDOs, give up on the idea of controlling them at all, or move to coordinate with them. The economics crisis of the late 1970s and 1980s reversed much development progress made in previous years and also greatly undermined the confidence that leads to good governance, presenting challenges to the legitimacy of the state. Diminished capacities, suffering budgets, continually growing interference by donors and foreign governments, and the push for NGDO involvement presented a further threat to the government, leading to heightened sensitivity regarding issues of sovereignty and control. As such, the vulnerable position governments find themselves in prompts them to intensify regulation efforts, and "to use a mix of strategies, at the same time seeking to dissolve the assertive and coopt the meek" (Bratton 1989b, 585). These actions make it clear that relationships between NGDOs and the state in Africa are influenced first and foremost by the political climate, rather than solely by economic conditions. Until governments become more politically confident and able to steer development themselves, there will be a continued tension between governments and NGDOs. 40


The New Policy Agenda The debt crisis during the 1970s in Latin America that almost crippled the world economy, the end of the Cold War, the popularization of free markets, and anti-state policies put forth in the late 1980s propelled the idea of drawing back the role of the state (Clarke 1998, Hailey 2000; 38-40; Meyer 1992, 1995, 1996; Smith 1993, 327; Sollis 1992, 167; Zaidi 1999, 261). These events and policy developments increased the frequency with which Western donor agencies were called upon to carry out development initiatives, and, as the idea that the role of the government and the public sector should be diminished gained credence in Western circles, NGDOs became the obvious choice for implementing development policies (Hailey and James 2003, 2; Pearce 2000, 22; Robinson 1997, 59-61; Sollis 1992, 165; Zaidi 1999, 261). NGDOs were the agencies of choice for those overseeing development policy because they were lauded "by many social agencies and members of the public as more efficient and cost-effective service providers than governments, giving better value-for-money, especially in reaching poor people" (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 961). In sum, NGDOs were seen to have a comparative advantage over governments in their ability to address the needs of the poor. This view of NGDOs, along with the evolving characteristics of their relationships with other development actors, can be attributed to the emergence of the New Policy Agenda at the end of the 1980s, which has both created and promoted myths' about the capabilities of NGDOs, and is currently the source of some of the core issues in all NGDO relationships (Commins 1997; Edwards and Hulme 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997; Hearn 1998; Mercer 1999; Pearce 2000). The New Policy Agenda 41


"is a reflection of the triumphalism associated with the belief that the end of the Cold War ... vindicated a market-centred approach to social organisation and economic development," and it resulted in a marked shift away from state-directed development to market-driven development (Commins 1997, 141). The NPA is significant because it prompted multilateral and bilateral donors to increasingly channel funds through NGDOs, due to the myths and assumptions that were being drawn by donors and policymakers alike (Clark 1997, 51; Clarke 1998, 40; Dagnino 2008; Sanyal 1997, 28-31). These myths include ideas that NGDOs are better than governments at maintaining accountability and more capable of fostering good governance, promoting a vibrant civil society, and implementing development initiatives efficiently and effectively. NPA Effects on NGDO-Government Relationships The surge of NGDO presence in Africa can be attributed in part to the condition of post-colonial African states, which "evolved as either single-party, patrimonial, autocratic, centralized political systems founded on ethnic clientelism or as dictatorial (semi-permanent) military regimes," and were all unable to achieve the development that was so drastically needed (Fowler 1991, 53). Much of the progress that had been achieved during the 1960s and 1970s saw a reversal during the 1980s due to worsening economic conditions. Additionally, overdeveloped bureaucracies, staffed by corrupt, unaccountable, or simply inept civil servants, have been unable to use the aid channelled their way since the 1980s to positive and long-term ends. This lack of results fit nicely into the argument of the NPA, and MLAs and international development agencies, such 42


as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, shifted their approach to favor the participation of NGDOs (Hailey 2000, 312; Pearce 2000, 23; Robinson 1997; Sollis 1992, 164-165; Wood 1997). In the wake of the financial crisis of the mid-1980s and the subsequent imposition of SAPs and the NPA, NGDO presence boomed as they became the main recipient of development funds, amounting to "a 1400% global increase in the official assistance available to NGOs" (Fowler 1991, 55). The reason NGDOs all over the world, but most especially in Africa, have become the recipient of so much aid is because of their supposed comparative advantages in implementing development programs. Several authors have written on the fallibility of the concept that NGDOs are allegedly less corrupt than governments, more efficient, more likely to be democratic in their operations, and less risk averse when it comes to implementing development programs. All these supposed attributes of NGDOs result in an overall reputation that purports they are the most capable of reaching the poorest of the poor, especially in those areas that the state cannot or will not reach a reputation which is not realistic (Cernea 1988; Clark 1991; Fowler 1991; Gary 1996, 149; Hailey and James 2003; Mercer 1999, 247; 2002; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005; Pearce 2000; Smillie 1997; Vakil 1997). These myths and overgeneralizations built up around NGDOs are harmful to development because many of them are the reason for increased funding of NGDOs and lessened aid offered directly to the state. Increased emphasis on giving responsibility and funding to NGDOs has placed African governments on the defensive. Official bilateral and multilateral aid agencies have gone so far as to make development "assistance conditional upon the host 43


governments' acceptance of structural adjustment policy reforms," and one of those conditions is that governments work with or allocate fund to NGDOs (Bratton 1989, 570). Governments in Africa are becoming increasingly resistant to the reduction of their role in development and have endeavoured to control NGDOs in their country through legal and administrative measures (Bratton 1989, 570). The burgeoning NGDO sector poses "a direct threat to a weakened African state ... [and] the explicit project of many international donors, through increased NGO funding, [is] to undermine the African state from below', while it is undermined from above' through a loss of legitimacy and sovereignty caused by World Bank/IMF mandates" (Gary 1996, 150). African states generally do not perceive NGDOs to be an unmitigated good; they are more aware of their drawbacks than other actors (Fowler 1991, 57). The space allocated to NGDOs by "any given country is determined first and foremost by political considerations, rather than by any calculation of the contribution of NGOs to economic and social development" (Bratton 1989b, 572-6). The primary political concern African states have in regard to the presence of NGDOs is the potential for these groups to undermine government legitimacy and any hegemony that government exerts. NGDOs active in advocacy and mobilization are a danger to state power, and those that are more apt than the government at providing services to citizens are also seen as a danger to legitimacy (Mercer 2000, 18; Pearce 2000, 30). The threat to legitimacy and erosion of the authority of political leaders is a real and oft-occurring aspect of the relationship, and has resulted in a loss of control by governments, who in turn become hostile toward NGDOs in an effort to maintain the 44


control they still possess (Fowler 1991, 63). Governments in Africa are already without full national sovereignty due to the implementation of structural adjustment policies by the IMF, World Bank, and other agencies and countries that ascribe to the Washington Consensus model of development. 2 The added threat of NGDOs eroding sovereignty is a related problem that requires attention (Anghie 2009, 300-302; Gary 1996, 151-152). Effects on Service Provision Supposed comparative advantages of NGDOs are that they are more cost effective in delivering services, have a better ability to directly target the poorest people have a greater capacity to develop community-based institutions, and are more apt at promoting participation on a local level (Clarke 1998; Clark 1997, 51; Dagnino 2008; Robinson 1997, 65; Sanyal 1997). However, the continued move to strengthen NGDOs weakens the state further, and arguments that they are better than the state at these tasks become a selffulfilling prophecy, if they are true at all, especially when funding constantly bypasses government and is given to NGDOs (Hulme and Edwards 1997a, 1997b; Pearce 2000, 30). Increased salaries for NGDO employees, easier working environments, and other factors create "incentive to professionals to move out of government into NGOs," removing valuable assets from government and diminishing the government's ability to provide services and other state functions (Bebbington and Riddell 1997, 114). This aspect of the NGDO-donor relationship not only weakens the state, it also makes it 45 2 Coined in 1989 by John Williamson, the Washington Consensus is a set of primarily economic policy prescriptions that came to be part of standard aid packages given out by the IMF for developing countries in crisis. Policies include macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening to both trade and investment, and market expansion within the domestic economy. These policies have a clear emphasis on neoliberal market-based approaches to development, which is compatible with the NPA (Williamson, 1989).


negatively predisposed toward allowing an NGDO to work in its country. NGDOs are not as effective and efficient as they are made out to be, especially as compared to the state; the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) found in its global surveys of NGDOs that the majority do not actually manage to reach the 5-10% poorest in a country (Sanyal 1997; World Bank 1995). Those who would place NGDOs on a pedestal over the state greatly overestimate their capabilities, especially as newer generations of NGDOs are increasingly concerned with implementing programs promoted by donors. The shift toward technocraticism among NGDOs is disappointing; rather than criticising the government for distributional and political biases and working to change them or lobbying the government to make changes, NGDOs focus on flinging about criticisms of government efficiency, an aspect with which they themselves struggle. Promoting NGDOs as a replacement for the state fails to keep in mind "inherent limitations of NGO initiatives, especially as they concern macro level policy and structural change" (Vivian 1994, 171). NGDOs operate primarily on a micro level, ignoring linkages, causes, and consequences of deep, intrinsic issues present in a country, such as crippling poverty, attributable in part to the failures of structural adjustment programs and dependency (Clarke 1998, 44). Because they do not have the scope of the state to work on a macro level, they also cannot achieve institutional changes without the state; they are simply not equipped to address broad issues. While it is true that in many cases, states are corrupt, inefficient, and inflexible, this should not preclude the rehabilitation and reform of the state, nor should it be cause to insert NGDOs into the place of the state. The state, 46


"[a]lthough prone to many pitfalls," has institutions that are "at least accountable to citizens, unlike NGDOs, who have very little accountability and responsibility to anyone but their donors" (Zaidi 1999, 269). These gross oversimplifications of NGDO abilities fail to take into account aspects of the "complex and changing relations between elements of the state, the private sector and civil society," and neglect to invoke "context and historical timing [, which] are of key importance, especially in an area so culturally sensitive to" socioeconomic and historical contexts (Hulme and Edwards 1997b, 277). The oversimplifications are not questioned, resulting in a shift away from government as a vehicle of development, with pronounced consequences. While the assumption that NGDOs are more effective in delivering services than the government may sometimes be true, it is often so because channelling funds through NGDOs deprives governments of resources with which to provide those same services and undermines capacity. NGDOs "are more effective in delivering services than they are in achieving a sustainable alleviation of poverty or in supporting the development of self-sustaining market-based activities," which is the goal of development (Bebbington and Riddell 1997, 112). Other aspects for which they are praised, such as low overhead costs, costeffectiveness, and the ability to foster popular participation better than government, may also be true in certain situations, yet these achievements more than likely stem from the smaller size of NGDOs (Fowler 1991; Hailey and James 2003; Mercer 2002; Nalinakumari and MacLean 2005; Pearce 2000; Smillie 1997; Vakil 1997). Their smaller size makes their reach smaller as well, and a country cannot be run by NGDOs, most of 47


which are are not connected to one another and have to contend with the input of their donors. 48


Chapter Two Education and Development in Kenya and Tanzania The focus of this study is on NGDOs active as service providers in the education sectors of Kenya and Tanzania. Education was chosen as the sector of analysis because it is central to the development of a country. Education has long been deemed an essential element for modernization and development, providing a path to a labor force prepared for the challenges of the international market, increasing chances for employment at all levels, and creating a citizenry that is able to contribute skills and knowledge to the development of the country's economy, political system, and civil society. The primary purpose of this chapter is to establish major issues regarding education in developing countries and the presence of NGDOs in the education sector as service providers, as well as to provide a historical background of educational policies and development in Kenya and Tanzania, starting at the time of independence. Establishing this context is vital for the empirical analysis that follows in the next chapter. 49


Education in the Developing World Many authors have found mounting evidence of an imperative need for highquality education in developing countries, critical for achieving sustained social and economic development (Benavot 1989, 1992a, 1992b; Brown and Barrett 1991; Cleland and Van-Ginneken 1988; Fuller 1986; Hadden and London 1996; Sawyerr 1997; Schafer 1999, 69). The state of education in developing countries has been precarious in the past three decades. Many governments are trying to cope with stagnating enrolments, inefficiencies, deteriorating quality of education offered to students, and a decrease in per pupil expenditures. These conditions are in part a consequence of "economic decline, increasing world debt and its concomitant austerity programs, and inefficient state bureaucracies" (Schafer 1999, 69). International NGDOs have been active in education since the 1960s, offering primarily non-formal approaches to learning without necessarily competing with the government. In the 1980s their approach changed to assisting in the provision of education at the behest of foreign governments and donors. Engaging in a range of activities including advocacy and service provision, NGDOs came to be seen as an appropriate substitute for the state in the education sector, as well as elsewhere. What conditions created the need' for NGDO involvement in the education sector of various underdeveloped countries, and what has the impact of their involvement been? 50


Conditionality and Dependency: Opening the Door for NGDOs A major impact upon the ability of developing countries to provide education came in the form of SAPs in the 1980s, implemented in an effort to stem the effects of crippling debt crises and overall economic stagnation. The IMF provided assistance to governments, but not without heavy conditionalities that have been found to have a negative impact on economic growth (Bradshaw and Huang 1991; Bradshaw et. al 1993). Aside from the effect on the economy, conditionalities pose concerns about the autonomy of developing countries to continue to pursue their own policies. Many of these countries have faced (and continue to face) "real financial constraints," resulting in an inability to "provide the necessary resources" for social services such as health and education (Schafer 1999, 72). As underdeveloped countries continue to "fail to achieve development, they risk losing the legitimacy required to carry out subsequent developmental efforts" (Schafer 1999, 72). This loss of legitimacy has in part prompted these fragile states' to "seek partnerships with local communities, international donors, and INGOs [international non-governmental organizations]," (Schafer 1999, 72) but the seeking' has mostly been prompted by imminent need of assistance, as well as conditionalities that stipulate NGDO involvement (Fuller 1991). The pressures and problems of rising debt, structural adjustment, investments made by foreign governments and organizations, and the presence of NGDOs have all had an impact on education in developing countries. For the most part that impact has been negative, furthering dependency. Some scholars insist states maintain a considerable amount of control over their educational system, yet the effects of dependency are not to 51


be underestimated. This is especially true, given that a large amount of funding for education does not go directly to governments, and SAPs have reduced education expenditures while simultaneously promoting the privatization of education (Schafer 1999; Fuller 1991; Rose 2009). Thus, in the 1980s, as governments struggled to fulfill responsibilities and promises in all sectors, NGDOs began moving in as part of the promotion of a move toward good governance and a reduced role of the state. Under these conditions, NGDOs became more active in education service provision. International NGDO involvement in education began in the 1960s, and during this period through to the 1970s, they focused mainly on creating "education initiatives independently of the State identifying alternative approaches, supporting experimental schools or promoting non-formal education" (Archer 1994, 223). Working mostly in a removed setting, promoting alternatives to the state's educational system, they were not as closely tied to governments as in recent years. But, as the capacity of the state to provide education entered a sharp decline in the 1980s, non-state actors were "being asked to assume more and more responsibility for Third World development and education," and this trend continues through to the present day (Schafer 1999, 82; see also Archer 1994; Rose 2009). NGDOs emerged as a replacement for the state as pressure to downsize activities and cut expenditures weighed heavily on developing countries, a result of the "international economic policy agenda associated in particular with economic liberalisation and political democratisation" (Rose 2009, 225; see also Bano 2008; Edwards and Hulme 1995; Fine and Rose 2001; Rose 2006). In terms of their presence in 52


the education sector, some scholars view NGDOs merely as intermediaries, helping the state to maintain legitimacy without necessarily implying the demise of the state, or threatening autonomy (Ghils 1992). However, given the larger context of donor pressures upon governments, the abundance of aid channelled through NGDOs for education purposes, and the emphasis on moving certain responsibilities of the state, such as service provision, away from government, this line of thinking comes into question. Amidst the troubles of structural adjustment and accompanying difficulties in covering national education expenditures, NGDOs emerged as actors working to reaffirm the commitment of the global North to improving education in developing countries as a means for modernization and integration into the international system. NGDOs came to represent the one concrete alternative to the state when it came to education provision, especially in light of the policies of the NPA which reduced state capacity, prompting NGDOs to broaden the scope of their operations in developing countries (Schafer 1999). Involved in a myriad of education related activities, many NGDOs provided mainly advocacy-related work, yet a great number also became active in service provision. Institutionalist scholars insist that the activities of NGDOs and the funds they receive are still channelled through official state channels or that at the very least they are carried out with approval from the state. Furthermore they claim that the work of NGDOs can strengthen weak states by bolstering their legitimacy (Bratton 1989b). Not only do these assertions incorporate myths about NGDOs that have resulted in their promotion as alternatives to the state, but they also fail to take into account the conditionalities imposed by SAPs that entail involvement of NGDOs (Schafer 1999; Bratton 1989b). 53


Another concern, expressed by Powell and Seddon (1997), is that in addition to the substantial amount of influence NGDOs have over development, which shifts control away from states, this shift takes away decision-making power from civil society, the very people relying upon both actors. Impacts on Educational Quality NGDOs have replaced the state in education in many places, yet the influence and impact "of NGO education providers in terms of extending access is extremely difficult to assess in practice" (Rose 2009, 220). This difficulty is due to limited available data on NGDO service provision, data that is "not generally collected in a systematic way either by ministries of education or by household surveys" (Rose 2009, 220). Given the sheer number of NGDOs of varying sizes that exist in any given country, being able to gain an overarching view of the scale of their service provision, their effectiveness, and their success vis-ˆ-vis the government is problematic. A major concern about NGDOs is that they are not in fact able to reach the neediest, most marginalized children in need of an education. Carron and Carr-Hill (1991) provide evidence that NGDOs not only have a limited reach, but that their "programs are more easily accessed by those who have already had some successful experience of education rather than those who have never been to school" (Rose 2009, 220). Another issue in assessing the impact of NGDOs in education is that problems encountered by NGDOs are rarely documented; reports focus instead on the positive experiences, without alluding to the challenges of service provision (Molteno et al. 1999, 54


