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BUSINESS AS USUAL: GREENPEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD BY MARA FEINBERG A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Frank Alcock Sarasota, Florida May, 2012
ii Acknowledgements First I would like to give a special thanks to Dr. Frank Alcock, Dr. Barbara Hicks, and Dr. Alfred Beulig for all of their help and advice over the past four years and for supporting my academic endeavors. Specifically, thank you to Dr. Alcock for working with me to create a thesis that I am proud of and always providing me with encouragement. In addition, I would like to give an extra spec ial thanks to Jan Wheeler. With out Jan and her constant motivations, revisions, and lessons I would not be the writer I am today. And to my family and friends who have always been there for me throughout the thesis process and my time here at New College. To my Mom: without your support, motivation, and love I would not be the person I have grown to be. Thank you for being there no matter what and always encouraging me to my best To Ilene: let me just say you are wonderful a nd one of the greatest people I have met. I am so glad we found friendship, one that will last. To Rachel: you are my Dance Tutorial savior. I am so glad we have met, danced, and become the friends we are today. To Thomas: thank you for always being there even when times are tough and supporting me through this crazy thesis year. And to Tobin; thank you for always being so adorable! Thank you to everyone in my life for always being there. Your support is appreciated and I love every single one of you!
iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iii List of Figures and Tables iv Abstract v Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Literature Review of Non Governmental Org anizations 6 Chapter 2: Case Study of Greenpeace Campaigns 34 Chapter 3: Interviews with Greenpeace Affiliates 69 Chapter 4: Metrics of Success 92 Chapter 5: Analysis and Conclusion 114 Appendix A 128 Appendix B 13 7 Works Cited 1 3 8
iv List of Tables and Figures Tables Table 1. Environmental movement tactics 27 Table 2. Greenpeace international supporters 1971 2010 98 Table 3. Distribution of Greenpeace environmental victories 106 Table 4. Degree of Greenpeace victories from 1 to 4 107 Table 5. Amount of Greenpeace victories from 1971 2010 acc ording to degree 107 Figures Figure 1. Greenpeace USA income and expenditures 1971 2010 96 Figure 2. Greenpeace International income and expenditures 1971 2010 97 Figure3. Concern for environmental problems 100 Figure 4. Personal worry about global warming in the US 101 Figure 5. Opinion of the effects of global warming 102 Figure 6. Opinions of news reports about global warming 103 Figure 7. Opinions of the primary cause of global warming 103 Figure 8. Orientation toward the environmental movement 104 Figure 9. US environmental protection versus economic growt h 105
v BUSINESS AS USUAL: GREENPEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD Mara Feinberg New College of Florida, 2012 ABSTRACT The history of Greenpeace creates an iconic image of the organization in the environmental movement. However, that image dates back t o the late 1970s and it remains to be seen whether over the last forty years Greenpeace is still impacting change on the environment. It is difficult to define how environmental non governmental organizations such as Greenpeace are effective in politics. The mai n goal of this thesis is to understand how Greenpeace has evolved in global environmental politics, addressing how Greenpeace operates in different environmental issue areas over time. This thesis examines the following: literature on NGO existence in envi ronmental politics; a historical narrative of Greenpeace over the last forty years; personal interviews investigating the organizations self perceptions; and indicators of success such as Greenpeace's finances, public opinion of environmental perceptions, and G reenpeace's assessment of its environmental victories. It is possible that Greenpeace has not evolved since its inception forty years ago. However, my f indings show that Greenpeace stays true to its core values but with little variability in its strategies and tactics but is still accomplishing micro level envi ronmental victories as an ENGO in politics. Frank Alcock Social Sciences
1 Introduction Greenpeace has been a recognizable part of politics since the peak of the American environmental movement in the 1970s. If the world were polled at this moment and asked what environmental organization symbolized the environmental movement over the past four decades, it would be surprising if Greenpeace was not the most popular answer. Greenpeace has gained popularity in environmental poli tics since its inception in 197 1 when it sailed the Phyllis Cormack to the Aleutian Islands to stop nuc lear testing. Its popularity grew from Greenpeace's motivation to protect the environment through non violent, confrontational, direct actions. Despite its current high profile reputation in environmental politics, it is questionable whether Greenpeace is the same organization it was almost four decades ago. Clearly Greenpeace has integrated itself in the dynamics of global environmental politics, but the degree to which it is effective is the concept in question. Interested in understanding Greenpeace's accomplished reputation, an investigation into the history of the organization, as well as its own opinions of its position in environmental politics are pertinent and timely. The history of Greenpeace creates a certain image of the organization, one of a powerful and motivated group of activists. However, that image dates back to the late 1970s and 1980s; it remains to be seen whether Greenpeace and its members are still those same mobilizing individuals impacting change for the environment. Also, Greenpea ce historically focused on a few campaigns, such as whaling and seal hunting and nuclear energy and testing. However, as time went on, environmental problems and concern began to rise exponentially. Environmental issues expanded political concern to oceans forests, toxics, and global
