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DEUS EX MACHINA: THIRD PARTY STATE BUILDING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA BY R OSALIA MAIER KATKIN A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Art s Under the sponsorship of Barbara Hicks Sar asota, Florida April, 2013
! "" Table of Contents Table of Contents.ii Maps, Tables, Figures.iii List of Abbreviations..iv Abstractv Introduction .. 1 Chapter 1 The Burden of Western Democracy 8 Third Party State Building ...................................................... ............................. 9 Democratization in Multi Ethnic Societies 11 Consociationalist T heory ... 14 The Role of the OHR as the European Raj 17 Conclusion 19 Chapter 2 A Brief History of Bosnia and Herzegovina 21 Pre War Yugoslavia ... 22 Bosnia and Herzegovina during the War ... 24 The Dayton Peace Agreement ..29 Chapter 3 International Involvement in the Governm ent of Bosnia and Herzegovina..31 The Dayton Accords..32 Structure of the Bos nian and Herzegovinian Government35 The Role of t he OHR in Bosnian Politics..40 1977 Bonn Powers .42 Intervention from the OHR47 Pathologies in the OHR's Wake and Nationalist Culture ..54 The Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.56 Conclusi on.62 Cha pter 4 Conclusion.63 Bibliography .72
! """ Maps Map 1 .1 : Bosnia's Prewar Diversity and Postwar Di vision ... .4 Map 2.1: Ethnic Structure Before the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991 ... 28 Map 2.2: Ethnic Structure After the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998 ... ..28 Tables Table 2.1: The 1991 Yugoslav Census Results .26 Table 3.1: Type and Number of Decision made by the OHR ... .46 Figures Figure 3.1: Political Structure of Bosnia & Herzegovina under the Dayton Regime .. ..37 Figure 3.2: OHR Number of Decisions by Year 4 5
! "# List of Abbreviations AVNO J Antifa isti ko Vije # e Narodnog Oslobo $ enja Jugoslavije Anti Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia BiH Bosna i Herc egovina Bosnia and Herzegovina BSC Bosnian Serbo Croatian EU European Union FBiH Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine The Feder ation of Bosnia and Herzegovina HR High Representative H DZ Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Croatian Democratic Union ICJ International Court of Justice ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IMO International Monitoring Organiza tion JNA Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija Yugoslav People's Army NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OHR Office of the High Representative OSCE Office of Security in Central Europe PIC Peace Implementation Council RS Republika Srpska SAA Stabilizati on and Association Agreement SDA Stranka demokratske akcije Party of Democatic Action SDP Socijaldemokratska partija Social Democratic Party SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka Serbian Democratic Party SFYR Socijalisti ka federativna republika Jugoslavija Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia SNSD Savez nezavisnih socialdemokrata Independent Social Democrats
! DEUS EX MACHINA: THIRD PARTY STATE BUILDING IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Rosalia Maier Katkin New College of Florida, 2013 ABSTRACT It ha s been over seventeen years since the conclusion of the Bosnian War in 1995. The war left the country torn among three ethnicities: Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb. The Dayton Accords that ended the war installed a consociational government, estab lishing a system of executive power sharing and minority vetoes, as well as an international overseer to ensure a safe transition to democracy. In 1997, the High Representative was given the powers not only to oversee but to single handedly implement legis lation to help the local politicians during times of deadlock. Due to the veto points built into the political structure and the high levels of intervention, a series of pathologies arose, namely, a dependence on the Office of the High Representative that has led to local politicians avoiding hard decisions and transformational compromises that would help to establish a self suff icient democracy. The level of intervention and the structure of the government following the Dayton Accords ha ve also rei nforced ethnicity and ethnic identity as the main organizing mechanism for political life Before the country is able to progress, and receive EU or NATO membership, it must lose its protectorate status. The international community needs to fully exit, and the con stitution
! "# needs to be heavily revised or rewritten to reduce the allocation of political power by ethnic group. Barbara Hicks Social Sciences
! Introduction The war ended in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1995, nearly twenty years ago, and yet BiH is still experiencing issues seen primarily in post conflict nations, such as political and economic stagnation, low social capital, high unemployment, and high emigration rates. Unlike BiH, its neighbors to the east and west are rapidly improving; Croatia is due to join the EU in June 2013 and is already a member of NATO. Serbi a is now an official candidate for membership in the EU. BiH, however, has not been able to reach the steps required to submit the EU membership application and is in a similar situation with NATO membership, despite constant encouragement, aid, and incent ives from the EU. This study will investigate how the role of the international community has affected BiH national politics and whether the international community is hurting the fragile intern al legitimacy of the BiH's post war government, preventing BiH from moving out of a post conflict system. BiH was torn apart by the brutal Bosnian War, starting in 1992 and ending in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accords. The Wars of Yugoslav Se cession began in 1991 when Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia shortly followed by Croatia. BiH came to the decision in 1992 that it would also be in its best interest to pass a referendum for secession. Unfortunately, BiH was the most heterogeneous state within Yugoslavia (as can be seen in Table 2.1), and the motion toward independ ence was controversial not only within the country but also among its neighbors Croatia and Serbia. Reports of violence from the war in Bosnia have been described as the worst Europe has seen since the Second World War with over 50% of the prewar populati on of Bosniaks, 35% of
! # Bosnian Serbs, and 10% of Bosnian Croat s dead or missing after the war (Bieber 2006, 29). There were many unsuccessful attempts to end the war, until finally the United States stepped in and, with the help of NATO, took a more aggres sive stance for creating peace than had previously been seen. The war ended in 1995 in Paris with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords effectively setting up the basis for a loosely federalized consociational constitution in BiH. The international com munity played a vital role in ending the conflict and establishing a government where there had essentially been none during the wartime period. Without the international community's intervention the w ar could have gon e on until one party's exodus from th e region. The w ar had exacerbated ethnic tensions to an extent where cohabitation of the warring ethnicities seemed to be an almost impossible feat. The international community settled on a two part strategy of rehabilitation. The first was to establish a consociational government which would establish an extensive system of checks and balances and ethnic quotas to assure that no one ethnicity could ignore or overlook the vital interests of the other primary ethnicities in BiH. The second was to establish a series of international institutions to teach local leaders how to transition into a democratic system and reestablish the government. The Dayton Accords suc cessfully ended the w ar that many other peace treaties could not. As a short term plan the Dayto n Accords proved to be the most effective in helping to rehabilitate and advance BiH; however in the long run maintaining the consociational system with heavy international tutelage created opportunities for certain pathologies to develop, hurting BiH's c hances for becom ing a country that can function without heavily relying on the support of the international community.
! $ The current constitution of BiH has many flaws that have stagnated the government politically and economically The initial problem is t hat the international community wrote the constitution with very little representation of BiH, and the writing and sig ning of the BiH constitution took place under a great time constraint. The constitution is in fact a peace treaty, the fourth annex of th e Dayton Accords, signed by many nations and one Bosniak (the wartime president of BiH, Alija Izetbegovi ) in order to end the greater Yugoslav Wars. Because the constitution of BiH was part of a general peace treaty it did not reflect a vision shared within the state and among the warring ethnicities in BiH. Benomar says that to create a constitution in such conditions does not bode well for its long term implementation (2004, 88). Reconciliation has also been slow and limited in BiH, and the primary institution for justice in the Balka ns has been the In ternational Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which has been slow to generate positive outcomes. A Truth a nd Reconciliation Commission instated in Serbia to deal with the crimes of the Yugoslav Wars was poorly received within the country and has yet to be retried in the region. The constitution of BiH established two federalized states, called entities (see map 1 .1 ). One entity is the Republika Srpska, dominated by Bosnian Serbs. The Republika Srpska was declared an e ntity, and governed, by the now designated war criminal Radovan Karadzi The other entity is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprised mo stly of the Bosniak and Bosnian Croat populations in BiH The international authorities in the peace process allowed for two entities to exist in BiH in the hopes that eve ntually they would one day reunite (Manning and Anti 2003, 49). Unfortunately, very little integration has occurred between the two entities, and
! % Republika Srpska has threatened s ecession on multiple occasions The Federatio n is separated into ten canton s with each canton main taining its own constitution and headed by either a Croat minister and a Muslim deputy, or vice versa, creating ethnic power sharing from the local level all the way to the federal presidency (Manning and Anti 2003, 50). m The executive branch of the central government is headed by a triumvirate, comprised of three presidents, elected every four years. Each president represents one of the primary ethnicities that were engaged in the Bosnian War: Bosniak, Serb, and Croat. Map 1.1: Bosnia's Prewar Diversity and Postwar Division Reproduced from Bose 2007, 108
! & The central government of BiH is in charge of foreign and customs policy, foreign economic relations, finance, and commerce. However, in reality the central government of BiH "does little and controls little" (Manning and Anti 2003, 50). In many ways "the two ent ities within [BiH enjoy] the pr erogatives of a state to the extent of possessing separate administrations, distinct citizenship (as well as common citizenship), their own armies, and the right to form special parallel relationships with neighbor states" (Caplan 2004, 56). T he entities are much stronger governmental forces tha n the central government of BiH. The high amount of autonomy that each of the e ntities e njoys combined with the relative inefficienc y and lack of authority of the central government has created a need for certain international authority figures to oversee every day politics. The international community oversees the divided government and en sures adherence to the Dayton Accords, protecting against persistent nationalism or deadlock within the legislative system. These international overseers are the Office of the High Representative (OHR), "charged with overseeing implementation of the Dayton agreement and possessed of final authority in theater' regarding its interpretation;" the Office of Security and Co operation in Europe (OSCE), "responsible for managing elections in the country;" and the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), "whose member s meet annually to discuss progress in the implementation of Dayton and to tweak the arrangements for international oversight and intervention;" as well as three out of the nine constitutional judges, who are selected by the European Court of Human Rights in order to break ties and gridlock (Manning and Anti 2003, 47) In practice, the international authorities have kept a tight rein on Bosnian political processes, and have on many occasions altered and shaped
! ele ctoral and political outcomes. Legislative g ridlock is a frequent occurrence, because of th e constant need for consensus based decision making The position of the OHR is to ensure that during these instances of gridlock vital issues to BiH are passed through. The initial role of the OHR, as established in the Dayton Accords was merely to overse e and guide, but in 1997, the OHR and PIC became frustrated at how ineffective passively guiding the country was, and the OHR's powers were extended from passive guidance to active implementation. From 1997 to 2006 the number of decisions made per year by the OHR increased exponentially. These decisio ns included dismissing publicl y elected officials, restructuring the economy, and creating a flag, a national anthem, and a currency, among othe rs. In this time period the High Representative s were criticized as being imperialistic and were condemned as hypocritical figures who installed democracy in a foreign country through undemocratic methods. Due to the great deal of criticism, in 2006 2007 the next High Representative took a very different approach: he de cided to take a passive stance and allow the BiH politicians to guide themselves into the EU and NATO. However, due to a series of unfortunate events between 2006 and 2007 (explained in greater detail in chapter 3) nationalistic tensions rose to a new hig h and the country seemed on the brink of a schism. As the new High Representative took a more passive stance on assisting BiH, the levels of nationalism increased. The rise in nationalism indicated to all observers that, although the High Representative fo rcing BiH into democracy was largely unsuccessful in promoting good long term democr atic behavior, it was unclear whether the BiH politicians could control the country without international assistance. They had become too reliant on the authoritative posit ion of the OHR to govern and surmount division
! ( It is possible that had the OHR maintained a passive role in BiH politics, that the BiH politicians would still be unable to overcome their divisions to run the government cooperat ively. Clearly, without the aid and support of the international community, the implementation of the Dayton Accords and the role of the OHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina would have been the site of greater war atrocities and larger death counts and possibly the conflict could have led t o the extinction or expulsion of one of the three BiH ethnicities. Although the long term results of intervention in BiH have not proven to be too favorable, it cannot be denied that without the international community the current situation could be much w orse. This stud y will investigate the role the international community has had in Bosnian national politics since 1995, focusing on the effect the OHR and the Dayton Accords continue to have over how politicians and citizens of BiH interact. This study wil l also investigate the seven High Representatives who have worked in the OHR guiding BiH's progress forward and the roles they have individually played in shaping BiH's possibilities for a self sufficient future. This i nvestigation will ask: Were pathologi es created during the 1997 2006 period by the combination of the OHR and the highly consociational institutions of the state ? If so, is it possible to reverse those pathologies and create good democratic tendencies? How can this be done? And is it appropr iate for international community to do so?
