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INTEGRATING ETHNIC GUANGXI PROVINCES BY DARA JORDAN OSHER A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Science s New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida April 2013
ii Acknowledgments The completion of this thesis would have been entirely impossible, first and foremost, without the love and support of my parents, Lynn and Steven Osher. They always knew I could accomplish anything and I am forever grateful that they have always been proud of my work and supporting of my goals and achievements. As to the rest of my family, I would also like to appreciate my grandmother, Bernice Meisels Fishbein, my br other, Michael Osher, and my sister, Shanee Osher, for giving me support and recognition in trying to achieve success with this thesis. I would also like to thank someone I consider my mentor, Malcolm Riddell, for forcing me to realize that not everything I write is automatically amazing after the first draft. Malcolm, I never would have finished this huge assignment if it had not been for your guidance, patience faith and help in revising my first chapter. I am eternally grateful to all of my friends who supported me in writing my thesis: Nolan Benson, Michael Parker Getz, Rosalia Maier Katkin Wenonah Venter, Hannah Schotman, Lizbeth Hampton, Stephanie Rischard, Ricky Rossi, and all my other dear and amazing friends who listened to my endless ranting, rambling, complaining, and sometimes bragging. I love you all! Lastly, I would like to thank the members of my committee: Professor Barbara Hicks, Professor Uzi Baram, and Professor Jing Zhang. Without the support and guidance of these three educators in my life at New College, I never would have been able to succeed in completing this project and discovering my love for the Chinese language and culture. To Professor Baram in particular, I would like to express how grateful I am for the discussions we had when I had lost hope and lost faith in myself at New College your kind words and praise helped me get back onto my feet on more than a few occasions, and I will forever be grateful for that. Very lastly, I would like to express my e ternal gratitude to Caroline Reed, who donated hours of her time on two separate occasions to helping m e learn how to navigate the online library webpage and locate sources on my two case studies. I never would have found the resources on my own to write t his thesis without you Caroline. In the end, I just want to thank everyone who thought I could do it because, honestly, I never would have gotten here without each and every person who never lost faith in my abilities. Thank you!
iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . i i Table of Contents . . . . . . i i i Tables and Maps . . . . . . . iv List of Abbreviations . . . . . . v Glossary of Chinese Terms . . . . . . v i Abstract . . . . . . . v i i Introduction . . . . . . . 1 Chapter On e Ethnic Tourism in China: Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity in the Western Interior . . . . 7 Ethnic Tourism and the Chinese State . . . . 10 Shaoshu Minzu and the Chinese State . . . . 23 Conclusion . . . . . . 36 Chapter Two Development, Integration, and Identity in Xinjiang: A Case Study of Ethnic Tourism and the Uighur Shaoshu Minzu . . . 3 9 Xinjiang: A Brief History and Introduction to Ethnic Tourism . . 40 Ethnic Tourism in Xinjiang: Implications for Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity . . . . . 50 Conclusion . . . . . . 60 Chapter Three Development, Integration, and Identity in Guangxi: A Case Study of Ethnic Tourism and the Zhuang Shaoshu Minzu . . . 6 2 Guangxi: A Brief History and Introduction to Ethnic Tourism . . 63 Ethnic Tourism in Guangxi: Implications for Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity . . . . . 70 Conclusion . . . . . . 78 Chapter Four Conclusion: A Comparison of Ethnic Tourism in Xinjiang and Guangxi . . . . . . 80 Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity in Xinjiang and Guangxi . . . . . . 81 Conclusion . . . . . . 94 Bibliography . . . . . . . 96
iv Table s Table 1.1: Chinese Tourism Statistics 1978 2005 . . . 19 Table 1.2: Chinese Domestic Tourism Statistics . . . 20 Table 2.1: Number of International Tourists and Foreign Ex change Earnings in Xinjiang 52 Table 3.1: Number of International Tourists and Foreign Ex change Earnings in Guangxi 72 2004) . . . . 73 Maps . . . 8 Map 2.1: Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) . . . 41 Map 2.2: The West Development Provinces . . . . 46 Map 3.1: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region . . . 64
v List of Abbreviations CCP Chinese Communist Party CNTA China National Tourism Administration EIU Economist Intelligence Unit GDP Gross Domestic Product GMD Guo m indang LRNA Law o n Regional National Autonomy PRC RMB Ren m in b i UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization USD United States Dollar USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics XUAR Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
vi Glossary of Chinese Terms Guomindang or GMD ( ): This term, sometimes written as Kuomintang (KMT), refers to the Chinese Nationalist Party, led by Sun Yat Sen who helped overthrow the last Qing emperor in 1911 and established the Republic of China. After a brutal civil war, the Nationalists were defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 and fled to Taiwan, where they still rule today. Shaoshu minzu ( ) : This term refers to the ethnic minorities of China, who only make up about 8.5% of the population according to official statistics Zizhiqu ( ) administratively equivalent to a province and meant to provide ethnic minor ities with a degree of autonomy
vii ETHNIC TOURISM AND DARA OSHER New College of Florida, 2013 ABSTRACT market economy and rapid economic development along the eastern coastline, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has realized the opportunity to promote a tourism market within the more impoverished Western interior. Greater wealth and leisure time for domesti c citizens, coupled with increased in ternational access to China, have resulted in a boom in the tourism industry. Meanwhile, t he CCP seeks to legitimate its rule via a new national identity that would include the majority Han officially recognized ethnic minority groups. A burgeoning tourism market, subsidized partial ly by the government, allows these shaoshu minzu to generate income by marketing and commoditizing their culture s to tourists. In the autonomous regions of Xinjian g and Guangxi, the integration of the Ui ghurs and Zhuang, respectively, into the new market economy gives the central government greater access to and control over these peripheral regions. Ethnic tourism, which permits the cultural exchange between local integration of minorities into the Chinese state and the loss of certain ethnic traditions, but it may also sustain their cultural practices and even ethnic identity. Barbara Hicks Social Science s
1 Introduction 1978 and its general opening to the capitalist world economy, the establishment of special economic zones a n d an influx of Foreign Direct Investment has resulted in a development boom in the country. Due to this abounding economic progress, many Chinese have grown wealthier. This extra wealth has created the opportunity for new or improved markets to arise in the hopes of a ttracting both foreign and domestic revenue. Through the growth and establishment of a middle class in China, one such market that has blossomed since the early 1980s is ethnic tourism, an industry that attracts both international and domestic tourists to encounter the While tourism in general is becoming a greater focus for the government as a means of economic development, ethnic tourism is of particular interest because it allows Deng Xiaoping 1978 reforms identifi
2 for economic development, leaving the western interior of the count ry largely impoverished. An increase in international access to China for business and leisure purposes coupled with government reforms allowing free movement of Chinese citizens has greatly contributed to the rise of tourism. Prior to 1978, leisure t ravel among the Chinese people was an extreme ly difficult p rocess one had to apply for permits and visas to travel anywhere, and the travel destinations themselves were limited. As a result, the recent freedom of Chinese residents to travel uninhibited w ithin the co untry has encouraged a vast amount of domestic movement and tourism. The government is using this domestic as well as the international, tourism market to encourage economic development in the more remote and rural areas of the country, most o f which are ethnic minority autonomous regions or areas where many ethnic minor ities live By advertising these remote areas as spaces of exotic culture, the government is pushing its citizens the majority of whom are part of the largest ethnic group in China, the Han to explore and thereby bring revenue and a This study focuses on th e effect s that this new market is having on some of Chi Because tourists want to see the ethnic minorities as something different and exotic from themselves, the minority peoples are able to create a market for their culture through selling crafts, playing music, and putting on traditional or ceremonial dance s and performances. This process of supply and demand in the ethnic tourism market is completely supported and sometimes even patronized by the Chinese government. regions calls for infr astructure and other construction projects that enable tourism to
3 thrive, including highways, railroads, and hotels. By subsidizing the establishment of an ethnic tourism market the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may be trying to pull its ethnic minority r egions into participating in the national market economy as well as raise standards of living in these rural regions Through an analysis of how economic development from tourism autonomous regions is affect ing the existing ethnic minorities I hope to discover whether this exposure has an impact on ethnic identity and whether it fuels a trend towards integration into t he Chinese state particularly among the Uighurs of Xinjiang and the Zhuang of Guangxi Province. T he a mount of attention that tourism is bringing to these ethnic autonomous regions raises several questions Is the introduction of ethnic tourism leading to a renewal of cultural identity or a loss of traditional ethnic culture ? Is it causing greater ethnic conflicts to arise, whic h may or may not encourage and influence certain minorities to try and separate themselves from the maj ority Han Chinese state? Or is tourism revenue helping ethnic minority regions to develop and better integrate themselves intentionally or not, into the Chinese economy? This study will utilize a number of th eories to determine how ethnic tourism may be affe cting ethnic autonomous regions. One theory Th e Art of Not Being Governed a work focusing on a region in Southeast Asia consisting of the linguistically choose to live on the peripheries of nearby states in difficult to access, mountainous terrain. One of Sco
4 available in those regions (Scott 2009, 11). As China embraces aspects of capitalism through a market economy, p erhaps the central government is aiming to use ethnic tourism as a means to bring its periphery regions and peoples the ethnic minorities under firmer state control. Now that the autonomo us regions are capable of providing new markets and revenue for the post reform, more capitalist Chinese economy, the government may be aiming minority populations into closer contact with developed, Han Chin ese culture. T he tourism market is arguably one of the main avenues through which minority regions are being exposed to more di rect state control. A review of the existing literature on ethnic tourism in China and in its autonomous regions this study focuses on will prec ede a history of two minority province s and how they were incorporated into the Chinese state. The first chapter will also set the stage for understanding the evolving relationship between the Chinese government and its minority populations through a summa ry of minority policies in China. Using data from recent calculations of tourism revenue and economic development variables, I plan to note the changes that have occurred in the past thirty years with the establishment and growing strength of the tourism m arket in each region. While it may be difficult to assess the qualitative effects of ethnic tourism on each minority, case studies of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region will provide a more focused means by which to analyze whether and how tourism is having an impact on economic development, integration, and ethnic minority identity
5 background in their particular area of China provides the justification for using the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Re gion and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region as the foci of this study. These case s were specifically chosen out of the five autonomous regions in China due to their vast differences in the unification of their respective minority groups. In Xinjiang, the Uighurs share a strong religiously bordering other Turkic speaking, Muslim nations, has incited tensions with the Han Chinese. The Zhuang never shared a homogenous identity until the Chinese government d esignated them as an officially recognized minority group. Historically, these people developing a singular dialect and sense of identity. This sharp contrast between the Uighurs and Zhuang offers a perspective on whether ethnic unification may be a deciding factor in the ease and development of integration and tourism in each minority region. Patterns in the newly capitalist Chinese econom y are important for the international arena to understand. My focus on the ethnic minorit ies and the effects of (ethnic) tourism on them is a lens through which the academic, particularly the anthropological, world can view the impact s r eforms. Problems agenda. Some development policies may inadvertently lead to integration that would reduce ethnic differences and identities, or perhaps cause or exac erbate ethnic tensions and conflicts in peripheral regions. While it is highly unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party will ever permit the separation and true autonomy of its autono mous provinces, this study can help to bring into perspective partial an d uneven processes of
6 integration that are met with resistance in some areas and with cooperation in others In doing so, it adds to the research in the political science and anthropo logical fields that analyze s the relationship between the state and its peoples particularly those who have historically lived on the periphery of government control and only in the past fifty years have become crucial to government policies of national development
7 Chapter One Ethnic Tourism in China: Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity in the Western Interior th e Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang ( or GMD the Chinese Nationalist Party), is a vast territory that encompasses a population of over 1.3 billion. Of the 56 officially recognized ethnic groups, the Han Chinese accounted for 91.59% of the population in 2000 while the other 55 shaoshu minzu ( ethn ic minorities) made up 8.41%, a population of around 106.43 million (China Statistical Yearbook 2006, 102). With such a huge disparity in the majority and minority groups, China has faced a wide range of social and economic issues associated with ethnic differences, including separatis t movements, underdevelopment, poverty, and religious conflict. One solution the CCP has used to mitigate some of these issues is the establishment of zizhiqu ( autonomous regions) for the larger ethnic minorities, administrative units that are given a number of rights not accorded to other provinces and that offer the minorities a degree of
8 autonomy from the state. These regions are the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, the Tibet Autonomous Region, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region (see Map 1.1) Map 1.1: T the autonomous minority regions highl ighted in yellow. This clearly illustrates the dramatic separation of the autonomous regions from the developed, eastern coastline, and how far removed some of the minorities are from Beijing, the epicenter of state control. Source : of China (PRC), 2012 Most of these regions are located in the western part of China, where the effects eastern coastline continues its rapid development, the need for new markets to foster further growth of the economy has encouraged the government to explore autonomous territories for potential profit. With this sudden interest in developing the Western
9 frontier, new issues have arisen between the ethnic groups and the Han Chinese who are b eginning to flood the areas looking for economic opportunities that have become scarcer along the developed eastern coastline. As a result, conflicts have exploded between the Han Chinese and the minorities of the West, some of whom feel that the Chinese g overnment (which is primarily comprised of Han Chinese) is using the majority group to invade their autonomous spaces. In addition to new patterns in Han Chinese settlement, globalization in China has produced a market for both international and domestic tourism on the developed eastern coastline and, recently, in the Western regions. Many Chinese have grown wealthier since the country opened up to economic reforms in 1978 and this wealth, along with greater ability to travel within China, has resulted in greater Chinese domestic exploratio n. The CCP, noticing the profit ability of this trend, has encouraged ethnic While also improving economic development via foreign exch ange and hard currency revenue, the interaction between the shaoshu minzu and the tourists coming to view them has impacts on ethnic identity for these groups. Increasing tourism and the need to impoverished zizhiqu These trends raise severa l important questions about the impact of tourism on the economic status, cultural identity, and political integration of these minorities. What effects is tourism having on economic development? Does the interaction between tourists and the ethnic groups on the frontier have an impact on ethnic and cultural