Rose 2009). This phenomenon results from the reliance of NGDOs upon aid money for their projects, because "in order to continue to receive aid funding, their evaluations need to display positive results" (Rose 2009, 222). Such reporting mechanisms reinforce several overgeneralizations about the abilities of NGDOs, such as the assertion that NGDOs are more cost-effective when compared to government provision of services, which is dubious at best, given the limited amount of available, viable data. Non-Formal vs. Formal Education The main claim about NGDOs is that they provide a better quality of education when compared to government schools, in part because their provision of services is more cost efficient, and because they take a primarily non-formal' or alternative' approach to education, although government has also been known to engage in nonformal education. Formal schooling has come to be associated mainly with government provision and non-formal education is "commonly viewed in a more positive light, while formal schooling is often associated with more negative connotations" (Rose 2009, 221). A report from UNESCO (2006) utilizes a table that offers comparisons of non-formal and formal approaches, "associating the former with negative attributes of passive and decontextualised learning, and the latter with problem-solving approaches developed in a meaningful context" (Rose 2009, 221, UNESCO 2006). This line of thinking completely disregards positive aspects of government provision, which is often far more developed and regulated, seeking to provide students with real skills that can be used effectively to access jobs in the formal labor market. NGDO provision on the other hand is often very 55


poorly monitored, except by donors, and offers constituents no recourse for holding the organization accountable. Furthermore, most NGDOs offer limited learning, having far less developed, encompassing curricula than the government (Rose 2009). Thompson (2001) writes that in the majority of cases, non-formal educational programs tend to be the less successful, and drawing conclusions about non-formal service provision by NGDOs as being superior is not possible due to the lack of systemic and critical evaluation among NGDOs. That they are less successful can be inferred from the fact that programs that attempt to mainstream the two approaches end up "converging towards government formal approaches to ensure children can transit from one system to another," an occurrence that "is contrary to the expectation that government provision will adapt to NGO program innovations, as is often envisaged, particularly where NGO programs are designed as pilots from which lessons are to be drawn for larger scale provision" ( Balwanz, Schuh Moore, and DeStefano 2006, Rose 2009, 224). Long-Term Impact on Education Service Provision Despite overgeneralizations about NGDO attributes and the questionable success of their non-formal education approach, they continue to receive money from donors and foreign governments, competing with developing countries for funding. NGDOs are not nearly as effective or efficient as they are said to be, especially in comparison to the government, and the lack of adequate data, coupled with skewed and improper assessments puts the viability of NGDOs as a replacement for the government into question. No doubt, NGDOs contribute to education overall; yet their ability to reach the 56


neediest is dubious and the quality of their service provision is not what it is made out to be. Since the literature makes it abundantly clear that the impact of NGDOs on educational service provision is not overwhelmingly positive, the continued funding of NGDOs is most likely a result of two intertwined factors. The myths and overgeneralizations about NGDOs are part of the problem, the rhetoric surrounding their abilities resulting in continued funding. In combination with the emphasis on good governance and removing control from the state inherent in the policies of the NPA, aid agencies and government bodies continue to impose the inclusion of NGDOs upon developing countries by establishing conditionalities that favor NGDOs (Rose 2006, 2009). Since the 2000 World Conference on Education For All (EFA) in Dakar, there has been an increased push for involving NGDOs in policy dialogues, another move promoted by aid agencies. "Changing aid modalities towards basket funding associated with sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and direct budgetary support" greatly strengthened the voice of NGDO service providers in the policy process and continues to accord them additional responsibilities (Rose 2009, 226). Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where NGDO service provision is still a relatively recent phenomenon, the push for their inclusion in educational policymaking is even greater, dictated by priorities of international aid agencies who introduce terms requiring channelling resources through international NGOs. Most international aid organizations "continue to be seen as responsible for providing financial support to NGOs, and are also often the ones promoting the inclusion of NGO provision within education plans" (Rose 2009, 230). NGDO service provision in the education sector 57


remains a second-best alternative to formal education offered by the state, yet it continues and there is a a shift by many donors and foreign governments to achieve full replacement, which can be seen "in national education plans" that include NGDOs in policy planning and implementation (Rose 2009, 231). The problem is not only that there are two different actors shaping the provision of education in developing countries a big part of that problem is that these actors are at odds with one another. NGDOs not only take away funding from the government, but they also threaten the legitimacy of the state as its own ability to provide is jeopardized. A solution to these issues seems simple enough; if NGDOs and the government simply combined their efforts they could achieve more than they currently do on their own. Yet, if the solution were that simple, the problem would not exist. The tensions that exist among governments, NGDOs, and donors are numerous, and the influence of these tensions upon education differs from country to country, in turn affecting the level of cooperation between the two. History of Education and Development in Kenya and Tanzania Kenya and Tanzania share certain similarities in their post-independence journey. Both placed a great deal of emphasis on secondary and post-secondary education as a means of creating a capable workforce able to assist the country in developing a thriving economy, although in recent years there has been a marked shift toward focusing on primary education. Each focused on reorienting education toward a more Africanist 58


approach, implementing racial integration of schools shortly after independence and focusing on creating education for their own people so that they could ascend to positions of power and influence previously held by non-African colonizers (Furley and Watson 1978, 358-362). Undergoing similar reforms of their state structures, Kenya and Tanzania became single-party regimes and "continued to allocate an extremely limited role to representative institutions, to maintain a four-tier system of government dominated by strong central and provincial authorities, and to separate representative bodies in the lower two tiers from any meaningful revenue base" (Gibbon 1994, 10). Ideologically, however, these two states differed greatly during the first few decades after independence, both in their approach to education and their stance toward the involvement of outside actors in their country. Tanzania followed a strictly socialist model, seeking to develop on its own terms and building an education sector that incorporated agricultural aspects and focused on creating rural vocational skills. Kenya pursued a more general approach to education without the distinctly pronounced emphasis on self-reliance and independent development of its neighbor. Tanzania closed itself off to the assistance of NGDOs and stressed self-reliance, largely refusing to accept assistance from outside actors, whereas Kenya had a more open civil society, allowing NGDOs to operate within the country. Despite these marked differences, today both countries are experiencing the same situation. Many African states began to experience economic crises during the 1970s that stretched through into the 1980s, leading to state contraction, faltering maintenance of infrastructure, and the withdrawal of government from basic social services. Kenya and 59


Tanzania were no exception, and over the course of the past forty years both have encountered many problems. Hardships faced by the government in fulfilling its responsibilities reversed much of the progress that had been made in the 1960s and 1970s, and in the mid-1980s the economic contraction worsened, prompting the abandonment of ideology and the introduction of homogenizing external influences. The impact was felt heavily in the education sector, leading to a "significant rise in provision by non-state actors, from locally-organised private vigilante groups on the one hand to non-government organization (NGO)-run schools...on the other" (Gibbon 1994, 11). Tanzania The path toward development and growth of education in Tanzania has been difficult. Education became a highly political issue at the time of independence and since then, there has been a marked emphasis upon asserting control over education. Education was appropriated as a means of guiding national development rhetoric, often merely a tool for politicians, drawing focus away from the subject of making changes to the system and improving the quality of education to achieve meaningful, productive progress. A major problem has been the disconnect between the national government's centralization efforts and attempts by local government to retain autonomy; both have prevailed to some extent but limit each other and the development of education. Introducing socialist policies in 1967 through the Arusha Declaration (see table 2.1 for a list of key education policies in Tanzania ) not only suppressed civil society, but also repeatedly presented scenarios in which further attempts at centralizing the sectors of the 60


country only created more conflict about control. When the economic hardships that Tanzania continually experienced became worse toward the late 1980s, a reversal of progress made in previous decades occurred. Subsequent deterioration in the quality of education, coupled with the state's struggle to provide services, forced the government to resort to external aid with increasing frequency, and the legitimacy of the government has since been called into question frequently. Table 2.1 Major Policies and Events in Education in Tanzania Year Policy 1961 Three-Year Development Plan enacted expanded secondary and vocational education; Education Ordinance implemented created common curriculum and integrates schools 1963 Secondary school fees abolished for government schools 1967 Arusha Declaration enacted, along with Ujamaa and Education for Self-Reliance closed civil society and implemented African socialist policies for education 1969 Second Five-Year Development Plan enacted furthered the socialist emphasis on education and enacted tighter regulation 1972 Regional Development Directorates established, restructured education to give government more central control 1973 Government introduced Universal Primary Education 1984 Fees for primary and secondary school reintroduced 1986 IMF began implementation of structural adjustment 61


Year Policy 1992 Government overturned 1978 legislation to allow expansion of private primary schools 1995 ETP implemented provided overarching policy framework for education, focused on access, equity, expansion, and decentralization 2000 SEMP implemented focused on decentralization and partnership 2001 SWAp and ESDP implemented focused on quality, management, accountability, decentralization, collaboration with stakeholders and control of NGDOs 2002 PEDP implemented focused on decentralization, expansion of education, and partnership with NGDOs 2003 National ICT Policy implemented recognized importance and potential of ICT in education 2005 SEDP implemented focused on decentralization and capacity building 2007 ICT Policy for Basic Education implemented focused on integrating more ICT into education and working with NGDOs 1961 to 1990 Before merging with Zanzibar in 1964 to become Tanzania, Taganyika gained independence from Great Britain in 1961, at which time the Education Ordinance of 1961 3 was introduced, along with a Three-Year Development Plan (1961-1964) (Furley and Watson 1978, 379; Mushi 2009, 98). This development plan preoccupied government 62 3 Mushi (2009, 99) refers to this as the Education Act of 1961, but all other consulted sources (Furley and Watson 1978, Samoff 1994, Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001) refer to it as the Education Ordinance of 1961.


officials with increasing manpower as well as expanding secondary and vocational education, which received the highest priority in order "to meet the higher-level workforce requirements" (Mushi 2009, 98). Changes in the educational system in matters of curriculum and structure were initially less dramatic, but the Education Ordinance not only ensured racial integration and the abolishment of discrimination within education on the basis of race and religion, but also allowed for the creation of a common syllabus and national exam (Furley and Watson 1978, 371-383; Mushi 2009, 99). Additionally, the ordinance tightened government control over education, giving local authorities in municipalities, districts, and town councils responsibility for primary education; boards of governors were given control over secondary education (Furley and Watson 1978, 380; Mushi 2009, 100). With the merger of Taganyika and Zanzibar, the system of local government in charge of education continued until 1972, when it was replaced by a "system of sub-national administration in which Regional Development Directorates headed by presidentially appointed Regional Commissioners" became the focal point of the education sector regarding implementation and delivery of services (Therkildsen 2000, 409). In 1962, enrollments began to rise due to the growth in number of schools, and the next year the government abolished fees for all secondary schools that were aided by the government (Mushi 2009, 100; Samoff 1994, 151; Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 162). After 1964, leaders continued to promote a general direction and set of priorities that were met with approval on a wide scale. Part of their plan was to provide all children with access to a basic education, as well as to eradicate adult illiteracy. In spite of its 63


poverty, even during the most financially difficult times, Tanzania maintained levels of spending on education and some of these goals were achieved. The main priorities of the government included developing human resources, replacing Europeans in positions such as education, healthcare, economics, and politics with Tanzanians, and policy emphasis on creating more schools and promoting the teaching of high-level skills. Great pressure came from the people to expand primary schooling, because education was seen as a promise of upward mobility (Samoff 1994, 134-137). At the point of independence, Tanzania had a number of both strengths and weaknesses. On the one hand, there were few racial, tribal, regional, or political divisions, and the country was united under one party, the Tanzania African National Union (TANU), in order to maintain national unity and avoid potential conflicts. Additionally, Swahili was the commonly spoken language, along with English, both of which were made part of the curriculum, thereby making education far easier to synthesize. On the other hand, Tanzania had a very small modern sector and an incredibly low literacy rate, and few of its citizens had a post-secondary education. The country faced a litany of challenges going into the development of not only its educational sector, but all other sectors (Furley and Watson 1978, 371-383; Mushi 2009, 93-98). In 1967, President Julius Nyerere introduced an explicitly socialist agenda for the country, which entailed the centralization of government, as well as "systematic efforts by the state to penetrate/dissolve civil society and remould it in the image of the state itself," meaning all public and private organizations were under government control (Kiondo 1995, 110; Mercer 1999; Mushi 2009). Few autonomous organizations existed 64


and "between 1961 and the late 1970s only 7 NGOs were formed, the number rising to 18 towards the end of the 1980s" (Kiondo and Mtatifikolo 1999, 5). Donors and foreign governments approved of this model despite the absence of a vibrant civil society, because the Tanzanian model of government was nestled safely between communism and the free market, with a distinct focus on education, healthcare, welfare, and redistribution (Kiondo 1994, 1995; Mercer 1999). Subsequently, the government's approach to education was completely reoriented, emphasizing the importance of the predominantly rural economy in Tanzania and the need for improving village life, while at the same time infusing the close-knit community aspect of the culture with technology and innovation (Mushi 2009, 109). The new orientation for education combined egalitarian efforts with economic development by intermingling work with education; Nyerere declared "schools must become communities ... which practise the ideology of self-reliance" (Mushi 2009, 113). The change became official through the Arusha Declaration, putting into place an overall development model formed on the basis of African socialism and the concept of Ujamaa 4 (Furley and Watson 1978, 384-386). "With the adoption of Ujamaa' ... the philosophy of Education for Self-Reliance (ESR) was introduced," framing education in a definitively socialist model (Mushi 2009, 111). Nyerere declared education "had to become a vehicle for modernization, for class organization, and for constraining elites," because efforts to expand access to schooling 65 4 Ujamaa is Swahili for familyhood' and emphasizes the Africanness' of the strategy, which entailed "eliminating poverty, disease, ignorance, and miserable living conditions." Part of the concept was that a person only becomes a person through the people or the community, and in order for Tanzania to modernize, development had to adopt "certain basic traditional principles (i.e. respect, common ownership of the means of production and obligation" and combine them with modern technology and knowledge (Mushi 2009, 109).


and eradicating adult illiteracy "would change little if the reward structure continued to favor academic achievement and individual success" (Samoff 1994, 137). A distinct emphasis on reducing outside dependence by way of increased self-reliance also meant that the "government's direct role in the economy was substantially increased" (Samoff 1990, 210). The Second Five-Year Development Plan (1969-1974) furthered the regulation of the provision of education; it also envisioned morphing "primary schools into community education centres which, in addition to providing education by functioning as primary schools, would take care of educational needs of out-of-school youths and adults" (Mushi 2009, 126). Adult education would emphasise a curriculum built upon agricultural practices and rural development as part of the policy direction provided by Ujamaa and the emphasis on self-reliance (Samoff 1990, 270). Overall, the 1960s and 1970s witnessed enormous gains in both equity and access in education, achieved through Nyerere's policies, which focused on adult literacy programs, abolishing school fees, and nationalizing private primary schools, as well as adding Universal Primary Education (UPE) as an official national policy in 1973 (Haggerty et. al 2007, 2; Mercer 1999, 2003; Mundy et. al 2008; Samoff 1990, 231-241). Unfortunately, these gains were unsustainable as time went on; administrators criticized the government for spreading limited resources too thinly and pointed to declining quality of education as proof that most resources had gone toward expansion as opposed to improving the state of the educational system (Samoff 1994, 137-140). In other areas of national policy, most especially economic policy, Nyerere was far less effective, which also had an impact on education. Analysis of policies implemented during the time of 66


socialism in Tanzania presents the argument "that Nyerere's socialism created a widespread dependency on top-down reform, and reinforced patrimonial social relationships between political leaders and rural communities" (Haggerty et. al 2007, 2). Being in an economically vulnerable position caused many problems, and the war fought between Tanzania and Uganda from 1978 to 1979 only worsened the situation. Although Tanzania won the conflict, it received no help from other countries to pay off debts incurred by the war, and as a result, the government had to finance both the invasion and the subsequent peacekeeping role from its own coffers, further driving the country into poverty and diverting resources from education (Acheson-Brown 2001; Ngowi 2007, 13). Economic crisis worsened further in the later part of the 1980s with the introduction of "structural adjustment programs [that] led to a deterioration in primary school participation," as well as in other areas of education, which has "only recently been reversed" (Haggerty et. al 2007, 6). Part of the problem with education reforms and policy implementation was that, while these were all appropriate goals to set and a substantial amount of success was initially observed, the nature of the government and its measures of policy implementation were often ineffective. Each new policy was introduced through campaigns, which made an effort to mobilize resources, to energize participation and support for the policy, and to widen political and administrative reach for effective implementation and monitoring of policies. Unfortunately, most of these campaigns lost momentum once the fanfare faded and old policies returned. As campaign after campaign failed to achieve progress for development in education, the "legitimacy of the political 67


process" eroded (Furley and Watson 1978; Samoff 1990, 223). Thus, not only was Tanzania in an economically difficult situation that eventually led to the reversal of gains, ineffective governance and short-term policy implementation measures further damaged development of education and the credibility of the government. Long before civil society was opened up to allow NGDOs to work in the country, Tanzania's government was having problems with legitimacy, especially as pertains to educational policy. Such an inherently political policy process, in which "political education and mobilization are far more important than technical expertise and rationalized resource use," is not only unsustainable but makes no productive gains for education (Samoff 1990, 224). Centralization presented another problem, partially due to the scarcity of expertise, which prevented proper policy formulation and implementation; also, despite emphasis on self-sustainability, most education projects relied on externally provided finance. In 1972, in a renewed attempt to assert more central control over education, Regional Development Directorates were established, becoming the main bodies of the education system. Accountability was upwards, to the party, ministries, and the President, "in a deliberate attempt to assert central control and direction and to undercut local councils as rallying points for opposition to national policies," making education a politicized issue (Therkildsen 2000, 409). Persistent lack of quality and access to education was due to a lack of resources, inefficient centralized administration, and the continued decline of political legitimacy. Continued economic deterioration in the 1980s made it apparent to donors and aid agencies that the role of the state as sole and primary provider and controller of social and 68