! ) Chapter 1 The Burden of Western Democracy Political scientists have noted over time the movement towards a more moral perspective on the process of peace building in conflict ridden countries. After the Dayt on Accords, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was not immediately ready to establish a majoritarian democracy such as its neighbors Serbia and Croatia; instead a consociational system of power sharing was established to ensure that all primary ethnicities could have a strong voice in national politics. An international overseer, the office of the High Representative (OHR), was also created to guide the governmental process when the local politicians were unable to work within the often convoluted process of the B iH government as dictated by its consociational form, in order to enact legislation. "To any outsider who naively stumbles across [the political system of BiH], such political arrangements bear an uncanny resemblance to a form of governance that has long gone out of fashion namely, that of an imperial power over its colonial possessions" (Knaus and Martin 2003, 61 62). Hayden (2005) makes the argument that the OHR holds a strange position in the process of democratization in BiH, where the OHR is the figur e who installs democracy but who has in fact no direct relation or r esponsibility to the people whom the OHR governs. Caplan concedes that, "long term international engagement of some kind may be necessary to promote the development of liberal democracy in Bosnia" but that the OHR should find a way to be more accountable to the people of BiH (2004, 59).
! Third Party State Building Caplan describes state building as the "effort to reconstruct, or in some cases to establish for the first time, an effective i ndigenous government in a state or territory where no such capacity exists or where the capacity eroded" (2004, 53). Third party state building differs, however, in comparison to indigenous state building and is a relatively recent occurrence in internatio nal relations. "Today third party state building is undertaken  in response to weak or so called failed states and, more recently, as part of the international administration of war torn or strife ridden territories" (Caplan 2004, 53). Classic examples of third party state building in the modern world are Germany and Japan after World War II or even the British Empire in India. Today, third party state building has been used more frequently in post conflict countries that are considered unable to establi sh peace or democracy on their own, such as BiH and Iraq. Third party state building is a new form of liberal imperialism, the idea that one foreign body can completely take over a country and overhaul the previous system of government, whether in crisis o r not, in the name of democracy. The UN Secretary General noted in 1996, that "democratization is predominantly a new area for the UN, nevertheless it is already seen as a key component of peace building addressing the economic, social, cultural, humanita rian, and political roots of conflict" indicating that in the post Cold War world, democratization and peace building were slowly becoming synonymous terminology (Chandler 1999, 1). Daniel Rieff notes that conflict resolution and international peacekeeping since the end of the Cold War have been "undertaken more in the name of human rights and moral obligation than out
! "+ of any traditional conception of national interest" (1999, 1). The Western world has moved into a new phase of peace building, one that is b uilt from largely Christian missionary and imperialistic habits, a peace building, which is no longer primarily aid based but occurs through installing a democratic system of government as a means of ending a conflict (Rieff 1999, 3). Caplan states that t hird parties have become active in governance, which was historically thought to be exclusively a matter of domestic jurisdiction, "as part of complex' peace keeping or peace building arrangements that have granted the UN and its representatives intrusive powers, ranging from human rights monitoring and the super vision of election s to the demobilization of armed forces and the reorganization of police forces" (2004, 54). Caplan, however, comes to the conclusion that it is preferable for these third party a ctors to "possess the power to exercise full executive authority," because without such authority international officials tend to be frustrated in their efforts to achieve their democratic aims when confronted with the opposition of national actors whose s trategic goals differ greatly from that of the international community, as i s the case in BiH ( 63). However, for a country to truly be a democracy it must have the support of the people, and cannot rely solely on the benignity of a foreign dictator; "inter national administrations need to be more accountable to the local populations on whose behalf these institutions have been established" ( 63). Ramet describes two different schools of thought in terms of third party state building: Kemalist and Weimarists. Kemelism, steming from Kemel Ataturk, believes that "the successful construction of a democratic system requires that there already be some progress toward the development of a liberal political culture before locals are
! "" allowed to run their own system" ( 2006, 471). Kemelists believe in prioritizing reconciliation and the education of tolerance over democratic elections and supporting the international community's involvement in BiH because these policies are able to help the country accomplish what the l ocal politicians are unable to accomplish on their own. The other school, Weimarism, states that the "only sensible strategy to build democracy is to push ahead with elections as quickly as possible and allow locals to build democracy their own way" ( 472). Weimarists argue the OHR is offering fake democracy at best to t he Bosnian people, and that only when t he international community has exited can BiH democratize. Ramet states that these two different schools are both idealist in nature, and "the actual pr actice need not stick strictly to either one" (473). Ramet argues against the Weimar perspective for BiH. Although Weimarists argue for democratic elect ions as quickly as possible, there were so many problems with the democratic process in BiH directly aft er the war such as "widespread fraud in voter registration, ballot counting irregularities, control by local ruling party of the media and security a pparatus" t hat turning over the government to local officials immediately after the end of the conflict ha d little chance of positive results (2006, 491). Democratization in Multi Ethnic Societies Looking at events such as the outbreak of the war in Yugoslavia, i t is easy to come to the conclusion that authoritarian regimes are better at controlling multi e thnic societies and that the world needs "strong man" popul ist leaders such as Tito or Stalin to keep the cauldrons of multi ethnic societies under control. It could be argue d that the current system of international intervention in BiH supports the fact t hat multi ethnic
! "# regimes need a strong benevolent authoritarian figure to guide the country. Bell (2004) proposes that "less democratic states" su ch as China and Singapore have much better contr ol over the ir multi ethnic countries and are more conscientiou s about minority rights than other possible democratic multi ethnic states. He argues that because authoritarians keep control of the electoral competition that the minorities have no ability to rise up and gain political power through nationalism, natio nalistic symbols and institutions. Furthermore "minorities are numerically handicapped in parlaying  electoral success into political clout thus limiting the chances of ethnicities causing trouble for any regime, democratic or authoritarian ( Leff 19 99, 216). Even so, Bell fears if multi ethnic countries begin the tr ansition to democracy, then leaders will be inclined to use nat ionalism to help win favor with their ethnic group s thus causing ethnic tension within the state a reoccurring problem in Bi H, that even the large amount of international aid cannot suppress. One could argue that this was also a problem in the f ormer Yugoslavia Yugoslav politicians were too inclined to resort to nat ionalist symbols to try to consolidate their ethnic base s of s upport in order to accumulate more political clout after Tito's death. In the times of Tito, nationalistic displays in politics were quickly shut down, but after his death the combination of economic crisis, partial political liberalizations and the incent ive structures of the semi autonomous system he left behind led certain leaders to bring these symbols back into use contributing to the incitement of ethnic conflict and genocide. The argument that authoritarian regimes can manage multi ethnic countries better than democratic ones has its flaws. Above all, a large number of successful multi ethnic democracies exist today such as the United States, Great Britain, and other examples
! "$ M oreover, the number of multi ethnic democratic countries is constantly gr owing with the rise of globalism. The main problem with the argument for authoritarian control over multi ethnic countries is that authoritarian regimes do not always take care of their ethnic minorities and can do more harm than good. Henders emphasizes t hat it is not necessarily a question of which type of regime is democratizing but "under what conditions authoritarian, democratizing, or democratic regimes are associated with ethicized conflict and exclusive hierarchical ethnic identities (2004, 5). Bow en (1996) agrees that it is not a matter of how the government operates or the number of ethnicities within the nation but outside pressures, which make ethnic conflicts even possible. Linz and Stepan suggest that to create and consolidate a democracy in a multi ethnic state one has to "grant inclusive and equal citizenship and to create "a common political roof' of state protected rights for inclusive and equal citizenship (1996, 33, 35). T he leadership must be ready to properly recognize all of the citi zens and give them rights to their religion, culture and language. In between the authoritarian rule and democratic rule of multi ethnic societies is BiH. The country has taken on a consociational federation as a means for installing and sustaining a demo cracy, but at the same time has given unrestricted power, which at times resembles a dictatorial system of government, to the internationally commissioned arbiter in BiH, the OHR. By combining these two governmental systems into one, local and internationa l actors have been able to end the war in Bosnia and begin to restructure an economic and governmental system. However, this same combination of governmental systems that has brought the country together has also been divisive in its
! "% continued inability to be self sufficient and independent from international assistance and counsel. Consociationalist Theory At the end of the Bosnian War in 1995, the clear choice for the government of BiH was consociationalism, blatantly ignoring the fact that Yugoslavia's final governmental system was also a system of consociational power sharing that clearly failed to keep Yugoslavia together as a country. "Suggestions for constitutional solutions [for deeply divided societies] are strangely uniform: loose federations of e thnically defined mini states, with minimal central authority that must act by consensus and thus cannot act at all on issues that are contested rather than consented" (Hayden 2005, 226). Lijphart (1968) was the first to coin the phrase consociationalism w hen referring to a governmental system of power sharing. Consociationalism is a system of government installed in heterogeneous states that are on the brink of conflict or as a mechanism to end conflict. In BiH consociationalism was used to end the war and ensure that all of the primary ethnicities in the war would be represented and on equal footing allowing no one to abuse the government to oppress the other. Lijphart fears that installing a majoritarian democracy in divided societies can be unfair and u nworkable and will result in the repression of minorities. He writes that partition is another possibility, although it is inevitable that no par titioning can be perfect and will result in pockets of minorities remaining disenfranchised, or worse represse d. The Republika Srpska for instance has been vying for independence from BiH since its creation in the Dayton Accords, but this move would be unwise. Although the Republika Srpska contains a clear Bosnian Serb
! "& m ajority, a distinct population of non Serbs still lives there and would become a discontented and unrepresent ed minority within an independent Republika Srpska. For the protection of minorities, Lijphart argues that in heterogeneous post conflict states consociationalism is the best way to form a st able government and allev iate or prevent ethnic conflict, as opposed to creating new tensions. Lijphart outlines four basic elements for creating a successful consociational government: executive power sharing, a high degree of internal autonomy, proportio nal representation, and a minority veto (2004, 107) The first element of consociationalism is executive power sharing or the division of the executive powers in a federal government amongst the significant ethnic or religious groups within a nation. In Bi H power sharing pervades all levels of government from the central government to the entity level and down into the cantonal level. Power sharing among Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs within Bosnia is an important element to make sure that all groups are being represented in all levels of government and at no point repressed. The second aspect of consociationalism is to ensure a high degree of internal autonomy for all ethnic groups. This means that "these groups have authority to run their own internal affairs especially in the areas of education and culture" (Lijphart 2004, 97) In BiH the two entities (the Croat Bosniak Federation of BiH and the Serbian Republika Srpsk a) are both granted a degree of internal autonomy as are each of the twelve cantons in the Federation. Lijphart maintains that all issues of common interests should be decided jointly and issues that concern only the individual groups should be dealt wit h by those respective groups (1985, 7) Third, Lijphart emphasizes the importance of proporti onal representation and proportionality in the allocation of civil service positions and public funds stating that proportionality
! "' eliminates the sharp distinction between winners and losers evident in a majoritarian democracy (1985, 8) Proportional repr esentation is a vital element of BiH's central government. Up until 2002, however, it was not stressed within the entity and cantonal levels, where positions were exclusively held by those who held the majorities in the region in the Republika Srpska gover nmental positions were held almost exclusively by Bosnian Serbs and in the Federation most positions were held by either Bosniaks or Bosnian Croats. In 2002 an amendment was passed with some pressure from the OHR to the entity constitutions "introducing pr oportional representation as a general principle for the public administration" (Bieber 2006, 45). Lijph art emphasizes the importance of his final condition of a proper consociational government : a minority veto on vital issues. H e refers to the veto as "t he ultimate weapon that minorities need to protect their interests" (1985, 8) Although this is a clear method of preventing tyranny by the majority it is very rarely manifested in current consociat i onal governments more often supermajorities are used as opposed to a minority veto in order to have the veto present without there being an explicit condition In BiH there is a mutual veto: "at the state level, in entities, and most cantons, each community has the right to veto decisions by parliament that may negatively affect the community  additionally, a majority of one of the three peoples can also veto le gi slation" (Bieber 2006, 44 45). However, veto capability by one ethnic group can only be in relation to vital issues. The representation and veto cap abilities in BiH encompass all major ethnic groups, but have essentially disregarded the minorities living in BiH who do not label themselves one of th e three major ethnic groups (see the Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina case, reviewed in chapter 3). Lijphart warns of the danger of the minority or mutual veto poi nti ng out