10 reform goals focuses on the recreation of a nat ional Chinese identity based on the Han and including all of the 55 ethnic minorities. Do ethnic tourism policies i n the autonomous regions have any effect on ethnic minority integration into the Chinese state? A review of the literature on ethnic tourism in China and the political history of its ethnic minorities will set the stage for further investigation of these questions Ethnic Tourism and the Chinese State oms of indigenous and often exotic peoples, by tourists, including visiting ethnic villages and minority 562). T his form of tourism has been a strategy widely adopted for regional socioeconomic development (Yang 2011, 562). Through the commoditization of ethnicity, minority groups have been incorporated into tourism, finding economic benefit in the production and co nsumption of ethnic goods and lifestyles (Yang 2011, 578). Yang, Wall, and Smith argue that minority people have limited control over resources and development, and tensions rise when governments seek to transform their culture into marketable products (20 06, 766). The motivation for ethnic tourism relies on a Western based economic rationale that income generated through tourism is a fair exchange between indigenous and non indigenous peoples that engenders economic independence and a higher degree of cultural pride (Hinch and Butler 2007, 3). The belief that
11 interaction between indigenous and non indigenous peoples promotes a deeper cross cultural understanding fuels minority participation in tourism (Hinch and Butler 2007, 3). This argument, however neglects to mention the tensions created by ethnic tourism. The need to satisfy non indigenous demands for authenticity, which commodifies particular aspects of ethnic culture while neglecting others, can result in a loss of traditional activities (Yang and Wall 2008, 527). The promotion an d development of ethnic tourism has econ omic, social and cultural impacts involving the protection of ethnic culture and the use of tourism as a form of economic development with adequate economic returns (Yang and Wall 2008, 526). Tourism, particularly ethnic tourism, is reflected in tangible and intangible representations of how people see themselves and their heritage. Ethnic tourism also reinforces certain cultural representations of minority peoples that affect thei r culture and sense of identity, including stereotypical conceptions of indigenous peoples as uncivilized or backward (Yang 2011, 561). Tourist attractions turn heritage into a sociocultural and economic asset, creating political capital that governments may use as a means of control or to promote their own interests (Henderson 2007, 241). According to Yan and Bramwell, governments promote strengthening loyalties to favored ide ologies and political objectives tourism and its promotion can thus become an effort to exercise control and demonstrate authority and legitimacy (2008, 969). T policies and meaning complementary to those transmitted by tourism (Yan and Bramwell 2008, 969 970). In many countries, tourism also exerts a powerful influence in shaping
12 cultural images and represe ntations of ethnic groups (Yang 2011, 562). Control of tourism as a commodity for development is most often visible in developing economies where tourism planning and promotion tend to be directed by governments (Yang et al. 2006, 751). The role of minority identities in marketing, developing, and enhancing a 2003 cited in Yang et al. 2006, 752). Chinese Ethnic Tourism he development of Chinese ethnic that is supposed to be distinctively uniq ue and see mingly authentic ( 2011, 22). Li contends that there is a universal sense of the differences and boundaries between 2008, 495). This idea, widely held in China for cen turies, is crucial to understanding the shaoshu minzu In the pursuit of modernizing and civilizing ethnic minor ities, modern China has, like few other nation s persistently attempted to eradicate l uohou or backwardnes s (Xie 2011, 100). L i argues that tourism that often take place in the realm of the primitive or isolated or technologically 495). Ethnic tourism modifies many of the qualities traditionally associated with regions and people through identity recreation brought about by rapid commercial development and cultural adaptations induced b y the
13 interactions of visitors the Han and in ternational tourists with the hosts the minority groups (Yang 2011, 582). Yang finds that ethnic representation as a political instrument is capable of shaping a collective Chinese nationalism or legitimizing a dominant regime (2011, 579). Governments, like the Chinese Communist Party, actively participate in tourism through key developmental and ope rational roles as a means to retain power, including: providing tourism infrastr ucture to stimulate the economy, formulating business practices, acting as an investment stimulator b y granting financial incentives, and advertising tourism activities worldwide (Xie 2011, 101). However, tourism is also a tool of development with in China, promoting regional economic integration into the new market eco nomy. The to move cautiously to include ethnic culture as an acceptable component of tourism since the 1980s. Ethnic tourism emerged as part of a state led marketing camp aign to alleviate 2011, 102). However, government and market promoted political, economic, and cultural integration of minority groups into a mainstream culture acts as a countervailing force to the cultural exoticism that draws tourists (Yang 2011, 582). If the exotic and authentic qualities of ethnic minority cultures become homogenized into the dominant Han Chinese group, According to Yang, t hese contradictions between development and preservation and between cultural exoticism and modernity are intensified in ethnic tourism (2011, 582).
14 The prevalent literature sees Chinese ethnic tourism a s a means of regional economic development and a tool by which the government reinforce s legitimacy and authority through the control and marketing of cultural repr esentations of minority groups T he co mmoditization of ethnic culture involves minority groups directly in regional economic development as well as the production and marketing of their traditions to the majority group. However, a s these regions develop and become more integrated into a culture becomes essential to fueling a growing tourism market. This literature on state regulation and econo mic promotion poses spe cific questions that this study aims to investigate. Is it plausible to have policies of cultural preservation alongside those of development? Can cultural exoticism remain intact during the pursuit of modernity? These paradoxical questions should be kept in mind as this study assesses Chines e ethnic tourism for impacts on regional economic development, integration into the post reform Chinese state and ethnic identity in the zizhiqu The Post Reform Chinese State was in a state of economic, political, and social disarray. After the failures of the Great Leap Forward, which Mao used to increase agricultural and steel outputs while attempting autar ky, and the Cultural Revolution, a campaign designed to eradicate traditional Chinese culture in favor of Communism, the ideology of the CCP needed a reform. zones for exper imentation with market reform, and enabled modernization along the eastern coastline. The switch to a more free market economy resulted in booming
15 development, though strictly regulated and monitored by the government to keep Western influences in check. A s the economy grew and flourished, the social and political side of Chinese s ocialism also required a new reform path, particularly since national identity and unity had suffered during the tumultuous Mao era. modernization, the Chinese introduce a more egalitarian society through socialism, their desire to modernize rapidly, From the extreme policies under Mao, who criticized traditional Chinese culture for es, the CCP has had to recogni ze the new political agenda ( Sofield and Li 1998, 367). This study focuses on government encouraged ethnic tourism as a m eans by which the CCP is promoting economic development and a renewed national identity. Historically, heritage tourism has always been a main facet of Chinese culture, but the political upheaval the country faced in the early 20 th century after the fall o death in the mid 1970s made recreational travel either too dangerous or entirely prohibited (Sofield and Li 1998, 363). During the Mao era from 1949 1978, the Chinese Communist Party resisted tourism dev Bramwell 2008, 972).
16 As a result of this Maoist ideology campaigns such as the Cultural Revolution led 364). These radical policies of cultural rejection also greatly affected the ethnic minorities of China, who faced religious discrimination and a forceful stifling of their cultures. acc eptable market by which the Chinese could travel and find again the heritage that was lost to them under Mao. The Heritage Conservation Act of 1982 embodied the need for able f According to Sofield and Li, t ourism can promote heritage revival, strengthen and legitimize the state, and create a market fo r revenu e that can promote development (1998, 387) T the national heritage, promoting national that is intended to include the 55 ethnic minorities who primarily inhabit C ( Sofield and Li 1998, 387). Through the use of ethnic tourism as a tool of regional economic development, the Chinese government is finding economic and political incentives to bring its periphery regions under firmer state control by including the minorities in the search for a new Chinese identity T he Western territories offer an abundance of natural resources and, in its efforts to modernize, the Chinese Communist Party is realizing the value and necessity, in developing this area. alarmingly impoverished, highlighting the wealth disparity between the interior regions
17 and the eastern coastline. Therefore, tourism is viewed first and foremost as a tool of economic development (Xie 19 99, 212). Yet the overarching aim of Chinese socialism remains the integration of the minorities into the majority Han society (Sofield and Li 2007, 280). P rogress in development may lead to the loss of authentic culture in ethnic regions where tourists se establishment of a national Han Chinese identity including the shaoshu minzu via a path to economic development and integration could deteriorate the culturally exotic market supplying the tourist dem and and, as a result, have an impact on the progress of development in these regions. Ethnic Tourism: Why and How? The Chinese central government has specifically used tourism as a means of to address issues of income disparities between rural and urban zones, and between east and wes According to Xie, Chinese authorities find that tensions between the Han Chinese and the shaoshu minzu have resulted development opt ion (Xie 2011, 115). P overty alleviation and national tourism policies have emphasized that generating economic growth is the only avenue to improve living standards : As Westerners increasingly express a strong interest in experiencing ethnic cultures in China, ethnic tourism becomes a viable path for the communities to prosper. Given that the unemployment rate of ethnic communities is high, government policies place the greatest emphasis on job creation and the view that tourism could provide job opportunities for the increased number of minorities wanting to join the workforce. ( Xie 2011, 115)
18 Zeng and Ryan contend that tourism in China has already directly contributed to a reduction of around 10 percent in numbers of those below the official poverty line (2012, 240). As China progresses along a path toward a socialist market economy, tourism and travel have become a strategic industry fo r local development, with the country fast becoming one of the most rapidly growing tourist destinations (Andreu et al. 2010, 343 344). Although first included in the seventh 5 year plan (1986 1990) for social and economic development, tourism in China onl y experienced rapid growth during the late 1990s. Together with more leisure time and structural adjustments made to the national economy, increased income per capita among the Chinese population cont ributed to this tourism boom (Andreu et al. 2010, 345). President Jiang Zemin the Fourteent h National Congress in 1992 emphasized from 1978 2005, demonstrating a huge increase in the number of tourists (consisting of foreigners, overseas Chinese, and residents from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) from around 1.8 million in 1978 to around 1.2 billion in 2005. In terms of receipts, the financial gain from tourism jumped from $262.9 million in 1978 to around $29 billion by 2005. Astounding increases in annual growth rece ipts from year to year indicate the success of this ind ustry. Table 1.2 indicates the progress that do mestic tourism has made, which entails the domestic, resident Chinese traveling within the country (these tourists are mostly comprised of the wealthier Chinese who have benefited from development along the ea stern coastline). Since 1984, domestic tourists in China have increased from
19 Table 1.1 : Chinese Tourism Statistics 1978 2005 Year Total Tourists (Foreigners, Overseas Chinese, Compatriots**) Receipts (US$ millions) Annual Growth of Receipts (%) 1978 1,809,200 262.9 -1979 4,203,901 449.3 70.90 1980 5,702,536 616.7 37.30 1981 7,767,096 784.9 27.30 1982 7,924,261 843.2 7.40 1983 9,477,005 941.2 11.60 1984 12,852,185 1,131.3 20.20 1985 17,833,097 1,250.0 10.50 1986 22,819,450 1,530.9 22.50 1987 26,902,267 1,861.5 21.60 1988 31,694,804 2,217.6 20.70 1989 24,501,394 1,860.5 17.20 1990 27,461,821 2,217.6 19.20 1991 33,349,757 2,844.9 28.30 1992 38,114,945 3,946.9 38.70 1993 41,526,945 4,683.2 18.70 1994 43,684,456 7,323.0 1995 46,386,511 8,733.0 19.25 1996 51,127,516 10,200.0 16.81 1997 57,587,923 12,074.0 18.37 1998 63,478,401 12,602.0 4.37 1999 72,795,594 14,099.0 11.88 2000 83,443,881 16,224.0 15.08 2001 89,012,900 17,792.0 9.66 2002 97,908,300 20,385.0 14.57 2003 91,662,100 17,406.0 14.61 2004 1,090,382,000 25,739.0 47.87 2005 1,202,923,000 29,296.0 13.82 S ources : China Statistical Yearbook 2006, 773; Guangrui 2003, 16 17. *Owing to the change of statistical methodology of foreign exchange receipts, the data for this year are incomparable with those of previous years. ** Compatriots include residents from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. 200 million to 1.212 billion in 2005. Domestic tourism revenue has also risen from RMB millions 8,000 to RMB millions 528,590, indicating a staggering jump in the popularity and economic value in domestic Chinese touring the country. By 2020, the United
20 Nations World Tourism Organization (UNW TO) expects China to be the most popular tourist destination worldwide, receiving 210 million foreign tourists. It is projected that total revenue generated by tourism will comprise 8 11% of the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) (Andreu et al. 2010, 344 ). Table 1 .2: Chinese Domestic Tourism Statistics Year Domestic Tourists (millions) Domestic Tourism Revenue (RMB millions) Domestic Tourism Revenue Annual Growth (%) 1978 -1, 840 -1984 200 --1985 240 8,000 -1986 270 10,600 32.5 1987 290 14,000 32.1 1988 300 18,700 33.5 1989 240 15,000 19.7 1990 280 17,000 13.3 1991 300 20,000 17.6 1992 330 25,000 25.0 1993 410 86,400 -* 1994 524 102,350 18.5 1995 629 137,570 34.4 1996 639 163,840 19.1 1997 644 211,270 29.0 1998 694 239,100 13.2 1999 719 283,192 18.4 2000 744 317,550 12.1 2001 784 352,240 10.9 2002 878 387,840 10.1 2003 870 344,230 11.2 2004 1102 471,070 36.8 2005 1212 528,590 12.2 S ources : China Statistical Yearbook 2006, 777; Guangrui 2003, 19. *Because the sample survey replaced the previous statistical method of collecting data of domestic revenue, the data are incom parable with the previous years Ethnic tourism as a means of development and poverty alleviation took flight in 1994 when the state implemented the Seven
21 Development in the Rural Areas of China T hese polic ies specifically targeted a total of 267 ethnic minority areas in need of assistance including all 5 of the minority zizhiqu (Sofield and Li 2007, 270). In 2000, the Chinese government launched the Western Development Project campai gn, which aims to close the wealth disparity between the developed eastern coastline and the interior (Sofield and Li 2007, 270). During the first five years after the launching of this development strategy, the state has initiated 60 important projects vital to tourist infrastructure in the West including 250,000 kilometers of highways, major railway lines linking different ethnic regions, power stations and west east gas pipelines, with a total investment of 850 billion yuan (US$ 106 billion) (Sofield and Li 2007, 271). been largely effective. Zeng and Ryan have found that, measured in terms of the World of the population li E thnic tourism is almost entirely state ru n. At the national level, the regulation and management of ethnic tourism fall under three state institutions : the Nationalities Affairs Commission, the Religious Division of the State Cultural Bureau, and the China National Tourism Administration (CNTA). These political agencies determine which aspects of ethnic cultures are authentic and should be preserved. The government, via these agencies, runs two parallel paths for authenticating ethnic cultural resources; is the active pursui t of modernity, including the commercial,