2 warming. In not only a rapidly evolving realm of politics, but an evolving world in general, Greenpeace is still in existence. That existence, however, needs to be redefined as environmental problems are not necessarily bein g solved, but rather proliferating. As society and the world progresses with technology and improved communications, environmental politics especially has become more complicated. Every new environmental issue presents a different political context or poli tical opportunity. An environmental NGO should realize this complexity and structure their political campaigns accordingly. Strategies and tactics utilized by these organizations should vary from campaign to campaign, depending on issue sensitivity. If an environmental NGO were to attack each environmental campaign with similar strategies and tactics, it is difficult to assume how effective its outcome may be. It could be assumed that there is no one environmental issue that is politically similar to anothe r; environmental issues varies greatly as the world progresses forward. An environmental NGO's role in politics should evolve accordingly as well; the role of Greenpeace in global environmental politics is assumed to evolve with time as well. Recently, a visit to the maiden voyage of Greenpeace's newest vessel, The Rainbow Warrior III, demonstrated it is continuing its involvement in environmental protection. At the vessel's sendoff, members of Greenpeace were giving tours, answering questions, and promot ing the Greenpeace message: to bear witness to any environmental injustice through non violent direct action tactics and strategies. The dock was covered in Greenpeace signs and posters displaying the organization's political agenda. The organization clear ly defines how and why it has been historically influential and effective
3 in politics. However defining political effectiveness through ideology and organizational purity is not a sufficient answer. It is clear that the organization is firmly established i n the realm of environmental non governmental organizations, but whether or not it is just living up to its popularity or evolving to continuously impact the world through environmental improvements remains undefined. Clearly, various questions remained to be defined in regard to Greenpeace and its influence and presence in global environmental politics. This thesis attempts to gain an understanding of Greenpeace's emergence in global environmental politics and the values and goals it has embodied along t he way. Specifically, the literature will focus on the strategies and tactics available to NGOs like Greenpeace, and the effectiveness of these organizations in social and political science literature. Greenpeace's current reputation leads to the assumptio n that it is an environmental NGO that still wants to make changes and impact the environmental issues facing society. The main goal of this thesis is to understand how Greenpeace has evolved in global environmental politics; specifically addressing how Gr eenpeace operates in its campaigns, in different issue areas, and how they make operational decisions. It is possible that Greenpeace has not changed at all since its inception almost forty years ago; despite this assumption Greenpeace is a well known envi ronmental NGO that still has a popular presence in global environmental politics. Thesis Structure Chapter 1 aims to accomplish this thesis's objective goals, by first reviewing environmentally oriented, non governmental organization literature. An anal ysis of several theoretical political science lenses will explain several concepts: the emergence of
4 environmental NGOs and why they matter; the values and ideology that establish what these organizations want to accomplish; their strategies and tactics In addition, it is an objective of this thesis to develop an understanding why Greenpeace is not as adaptive as its iconic image indicates is established through a variety of analyses. Chapter 2 presents a historical narrative of Greenpeace's evolution, fr om the perspective of the organization. This narrative summarizes the four decades of environmental campaigns, tactics, and strategies that have given Greenpeace its high profile status. Each decade of Greenpeace's existence in politics has been documented ; the chapter highlights specifically the strategies and tactics that Greenpeace has used in its famous campaigns like whaling and nuclear energy. This historical account serves as secondary source data, used to evaluate Greenpeace's effectiveness as an EN GO. Chapter 3 establishes a primary source to asse s s the evolution based of the organization from the viewpoint of current and former affiliates based on personal interviews. Each interviewee was asked similar questions and conversation like objectives, to establish what members of the Greenpeace believed to be true of the organization's adaptive structure. Objectives include such topics as long term and short term goals of Greenpeace, how tactics and strategies have changed over time and whether or not G reenpeace aims to fundamentally change the world. These data serve as a primary source of information on the way in which Greenpeace argues that it is an environmentally successful and effective organization. Chapter 4 explores a variety of objective and subjective indicators such as a comparison of Greenpeace's income and expenditures, a review of environmental public opinion polls, and an explication of the organization's self claimed environmental
5 victories. These variables will be identifiable metrics of success that are pertinent in evaluating Greenpeace's adaptive structure over time. These chapters, along with an in depth literature review on the theoretical assumptions of environmental NGOs in Chapter 1, contribute to the evaluation of Greenpeace a s an effective or influential organization in politics as well as contributing to the existing literature on the effectiveness of ENGOs.