economic activities was faltering. Education continued to decline in quality and reach, and the inevitable' fading of state power allowed for civil society to open up slightly, enabling the formation of new NGDOs (Kiondo and Mtatifikolo 1999, 6; Mundy et. al 2008). Along with new NGDOs came increased aid, directed at provision of welfare services and funneled through non-state channels "which were assumed to be expanding from below to fill some of the gap' which the state was leaving" (Kiondo 1995, 111). Economic crisis continued to amplify the problems Tanzania faced along the rocky road to development. Throughout the late 1980s, Tanzania became increasingly dependent on donor funding and conditionalities compounded weakening state control (Therkildsen 2000). Education and other social expenditures suffered under economic crisis. UPE, having been achieved less than a decade earlier, deteriorated and primary enrollment fell drastically. In 1984, the reintroduction of schools fees at both the primary and secondary levels led to a sharp drop in enrollments. In response to continued demand for access to secondary schooling, the government "began to encourage the formation of private community secondary schools" in 1986, as part of a more laissez faire approach to educational planning, deemed necessary in light of diminishing resources. The development strategy of the country changed from a focus on growth and equity, "in favour of a planned development strategy which focused on growth and efficiency," signalling a move away from government control over the economic and public sectors (Mushi 2009, 185). This new approach was particularly influenced by the resignation of Nyerere in 1985 and the beginning of a "gradual shift from political and economic 69


socialism to support for trade-oriented market liberalization and a multi-party democracy" (Haggerty et. al 2007, 2-6; Samoff 1994, 151). In August of 1986, the IMF and Tanzania agreed upon a structural adjustment policy after several years of negotiations. The immediate increase in foreign aid was accompanied by forceful advice' and a definitive reversal of the gains that had been made in education. Heavy conditionalities and a push for lowered government spending rendered the surviving remnants of progress useless by the late-1980s education standards were falling in public schools, and the physical condition of school buildings was quickly deteriorating (Mushi 2009, 186-187). In the presence of increased international influence and aid money, government officials no longer focused on implementing a philosophy of education or achieving long-term goals; instead they assessed the aid market and determined what would most likely interest foreign aid agencies (Samoff 1994, 134-136). 1990 to Present After the end of the Cold War and the rapid wave of political changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, increasing pressure was put on Tanzania to democratize. In order to avoid forceful opposition from opponent groups within the country, the government "initiated a process of political reform from above" during the early months of 1992 (Kiondo 1995, 113). In education, the government remained the dominant player, but only as pertained to primary and tertiary levels of education, nevertheless allowing private institutions to multiply. The government overturned legislation from 1978, allowing expansion of private primary schools, a major change from previous years 70


during which "private school owners were in constant threat of having their schools nationalized" (Mushi 2009, 187). Pre-schools and secondary schools were increasingly provided by community organizations, religious bodies, District Development Trusts (DDT) 5 and NGDOs (Kiondo 1995, 160). Private secondary schools were also allowed to expand, and private citizens were permitted to own and operate schools, a clear sign that the government's new approach "led to education being seen as an enterprise, driven by market forces" (Mushi 2009, 187). Decentralization became a centerpiece of the strategy for the education sector. Since 1990 Tanzania has had two separate Ministries of Education the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. Both implement policies approved by the National Assembly. Several parastatals such as the Institute of Adult Education, the National Examination Council, and the University of Dar Es Salaam exist, each with varying degrees of autonomy and responsibilities within education (Samoff 1994, 141-142). Whether decentralization has been completely voluntary is questionable because many donors lock in' decentralization by introducing "conditionalities that require governments to disburse a significant proportion of sector funding to decentralized authorities" (Mundy et. al 2008, 10). Reforms setting up decentralization in the 1990s also "ushered in a discourse about partnership between civil society actors and the state," and "are heavily supported by international agencies, to provide the local oversight and accountability necessary for 71 5 District Development Trusts are similar to hometown associations and "the current research suggests that the Development Trust/Trust Fund phenomenon in Tanzania is generally less about the supplementation of weak and ineffective local government by voluntary initiative (although this is going on) than it is about the privatisation of local government or at least an increasing range of locally-devolved services which have hitherto been under state control...Accountability lies mostly with non-local elites and there is no democratic process" (Kiondo 1995, 163; Kiondo 1994).


improvements in educational access and quality" (Mundy et. al 2008, 10). Planned decentralization has given autonomy to school committees at the local level, which in turn has created new possibilities for NGDO involvement in local education planning. However, as of 2005, decentralization still remains to be fully implemented, and the prolonged ordeal presents the "risk of a continuing lack of capacity for decision making at the lower levels, contrary to the rhetoric of democracy and decentralization in the country" (Haggerty et. al 2007, 2) During the mid-1990s, as a result of democratization measures, several changes were made to education policies. Aid agencies such as the World Bank and foreign governments like Denmark and Britain became actively involved, not only with the funding of education activities but also with policy formulation (Samoff 1994, 136; Therkildsen 2000, 410). Financial assistance, especially to education, also increased significantly, but the way in which this has happened exacerbated regional disparities in both access and quality of education. A shift in the manner of aid allocation to education, namely from financing the public sector to a "combination of private contribution and fees and foreign aid," means that funding for education is no longer evenly dispersed by the government; instead dispersal occurs through other actors, or through the government acting under conditionalities. In 1995, the government introduced the first national education plan since Nyerere stepped down the Education and Training Policy (ETP) which still provides the overarching policy framework for education. The policy's main aims were to promote access and equity of education, in part by expanding the provision of education 72


and training and strengthening both formal and non-formal education programs. It also sought to "decentralize education and training by empowering regions, districts, communities and educational institutes to manage and administer education and training" (Mushi 2009, 189). Since then, Tanzania has achieved much in education, especially in contrast to the deterioration of the 1980s and early 1990s. Building upon this policy, in 2001 the government and the international donor community implemented a SWAp for education through the Education Sector Development Program (ESDP). At first, the only two sub-sectors that developed and implemented comprehensive plans were the primary and secondary education sectors (Haggerty et. al 2007, 4; Mundy et. al 2008). The Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) was initially implemented from 2002 to 2006, and came hand in hand with abolition of primary school fees and significant improvement of access to primary education. Abolishing fees alone led to an increase of 1.6 million children. Sixty-five percent of the nation's education budget goes toward primary education, and, in spite of this skewed spending, secondary school enrollments rose from 5.9% in 2000 to 11.7% in 2004, and rose even more due to the introduction of the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) from 2005 to 2009. This expansion has been a consequence of government policies that "acknowledge an important role for nongovernmental and community participation in secondary education and other sub-sectors," meaning that room for NGDOs as service providers in education has opened even more (Haggerty et. al 2007, 5). Regarding the presence of NGDOs in education, the general trend since the 1990s has been that the government continues to desire retention of control over planning and 73


implementation, and that in some cases the government has sought out ways to tap into NGDO resources. The presence of so many other actors has made the government eager to "flex their leadership in the education sector as a result of donor-government sector coordination and the aid effectiveness agenda" (Mundy et. al 2008, 15). By and large, instead of working on independent projects, NGDOs are fitting their plans into the national policy arena by aligning their programs with the sector plan. The government still has an oppositional stance to the presence of NGDOs, especially given that "a small number of the most powerful international and national NGOs have moved into leadership roles in the context of new sector plans," recasting the work that they do as complimentary service provision (Mundy et. al 2008, 15). Nevertheless, they have been important in the development of education in the past decade, implementing programs to support regional and local authorities and training programs for teachers. In some cases, the NGDO is even subcontracted by the government, but for the most part they rely on direct funding from donors or funding that the government is forced to give them (Haggerty et. al 2007, 16). Despite gains made in education, several major challenges remain in regard to quality, access, resources and administration. In terms of secondary education, in comparison to Kenya which had 48% enrollment in 2004, Tanzania's 11.7% during the same year looks dismal, and while adult literacy has improved to about 60%, it is far from ideal. Children with disabilities, orphans, and socioeconomically vulnerable children have limited access to education, and there are not enough teachers or resources to meet gains that have been made in enrollments, further compounding the issue of 74


quality (Haggerty et. al 2007, 5). Lack of teachers and funds greatly affects the quality and equity of education. Even though the government, donors, and NGDOs have been working together, the legacies of economic crisis, donor influence and conditionalities, and failed decentralization continue to make development an arduous task. Kenya In the first three decades after independence, the Kenyan government was convinced education had to be oriented toward several different types of work in both rural and urban economies as well as the formal and informal sector. Observed and implemented first by the Ominde Commission (see table 2.2 for a list of key education programs in Kenya ), over time this orientation would become a common thread throughout education policy. There was "no focus of attention on a single sub-sector of education such as primary; all the commissions had dealt with the entire education system, including technical and vocational" (King 2005, 3). Unfortunately, this concerted effort to focus on all aspects of the education sector meant a persistent lack of quality plagued the whole sector (King 2005, 3). In Kenya, the Ministry of Education is charged with provision of education to all citizens, and its primary tasks include the employment of teachers, distribution of resources, and implementation of policies. In the past decade, the main focus has been a renewed effort to achieve Universal Primary Education by 2015 and to truly abolish school fees. As of 2008, the country moved the year for achieving UPE to 2030, and 75


overall, Kenya is one of the biggest spenders in all of Africa when it comes to education, expenditures accounting for roughly 30% of the annual budget (Wosyanju 2010, 10-11). In light of problems Kenya has had in achieving meaningful, long-term development of education, the high amount of spending indicates a dedication to education but is also a potential sign of deeper problems such as corruption, inefficiency, and issues with other development actors (Wosyanju 2010 2010, 10). The extent of corruption in Kenya is debated; the new government that came to power in late 2002 made "pledges of zero tolerance of corruption," yet Transparency International continued to rank Kenya 129th out of 145 countries on its corruption perception index (King 2005, 13; Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 7). Doubtless, corruption continues to exist, which proves to be a poor environment in which to foster a functioning educational system, because "it distorts policy formulation, obstructs the delivery of proper services, puts or keeps wrong people in jobs for dubious reasons, diverts scarce resources and loots the public purse" (King 2005, 13). As to the presence of NGDOs in Kenya, the country "has been noted for its open door policy towards NGOs and its support for self-help groups, resulting in an influx of organizations and a great increase in the local voluntary sector" (Fowler 1991, 65). Unfortunately, there is little historical discussion of the role of NGDOs in the educational sector, attributable to any number of factors such as poor documentation and a lack of resources to track NGDO activity. Since the 1990s there has been some increase in documentation of NGDO involvement, but there is a limited amount of evidence to give 76


insight into what these organizations were doing and how closely they were working with the government. Table 2.2 Major Policies and Events in Education in Kenya Year Policy 1963 Ominde Commission formed identified needs of education sector, emphasised need to expand secondary education and the creation of Kenyanoriented' national syllabus 1968 Education Act enacted transferred full control and responsibility for the education sector to the government 1974 Primary school fees abolished 1985 8-4-4 school system introduced 1988 School fees reintroduced 2003 Free primary education enacted again 2004 SWAp enacted 2005 KESSP created through stakeholder cooperation focused on creating effective partnership, financial transparency, and decentralization; provided funding to continue free primary education 2006 National ICT Strategy for Education and Training enacted implemented ICT approach for improving education 2008 Free secondary schooling enacted MOE implemented Strategic Plan, continuation of KESSP and free primary education, offered additional ways for NGDOs to effectively partner 77


1963 to 1989 Kenya attained independence from Great Britain in 1963, at which point it began making substantial changes to the education sector, ending racial segregation of classrooms, bestowing control over primary education upon local authorities, and focusing on literacy, numeracy, and citizenship in the new national curriculum (Furley and Watson 1978, 364, 370; Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 141-142). These changes, and many others, came as the result of the Ominde Education Commission which was formed in the same year and "identified the needs for education both to meet the skilled manpower' needs of the economy and to aid the eradication of poverty" (Sheffield 1973, 87; Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 141; Wosyanju 2010, 2; Eshiwani 1993, 27). The Commission, in presenting its findings, advised the revision of all syllabi to make education Kenyan-oriented', eschewing colonial leanings of the curriculum in place at the time (Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 142). Additionally, the Commission's report emphasised the need to focus on secondary education and for educated and trained manpower to fill positions in the industrial and agricultural sectors of the country, considered to be achievable through massive expansion of secondary schools (Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 143-144). Both the Commission and the government disapproved of Harambee schools 6 and tried to control or close these schools. Such efforts were often opposed by government ministers and members of Parliament, many of whom had vested personal interest 78 6 The word Harambee literally means to pull together' in Swahili, and has also been translated to mean self-help'. These schools were started prior to independence, continue into the present day, and are a way of providing education to students without the means to access government or private schools. Additionally, these schools offer secondary-level schooling to students who did not score high enough on their primary school exams in order to enter government or private secondary schools (Colclough and Webb 2010, 8).


because they themselves operated Harambee schools (Sheffield 1973, 86; Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 144). The report by the Commission also acknowledged that universal free education was financially unfeasible in the immediate future of 1963, urging the government to focus instead upon achieving equitable distribution of educational opportunities and improving the quality of primary education before abolishing fees, in order to ensure the sustainability of not only fee-free primary education but the education sector as a whole (Sheffield 1973, 88). Kenyan children had been provided with few viable formal education opportunities during colonial rule, and for several years after independence, the lack of schools affected the government's ability to provide schooling. The Kenya African National Union (KANU), ruling party for over forty years, came to power in part through its campaign emphasis on "a commitment to providing free primary education (FPE)," and upon gaining power "implemented changes which began to correct the disadvantages that had been suffered by African children prior to independence" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 5). Despite recommendations by the Commission, many of which were implemented, the government pushed for fee-free schooling and upheld the legacy of British colonial education. From 1964 to 1985, the government followed an educational structure of 7-4-2-3 "seven years of primary education, four years of lower secondary education, two years of upper secondary education, and three years of university" borrowed from the British system (Wosyanju 2010, 2). Kenya's government was cognizant of the need for skilled workers who could fill positions left open by the British and realized that promoting an educated populace was 79


the best way to spark social and economic development. This realization prompted the government to work tirelessly to expand the education opportunities for all citizens. A UNESCO study (2008) found that at the time of independence, 891,000 children were attending the 6,056 primary schools in the country, and 30,120 students were attending 150 secondary schools. By 1990, over 14,690 primary schools existed with 200,000 trained teachers and five million students, and at the time of publication there were about 3,000 secondary schools with an enrollment of over 620,000 students. This growth was an incredible increase, not only in the number of schools, but also in student enrollments and "despite a high attrition rate in secondary school, enrolments at this level have steadily been growing" (Wosyanju 2010, 5) Quantity, however, is not the same as quality, and the quality of education in a country strained by the costs of expanding the sector is highly questionable. The Education Act of 1968 bestowed full responsibility for education upon the national government and conferred primary power on the Minister of Education (Ssekamwa and Lugumba 2001, 146). In 1970, the central government assumed full responsibility for financing primary education and institutions such as USAID and UNESCO, as well as foreign governments, offered aid toward many sectors including education, leading to sizeable growth in the number of schools and a decrease in dropout rates (Furley and Watson 1978, 370). Despite the abolishment of fees, attending school continued to carry other costs that many parents simply could not afford. The first actual attempt at fee-free schooling came to pass in 1974, when fees were struck down for the first four years of primary schooling. Here again, communities 80


were still held responsible "for providing the additional classrooms and teachers' houses required as schools expanded," and this "led to the introduction of building levies which, in many communities, exceeded the levels of tuition fees previously charged" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 6). On top of the increasing private costs shouldered by families and communities of students, the increase in students led to overcrowding as well as further declines in quality. This increase in fees in turn led to a reversal in enrollment gains made in previous years. The introduction of a new education system in the early 1980s, changing from 7-4-2-3 to 8-4-4, did nothing to lessen the burden on poor families. The new system pushed costs for textbooks and facilities upon parents and communities, leading to an additional fall in enrollment rates (Colclough and Webb 2010, 6; Eshiwani 1993). In 1988, fees for primary schooling were reintroduced at the behest of the World Bank, which made a "newly envigorated [sic.] neo-liberal stance against excessive' government spending" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 6). Other problems plaguing the education sector at this time included regional and gender disparities in respect to resource allocation, "with certain areas being favoured according to the ethnic group of the prevailing political elites, resulting in skewed resource distribution across schools, whilst gaps between enrolments for males and females also remained high" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 7). In respect to secondary schools during the mid-1970s, expansion was a desired yet problematic goal due to the associated cost. Lack of government funds for expansion allowed Harambee schools to increase in number, from 50 at the time of independence to 81