22 economic and social integration inherent in tourism development; the other involves top down administrative policies to formulate ethnic culture and to monitor heritage preservation These policies are considered authenticating because the en and reducing high unemployment rates in ethnic communities while the second path allows the state to certify ethnic traditions as either authentic or inauthentic ( 2011, 103). Ethnic tourism, then, is an industry controlled by the central government an entity that has the authority to dictate which aspects of mi nority culture are deemed authentic and worthy of preservation. Tourism is meant to bring economic development to the peripheral regions of the West while also having an impact on a renewed Han cultural identity aimed to include and ultimately integrate th e shaoshu minzu regions into the Chinese state While this endeavor may be a benign attempt to raise the standard of living of the minorities and bring economic development to the interior Chinese leaders actively timacy liv[ ing] (Sautman 1998, 87). T o avoid et hnic tensions and propagate the s ocialist i deology that all of big united family of ethnic groups, the Chinese sta te is realizing the necessity to bring these fringe and periphery regions under more direct state control In other words, a renewed national identity must provide the ethnic minorities, particularly those in the zizhiqu with a new identity and further integrate them into the Chinese state. Ethnic tourism is a government tool to execute this strategy, one that also accomplishes state goals of dev eloping the peripheral Western interior and control ling the proc esses of ethnic cultural representation via tourism
23 Shaoshu Minzu and the Chinese State the premise of Chinese rule asserted that the ethnic groups its territory came to incorporate would eventually assimilate, the natives would on occasion preserve their uniq ue traditions and cultural institutions. As the Han (206 B.C.E. C.E. 220), Tang (618 907), and other great dynasties rose to power, an ideology of Chinese civilization as sabi 2004, 3). Over time, the great rulers of China seemingly entranced bordering foreigners groups, such as the Mongols, chose to hold onto their nomadic pastoral ways, whi ch undermined the notion that outsiders chose to integrate into Chinese society due to its f did aggressively seek to incorporate the non Chinese peoples of the southwest into its kingdom (4). Once the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644 1911) gained power, thes e policies were entirely scrapped in favor of a plan for expansion, one of which aimed to dominate resistanc e in Inner Mongolia was crushed; by 1720, Tibet became a tribut ary state; and in 1757 the Qing annexed the vast domain of Xinjiang, which comprises one sixth of present day China. A number of southwestern provinces controlled by the Miao ethnic group, including Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, were subdued by 1760 after years of
24 plaguing the Qing court. At this point, with the non Han peoples pacified, new policies to ssume positions in the exploited the ethnic groups, as opposed to not to permit Han entrepreneurs and merchants to take advanta In the northwest, practitioners of Islam faced discrimination and, on occasion, the banning of mosque construction. Chinese merchants, entrepreneurs, and bankers traveled freely and settled in non Han lands, directly against court direction, which resulted in faced by the natives at the hands of Han official s, revolts erupted in the northwest as early as 1781 and the Qing assimilation goal was never fulfilled. In Inner Mongolia, the ile in the south, rebellion by Muslims and othe r non Han raged on from 1847 to 1877 (6). Faced with domestic insurgence by Han and non Han groups and foreign threats, including the Opium Wars, the Qing dynasty fell in 1911. With help from the USSR, Mongo lia tore away completely from Chinese control and established itself as the Mongolia n Mongolia Autonomous Region in 1947. From 19 Nationalist Party, and the USSR vied for influence over Xinjiang, and the native peoples
25 sought independence through the establishment of an Eastern Turkistan Republic in the Liberation Army to seize the region in 1949 50, and the government created the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in 1955 (7). From 1911 to 1950, Tib et had real autonomy until, as it had Liberation Army brought it back under Chine se control. In 1949, the southwest, including Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi provinces, came under Chinese Communist reign, with group in China), the Yi, the Miao, the Yao, and other non Once the Chinese Communist Party assumed control in 1949, it pledged to preserve the linguistic and cultural heritage of the 55 shaoshu minzu The founding of autonomous regions showed the willingness of the new government to Rossabi 2004, 8). Yet, the autonomous regions were continuously ref erred to as assimilating to the dominant culture (8). Government policies toward the autonomous re ethnic conflic ts in some minority provinces. The Et hnic Minority Regions and Han Migration The central government has granted minorities a degree of autonomy, but forbids secession from the state. Policy in the southwest has been more lax than in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia (although Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Ningxia fall outside the scope of
26 t his study) because minorities in Guangxi, for example, rarely use violence to confront central authority, whereas relations between Han Chinese and groups in the northwest have been strained for centuries (Yang et. al. 2006, 753). The Hui, on the other han d, have their designated Ningxia Autonomous Region also in the northwest, but are generally scattered around the country and have assimilated into Chinese culture almost all speak the Chinese language and follow customs similar to those of the Han, thoug h they are religiously Muslim (Rossabi 2004, 11). This stu dy, however, will only focus on the Uighur and Zhuang minorities of Xinjian g and Guangxi, as the lack of resources, ethnographic research, and time excludes the inclusion of the Ningxia Hui and Inne r Mongolian Mongol groups as case studies. Although, for the understanding of minority history and policies pertaining to development and Han migration, some information in this chapter will include the Mongols, Inner Mongolia, the Hui, and Ningxia. Since the 1990s, the shaoshu minzu of Southwest China have experienced a continuing influx of Chinese immigrants looking for opportunities away from the coastline. The effect of Communist policies encouraging Han migration into this region has been the acc ulturation of the minorities through greater access to Chinese education and use of Chinese language with Han leadership imposing greater control (Rossabi 2004, 12). Morris Rossabi finds that, in particular, the Hui and Zhuang minorities are: assimilating to Chinese culture. Faced with condescending and Communist leadership, both have accepted their positions within the Chinese state. Each recognizes that economic, social, and political advancement requires greater integration into Chinese culture. The growing pressure of Han migrants in the southwest offers added incentives to acculturate, for the government would most likely provide even more opportunities for Han if the m inorities remained attached to their heritage and avoided making some concessions to the dominant Chinese culture. (2004, 13)
27 In Inner Mongolia, the Chinese have outnumbered the Mongols three to one since 1937 and the establishment of the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region has yielded more opportunities for the Han majority. During the Cultural Revolution, between 1966 and 1969, pressures to integrate into Han culture saw the deaths of more than twenty thousand na tives (Rossabi 2004, 14). Unable to resist the influx of Chinese peasants, the Mongols have seen their traditional pasture lands transformed to support agr iculture. This on of the the Mongol lifestyle (14). While the Communist regime has improved sectors of the economy and provided better health, education, and social off has been the erosion of Mongol identity and cultur 2004 14). Xinjiang Tibet, and Inner Mongolia are somewhat different case s from the other zizhiqu located caused more problems for the Chinese government. When the CCP took control of the country in 1 949, the Turkic peoples constituted the largest group in the Xinjiang region but by 2000 the Han, having been coerced or induced by the government to migrate, already c omprised half the population. In the 1990s, the Han influx became more voluntary due to the promise of wealth from CCP policies of economic development in the west. Ethnic conflicts between the Turkic peoples (particularly the Uighurs) and the Han erupted in the form of riots and bombings Han Chinese dominated the most important government positions, while the less influential positions in the local administration were left to the Uighurs. Economic development in Xinjiang continues to favor the Han, but affirmative action policies have benefited minorities by improving access to education, a s well as exemption from the
28 one child per family rule applied to the Han areas of the country. Nonetheless, advocates of independence, though a small minority, have exacerbated state fears of separatism. Today, CCP goals for national unity and heavy investment in the region have forced a hard government stance against this desire (R ossabi 2006, 14 15). The Art of Not Being Governed focuses on a region in Southeast cult ures. Over the course of two millennia, they have fled the oppressions and state making projects in the valleys, such as slavery, conscription, taxes, c orve labor, ep idemics, and warfare (Scott 2006 ). Scott poses a number of arguments that can be related to other peripheral ethnic groups, including the ethnic minorities of China who inhabit the Western border areas. The periphery is the edge of a given sovereign territory where the power of the central state cannot always easily penetrate. Historically, th e the autonomous regions in Chi na, ethnic groups inhabited these territorie s for hundreds of years. state distance
29 sovereig argument with the following: The hegemony, in this past century, of the nation state as the standard and nearly exclusive unit of sovereignty has proven profoundly inimical to non of coercive force that must, in principle, be fully projected to the very edge of its territory, where it meets, again in principle, another sovereign power projecting its command to i ts own adjacent frontier. Gone, in principle, are realization that these neglected and seemingly useless territories to which stateless peoples had been relegated were suddenly of great value to the might in many cases be the li nchpin of state revenue. ( 11) The internal colonialism that Scott mentions refers to the conflict between a dominant majority and the ethnically and linguistically diverse minority populations dwelling on peoples under their routine administrati on, to encourage and, more rarely, insist upon rogress where progress is, in turn, read as the intrusive propaganda of the linguistic, agricultural, and religious practic es of the dominant ethnic one of which he specifically designates as the Han (13). The periphery is (13). Because sovereignty in recent history is equated with the projection of state control over it s entire territory, pressure to assimilate nonstate peoples has increased, especially when these peripheral regions offer natural resources that would benefit a growing economy.
30 The dominant group that has state control typically views the nonstate peopl es as backwards and inferior. This characterization of nonstate peoples is similar to the European characterizations of Africans during colonization of that continent. The ethnocentric thinking finding that the backwards minority peoples should follow the le ad of the advanced, superior Han Chinese society along their path to modernity and development. H shu sheng ) barbarian ( 2006, 120). In the eighteenth century, a people who declared loyalty and 2006, 120). Scott emphasizes the di stinction between the two: Nonbarbarians are fully incorporated into the taxpaying population and have, presumably, adopted Han customs, dress, and language. Barbarians distinct but no w registered and governed by Han administrative norms even if they retain their local chiefs. They have, also presumably, started their march toward cultural incorporation as Han. The raw barbarians, by contrast, are wholly outside the state population, heavily ethnicized. (2006, 121) This th eory of raw versus cooked applies historically the Chinese government would purposely classify ethnic minority group s into and
31 103). The Chinese government is finding economic and political incentives to bring its periphery regions under firmer state control through the process of development. The Western territories offer an abundance of natural resources and, combined with new efforts to modernize, the Chinese Communist Party is realizing the value in developing this area. As a result, there has been an inc rease in government encouraged Han settlement of the West reinforced by intense overpopulation in the urban areas of the Eastern coastline. Another motive for this migration is the promotion of loyalty as the CCP presumes that the ethnic minorities cannot necessarily be trusted. Scott refers to this ( Scott s regions offer, amon g others, a market for ethnic growth rate begins to stagnate. Therefore, the creation of development and tourism policies for the autonomous regions seemingly useless territories are indeed capable of furthering the CCP goal of national economic development as well as including the peripheral minori ty groups in a renewed Chinese s ocialist identity (Scott 2006, 11). The Ethnic Minorities and Tourism Development While the ethnic minority population in China is comparatively small in number area and some groups ar e located along strategically important border regions. As a
32 consequence, the government has been motivated to involve these minorities in the pursuit of a renewed national identity. legitimacy for bringing the agenda of political and economic integration of peripheral territory, it more significantly provided a new justification for cultural integration. An integrated nation state required not only advanced administrative and economic institutions, but also a unified and modernized culture enabling people throughout the territory to communicate, trade, and otherwise interact with one another. (131) during polit ical campaigns, including collectivization and the Cultural Revolution, in the not s measure of autonomy to some of the 55 nationalities in an attempt to head off separat ist Sofield and Li 1998, 372). The law also introduced policies more tolerant of minority cultures, and shaoshu minzu status conferred certain rights not shared by or available to the Han Chinese (Sofield and Li 2007, 270). Although some beliefs were suppressed and religious institutions placed under strict state control, t hese privileges inclu ded certain religious freedoms, some cultural freedoms, access to development funds, non application of the one child rule, and respect for cultural integrity (Sofield and Li 1998, 372; 2007, 270).
33 government agenda, and this meant findin g a w ay for cultural policy to comple ment economic policy (Sofield and Li 1998, 372 73): Development assistance needed to be sought and the nationalities should try to find ways to make money from their heritage. This attempt to synthesize socialism and mo dernization with the preservation of minority traditional cultures, while artificial and strained in some respects, nevertheless provided further encouragement to tourism planners to find huan, the Director of Cultural A ffairs] provided direct encouragement for domestic tourism with his exhortation that the Chinese people should visit heritage sites, cultural festivals and the performing arts. ( Sofield and Li 1998, 373) Tourism became a means by which to modernize the un derdeveloped minority regions, already developed eastern coastline. Sofield and Li find that the situation of the Miao minority group of Guizhou in southwest China whe dominated state controls and Sofield and Li 1998, 374). Li Yang and Geoffrey Wall share a similar view, co ntending that traditional ethnic culture is being (2008, 522). Yang, Wall, and Sm ith found that the approach to developing tourism is largely controlled by the state: In many developing countries, government is not only the key player in developing tourism but also issues and policies regarding ethnicity. Governments may also use ethni c images in promoting tourism, and base tourism plans on the development of ethnic resources, traditions, and artifacts. In effect, the state becomes a marketer o f cultural meanings and arbiter of cultural practices. Government determines the role of minority identities in marketing and development, and decides what images are
34 A uni linear approach to development is widely accepted and utilized in Chi nese society and policy making; it postulates that all societies pass through similar developmental stages. earlier stages in the development of a more advanced Han society where modernity is a The Chinese government, by institutionalizing ethnic identity, closely monitors and determine s those aspects of culture that unity) ; so arts, crafts, cuisine, architectu re, dance, some festivals and some ceremonies form the main touristic diet (Sofield and Li 2007, 275). Because tourism is one of the generally does not permit ethnic celebra tions of past victories over Han Chinese, ethnic military prowess 275). receptive to regional economic development via ethnic tourism due to the harsh but scenic mountain environments and socio cultural distance from modern Chinese lifestyles and ec with opening a region to tourism are much less than implementing other modernization schemes (Oa kes 1998, 132). Because the shaoshu minzu mostly isolated in mountainous areas, have been able to preserve their traditional culture and heritage, the active
35 promotion of ethnic tourism involves appealing to Han (and international) visitors by state and its economic goals dominate scale economies and their bureaucratic states [grow] at the expense of local communities and stance that Oakes takes on the effects of Chinese ethnic tourism is rather negative, victims of destructi ve change, but as actively engaging that change, as individuals constrained by often oppressive forces, yet at the same time constructively adapting to and modifying these forces to the extent that ere seldom in mation. ( Oakes 1992, 7 8) S renewal of Han national identity. In the process, local ethnic identity should eventually acculturate into Han culture, though the oppo rtunities found in marketing ethnic tourism are given three allowances: low interest state loans state price subsidies, and local enterprise ventures. The Chinese government is essentially providing economic incentives for field and Li 1998, 12).