! "( that using it too frequent ly could paralyze t he government, an issue that is not uncommon in BiH (1985, 8). Executive power sharing and government represen tation based on each e thnicity's respective proportion of the population ensure a fair and diverse government, while a degree of autonomy for each ethnic group and veto power for the minority segments of society prevent one ethnic majority from controlling the government and li miting the participation of others. The Role of the OHR as the European Raj In BiH the process of third party state building has existed within the national government since the state's conception. The role of the OHR is to act as the overseer of democra cy and international norms in BiH. Knaus and Martin note the paradoxical nature of the government of BiH: since the end of fighting, "and despite possibly the largest amount of democratization assistance per capita ever spent in one country, the internatio nal mission in BiH has arrived at [the conclusion] that what Bosnia and Herzegovina needs is not democratic domestic politics, but government by international experts" (2003, 61). They compare the role of the OHR in BiH to the British Raj in India during t he Victorian era, calling the OHR the European Raj (Knaus and Martin 2003, 70). The term British Raj refers to the direct rule of India by the English government from 1858 to 1947. In 1857 after the rebellions against the ill treatment of the natives by th e British East India Trading Company had swept through India, the rule of India was passed from the Trading Company to the crown under Queen Victoria. The British Raj was seen as a compromise between independence and the rule of the British East India
! ") Trad ing Company. The British felt that the Indians were not prepared to rule a country on their own and the British Raj was set up to aid the Indians in the governmental process. The Raj ruled over all of the political, social, and economic aspects of life in India at that time. The British Raj and the OHR draw their similarities from their duties as internationally appointed authorities acting as the strongest governmental force in a foreign nation, owing no accountability to the people except for their own g ood will and feeling of duty to bring about a western system of governance. It can be argued that the O HR and the British Raj have accomplished many things for the good of their countries, including a ccomplishments that the local governments might not have been able to achieve or to achieve as efficiently as the external agents of democracy. The similarities between the British Raj and the European Raj become clearer when Knaus and Martin (2003) indicate tha t neither had to give explanation s or submit thei r decision making to a legislative audience. Both have had free reign to dismiss officials as they pleased with no sense of checks and balances. In 2002 the OHR dismissed over 100 individuals, including some democratically elected officials, which bears re sem blance to when the British Raj deposed the Rajah of Benares without having to give any trial or explanation for the Raj's deposition (Knaus and Martin 2003, 66). There is, however, a large difference between the role of the High Representative and the British Raj. The British Raj was unilaterally instated in India by the United Kingdom, which gained economically from its colony. Whereas the OHR was set up by a multilateral treaty, which does not reap any economic gain from BiH. Despite this difference t he OHR has reinforced dependency on an external hand in ruling the country. T he Bosnian politicians have started using the OHR to their advantage. "With respect to
! "* politically unpopular decisions, the local parties have sometimes found it prefer able to lea ve it to the High R epresentative simply to impose these measures rather than legislate for themselves, creating what Wolfgang Petritsch called a dependency syndrome" (Caplan 2004, 59). The international community would prefer those decisions to be made int ernally, the internal parties that cleverly decided to delegate them to the external powers that do not rely on the popularity of the BiH people to keep them in power. This strategy allows local parties to behave, "despite being in government, as if they a re in the opposition and defend their ethnonationalist goals without the need to compromise" (Caplan 2004, 59). Conclusion In BiH outsiders play a large role in national politics, and although the intention of the international community has always been t o slowly lessen its involvement over time, however, from 1997 2006 each OHR made more decisions (dismissals, laws, amendments) than the last, thus increasing the amount of intervention. Installing an international player within the executive but without an y system of national checks and balances begs the question: is it really better for the international community to solve BiH's problems unilaterally creating various pathologies within the system (such as the politicians relying on the OHR to make the unp opular decisions), or is it better to show the Bosnians the way to democracy through advice and guidance, allowing them to either reach democracy or come to their own conclusion as to what works best. BiH has come to a crucial point especially wit h the upc oming 2013 census because the constitution is no longer beneficia l to the country and is in fact hindering BiH's further progress. A
! #+ possible solution would be for the OHR to rewrite the constitution with current political leaders from each party. The best possible solution would be to write a new constitution that would effectively make the position of the OHR void as well as revise the consociational aspects of the governmental structure to make the central government more effective and the role of the O HR less vital, and finally eliminating any ethnic writing within the constitution a solution that is seemingly impossible with the current state of affairs. F or now it seems that the role of the OHR is indispensable and there appears to be broad recogniti on among Bosnians that the quality of local political leadership is inadequate and that a Deus ex machin a is required, for now at least, to bring Bosnia into Europe" (Caplan 2004, 60).
! #" Chapter 2 A Brief History of Bosnia and Herzegovina I n the medieva l age, the region now known as Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was conquered by the Ottomans. "The Ottomans were  not interested in cultural or religious homogeneity, which accounts for the continued diversity of those parts of the Balkans that they ruled" (Gagnon 2004, 16). The Ottoman Empire did not have traditional western nation state borders and did not enforce a single standardized religion. Instead a religion would refer to its millet as opposed to any centralized governmental organization. Given th e power of the European states, including their hegemony over questions of international recognition of independence and sovereignty, elites who wished to lay claim to a state on the territory or either empire had to frame the claim in western European ter ms of a territorialized ethnic/linguistic nation, despite the fact that no territory in the region conformed to that demand (Gagnon 2004, 17) Currently, the three primary ethnicities in BiH Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Croat s all speak essentiall y the same language which has diplomatically been called BSC (Bosnian Serbo Croatian). The primary way to differentiate the three is based on religion. Due to the Ottoman occupation of Bosnia, the Bosniaks are Muslim; because of the Austro Hungarian influe nce on Croatia the Bosnian Croat s are Catholic; and the Bosnian Serbs are Eastern Orthodox. There are, however, very small pockets of populations where religious, ethnic, and linguistic identities do not break down along these standard lines.
! ## Pre War Yug oslavia In 1943 in the midst of the Second World War, the communist Partisans founded the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in Jajce, BiH. During World War II, Yugoslavia was invaded by the axis powers a combination of Italy, Hungary and Nazi Germany The Nazis worked with the Croatian fascists, the Usta a, to encamp Serbs, Jews and Roma for the goal of creating an ethnically cleansed Greater Croatia. The historical link between the Croats and Germans would later exacerbate the beginning conf lict of the Wars of Yugoslav Secession when Germany was the first of the European nations to recognize Croatian independence, creating an exaggerated fear among the Serbs of the creation of a Fourth German Reich. The Usta a were defeated in 1943 by the Ant i Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). The Communist Partisans had been headed since 1936 by Josip Broz, called Tito, a Croat Slovene. Tito and the partisans carried the slogan "Brotherhood and Unity," which helped to make the Part isans the most desirable party to control a unified Yugoslavia because they represented, not only in their slogan but also in th e ethnic makeup of their members all of the prima ry Yugoslav ethnicities (Rusinow 1977, 2). Marhsal Tito decided to create a "f ederal State, one which would recognize the autonomy as well as the brotherhood and unity of the South Slavs, now defined as constituting five distinct nations" (Rusinow 1977, 2) Yugoslavia became one of the few countries in the world that could boast a s uccessful communist revolution. Once the Yugoslav government was put in place, Tito and his leading groups quickly tried to interpret the writings of Marx and Lenin to understand how to properly run a communist nation. In attempting to stay true to that
! #$ li terature, Yugoslavia had a falling out with Stalin and the Soviet Bloc in 1948, resulting in its exit from the Comintern. On November 29 th 1950, after two y ears of Yugoslav isolation, the country was reaching a point of economic desperation, "President Ha rry Truman sent a letter to Congress supporting a Yugoslav Emergency Relief Act [making] no reference to the nature of Yugoslavia's political system" (Rusinow 1977, 44). American aid was the starting point to economic prosperity and Yugoslavia's new role a s a non aligned nation. In 1974 Marshal Tito wrote the last constitution of Yugoslavia. This document was the longest constitution ever written, with a total of 406 articles, parts of it were so ambiguous that after Tito's death, on May 4 th 1980, interpr eting what was and was not constitutional became a very long and convoluted chore. The 1974 constitution brought in the theory of "self management," which substantially decentralized Yugoslavia, the presidency, and other federal institutions, while the six republics (Bosnia and Herzegov ina, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia) and two autonomous regions of Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo) became the main loci of power (Bieber 2006, 18). Self management was reaffirmed and extended in the 1974 c onstitution; while it had existed in the economy since 1952, the constitution made self management the underlying principle of all political life in Yugoslavia. The concept was a means of restricting the accumulation of political power in the central gover nment as a guarantee against the abuse of power (Roberts 1978, 139). Ironically, it was the decentralization of the Yugoslav government that led to the abuse of powers by Slobodan Milo evi in the mid 198 0s creating ethnic tensions which ultimately began the Yugoslav Wars. The government al form put into place by the international community in
! #% BiH after the war bears a shocking resemblance to the old Yugoslav government, creating heavy decentralization in order to placate the various ethnicities. This meth od of consociationalism, ironically, has often been used in multi ethnic states building since the disastrous results of the implementation of consociationalism in Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina during the War The Wars of Yugoslav secession started in 1991 with Slovenia's declaration of independence. The appeal of secession from Yugos lavia came with the end of the Cold W ar and the liberalization of the former Soviet Bloc. The presidents of Slovenia and Croatia Milan Ku # an and Franjo Tu $ man feared that Milo evi the president of Serbia, was in the process of creating a greater Serbia and strengthening authoritarian rule These fears were sparked with the Serbian annexation of Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo. The annexation of these regions at a time wh en the JNA (Yugoslav National Army) was both the third largest army in the world and co nveniently under Serbian control caused Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH to fear for their future roles in Yugoslavia. The 14 th Congress was held in 1990; it was the last part y congress of Yugoslavia. Issues of economic depression which had hit Yugoslavia after Tito's death became a polarizing force in Yugoslav politics. The conservatives in Yugoslavia wanted a tighter recentralization of the country whereas others wanted gre ater liberalization. Serbia and its allies were most in favor of recentralization, whereas Slovenia wanted liberalization and radical restructuring, but unlike Croatia and Bosnia, there seemed to be little commitment on the part of the Slovene leadership to maintain Yugoslavia as a state.  The 14 th Congress ended in stalemate. Slovenia's delegation walked out when it became clear that Milo evi 's allies were refusing to even consider anything that did not
! #& result in a recentralization of the party and a tightening of th e party's control over society. (Gagnon 2004, 84) Seeing no room for compromise in Milo evi 's Yugoslavia, Slovenia cl osely followed by Croatia began the fight for independence. Glenny (1994) writes that, Germany 's announcement that it would recognize Slovenian and Croatian i ndependence unconditionally was the death sentence for BiH. The fight for Slovenian secession wa s the quickest and easiest of the four wars that made up the Yugoslav Wars 1 and is commonly referred to as the Ten Day War. Slovenia, the most ethnically homogeneous republic in Yugoslavia, was successful in defending Slovenia's borders against the primari ly Serb run JNA. Slovenian independence was shortly followed by Croatian secession in March 1991. Croatian secession was a much longer and more painful process than the war in Slovenia. Croatia was slightly over 78% Croatian with a roughly 12% Serbian mino rity (see table 2. 1). Krajina Knin is a historic Serbian town in Croatia, known for having "an extraordinary affinity with weaponry and it put up an especially vigorous fight against Croatian sece ssion (Glenny 1994, 6). O ver 500,000 Serbian Croats lived in Croatia, and the Serb leadership of Yugoslavia felt it could not allow the fate of that population to be left in the hands of Tu $ man and the Croat s While Croatia was fighting for its independence, BiH, the most ethnically heterogeneous of the republic s in Yugoslavia, was faced with a problem. The Bosnian Government only had three roads along which it could travel and each led to war. It could have stayed in the rump Yugoslavia and been ruled over by Milo evi and Serbia. It could have accepted the ter ritorial divisions of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia, as suggested by Tu $ man and Milo evi Or it could have applied for recognition as an independent state. (Glenny 1994, 143) !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! The Ten Day War in Slovenia, the Croatian War of Independence, the Bosnian War, and the Kosovo War.