600 in 1974, leading to a marked increase in the size of the secondary schools sector, adding to 381 government run schools (Colclough and Webb 2010, 8; Eshiwani 1993, 21). Unfortunately, Harambee schools had many problems, contributing to the government's opposition to their existence. The "lack of formalised adherence to national curricula, poorly staffed schools with unqualified teachers, consistently lower student exam performance in comparison with government schools, and an over-emphasis on technical and practical education," motivated the government to orchestrate a take-over in 1988, turning all Harambee schools into provincial state schools (Colclough and Webb 2010, 8). In 1981, the government began to reconsider the structure of the education system. A committee recommended changing the system to one similar to that of the United States, and in January of 1985, the 8-4-4 system was launched, "designed to provide eight years of primary education, four years of secondary, and four years of university education" (Wosyanju 2010, 3). The focus of the new system was on Mathematics and English, as well as an option of vocationally focused subjects for those students unable or unwilling to continue on to secondary school (Wosyanju 2010, 3). The 1980s were a time of economic crisis for Kenya, resulting in many issues, including increased assistance from international agencies in an effort to achieve better control over the crisis. These international agencies were mainly focused upon policies of economic adjustment, which entailed reducing the government's budget deficit by cutting expenditures, mainly for social services. Education costs, which had risen greatly since independence, caused the World Bank to recommend "a return to cost-sharing and self82


help schemes which depended on communities and parents covering the costs of school buildings, teaching materials and tuition fees" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 13). Thus, once again, the increases in private costs shouldered by families led to a decline in enrolled students well into the 1990s, and, coupled with the decline in available aid money to Kenya due to strained conditions with donors, this situation produced additional hardships for the government in trying to attain a functioning and effective educational system (Colclough and Webb 2010, 13). 1990 to Present In 1990, the KANU party began to liberalize politically, in light of waning donor support due to concern about the lack of an active civil society and democratic action. In an effort to open up civil society, the National Council of NGOs (NCNGO) was established in August of 1993 as part of the NGO Act. The NCNGO's role is to serve as an impartial, non-partisan agency to register, regulate, and coordinate NGDOs on a sector by sector basis. This council has often been invited by the Kenyan government to sit in on different proceedings, yet internal leadership disputes have rendered the council "ineffective as a governance apparatus" (Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 10). Rapid expansion of civil society allowed NGDOs to begin channelling "their funds and funding from bilateral donors into direct service provision in the late 1980s and early 1990s," making the government wary of NGDOs and preventing any real cooperation that could be beneficial for education in the country (Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 14). Even with increased room for NGDOs to work, concerns about transparency and corruption within the Kenyan government, which had been headed by the same ruling 83


party since independence, had an impact upon donor aid to Kenya during the 1990s and led to a rather sharp reduction in aid to education (Colclough and Webb 2010, 2). During the Moi presidency, from 1978 to 2002, "opposition parties and civil society organizations were severely suppressed, and bilateral and multilateral donors withdrew aid as a result of rampant official corruption" (Mundy et al., 2008, 7; Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 10). Between the years of 1995 and 2004, aid came in the form of "isolated projects towards program financing," so, although aid doubled in real terms, the impact was scattered and mostly ineffective. Not until 2002, when Moi's presidency came to an end, did aid begin to return to levels of the mid-1980s due to increased donor confidence (Colclough and Webb 2010, 13). The National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government that came to power in 2002 quickly assumed leadership, placing education at the forefront of its political plans. In 2003, the government implemented a third FPE initiative, increasing enrollment by 1.3 million students, from 5.9 million to 7.2 million. Persistent issues arose once more, as it was obvious that this was a case of quantity over quality; classrooms were overcrowded and access to proper resources and teachers was difficult. The "political expediency [of the FPE initiative] seemed to have superseded" the very real need for a robust analysis "and assessment of the needs, leading to inadequate preparation, consultation, planning, budgeting and [lack of] smooth implementation of the program" (Sifuna 2007, 695). In 2004, the government developed a SWAp and worked with external partners to create the Kenya Education Sector Support Program (KESSP) for 2005-2010 (King 2005, 5). This program was a concerted effort to combine national policy with perspectives of 84


development partners, each side bringing certain goals and focuses to the table. The purpose of the KESSP was to improve the education system's structure through enhanced funding flows, improved effectiveness, and financial transparency. Additionally, there was an emphasis on "establishing strong and co-ordinated relationships with donors, whilst maintaining ownership of the policies being implemented at the national and local levels," which it was hoped would not only properly develop the education sector, but would also re-establish functional relations with donors (Colclough and Webb 2010, 16). As part of the program, fee-free primary schooling was continued with the support of donors, once again leading to a spike in enrollment rates through 2008 (Colclough and Webb 2010, 26). Furthermore, in 2008 the government announced the introduction of free secondary schooling, although the larger "scheme proposed to pay tuition fees for students while parents would still be required to meet boarding school costs and school uniforms" (Wosyanju 2010, 5). Continued involvement of NGDOs in education presented additional challenges low quality of education and the lack of linkages with the formal education system did not make an advantageous addition to the Kenyan educational sector. Despite ensuring the absorption of 1.5 million out-of-school children into non-formal education, many still remained outside of both the formal school and non-formal system, and the quality of both state and NGDO-provided schooling left much to be desired (MOEST 2004, 10). The KESSP placed a lot of emphasis on decentralization and, in accordance with good governance and neoliberal policies, advocated for bringing in NGDOs to carry out services for the government. 85


Decentralization was supported heavily by international agencies as a way "to provide the local oversight and accountability necessary for improvements in educational access and quality," and was believed to also be able to usher "in a discourse about partnership between civil society actors and the state" (Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 10). Given that "many decentralization reforms are locked in' by donors, through funding conditionalities that require governments to disburse a significant proportion of sector funding to decentralized authorities," and that in most cases NGDOs are those decentralized authorities', decentralization in this case should be seen more as an attempt at replacing the government with NGDOs (Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 10). Due in part to the large role given to NGDOs by international agencies and other donors, the direct provision of education by NGDOs does not receive strong governmental support, and the "tendency among NGOs" in Kenya to neglect "sustained engagement in the national policy arena and in national CSO 7 coalitions" has led to "weakly coordinated NGO sectors in education" (Sivasubramanium and Mundy 2007, 16). The government upheld priorities for developing strong scientific and technical capacity, "based on the belief that quality education and training contributes to economic growth, enhances equity and leads to the expansion of employment opportunities," and donors focused on creating pro-poor policies in every sub-sector (Kenya 2005, viii; King 2005, 7). The emphasis of outside donors was that in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of UPE and Gender Parity, the government had to diversify 86 7 CSOs (Civil Society Organizations) are one of many alternative or overlapping terms in use for NGOs, but can also include trade unions, faith-based organizations, indigenous peoples movements, foundations and many other (Edwards and Hulme 1996a, 961-962; Gary 1996, 153; Ndegwa 1996).


its targets. Solely focusing on primary education, as the government had in recent years, would not be enough to achieve these goals, and a "holistic and integrated approach" was necessary to attain progress (King 2005, 11). Changing the approach to education, however, was not so simple as following these recommendations, because Kenya continued to be plagued by corruption and a lack of good governance, without which the ability and capacity of the state to deliver on services and other needs is nearly non-existent. A UN project, cited by King, states that "bold MDG-based investment programs cannot be scaled up in developing countries with extremely poor governance" (2005, 13). In addition to the significant quantities of foreign direct investment (FDI) and other types of aid that would be needed to implement meaningful development, the lack of good governance made prospects for the achievement of the MDGs within the coming decade highly unlikely (King 2005, 13). While there has been progress, namely in the use of local systems to deliver aid resources and the "pooled funds within KESSP" which "provided a strong endorsement (on the part of a sub-set of donor agencies) that financial transparency and accountability was working tolerably well," success has been partial at best (Colclough and Webb 2010, 27). Continued concerns regarding corruption abound, and many donors kept their money separate from the KESSP pool to avoid such issues (Colclough and Webb 2010, 27). Another problem encountered by the government, donors, and NGDOs is that there are often delays in the release of available funds, and all sides deflect blame; "the Kenyan government usually blamed this upon inefficiencies within donor administrative systems, 87


whereas the agencies cited similar failings in the Treasury, expressing continued concerns about the transparency of resource-use" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 27). Problems in this case arise on both sides. Even though government is now formally required to report on project implementation progress, the quality of such reports is usually low, and "donors, on the other hand, have had little formal obligation to account for their own performance" (Colclough and Webb 2010, 27). While donors have "admitted that their procedures for the speedy delivery of funds were weak," they give no reasons, nor do they address it in any transparent fashion (Colclough and Webb 2010, 27). Clearly, partnership has not been incredibly effective for creating meaningful development in Kenya's education sector, and the same problems continue to haunt the process corruption, an ill-conceived focus on quantity as opposed to quality, and in more recent years, the absence of available aid and the emergence of NGDOs as replacements for the state in service provision in the education sector. Summary Both Kenya and Tanzania face an uphill battle to develop of their education sectors. Given the history of both countries, it is clear that they face similar challenges, the root cause or exacerbation of many being neoliberal policies such as the New Policy Agenda. Poor capacity to manage and administer the implementation of education policies and the delivery of services have continually weakened the state of education, as has poor communication and coordination. This lack of capacity is attributable not only to an absence of adequate resources with which to lay a strong foundation, but also the 88


deliberate shifting of responsibilities and aid from the state to NGDOs. A long legacy of dedication to education shows that the governments are not blind to the need for education and that they have been actively involved in the development of the sector since the beginning of each country's period of independence. Each country achieved considerable progress and success during the 1960s and 1970s, but economic crisis and interference from other actors dealt a deafening blow, reversing the majority of what had been achieved up to that point. Policies and plans show visions of a functioning education system with which to push the countries toward prosperity, yet many fall flat due to continued problems with decentralization, corruption, and weakened institutional capacity. In recent years there has been a perceivable shift in both Kenya and Tanzania in the approach to developing the education sector, as well as in the relationships between the state and NGDOs. Dialogues of partnership are becoming more genuine and the two actors are coming together, along with other stakeholders, to approach the provision of education in solidarity. Part of the motivation behind the renewed efforts at partnership stems from the realization by governments that they cannot achieve development in the education sector, let alone in the entire country, without other stakeholders such as NGDOs because of continued conditionalities that stipulate their involvement. Partnering is also a method by which governments can regain control over the development of education. Many of the challenges of the past persist, most especially compromised capacity, which has an effect upon many of the other elements that are vital to effective development. Misgivings about partnership due to decades of distrust linger and the 89


wariness on the part of the government is not without reason. Distrust was created by neoliberal policies that pushed for replacement of the state with NGDOs, thereby not only weakening government capacity but also threatening the legitimacy of the state, placing it into a position where they felt threatened by the mere presence of NGDOs in their country. The continued push for NGDOs through conditionalities made these misgivings no smaller, and hostility toward NGDOs was not uncommon. Yet, the intention to create a change is there. Improving the development path of the education sector is dependent upon many things, but perhaps the two most important are the ability of the government to steer the implementation of policy and the provision of services in the education sector, and the capacity to exert such control. That is the subject of the following chapter analyzing different aspects of development in the education sectors of Kenya and Tanzania in order to create an idea of the level of capacity and control that the government has over the sector as a whole and over the activities of NGDOs, and how much this control is affected by the legacies of the NPA and other policies like it. 90

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Chapter Three Who is in Control? The governments of Kenya and Tanzania face a myriad of issues as they struggle to achieve long-lasting development, and many of these issues are mirrored by or connected to the presence of NGDOs in the same arena. The development of education has been of highest importance to both governments, with no shortage of effort or inputs, yet many problems prevail that prevent the full achievement of goals and attainment of progress. Many events and policies of the past decades have affected not only the progress of development but also the partnership that exists among actors in development. Furthermore, these legacies have had an impact on the ability of governments to manage, administer, and coordinate the provision of education services effectively, thereby influencing both the quality and quantity of education in these countries. At the center of all these conflicting forces lie two questions does the government maintain autonomy over the provision of education, and does it have the capacity to provide the education it designs? Is the government able to retain its voice in the creation and implementation of curriculum, can it effectively manage and control the 91

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system of education as it tries to expand it while simultaneously maintaining or even improving quality, and is it able to coordinate with NGDOs active in the education sector? The answers to these questions are not a simple yes or no. Examination of a variety of empirical evidence, however, moves us toward providing answers to these overarching questions about autonomy and capacity, answers that are useful in contemplating changes that must be made, as well as how these changes should be made in order to finally attain long-term development in education. However, limitations exist in regard to the empirical evidence. While conducting original research with governments, donors, and NGDOs would have been the preferred method of gathering evidence, neither the time nor the funds needed for such an endeavour were available. Instead, this study relies on some primary data from government sources and empirical evidence obtained and interpreted by other scholars and organizations. A good deal of this information has to be viewed with caution. A lack of funding, skewed accountabilities of different development actors, and selective reporting result in evidence that is not always entirely objective or completely accurate. The limited amount of documentation produced by governments, who are unable to fund extensive reports and investigations, makes it difficult to attain a full picture of the events and policies that shape service provision today. Not only is some of the evidence incomplete, but it is also sometimes impossible to determine fully the level of completion, which makes the conclusions of this study tentative. The evidence comes from different sources, including NGDOs, government agencies, multilateral organizations, research groups, and the work 92

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of scholars. Often, different actors report on or analyze different aspects of the same issue, resulting in evidence that contains a common theme and speaks to the overall issue, yet disallows side-by-side comparison of specific sets of data, both qualitative and quantitative. This study makes a sincere effort to eliminate bias in interpreting and understanding the evidence at hand, based in extensive research and review of the appropriate literature. In order to assess the extent of control that the governments of Kenya and Tanzania maintain over education, several issues must be addressed. The best starting place is with the structure of management and administration of education. Knowing which specific actors are responsible for administering policies or coordinating implementation gives great insight into control, as does an understanding of the policies and issues, such as privatization and decentralization that affect the government's capacity to manage, administer, and coordinate educational service provision. The existence of partnerships between the state and NGDOs is also of high importance, as are the policies that influence and motivate such partnerships, and the continued problems of the partnership dynamic. Examining the evolution of partnership between these actors and understanding what partnership entails allows for an understanding of the extent to which each actor exercises control. Finally, issues of expansion are also an indicator of how effective government is in providing services and controlling factors that influence the quality and quantity of education. 93

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Management and Administration Good management and administration are essential in order for the system of education service provision to utilize and mobilize available resources for optimal impact. 8 Unfortunately, this machinery is not as well established as it could be in either country, and many factors contribute to the relative health of the mechanisms and structures that are intended to coordinate, communicate, administer, and manage the provision of education and the policies that influence such provision. Factors influencing such capabilities, which ultimately indicate the level of control the government maintains over the provision of education, include various policies and influences from other actors, as well as issues of privatization and decentralization. Before delving into such issues, however, knowing who is supposed to be responsible for what in the education sector is necessary for analyzing government attempts to maintain the capacity to administer and manage appropriately. Who Does What in Education? Management and administration of the education sector in Tanzania is a shared responsibility for the Ministry of Education and Culture (MOEC), the Ministry of 94 8 At first, the terms management' and administration' seem to be synonyms and easily conflated, yet there are distinct and important differentiations between the two (Hughes 2012, 6) Administration, a determinative function, primarily involves the creation of objectives, plans and policies within an organization, whereas management, an executive function, is understood to be the act or function of putting policy into practice. In essence, administration creates a framework within the confines of which management makes decision and coordinates policy implementation. Management can be viewed as a subset of administration, dealing with the technical aspects of an organization's operation, but it also carries with it the expectation of "the achievement of results, and secondly, personal responsibility by the manager for results being achieved," two elements that are "not necessarily present in the traditional administrative system," which tends to focus more on process and procedure (Hughes 2012, 6).

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Science, Technology and Higher Education (MSTHE), and the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG), most especially in terms of primary education (MOEC 2001, 10). 9 Among a litany of duties and responsibilities, the MOEC and MRALG are directly accountable for the management of "primary education, adult literacy, and non-formal education through the Regional Secretariat and Local Authorities," the setting of education policies, standards, curriculum, and examinations, and designing modalities for "monitoring, inspection and supervision and performance auditing of local government" (MOEC 2001, 10-11). Along with smaller ministries involved in sector specific programs, these main actors "carry out the delivery of education and training," and the central government is responsible for coordinating the provision of education by other actors, including NGDOs (MOEC 1995, 11). Various other ministries, secretariats, and government bodies at the national, regional, and local level are in some way or another involved in the education sector of Tanzania, along with donors, NGDOs, and CBOs 10 (MOEC 1995, 2001, MOEVT 2007). In recent years, through the adoption of a sector-wide approach to education, these ministries and other government bodies have undergone reform of "the overall structure planning and delivery of primary education" (World Bank 2010, 14). The MSTHE, for instance, has been restructured "to focus more clearly on policy-making, 95 9 Tanzania's government is more heavily involved in primary education than secondary education, having opened up secondary education to other actors such as NGDOs in recent years. This opening is partly due to the fact that 65% of the Education Budget goes towards primary education," and thus "the government's policies acknowledge an important role for nongovernmental and community participation in secondary education and other sub-sectors, such as vocational and non-formal education" ( Haggerty et. al 2007, 5). NGDOs are nevertheless involved in primary education as well. 10 CBOs (community-based organizations) are a part of civil society, defined as small and intimate, often village level, organisations run by the members themselves and relying primarily on locally-generated resources" (Gary 1996, 151).

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regulating, approving and monitoring standards, and general monitoring" (Woods 2007, 31). Similarly, the role of the MOEC "was reoriented to that of making policy, setting standards and assuring quality," while the MRALG "was given responsibility for delivery and direct oversight of schools through Regional Secretariats and Local Government Authorities" (World Bank 2010, 14). Furthermore, schools and community committees received more responsibilities and the ability to participate directly in the management of individual schools (Haggerty et. al 2007, 5; World Bank 2010, 14). Structurally, the system is still incredibly convoluted and confusing, due to the abundance of agencies and ministries that work alongside private and non-governmental actors, and the reforms of recent years have done little to improve coordination and communication. The majority of measures and interventions introduced into service provision "over the last few years have been uncoordinated and unsynchronised," and the coordination needed "to optimise linkages and reduce overlaps" is largely absent (Woods 2007, 34). Herein lies a major obstacle to control over education, and what is needed is not only a "commitment to a sector wide approach," but an accompanying effort to secure "coherence and synergy across sub-sectoral elements" (34). In Kenya, the management structure differs slightly. Two ministries the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science and Technology (MHEST) are responsible for education, training and research (MOE 2008; UNESCO 2010, 6). The MOE is the major actor of the two, and its tasks include "employment of teachers for government schools, distribution of learning resources, and implementation of education policies," (Wosyanju 2010, 20) as well as "sector policy 96

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formulation, planning ... development of sector strategies [,...] regulations of the provision of education[,] and training services by other providers" (MOE 2008, 43). Due to the many responsibilities that the ministry has, including oversight and management of most every sector of education, from Early Childhood Development and Pre-Primary Education, through Primary Education, Special Needs Education, Secondary Education, and Teacher Education 11 (Wosyanju 2010, 10), it is crucial that modalities for accountability, communication and coordination are in place to ensure adequate service provision. The MOE counts among its strengths "well established institutional structures for the management of education existing legal framework for all service providers...[and] excellent political support," yet also admits to considerable weaknesses that impede its ability to properly oversee management and administration of education. These shortcomings include "a weak Education Management Information System...high budgetary expenditure on personal emoluments vis-ˆ-vis operations and maintenance," and shortcomings that partially contradict the very same strengths that the government cites; "an unharmonised legal framework that inhibits the performance of the Ministry" and "weaknesses in co-ordination between the MOE headquarters, field offices, and the SAGAs [Semi Autonomous Government Agencies]" (MOE 2008, 11-12). While not necessarily identical, both Kenya and Tanzania have the same problem they have clearly defined roles for different ministries and agencies, who are intended to work 97 11 Much as in Tanzania, the majority of Kenya's education budget goes toward primary education, leaving room for other actors to involve themselves in the remaining sectors, especially secondary education (UNESCO 2008). However, perhaps more so than in Tanzania, the government works with "parents, communities, NGOs and private entrepreneurs [to] provide primary education in partnership and in some cases through cost-sharing policy" (PEI 2002, 1). The extent and effectiveness of such partnership is analyzed throughout the chapter.