36 According to Sofield and Li, the Chinese government realized that international tourism could lead to the penetration of Western values and cultures. As a result, cultural policy oriented tourism to Chinese culture and traditions so as to avoid the pollution of ui huan, the Director of Cultural Affairs, encouraged domestic tourism by inviting Chinese people to visit heritage sites, cultural festivals, and the performing arts. Ethnic tourism utilized by the state for the purpose of modernization, also allows the CCP to control and project images of the minorities as primitive, exotic, as peoples. Motivation comes from the prospect of profit, rather than any concern to genuinely portray indigenous groups in a just manner (1998, 12 17). Conclusion Since the 1 978 economic reforms, the Chinese government has tried to find ways to modernize and develop the country. With a transition in focus from the Eastern coastline to the more impoverished Western frontier, the government is using tourism as a tool for economi c development and a renewal o f Han identity. How is tourism a ffecting economic development? Does the interaction between ethnic groups on the frontier and tourists, particularly the Han Chinese tourists, have an impact on ethnic and cultural identity? Do g overnment way the shaoshu minzu and their visitors interact? Ethnic tourism as controlled by the state promotes a way for minorities to sell their culture to travelers for the purpose of
37 econ omic development, which the government believes can contribute to development on a national level. However, the interests of some minorities conflict with those of the state as well as the increasing exposure to Han Chinese visitors and migrants. Do touris m policies in the autonomous regions, then, have any effect on ethnic minority integration into the Chinese state? While Ti bet is an important region that has faced issues similar to those in Xinjiang, it is too politically and historically vast an area to properly include in this study. Although an assessment of tourism in Tibet would be fascinating, the international attention drawn to Tibet in recent years complicates the dynamics central to this study. As for Inner Mongolia and Ningxia, the lack of da ta makes comparisons difficult. A p rimary focus on the Uighurs and the Zhuang, as well as their respective autonomous regions allow s for a comparison to be drawn between two ethnic groups that have been affected by Chinese rule very differently in the pas t, yet now face some similar consequences of modern CCP tourism policies. Historically, t he Uighurs of Xinjiang have shared in a far more united ethnic identity, based on a strong culturally Turkic and religiously Muslim alignment, than the Zhuang in Guangxi, who never considered themselves a homogenous ethnic group until the Chinese government labeled them as such. In addition to this distinction, the Uighurs have also posed far more of a separatist and security threat to the Chinese state as compared to th e Zhuang. These differences set the stage for an interesting comparison and create a picture of the various ways and degrees to which the Chinese state is controlling tourism and promoting a new national identity and how ethnic identity is being sha ped by impacts of this ethnic tourism.
38 Although the usefulness of ethnographic work to this study is obvious, the limit of time and resources renders that option impossible. The following chapters offer an examination of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomou s Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous as two case studies of regional ethnic tourism in China. I will analyze ethnic tourism impacts on economic development, integration, and ethnic identity in Xinjiang, focusing primarily on the Uighur ethnic group. A history of tensions with the Han Chinese and the Chinese central government may provide a unique le ns for this study. I will also assess the Guangxi zizhiqu to determine the impacts of ethnic tourism on the Zhuang ethnic group The final chapter compares the issues faced by the Uighurs in Xinjiang and the Zhuang in Guangxi as a result of regional ethnic tourism.
39 Chapter Two Development, Integration, and Identity in Xinjiang: A Case Study of Ethnic Tourism and the Uighur Shaoshu Minzu Since the 1978 economic reforms in China, an economic disparity has caused a rift in development between the interior West and the eastern coastline. The interior is greatly impov erished and inhabited by ethnic minorities (as well as many majority Han communities) In response, t he Chinese Communist Party has highlighted the budding tourism market as a means by which to develop the Western part of the shaoshu minzu and integrate the minorities into a renewed national identity based on national development, and their involvement in regional economic develo pment can contribute to their ado pting this national identity. However, as a growing ethnic tourism market fuels development in the Western frontier, the paradigms associated with development and preservation and
40 cultural exoticism and modernity highlight an uncertainty that ethnic minori ties may lose that which makes them exotic, causing tourists to lose interest in their pursuit of this form of cultural authenticity. An analysis of ethnic tourism in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) known for tensions with the Han Chinese and separatist desires, provides insight into how this market is affe cting development, integration, and ethnic identity in zizhiqu and the rest of the impoverished Western interior Xinjiang : A Brief History and Introduction to Ethnic Tourism The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous R egion ( see Map 2.1) accounts fo r over 1 5% and houses a number of ethnic minorities within its borders, including the Uighur, Mongolian, Hui, Kazak, Kirgiz, Xibe, Ozbek, Russian, Tajik, and Tatar shaos hu minzu The majority ethnic group is the Uighur s with a population of 8.39 million in 2000 (China Statistical Yearbook 2006, 50). This territory was designated an Nationa lities offered certain rights and benefits to the minorities which excluded the Han Chinese. As new encouraged migration to the Western frontier, tensions arose between the Uighurs and the Han Chinese who came in search of new economic opportunities. As Xinjiang developed, the Chinese Communist Party realized the value in many attention to the ethnic minorit ies as a potential point of interest for both domestic and foreign tourists. A rise in ethnic focused tourism attracted visitors to the underdeveloped,
41 Map 2.1: Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) S ource : Xinjiang, 2013 remote autonomous regions, This increase in tourism required the development of an accommodat ing infrastructure and provided a means to alleviate poverty Xinjiang: Before During, and After Mao The vast domain of Xinjiang was annexed by the Qing dynasty in 1757, after which policies to avert ethnic minority resistance to the government resulted in Han officials taking positions in the region. Due to a strong Uighur desire for separation spanning bac k to annexation this interaction between Han officials, who viewed the
42 shaoshu minzu as culturally inferior, uncivilized, and backwards, and non Han groups instigated tensions in the region that persist to this day. Rebellion and instability characterized Xinjiang, which was fought over by the Chinese Nationalist Party, the USSR, and various warlords between 1911 and 1949 (Rossabi 2004, 6) In the 1940s, however, Xinjiang had a taste of freedom as the Eastern Turkistan Republic, though this status was short took control of the area in 1949 The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region was officially established and i ncorporated zizhiqu aimed to offer the ethnic minorities a degree of autonomy ( Rossabi 2004, 7) Prior to 1949, during the civil war between the Guomindang and the Communist Party, Mao indicated that the minorities particularly the Muslim Uighurs who dominated the region, should expect independence in Xinjiang if the CCP won the war. After the founding of the PRC, however, the Uighurs were expected to settl e for autonomy and (Bovingdon 2004a, 5). The central government divided Xinjiang into a number of smaller autonomies to reinforce the idea that the region belonged to thirteen different minzu and to equal out the overwhelmi ng political and demographic majority enjoyed by the Uighurs (Bovingdon 2004b, 118). A history of violence and separatist desires deemed the Uighurs untrustworthy by the CCP, and any promises of ind ependence made by Mao before 1949 have been dropped in fav or of development. The real power in Xinjiang remains with trusted Han officials imported from the eastern part of the country, and the Uighurs still have very little control in governing themselves. This political situation as well as di scriminatory employment and housing practices, has fueled ethnic tensions.
43 Central government goals in Xinjiang, as in the other zizhiqu remain the ultimate minzu policies respecting cultural and religious differences prevailed in the early 1950s as did those of forced Han immigration and language reforms over time, organizations such as the China Islamic Association gradually took control of some religious inst (Bovingdon 2004b, 122). The mid nomic changes, initiatives that drove many Uighurs and others together against the Party. During the a nti R ightist movement a response to the 1956 Hundred Flowers campaign, which invited criticism of CCP policies from the masses the gover nment in Xinjiang targeted nationalist locals resisting CCP rule. The Great Leap Forward, beginning in 1958, label Countrywide famine increased numbers of Han migrating to Xinjiang, and the mid 1960s Cultural Revolution implored Han Chinese (customs, culture, habits, and ideas). This campaign prompted the targeting of non Han cultures in Xinjiang, and the destruction of mosques, the force d raising of pigs by Muslims, and mandatory shedding of traditional and habitual garments in favor of Mao suits (Bovingdon 2004b, 124). The Cultural Revolution alienated large portion s of the Uighur and other minzu population s against the central government crisis of shaoshu minzu resentment against the Han Chinese and party rule, and adopted more culturally and religiously tol erant policies for the autonomous regions. Despite
44 these policies, however, the 1990s wit nessed viol ent Uighur resistance to CCP rule and policies of Han migration and privilege in Xinjiang, including riots and bus bombings in Urumqi. and subsequent reforms of 1978 mainly pinpointed the eastern coastline of China for development only in the past decade has overwhelming poverty in Xinjiang and the rest of the We stern interior become a priority of the central government. The CCP believes that increased development in Xinjiang will pacify the separatist desires of the Uighurs, and ethnic tourism has arisen as a means of accomplishing this goal. E conomic prosperity through such policies as the Go We st development plan are meant to integrate the Uighurs and show them that cooperation with the Chinese regime is more beneficial than resist ing it (Moneyhon 2003, 513). T West Development P olicy in Xinjiang When the Chinese Communist Party came to po wer, it realized a need to unite the country under a recreated Chinese national identity capable of stimulating successful and lasting unification. This Chinese nationalism needed to include the ethnic minorities, most of whom inhabit the extremely impoverished Western h alf of the countr y Recent Chinese policies have focused on the Western frontier for development, adopting poverty inequalities in income distribution between eastern coastal gateways and wes tern and inland provinces, with the tourism industry playing a leading role in regional development (Jackson 2006, 695). Wealth disparities between the developed eastern coastline and the largely underdeveloped interior result in ethnic tensions between th e richer Han Chinese and the ethnic minority groups who make up a large percentage of
45 integrating minorities into a renewed national identity, albeit one based on a Han vision of Chineseness and modernization. The West D evelopment Plan policy because it encourages Han Chi nese to migrate i The West Development plan is meant to direct state investment, outside vast and comparatively backward interior (Moneyhon 2003, 492). transform the western region (the specific provinces are shaded gray on Map 2.2 ) into an area with stable livi ng conditions, a thriving economy, and an advanced society by the mid 21 st century (Jackson 2006, 697). Building regional tourism, a more self sufficient or will enable local communities to contribute to their own development (Jackson 2006, 705). However, the 12 West Development provinces only attract a small proportion of Foreign Direct Investment (4.6% of the total in 1999 and 3.6% in 2002) domestic tourism (15.6% in 2000, 14.9% in 2002) and international to urism (21.3% in 2000, 19.7% in 2002) (Jackson 2006, 697 698). As a result, the government is providing assistance by establishing infrastructure and a market for tourism in these regions. with enticing economic opportunities. Large infrastructure construction projects provide jobs, which often go to Han migrant workers rather than indigenous Uighur workers. Moneyhon contends that this development policy is a civilizing project for the Uigh urs:
46 Chinese into Xinjiang has a powerful assimilative effect on the Uighurs [who demonstra te a] much higher rate of assimilation to the Han than vice 507) Map 2.2 : The West Development Provinces S ource : Jackson 2006, 697. Despite the assimilating effects the West Development plan may have on the Uighurs and other indigenous groups, tourism based on ethnic distinction has a risen as a nother means to develop remote areas like Xinjiang. Although still a fledgling market, ethnic tourism is capable of providing economic development in the zizhiqu while also furthering the Development in this impoverished region is meant to pacify Uighur separatist tendencies
47 and assimilate this group into Han Chinese culture. Centr al government regulated tourism can preserve certain aspects of Uighur identity, while also demonstrating that the livelihoods of the Uighurs and other ethnic minorities will benefit and improve from cooperation with the Chinese state. Ethnic Tourism in Xi njiang Tourism in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region primarily focuses on ethnic minority interactions and v iewing local scenery, relying on rural allure and the history of the Silk Road to attract tourists. Compared to other provinces, Xinjian ee of tourism is less developed though it has had a significant impact on the Uighurs and other shaoshu minzu as well as contributed to development in a number of cities, including Urumqi (the capital), Kashgar, and Turpan. ational tourism began, 88 forei gners visited the region and, by 1982, that number jumped to 8,095 and then to over 41,000 in 1987 (Toops 199 2 22). Not all areas in Xinjiang are open to tourists, al though the government has increased access to many formerly closed places. The three primary tourist destinations are Urumqi, Turpan, and Kashgar, and tourists annually flock to these cities to view recently discovered art and artifacts, ruins of ancient c ities, and mummified human remains (Toops 1999, 303). When Kashgar was given open status in 1984, the in ternational tourist market boom ed and even t he five year period from 1980 19 85 saw over 4000 tourists buying 60,000 RMB of ethnic goods, resulting in th e inclusion of a restaurant and hotel to the Kashgar Arts and Crafts Factory so tourists could spend more (Toops 1993, 97). Most visitors to Xinjiang travel with group tours Turpan, a historically important stop along the Silk Road for travelers since t he Han Dynasty (206BC 220AD) opened
48 completely for tourism in 1979 (Toops 1992, 25) Here, Uighur culture is put on display guides who lead troops of visitors throu (Toops 1999, 303). A Uighur song and traditional instrume nts and adorned in traditional chapan (jacket), koynek (shirt), and doppa (skullcap) Catering to their audience, the troupe performs a Japanese and a Chinese song, though most songs, dances, performers, and instrum ents are authentic and Uighur (1999, 310). Despi Muslim heritage, most tourist sites use Chinese names Toops contends that this Chinese preference Centr al Asian heritage and places it into a fully Chinese historical context, saying in by firmly tying the region to the historic Chinese empire (Toops 1999, 303). Of t he 50 tour guides who work in Turpan and Urumqi, a few are Uighurs and the rest are Han Chinese from Shanghai or Beijing who perceive Xinjiang in a totally Chinese context holding that this region is very different from the rest of China, yet historicall y has been and is a part of China (1999, 314). E thnic and cultural tourism as described above constructs a history of Xinjiang that is viewed from the outside perspective of the Han Chinese, not those of the local Uighurs. Turpan, for example, historically a religious and economic major player in 20 th century politics in the region, These guides act as