! #' Alija Izetbegovic, the wartime president of BiH decided to accept the idea of Bosnian independence as put forward by the European Union, which offered to recognize the republic's secession from Yugoslavia. As can be expected, war broke out in BiH shortly after the referendum for independence was passed on February 29 th 1991. The Croatian Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Serb s living in BiH were terrified of what might happen to them, if BiH became an independent state ruled by the Muslim Bosniak majority a fear which is present in Bosnian politics even today. On March 1 st the war i n BiH began. Table 2.1: The 1991 Yugoslav Census Results Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatia (Croatian Embassy) Serbia Slovenia Muslim by Nationality 2 (Bosniak) 43.5% 0.91% 2.5% 1.4% Serbs 31.2% 12.15% 65.9% 2.5% Croats 17.4% 78.1% 1% 2.8% Yugoslavs 5.6% 2.22% 3.3% 0.6% Slovene 0.1% 0.47% 0.08% 88.3% Other (Hungarian, Albanian etc.) 2.2% 6.14% 27.3% 4.4% Sources: Bieber 2006, 15; Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 1991; Republi # ki zabod za statistiku (Serbia) 1995, 221. Note: The final Yugoslav Census was taken in 1 991, right before war broke out. D ue to its timing the census was never officially published. This table shows how BiH was very ethnically divided with no clear ethnic majority. Croatia, although with a clear majority of Croats also held a large number of Serbs. The large percentage of other in Serbia's population is due to the annexation of Vojvodina (a primarily Hungarian autonomous state) and Kosovo (primar ily Albanian). One can easily see by the ethnic makeup of Slovenia why the war was so simple : very few Serb s lived in Slovenia, making Milo evi 's anti secessionist campaign harder to enforce. The Bosnian war is often referred to as a bloody and brutal war between two countries fought on a third country's soil. It was also considered to be the worst genocide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 Declaration for Bosniak as a nation ality was enforced by the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1994" ( Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia, 1991 ) and therefore in the Yugoslav Census of 1991 they were referred to as Muslim by nationality'
! #( in Europe after the Holocaust conducted by Nazi Germany. During the time of the Yugoslav Wars, the Western media often attributed the brutality to primordial ethnic tensions, saying that the Serbs and Croats have been fighting since the beginning of time and that Tito was only keeping a lid on the boiling cauldron of ethnic tensions. In the approximately fifty years between the Second World War and the Yugoslav Wars, tensions between the Serbs and Croats lessened and BiH became a place of intermarriage and ethnic pluralism, where Serbs and Croats would marry and give birth to Yugoslav children. Before the war roughly ten percent of the population in BiH considered themselves to be Yugoslav. Beyond just having a diverse population, BiH also had a settlement pattern that interpreted ethni c groups. Maps 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the ethnic make up of BiH before and after the war with the outline of the current entity lines traced over. One can see that before the war there are distinctive regions with a specific ethnic concentration, but overa ll the regions are ethnically mixed. Map 2.2 offers a stark contrast to map 2.1 the lines in white illustrate where the two entities are divided and one can clearly see how there is very little integration in BiH directly after the war. In the 2000s a push was made by the OHR to bring back more refugees, especially Bosniak refugees into the Republika Srpska, so perhaps these eth nic lines have blurred a little, but the predominant patter n persists Map s 2.1 and 2.2 "Ethnic Structure Before the War in Bos nia and Herzegovina 1991" and "Ethnic Structure After the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998"
! #) Reproduced from Petritsch 2001 (301 302) During the Yugoslav Wars Slobodan Milo evi president of Serbia, and Franjo Tu $ man president of Croatia, exacerbate d the ethnic tensions, creating a state of terror, mistrust and misinformation among the people of Serbia and Croatia. "Each government indirectly helped the other: Milo evi 's expansionist talk confirmed Croat fears that Serbs intended to control the Balk ans and Tu $ man 's politics revived Serbs' still remembered fears of the Usta e" (Bowen 1996, 10). The Yugoslav Wars were a battle of nationalist propaganda, with each government directly raising fear in its pop ulation and indirectly confirm ing the fears of the other groups Ethnic tensions were spurred on by the propaganda, which mounted among the Serbs and Croats in BiH as well as among those in the region's more heterogeneous areas. Men and women became scared of being
! #* assaulted or murdered by their neighb ors of different ethnicities and so became preemptively violent to protect themselves. Not all were driven to violence against each other; there were some who stayed and fought with their neighbors against invaders regardless of ethnic differences. From 19 92 to 1995 the war raged on leaving almost 279 ,000 dead or missing and roughly 1.3 million displaced (Bieber 2006, 29) The Dayton Peace Agreement During the War of Yugoslav Secession many peace treaties were attempted alt hough none succeeded before the D ayton Accords. The first plan the Carrington Cutileiro peace plan in 1992, was an early attempt to pre vent BiH from entering into war. This plan however proposed to ethnically divide the country into cantons each canton being ethnically homogeneous, and combining these cantons with a highly decentralized government as well as a system of power sharing Izetbegovi withdrew his signature from the plan shortly after signing it, declaring that he would not let BiH be divided. The second peace proposal was t he Vance Owen plan in January 1993, which tried to divide the country into ten semi autonomous canton s with a central BiH government. Karad % i leader of the Bosnian Serbs at that time, rejected the Vance Owen plan. Overall "the plan failed due to the rapi d pace of territorial divi sion, fragmentation, and ethnic cleansing taking place during the negotiations for the proposal. The plan was already irrelevant by the time it was announced" (Erlap 2012, 60). The third plan was that Joint Action Plan in May 199 3, which proposed to a three way partition of BiH, which would give Serbia 53% of BiH, give Croatia 17% and leave the Bosniaks with only 30% of the country. In August the Bosniaks rejected this plan.
! $+ The Yugoslav Wars finally came to an end with the sign ing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on December 14 th 1995 in Paris. The peace agreement successfully negotiated the end of the Yugoslav Wars, the creation of free and fair elections, the return of refugees and the establishment of the two Entities in BiH. The solution for BiH as prescribed by the Dayton Peace Agreement "was to establish a complex institutional formula that created a relatively weak centralized government, devolving significant power to the two [Entities]" creating a government that greatly resembled the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 (Mansfield 2003, 2057). A federalized consociation was the only possible governmental form that the international community, the Serbs, the Croats, and the Bosniaks were able to agree upon The Dayton Peace Acco rds established the framework for the current BiH government and constitution. The constitution sets up a federation with a system of power sharing Although this approach has its limits in the long term, it was the best way to end the fighting and make su re that all ethnicities' rights were protected. The constitution outlines a collective presidency and a bicameral legislature. The Dayton Accords also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to assure that peace measures were accurately imp lemented The Dayton Agreements have been harshly criticized as creating a system that "ended the war but did not restore lasting peace or political and legal stability" (Mansfield 2003, 2055).
! $" Chapter 3 International Involvement in the Government of B osnia and Herzegovina The Dayton Accords comprise one of the most peculiar peace treaties, not only because the treaty was externally negotiated and enforced, but most importantly because "of the far reaching powers given to the international community w hich extended well beyond military matters to cover the most basic aspects of government and state" (Chandler 2000, 43). The constitution of BiH is partially irregular because it is the fourth annex of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (commonly re ferred to as the Dayton Accords), as opposed to being an independent document. The constitution also installs a series of international overseers for the implementation of the Dayton Accords, and supports t he preservation of peace among the warring ethnici ties. There are three primary international actors in the BiH government: the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the three international judges out of the nine judges in the Constitutional Court, and the Organization of Security in Central Europe (OS CE). These international actors are interwoven into the BiH political system to ensure the implementation of the Day ton Accords. These institutions, especially the OHR, have at times been criticized for obstructing democracy and progress in BiH. S ince the Bonn Conclusion, which effectively gave the OHR the right to make "binding decisions," the OHR has, as of February 2013, discharged or suspended 195 popularly elected officials
! $# on the grounds of being too nationalistic or obstructing vital legislation, thu s endangering the fragile Bosnian peace (OHR 1997 2013). Consequently, a lot of controversy has surrounded the OHR. For an internationally appointed official with no system of checks or balances to mandate what is the best for BiH, as opposed to what the people think and vote for, broaches the uncomfortable subject of imperialism. The Dayton Accords have crippled the BiH political system, solidified ethnic identities, and created unwillingness from the national parties to enact unpopular legislation becaus e they know the OHR can and will eventually enact legislation for them It is hard to deny the initial benefits of international intervention in BiH or to know whether there is even a viable alternative to what was done in BiH, but the international commun ity has arguably hurt the future self sufficiency of BiH with its heavy handed interventions in the past. The Dayton Accords T he General Framework Agreement for Peace, frequently referred to as the Dayton Accords have been scrutinized from all angles. It is easy to overlook the advantages of the Dayton Accords and quickly state that throwing out and creating a new constitution for BiH is the only way to create a sustainable, independent future for BiH. However, the Dayton Accords achieved what a great many other peace a greements could not: they successfully ended the Yugoslav Wars, and no one can deny the short term gains of the Dayton Accords. Allcock (2004) warns against throwing away the Dayton Accords so hastily, stating that the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) could not function without the current Dayton Accords in place. The
! $$ Accords insist on the cooperation from local officials to bring former war criminal s to justice, and, if the local politicians do not cooperate, t he OHR can bring the war criminals to The Hague. Since 1997, the OHR has made 117 decisions related to the indictment of the war criminals ( OHR 1997 2013). The ICTY would struggle to function without the Dayton Accords still in place; the levels of coopera tion would drop greatly. Possibly once th e ICTY feels as though it has obtained all of the war criminals, then that incentive of maintaining the Dayton Accords would be less vital, and a constitutional overhaul would be more viable. Another problem of the Dayton Accords was realized during the case of Sejdic and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina that was brought to the European Court of Human Rights in 2009. Dervo Sejdic and Jacob Finci are leading figures in the Roma and Jewish community respectively, and t hey are also active figures in cantonal politics (in th e Federation). Sejdic and Finci do not identify with any of the three constituent peoples in BiH, and "only persons declaring affiliation with a constituent people' are entitled to run for the House o f Peoples (the second chamber of the State parliament) and the Presidency (the collective Head of State)" (Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 2009). In 2006 Sejdic and Finci tried to run for the House of Peoples and the Presidency, but the Bosnian Central Election Commission turned down their application s Sejdic and Finci viewed their inability to run for the upper level political positions as discriminatory. The European Court of Human Rights agreed with them, declaring the constitution of BiH to be in direct violation of the "European Convention's Protocol No. 12, which generally prohibits discrimination. The Court also found a violation of article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, taken in conjunction with article 3 of Protocol No. 1,
! $% which protects free elections to the legislature" (Eralp 2012, 38). With these human rights violations, it was agreed that a constitutional revision must be immediately set in motion in order for BiH to move forward towards official EU candidacy. As of February 2013 no movement has been made to amend the constitution, despite increasing pressure from the international community. A third vital issue with the Dayton Accords is the lack of an official Bosnian identity. The BiH government planned to hold a census in April 2013, the first census to take place in BiH since the 1991 Yugoslav census, which was never officially published due to the outbreak of the war. However, as early as December 2012 reports came out from the International Monitoring Operatio n (IMO) stating, "To ensure proper preparation of the census and avoid unreliable results and figures the IMO recommends postponement of the census for at least six months ," (Balkan Insight 2012 c ). I nsufficient capability to organize a census is one issue, but Jacob Finci suspects that the census has been postponed due to ethnic reasons. An unofficial test census was prepared in October 2012 only to have 35% of citizens declare themselves as "Bosnian Herzegovinian (Balkan Insight 2 012 b ). It is supposed tha t, if more citizens declare themselves to be Bosnian Herzegovinian rather than one of the three primary ethnicities, then the whole system will have one more reason to undergo a constitutional revision. For this reason current ethnic politicians want more time to strengthen ethnic ties in order to maintain the status quo. A census is very important to the BiH community, because knowing the actual ethnic makeup, as well as the number of people who truly do not agree with the system of emphasi zing ethnicity, could cause a larger movement for a complete revision of the BiH constitution.