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together through coordination and communication in order to achieve better management and administration, yet the systems lack the necessary synchronization and capacity. In order to be efficient and effective in service provision, the state requires organizational strengths, that are "found to be rather weak on many fronts: the state often lacks the resources required to maintain the facilities and to provide the services; the little that may be available is often inefficiently managed, thereby depriving the people of the expected services" (Oyugi 1995, 138). The 1995 Education and Training Policy of Tanzania acknowledges firsthand that the provision of quality education "is the ultimate goal of any education system" and that this goal "cannot be achieved without a well established and effective management and administrative machinery" (MOEC 1995, 23), yet the lack of such coordination is precisely the case in both Kenya and Tanzania. Capacity to Coordinate, Communicate, and Control Capacities of Kenyan and Tanzanian institutions remain weak, impeding the ability to coordinate, communicate, and control both their own activities and those of NGDOs. Part of the problem is that the ministries working to deliver education are strained, not only financially but also in terms of manpower, considerably impeding capacity. For instance, in the public school sector of Wareng district, part of the Eldoret constituency in Kenya, fifteen MOE officers are "responsible for meeting with, observing and evaluating over 900 schools" (Bandi 2011, 41). These officers, many of whom are responsible for over 50 schools each, voiced complaints that the inability to know details of the situation in each school not only impeded their ability to assist the communities' 98

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education needs, but also had a considerable impact on overall quality in the country (Bandi 2011, 41). Similar situations persist throughout both countries; limited qualified personnel exist to undertake activities necessary to strengthen capacity, and they operate with equally limited funds. Poor infrastructure makes communication and delivery of services cumbersome, in turn affecting the ability to coordinate implementation of policies, programmes, and supplies among different actors. Diminished capacity to communicate and coordinate in turn makes itself felt in weak control by government over both its own administrative bodies and NGDOs. Policies and Issues Affecting Capacity Many of the problems affecting government capacity to properly engage in administration and management stem from policies implemented in the late 1980s and 1990s, the legacy of which can be clearly observed today. Of primary concern in regard to capacity is the involvement of donors and the policies that they impose, such as SAPs which "have forced weak states to reduce expenditures and to slash funds for precisely those services that most benefit the poor" (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 12). Reducing allocations to basic services also reduces the number of individuals whom governments are able to hire to deliver education services. Furthermore, administrative reforms included within SAPs "aim to reduce the direct role of the state across the board" (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 27). NGDOs have been implicitly involved in the reduction of the state's role, given more and more responsibilities by donors and 99

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development agencies, which on the whole tends "to be a significant part of the problem" (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 27). The presence of donors in both Kenya and Tanzania, which far exceeded forty even in the mid-1990s and has only grown since, has an increasingly negative effect upon recipient administrations when it comes to coordinating the multitude of donor-funded projects. "In some cases, regions of a country are divided among donor-funded projects," while "in other cases the division is done along sectoral lines," creating a great deal of confusion and a system of projects that the government lacks the capacity to oversee or coordinate, in large part due to the very same administrative reforms that are pushed onto them by donors (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 27). A great number of these projects "are controlled by staff employed by the donors, who operate according to their own guidelines and bypass recipient bureaucracies in the process," fragmenting and weakening state agencies further (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 27). Tanzania's government, at least on paper, makes a concerted effort to implement policies that improve capacity. The ESDP of 2006 mentions good governance, accountability and management training, which should be provided to education actors at all levels. The intent of this mandate is to address issues of internal efficiency and quality, by training education actors from the central government "in policy formulation and analysis, strategic planning and budgeting, research, monitoring and evaluation, curriculum development and review, testing, examinations and assessment mainstreaming cross cutting issues within the country and abroad" (BEDC 2006, 24). The planned program has all the proper intentions necessary for creating a positive impact, and the 100

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political will to implement it certainly exists, but the capacity to improve capacity is lacking. The proposed SEDP for 2010-2014, among its many recommendations, discusses the provision of "capacity building and technical assistance to implement current and future reforms," with a budget of USD 3 million. The objective of the program "is to strengthen institutional capacity for educational management," with "sustained inputs to strengthen capacity for planning, management, delivery, and monitoring and supervision of education [which] are critical to improv[ing] the quality and efficiency of education service delivery" (MOEVT 2010, 4). However, the report does not go into detail in regard to how such objectives will be obtained, and, in light of previous reports that utilized similar language of improving capacity with few observable results, it seems plausible to deem such documents as nothing more than rhetoric with which to appease donors and foreign governments that provide funds, or wishful thinking on the part of the government that hopes to increase efficiency and capacity but cannot do so. Another policy that both Kenya and Tanzania have been undertaking as a means to improve not only administration and management of education, but also the quality of teaching and learning itself, is the implementation of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Tanzania's ICT Policy for Basic Education (2007) and National ICT Policy (2003) acknowledge the promise of "new opportunities to enhance education and to improve the quality of delivery of education in all areas" and regard ICT as a "powerful tool with which to achieve educational and national development objectives" (MOEVT 2007, 1). Without referring to the financial issues that the 101

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government experiences, the policy mentions that funding and implementation will occur through partnership with other stakeholders, indicating that this policy actually has potential to create improved capacity and that government realizes the indispensable nature of partnering. Kenya's KESSP, a policy that "skilfully straddles the different visions of the main actors," has allowed Kenyan policymakers to hold "on to their priorities for technical and scientific capacity," (King 2005, 6) enabling the creation of a strong vision for ICT, which is echoed by the 2006 National ICT Strategy for Education and Training. Pursuing the implementation of ICT in much the same way as Tanzania, and for similar reasons, Kenya also includes other actors such as NGDOs in the implementation of ICT. The recent date of these policies and their mention of partnerships indicate a changing dialogue with implications for administrative and managerial capacity, as well as control over the provision of education overall. The KESSP in particular has made great strides to reverse the history of policy in Kenya that created a situation in which "it is difficult to draw a line between those documents which reflect more national concerns, and those which are more of a national version of what is an international requirement" (King 2005, 2). Although it is far from perfect, this sector-wide program "attempts to bring international donor organizations and other local partners together around a coherent policy agenda that is fully owned by government," indicating what appears to be a considerable amount of control by the Kenyan government (Sivasubramaniam et. al 2007, 2). In developing the KESSP, "considerable effort ha[d] been undertaken to review existing coordination, management 102

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and accountability systems at the MOE," and the MOE retained control over coordination and accountability structures. These revised structures now include "sector-wide stakeholder coordination through an Education Stakeholders Forum and National Education Advisory Council ... [d]evelopment partner coordination ... [and M]inistry wide coordination through a KESSP Steering Committee" (MOE 2008, 44). Clearly, new attempts at coordination and accountability include an increased willingness to work with other stakeholders and recognition that the government cannot, at this point in time, pursue the development of the education sector on its own as it has in the past. Yet there remain two main issues that affect government capacity in the education sector: privatization and decentralization. Privatization Therkildsen and Semboja note that the concept of privatization is commonly understood as (i) the transfer of control/ownership of activities from the public to the private sector; (ii) the transfer of actual service provision to the private sector, while governments retain ultimate responsibility for the service; and (iii) the liberalization or deregulation of entry into activities previously restricted to the public sector (1995, 2). However, what occurs in Tanzania and Kenya does not fit such conventional uses of the term and should instead be seen as "fairly invisible adjustments to the division of labour between the state, NGOs and POs [ People's Organizations] ...often through action from below and sometimes by design from above" (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 3). For instance, a local initiative could be all that is needed to initiate the construction of a school, yet external support is most likely needed to complete and then operate the school (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 3). 103

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The example of rather unorthodox development of privatization in East African countries illustrates that few NGDOs are in fact autonomous or self-reliant, especially given the presence of donor influence in these groups. The majority of them "need outside approval, finance, technical advice, training or tactical accommodation," and the "acquisition of such support is at the heart of relations between the state, voluntary agencies and donors involved in service provision" (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 3). Whether coordination attempts imply that government is completely in charge is doubtful, given the number of separate influences it must deal with, but it does indicate that government has a certain amount of control over the activities of NGDOs. Furthermore, while privatization' implies a distinct demarcation between the public and private sectors, in Kenya and Tanzania this distinction is more blurred. These problems with privatization have "led to increasing inverse' privatization of state resources which are frequently controlled by government officials for private use," contributing to corruption, embezzlement of state resources, and patronage networks, all of which can have a ruinous effect upon not only the government's ability to administer and manage, but also the quality of education and the reputation of the government (Therkildsen and Semboja 1995, 3). Decentralization Difficulties Another trend that continues to affect capacity and that both governments appear to support fully is the decentralization of the education sector, and the failures to achieve decentralization are in part yet another consequence of poor capacity. The pursuit of decentralization poses a frustrating problem, because in order to decentralize, government 104

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has to have the capacity to put in place mechanisms of management and administration that allow for coordination and communication between different levels of government and development actors. That very same capacity continues to be undermined, preventing the attainment of decentralization. Tanzania has made numerous attempts at decentralization, which have mostly only been such in name, as can be seen in looking at two particular policies put into place in the same year. The 1995 Education and Training Policy "formally recognized the need to decentralize decision making in the education system, and explicitly advocated the liberalization of ownership, financing, and management of educational institutions" (Lassibille et. al 2000, 16; see also MOEC 2001, 4-5), while in the same breath "the 1995 revision of the 1978 Education Act" strengthened the "legally prescribed role of central government in primary education" (Therkildsen 2000, 412). In 1997 there was a renewed focus on decentralization, due to conditionalities in the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Credit, in part stipulating "that previously earmarked recurrent government grants to local authorities for primary education should be given as block grants, thereby giving councils greater room for manoeuvre in decisions about primary schooling," and by establishing a policy "that the employment of teachershitherto mainly managed by the Teachers Service Commissionshould be shifted to the councils" at the local level (Therkildsen 2000, 411). Whether these stipulations were actually fully implemented is doubtful, and evidence presented by Therkildsen "indicates that the political commitment for shifting control of primary education downwards to local governments and parents is 105

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ambiguous," an observable trend in the post-Independence era (2000, 412). However, he asserts that the policy documents that outline plans for decentralized reform are "not mere rhetoric written for the benefit of donors whose funds are needed for implementation (although that certainly plays a role)" (Therkildsen 2000, 412). He insists that the ambiguity in implementing decentralization "reflects real conflicts about control of the provision of primary education and about the appropriate means for its improvement" (Therkildsen 2000, 412). Part of the problem is also that, especially at the local level, decision making and implementation is dominated primarily by individuals such as politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and teachers, rather than by local government, school committees, or NGDOs (Therkildsen 2000, 419). The Secondary Education Master Plan (SEMP) of 2000 once again openly acknowledged the need for decentralization, stating that because the country has such large "geographical, economic, and cultural diversities and complexities that cannot be adequately addressed from the centre," autonomy is essential for improving operational efficiency (MOEC 2000, 26). The proposed plan of the government was to "devolve the operational powers for the efficient management of schools to regions, districts and schools, within broad national guidelines," while still maintaining control through "review [of] the terms of recruitment, retention status, and promotion of heads of schools and their assistants to ensure that the autonomy given to them is not abused" (MOEC 2000, 26). Taking into account that this policy was passed in 2000 and decentralization continued to be an elusive goal in following years, the capacity to implement it was clearly nonexistent. 106

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However, as with the recent changes in ICT policy in education, the ESDP, PEDP, and SEDP of recent years have initiated several changes in the organizational structure of the education sector. Chief among them was the "decentralization of educational administrative structures and devolution of authority to local levels under the Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP)" (Haggerty et. al 2007, 6). This planned decentralization made school committees responsible for "preparing budgets, financial reports and school plans," ensured that each school receives a direct grant from the government which it is expected to manage through its own bank account, and "opened up new roles for NGOs in capacity building for school committees (Haggerty et. al 2007, 6; see also World Bank 2008, 23). Perhaps the increased dialogue of partnership in recent years has created some capacity for decentralization to work, but cautious optimism is called for, as the outcomes of these policies cannot yet be fully seen. Kenya faces a more complicated situation in regard to decentralization due to the high level of corruption in the country, which hinders genuine efforts to decentralize. In 2005, Transparency International ranked Kenya as the 112th most corrupt country out of 133 (Cruz and Ombretta 2005, 6), and although the extent to which this corruption extends into education is not known, considering the sizeable budget and the financial contribution of donors, the sector is most likely a lucrative temptation. When the National Rainbow Coalition Government came to power in 2003 it initiated a series of reforms that placed good governance at the forefront of importance, yet highly centralized decisionmaking and low institutional capacity were not beneficial for creating the capacity to properly manage and administer the education sector (Cruz and Ombretta 2005, 2). 107

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In 2005, the MOE began transferring greater decision-making authority to District Education Offices and District Education Boards, but while this is in fact an "increased decentralization of responsibilities...local and regional government[s] in Kenya often lack the power and resources to be effective" in carrying out the responsibilities they have been given, once again revealing tenuous capacity (Sivasubramaniam et. al 2007, 15). Additionally, local government is also prone to patronage and corruption, causing some to refer to decentralization efforts to date as "recentralization" because the "central government continues to hold discretionary powers, financial resources and human resources," thus effectively making decentralization in the Kenyan "nothing more than delegation" (Sivasubramaniam et. al 2007, 15). While Tanzania is not free of corruption by any means, corruption is not nearly as bad as in Kenya, and the issue not only complicates Kenya's efforts to decentralize but affects other facets of capacity in the education sector. Performing Partnership In the true sense of the word, partnership did not begin to develop in Tanzania and Kenya until recently and even now it is far from perfect. Yet, compared to the grudging and oft forced collaboration between the state and NGDOs in the past, it seems that the possibility for real change now exists. The logic behind pursuing partnership with NGDOs in developing countries is based mainly upon many of the assumptions about NGDO abilities that have been cemented into the relationships among states, donors, and 108

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NGDOs by neoliberal policies such as the NPA. NGDOs have been pushed into the realm of service provision by donors for several decades now, and it has become inevitable that the state and NGDOs work together. Partnership has evolved in these countries, and an exploration of the decisions and motivations that prompted engagement in true partnership is important. Understanding these motivations, both positive and negative, and the implications thereof is useful because it allows insight into the genuineness of the partnership and its potential to improve education. Ulterior motives still persist on both sides, as does goodwill, and both have potential to influence the nature of partnership, as well as the potential to affect capacity, and thereby control, over the education sector. Motivations to Partner Legacies of policies such as the NPA and conditionalities accompanying SAPs push into the present day, placing NGDOs into the same sphere as the government, which states had often resisted in the past, subtly or outright. Toward the end of the 1990s, government dialogue of partnership took on a new tone. In Tanzania, for instance, new phases of the ESDP and PEDP, which were formulated in 1997 and put in place in 2001, introduced "close collaboration among all stakeholders government (central and local), the major donor partners, and civil society organizations" (World Bank 2010, xi). Additionally, the government began inviting NDGOs "into the mainstream development initiatives, especially with regard to provision...of merit goods (education and health in particular)" (Kiondo and Mtatifikolo 1999, 32). Historically, the Kenyan government has been more disposed toward partnership than Tanzania, allowing NGDOs to work in the 109

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country and partnering with them in certain instances, yet partnership was not widespread or institutionalized, and corruption played a large part in the failures of partnership. One early instance of partnership is the Starehe Boys' Centre in Nairobi, started in 1959 prior to independence by the state, and aided by NGDOs and donors. This school "has developed to become one of the largest (over 1,000 primary and secondary pupils) and best-performing schools in Kenya," and is one of the first instances of long-lasting partnership and not mere delegation of tasks (Makau 1995, 96). The motivation behind increased partnership can be attributed to a realization by the Tanzanian and Kenyan governments that the only way they would continue to receive aid was to involve NGDOs directly in service provision and policy dialogues. Conditionalities stipulating NGDO involvement would not simply disappear, and as donor funds were increasingly channelled "directly to the international NGOs based in the country and to their local networks," government either had "to come to grips with the increasing possibility of its being crowded out in some operations" or make genuine efforts at partnership, which would simultaneously result in retaining a higher degree of control over education (Kiondo and Mtatifikolo 1999, 32). For Tanzania, the promise of debt relief has also been a strong motivating factor for entering into genuine partnership, and, in order to "earn the forgiveness of external creditors," the government has adopted "a more accommodating attitude to civil society'" (Kukkamaa 2008, 22). Both countries receive strong encouragement by donors to engage in partnerships. Yet Kenyan President Kibaki, who succeeded Moi in 2002, shows that acting on donor encouragement may simply have been a strategic move "to receive a better donor 110

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package than did his predecessor" (Brass 2008, 218). Many "throughout the government" are aware of the new global approach involving all actors in partnership and "were thus likely influenced by a global pattern of change toward collaborative governance" (Brass 2008, 218). Partnership provides continued access to funds, albeit in part through NGDOs. Moreover, for weaker states, "joining forces with private-sector actors has been an established strategy to increase their governing capacity," allowing the government to retain more control over NGDOs and the education sector as a whole (Peters and Pierre 1998, 233). In order for government to build up the capacity to deliver quality education to its citizens, partnering with other actors became an inevitability, one that they have started to embrace to a certain degree. Genuine communication and work between NGDOs and the government is reflected not only in policy but in practice, which is not to say that partnership does not still pose drawbacks. Partnership Policies Since 2000, many policies have directly referred to creating partnership by creating transparent processes' and involving a variety of stakeholders'. The SEMP is one such policy, offering solid recommendations on how partnership should be formed, "including secondment of teachers for competent leadership, school inspection, waiver of import duty on educational materials, providing block grants and student vouchers whenever possible so as, to ensure that standards are upheld, and to provide expert advice whenever required" (MOEC 2000, 31). The creation of the plan itself involved different stakeholders, NGDOs among them, showing a disposition to consult them in not only the 111