6 Chapter 1: Literature Review of Non Governmental Organizations Environmental non governmental organizations (ENGOs) like Greenpeace have established a salient role in global politics. Functionally, ENGOs or non governmental organizations (NGOs) in general have gained a level of political competency since the early 1970s and continue to exert influ ence over policymakers and their decisions. Political scientists such as Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer and Gary Bryner argue that the dynamics of competing interests in politics have allowed for NGOs to represent all types of societal interests internationally Today, environmentally oriented NGOs have become a fully functioning part of global politics, having the ability to be heard in negotiations. In addition, analyzing the social aspects of the American environmental movement will contribute to the verific ation or falsification of the assumption that ENGOS specifically have become stronger because of the various discursive frameworks and political collective identities formed over time. Other scholars argue with the theory that ideologically led tactics and strategies and an organization's collective identity, not only reflect the core values of an ENGO, but are the impetus to effectiveness in global politics. Both theoretical assumptions in addition to understanding group dynamics in environmental politics argue that environmental NGOs have proven to be effective and influential; these organizations are able to make positive changes for the environment and become a part of the global political negotiation process. Chapter 1 provides an in depth evaluation of these political theories in regard to environmental NGOs. Furthermore, using a variety of political science lenses contributes to the processes by which ENGOs have maintained influence and environmental effectiveness.
7 NGO Existence and the Environment al Movement A general understanding of social movement tendencies is a useful social science lens that contributes to the understanding of NGO influence and existence. This theoretical concept establishes the development of early American environmental so cial movement frameworks and the core methods and values that NGOs have developed. In addition, understanding the dynamics between the values and ideology of NGO strategies and tactics establishes the motivation and perpetuation of these organizations. Exa mining early environmental NGO values and approaches to governance also creates an understanding of the type of behavior and conditions necessary for NGO influence in policy today. U.S environmental organizations have been in existence since the 1900's. As early as 1864, the protection of national lands and natural values has been on the U.S. Congress's political agenda. Over time, industrialization and globalization have intensified environmental concerns and American reactions to these issues This movement has evolved over the past one hundred years. According to Jacqueline Switzer, 1 and some of the earliest associations were the Sierr a Club and Greenpeace USA. Historically, the environment has remained a part the political agenda. As a result, groups like Greenpeace and the Sierra club have grown in size over time, due to member and societal support for the environmental actions and fo undations they embody. An investigation of various aspects of the environmental moment establishes how 1 Jacqueline Vaughn Switzer and Gary Bryner, Environmental Politics: Domestic and Global Dimensions ( St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998), 21 44.
8 environmental non governmental organizations (ENGOs) have displayed influence in environmental politics today. Scholars such as Robert J. Brulle claim that there are multiple discursive frameworks that define actors in environmentalism. Brulle has divided the environmental movement into different sectors which delineate, in terms of the issues they speak to address, strategies and methods, division of la bor, and roles of its associations have taken on discursive frameworks and thus have created individual identities and a particular way in which they network and 2 A question t hat remains to be answered is how these frameworks create the foundations of current environmental associations' forms of actions and internal organization and objectives. Common discursive frames seen in the U.S. Environmental Movement have been nature as being an important factor in the physical and spiritual continuance of the human race, arguing that nature should be left undisturbed. Conservationists believe tha t nature should managed from a utilitarian perspective, while deep ecologists believe that all life on earth has intrinsic value and that maintenance of the environment mandates a decrease of human impacts. 3 Once an environmental association defines its id eological structure, its collective identity will have an effect on resources, political alliances, and practices. John McCormick defines groups similarly, in regard to their theoretical framing and ideologically structured actions. He has identified th ree typologies that early American activists associations have embodied. McCormick specifically connects these philosophical foundations to more recent typologies of NGOs. NGOs may be considered 2 Robert J. Brulle, The Handbook of Politics: State and Civil Society in Global Perspective (Springer Publishers, Ne w York, NY), 1 17. 3 Brulle, The Handbook of Politics: State and Civil Society in Global Perspective, 2.
9 or radicals. McCormick claims that pragmatic reformists are considered to be the most conservative, largest, and most publicly recognized, politically active type of NGOs. American environmental NGO examples of this type of organization are the Sierra Club and the World Wildlife Fund. have an equal right to exist, challenge the underlying institutional structures and social values upon which governments are based and economies function, and argue [that] the need for fundamental social change is a prerequisite for effective environmental 4 These groups do not accept current social and political values, but instead criticize and undermine ideas such as consu merism and materialism. Such groups see themselves as strong green movements, while politicians view them as threats to political disenchanted with the methods and goals of mai nstream environmentalism and believe in the use of direct action as a means to bring about urgent needed political and social 5 McCormick argues that Greenpeace is an example of an early radical group and still strives to be that type of group. Gre enpeace believes it consists of determined environmental issues at whatever cost necessary. It could be assumed that there is a key fault line among the frameworks, that the re an ecological perspective are more likely to resort to direct action and other 4 John McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy, edited by Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig, (Washington D.C. : CQ Press 2005) 83 102. 5 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 93.