! $& Despite the negative aspects of the Dayton Accords, the Accords were crucial in ending the war in the Balkans and in providing stability on which to build a country. That said, for a long term government the c onstitution that appeared out of the General Framework Agreement is full of flaws and contradictions. The most i mportant of these flaws is the c onstitution's overemphasis on ethnicity that does not allow for the citizens to move out of their ethnic molds. Although to some extent the country has moved past wartime mentalities, the nationalist political parties continue to exist and reinforce these exclusive ethnic identities, threatening the process of reconciliation. Finally the ICTY has not completed its mission in Former Yugoslavia and is still indicting and pros ecuting war criminals. Once this process is c ompleted, the Dayton Accords could undergo a complete revision, changing the writing of the current constitution from th at of a peace treaty to a founding document that is meant to run a stable and effective state. Structure of the Bosnian and Herzegovinian Government Figure 3.1 presents an overview of the governmental structure and process es of BiH. The chart also illustr ates the uneven and at times convoluted structure of what is often referred to as the Dayton state. BiH is a federation and has been broken into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. Manning and Antic describe the government structure of BiH as "something of a political Frankenstein, with 13 different constitutions (one for the Republic [of BiH], one for each of the two different entities, and one for each of the ten cantons in the Federation), a lopsided structure with two entities each founded on different principles" (2003, 50). The entities of BiH are like states themselves "to an extent [they possess] separate
! $' administrations, distinct citizenship (as well as common citizenship), their own armies, and the right to form special parallel relationships with neighbor states" (Caplan 2004, 56). The Republika Srpska is essentially a centralized mini state, whereas the Federation is highly decentralized with its 10 cantons. The Federation itself has a bicameral legisl ature, unlike that of the Republika Srpska, which only has one chamber, the National Assembly. The upper house of the Federation, the House of Peoples, is made up of 30 Bosniaks and 30 Croats and a given number of other' delegates based on parity represen tation. The members of the House of Peoples are elected through their cantonal legislatures. Each canton chooses the number of Bosniak, Croat and other' representatives to send based on their population size. The only stipulation is that each canton must send at least one Bosniak, Croat and other' delegate. The House of Representatives consists of 140 delegates who are elected every four years in a direct election in the Federation. Parties must cross a 5% threshold to gain seats in the lower house. Each chamber must also elect a speaker and deputy speaker, if the speaker is a Bosniak than the deputy must be a Croat and vice versa.
! $( Figure 3.1 : Political Structure of Bosnia and He rzegovina Reproduced from Sumantra Bose 2002 (61) The government of BiH, in the true spirit of consociation, has three presidents, one of each ethnicity. The constitution says, "The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of  one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the Federation, and one Se rb directly elected from the territory of the R epublika Srpska" (U.S. State Department 1995a ). The co presidents serve a four year term and the chair rotates every eight months. Decisions made by the presidents are supposed to be made by consensus, but onl y two presidents are needed for a decision to pass. If one president feels as though the decision is destructive and goes against his or her ethnicity's vital interests, then that president is allowed to veto the decision. On any level of government a deci sion can be vetoed if it appears to go against one minority. If a decision has been vetoed by a president, then the decision would go down to either legislature in the
! $) Federation or in the R epublika Srpska, which needs a two thirds vote to be nullified. Th e wording of Article V of t he constitution is problematic. T o begin with the article states that only citizens of the three primary ethnicities in BiH are allowed to be president, barring any others' from being included. Second the wording states that Bo sniak and Croat presidents can only be elected from the Federation, meaning that a Bosniak living in the Republika Srpska would have to move to the Federation in order to be considered as a presidential candidate. This unlikely scenario shows how constrain ing the constitutional guidelines can be. The wording of the constitution reflects the post war sentiments, but l eaves little room for deemphasizing ethnic identities or allowing free movement of people between entities while maintaining fair ethnic repres entation. The Bosnian legislative branch, as set forth in Article IV of the constitution, is a bicameral legislative assembly. The House of People is the upper house, and is comprised of 15 delegates, ten from the Federation (five Croat and five Bosniak) and the other five (Serbs) come from the Republika Srpska. The language in Article IV states specifically that each of the delegates in the House of Peoples must be of one of the three primary ethnicities. These delegates are elected by their entity level legislatures. In the Republika Srpska the delegates are chosen by the National Assembly, and in the Federation deleg ates are chosen by the upper house of the Federation, the House of People. Decisions in the House of People are made by majority. The second chamber is the House of Representatives consisting of 42 directly elected delegates, two thirds of whom come from the Federation and the other third of whom are from the Republika Srpska. Decisions ar e made on a majority basis, and other than the two to o ne ratio of Representatives from the Federation t o those of the Republika Srpska, in the House of
! $* Representatives the ethnicity of the members does not matter, the quota is only geographically specific. Both chambers of the BiH legislative branch select th ree members of each ethnicity to co chair the assemblies on a rotating basis. Although both houses allow majority decision making, if one ethnicity feels as though the decision is "destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniak, Croat or Serb people by a m ajority of, as appropriate, the Bosniak, Croat or Serb Delegates to the House of Peoples then the action can be vetoed (Bose 2002, 63). When a decision has been vetoed, it moves to a three member commission made up of one participant of each ethnicity. I f it takes over five days for this commission to come to a resolution, then the decision is moved to the Constitutional Court. Sumantra Bose calls the Constitutional Court, "ironically, the most robust of Bosnia's central institutions [because] it is the o ne on which non Bosnians play a direct role" (Bose 2002, 65). The Constitutional Court is made up of nine judges, two of each of the primary ethnicities meaning that once again no others' in BiH gain representation in the supreme judicial branch. Four of the judges are elected from the Federation (two Bosniak and two Croat) and two from the Republika Srpska (Serbian). The president of the European Court of Human Rights appoints the other three judges, after consultation with the three presidents. The inter national judges "shall not be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina or of any neighboring state" ( U.S. State Department 1995 a ). The Constitutional Court issues rulings based on majority decision making so that it is easier to come to a decision. The internati onal judges are also there to prevent deadlock among the other judges.
! %+ In post war Bosnia, it is vital that all of the primary ethnicities feel as though they are safe from ethnic persecution and that no law is passed that could be destructive or threateni ng to the vitality of any of the primary ethnicities. However, these easily accessible veto capabilities make it very hard for the BiH presidency and legislature to pass legislation. Moreover the need for consensus based decision making on most platforms of government creates frequent gridlock. The role of the OHR is to protect BiH from such instances that could prove extremely detrimental to the future of the country. The OHR can unilateral ly pass legislation if the High Representative finds the decision to be vital to the country's continued success. With such a complicated governmental system filled with veto opportunities around each corner, the success ful passing of the majority of legislation is unlikely. An obvious pattern is that the organs of gover nment that are capable of functioning without gridlock are those with international actors in them. A government cannot continue indefinitely when the two most effective aspects of the government are run by the international community. Consensus based deci sion making and veto abilities, both important factors of a consociational government, create a system of precautions for post war governments, making sure that no rash actions are made that could once again result in genocide or war. This system of precau tions, however, has left the BiH government unable to function without international assistance at all major crossroads. The Role of the OHR in Bosnian Politics The role of the OHR was originally to oversee, facilitate and coordin ate the implementation of the Dayton Accords. The OHR is also there to give advice where
! %" needed to different Bosnian officials. The purpose of the High Representative was first mentioned in Article I of the 10 th annex of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, which states t hat: The Parties agree that the implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement will entail a wide range of activities . A considerable number of international organizations and agencies will be called upon to assist. In view of the comp lexities facing them, the Parties request the designation of a High Representative, to be appointed consistent with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, to facilitate the Parties' own efforts and to mobilize and, as appropriate, coordinate the activities of the organizations and agencies involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement by carrying out, as entrusted by a U.N. Security Council resolution, the tasks set out below. ( U.S. State Department 1995b ) However, the High Repres entatives' powers merely to facilitate, coordinate, and report resulted "in the parties to the conflict mostly ignoring the work of the High Representative" (Bieber 2006, 84). The original mandate of the OHR was only supposed to last a year or until the fi rst free elections were held. However, the somewhat rushed elections only proved that the ethnic divisions had become stronger after the war, and the wartime political parties were all easily reelected into parliament. The Serbian nationalist party called the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) won 52% in the National Assembly and 54% of the BiH assembly. In the Federation, the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), the Bosniak party, won 54% of the seats in the House of Representatives and the BiH assembly, and in the National Assembly the SDA received 25% of the vote. The Croatian nationalist party called the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia Herzegovina (HDZ BiH) obtained 25% of the seats in the House of Representatives and the BiH Assembly (Eralp 2012, 16). The 1996 election results confirmed the international community's fears that BiH had rushed the elections and that leaving the now freely elected government to its own devices could result in a relapse into conflict. "The international
! %# community did not see a ny possibility of eventual reconciliation among the three constituent nations as long as the extreme nationalists maintained control" (Eralp 2012, 41). Thus in 1997 the Bonn Powers were put into place equipping the position of the OHR with both executive a nd legislative powers. The OHR is the most powerful institution in BiH; it has no checks or balances or direct responsibility to the citizens. The OHR is only responsible to the moral obligations that come with Western democracy and the Peace Implementati on Council (PIC). The PIC was established in London on December 8 th 1995 and is made up of 55 members including individual countries and international organizations. The 11 members of the steering board of the PIC are: The United States, The United Kingdom Canada, France, Germany, Russia, Italy, Japan, the presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which is represented by Turkey a long time ally of BiH. The OHR chairs weekly meetings with the Ambassadors of the Steering Board members, and the Steering Board also meets with the heads of the BiH government three times a year. 1997 Bonn Powers Afte r the 1996 election did not produce the desired results, the mandate of the OHR and other internati onal actors in BiH was extended. In 1996, an OHR report stated it would be naive to believe that this can be done fully in just one short year, and that it will happen without an active involvement by the international community over time.  Our involve ment must not only be longer in time than 1996 but also wider in geographic scope" (OHR 1996). The PIC was scheduled to meet in 1997 in Bonn. With
! %$ the evidence mounting that the government of BiH was not ready or capable to govern w ithout international ass istance, t he PIC felt that it was time for the OHR to have a stronger role in rectifying Bosnian politics. The first issue was the wartime parties that continued to b e the most powerful political play ers, were unwilling to compromise and fanned ethnic te nsions. It was time for the international community to take a stronger stance on the post war governmental reconstruction, since the local actors were not taking the responsibility of rebuilding their country. The original role of the OHR as outlined in th e General Framework Agreement called the High Representative, "the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement" ( U.S. State Department 1995b ). In comparison the PIC Bonn Conc lusions state that, The Council welcomes the High Representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of di fficulties by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary" ( OHR 1997 ). It was agreed in article 11.2 of the Bonn Conclusions, that the OHR would have jurisdiction over the following issues: a. timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of the common i nstitutions; b. interim measures to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned; c. other measur es to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials who are ab sent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation. (OHR 1997 )