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delivery of services but also the creation of policy regarding the implementation of these same services. Similarly, the PEDP of 2002 and ESDP of 2006 consulted NGDOs in the creation and implementation of the plan, and the National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations of 2001 recognizes NGDOs as important stakeholders and partners in development efforts (MOEC 2004, 2; 2006). The NGO policy in particular, calls for measures to "enhance self-regulation, transparency and accountability of NGOs and establish modalities for interaction between NGOs," indicating government initiative to establish methods of controlling the actions of NGDOs (VPO 2001, 4). The policy shows attempts at retaining control over the activities of NGDOs in the education sector by creating an environment that not only enables NGDOs to operate effectively and efficiently in partnership, but also strengthens the relationship between the state and NGDOs. However, the government does not have the capacity to place adequate checks and balances upon NGDOs that would enable control. The ESDP of 2006 attempts to assert control by explicitly spelling out the responsibilities of NGDOs, rather than merely mentioning their involvement as stakeholders. These measures may be more fruitful than attempting to directly monitor NGDOs, because they are given obligations that do not necessarily entail government oversight or involvement. Rather, these obligations require commitment of NGDOs to "participate effectively in planning, implementing, monitoring and evaluating activities at all levels that support the ESDP and PEDP objectives" and to contribute "experiences, knowledge, human, financial, technical and material resources to the improvement and provision of quality basic education," all of which are activities that do not entail monitoring of the 112

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NGDOs themselves (BEDC 2006, 36-37). The ICT Policy for Basic Education of 2007 also widely acknowledges the importance of NGDO involvement in "conceptualizing and implementing activities related to the introduction of ICT in education in Tanzania" (MOEVT 2007, 12). The ICT policy considers NGDOs to be vital stakeholders in the implementation of a range of issues and policies, including matters of infrastructure and technical issues; curriculum and content; planning, procurement and administration; and monitoring and evaluation (MOEVT 2007, 24). It would seem that the aspect of partnership that involves oversight by the government may not be enforceable by the state due to poor capacity. Lack of oversight casts a shadow upon partnership, because while partnering may yield results for the development of the education sector to a certain degree, it may actually further undermine government control. Similarly, Kenya's 2006 National and Communication Technology Strategy for Education and Training includes NGDOs among the agencies responsible for the strategy's implementation and discusses at length the ways in which NGDOs should engage in the provision of ICT to the education sector. The KESSP, in addition to its many policy changes, launched an initiative through the introduction of the sector-wide approach "that attempts to bring international donor organizations and other local partners together around a coherent policy agenda that is fully owned by government" (Sivasubramaniam et. al 2007, 2). The KESSP itself was created through the National Conference on Education and Training, which was convened by the MOE and engaged over 800 individuals from the education sector, including teachers, government officials, and representatives from NGDOs who together "deliberated and 113

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suggested ways of reforming the education sector," suggestions that resulted in the design of the KESSP (Sivasubramaniam et. al 2007, 26). The MOE's Strategic Plan, which "should be viewed as continuation of" the KESSP, is also a furthering of partnership with all stakeholders, including NGDOs, thereby ensuring "that scarce resources are invested in programmes that will deliver equitable quality education and training to all Kenyans in an efficient manner" (MOE 2008, 43). The plan also offers up different ways in which NGDOs should partner with the government. One way is to be a member of an Education Stakeholders Forum that fosters "co-ordination and collaboration between the MOE and other providers of education services,...[and] information sharing and partnerships between public, private, and non-profit sector education stakeholders" (MOE 2008, 47). This forum is an important element of partnership because it works toward increasing the capacity to communicate and coordinate. Likewise, chosen members of NGDOs serve as representatives to the National Education Advisory Council. In this capacity, they advise ministers on policy issues, mobilize resources, and foster coordination and collaboration between the government and other education providers (MOE 2008, 47-52). Certainly, both countries have additional policies that elaborate on how NGDOs are involved in service provision to the education sector through increased partnership. This is merely a sample of the available evidence to convey that official policies reflect engagement in partnership by giving specific tasks and responsibilities to NGDOs, and that partnership has begun to take on the goal of improving capacity for management and administration of education, thereby strengthening control of the government. The way in 114

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which the policies discuss partnership indicates a commitment to improving coordination and communication by drawing on the strengths of all stakeholders in collaboration, while simultaneously asserting government control over NGDOs by taking the initiative to engage with them and then dictating their responsibilities. The question still remains whether the partnership is genuine, given some of the motivations behind government's increased disposition toward working with NGDOs and the low capacity of the state to enforce measures of control over NGDOs. The expectation of the state is that NGDOs "implement government policy instead of charting their own independent agenda," serving as a legitimizing agent for the state in education, but this is not always the case (Kukkamaa 2008, 22). Often government lacks the ability to control the extent to which NGDOs involve themselves, due to poor capacity and donor dependency which prevents the government from objecting outright to NGDO activities. Many setbacks and problems exist for partnerships, and the root cause is the legacy created by the NPA, which has both created a mistrust of NGDOs by the government and weakened government capacity. Problems for Partnership Very little systemic evidence exists about partnership between government and NGDOs, although many NGDOs are listed as being active in service provision, such as ActionAid and Save the Children, both of which work in Kenya and Tanzania. The Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) is one NGDO that has partnered with the Tanzanian government (AKF also works on similar projects in Kenya) on the Support to Education in Primary 115

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Schools (STEPS) project. The organization receives funding directly from the government to help develop and implement a "pilot course on training Ward Education Officers in other districts through the country," which has both service-provision and capacity-building functions (Haggerty 2007, 75). AKF also works with the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE) as chosen representatives of the Tanzania Education Network /Mtandao wa Elimu Tanzania (TEN/MET), working to create a strong reputation with the government through partnership (Haggerty 2007, 75). Although firsthand analyses of specific partnership projects are lacking, there is plenty of evidence about how individuals from both NGDOs and the government view partnership in the education sector. Haggerty et. al (2007) conducted numerous interviews with members of the Tanzanian government and NGDOs. Their primary conclusion was that the relationship between these actors "is a mix of contention and cooperation" and all interviewees agreed "that [although] they are working towards the same goals of education...they held different opinions on the role that civil society should play in achieving this end" (Haggerty et. al 2007, 23). The government's perspective, as conveyed by interviews with officials, is that NGDOs and civil society as a whole fit into the picture of development, but in a complementary role to government efforts. One official remarked "that the Education Training Policy of 1995 clearly acknowledges that the government cannot be the sole provider of education," adding that NGDOs are valuable in roles of service provision, particularly in matters of "teacher and committee training or materials contribution" (23). 116

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NGDOs, on the other hand, view themselves as more than complementary, contributing to education through advocacy and watchdog activities, in addition to service provision. However, the government is unlikely to continue engaging in effective partnership with an NGDO that does not pursue a complementary relationship. The government harbours a great deal of mistrust for any NGDO that is perceived to be impeding its legitimacy. NGDOs working in service provision "legitimize [the government's] actions," while those that are more concerned with advocacy can weaken legitimacy (Kukkamaa 2008, 22-23). In Kenya, many government officials also view NGDOs "primarily as implementers and not as policy interlocutors," and hostile skepticism is often geared toward NGDOs who engage in advocacy activities, because such activities raise "old insecurities and distrust in government-civil society working relationships," making partnership a difficult concept to put into practice (Sivasubramaniam 2007, 2). One highlevel government official stated that the government's role is policy development, strategy development, resource mobilization, quality assurance, monitoring and evaluation and CSOs are the implementers. Government cannot implement EFA without support from CSOs as a machinery to reach those the government cannot reach. CSOs exist for areas the government cannot reach for example Non-formal schools. (30). Agreement on what overall role NGDOs should be playing in the education sector and how to operationalize the partnerships has not been reached. Nevertheless, it appears that the government attempts to wield a certain amount of control in partnership, especially given the fact that government is "seeking more accountability" over the actions of NGDOs (Sivasubramaniam 2007, 40). The views expressed by government 117

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officials may very well be the norm when it comes to how they view the ideal partnership; yet the capacity to enforce such partnership is lacking for various reasons. Nevertheless, the quality of interaction has certainly improved, although it seems to be more favourable toward those NGDOs that "are positioned to work as partners (either service provision, technical assistance)" rather than those groups that are more focused on "advocacy or those who adopt a more confrontational stance" (40). Another problem for partnership that is documented, particularly in Kenya, is the high turnover of government staff working with NGDOs. Each time an individual leaves, the NGDO has to build rapport with a new official from scratch, which greatly "slows down the process of collaboration" (Sivasubramaniam 2007, 29). Additionally, NGDO workers note "that the flow of information between local and national ministries [is] weak" and that "at times districts and national MOE are even found to be using different statistics," which greatly hinders communication and coordination (29). Nevertheless, there are working relationships between the MOE and NGDOs, primarily among NGDOs that focus more on service provision and operate "within MOE priorities" (29). Interviews conducted with NGDO and government members by Brass (2012) in Nairobi and two other rural districts between 2005 and 2008 reveal insight into how these actors view partnership. Particularly in regard to service provision, the attitudes of both actors "have become more open, with individuals on both sides more willing to work together" (Brass 2012, 216). Nevertheless, she observes that there is significant variation in the response of government officials in regard to NGDOs, and that the motivation to work with NGDOs often stems from instrumental reasons' because partnership "is 118

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required by large and powerful donors" (Brass 2012, 224). Partnership for appearance's sake is a practice that Chabal and Daloz (1999) refer to as politics of the mirror' wherein "governments reflect back to donors what they want to see or hear, while following their own preferences behind the looking glass" (Brass 2012, 224). Actions such as these can be attributed directly to the pervasive nature of corruption in Kenyan government and suggest that partnership should be regarded with a skeptical eye. Clearly this practice is in part an attempt to maintain control over the education sector, yet it does not benefit the country as a whole and further weakens control. The Kibaki administration has adopted a dialogue of openness and collaboration, promoting the "ambitious plan to implement the Millennium Development Goals by the year 2030," while also advocating for a collaborative approach that involves as many stakeholders as possible (Brass 2012, 224). Workshops and other collaborative methods have been used to improve service provision in the education sector, yet the government's lack of capacity prevents the full potential of partnership from taking hold. The administration lacks the capacity to improve efficiency and accountability, as well as the ability to curb corruption, which only furthers the tenuous nature of capacity in Kenya. Furthermore, continued lack of trust between government and NGDOs, as well as poor communication and resource constraints pose problems, not only for partnership, but for capacity and government control. NGDOs have become imbedded within the workings of government, and "instead of a clear separation of duties where government makes policy while private organizations implement them, we find the blurring of lines of authority, decision making, and governing between NGOs and government" (Brass 2012, 229). 119

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These blurred lines occur in both Kenya and Tanzania. Increasingly, instead of helping to row the ship of state, NGDOs help the government to steer, whether the government wishes it or not. Genuine desire to engage in partnership is thwarted by old resentments and lingering issues of capacity that make it difficult for government to wrest back control. Government cannot pursue development on its own, but it also does not wish to take a back seat when it comes to policymaking and implementation, two aspects of the education sector that have become increasingly conflated with service provision. NGDOs active as service providers now "sit on government policymaking boards, development committees, and stakeholder forums" and the strategies and policies that they use in service provision are increasingly appropriated into government planning documents (Brass 2012, 218). Even distinct NGDO methods of decisionmaking are now embedded within decisionmaking processes of the government, and NGDOs have "become institutionalized in the governing processes of public service provision," seriously calling into question the degree of control that the government retains (Brass 2012, 218). Expansion Efforts Both the Kenyan and Tanzanian government have consistently promoted the expansion of education. Increasing access and enrollment numbers, mainly through the physical expansion of education facilities, is the primary objective of these policies. The decision to ramp up the enlargement of the education sector is driven by several 120

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motivating factors, including demand from the people, donor influence, and policies promoted by other governments. Numerous consequences, both positive and negative, stem from the decision to expand. Ultimately, expansion affects not only the quality of education offered in these countries, but also the quality of the physical infrastructure and other quantitative aspects of the sector that contribute to quality. If the focus is merely on expanding for the sake of raising enrollment numbers, quality can easily fall to the wayside. Examining these efforts and their outcomes provides insight into the government's capacity for expansion, which in turn speaks not only to the ability of the state to control the education sector as it grows, but also its ability to control the involvement of NGDOs. Factors Influencing Expansion Efforts A chief motivating factor that affects the government decision to expand, both in Tanzania and Kenya, is the Millennium Development Goal of achieving Universal Primary Education. UPE as a policy has been subject to much debate, and while most agree that the goal itself achieving full net enrollment of the student age population in primary school is a worthwhile and achievable goal, discord arises in the methods of implementation and specific policy problems. Despite great achievements since the UN and other institutions recast focus upon the issue in 2000, globally over 75 million children remain out of school and the systems of education in developing countries are failing to keep up with the goal (Steer and Baudienville 2010). 121

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Trying to provide primary education for every child should be a central concern, yet critique and debate arises regarding the methods and policies used to implement UPE. As is the case in Kenya and Tanzania, the problems with UPE arise from lack of funds, improper implementation, and the sense of urgency imparted upon governments by donors who push government to sacrifice quality for quantity (Wedgewood 2005). Implementation is besieged by a multitude of challenges including unavailability of physical facilities, school furniture, equipment and teachers, and until these aspects are adequately addressed and resolved, quality of education will continue to decline (Vos et. al 2004, Wedgewood 2005). UPE does reach a great number of children, teaching them vital skills such as literacy that greatly improve their individual opportunity for leaving a life of poverty. Yet it also disregards "major concerns about the level of overall demand for primary education in the context of limited expansion of formal sector employment," opportunity costs and private costs to families in sending their children to school, as well as "limited payoffs to investments to primary education in the smallholder agriculture and informal sectors where most of the population" of Kenya and Tanzania lives (Vos et. al 2004, 1192; see also Wedgewood 2005, Woods 2007). Educating as many children as possible and providing them basic literacy and numeracy skills will greatly improve their chances in life, but not every child is able or willing to go to school. While the ultimate and eventual goal should be that every child receives a basic education, stressing universal primary education may not be ideal in the present situation. Therein lies the primary criticism the goal of education itself is not the problem, and most everyone is cognizant of the benefits of even the most basic 122

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literacy skills. The push for universal education in developing countries with strained resources is the problem, because it draws focus away from quality and does not ensure the creation of an education system that can support the entire school-age population of a country. Increased commitment from governments and donors to provide a quality education for every child that can be utilized effectively is needed for UPE to work, but doing so requires focusing on current problems within the education sector, as well as other issues such as poverty. UPE as a policy essentializes and decontextualizes issues of politics and poverty within developing countries, ignoring the source of the problems within education (Sifuna 2007). An effective universal education policy also requires communication and cooperation between different development actors, capacity on the part of government, and the availability of extensive resources. These factors are largely missing and in the context of Tanzania and Kenya, and the continued push for UPE exacerbates existing problems, including those of quality. Often, UPE is worked into conditionalities of aid packages given to countries, thus making it a priority to enroll as many people as possible in order to maintain aid flows. This aid money is also highly necessary for improving the quality of education, yet the goal of attaining universal enrollment does not leave much room for enhancing quality. The focus of UPE tends to be "more on enrolling large numbers of children," and "although the importance of quality education in the policy is often acknowledged, improvement in nation-wide school enrolment rates tends to become the main emphasis" (Sawamura and Sifuna 2008, 104). Among Tanzania writers the generally held 123

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view in regard to UPE is that the push for it "was the major cause of a deterioration in quality at all levels in education" and the main focus of expansion was on primary school, rather than on the entire sector (Leshabari and Masesa 2000; Rajabu 2000; Wedgewood 2005, 4; Woods 2007, 16). 12 Kenya has also felt the effects of UPE, one of its main motivators for expanding access to education. The pursuit of UPE resulted in a situation in which "it seemed as if the Ministry of Education and aid agencies were not particularly concerned about the deteriorating quality of education," and instead were more concerned with raising enrollment rates which are visible to anyone (Sawamura and Sifuna 2008, 110). Therein lies an underlying motivating factor; sure enough, UPE is a priority and carries with it the promise of resources with which to develop the education sector, but quality is more difficult to measure and present to aid agencies. Thus, governments in Kenya and Tanzania pursue the expansion of the education sector through enrollments because it produces fast results that are easily reported. In Kenya, the government has gone so far as pushing over-age children into school and expanding free education to secondary schools in order to attain their goals, all the while ignoring concerns from teachers and organizations such as the World Bank regarding the quality of education (Sawamura and Sifuna 2008, 111; World Bank 2010, 21). Conditionalities, donor demands, and reviews conducted by agencies and governments that determine the continued provision of aid to education all influence the government's decision to pursue expansion of education. One other powerful motivating 124 12 UPE has become a colloquial term that is associated with low quality in education "rather than with universalisation" and it is common for people to joke "that the letters UPE stand for Ualimu Pasipo Elimu (teaching without education)" (TCCS 2007, 16)

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factor is demand created by civil society. Parents want to send their children to school, and those living outside of urban areas place increased pressure on the government to expand access. Community-driven demand is also influenced by policy platforms of past governments, which have all placed an incredible emphasis on the creation a developed education sector (World Bank 2010, 21). Observed Effects and Consequences of Expansion Expansion of the education sector has created quite an impact in both Kenya and Tanzania, the main focus of the initiative being the increase of access to primary school. Primary education is arguably the most important of the education sub-sectors because it is the first step to improving literacy rates and bestowing a rudimentary knowledge of arithmetic and basic reading and writing skills. Increased enrollment is the most concrete and obvious result of expansion, but other effects must be taken into consideration in evaluating the outcome of expansion. Rapid expansion has resulted in an ailing infrastructure; shortages of textbooks and other education materials; high student to teacher ratios and poor quality of instruction due to untrained or poorly trained teachers; and poor transition and exit exam rates. The priority of expansion over improving the quality of the existing education sector undermines the gains in quality that have been achieved thus far, which can in turn have heavy consequences for the legitimacy of the state. 125