10 confrontational strategies (sometimes in combination with insider tactics) while group s with a conservation perspective work exclusively within the existing institutional 6 Radicals that engage in a direct action ideological framework will always choose to use confrontational tactics like property damage, to set themselves apart from pragmatic reformists. According to Russell Dalton, pragmatic reformists would rather be Identifying this fault line within the environmental social movement can help define the roles of early environmental associations into what is now known as the American environmental NGO community. Consequently, environmental concern and the development of social movement and activism of political opposition peaked in the early 1970's. Wit h popularity came enormous growth in organizational membership of within groups and the creation of new groups in the United States. From this growth came the establishment of groups of activists as non governmental organizations. According to Jacqueline S witzer, the term profit and may include groups ranging from rural peoples' leagues and tribal unions to private relief associations, irrigation user groups, and local developm ent associations. NGOs are classified as grassroots organizations, service NGOs, or policy 7 These organizations strive to shape environmental policy and foster change, as well as monitor existing policies and the adherence of participating count ries to these policies. 6 Frank Alcock, Conflicts and Coalitions Within and Across the ENGO Community, 2008, Excerpt from Dalton 2002. 7 Swit zer and Bryner, Environmental Politics: Domestic and Global Dimensions, 36.
11 ENGOs in Action Competition of societal interests could be defining factor to the understanding of the dynamics of NGOs in environmental politics; which determines the desires of an NGO in environmental politics. Adherents of t his approach believe that political decisions are the result of the struggles among competing interests who have access to the political process; some groups will have more access than others, because of superior financial resources, leadership, organizati on, or public support for their cause. 8 There is a chance that some groups will outweigh others in the amount of influence exerted in political processes. Therefore, this assumption establishes an understanding of the role of certain groups. NGOs are one t ype of group that has historically participated in the ongoing political debate within international environmental politics. Understanding NGO development in environmental politics and their successes and failures allows for a deeper understanding of a NGO s' role in the overall political process. More importantly, the environment has become a concern of civil society as more evidence has been put forth about the damaging effects the environment has experienced. Early social movement strategies represent t he specific concerns of civil society. With higher public awareness of environmental issues, it could be assumed that governments may experience an increase of political pressure to enforce and implement proper ernational level, the handicaps to effective (other than international treaties or the terms of membership of international organizations), and there is no global author ity responsible for proposing and enforcing 8 Switzer and Bryner, Environmental Politics: Domestic and Global Dimensions, 21.
12 9 It seems to be easier for a state to ignore the problems and environmental costs beyond its border; therefore, over time, civil society has recognized on state weakness and become more involved in global environmental governance emerging in the form of NGOs. Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have defined the concept of transnational advocacy networks which connects to the emergence of NG Os. These networks of highly diverse non state actors, or activists, have become key actors of regional concerns in international policy negotiations on environmental issues. Transnational advocacy networks began by building new links among actors in civil societies, states and international organizations; they multiply the opportunities for dialogue and exchange 10 in areas such as the environment. Unlike other political actors, these activist networks are driven by morals and values versus economics or mate rial concerns. NGOs are activist groups bound together by shared values, common discourses and dense exchanges of information and services. 11 These non state players try to influence policy negotiations and strive to transform the way issues are debated in international environmental politics; society. traditions that focus on complex interactions am ong actors, on the inter subjective construction of frames of meaning, and on the negotiation and malleability of identities 9 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 92. 10 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikk International Social Science Journal (Vol. 51. Issue 159, 1999), 89 101. 11
13 12 Transnational advocacy networks emphasize the dynamics of group interaction and naturally competing interests of g roups in environmental politics. NGOs are able to exert influence and be apparent in environmental politics once ties between domestic groups and their governments have been severed, creating what is known as the boomerang effect or pattern. NGOs target st ates specifically, pressuring the state and trying to change its behavior regarding an issue. These networks try to amplify the access to different publics, multiplyi 13 In addition, McCormick argues that most states lack the motivation to respond to environmental issues properly. As a result, the public has taken a stand against ineffective government intervention tho ugh the creation of NGOs. These organizations take on different responsibilities hoping to put pressure on governments to create public awareness of environmental issues: for example, lobbying local governments, monitoring government action, or raising fun ds to implement private enforcement and management practices. Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele Izu identify different roles in civil society that NGOs will technically utilize and which are considered most important in ing, disseminating and analyzing information, providing input to agenda setting and policy development processes, performing operational functions, assessing environmental conditions and monitoring compliance with environmental agreements and advocating en 14 Non governmental organizations have stepped up to these roles and aim to make successful impacts on 12 13 14 Barbara Gemmill and Abimbola Bamidele GOs and Civil Society in Global and Global Governance: Options and Opportunities (2002), 9.