49 cultural brokers between tourists and locals. In Turpan, locals interacting with visitors work in the informal sector of tourism and only superficially encounter tourists by selling them kebabs from a stand or crafts in the bazaar ( Toops 1999, 315). To increase the appeal of Turpan, several beautification projects have been carried out one of which contributed to the rebuilding of the Turpan bazaar. C ompletely rebuilt in the 1980s, this two story bazaar provides merchants with the space to hawk their wa res of hats, cloth, scarves, boots, and knives to locals and tourists alike (Toops 1992, 25 26) Behind this structure stands the working bazaar, where visitors can bargain with local jewelers, bakers, craftsmen, and fruit sellers for goods or negotiate a maze of stalls housing restaurants and other shops (Toops 199 9 309 ). Domestic tourists are attracted to programs highlighting the history of early Chinese travelers and adventurers sojourning the Silk Road The main tourist attractions focus on the surrounding scenic areas where tourists can hike to nearby waterfalls, eat mutton in local Kazakh yurts or guesthouses, and ride horses around summer pastures (Toops 1992, 24). In the city, the south of which houses the Uighur population, tourists can enjoy ethnic markets and restaurants, or stop at the jade carving, carpet, and musical instruments factories ( Toops 1992, 24). Another side of Xinjiang tourism focuses on local mi alignment including the Uighurs Muslim attractions can be divided into physical assets Xinjiang has 19 mosques and six famous Islamic sites, considered tangible Islamic attractions for tourism for example, the Aitiduer Mosque in Kashgar, built in 1442, is the largest and oldest mosque in China,
50 attracting a daily attendance of over 3,000 and more t han 7,000 at Friday prayers (Wang et al. 2010, 113). Muslim tourism considered a facet of ethnic tourism, attracts the peoples within China. Most foreign tourists, however, visit Urumqi, Kashgar, and Turpan to enjoy the surrounding scenery or superficial interactions with loca l minority peoples. Since travel services provide visitors with tours and accommodations during their travels to Xinjiang, a large chunk of the foreign exchange and domestic revenue earned from t ourism goes to them, with few profits seen by the Uighurs and other participating shaoshu minzu groups. Ethnic Tourism in Xinjiang: Implications for Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity In the late 1980s, Deng X which encouraged the developm tal regions and, after it achieved a measure of prosperity, the western interior would then receive special help from the central government. This pattern of asymmetric development has resulted in the Development pol icies such as the West Development Plan, represent the second stage of In Xinjiang, economic develo pment in minority areas attracts (government encouraged) Han migration and instigate s ethnic tensions between the Han Chinese and the Uighu r s and other shaoshu minzu Although the Han Chinese population, the majority group in China, remains a minority in Xinjiang, they still account for 37% of a percentage that has skyrocketed from 6.2%
51 in 1953 (M oneyhon 2003, 497; Sautman 1998, 101 102). Despite their fewer numbers, the Han typically live in the larger industrialized urban areas of the north, while the ethnic minorities dominate the more rural south S uch a huge Han Chinese presence in Xinjiang has already exacerbated ethnic tensions between this group and the Uighurs particularly because the former tends to have greater wealth and economic opportunities than the latter Tourism is meant to provide a means for eth nic minority development, giving the Uighurs and other shaoshu minzu opportunit ies to bring sustainable and self sufficient development to Xinjiang. In market has grown considerably due to several factors : international interest in the Silk Roa d, CCP investment in and support of the tourism sector, the quality of local rural and ethnic attractions, and the opening of these exotic destinations to domestic and international tourists (Church 2004, 41). Yet tourism and the way it is established by t he central government, while providing a market for economic development, may exacerbate ethnic tensions in Xinjiang, especially when the Uighurs already resent the C hinese C ommunist P arty ly and religiously oppressive policies. If tourism development benefits the wrong groups or causes a strong renewal of cultural identity its impacts could lead to a more intensified desire for separatism of the ethnic minorities. Economic Development and Tourism ndustries, oil and cotton, that are central to its economic development strategy. The oil industry, almost completely controlled by the Han Chinese, inc ites tensions with locals. According to Moneyhon, these development
52 policies concerning oil and cotton make little economical sense and are driven by an underlying political agenda. Development of the cotton industry would open up new land via reclamation that would bring in massive numbers of Han settlers. This explanation known as 2003, 503 504). Because this region also has potential for a lucrative tourism industry local authorities find that the tourism market will attract both domestic and int ernational historical and cultur al sites, rural scenery and landscapes, Tourism has already attract ed a considerable amount of foreign exchange in Xinjiang (see Table 2.1) In 1995, over 200,000 internation al tourists visited the region, jumping to over 300,000 by 2005. Foreign exchange earnings totaled $74 million in 1995 Table 2.1 : Number of Internationa l Tourists and Foreign Exchange Earnings in Xinjiang Xinjiang Number of International Tourists (10,000 person times) Foreign Exchange Earnings (USD million) 1995 20.36 74 1997 -71 1998 -82 1999 -86 2000 25.61 95 2001 -99 2002 -99 2003 -49 2004 31.69 91 2005 33.11 100 S ource : China Statistical Yearbook 2006, 776 777. and $100 million in 2005, indicating a rising foreign interest in Xinjiang tourism In 2007, added
53 tertiary industry. The first four years of the 11 th five year plan (2006 2010) saw an increase of 8.10% in domestic tourists received, 5.83% in domestic tourism revenue earned, and 5.16% of total tourism revenue earned indicat ing a n overall increase in each category in the first three years of 14.96%, 15.21%, and 13.85% respectively (Sun 2011, 1311). B y t he end of 2009, Xinjiang had received 1.52 million foreign tourists and 80.80 million domestic tourists total with revenue from tourism amount ing to 71.7 billion RMB (about $11.5 billion USD ) each respectively increasing by 46%, 101%, and 86% percent compared with the 2001 2004 period of the 1 0 th five year plan (2001 200 5 ) (Sun 2011, 1311) class tourist culture brand, two high quality tourist regions, three Silk Road tourist routes, four famous brand scenic resorts, five key tourist regions, six series of special products, and These statistics and Table 2.1 at a steady rate. E ach year the nu mber of foreign and domestic tourists visiting and spending money in the region is increasing due to government investments in building up ethnic minority ( particularly Uighur and Kazakh) culture, scenic landscapes, and history of Silk Road trade for tourism. According to Moneyhon, however, the Uighurs have seen little of the rapid economic growth XUAR has experienced and, of the 20 counties in Xinjiang where Uighurs make up 90% or more of the population, 13 have been designated by the CCP as key poverty alleviation counties (2003, 497). An online article claims that the Muslim Uighurs in Tuyoq, Xinjiang are being left behind by the tourism boom Tickets sold to visiting t
54 village of grape til the [government ( Reuters 2006). While Xinjiang is benefiting from increased tourism in the region, instances where these economic opportunities are providing growth for the Han Ch inese minority as opposed to the Uighur majority will only exacerbate ethnic tensions. Saich claims that policy approach to dealing with the poorer interior (2011, 19 2). Moneyhon finds that, while the Go West development plan and other CCP policies are geared towards alleviating poverty and bridging gaps in growth and economic disparity between the eastern and western regions, attempt to quell ethnic unrest, solidify the nation, and legitimize the current regime by Although tourism is obviously contributing to economic development in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, it appea rs that these policies are designed to keep power and economic growth in the hands of the Han Chinese and not the Uighurs. In a region such as this, with a history of ethnic unrest and shaoshu minzu through development of the tourism market may never be realized. Integration in Xinjiang and the Hardships of Separatism Since the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, it has maintained a desire to assimilate the 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities into a Han Chinese, s ocialist identity. during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural
55 Revolution alienated many of these groups, the post reform CCP realized a need to reinforce the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of the shaoshu minzu by giving them preferential treatment over the Han Chinese and a degree o f autonomy by establishing the five zizhi qu profound way: overwhelmingly Han Chinese and claims that Han culture is more 1980s, preferential standards and education and reduce tensions through redistributive justice (1998, 86 97) In Xinjiang, Sautman finds that these affir mative action policies have created greater social equity and perhaps even promoted positive Han minority relatio ns (1998, 86). The most valued of the preferential policies is liberalized family planning, including exemption from the one child policy, a li festy value population, though the minorities could decide whether or not to practice it (89). Sautman highlights education as another important po licy in Xinjiang. S pecial funds for minority education are manifested in some 400 boarding schools in minority pastoral areas t hese schools exempt boarders from payment for tuition and books, and guarantee them free food, clothing, lodging and study materials (91). These preferential policies no doubt placated the minorities to some extent, but what they really wanted was immediate realization of the regional autonomy that Mao Zedong had promised prior to CCP victory in 1949 and again during the 1950s. In 1984 the Law on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) implemented a system of regional national autonomy for the zizhiqu government for the exercise
56 shaoshu minzu though it has been cri ticized by LRNA 1984; Moneyhon 2003, 512). In 2001, revisions to the LRNA subtly shift ed the right to control resources and i nd u strial and agricultural products from the autonomous regions to the central responded with growing unrest and violence actions that explain why the CCP has gone so far as to label some Uighurs as terrorists after the 2001 terrorist incident in the United States (Bovingdon 2004, 12; Saich 2003, 353) Historically, the central government has been dealing with Uighur separatist desires and unrest for a long time. In 1990, for example, clashes between Han Chinese police and soldiers and Uighurs, con sidered dead (Moneyhon 2003, 498). After witnessing the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, Uighur separatists began rioting in the hopes of establishing an independent Uighurstan or a unified Eastern Turkestan. The central government labeled these separatists in Xinjiang as terrorists and cr (2003, 500). H owever, this campaign incited further separatist movements and increased Uighur anti government protests and violence. The onstrated Uighur contempt and disrespect for Chinese rule by coordinating bus bombings in Urumqi with the state funeral for Deng Xiaoping, leaving hundreds injured and at least ten dead. In Beijing, separatists also exploded a pipe bomb in a bus in one of
57 2003, 499 500). Since then, the CCP has joined together with Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, or Shanghai Cooperation O rganization, intended to serve as a unified front against separatists and extremists and to strengthen relations between China and the Islamic countries bordering Xinjiang that might sympathize with the Muslim Uighurs. The central government theorizes that the Go West developme nt policy will bring prosperity to the Uighu rs and other minorities in the W est and breed greater minority cooperation and acquiescence thereby encouraging their integration into mainstrea m Han Chinese culture the new market economy, and an underlying Ha n framework Moneyhon contends, however, that economic prosperity will and incite an ethnic resurgence, citing a point Gladney made in revitalization amon g the shaoshu minzu (2003, 518). The Handicrafts Industry, Ethnic Identity and Tourism Tourism in Xinjiang is closely tied to ethnic identity through the handicrafts industry. This marketing of Uighur culture according to Stanley Toops, can lead to a cultural reawakening and allows for preserva tion of historical sites ( 1992, 20). A revitalization of culture can be measured in a revitalization of crafts and products created for tourism. R eaffirmed interest in developing a market for minority handi craf ts is a positive aspect of tourism in Xinjiang. Two types of crafts, touristic crafts and ethnic crafts, have evolved to cater to the international tourism market (Toops 1993, 89). A long cultural significance of craft articles to the people of Xinjiang in dicates an ethnic attachment to goods such as carpets, knives, jewelry, hats, and clothing. Uighurs in
58 particular use local materials and technologies to pr oduce locally styled items that distinguish them from other ethnic groups, including the doppa (skullcap), pichak (knife), chapan (jacket), and otuz (boots) (Toops 1993, 90). Post Mao government policies of development and ethnicity have committed to further production of ethnically distinctive goods. Tourism provides a handicraft industry in Xin jiang that allows a marketing of culture. The Uighurs, through their crafts, sell tourists ethnic markers of their traditions and identity. Toops finds that, as tourists become interested in and pursue crafts, the recognition of local ethnic identity is re affirmed in the crafts ( 1993, 104). The duality of the ethnic and tourist craft industry is represented in a dualit y of the handicrafts industry. E thnic crafts produce goods and musical instruments to the national, regional, and local song and dance troupe s while also meeting the demands of the hotels and friendship stores geared to tourists some of these ethnic crafts include: rugs, knives, silk clothing and decorations, embroidered hats, traditional instruments, earthenware, and red copper ware (1993, 9 5). according to Toops, this production of touristic crafts does not mean that the preservation of local culture is also occurring (1993, 10 5). In fact, the rising prominence of Urumqi in Kashgar and Gulja, both more dependent on the handicraft industry, are being dwarfed by the development of this industry 93). minority groups are backwards and simple, allowing this CCP and Han Chinese perception of shaoshu minzu identity to prevail. Tourist brochures, according to Church,
59 construct a minority national character that is reinforced within tourist destination cities ( 48 ) : The Uyghur cities of the Tarim are depicted as relics of the past, primitive bazaar towns of the ancient Silk Roads. Almost as if museum pieces, the the photos Uyghur cities, scenery, architecture, and ethnic people become peop clothing and hats, hard at work producing beautiful, labor intensive, handicrafts: silk weavings, jewelry, carpets, ceramics, and beautifully fluted copper vessels, in romantically languid bazaars. These images essentially not changed since the days of the ancient Silk Roads. (2010, 48) This Han centered outlook on minority peoples is transferred to the tourists who visit Xinjiang, including the international tourists and also the wealthier domestic Han Chinese unspoiled reserves of nature, religiosity, and simple lifestyles of the 42). The government, via control of the tourism industry, is able to regulate and market an exotic and culturally inferior image of the Uighurs to tourists. Not all tourists will fall for this government propagated notion of minority c ulture, and Toops holds that, in terms which reaffirms and strengthens local recognition of ethnic identity in the crafts (1993, 105). While ethnographic work would b e required to assess the impacts that th ese aspect s of tourism are having on ethnic identity, some facets of Uighur culture are no doubt being overlooked in favor of appealing to the tourism market for the sake of economic growth and development. However, tourism has been known to instigate a renewal of cultural identity and, particularly in Xinjiang where th e shaoshu minzu have
60 resulting economic prosperity is likely to result in ethnic revitalization (Moneyhon 20003, 519) Conclusion A history of ethnic unrest and separatist desires in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region has resulted in tensions between the Han Chinese and Uighur ethnic migrants to sett le in Xinjiang, increased disparities in wealth and economic opportunities fuel resentment on the part of the shaoshu minzu Because the Chinese Communist Party is aware of the need to bring poverty alleviation measures to the western interior and legitimi ze the Party in the eyes of minorities, preferential policies, including exemption from the one child policy, arose as a means of placating them. However, tensions are still present in Xinjiang, and the rise of tourism as a market for developing this area is capable of exacerbating conflict. Although tourism is attracting foreign exchange and government subsidized infrastructure provides employment opportunities, little profit and few jobs are trickling down to the Uighurs. Since the 1990s, violence among separatist groups, who want the autonomy pr omised to them by Mao in the 194 0s and 19 5 0s, has resulted in the deaths of Han Chinese and Uighurs alike. Tourism as a tool for integration of local ethnic minority groups and firmer control over interior provin ces like Xinjiang ha s the possibility of assimilating some aspects of Uighur culture, while economic prosperity could also lead to ethnic revitalization. Imbalanced economic development in this region also aggravate s ethnic conflicts, and the outbreak of v
61 seat to necessary policies that would first help to stabilize the region and lessen the ethnic tensions present between Uighur a nd Han Chinese groups. The Gua ngxi Zhuang Autonomous Region offer s a contrasting take on tourism development in an area and to a minority group that is historically more assimilated to Han culture than Xinjiang and the Uighurs.