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Enrollments and Literacy Enrollment has been growing consistently in both countries. Between 1990 and 2000, enrollment rates in Tanzania increased by roughly 22 times (consult Appendix A for further data on educational inputs and attainment in Tanzania) The pace of enrollment growth in government schools was much faster than "in the past in contrast to the growth in community and non government schools," a change that can be attributed to the increased pressure to expand (MOEC 2000, 15). Since then, enrollments have only increased, although complete enrollment numbers are hard to come by and are largely unreliable due to poor reporting mechanisms and lack of capacity to ensure full reports, as well as government officials' incentives to inflate them in order to portray higher success rates for donors (Colclough and Webb 2010, 7). Similarly, in Kenya, education has experienced exponential growth since 2003. This period coincides with the end of the Moi administration and the implementation of various policy interventions that spurred on expansion, including FPE and free secondary education, as well as increased budget allocations meant solely for the increase of enrollments (UNESCO 2010, 37). In 2008, Kenya recorded a net enrollment rate of 92.5%, which brought it closer to achieving the MDG target of UPE by 2015, but concerns remain about the quality of education and to many, the high percentage is more worrisome than heartening (consult Appendix B for further data on educational inputs and attainment in Kenya) (Bandi 2011, 22; UNESCO 2010, 12). Although Tanzania had expected to eliminate illiteracy by 2010 (Woods 2007, 26), government reports from that year stated that the literacy rate for the adult population was only 75% (MOEVT 2010, 7) 126

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and in Kenya the rate for the same year was far lower, coming in at 38.5% of the adult population (UNESCO 2010, 35). Infrastructure and Inputs Expansion's effect upon the infrastructure of education, in a sector that is plagued by a lack of adequate resources and poor management, is not desirable. In 2001, the Basic Education Master Plan (BEMP) reported that the physical infrastructure of the majority of public school buildings in Tanzania was "dilapidated with leaking roofs, no windows, and doors" (MOEC 2001, 15). Additionally, the number of classrooms, staff houses, desks, and chairs fell far below the required amount, in some cases by hundreds of thousands. Considering that the quality of existing buildings and furniture was already poor and the quantity insufficient, the need for more in the wake of expansion is worrisome. Between 2002 and 2004, 30,000 new classrooms were constructed in Tanzania and 20,000 additional classrooms were under construction. This would be a monumental achievement on its own, were it not for the fact that "many of these classrooms were actually replacements for old and dilapidated rooms, so that there is still a shortage of good quality rooms" (Woods 2007, 15). Kenya also faces issues of poor infrastructure, and the introduction of FPE exacerbated problems with the quality of infrastructure. School infrastructure is sorely lacking; in rural areas and urban slums, sanitation and water pose huge problems, as does the lack of adequate equipment for both teachers and students (UNESCO 2010, 12). Poor reporting mechanisms and a tendency to discuss planned improvements without referring 127

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to data on existing conditions means that quantitative data on the state of infrastructure is lacking, yet many government reports refer to poor infrastructure as being a consistent problem. As the World Bank points out, government should give more attention to the "quality of the infrastructure that is being put up in the schools," and that poor infrastructure will only "result in high costs in rehabilitation and maintenance" in the future (2008, 29). The quality and availability of teaching inputs is an important indicator of overall quality of education as well as the effects of expansion. An input that is easier to measure than others is the supply of textbooks to schools. In Tanzania, the pupil to textbook ratio improved dramatically between 2000 and 2009, from 20:1 to 3:1 (World Bank 2010, 16). This improvement, however, is only a national average and does not indicate influential factors such as rural-urban disparities. The pupil to textbook ratio for mathematics, science, and English texts at the primary level ranges from 3:1 to 13:1, a discrepancy that is most likely the result of uneven distribution and expansion (URT ESDC 2011, 23). A similar situation exists in Kenya, where the average pupil to textbook ratio is 3:1, which was not always the case, because the government used to provide textbooks without a fee to every student enrolled in school. However, increases in expansion efforts caused the government to cut back on the program, pushing costs back onto parents (Otieno and Colclough 2009, 27-29; UNESCO 2010, 12). Overall, the situation could be worse in regard to the number of textbooks available, but were it not for the massive emphasis on expansion that has overstretched the available resources of the government even further, 128

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more students might have textbooks of their own, improving the quality of their education exponentially. Teaching Teaching is arguably the most important aspect of education, so the quality of teachers and the student to teacher ratio is vital. Demand for educators in Tanzania has been driven up so high by the expansion of primary education that the supply of secondary school graduates that could fill teaching positions was inadequate, prompting the government to draw teachers "from populations who had not attended secondary school" (Woods 2007, 16). The implications for teacher quality do not bode well. Several studies have shown that teachers employed by the government have poor teaching methods, and the inadequate quality is indicative of a vicious cycle that continues to undermine the quality of education (16). Poor quality in primary education, caused in large part by the effects of expansion, creates a situation in which few pass on to secondary education, which in turn leads "to a very limited pool from which to draw teachers for both secondary and primary levels," because they themselves "have passed through a very weak education system [and] achieved low academic grades" (16). The lack of available and qualified teachers has a double impact on quality, not only because the quality of the instructor is often sorely lacking, but also because the shortage increases student to teacher ratios. Rapid expansion of both primary and secondary school in Tanzania has resulted in high averages of 43:1 in 2010, and many cases classes exceed 70 students, often mixing grade levels, which further complicates the task at hand for teachers (MOEVT 2010, 3). Expansion has not presented favourable 129

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conditions for teachers and the over-stretching and average underqualification of one of the most important inputs into education continues to impede overarching efforts to improve the quality of education. In Kenya, increased enrollments have raised the pupil to teacher ratio to 47:1 in primary education and 30:1 in secondary education (Colclough and Webb 2009, 7). The government insists that it is pairing its undertaking of necessary' expansion measures with simultaneous measures to improve the quality of education, yet the growing number of students has placed additional stress on an already strained system, wherein teachers have a difficult time coping with such a high number of students (Sawamura and Sifuna 2008, 109). Compounding the issues of an influx of students in the wake of continued expansion is the acute teacher shortage in the country. This shortage has forced many teachers "to combine classes for a number of grades," and some have even gone so far as to resort to the introduction of "double shifts to cater to the increased enrolments" (Sawamura and Sifuna 2008, 110). As a result, teachers are overworked, contributing to the decline of the quality of education. No doubt the qualifications of teachers are also questionable, given the suffering quality of the education system, but no evidence of this regarding Kenyan teachers could be found, due in part to limited available research on the subject. Examination and Transition Rates In Tanzania, an early consequence of secondary school expansion that began in the mid-1980s was "a noticeable decline in the proportion of children from peasant backgrounds," as well as a decline in "overall student achievement, as judged by Form 4 130

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examination results in the early 1990s" (Lassibille et. al 2000, 23). Declining achievement is an expected response of opening the educational system further because it draws weaker students. While this decline means the government was successful in expanding access, the impact on equity and effectiveness of learning in schools remained weak in the system as a whole and poor achievement continued. Lassibille also points out that the ability of a student to perform well in secondary school depends largely on the foundation formed by primary education. His study of schools showed "that most students enter secondary school with a poor basis for good performance," a direct consequence of poor quality of learning and limited access to learning materials at the primary level (2000, 25). From 2005 to 2006, Tanzania observed an increase in the pass rates for the primary school leaving exam (PSLE), going from 49% in 2004 to 62%, and peaking at 70% in 2006. These improved results were used to support the assertion that the PEDP's focus on expansion was achieving the desired impact on quality. However, in 2003, when examination results first began climbing, jumping from 27% in 2002 to 40% in 2003, "skepticism was voiced about increasing the weights given to Kiswahili (and less to English and mathematics) in computing the total exam score" (World Bank 2010, 15). Mathematics and English being the weaker subjects, the sudden increase in scores no longer seemed so meaningful, especially given sharp declines in exam scores that followed in 2007, dropping down to 54%. Although a full explanation is still lacking, the Education Sector Performance Review for 2008/2009, conducted by the government, investigated the drop in scores and found it to be a consequence of a "shortage of 131

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qualified teachers...shortage of materials...[and a] lack of regular in-service training and school supervision" (World Bank 2010, 15). In addition to poor examination results, transition rates are poor, due in part to repetition, drop-out rates, and poor quality of learning (Bines and Woods 2007, 7). The expansion of primary schooling took priority and was not initially accompanied by expansion of secondary school, which also reduced transition rates and this decline in turn is "perceived by parents as reflective of reduced quality of primary schooling," altogether not a farfetched perception given the effects of expansion (Bines and Woods 2007, 16). Of the age group that attends secondary school, an exceedingly small proportion completes the cycle, with about 5% completing the lower rung of secondary school and 1.5% completing upper secondary. Pass rates for the Certificate for Secondary Education Examinations (CSEE) at the end of the lower rung in 2010 were incredibly low at 50.4%, down over 20% from the previous year, and overall they have been decreasing since the introduction of the SEDP in 2004 (MOEVT 2010, 56). As a result, less than 5% of the labor force holds a secondary education (MOEVT 2010, 29-30). Kenya experiences a slightly better situation when it comes to completion of primary school, averaging about 81% in 2008 and 92.5% net enrollment for the country. However, completion rates vary widely by province, with urban and wealthier areas experiencing higher completion of primary school, indicating that access to primary education is far from equitable. Additionally, enrollment rates in secondary school are very low, especially in poorly performing provinces such as Nairobi and the North Eastern Province. The disparities among different areas of the country not only indicates 132

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uneven distribution of expansion but also raise concerns about quality in primary schools as a whole (UNESCO 2010, 35). Repetition and drop-out rates are not very high in Kenya, especially as compared to Tanzania, yet transition rates to secondary school are not very high either. The lack of transition, however, is not due to a lack of qualified individuals. Poor transition rates can be attributed to cost factors (many families cannot afford to send their children to school) and to the lack of secondary schools (UNESCO 2010, 12, 37). In 2007, transition rates from primary to secondary school were recorded at 70%, up 10% from the previous year and only 5% below the target for 2012, but the lack of capacity and available schools means that while many are theoretically able to transition based upon their scores, a lack of access or personal funds holds back potential students (MOE 2008, 15). Enrollments and Control As enrollments continue to rise in Kenya and Tanzania, problems exacerbated by the decision to engage in expansion prior to improving the quality of education continue to slow the progress of development. Shortages of qualified teachers, learning materials, and poor infrastructure pose incredible challenges for the education sector. Equitable access to education is far from reality, and transition rates, completion rates, and exam scores have not reached the desired goals. Problems of capacity further the shortcomings of education service provision: inadequate mobilization of scarce resources, poor operational effectiveness and planning, and a lack of efficiency in provision all compound the consistent lack of quality. 133

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The connection between the capacity to successfully manage and administer the education system and the ability to provide and control the provision of education services is irrefutable. Poor capacity equates to poor control, and in these countries, both factors affect each other and are in turn affected by elements such as corruption and the relationship with other actors. Both countries have struggled immensely with strengthening capacity and maintaining control. By rapidly expanding the education sector, the ability to do either has been further damaged, perpetuating the cycle of weakening capacity and control. The decision to expand, in and of itself, was not one made of the government's own volition. Much of the motivating force behind renewed expansion of the education sector before it was ready for such an endeavour came from other actors, and the state had little choice but to comply if it was to continue receiving aid to education. These same actors who push for expansion later voice concerns and complaints about weakening quality of education and poor capacity for operating the system. Over a decade has passed since the renewed push for UPE and general expansion of the education sector, and during this time, expansion has remained a primary policy objective. Many of the same problems prevail, although perhaps not quite as strongly as before. However, the question lingers what would the quality of education be if the focus had been not upon achieving goals such as UPE, which are less meaningful if the universal provision of education lacks adequate quality? Would the government now have the capacity to expand while maintaining and improving quality at a steady rate? These what ifs serve no purpose expect perhaps to illustrate that, had these governments had 134

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more control over decisions in the education sector, they could perhaps have had the political strength to go along the route that held the most promise for the education sector. Comparing NGDO and State Provided Education Tanzania and Kenya have experienced rapid expansion of the education sector alongside the presence of NGDOs, working to provide the same services to the people. Efforts to engage in partnership exist, but these are far from ideal, and, much like expansion efforts, suffer from a lack of capacity along with other problems. NGDOs, as a consequence of the policies that promoted their presence, are seen as the optimal actor for service provision in education and have thus been given many of the responsibilities of the state. Do they, however, provide a higher quality of education, as they have been purported to by theorists and development actors? What does the quality, perceived or otherwise, of NGDO education mean for state control over the education sector? A major difference between public and private education, especially in Tanzania, is that the public system "implies a direct role for the government in both finance and school management," in all matters, including expansion; "whereas expansion through the private sector implies a more indirect role [for the government] exercised through, for example, selective targeting of public resources for secondary education, and sector regulation" (Lassibille et. al 2000, 7). 13 Government is still involved in private education, due to the highly centralized nature of the system. Thus, the two do not differ largely in 135 13 The term private' here does not denote for-profit organizations, although many private schools charge fees, while both Kenya's and Tanzania's governments do not, due to policies promising free education. Private schools can include for-profit actors; yet the term also refers to NGDOs and religious organizations that offer schooling; because as they are non-governmental, the education they offer is not public.

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regard to their impact on student learning. In fact, the gap in performance and effectiveness between public and private schools is very small, with private schools achieving higher scores on average (Lassibille et. al 2000, 2). Private schools do, however, have far more autonomy than their public counterparts. Control by the government remains substantial in two areas: private schools are not free to set their own fees (although they do find ways to circumvent these restrictions and collect financial contributions from students), nor are they free to create their own institutional practices because the government still prescribes textbook choices and the design of the curriculum (Lassibille et. al 2000, 17). Government does not, however, have any control over the quality of education offered in these schools, and private schools often have poor evaluative practices when it comes to appraising the work of their teachers (Lassibille et. al 2000, 2). As far as the quality of education produced by teachers is concerned, even though NGDOs possess more resources and attract teachers through their relatively higher pay grade, the effectiveness and quality of teachers is not much better than in government schools. The underachievement of NGDO schools in terms of performance on examinations can be attributed to, inter alia, a lack of "professional qualifications, compulsory in-service training, regular inspection, staff appraisal, and mandatory training for all school and subject heads so as to improve teacher effectiveness" (MOEC 2000, 18). On the whole, NGDOs provide 20-25% of the education in Tanzania, making them indispensable to the sector (Haggerty et. al 2007, 17). NGDOs are often held to a higher standard than government, although the quality of their provision is as questionable as 136

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that of the government (Haggerty et. al 2007, 17). NGDOs have even fewer checks on their actions than government schools, and the government in turn lacks the capacity to enforce the necessary control over every NGDO acting as a service provider in the country, especially when it cannot achieve the same for its own provision of services. Additionally, NGDOs are often praised as being more cost effective than government, which may well be true in a purely numerical sense, but effectiveness stems from the fact that they are much smaller entities than the state and thus have a limited reach. The smallness also translates into an inability to reach the neediest constituents, something that NGDOs are often lauded as doing, and, just like government, they have limited resources and suffer from problems of capacity (Kukkamaa 2008, 9). NGDOs do not fulfill the potential they are said to be able to reach; they are often "reduced to creating safety nets for the poor, no longer fulfilling a transformative function," and merely implementing programmes and channelling aid at the behest of donors (Kukkamaa 2008, 11). While NGDOs surely suffer from corruption and self-created problems much like government, many of their actions, including the push of NGDOs into the education sector as service providers, are guided by donors and other actors on whom they are dependent for funding (Kukkamaa 2008, 11). The different accountabilities under which NGDOs operate have great impacts on their actions, and they too lack a certain degree of control due to their dependence on donors. In Kenya, the expansion of FPE has prompted some parents to move their children from NGDO schools, which charge fees, into the public system. Still, a great number do the opposite, removing their children from public schools due to fears about 137

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overcrowding and the capacity of the government to handle the influx of new students while still maintaining quality of education. Upwardly mobile pupils and their parents may determine "that their chances of reaching a good public secondary school have been substantially reduced by large groups of FPE children' crowding the schools," and will thus resort to NGDO schools and other private actors (King 2005, 9). Despite, or perhaps more appropriately in spite, of the introduction of FPE in 2003, non-formal education provided by NGDOs and other private actors has mushroomed. In Nairobi alone, over 560 non-formal schools existed around 2007 (Haggerty et. al 2007, 22). However, much like in Tanzania, "there is currently still no policy in place governing or monitoring these schools," in large part due to lacking capacity needed to achieve such an endeavour (Haggerty et. al 2007, 22). Specific instances of NGDOs building schools such as SOS Children's Village, which has built twelve schoolhouses for orphans since 1990 in Meru, Nairobi, Mombasa, and Eldoret, and ActionAid Kenya, which has committed itself to building 17 boarding schools in the North Rift Valley are certainly helpful to those who are directly affected by these initiatives (Bandi 2011, 32-33). However, the majority of NGDOs in Kenya cannot count such projects among their achievements, and most lack quality in the provision of education services. Many NGDOs face their fair share of problems, including "poor quality and relevance due to lack of a clear policy, a negative image, lack of a clear transition mechanism to the formal system, inadequate resources, unqualified teachers, lack of teaching and learning materials, lack of quality assurance mechanisms, and poor coordination of the large number of service providers" (UNESCO 2010, 14). 138

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Observations from the early 1990s in East Africa noted that NGDOs, when acting as service providers, suffered from institutional weaknesses including a "limited absorptive capacity, inadequate delivery mechanisms, and a lack of technical expertise and managerial effectiveness," as well as problems with resource mobilization and infrastructure, financial misappropriation, and manipulative accounting techniques (Fowler 1995, 61). These weaknesses persist into the present day and are in turn mirrored by the government, yet NGDOs are continually given additional responsibility and are lauded by those advocating for their presence. Given the position of NGDOs as the favoured actor, it is clear why they continue to work as service providers in education. They are too deeply mired in the sector to depart now and instead continue working, whether in partnership with the government or on their own, and the myths and overgeneralizations about their skill-set and capacity pose problems for control. Government quality in education is higher than among NGDOs, although not by much, which only further damages the quality of education. Yet, the government can only do so much, given limited capacity. Even if the government had the capacity to more adequately control the educational services offered by NGDOs, it cannot dispense with their services because they provide such a substantial amount of the services in both countries. 139