! %% With the Bonn Powers, the OHR is now capable of making binding decisions in regards to dismissing publicly elected officials for being too extremist or nationalistic and enacting legislation unilaterally. As can be seen in figure 3.2 and table 3.3, the number of decisions made by the OHR peaked in 2006. Paddy Ashdown was th e High Representative from 2002 to 2006 and during his time as HR Ashdown made over 450 decisions, effectively half of the decisions that the OHR has ever announced. Ashdown took the most aggressive stance on reforming BiH and is in some cir cles criticized as being the European Raj (Eralp 2012, 45). The Bonn Powers were used differently by each of the Hig h Representatives, some using them extensively and others sparingly. The Bonn Powers also have an ironic nature: they give one internationa lly elected official final authority over the judicial, executive, and legislative branches, without any accountability to the Bosnian democratically elected officials or to the Bosnian people. "The Bonn Powers gave the High Representatives the mandate to influence the practice of democracy in BiH without any democratic oversight" (Eralp 2012, 42). Wolfgang Petritsch, the third High Representative, states that the problem with the Bonn Powers was that they "shifted the equation of the international presence in favor of the civilian implementation efforts and brought Bosnia closer to a protectorate like status" (Solioz and Vogel 2004, 12). Petritsch a dmits that there are strong points on both sides of the argument for the Bonn Powers. One side says that "ther e is an inherent contradiction between democracy building and the High Representative's role as an enlightened despot while the other side sees the "practical necessity to move things faster and more decisively towards consolidation, viability, and sel f sufficiency" although Petritsch could not say definitively which side he found to be more compelling (Petritsch quoted in
! %& Solioz and Vogel 2004, 12). The Bonn Powers unilaterally extended what had previously been a one year mandate for all international actors in the BiH government to an indefinite length of time. They were in their time a necessary addition to the advancement of BiH, but unfortunately have created a series of pathologies that have made the local government of BiH ineffectual and unable t o do what needs to be done. Figure 3.2: OHR Number of Decisions Made by the OHR by Year
! %' Table 3.1: Type and Number of Decisions made by the OHR Reproduced from Eralp 2012, 51 3 Intervention from the OHR !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! $ The title of the fifth category down "Renewals and Suspensions" should be Removals and Suspensions"
! %( There have been seven High Representatives (HR s) to date. Carl Bildt a Swedish diplomat who had also been Prime Minister in 1991 1994 was the first HR (December 1995 June 1997); followed by Carlos Westendorp (June 1997 July 1999) a Spanish diplomat as well as the former Minister of Foreign Aff airs; Wolfgang Petritisch (July 1999 May 2002) the Austrian Ambassad or to the Former Yugoslavia in 1997 1999; Paddy Ashdown (May 2002 January 2006) a prominent English politician as well as the leader of the Liberal Democrats; Christian Schwarz Schil ling (January 2006 July 2007) a German po litician, known for resigning from the Bundestag in protest to the poor German management of the Yugoslav Wars; Miroslav Laj # k (July 2007 March 2009) the current Foreign Minister of Slovakia ; and the current High Representativ e Valentin Inzko (March 2009 p resent) who comes from a Slovenian speaking family living in Austria and was previously an Austrian diplomat. As o ne can see fro m figure 3.2 and table 3.1 the use of the Bonn Powers became more frequent during Petritsch's and, especially, Ashdown's time in office. After Ashdown stepped down in 2006, the OHR used the Bonn powers significantly less and subsequent HRs h ave tried to take a less hands on approach to aiding the BiH government. The Bonn Powers were instated in 1997 and thus Westendorp, not Bildt, was the first to use the Bonn Powers. During Westendorp's time as HR he made 45 decisions and laws regarding cu rrency, the BiH flag and coat of arms, citizenship law, municipal courts, and decisions to remove or suspend certain lower and community level officials who blocked reforms or went against the return of refugees. Westendorp's interpretation of the Bonn Po wers was to lay down the most fundamen tal building blocks of a state, a lthough Westendorp primarily used the Bonn Powers to create the frameworks for a fu ture
! %) Bosnian society. H e was delighted at his power and amount of efficiency in democratizing BiH that was suddenly available to him as opposed to the frustration his predecessor felt, stating that "were it not for the [Bonn Powers] there would have been almost no progress" (quoted in Erlap 2011, 43). He believed that, "the problems of the region [would] o nly be solved when we have introduced a general respect for democracy and the rule of law" ( quoted in Chandler 2000, 201). Chandler (2000) a nd many other scholars (Bieber 2006; Knaus and Martin 2003; Caplan 2004 ) were all terrified by this new White Man's Burden' take on democratizing that the OHR was embodying. Petritsch however, made more decisions than his predecessor, some of which were used for the dismissal of 22 democratically elected officials, "including nine mayors, one governor, two ministers, and several parliamentary deputies and other local or regional officials" (Chandler 2000, 202). The majority of the officials whom Petritsch dismissed were high ranking nationalist party officials from each ethnicity. Petritsch and the OSCE were at times a lso criticized as being too determined to unseat the nationalist parties from power (HDZ BiH, SDS, and SDA) rather than impartially implement ing the Dayton Accords. One of Petritsch's most memorable decisions was to stop the move by the Croat Chairman of the Presidency Ante Jelavi who was on a campaign to create a separate Croatian entity in BiH along the lines of the wartime Croat borders. Petritsch quickly put an end to the debate by rem oving Jelavi from office. Such a move is arguably a goo d reason to dismiss an offic ia l, but Knaus and Martin argue that having a debate and giving the population and the politicians a chance to act responsibly to a threat should be the first step before a politician is dismissed by the OHR (2003, 72)
! %* Although Westendorp and Petritsch wer e criticized for being over ly zealous in exercising their unilateral powers, they both pale in comparison to Paddy Ashdown, "th e European Raj," the most interventionist of the HRs to date. Ashdown imposed "an average of ten decisions each month" using his powers 307 times while in office (Eralp 2012, 44). The four most recent HRs have so far made a total of 105 decisions combined, that is fewer than Ashdown made in the single years of 2002 and 2004. Ashdown's opening speech to the BiH people clearly stated that, "the more you reform, the less I will have to do. The less you reform the more I will have to" indicating his reluctance to intervene but also willingness to get the job done if need be (Knaus and Martin 2003, 61). It turned out that the politicians of BiH needed more help than not, and Ashdown was ready to rise to the challenge. Ash down was able to punish elected officials to a point of confusion, where the officials did not know whether they were responsible to their constituents who put them in pow er, or to the OHR who could easily take them out of power. Knaus and Martin marvel at the oddities that occurred in BiH politics, something unseen anywhere else, where these internationally elected officials had more power than those nationally elected and could enact unilateral decisions with no direct responsibility or accountability to the BiH people. "In BiH, outsiders actually set the agenda, impose it, and punish with sanctions those who refuse to implement it" (Knaus and Martin 2003, 61). Ashdown int erpreted the Bonn Powers in a way that none of his predecessors had; several scholars closely following the post war situation in BiH were shocked at the great deal of hypocrisy and imperialistic ideology that was being used in BiH to create democracy. The first three HRs who had use of the Bonn Powers played the parts of
! &+ "benevolent despots" in the face of inaction by the Bosnian politicians (Knaus and Martin 2003, 62). Christian Schwarz Schilling represented an over correction from Ashdown's policies in BiH. Eralp describes his term as HR as a "complete failure" (2012, 46). Ashdown was frequently criticized as being too involved in BiH politics and so Schwarz Schilling declared in his opening speech that, "I will use the Bonn Powers without hesitation sho uld this be necessary to maintain peace and stability or to further BiH's cooperation with the ICTY  I will not use the Bonn Powers for anything else" (OHR 2006 a ). The PIC placed Schwarz Schilling in power with the thought that he was going to be the la st HR. BiH seemed to be at a place where a less intrusive HR would be best and could possibly lead to the p hasing out of the OHR altogether In June 2006, the PIC and the Steering Board agreed that it "was in the interest of all for BiH to take full respon sibility for its own affairs. To this end, the [OHR] will immediately begin preparation to close on 30 June 2007" (OHR 2006 b ). However, with this room made for the BiH politicians to impress the international community, three issues proved that a BiH left to its own devices by the following year could only promise further destabilization and an increase in ethnic tensions The three issues were: the failure of a constitutional package, the independence of Montenegro, and the threat arising of Republika Srps ka seceding from BiH The first issue arose in April 2006, when a constitutional package failed in parliament, that would have enabled more effective state level institutions and returned to the BiH government more responsibilities from the international c ommunity, such as security, intelligence and defense. In June 2006 Montenegro received its independence from Serbia, prompting a call for a referendum
! &" from the Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, concerning an independent Republika Srps ka. The ethnic tensions rising in Republika Srpska were quickly countered by the nationalist Bosniak parties in the Federation when in February 2007, the International Court of Justice ( ICJ ) determined that the massacre in Srebrenica was an act of genocide Dodik wanted Republika Srpska to be an independent state and the Bosniaks wanted the "abolition of [the Republika Srpska] as a genocidal state" (Eralp 2012, 47). Schwarz Schilling resigned in June 2007, his attempt of helping the BiH people to develop th eir own future, resulting in a complete disaster. The end of Schwarz Schilling's term as HR raised the question, if Ashdown was too interventionist and Schwarz Schilling did so little that ethnic tensions greatly increased, then what is the approach to t ake? After Ashdown the general consensus among scholars was that the OHR had taken too invasive of a step for an international figure, and installing democracy through dictatorial means reminded the west of the colonial times far too much. But when Schwar z Schilling did as little as possible, allowing the politicians of BiH to prove to the international community that they were ready to become a sovereign nation, things fell apart and ethnic tensions swiftly returned to the surface. Schwarz Schilling's suc cessor, Laj # k, tried to find the balance betwe en these two Laj # k tried to maintain Schwarz Schilling's method of minimal intervention, or intervention only when necessary. He did not use the Bonn Powers to remove nationalist leaders, trying to prove to politici ans of BiH that it was their responsibility to solve these problems and not the OHR's. However Laj # k did not allow tensions to rise too high before he intervened. O n one occasion he dismiss ed a member of the Intelligence and Security Agency because he was providing material support for indicted
! war criminal (Erlap 2012, 49). Laj # k's goal was working towards reconciliation, and he felt it was his job to create a neutral negotiation space for both entities to discuss issues and come together. He pushed very hard to have BiH sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), which is the first step towards EU membership. However, at the same time the international community's focus shifted quickly from BiH to Kosovo, and the pressure on the Bosnian polit icians to implement the reforms as stated in the SAA was reduced. One of the biggest tasks that was set forward in the SAA was to combine the police forces of the Federation and Republika Srpska. However, "after endless meetings with Bosnian politicians ov er compromise on the implementation of the police reform, the reform initiative silently died as the country entered the local elections process in 2008," and the focus of politicians was once against drawn away from international long term goals (Eralp 20 12, 49). Inzko is the current HR and also the EU Special Representa tive to BiH. In 2009, when he t ook power, the EU US summit determined that Inzko would only participate in Bosnian politics as "the EU Special Representative and excluded OHR policy makers from the constitution reform proposal" (Eralp 2012, 49). In February 2008, the PIC and the Steering Board decided that BiH is a "peaceful, viable state irreversibly on the course for European integration," and that five objectives and two conditions must b e fulfilled before the OHR can safely exit BiH, leaving total sovereignty to the local politicians. This set of requirements is referred to as the 5+2 Agenda. The five objectives are: Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of the Issue of Apportionment of P roperty between State and other levels of government; Acceptable and Sustainable Resolution of Defense Property; Completion of the Br # ko Final Award;
! &$ Fiscal Sustainability (promoted through an Agreement on a Permanent ITA Co efficient methodology and estab lishment of a National Fiscal Council); and Entrenchment of the Rule of Law (demonstrated through Adoption of National War Crimes Strategy, passage of Law on Aliens and Asylum, and adoption of National Justice Sector Reform Strategy). (OHR 2012) Followed b y the two conditions: Signing of the SAA; and a positive assessment of the situation in BiH by the PIC SB based on full compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement. (OHR 2012 ) The EU has put increasing pressure on BiH to complete the 5 +2 Agenda as well as a mend its constitution as determined by the ruling of the case of Sejdic and Finci vs. BiH in 2009. In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights resolved the Sejdi and Finci case by declaring that the BiH constitution was in violation of human rights. The C ourt insisted that the local politicians of BiH must amend the constitution on their own and that it was not in the jurisdiction of the OHR to amend it for them. It is now up to the local actors to come together to amend the constitution to allow ethnic mi norities to run for high level positions in the government (Eralp 2012, 38). On February 13, 2013, the head of the EU in Bosnia issued a statement that said that "it's up to local politicians not the international community to find a way out of the current impasse over a key human rights ruling" ( Balkan Insight 2013 b ). To date no conclusion has been reached on the amendment of the constitution, despite t he constant insistence that BiH cannot go further in its EU candidate status before the constitution is n o longer in violation of human rights. The EU has giv en BiH the tools to remedy its current situation, and yet local politicians have done very little in the way of moving closer to the EU candidacy. Inzko's current position is possibly a testament to the exhaustion of the international community