14 environmental politics and negotiations. NGOs have established political legitimacy through these roles of being a non state or gover nmental actor. Most scholars agree that NGOs have in fact been integrated into global society, competing with entities such as the state. NGOs have clearly become an important presence in international politics, not only influencing public values but soc ial behavior in international civil society. It is questionable as to whether NGOs have torn down the metaphorical boundaries that states create. McCormick argues from an idealist e response to issues that transcend state lines; the state may have improved the quality of life of many of its citizens, but it has done so at the expense of encouraging people to think of themselves as competing citizens of individual states rather than as cooperating members 15 This argument reinforces the fact that there is no real international authority that has coercive powers over states to comply consistently with environmental negotiations and policies; thus there has been an int egration of these social activists as political non state actors or NGOs. However, the idea of a weak state system is nothing new. NGOs have taken advantage of this weakness, which is why NGOs have come together outside the formalized structure of a stat e to achieve political goals in regard to the environment. It seems that NGOs have increased their participation as actors in environmental politics to carry out their diverse political goals. They strive to be civil, environmental agents that gather, anal yze, exchange, and disseminate data, or act as normative agencies that define standards and declare international principles and goals, or to function as operational agencies that have the power to oversee, for example, the administration of financial or 15 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 94.
15 t echnological assistance. 16 Other scholars such as Kal Raustiala argue that NGOs have gained influence not because of state failure, but because NGOs have taken advantage of their comparative political advantages and resources. Raustiala claims that environmental politics has changed radically over the last fifteen years; thus, the strength of international politics illustrate[ing] the expansion, not the retreat, of the state i n addressing global 17 In addition, the significance of the evolution of American social environmental movements into NGOs is observed from a variety of perspectives. Raustiala suggests that environment in ways that states do not. Others question whether NGOs are merely satisfying public opinion and do not create effective change, and that there has been an e rise of NGO activity [is] evidence of the 18 This is demonstrated through the 19 NGOs are demonstratively creating a stronger link between local needs and global decisions. Social dynamics in general and more specifically environmental activism is once again contributing to the linkage between local needs and global decisions and clai ms are made that NGOs are challenging the limitations of the traditional political, state centric system. International environmental 16 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 95. 17 Kal Raustiala, International Studies Quarterly, (Vol. 41, 1997), 721. 18 NGOs, and Internatio 725. 19 nal Environmen 725.
16 cooperation has evolved and adapted over time due to both social and group aspects of NGO involvement. Ideological Value s and Goals Importantly, the ideological goals and values of a group seem to be considered when an NGO chooses how to operate and represent civil society. Ideology is the core element that shapes organizations' perspectives on environmental issues and the way they attack these issues. Russel l organizations to select certain political actions that are considered to be suitable, 20 Groups co mmonly choose unconventional actions over conventional within this theory. Unconventional actions are favored by strongly ideological NGOs because these groups tend to challenge dominant social and economic norms. They might not see significance in creatin g change through the conventional political channels and would rather engage in more expressive, radical public displays such as protests or media covered demonstrations. Dalton expresses this group distinction as either insiders and engagers or confronter s. Thus, the stronger the ideological foundations an environmental NGO has, the more commonly unconventional or confrontational tactics and strategies will be chosen; this conclusion however, remains to be defined. There is also a set of conditions known as political opportunity structures that contribute to the overall literature have an effect on organizational structure. Thus, NGOs are seen as rational actors that are responding to political opportunities as they arise from environmental issues. Thus, the political structure of these opportunities will influence 20 Dalton, Russel J. and Robert Action Comparative Political Studies, (Vol. 36, September 2003), 16.
17 n short, the political opportunity structure [theory] presumably can encourage or discourage certain activities depending on how political processes function and what access points (and likely influence) are available for specific political 21 system is open, there are more opportunities for conventional NGOs to be effective, oppo sed to a closed system where unconventional organizations tend to take a stand. Judging the degree of openness or closeness of a political system varies and alters the access points available to environmental NGOs and the dissemination of their goals. I nterestingly, some political scientists argue that democratic societies are more likely to bring about opportunities for citizens or new environmental groups to express, mobilize and receive support through conventional tactics. Yet, democratic societies a re also more tolerant of such unconventional activities such as protests or media covered demonstrations. In addition, the social and economic status of a society may also affect the political action of such environmental NGOs. More developed and financial ly stable countries, which also happen to be democratic, have more resources and awareness awarded to environmental protection and concerns. There are generally more possibilities and opportunities for environmental NGOs in these types of societies. In com parison, 22 This leads to a higher rate of unconventional tactics and strategies being used to catch the attention of environme ntal politicians. Greenpeace exemplifies this argument quite frequently in its valuation and goals seen in its historical whaling campaign. 21 Dalton and 18. 22 Dalton and 19.