62 Chapter Three Development, Integration, and Identity in Guangxi : A Case Study of Ethnic Tourism and the Zhuang Shaoshu Minzu The Guangxi Zhuang Autono mous Region, which came under Chinese Communist rule in 1949 is one of the five zizhiqu meant to offer ethnic minorities, the Zhuang in this case, a degree of autonomy. The 14 million Zhuang living in Guangxi and minority group Similar to the rest of dev elopment policy Compared to Xinjiang, scenic and ethnic tourism in Guangxi are far more popular as a means of development. This province is renowned for its beautiful landscapes and rural, culturally exotic ethnic minorities, attracting tourists from all around the world and also from within China. P referential policies exempt the Zhuang and other shaoshu minzu from the one child policy, and offer them subsidies in starting businesses or ease of access to primary and higher education. Tourism is one of the
63 tional identity. Prosperity as a result of economic growth is meant to satisfy the needs of the shaoshu minzu and encourage them to follow the benevolent guidance of the Han CCP towards a socialist path of development. However, the impacts associated with ethnic tourism raise concerns over los s of cultural identity and integration into Chinese society. The Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region attracts international and domestic tourists because it is largely rural, secluded, exotic, and serene. As developm ent progresses, tourists may lose interest in Guangxi due to its homogenizing effects. If tourism becomes the main industry providing revenue and bringing economic growth to the minorities, then tourism based cities and villages will be left without altern ative industries to provide employment and opportunities for them. The paradigms associated with preservation and modernity and with cultural exoticism and modernization raise questions as to what impacts ethnic tourism will ultimately have on economic dev elopment and integration in Guangxi and how it will affect ethnic identity and culture of the Zhuang and other minority peoples Guangxi: A Brief History and Introduction to Ethnic Tourism With 46 million people living within its borders and the Han Chinese accounting for 61.7% of the population the shaoshu minzu of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region ( see Map 3.1 below ) make up 40 % of total population, consisting of a pproximately 16 million Zhuang, Dong, Miao, Yao, Yi, Hui Shui, Ting, Maonan, and other ethnic groups (Kaup 2000, 32) The Zhuang are the larges t ethnic group in China, and 90% reside in Guangxi, accounting for 3 3.8
64 14 million people (Turner 2010, 11) Similarly to Xinjian g and the other three ethnic autonomous regions, Guangxi was also largely left behind in terms of development. Only i n recent years has the government begun to assist in the process of tourism development in poorer regions, including Guangxi, in order to promote economic growth and alleviate poverty. This government assistance fuels a deep seated CCP goal of integrating the ethnic minorities into a Han Chinese national identity. This underlying agenda of integration becomes more obvio us through a brief review of the Zhuang during the time Map 3.1: Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region S ource : Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, 2013
65 Guangxi, the Zhuang, and the Communist Revolution The Zhuang have changed greatly since before the early 1950s. Prior to this time, category (Kaup 2000, 26). Because the minorities were historically discriminated ag ainst and terrorized to the point of masking their lineages with Han Chinese ancestry no one knows for certain if the Zhuang are indigenous to the Guangxi and Yunnan area (26) The rugged topography kept pockets of people separate from each other and far removed from the penetration and control of the ruling governm ent. Therefore, the Zhuang have many different dialects and have never constructed a unified written script (28 29) The Zhuang primarily inhabit western Guangxi and, even after years o f Han migration, this geographic concentration has remained largely the same, though the Han are the majority group in the province and have the best land Most Zhuang reside in the cities in 1986 and only 7% in 1990 (31, 33 34 ). Historically, the languages of the branches of the Zhuang nationality were largely mutually unintelligible and closer to Thai and Lao than Mandarin (Edmondson 1994, 150) Before 1959, less than 10% of Zhuang were likely verbally fluent or literate in Prior to the Communist takeover, ethnic conflicts and violence often broke out in certain areas of Gua ngxi between the Zhuang and the immigrant H an, indicating that the Zhuang were not as h istorically assimilated as some scholars have made them seem (37) S ince the 17 th century, there has been much Zhuang resistance to the Han, contributing to difficulties in integration.
66 The isolating mountainous terrain, poor infrastructure, self sufficient economies, and lack of a unified religious or political leadership all contributed to the weak sense of Zhuang identity on the eve of the Communist takeover. Yet withi n eight years after officially taking control of Guangxi, the Communist Party announced the formation of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region and declared that the Zhuang region would enjoy limited independence from central control. (47) B ecause the Zhuang were less unified in terms of language, government, and religion, they posed far less of a separatist threat to the central government than did the minorities of the northwest, such as the Turkic speaking, religiously Muslim Uighurs. This may be partly w hy the Zhuang, also not as from the Han, have been considered more assimil ated into Chinese culture ( 55). Kaup contends that the Zhuang endured three phases of consolidation from the eve of the Communist Revolution in 1949 to the present. The first phase, from 1949 to 1966, saw the CCP driven by its desire for national political integration. Because the allegiance was the first change the central government wanted to make. By calling for full participation in the Communist system via a propaganda campaign, the party hoped oyalties Kaup 2000, 74). During phase two, from 1966 1978, the Cultural Revolution under Mao Zedong erupted and wrought chaos, disrupting minority work in Guangxi ( 74). Phase three from 1978 to the present saw a change in party policy from a focus on minority work and political integration to economic develo pment. Preferential policies surg ed during the first half of the post Mao period, with the government asserting that the elevated to Han level ring
67 75). T hese policies of minority legal and economic rights were further clarifie d by the 1984 Law of Regional Autonomy (LRNA 1984) although reforms to this policy have since placed control of most zizhiqu industries into the hands of the central government As one of the driving factors in the push for CCP development of the western development in China began to illustrate that minorities could be lured into the unified Development in Guangxi and the Rise of Ethnic Tourism Development as a means of pover ty alleviation in Guangxi places an emphasis on the tourism market. This zizhiqu in particular is known for its beautiful scenery karst caves, and diversely exotic cultures. however remained largely untapped until recreation and ethnic tourism in the late 1990s. The Guangxi provincial government has, in recent years, included tourism development in the formal strategic planning of the rural economy (Zhao 2009, 173). Th e most common feature s of ethnic tourism in the performance of minority song s and dances, presentation of minority rituals, and holding of festivals. In Guizhou, for example, the minorities, long reciated as resources for aesthetic and authentic peoples are no w attractions for foreigners and provide important income resources to both Guizhou and neighboring Guangx i (Wu 2000, 7 8). In addition to direct investment in the improve ment of infrastructure, the central
68 development an example is the conversion of spare rooms into hote l rooms which, tourists (Qin et al. 2011, 478). Tourism as controlled by the state gives the CCP influence over the construction of ethnic identity in China. By contributing to goals of economic development, the ethnic minorities fit into a larger rhetoric of Chineseness (Turner 2010, 18 19). Song and dance perfor mances are one of the major ways ethnic minorities in Guangxi showcase their identity and culture, and this display has become a renowned form of ethnic tourism: Local performers in Guangxi take part in tourism by promoting their traditions through perform ances of music and dance that are staged particularly for tourists in order to preserve and celebrate local culture and to make economic gains. Competitions for economic investments and government support through the development of tourism create a lively setting as groups and individuals scramble to benefit from cultural tourism resources by marketing place and ethnicity. [These local performers must compete with sites] constructed by tourism companies often subsidized by the national government (the Natio nal Tourism Board) as it promotes tourism for economic development in rural areas throughout China by 8) Because tourism does not guarantee their security in the future, some older generati ons worry about the loss of traditional skills and fertilizing knowledge that will influence the quality of their land in the long run (Wu 2000, 18). This loss is a concern because many small villages in the southwestern region in Guizhou, Yunnan, and Gu angxi provinces have been entirely converted to draw in tourism revenue, and minority land s or rice terraces are either neglected or ha ve fallen into the hands of the local government for upkeep The primary sites for tourism in Guangxi include the cities of Guilin, Nanning, The local scenery and b oat trips from Guilin to Yangshuo are meant to mesmerize tourists as if they were
69 vie wing the landscape directly out of a Chinese painting (Turner 2010, 11 12). Ethnicity is a valuable commodity here and the production of tourist sites to attract visitors is geared to give legitimacy to minority p erformances. Turner use representations of place and ethnicity for cultural promotion and economic profit in various sites in Guangxi, negotiating issues of representation, legitimization and This utilization of Guangxi landscape and ethnicity a s economic and cultural commodities contributes to the economic development to make the secluded mountainous areas less financial ly and physically isolated (2010, 14 15). While Turner may find that these song and dance performances sometimes benefit minority representations of place and ethnicity, problems are already arising with tourism de velopment in Guangxi. Yangshuo, a famous backpacking site among Westerners and recent popular destination for domestic Chinese tourists, is headed into the realm of overdevelopment. Westerners now avoid this area because of its heavy development, instead seeking out other scenic spots further north in Guangxi which are just beginning to develop via a burgeoning tourism economy ( Turner 2010, 66 ). This loss of tourism attraction in Yangshuo brings to light a conflict of interests : increasing development has changed the city into a less exotic destination for Western tourists, showing how modernizing tourist infrastructure can erode cultural exoti cism T he concern with the loss of traditional agricultural practices also highlights tensions between development and cultural preservation. Ethnic tourism in Guangxi may be bringing economic development to an impoverished region and co ntributing to CCP goals of minority integration into a Han Chinese sense of nationalism but impacts on identity may
70 also lead to adverse e ffect s on the preservation of the shaoshu minzu culture and traditions that are not easily marketed to tourists. Ethnic Tourism in Guangxi: Implications for Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity Tourism in Guangxi focuses on song and dance performances and tours of the scenic countryside. In some rural villages, in Backbone Rice government funded tourism encourages minorities to open their homes and lives to produce an exotic product within which tourists can immerse themselves. Spare bedrooms in Zhuang homes are transformed into guesthouses for v isitors who can join in festivals and eat traditional Zhuang foods. The tourism industry residents ide, guesthouse owner, cook, or porter (Chio 2011, 556 557). This type of tourism has attracted international and domestic attention to Guangxi, and more villages are being transformed into tourist sites with the aid of provincial and local government fu nds. Tourism at first may seem like the best way to achieve economic development and better integrate the shaoshu minzu into the Chinese state, but without cultural exoticism, the ethnic tourism industry is likely to fail in Guangxi. For these reasons, the way in which ethnic tourism affects minority identity is important to preserving the tourism industry as well as the livelihoods of those who rely on it.
71 Economic Development and Tourism in Guangxi down decision making system in which goals are set at the s decisive in managing tourism development, although the local government i s typically responsible for planning, as is the case in Yangshuo and many other places (Qin et al. 2011, 472, 484). market economy, local tourism is promoted by a more decentralized operation of the local government and private investor initiatives rather than direct control by the central government (Richter 1989 in Turner 2010, 114). While this policy allows for a le ss standardized approach to the development of tourism in Guangxi, it also pressures local officials to achieve quotas for economic growth put forth by the central government. labor exports. Due to the arid climate and mountainous landscape, the return from farming is scant and on the decline, while years of labor exports and emigration have led to a series of socioeconomic dilemmas, including loss of cultural identity and deser tion of farms. Tourism, according to Zhao, provides a solution to these problems by helping to diversify the agricultural economy and retain younger generations (2009, 173 173). Apart from stone and metal products, tourism has become one of the most import ant tertiary industries in the region. In 2004, Guangxi received a total of 55.2 million domestic tourists (up by 21.5%) and 1.1 7 million international tourists (up by 74.4%) (Guangxi Statistical Yearbook 2005 in Turner 2010, 54).