! &% and the desire to end the Dayton era,' even though the politicians of BiH do not appear ready to govern without the international community in ways that avoid an upheaval of nationalism. The international communit y hopes that the time of international intervention in BiH may be coming to a close. It is very possible that Inzko will be the last HR in BiH. Pathologies in the OHR's Wake and Nationalist Culture In his inaugural speech in 2002, Ashdown stated that "per haps part of the reason [for BiH's continual failure] is because we, the international community, have intervened too frequently, interfered too much and not given enough space for others to act," but his opinion once put in office quickly changed (OHR 200 2) It is possible that he was o riginally right and that Westendorp, Petritsch and Ashdown have intervened too frequently causing the politicia ns to become too reliant on their role in government Three major issues are holding back BiH from its being abl e to complete the 5+2 agenda and finally take off the yoke of the international community. The first problem is the system of heavy dependency on the decision making of the OHR; the OHR created, although not intentionally, the incentive to maintain ethnici ty strong political parties without having to reach across the aisle, because the OHR would take care of all of the issues that n eeded to be resolved. The second is the lack of will among the local politicians to resolve problems among themselves and inste ad turn to the OHR to solve all problems. The third problem is the persistence of nationalist culture in BiH. Part of the blame for the reoccurring nationalism falls to the ethnicity centric policies of the Dayton Accords that enforce identifying with one of the three primary ethnicities, as opposed to reconciling under the one identity as Bosnian and Herzegovinians
! && Since the first free elections in BiH after the war in 1996, the wartime nationalist parties have maintained strong followings, a fact that m akes the international community exceedingly uncomfortable, especially given how hard external actors have worked since the beginning to expel nationalism and the wartime parties from politics in BiH. Regardless of who the HR dismisses, the nationalist par ties are always present in each level of government in each entity as well as in the central government. Nationalist culture in BiH is persistent, and its presence greatly worries the international community especially as they try to extract themselves fro m BiH. "A primary consequence of the division of Bosnia into ethnically defined entities' has been the fixing of a structure of ethnarchy'" by fixing ethnicity into t he structure of the government; of course the parties are going to follow suit (Allcock 2004, 25). Bieber, also attributes the persistence of nationalism as stemming from the governmental structure, but focuses on institutional dynamics more than ethnic identity: "the division of the Bosnian government into entities meant that few parties bec ame active in the whole country and if they did, they mostly appealed exclusively to one of the three constituent nations" (2006, 41). The most prominent moderate party is the Social Democratic Party ( Socijaldemokratska partija or SDP), which is in essence the successor of the League of Communists from the Former Yugoslavia. The leadership of the party is multiethnic, and its support mostly comes from those located in the larger cities of central BiH. The SDP advocates strengthening the central government a nd further limiting the power of the entities in order to promote a strong BiH (Bieber 2006, 41). This platform, however, is less appealing to Serbs living in the Republika Srpska and Croats living in Herzegovina. The major moderate party in the Republika Srpska, the Independent Social Democrats ( Savez nezavisnih socialdemokrata
! &' or SNSD), still takes a partially nationalistic tone, "like all main Serb parties, it [supports] the autonomy of the Serb Republic, but [pursues] a less nationalist line towards oth er nations and the international community" (Bieber 2006, 42). Caplan claims that a number of pathologies have arisen in BiH from the heavy handedness of the HRs. The first is the HRs' influence in organizing elections and offering incentives, such as fina ncial assistance, for electing reformist parties into parliament. However, in the 1998 election the OHRs heavy backing of certain candidates only resulted in failure, due to the citizens' resentment of the intervention of the OHR, as tends to be the case i n the Republika Srpska. Along a similar vein, in the Republika Srpska the HRs attempts at removing nationalist figures usually lead to a deeper resentment for the international community, propagating the idea that the international community was there to punish the Bosnian Serbs and aid the Bosniaks. The most worrisome and detrimental issue that resulted from the HR intervention was the tendency for local politicians to shirk their responsibilities, knowing that the OHR would pick up the slack. Local polit icians will not want to pass unpopular legislation that will only hurt their popula rity as well as lose them seats. The HR, however, can make these kinds of decisions, and bec ause he or she is not responsible to the Bosnian people does not need to worry ab out popularity of his decisions or position (Caplan 2004, 59). Unwillingness to make unpopular decisions has proven itself to be detrimental to BiH's growth and search for autonomy. The Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina The OHR cannot be a long term inst itution in BiH. The role of the OHR cannot be to indefinitely guide the country towards democracy. At some point if the attempts at
! &( guidance are really not being accepted then it might just be time to leave. The goal of the international community was alwa ys to aid with establishing democracy a nd then leave. However, the wartime problems persisted despite the hig h level of intervention, and the international community has continued to have to extend its mandate in BiH. Two things are very clear about how B iH can progress forward into being self sufficient and no longer a protectorate of the international community. BiH needs to revise the Dayton Accords to allow for less decentralization, less emphasis on ethnicity, and stronger state level institutions. Bi eber claims "ultimately, this unusually convoluted structure of governance has rendered the country unstable and dysfunctional. The nature of governance in Bosnia is oft en described as static" (2006, 40). Clearly, BiH needs to undergo a govern mental change ; the system established by the Dayton Accords, was purely to stop conflict and is not a system that can establish healthy governmental development and growth Second BiH needs to join the EU. The process of EU accession helps to move BiH forward and make necess ary reforms, and subsequent membership will then help to reinforce these reforms. The EU is an important end goal for BiH; if it finally joins then the membership will be a testament to the improved living standards, the lack of corruption, and gove rnmental transparency; there are also the economic gains, which come from joining the EU. In their May 3 rd 2012 New York Times article, Swanee Hunt and Wesley Clark argued that the best future for BiH lies in joining international organizations, such as t he EU or NATO. They feel as though the international community put BiH into their current stagnated situation and needs to fully commit to helping the country rejoin the world as a sovereign state. Hunt and Clark outline three steps that need to be taken f or BiH to
! &) become a self sufficient country. They emphasize the importance of BiH joining the EU, but first they say it is vital for the US and EU (the countries that wrote the current BiH constitution) to aid the government in revising their constitution t o undo the constricting Dayton Accords. The second step is that once the constitution has been successful revised then as a reward, as opposed to having to undergo the entire EU application process, BiH should be granted EU membership. Third is that NATO n eeds to offer BiH a clear path to joining the alliance; at present BiH only has candidate status. Hunt and Clark feel as though granting BiH NATO membership would finally give the country a sense of security. Hunt and Clark's argument is clear: the interna tional community brought BiH into its current system of government and then only did half of a job. It is up to the international community to finish the job and just give BiH what has been promised to them, eventual EU membership. The Hunt and Clark argu ment however is not without its faults. Although the EU has gone out of its way on multiple occasions to help out BiH, granting the country EU membership and then leaving it more or less to its own devices will not help to stabilize the political institu tions nor curb the persistent problem with nationalism. Joining the EU would give the citizens of BiH freedom of movement and the country better trade opportunities, aiding the economy but possibly opening the door to an even greater brain drain. Simply gr anting BiH membership would also only worsen its relationship with i ts neighbors who have worked hard on domestic reform and with the international community to be able to gain membership (for Croatia) and candidacy status (Serbia). Hunt and Clark's plan h as the advantage of being quick and efficient; if their plan were to be carried out, the international community could be out of BiH as early as 2014. BiH
! &* needs to change and make the reforms and meet the standards required for membership. BiH must join th e EU not just for the sake of joining but to have a more efficient system of government and a richer economy. Simply giving BiH EU membership is not going to change current behavior or promote the necessary governmental and constitutional reforms that BiH needs. Hunt and Clark have a well intentioned plan, but it is a little impractical in nature. Eralp makes the argument that BiH "has not yet developed any alternative political vision to the EU membership perspective" and that a new plan for a future outs ide of the EU needs to be created (2012, 57). He believes, like Hunt and Clark, that the fault lies in the EU not taking a strong enough role in helping BiH to gain EU membership. Unlike Hunt and Clark, though, Eralp believes that the EU is not truly prepa red to take on a country like BiH, and BiH is nowhere near ready to meet the standards of the EU. To join the EU a country is required to have "stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for the protection of m inority," all issues that BiH has struggled with and never truly resolved (Erlap 2012, 112). Eralp is convinced that the EU is also not "an effective actor for peace in BiH," because the EU institutions are not equipped to "engage in a postconflict applica nt country.  The institutions of the EU are designed to deal with applicant countries that have functional state bureaucracies" (2012, 111). Eralp's final reason for citing the EU's reluctance to help is due to the current and prolonged financial diffic ulties, which makes the EU wary to take on BiH in the near future. "EU leaders are not able to pronounce any clear accession date for Bosnia Herzegovina without BiH demonstrating any concrete achievements in its reform process," and BiH has been struggling to achieve any reforms
! '+ to the current governmental system (Eralp 2012, 111). Eralp makes a good point that possibly joining the EU is not the best option for BiH at this point. However, so long as the local politicians do not become disheartened at their lack of substantial process, the possibility of EU membership in the long term can hopefully push the BiH politicians to make reforms and better themselves to the standards of the international community in Europe. Hitchner and Joseph (2013) are unsure wh ether the EU is really the best option for BiH, due to the obvious lack of interest from the Bosnian people or politicians to join, despite a series of clear cut paths the EU has made for BiH's EU candidacy. They wonder why there has been so much criticism of Ashdown as an HR. When Ashdown was the HR, BiH was taking the greatest strides to be com ing an EU member as well as a self sufficient nation an argument that perhaps the i nternational community should return to an HR who is willing to intervene in the n ame of progress to EU membership. However, what Hitchner and Joseph fail to take into account is the extent to which Ashdown intervened in the everyday politics of BiH, and how Ashdown's intervention could have negatively affected the capabilities of the B osnian politicians as well as how the following term of Schwarz Schilling demonstrated the failure of BiH politicians to move beyond wartime identities and segmented interests for the sake of a national transformation Hitchner and Joseph have noticed the recent trend of apathy towards BiH from the international community as more difficult and time consuming problems, such as the financial crisis, come to the forefront. They worry that apathy and the lessening of the role of the OHR in BiH is exactly wha t B iH does not need right now, and they believe that the OHR should be strengthened to help bring BiH back to the right path and bring
! '" them to do the door of EU candidacy as opposed to dropping them off somewhere in the neighborhood. All of these analyses ag ree to some extent that becoming a member of the major international organizations in the West (the E U and NATO) is vital to the continued success of BiH as a self sufficient country. They also insist that the international presence cannot leave: if a tota l exit of the international community were to take place in BiH as it is today, there would be disastrous consequences. All agree that BiH is not currently headed in any direction other than stagnation, and that a large change must occur to push BiH out of stagnation. Erlap and Hunt and Wesley make the point that the international community is to blame, although their reasoning as to why differs. Erlap blames the EU for not being prepared for a post conflict country to join, and Hunt and Wesley blame the EU for not taking a strong enough stance in bringing BiH into the EU. Hitchner and Joseph take the other stance, blaming the BiH politicians and people for not having enough interest in EU membership and thus continuing to avoid passing the necessary reforms Either way all authors seem to state that the future of BiH does not rest in its own hands, but in the hands of the international community. If left to its own devices BiH would surely fall into ethnic conflict again, further widening the already present ethnic cleavages. The international community needs to take a strong stance in order to help BiH move forward, and only then can it fully pull out of BiH without worrying about BiH sliding back into old tensions.