18 Brulle also argues in favor of political opportunity structures as a defining factor in the selection of NGO tacti cs and strategies; especially in the United States, there has been a shift in the significance of environmental politics due to the policy impact of oil spill. Policy po wer has been shifted to environmental concerns because of the acceleration of environmental NGOs' concern for human health and the environment. This understanding emphasizes the theoretical frameworks of political opportunity structures and the salience of environmental issues that bring about NGO action through 23 through unconventional and convent ional tactics. In most cases, this window of opportunity arises because there is strong counter movement mobilization of awareness and environmental concern. NGOs capitalize on issues such as the Love Canal Toxic Waste incident and are able to use whatever tactics they choose because of the political opportunity. Tactics and Strategies In order for NGOs to have potential influence in policy and environmental concern, environmental groups need to determine tactics to bring about change and accomplish the ir goals according to their values. Russe l l Dalton and Robert Rohrschneider [of states decisions] or to work within the conventional [political] channels to implement 24 There is no right or wrong choice of tactics an NGO can make; scholars insist that the political interests of each group will decide the tactics a group utilizes. 23 Dalton and 20. 24 Dalton and Rohrschneid 2.
19 McCormick also argues that all environmental NGOs attempt to persuade, bargain, and coerce o ther parties to accomplish individual goals. All organizations, however, have a variety of methods at their disposal, usually reflecting the type of framework they are broadly classified under and the ideology they embody. Dalton takes the division of NG O tactics one step further, by classifying these described tactics as either conventional or unconventional; NGOs choose to work within the confines of the political system or outside of the system. In addition, Dalton claims nization, [environmental] NGOs must develop and 25 To clarify, tactics are considered ways in which an NGO tries to make an environmental change, while strategies are the way in which NGOs empl oy their chosen tactics. In addition, activities are the ways in which environmental NGOs carry out their political agendas. Therefore, many environmental groups choose tactics that best represent their political and objective goals, also reflecting the sp ecific frameworks mentioned previously. There is also usually a dichotomous choice of tactics and strategies that Dalton describes as either fundamentalist and expressive or pragmatic and politically instrumental activities. He seems to argue in favor of t he unconventional, fundamental environmental NGOs and the activities that they deliberately choose to use as tactics. change through conventional channels, such as lobbying or v 26 Rather, the environmental movement should enforce the idea of challenging the political establishment to bring about change and awareness. Groups such as Greenpeace more 25 Dalton, and 4. 26 Dalton, and e Modes of Political Act 4.
20 frequently opt to protest the actions of corporations, along with dominant po litical and economic actors to essentially bring about conflict. Some ENGOs will aim for confrontation when choosing tactics, instead of participation. As organizations that confront the political system, ENGOs have created a new participatory style; accor ding to Dalton, direct action leans toward decentralized, nonhierarchical, and expressive forms of behavior. 27 Governments however appear to be less apt to work with groups such as Greenpeace, who by day work within the system and by night work against the system. Theoretically, this unconventional strategy of tactical actions creates an identity for most environmental NGOs, and Dalton argues that this limits an ENGO's repertoire of possible actions. Direct action tactics appear to be seen as a common founda tion to achieve an ENGO's political goals. In comparison, pragmatic reformists and their repertoires of action are more prevalent and accepted in NGOs in environmental politics. Common social movement malized groups that are private, 28 ENGOs embody behavior that produces social continuity rather than effective results with conventional tactics. Some ENGOs, like Gr eenpeace, may choose to do some work within the confines of the given political institution. This, however, requires fundamental resources, political allies, and influence from the available opportunity structure. 29 It depends on the individual NGO, but in some cases the pragmatic qualities of an NGO may exhibit effectiveness more often than ideological tactics that confront the system. 27 Dalton and 5. 28 International PhD diss., The University of B ritish Columbia, 2007. 29 Dalton and 5
21 Regardless, an ENGO will always face a tension when selecting their modes of action; the choice depends on its discursive framework and ideological goals. This organizational decision is reflected most in an NGO's social identity as a group and political actor. Regardless of the tactical choice NGOs make, all organizations have environmental goals that need to be accomplished via tactics and strategies. McCormick certain activities; NGOs commonly carry out a mixture of activities, conventional and non conventional. Through their tactics, ENGOs organization and its resources; they must [always] communicate, inform, and mobilize their members; they want to shape political discourse; they want to influence public policy and these different goals inevitably requir 30 Derived from a broader sense of NGO tactical effectiveness is the idea that ENGOs are a form of transnational advocacy networks in environmental politics. Advocacy networks clearly rely on the power of information and its v alue and how it is perceived by states in their policies and negotiations. Transnational advocacy groups specifically use four types of tactics to accomplish their political and issue sensitive goals. Keck and Sikkink believe that transnational advocacy ne tworks use information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics and accountability politics. Information politics is often used by NGOs to move politically useful information quickly, and disseminate the information where it is likely to make more of an impact. Symbolic 31 that is not necessarily aware. Leverage politics, 30 Dalton and 6. 31 Keck and Advocacy Networks in Inter 95
22 which is a common tactic of unconventional organiza tions, is the ability to call upon important actors to make a change on behalf of the weaker, less influential actor. And accountability politics is an NGO's effort instead to put pressure on powerful actors by holding them responsible for their inaccuraci es, such as not complying or endorsing a negotiation they previously agreed to. These four tactics are ways of agenda framing that networks can use to affect international environmental politics. Through these tactics, o bring issues to the public agenda, both by 32 Scholars argue that transnational advocacy network strategies rely more on image presentation and proper political venues compared to mass mo bilization of issues by activist groups. To be effective, networks identify points of leverage they may hold over states; Keck and Sikkink describe both material leverage and moral leverage. Material leverage usually involves connecting money or goods with the rights of human lives. 33 This allows the issue to be more negotiable in the perspective of the state. On the other hand, moral leverage in volves more of what scholars call leverage; for example a network may shed light on a state's inability to follow appropriate codes while creating infant formula, like in Switzerland and the Netherlands. However, this tactic strongly depends on the how media and public opinion carry out the issue. Transnational advocacy networks always try to incorporate the tactic of accountability politics into their strategy. Keck and 32 Keck and Advocacy Networks in Inter 95. 33 96.