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Summary Tanzania and Kenya share much in common, regarding not only their development history, but also the events of recent years. Problems of management and administration are complicated as overstretched education ministries work to deliver services, devise and implement policy, and coordinate a bastion of NGDOs on limited resources, faltering infrastructure, and dwindling manpower. Capacity to deliver services and maintain control over the education system is further hampered for both states due to SAPs implemented in the 1980s that cut funds for social services and administration and reduced the direct role of the state in development. Both countries have made efforts since the turn of the century to alleviate these problems by enacting progressive policies such as ICT and engaging in legitimate partnership with other stakeholders, most prominently witnessed through the development of Kenya's KESSP. Far from identical in their experiences, Tanzania was more adamantly opposed to the presence of NGDOs, keeping civil society suppressed for the larger part of three decades in order to maintain control. Kenya seemed more inclined toward a flourishing civil society and did not take many overt measures to curtail civil society, but knowledge of rampant corruption, the targeting of Harambee schools by the government, and a lack of information about NGDO activities until late 1980s casts acceptance of NGDO activity in the education sector into doubt. Corruption in Kenya has played a significant part in its problems with capacity and control, undermining much of the work done to develop the education sector and preventing decentralization from taking effect. Nevertheless, 140

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Tanzania is not free from corruption by any means and has also had problems enacting decentralization. In both countries, NGDOs have become increasingly active, not only as service providers but also as policymakers. This progression in the nature of NGDO presence in the education sector has had a profound effect upon the NGDO-state relationship and has certainly had an impact upon government capacity and control. Tanzania and Kenya both struggle to monitor and coordinate the vast number of NGDOs spread throughout the country, making partnership a difficult goal to pursue. The encroachment of NGDOs upon policymaking is met with caution and suspicion by government official in both countries due to well-founded fears about compromised control. Universal primary education has been pursued by both states, first after independence and once again starting in the late 1990s. The renewed focus on UPE came from donors, foreign governments, MLAs, and intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, yet both countries encountered problems of quality and quantity in pushing expansion. Without addressing issues of access, quality, demand, and deeply embedded issues such as poverty, UPE cannot be successfully and meaningfully attained. Tanzania and Kenya face the same challenges in this regard: attempting to improve quality while simultaneously expanding, all within an education system that is financially weak and stricken with poor capacity, which further undermines overall government control over the education sector. Drawing concrete assessments of the state of education in Kenya and Tanzania is a difficult task, but the evidence at hand is consistent in showing the similarities of the 141

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two states regarding education. On a broader level, this evidence allows us to draw tentative conclusions about the quality of education in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the reasons for its present state. These conclusions in turn offer insight into the extent of government control over both the education sector and the activities of NGDOs, conclusions that are discussed at length in the final chapter. 142

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Chapter Four Conclusion This study set out to analyze the relationship between NGDOs and the government in Tanzania and Kenya, evaluating the effect of the New Policy Agenda upon this relationship in the context of education service provision. What impact did the push for the inclusion of NGDOs in service provision have upon the relationship between NGDOs and the state? Furthermore, how has this relationship changed the government's ability to maintain control over service provision and NGDOs? Concrete answers that might lead to policy recommendations are not within reach due to gaps in appropriate evidence, yet a comparison of these cases examined here with findings in the literature suggests some conclusions and recommendation for future policies. Relationships between NGDOs and governments hinge on several factors, reflected in both the literature and the case studies. Shigetomi (2002), Fowler (1997), and Tvedt (1998) all provide insight into how the NGDO-state relationship is shaped, not only explaining interaction between these two actors in Kenya and Tanzania, but also showing how NGDOs were able to gain a foothold in these countries. The character and 143

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quality of these relationships are continuously shaped by historical, economic, and political factors, and the specific contexts allow understanding of the nuances of the NGDO-state relationships in Kenya and Tanzania and their effect on government control. There is an observable trend in the trajectories of NGDO-state interactions in Kenya and Tanzania, one that does not appear until the onset of neoliberal policies in the wake of several severe economic hardships suffered by both countries. Tanzania was more opposed to the presence of NGDOs, keeping their numbers and activity low for the first two decades after independence, as part of an ideological approach to the development of the country that emphasised self-reliance. Largely opposed to receiving aid from outside actors, Tanzania focused on African socialism for its development philosophy, applying it to the education sector and education policy. By incorporating agricultural knowledge and close community bonds to create an education for rural vocational skills, Nyerere and his peers believed they could create an education system that would allow Tanzania to develop on its own, creating independence and prosperity that could simultaneously allow the country to hold on to its traditional African roots and values. Kenya, on the other hand, allowed civil society to function somewhat, although the presence of NGDOs and their interaction with the government during this time is poorly documented. Education was styled to be African and to provide jobs for Kenyans that had previously been held by colonists, yet it lacked the strong emphasis on rural, communal types of development, instead gearing education toward several different types of work, in both rural and urban economies as well as the formal and informal sector. 144

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Thus, Kenya was more open and modern in its approach to both education and NGDO involvement, but it remained as in control as Tanzania was during the same period. However, the economic situation in both states worsened significantly in the aftermath of global crises and internal problems in the 1980s. Up until this point, the two states differed in their ideological approach to outside actors and education, yet they both ended up in the same situation. Opposition to the presence of outside actors in positions of greater control began to waver in Kenya and Tanzania, as both came to realize they could no longer afford to turn down assistance. Both government began to open civil society gradually, a change that coincided with the advent of the NPA and conditionalities imposed on governments in exchange for economic aid; both trends weakened political opposition to the presence of NGDOs. These influences on the NGDO-state relationship are raised in the literature, notably by Shigetomi (2002), who discusses how the changing political and economic space within a country determines how much room there is for NGDOs to operate. This space is often opened further by outside actors at moments of domestic weakness and could be used to take advantage of weakened capacity, whether or not the ultimate intent is to weaken capacity or control further. Such events certainly transpired in Kenya and Tanzania. When the economic position of the two states weakened in the 1980s, their development trajectories began to converge as an effect of assistance policies that included conditionalities that created political room for NGDOs to grow. Creation of artificial' political room, however, had a significant impact on NGDO-state relationships in Kenya and Tanzania. 145

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The sudden influx of NGDOs in the 1980s was not desired by government, foremost in Tanzania, yet these states were forced to open up in order to preserve economic stability. Forced imposition soured this relationship, creating problems for changing the dynamic of the NGDO-state relationship in the present. Kenyan and Tanzanian government officials remain cautiously predisposed toward NGDOs, as the effect of recent neoliberal policies upon the NGDO-state relationship has tainted attempts at partnership. As the political space for NGDOs was created, the policies of the NPA not only advocated for their increased involvement but also proposed shifting some government responsibilities onto NGDOs. Thus, NGDOs became more active not only as service providers in education, but eventually as policy actors. Fowler (1997) provides a hierarchy of NGDO activities that allows us to understand how these events influenced the relationship between the state and NGDOs. This hierarchy proposes that governments become warier of NGDOs as they move along the hierarchy of activities they engage in, from (1) delivery of services and inputs through (2) developing new technology and methods, (3) developing social innovations and (4) policy-level lobbying to (5) grassroots mobilization and federation (Fowler 1997, 121). In Kenya and Tanzania, NGDOs have certainly moved from delivery of services and inputs to policy involvement under the auspices of neoliberal policies that pushed for their inclusion in both aspects of education. Naturally, this shift of NGDO activity puts governments on the defensive, and they seek out ways to control the activities of NGDOs. Whether or not the capacity to control 146

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NGDO activities existed during the initial changes to the NGDO-state relationship, the push for increased NGDO activity reduced government control over NGDOs. These impacts upon the NGDO-state relationship moving the two sides from opposition to forced interaction while simultaneously drawing resources and capacity from the state by shifting responsibilities to NGDOs are still felt today and have greatly affected efforts to build partnership between them. Tvedt (1998) proposes four different types of models for the NGDO-state relationship and partnership. In light of the evidence presented in the case studies, there has been a marked move from the dual model to the collaborative model. Both Kenya and Tanzania pursued a dual model for most of the late 1980s and 1990s, working separately from NGDOs without many documented instances of collaboration, a course influenced by distrust of NGDOs and fear of compromised state control caused by the NPA's push for NGDOs as service providers. However, as time went on both states realized they could not rid themselves of NGDOs and that conditionalities would not stop seeking an ever-increasing role for them. Thus, both governments initiated a move to a collaborative partnership model. Clearly a reversal of previous tactics, the goal with partnership was to regain and maintain control over education service provision and policymaking. At present, Kenya and Tanzania appear to be stuck between the two models, an outcome that Tvedt says is not uncommon, as there are varying degrees of collaboration. The difficulties experienced in the new attempts at partnership can in part be explained by considering Mercer's (2003) discussion of the NPA's alteration of the complex balance of power that exists in the developing world. Different actors are all 147

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vying for room, and due to the stipulations for NGDO involvement, governments saw and still see themselves as losing control. Just as governments were wary of NGDOs at the beginning, fearing loss of control to the Western actors foisted upon them, they continued to be wary of them as they moved toward partnership, a move that was fuelled by fears of losing legitimacy. Among other things, NGDOs and governments have been conditioned into a behavior that prevents them from effectively collaborating. The case studies also fit the literature in respect to the role of donors in pushing NGDOs as replacements for the state. Bratton (1989b), Gary (1996), and Oyugi (2004), all argue that donors are crucial in creating situations that allow for increased NGDO activity, not only in service provision, but also the creation of policy. Such actions are seen by the state as threatening its legitimacy, an assertion that is accurate given the condition of government capacity and the fact that conditionalities themselves pose problems for state autonomy to pursue its own policies (Fuller 1991, Schafer 1999). Where these case studies diverge from the literature, however, is in the types of action in which the government will engage, in response to NGDO activities they encounter. The literature provides examples types of direct action that governments will pursue in order to curtail movements and activities of NGDOs seen as hostile. The argument that governments will go on the defense and engage in as cooptation or dissolution is a compelling one, yet it is only salient in cases where the political and economic capacity to do so exists. Kenya and Tanzania are both heavily reliant on thirdparty funding. They do not possess adequate financial resources and find themselves 148

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backed into a position where they cannot wield political muscle in order to achieve their intentions regarding the control of NGDOs or the creation and implementation of policy. Both governments make attempts at monitoring and coordination, yet they lack the capacity to thoroughly engage in these actions. The economic power to resist and regain control is largely absent, and in the same breath, the administrative capacity to achieve coordination and monitoring is lacking, preventing proper partnership. Regarding the NPA's effect on the NGDO-state relationship, the case studies coincide with much of the literature. The neoliberal character of these policies, pushing for greater NGDO involvement in service provision and policymaking, can be seen in government reports and other sources that recount increasing numbers of stakeholder forums and policymaking summits that directly involve NGDOs. The NPA undermined state legitimacy and capacity from above, imposing austerity and other economic policies, including conditionalities for NGDOs; the latter, in turn, weakened the state from below, seeking to assume many of its responsibilities and diverting vital development funds from the government. Such a perceivable erosion of state authority most certainly had an effect upon the NGDO-state relationship, as government saw NGDOs as little more than outsiders that further weakened their control, put into place by agencies and institutions that held incredible sway over their economic sovereignty. Criticisms of the NPA include that, in pushing for increased NGDO involvement, it promoted a version of NGDOs that was far from reality, reinforcing myths and overgeneralizations that have influenced the perception of NGDOs. The flawed perception created the opportunity to insert NGDOs as the perfect actor to not only 149

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augment, but eventually replace the state. In effect, these overgeneralizations created a false image upon which expectations and policies were built, cementing a relationship upon false pretenses and thereby not only affecting the NGDO-state relationship and service provision, but also setting the stage for government control and capacity to be undermined due to the irreversible presence of NGDOs in both service provision and policymaking. NGDOs do not measure up to their reputation (Clarke 1998, Commins 1997, Edwards and Hulme 1994, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 1997, Hearn 1998, Mercer 1999, Pearce 1994, 2000, Vivian 1994) as can be seen in the empirical evidence that, especially in regards to provision of education services, NGDOs are not on par with the state (Thompson 2001, Rose 2009). Most are poorly monitored, preventing compliance enforcement on issues such as curricula and teaching standards. The pursuit of firsthand evidence from NGDOs themselves led to an ironic revelation; poor reporting skills and lack of appropriate accountability resulted in a lack of adequate evidence from NGDOs, two weaknesses that are actually purported to be among their collective arsenal of strengths. The answer to the main question do the governments of Tanzania and Kenya maintain autonomy over education services provided in their country and the shaping of education policy comes in taking into consideration contingent, vitally intertwined factors that have been presented in this study. Many problems in development, and in these two countries, are complex and cyclical. Similar mistakes and events occur repeatedly, as can be seen in repeated attempts at partnership that are continually 150

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undermined due to poor government control over NGDOs in the education sector and a lack of capacity needed to improve management and administration of the education sector. When the state lacks both capacity and control, it goes to follow that it lacks the capacity to improve its control, and vice versa. This situation creates feedback, as weak control begets weaker control and a lack of capacity begets further loss of capacity. Neither aspect is able to improve, exerting negative long-term externalities upon both countries in the form of poor development progress and an inability to foster effective partnership. Other factors and events have certainly influenced government capacity and control over the education sector, but the impact of the NPA intensified these problems. In amplifying the negative effects on control and capacity, the cycle of failures in development grows more pronounced, as initiative after initiative fails to produce longterm, positive development. The prolongation and exacerbation of these issues that affect control are attributable to the influence of the NPA, because it was neoliberal policies that took advantage of the weakened capacity of the Kenyan and Tanzanian governments in the wake of economic crisis and reduced their control by imposing economic conditionalities and NGDOs upon them, which further weakened control. The push of NGDOs into the realm of education service provision has affected their relationship with the state, and has had a long-term impact upon government control over the education sector and NGDO activities therein. NGDO presence exacerbated existing weaknesses in these states, already debilitated by economic crisis and neoliberal solutions to the crisis. The weak capacity of these governments is attributable to a great 151

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many factors, including corruption and domestic political problems that impede development, yet the changing nature of the NGDO-state relationship has had a distinct impact that continues to contribute to the undermining of state control. Another factor influencing the push for NGDOs in service provision, and by proxy the NGDO-state relationship, is the relationship between donors and NGDOs. NGDO dependence upon donor funding served to shape them into a tool to be used by donors in promoting their own development agenda, and they often suffer under their own set of conditionalities that stipulate the use of funds in certain ways. NGDOs did not set out to undermine the capacity of government. Given the large donor presence in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as knowledge of NGDO-donor relations through the literature, it is not difficult to realize the impact donors have had on the NGDO-state relationship. Donors have been centrally complicit in advocating for NGDOs in service provision and pushing for their greater involvement in policymaking processes. By pushing for NGDOs, they undermine the capacity of the government, which is already operating under NPA policies, and they perpetuate overgeneralizations about NGDOs and their capabilities. Continued presence of NGDOs undermines what capacity the government has, whether directly or indirectly, and combines with other undermining factors to weaken control over education. The governments of both countries are constantly forced into policy situations and have little recourse but to comply because of their compromised autonomy. By complying with the policies put forth by other actors, the governments are 152

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further undermining their capacity, and can never gain enough control to push back against any given policy. Ultimately, in light of these circumstances and influences, the quality of education provided in Tanzania and Kenya suffers due to lack of control on the part of the government and overgeneralizations about the abilities of NGDOs to provide services. Neither government is able to fully oversee the activities of NGDOs in the education sector, or to monitor the quality of education implemented by these organizations. Compromised capacity translates into poor control over every aspect of the education sector. Unfortunately, these issues are deeply embedded within the development dynamic, especially seen in these case studies. The constant cycle of undermined capacity is seemingly impossible to break and it affects not only the relationship between NGDOs and the state, but also the quality of education and the government's control over both these issues. 153

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Appendix A Tanzania Education Indicators Indicator Name 1972 1975 1979 1980 1981 Persistence to last grade of primary, total (% of cohort) 40.6 29.1 Progression to secondary school (%) Repeaters, primary, total (% of total enrollment) 1.3 0.49 1.2 Repeaters, secondary, total (% of total enrollment) Trained teachers in primary education (% of total teachers) Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 24.6 35.3 77.1 Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24) Children out of school, primary 1043990 1123355 School enrollment, primary (% gross) 37.6 53.2 94.3 95.9 97.5 School enrollment, primary (% net) 70.2 69.0 School enrollment, primary, private (% of total primary) 1.9 5.0 0.19 0.2 School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.0 School enrollment, secondary (% net) 1985 1986 1989 1990 1995 1999 2000 2002 2003 2005 2010 76.3 47.0 73.9 80.0 79.1 15.6 19.7 18.8 27.9 46.1 0.96 1.1 4.5 4.3 3.1 2.4 5.8 2.3 1.5 3.1 3.2 1.2 100 100 94.4 80.3 71.7 47.5 57.4 59.1 55.3 89.8 69.4 73.2 78.3 77.3 1801179 1926035 2277635 2375940 2929009 3190096 3011283 1806175 1252293 649370 76.3 73.5 68.9 69.4 68.0 66.5 68.2 89.2 95.8 105.3 102.2 56.6 55.1 51.8 51.1 48.5 49.2 53.0 72.9 81.6 90.8 0.3 0.095 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.35 0.47 0.85 1.8 3.3 3.5 4.5 5.05 5.3 5.6 5.8 29.8 4.8 26.2 (Source: World DataBank 154

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Appendix B Kenya Education Indicators Indicator Name 1972 1975 1979 1980 1981 1985 1986 Persistence to last grade of primary, total (% of cohort) 50.5 41.6 48.9 54.0 Progression to secondary school (%) 84.6 80.9 57.9 68.7 69.8 Repeaters, primary, total (% of total enrollment) 3.8 4.3 8.4 12.9 13.1 Repeaters, secondary, total (% of total enrollment) 7.6 Trained teachers in primary education (% of total teachers) Primary completion rate, total (% of relevant age group) 53.9 60.6 89.4 86.0 84.5 Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24) Children out of school, primary School enrollment, primary (% gross) 68.7 109.3 119.3 119.8 116.1 106.8 106.2 School enrollment, primary (% net) School enrollment, primary, private (% of total primary) School enrollment, secondary (% gross) 18.4 21.6 27.0 30.0 29.3 39.6 39.1 School enrollment, secondary (% net) 1989 1990 1995 1999 2000 2002 2003 2005 2010 72.7 5.8 98.6 98.9 90.6 82.2 87.3 92.5 92.8 1980499 1814188 2017389 1368236 1361191 104.0 100.4 90.1 90.4 95.2 91.4 106.9 107.4 61.9 65.0 61.7 74.1 75.2 4.4 38.4 39.1 40.8 42.9 47.6 33.2 34.5 36.1 40.8 (Source: World DataBank 155

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