! '# Conclusion The government of BiH is onc e again at a point of stagnation. The international community has attempted to aid BiH by using a vari ety of interventionist methods and yet no substantial progress towards a self sufficient democracy has been made. In the beginning, the international comm unity was applauded for its successful efforts to end the war. However, over time it became clear that the Dayton Accords were more of a peace treaty than a constitution that could support a growing and reconciling country. Overemphasis of ethnicity, the o riginal criterion that necessitated the Dayton Accords, has now become an institutionalized obstacle to effective governmental reform. The international community has hardly attempted to create cross cutting cleavages, and the formerly warring parties have not committed to meaningful reconciliation. The governmental structure's consociational aspects hinder the government from being able to make meaningful ch ange towards strengthening national institutions and phasing out the international institutions. Hea vy amounts of intervention by Petritsch and Ashdown were well intentioned, and done in the hopes that they would rid BiH of destabilizing nationalism. However, when Schwartz Schilling took over in 2006, it was clear that heavy handedness had made no substa ntial change in the underlying levels of nationalism. When Schwartz Schilling tried to take a more trusting approach in his use of the Bonn Powers, the resurgence of nationalism brought doubt to the optimistic among the international community. It is clear that heavy handed intervention has reinforced certain pathologies that cannot be so easily undone while simultaneously that the Bosnian politicians have not taken the initiative and made the hard decisions necessarily to move from consociational segmenta tion to a functioning national unity
! '$ Chapter 4 Conclusion Bosnia and Herzegovina is reaching a changing point, for better or for worse. Major constitutional reforms are being continually delayed, the role of the OHR is being slowly weakened in the ho pes that the international community can soon exit, and the census that was supposed to take place this year, that would offer the first real look at the population of BiH, has been postponed indefinitely. These indicators, as well as others, show that the current governmental system cannot continue for long; something will have to change soon. Not least are the problems within and amongst the political parties. The political parties are gradually coming to the conclus ions that forming "a government of nati onal unity" is the best way to survive but even with these well meant intentions and the knowledge that they need to join together, radical parties still intervene and threaten the fragile balance (Ognjen Tadic quoted in Balkan Insight 2013 c) An example of the difficulties between the international community and the local politicians is the current situation in the Bosniak Bosnian Croat entity. The Federation of BiH is cu rrently in the middle of a governmental crisis based on the unwillingness of certain ethnicities and ethnic political parties to cooperate and compromise with one another The crisis began during the election period in the Federation when the House of Peoples faced the task of d eciding who would be the three Constitutional C ourt judges to represent the Federation. T he president of the Federation & ivko Budimir submitted three names, but the SDP, the main Bosniak party, has continually blocked Budimir's
! '% submissions based on the judges going against the vital interests of the Bosniaks. Strife within the House of Peoples truly began in May 2012, when the ruling coalition comprised of the SDP, SDA, and two minor Croatian parties split due to fundamentally different ideas about the future of BiH (Balkan Insigh t 2012 a ). Since the split, the SDP ha s acted as a spoiler in the House of Peoples, refusing to agree with the other members of the House of Peoples because they feel that their vital ethnic interests are at stake. A vote of no confidence was attempted on February 12 to rid the House of People s of the Bosniak ministers who continually vetoed legislation, but this move was also blocked by the Bosniak caucus. Typically an issue of this magnitude would be taken to the Constitutional C ourt, but because the issue currently being fought over is who s hould represent the Federation in the Constitutional Court, the Court is not currently functioning and canno t make a ruling over the s talemate The SDP has now pleaded to the OHR and the PIC to intervene using the Bonn Powers to rescue the Federation from its current crisis. The PIC responded by saying, "the authorities [of the Federation of BiH] must stop expecting the International Community to do their job for them and instead explain how they intend to move for ward" (Balkan Insight 2013 g ). The OHR issu ed a similar statement saying "the obligation to nominate judges will not go away  all parties involved must now put the basic functionality of the institutions and the interests of the Federation citizens first" (OH R 2013). The current crisis is an exa mple of the relation that the OHR has to BiH. The OHR is most i mportant to the Bosniaks in BiH; the international community is seen as their greatest ally. In this crisis, the Bosniaks are acting as spoilers and trying to gain the aid of the international community by claiming that their vital interests are being violated. The OHR, however, has moved into a period
! '& of non intervention, hopefully leading to the eventual exit of the international overseers from the country. The crisis in the Federation is a te st for BiH to prove that although things may not be easy and stalemates and deadlocks are frequent through compromise the politicians can operate their country or entity independently of the international community. BiH cannot progress with the internat ional community still deeply entrenched in its national politics one cannot formally join the EU as a protectorate state. However, for the international community to leave, the central institutions of BiH would need to become strong enough to manage the re lative autonomy of the two entities that currently funct ion like mini states. T he issue of c entralization is unpopular with the entity level governme nts though; they worry that reduction of their autonomy will bring ethnic oppression A series of patholog ies have been created during the international community's intervention in the transition to democracy in BiH. Namely, a depend ence on the OHR has led to local politicians shirking certain responsibilities that would help to establish a self sufficient dem ocracy. The leve l of OHR intervention in conjunction with the structure of the BiH government following the Dayton Accords has e nforced ethnicity as the central feature of political identity. This is not to say that without the intervention of the internat ional community BiH would have been able to create a self sufficient government on its own. T he international community has played an invaluable ro le in the reconstruction of BiH: endi ng the conflict and c reating a government have established relative poli tical and economic stability. Nevertheless, long term intervention has created a system of dependence on the international community for progressive legislation.
! '' The trend of increased intervention during the time of Petritsch and Ashdown, alt hough it ha s hel ped the country to develop, has not helped the BiH politicians become more capable of sust aining the count ry on their own without the assistance of the international community In an attempt to remedy the situation Schwarz Shilling tried to intervene as minimally in Bosnian affairs as possible, in the hopes that the function and [the OHR] will disappear in the near future" (OHR 2006 a ). However, after Schwarz Shilling's debacle in office, it appears that a complete exit of the international community from BiH is not immediately possible. Due to failures of Bosnian political actors and the pathologies that have bee n persisted through intervention overemphasis on ethnic identities through the consociational system persistent nationalist parties, and dep endency on the international community a slow exit with increasingly less intervention is the only way for BiH to move forward. Reversal of these pathologies will take time, reconciliation, a new generation that is willing to forgive and move on from the p ast, and entity governments that are willing to work together to enact the 5+2 Agenda. The structure of the government in BiH has also created a series of negative responses to well intentioned actions. Consociationalism was put into place because of the ethnic tensions present during and directly after the war, but ethnicity has become too heavily emphasized in the consociational system through ethnic quotas in the office of the presidency as well as other central organs of the state. These ethnic quotas, while meant to ensure that no one group is oppressed, exacerbate the dividing influence of ethnicity within BiH society and overshadow the idea of an overarching Bosnian and
! '( Herzegovinian identity. Similarly dividing the country into two highly autonomou s and ethnically defined regions h as emphasized ethnic identity geographically. The OHR plays an essential role in aiding BiH to pass necessary legislation and other activities that have become hindered by the extensive system of checks and balances a rol e that since Ashdown, the office has been trying to minimalize. Unfortunately in the past, the OHR has been too quick to enact legislation for the BiH politicians, indicating to them th at if they fail to do their job then the international community will do it for them without the Bosnian politicians having to worry about losing popularity among their constituents. The dilemma in BiH is that the country cannot progress with the Dayton Accords still intact and the international community maintaining authori tative powers in BiH. BiH cannot progress with the international community still involved in their government, yet the politicians have given few indicators that they are capable of running or even are willing to run, the government without the internatio nal community overseeing and assisting the Bosnian government. So what is to be done with a country that relies so heavily on a constitution and an i n ternation al institution that also hinder the country's progress? The generally agreed upon answer is that BiH needs to become a full member of the EU and NATO, allowing for passive international monitoring to hold BiH to certain standards that, as a member, it would have to uphold The only issue with such a situation is that the EU has become increasingly fru strated with the lack of progress that the Bosnian politicians have made in reforming the government for EU candidacy status. In fact in most instances it appears that BiH is not particularly interested in joining the EU, and has made very little progress towards completing the 5+2 Agenda. Hitchner and
! ') Joseph outline this dilemma: in "Bosnia Herzegovina, despite having a formalized relationship with the EU at its disposal, a prominent EU Mission in Sarajevo, and years of coaxing on EU requirements, the EU magnet holds no meaningful attraction either for Bosnia 's leaders or ordinary citizens (2013). Since the 5+2 Agenda was published and the capabilities of the HR were strictly diminished, the international community can at this point only encourage the Bos nian politicians to reform their constitution. To date, such encouragement has held no real effect. When looking at the criticism of the role of the international community, the following question frequently comes to mind: What do the Bosnian people want in terms of the role of the OHR as well as the status of the Dayton Accords? Allcock makes the point that "there seems to be no great clamor raised by Bosnians themselves for a wholesale reconstruction of the [General Framework Agreeme nt for Peace]" ( 200 4, 34). Why do so many international scholars argue so intensely for the Bosnian people to rise up and change their current system of government, when neither the people nor the politicians have indicated any concerted desire or interest to do so? There is little doubt that if the politicians and citizens of BiH of all three ethnicities were to organize a referendum effectively kicking out the international community they would go, almost gladly. The general opinion of the international community and the Da yton Accords, however, is split along ethnic and entity lines. The Bosnian Serbs of the Republika Srpska have long felt that the international community has accused the Bosnian Serbs of being the primary aggressors in the Bosnian War, and that the internat ional community's role in Bosnian national level politics is to punish them a fact hard to deny when 46% (74 of the 161) of individuals indicted by the ICTY have been Bosnian Serbs (ICTY
! '* 2013 ). On the other side, those from the Federation of BiH feel as th ough the OHR is there to protect their vital interests and maintai n stability. With such polarized opinions of the international community in BiH, it is unl ikely that the population in its entirety could reasonably say that they no longer need or want the international community present. It is hard to say what could have been done differently during the intervention of BiH. The Dayton Accords did what many other peace treaties could not: broker peace among three ethnicities whose leaders were determined to expel or extinguish the other s It is possible that had the international community worked harder to create cross cutting cleavages among the ethnicities and not created two different states based on ethnic lines, then cooperation among the ethnicities in government would be easier. However, fact that all of the attempted and finally successful peace treaties for BiH relied heavily on concessions being made along ethnic lines suggests that creating peace in BiH without stressing ethnicity might not have be en possible The creation of a stronger civil society among the Bosnian people across ethnicity is vital for BiH's future success. George Soros's Open Society Foundation for example, has worked in BiH since 1993 to improve the civil society and to bridge across ethnic cleavages. The Open Society Foundation in BiH noted in their annual reports (2002, 2006, 2007, and 2010) that ethnic segregation in BiH schools is adversely affecting the next generation, and they have been working diligently to try to desegr egate the schools. It is possible that helping the next generation to interact regularly with other ethnicities will help them to realize that the differences between them are not so great ; eventually, these students may be the best hope and be able to create a unified government without the prejudices or f ears of the current generation.
! (+ One must also question the international community's decision of governmental system to i mpose on the Bosnian government. C onsociationalism was a clear choice co nsidering that this system is typically wha t is used for third party state building in divided countries. B ut it is often forgotten that in 1974 Tito had established a consociational system of government in Yugoslavia the system to which many attribute the outbreak of the War s of Yugoslav Secession. Indeed, many of BiH's features such as rotation in office and multiple veto capabilities mirror the practices of the Yugoslav system. There is no clear successful model of international state building that BiH could follow; if anything on several occasions BiH has been t he model for other countries such as Iraq. Moving past the consociational system of government will be a very hard task but one that is necessary for BiH to move forward. The best possible solution would be to write a new constitution that would effective ly make the position of the OHR void, as well as eliminate the consociational aspects of the governmental structure and remove the ethnic quotas within the constitution. C reating a stronger c entralized government is vital for BiH' s future success. Unfortun ately such a so lution does not seem possible among the c urrent BiH politicians, who are more worried about protecting their ethnicity than promoting larger national identity. BiH has the potential to become as successful as its neig hbor states Croatia and Serbia. The EU and the internation al community in BiH have worked hard so that once the local actors are ready to work together to pass the necessary reforms EU membership should be in sight. BiH must overcome the pathologies that have arisen both from t he lack of cooperation among Bosnian politicians and intensive international intervention Overcoming these factors will req u ire reconciliation and the creation of a stronger central
! (" gov ernment that is not as structured arou nd ethnicity. M ajor changes and revisions need to be mad e before BiH can move forward. The international community is at a point where they would gladly leave BiH if given any inkling that the country could survive without their help. However, t he recent crises, and the inability of the domestic actors to solve the problems, indicate that intervention is still necessary. It is possible that all BiH needs is time for a new generation to come in to power, one that does not have the same resentment of the other ethnicities as their parents do one that grew up in integrated schools realizing that the differences between the ethnicities are not so great nor that important. But until that time all the international community can do is hope for the BiH politicians to join together to complete the 5+2 Agenda, allowing for the entrance of BiH into the EU and NATO, as well as allowing for the international community to begin their slow withdrawal from BiH.
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