23 government has publicly committed itself to a principle, networks can use those positions, and their command of information, to expose the distance between discourse 34 of a state. Essentially, one piece of the liter ature claims that networks aim to change state behavior, not necessarily international policy. However, it might be more effective for a network to alter the way a state carries out a policy compared with creating a strict, and in a way non enforceable pol icy. McCormick also believes that the most utilized strategy that an ENGO tends to use is the tactic of media coverage of found that environmental groups believe the me dia is generally sympathetic to their cause, and most groups actively use the media to get their message across to the public, mobilize potential allies, give legitimacy and support to their work, and influence 35 Clearly, media coverage of is sues might be by far one of the most important methods an NGO could implement. McCormick also discusses other common methods and tactics ENGOs tend to use in politics. One of the most common methods he believes NGOs use, is the tactic of lobbying or work ing with political and economic officials. Specifically, NGOs try to hearings and the development of international treaties, or by submitting proposals to government departm 36 In conjunction with political lobbying, NGOs also strive to collect and spend funds for the conservation of the environment. Organizations tend to create projects and campaigns with a particular environmental focus and raise money for the issue. One of the more common strategies 34 98. 35 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 98. 36 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 96.
24 Greenpeace utilizes is the organization of campaigns and public protests. Groups such as Greenpeace aim to generate publicity about environmental issues and concerns to draw not only l ocal media attention but worldwide attention to its focus. Other methods employed by NGOs include litigation and monitoring the implementation of environmental law or acquiring and managing property through states. In most cases, states lack the incenti ves either to fully comply or to provide information in an honest and timely fashion. This remains to be attributed to the lack of state capacity lack of adequate an d timely reporting poses a major problem, and concern over [state] sovereignty has been an obstacle to the creation of monitoring and verification 37 ; this is where NGOs step in to aid in compliance and monitoring. According to Raustiala, NGOs are n ot necessarily the perfect monitoring agents. Instead of being concerned strictly about compliance, NGOs are more worried about vocalizing the violations of nations or using accountability politics as Keck and Sikkink have defined. For example, on the whal ing issue, NGOs criticize and monitor nations such as Japan that are part of illegal activities such as research whaling while the country is supposedly committed to compliance agreements. Utilizing moral leverage on powerful nations is a tactic used to im plement change and hopefully positive policy renegotiation on issues. Additional methods include the idea of information exchange or the dissemination of expert opinion and advice to policymakers. NGOs will choose to conduct its own research on behalf of a government or international agency. NGOs recognize the misunderstood relationship between the environment and the political world and its associated concerns. This lack of information could be a barrier to effective policy 37 nd Internatio 728.
25 decisions, and NGOs aim to pro 38 ; it is up to the state to have the final say as to whether information is valid or not. This is not to say that NGO inf ormation is not beneficial to politicians because NGO contributions may provide new perspective on environmental issues that may have not been originally considered in the political process. In a way, it allows the states to allocate resources more efficie ntly by allowing NGOs to submit information more freely. And lastly, NGOs organizations focus on mobilizing grassroots support for their objectives; this is most common in rural 39 Furthermore, NGO tactics and participation do not necessarily weaken the state centric ideal, but including NGOs enhances the ability for states to regulate environmental politics. Importantly, the degree of public awareness of these tactics and actions through the media may have an important influence on the overall effectiveness of an environmental NGO. Visibility to the media and the public at large will determine the type of activities and instrumental use of activities that an environmental NGO will pursue. It seems most scholars argue that there are groups such as Greenpeace who emphasize this controversial dichotomous relationship between choosing conventional and unconventional tactics to form their organizational identity For example, lobbying activities to influence policy; they just pursue such activities quietly while 38 727. 39 McCormick, The Role of NGOs in International Regimes, 99.