72 Chio contends that, in terms of numbers, domestic tourists in China now far outpace and out spend international tourists (2009, 56). In Guangxi, for example, over 73 million domestic tourists visited the region in 2006 yet only 1 .7 million international tourists visited in the same year ( Chio 2009, 127). In 2012, domestic tourists totaled 155 million, a year on year growth of 19.8% and accrued 118 billion RMB of domestic tourism revenue up 28% from 2011 ( Hong et al. 2012). I n 2004, foreign exchange earnings from tourism in Gua ngxi equaled USD $2 8 8 million, an increase of 80% from 2003 (Turner 2010, 118). Table 3.1 indicates that, between 1995 and 2005 the number of international tourists visiting Guangxi almost tripled, as did the amount of foreign exchange earnings, a jump from USD $121 million in 1995 to USD $359 million in 2005. The China Data Center (2013) lists that, in 2011, Guangxi earned approximately USD amongst int ernational tourists. Undoubtedly, the reason why the CCP wants to assist in the process of tourism development in poorer regions is due to the positive impact this industry is having on economic growth in Guangxi. A 2012 EIU report claims that total touris m income in Guangxi increased by 34.1% in 2011, to 127.8 billion RMB, Table 3.1 : Number of International Tourists and Foreign Exchange Earnings in Xinjiang Guan gxi Number of International Tourists (10,000 person times) Foreign Exchange Earnings (USD million) 1995 41.85 121 1997 -178 1998 -156 1999 -202 2000 122.91 307 2001 -301
73 2002 -321 2003 -164 2004 117.58 288 2005 147.71 359 S ource: China Statistical Yearbook 2006, 776 777. Yet the tourism boom in this zizhiqu is not having a positive impact on everyone. based tourism company, Zhuang villagers have had to fi ght since 2002 to gain more of a cut from their tourism business. A ticket to the village in 2006 cost approximately USD $4 $6 or 30 50 RMB, and over 237,000 tourists Turner 2010, 200). The villagers considered their cut to be an unequal and unfair share of the total profits from ticket sales the original agreement between the tourism company, government 6% of total profits, a nd the remainder would go to the company and shareholders to pay back the investment (see Table 3.2 below ) (Chio 2009, 136 137). In 2002, a protest ensued and the amount received by the village increased to 350,000 RMB/year when the villagers realized how small a cut of 150,000 RMB was from t icket sale s profits ( Chio 2009, 137). In 2007, they asked the company and local government for 7% of the total profit from entry ticket sale s but were refused ( Chio 20 09 138). Table 3.2 : 2004) Table recreated; d ata from source: Chi o 2009, 136 Year 1998 15,000 1999 25,000 2000 30,000 2001 150,000 2002 150,000 2003 150,000 2004 350,000
74 and the virtual absence of other employment opportunit ies (Qin et al. 2011, 483). Qin, Wall, and Lu interviewed happy with their work: Many of them were formerly farmers whose land was expropriated for tourism projects so that they no longer have permanent jobs. Offering illegal tour guiding services is not honorable, although the labor is less hard than farming. The income is slightly higher than farming, but they u nreliable. ( Liu 2011, 483) M ass tourism here has replaced the former niche tourism market and the city has seen a dramatic increase in crowding, high prices, and the loss of origi nal ambience, particularly for international visitors. Entrepreneurs increasingly face the dilemma of whether to stay and the dilution of Wes These changes in Yangshuo are representative of the greater impacts economic development can have on the tourism industry and its preservation as a means of providing a livelihood for the (minority) peop le of Guangxi. The progression of development in cities like Yangshuo Guang Tourism, Integration and Ethnic Identity in Rural Guangxi In rural Guangxi, many younger generations have turned to migrant work as a means of making money and gaining experience away from home. Encouraged by the governme nt to engage in this type of migratory work, young people returning to tourism
75 villages no longer want to plow the fields and maintain the aesthetic quality of the rice terraces that attract tourists (Chio 20 09 221). Younger ge nerations who leave the countryside are often unsatisfied with returning to a rural lifestyle, which contributes to the integration of the ethnic minorities into a modernizing mindset that is typically reminiscent of the developed eastern coastline, particularly if these young people are returning home from big cities. is its sceni c destinations, but the minority cultural and musical heritage of the region is also emphasized Both the landscape and the cultural performances rely on maintaining the ethnic practices of the region. nd known for being the funded tourism development and officially opened to tourists in 1996. At the same time, the county government encouraged and supported a group of lo cal women to display some Zhuang ethnic songs by learning choreographed performances based on traditional practices of this area. Using local folk songs and Chinese folk songs, this all female group sings in Zhuang language and the Guilin dialect of Mandar in Chinese (known as guilinhua ), performing wedding and bamboo stick dances involving interaction with and the participation of the audience (Turner 2010, 68 69). government funding helped to build roads connecting the bottom of the village with a myriad of new restaurants, restrooms, and ticket booths (2010, 197) This Zhuang village contains over a dozen traditional, Zhuang style guesthouses in which tourists can stay. This model o f tourism development seen in villages similar to P in
76 and dance, performance driven consumption experiences offered at theme parks 1 in urban China can be found in rural, ethnic minority regions of the country in designated tourism villages (Chio 2011, 556). The tourism industry here is meant to fully take over the lives of the residents with everyone participating in some way. The Zhu urban, theme park counterparts, yet provide visitors with an even more authentic experience due to the added bonus of a rural setting. Rurality and ethnicity are equally promoted to attract tourists Chio fin ds that modern/unmodern, majority Han Chinese/ethnic minority) and advertised as sites for the celebration of these 556). According senses of place and identity are transformed through performances into shared ones, making this shared, imagined place of Guangxi important not only to a local construction appears to condone this form of tourism development in Guangxi as beneficial to Zhuang identity. Locals can construct a particular sense of place and self through public f Guangxi ( Turner 2010, 146). Yet there seems something oddly inauthentic in the amount of staging required for these tourism villages to function. A government funded group of women choreographing Zhuang and Chinese song and dance performances hardly soun ds like local ethnic identity is being preserved or is avoiding any sort of negative impact. Turner 1 States, except ethnic minority culture is the main attraction. People dressed in traditional ethnic clothing put on song and dance performances or sell ha ndicrafts and food to visitors. The main difference locations.
77 are overlooked in favor of new dance choreography geared towards bot h domestic and international touri sts these dances are even at f irst taught to the troupe by representatives of the Guilin Tourism Company (2010, 211). enabling the Zhuang to proudly display their home and traditions to visitors, but the impacts of tourism here are not all positive ( Turner 2010, tourists, and the loca l government has begun to discuss taking control of the terraces for maintenance of their aesthetic qualities ( 2010, 228). Certain aspects of Zhuang culture may be preserved for the benefit of the tourism industry, but cultural traditions including tendin g to the rice terraces that have provided for the Zhuang for generations are suffering as well learning and use of the Zhuang language is in decline among the younger generations in favor of Mandarin C hinese and tourism deve lopment in the village has contri buted to dec reasing standards of hygiene among the Zhuang villagers (2009 108,111). Migrant workers return to these small villages with visions of big cities and development, discovering t heir discontent with rural life. On the other hand, the contribution of university degrees and computer skills also help s business plans or the ability to advertise in local chat rooms and on person al webpages (2009, 223) While these improvements may ultimately result in more tourism and, therefore, more profit, they also result in the los s of ethnic traditions and further integrate
78 th e shaoshu minzu into the market economy and the Chinese state by advancing CCP goals of economic development Conclusion Tourism in Guangxi focuses primarily on the scenic beauty of the region and the exotic ethnic minority cultures prevalent in the rural countryside. As a result, ethnic tourism has penetrated into rural parts of the zizhiqu e well known tourist destinations, including Yangshuo, development has begun to deter both international and domes tic tourist interest While economic growth from tourism is contributing to development in Guangxi, it is also causing some aspects of Zhuang culture to fade in favor of those traditions that attract tourism. As the rural Zhuang minorities are transforming their livelihoods and villages to be solely dependent on tourism, they are integrating themselves into the new market economy of China. Despi te the cultural differences of the Zhuang minority, who have remained apart from the Han Chinese for centuries likely to homogenize their villages over time and, eventually, may result in an inauthentic display that could repel tourists. Tourism in minority villages still funnels most profit to fall into the hands of the local government or companies based in other cities. If the industry fails, the minorities risk being left with nothing, e specially if their agricultural traditions are lost over time. In Guangxi, tourism as a tool of development and integration appears to be working well it permits the government to have a firmer control on peripheral, minority villages assimilating into t he Chinese market economy. While tourism does not have the same
79 effects all over the Western interior, understanding its impacts on different minorities in autonomous area s.
80 Chapter Four Conclusion : A Comparison of Ethnic Tourism in Xinjiang and Guangxi Building e acts as a relatively short term catalyst for integrating some of the ethnic minorities into the new mar ket economy. By adapting to the modernizing Chinese economy, the shaoshu minzu are enduring a process of acculturation into the Chinese state and its majority Han culture. While ethnic tourism imprints aspects of minority culture and traditions onto those who v isit, the lifestyle and culture of tourists does not fail to leave its ma rk on the local ethnic groups. These interactions coupled with development goals, can instigate a strong desire among minorities in China to modernize, attain financial security, and further integrate in to the evolving Chinese state. Ethnic tourism is als o capable of revitalizing ethnic culture and identity, particularly when policies of Han migration and employment practices exacerbate existing tensions.
81 The positive and negative qualities associated with ethnic touris m are evident in the case studies o f the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region where tourism is being used as one way in which the Chinese Since Deng the CCP has also tried to integrate the 55 ethnic minority groups more fully into a Han centric Chinese national identity that has ari se n in response to the economically and socially destructive policie s enacted under Mao Zedong in the name of c ommunism A comparison of ethnic tourism in Xinjiang and Guangxi off ers insight into how new policies of social and economic development have affected economic growth, integration, and ethnic identity in two regio ns that, despite their differences and similarities, were granted to the Uighurs and Zhuang with the expectation of autonomous rule. Economic Development, Integration, and Ethnic Identity in Xinjiang and Guangxi The Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region China. While both regions are designated as zizhiqu meant to provide ethnic minorities with an opportunity to govern themselves in areas where they live in concentrated communities, the experiences of the shaoshu minzu in the n orthwest and the s outhwest are as different as they are similar (LRNA 1984) Xin jiang is culturally, religiously, and ethnically more aligned with its Turkic speaking, Muslim neighbors in surrounding Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan, and the distance between this area and
82 the state capital throughout history has allowe d the Uighurs and other ethnic groups relative autonomy and independence from the Han Chinese. Since the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949, the need for greater direct state control in the periphery regions has led to policies of Han migration and development in Xinjiang. To curb separatist desires and better integrate the Uighurs into the Chinese state, ethnic tourism arose as a means for ethnic minorities to engage in the new market economy while also preserving aspects of their traditions and cultures by interacting with and selling wares to tourists seeking out the culturally exotic interior In Guangxi, the Zhuang minority has had closer interactions with the Han Chinese, although the geography of the region has kept this group largely separate d from outside influences Language barriers and mountainous topography divided pockets of Zhuang for centuries, and it is only CCP minority policies that have influence d these people to consider themselves part of a single Zhuang identity. T he Zhuang remain loyal first and foremost to the lands they inhabit and to the groups to which they belong and do not as of yet, share entirely in the notion o f a Chinese sense of nation or identity. When the CCP first came to power, mo st of its attention was drawn to the ethnic minorities in the northwest who were far more removed from state control and far more unified in terms of language, religion, and identity than the shaoshu minzu of the southwest. This difference in unity between the Uighurs in the northwest and the Zhuang in the southwest is one of the most important points in comparing Xinjiang and Guangxi S uch a contrast explains why the central government has had and may continue to have more eas e in integrating
83 the Zhuang in to the Chinese state and its burgeoning market economy than it does the Uighur s Ethnic Tourism and Economic Developme nt in Xinjiang and Guangxi In both Xinjiang and Guangxi, ethnic culture is marketed as a means to attract tourism for the purpose of regional economic development. The West Development Plan includes all five zizhiqu in its policies for poverty alleviation, and it provides substantial subsi dies from the government for building infrastructure in each region. Inf rastr ucture allows tourists to reach these previously isolated minority communities that, due to their peripheral status, have been able to preserve the traditional cultures that are now actively promoted to tourists. In all areas where ethnic tourism is a burgeo ning market, the government feel s that resulting economic development will help the process of integration for the shaoshu minzu as they are incorporated into a market economy. Both Guangxi and Xinjiang have seen a huge increase in domestic and inte rnational tourist arrivals and in the revenue collected from this tourism. For example b y the end of 2009, 1.52 million international tourists and 80.80 million domestic tourists visited Xinjiang and spent a total of 71.7 billion RMB (abou t $11.5 billion USD) ( Sun 2011, 1311) exotic culture tends to attract more domestic Han Chinese tourists who are traveling for leisure Walsh and Swain 2004, 59). Over 73 million domestic tourists visited Guangxi in 2006, yet only 1.7 million international tourists visited in the same year (Chio 2009, 127). In 2012, domestic tourists totaled 155 million, a year on year growth of 19.8%, and brought the zizhiqu 118 billion RMB of domestic tourism revenue, up 28% from 2011 (Hong et al.
84 2012). Statistics from both Xinjiang and Guangxi show that domestic tourism is on the rise in China, and changes in CCP policies as wel l as the new market economy have given Han Chinese the means and leisure time to engage in domestic travel. This trend of faster growth in domestic tourism ove r international tourism is in because the ethnic minorities participating in eth n ic tourism are likely more influenced by their exposure to domestic tourists than to international tourists. The Han Chinese tourists represent the successes of the Chinese state this majority group has grown we althy and successful, able to travel the country and spend money with leisure. This display of wealth demonstrates to the shaoshu minzu that if they participate in the market economy and integrate themselves into a national Chinese identity, then they coul d also prosper and attain the same economic status as those coming to view them. This way, the central government is able to promote domesti c tourism and control the number of international tourists visiting the more impoverished interior. Coupled with policies of Han migration, it appears that the CCP is aiming to surround ethnic groups with dense populations of Han Chinese. In some cases, as in Xinjiang, social tensions have arisen as a result. Ethnic tourism is having a positive impact on economic development in Xinjiang and Guangxi and for 5.8% of 1, 1311). However, the wealth from tourism is not being fairly distributed to some participating th the local government and a Guilin based tourism company for a higher cut of profits from entry
85 ticket sales for the village. At first, the Zhuang settled for 150,000 RMB/year in 2001, but this amount increased to 350,000 RMB/year in 2002 after a village protest. In 2007, the villagers fought for a 7% cut of total profits from ticket sales, but were refused (Chio 2009, 136 137). While for the Guilin 001, the villagers felt that the attracting upkeep; that only they knew how to take care of the land; and that the company, local government, and outside entrepreneurs opening businesses in the village were making money through the labor of the villagers who kept the terraces attractive as a worthy ( Chio 2009, 138). Similar stories have aris en from Xinjiang, where Muslim Uighurs had to blockade roads to a village in Tuyoq containing a small Muslim shrine and Buddhist grottoes because none of the profi ts from ticket sales were reaching the Uighur villagers. In the end, the government owned com pany agreed to hand over 2 RMB per ticket (each costing 30 RMB) to the Uighurs (Reuters 2006). While it is hard to say for sure, as concrete data on this subject is difficult to find, some scholars argue that the Uighurs have seen very little of the econom ic prosperity that the West Development Plan and subsequently ethnic tourism have brought to Xinjiang (Moneyhon 2003, 497). In some cases, as in Yangshuo, Guangxi, prosperity from tourism has led to overdevelopment in the city. Those Western tourists who were initially attracted to Yangshuo as a popular backpacking destination now avoid it as mass tourism has replaced the original ambience of former niche tourism with crowding and high prices (Qin et al. 2011, 484). Many
86 minority residents of Yangshuo who se land was expropriated for tourism projects are high living expenses and the virtual absence of other forms of employment (Qin et al. 2011, 483). These zizhiqu alleviation, and rapid development is de finitely being seen in these regions. Rural ethnic tourism is growing more popular in the autonomous regions particularly in Guangxi, and some of the limitations of this form of development are obvious. If entire villages are being devoted to tourism, then the resulting development may lead to a loss of cultural exoticism and authenticity that could drive away tourists seeking to encounter the exoti c From generation to generation, more minority youths are finding work in the cities or have lost interest in tending to the fields as their ancestors once did. With the villages have the potential to end up bankrupt and without other forms of economic livelihood For these reasons, it appears that ethnic tourism acts as a quick fix to issues of ternational pressures have encourag ed the Chinese central government to take action in fighting poverty within its borders and ethnic tourism is one way to produce v ast economic growth in a relatively short period of time Based on statistics from Guangxi and Xinjiang, ethnic tourism has already had a considerable impact on economic growth in both zizhiqu and some progress in poverty alleviation has already been made. In Xinjiang, the state and provincial government ha s invested a total of 11.9 billion RMB of poverty alleviation funds that has solved the problem of adequate food and clothing for 2.57 million poor
87 people and has eased the degree of poverty on farmers and ranchers (Chinese Law and Government 2012, 85) In Shen 2005, 44 ). In Guangxi, the official poverty rate was 3.5% in 2001 and decreased to 2% by 2006 ( Shen 2005, 44; B ureau of H ealth 2006, 1 ). Despite this progress, time can only tell whether this pa th to development will prove to be sustainable Zhuang population Ethnic Tourism and Integration in Xinjiang and Guangxi One aspect of ethnic tourism is its ability to reflect representations of how people see themselves and their heritage. Central government control of tourism allows the CCP to demonstrate its authority, legitimacy, and competence as a ruling body through t ourism and other policies that shape a national identity. The promotion and operation of the Chinese tourism industry allows the use of ethnic representation to further state goals of a collective Chinese nationalism. Regional economic development integrat es minority areas into the Chinese economy, thereby placing the shaoshu minzu under direct state control and allowing the influences of this legitimated majority group (the Han Chinese) to better integrate such regions as Xinjiang and Guangxi into China pr oper. As China has embraced its own form of capitalism via a market economy, the legitimacy of the Communist regime relies on the establishment of a national ident ity and economic progress people. Ethnic tourism, alon g with other economic and social policies, helps to accomplish this goal because the state has control over the representation of ethnic groups through tourism advertisements and encounters. Over time, influences from international and Han Chinese tourists coupled with
88 identity shaped by and based on Han Chinese culture Despite their history of resistance the Uighurs are arguably becoming more integrated into Chinese society. Government policies have revealed that the livelihoods of and employment opportunities for the Uighurs will benefit from compliance with the Chinese state. Aside from separatist displays of violence and strong religious divides with the Han, preferential policies Han migration crackdown on Uighur defiance have largely pacifi ed the Uighurs, at least those living in Chin a will never relinquish its control over Xinjiang, and this realization promotes a path of integration for the Uighurs and other shaoshu minzu The Zhuang in Guangxi have also come to terms with the necessity to integrate further into Chinese society and a cquiesce to central government control, as cooperation seems to be the only way to attain economic, social, and political advancement. This resolve is shown in the willingness of Zhuang groups to establish rural tourism villages despite unfair tourism poli cies. T he consolidation of power the Chinese state has exercised via tourism and other development policies in Xinjiang and Guangxi has led to greater integration of the Uighurs and the Zhuang. After all, the development of a tourism industry calls for and enables the Chinese government to install infrastructure and other construction projects in its peripheral territories. Greater infrastructure means greater access for the central state to its rural peoples and a greater ability to tax and coerce them, keeping them under firmer, more direct control. This argument ties back to James C. Scott demolishing technologi
89 peoples who may be separated by grea 11). Such diversity is visible between the Uighurs and the Zhuang and the majority Han Chinese. Particularly in Xinjiang, the Chinese state needs to e xercise full control of its territory up to the very border regions where Turkic speaking, Muslim neighbors could influence the Uighurs and encourage the use of violence to protest Chinese rule. Policies of Han migration in both Guangxi and Xinjiang offer the CCP an upper hand in areas where ethn ic minorities are the dominant population, and the increased presence of trustworthy Han officials in the workforce and in administrative positions gives the state more control in the zizhiqu where there would other wise be little Development in the name of poverty alleviation gives the state power, and allows society. The resulting economic growth and monetary gain is mostly for developing citi es, companies, and local or regional governments. In the case of the Chinese Communist Party, tourism permits the state to provide infrastructure to stimulate rural economies, advertise tourism, and act as an investment stimulator. D evelopment de politiciz es poverty and makes it into a technical issue, creating a bureaucratic structure that extends the reach of politics into places it has never before reached ( Ferguson 199 0 35 ) For example, the creation of roads is a technical issue, but gives the central state more access to rural peoples. Ethnic tourism, then, is one of the poverty alleviating industries in China controlled by the central government meant to bring economic development to the peripheral regions of the West while also having an impact on a renewed Han cultural identity aimed to include and ultimately integrate the shaoshu minzu regions into the
90 Chinese state. The value of Xinjiang and Guangxi as regions for potential poverty alleviation via tourism has encouraged the Chinese state to gain fuller access to these more remote regions and integrate them into the Chinese state and the national, now market based, economy. The purpose of creating a market for tourism and stimulating the growth of consumeri sm in these peripheral regions is that they will then develop and align themselves with the Chinese state and follow the path to moderniza tion that the eastern coastal regions and the Han Chinese have already taken. Ethnic Tourism and Identity in Xinjiang and Guangxi Ethnic tourism repres ents ethnic iden tity in Xinjiang and Guangxi in similar ways. Both regions have song and dance troupes that put culture on display through traditional performances. These dances share Uighur and Zhuang culture with tourists, although this show of ethnicity is not always authentic. Many times, Chinese and Japanese songs are added to the list of performances given by Uighur and Zhuang troupes who must appeal to their Japanese and Chinese clientele. In Guangxi, some of the choreographed performances of Zhuang song and dance groups have been taught to them by a Guilin based tourism company. In Xinjiang, most of the tourist sites around the region are labeled in Mandarin Chinese, and very few tour guides explaining Uighur culture to visiting tourists are actually part of that ethnic group. Tour guides are used as cultural brokers between the Uighurs on display and the international and domestic tourists. This carefully controlled exchange appears to be a tactic intended to prevent tourists and Uighurs from interac ting on a deeper level, or when the eyes of the state are not around to monitor the situation.
91 In rural tourism villages in Guangxi, the experience is slightly different because tourists can stay in local guesthouses, sharing in the cultural performances and experiences that the Zhuang are marketing to them. This option of a home stay presents a more authentic Zhuang lifestyle to the visitor, yet this perspective is also a marketing tool that has entirely transformed and adapted rural villages to selling tourism. The tourism livelihoods of the residents 556 557). More prevalent in Xinjiang than in Guangxi is t he handicrafts industry, which allows the Uighurs to sell their culture as a commodity to tourists, while also meeting the demands of regional tourist gift shops and hotels. Over time, however, as these handicrafts are adapted t o tourism, it is likely that some traditional aspects of these crafts may be lost, especially as younger generations enter into the tourism industry solely to improve their economic livelihoods an issue that exists also in Guangxi A s the younger generations of Zhuang, via the gove opportunity to migrate to the cities for work or achieve a higher education away from home, they return to the countryside lacking a desire to work in the fields or embrace the traditional aspect s of their cult ure. While newly found insight and skills can contribute to improving tourism in their native villages, the loss of traditional culture is still occurring. Much of ruling Han Chinese thought on e thnic minorities views them as s lacking a path to s ocialism and modernization. This idea has remained prevalent throughout history both Scott and Xie refer to the Chinese system of labeling the shaoshu minzu out side of the boundary of state co ntrol and separated by harsh topography,
92 with Han culture and society ( Scott 2006, 120; Xie 2011, 102 103). Particularly during the Cultural Revolution, the religious and cultural ways of minority groups, including the Uighurs and Zhuang, were forcefully stifled and attempts were made to acculturate ethnic differences into a homogenized national identity b s ng Xiaoping used preferential policies to placate minorities whose traditions and cultures had been and they fueled strong separatist desires among some Uighurs. As the CCP now focuses on national and regional economic development, ethnic tourism has become a means to eradicate shaoshu minzu backwardness in the zizhiqu and other minority areas while also preserving certain aspects of ethnic culture that attract a tourism market. Li other, with experiences and adventures that often take place in the realm of the primitive 495). Ethnic tourism modifies many of the qualities traditionally associated with regions and people through identity recreation brought about by rapid commercial development and cultural adaptations induced by the interactions of visitors the Han and in ternational tourists and hosts the minority groups (Yang 2011, 582). The prevailing notion of ethnic minorities as inferior to the Han Chinese no doubt pressures the younger generations to integrate into the modernizing Han Chinese state. The governmen t has control over the tourism industry and, therefore, constructs the tourism brochures that are advertised domestically and abroad. The way in which the government controls this industry reinforces an exotic and technologically inferior image of the shao shu minzu
93 In Xinjiang, a history of separatist desires and a strong Muslim identity may result in the preservation of Uighur culture. Here, and also in Guangxi, the unequal distribution of tourism profits could result in the preservation of ethnic culture, as this s tructure reinforces social inequalities and projections of the shaoshu minzu as inferior to the majority Han Chinese. Han migration in Xinjiang fuels resentment between this group and Uighurs. The Han Chinese receive administrative positions in an autonomo us region designated for the Uighurs and other minorities and, coupled with unfair employment opportunities, this preference clearly demarcates that the wealthier Han are better trusted and supported by the central government. The resulting social tension s indicate that the Uighurs still share in a collective identity that may help preserve their culture despite development policies in the zizhiqu encouraging their acculturation In Guangxi, the lack of a standardized identity for the Zhuang might make t heir integration into a Han Chinese national identity an easier process compared to the Uighurs The younger generations influenced by increasing development and exposure to tourists with leisure time and money, are encouraged to learn Mandarin Chinese and adapt to a modernizing Chinese state for the sake of future education and employment opportunities. While ethnic tourism requires the preservation of some aspects of Zhuang culture, it is already evident that t he loss of traditional practices for example, in agriculture, hygiene, and language is occurring. As more Zhuang villages are transformed into rural t ourism theme parks, this group will have no choice but to further engage in the market economy. With t he loss of agriculture in favor of consumer based industries, this (and other) shaoshu minzu will have no choice but to align themselves
94 with a Chinese state that, as a result of tourism, now has greater infrastructure and access to minorities living in th Conclusion Tourism is a quick fix to poverty alleviation in China, although it cannot be used as a sustainable method of development. While ethnographic work is required to truly assess the impacts ethnic tourism is havin on the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region and the Guangx i Zhuang Autonomous Region provide insight into the positive and negative aspects of the growing tourism Some e con omic growth and development have been achieved, and the future generations of Uighur and Zhuang appear to be aligning themselves with the modernizing (Han) Chinese state. The influences of economic development and integration policies have mixed effects on ethnic minority identity aspects of traditional culture and practices ar e maintained but others are fading in response to the specific demands of the ethnic tourism market. Some scholars argue that this path to development via tourism will result in an ethnic revitalization of minority culture (Moneyhon 2003, 518 ), while others contend that ethnic identity is being lost and replaced with one based on Han Chinese culture. I conclude that ethnic tourism is leading to the loss and integration of ethnic c ulture, but the possibility of a cultural reawakening for the Uighurs and Zhuang is still present most likely as a reaction to Han domination Compared to its other industries, ethnic tourism in China is still a fledgling market one that has both the abi lity to alleviate poverty and the potential to pose many social and economic problems for the Chinese government in the
95 future. In the words of a popular tourism slogan food or burn your house down
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