26 40 The degree of public awareness or media coverage is important in understanding the true nature of most environmental NGOs and their tactic decision making. In addition, there are factors that influence an environmental NGOs choice of actions and tactics; direct act ion or indirect action is most prevalent. ENGOs can be impacted by, most importantly, the level of foundation funding and organizational governance characteristics of the group itself. Research shows that the environmental movement and what are known as NG Os today have been heavily dependent on foundation funding for continued existence as non 1950's, foundations have provided critical startup funding and currently a quarter of the annual budgets of the major environmental or 41 and NGOs. However, Brulle believes that most funding will most likely be distributed to environmental organizations of the conventional type, NGOs that use traditional discourses of environmentalism in at most foundation funding goes to the moderate organizations that use the traditional discourses of conservation, preservation, and mainstream liberal environmentalism; the impact of this funding has been to channel the environmental movement into more mo derate discourses and conventional forms of 42 Table 1 displays what Brulle has defined to be the most common direct action tactics that ENGOs utilize, showing the percentage of how often specific tactics are used. 40 Dalton and 7. 41 Brulle, The Handbook of Political State and Civil Society in Global Perspective, 10. 42 Brulle, The Handbook of Political State and Civil Society in Global Perspective, 10.
27 Table 1. Environmental movem ent tactics It could be argued that the distribution of foundation funding is an indirect way for corporations to create incentives for NGOs to shape their style of organization and tactics; could potentially shift environmental NGOs towards the institu tional system. The impact of foundation funding has led to a sort of control over forms of action; although donors do not outright attempt to control tactics, there has clearly been a pattern of incentivizing groups with funding if they choose the appropri ate forms of conventional action. Brulle argues that this impact of funding on ENGOs has empirically shown that direct action tactics are used the lowest percent of the time. For example, environmental NGOs choose public opinion and media advocacy is us ed 86% percent of the time, followed by the use of political advocacy at 28% and protest merely at 2% of the time. 43 Dalton's empirical research shows similar results to Brulle's; contact with people in the media ranks 67%, and efforts to mobilize public op inion follow at 64%. 44 And similarly, Dalton's research shows that, demonstrations, protests, and direct actions only account for 19% of tactics and actions environmental 43 Brulle, The Handbook of Political State and C ivil Society in Global Perspective, 10. 44 Dalton and 12.
28 NGOs choose to use. 45 There seems to be a distinct conflict in the empirical data and w hat theory has argued; theoretically unconventional forms of tactics make environmental NGOs new and effective actors. It seems that unconventional tactics appear less frequently because of the negative impact these tactics could potentially have. However, method available to it or uses the methods with equal regularity; a green group can develop its own political style, choosing a pattern of action consistent with its goals, resou 46 Regardless, several factors determine the tactical choices of environmental NGOs. Dalton also claims that environmental organizations and NGOs have individual tendencies to engage in certain types of actions and tactics du e to several factors. A basic theory that describes this generality is known as resource mobilization theory, which function of the resources controlled by an organization ; group behavior [and decisions] 47 The more resources available to an NGO, the more active that group should be. Interestingly, Dalton also argues that age and longevity of an environmental NGO have an impact on the choice between conventional and unconventional tactics. He claims that the older an organization, the more likely that group will pursue conventional tactics. Older and well established environmental NGOs are less likely to base their tactics on ideological and confrontational goals, and base their tactics on a goal of working w ithin the political system, maintaining status quo to achieve organizational effectiveness. 45 Dalton and 12. 46 Dalton and 13. 47 Dalton and 13.
29 Defining Effectiveness Environmental NGOs have been integrated into the international and domestic sphere of environmental politics as active political participants, comparable to states. However, there is still confusion in the literature when it comes to defining the dependent variable of environmental NGO effectiveness. According to Michele M. Betsill and g of what is meant by influence, scholars often appear to be presenting evidence on an ad hoc basis; lack of consistency in the types of evidence used to indicate NGO influence in international environmental negotiations makes it difficult to compare the r 48 Many researchers make the mistake of using the evidence on NGO activities and their access to environmental negotiations and organizational resources to describe effective influence. This evidence only describes how NGOs have th e goal to engage in environmental NGO access and influence in international environmental negotiations is more nuanced 49 T he idea of determining an ENGO's effectiveness in politics is a very complex issue. Other scholars such as Kal Raustiala argue that NGOs have gained influence not because of state failure, but because NGOs have taken advantage of their comparative politi cal advantages and resources. Raustiala claims that environmental politics has changed radically over the last fifteen years; thus, the strength of international politics 48 Environmental Negotiat ions: Global Environmental Politics, 1:4 (November 2001), 69. 49 Betsill and Influence in International Environmental Negotiat ions: A Framework for 70.
30 illustrat[ ing] the expansion, not the retreat, of the state in addressing global 50 For example, Raustiala claims that NGOs achieve influence through conventional tactics, like lobbying or holding informal meetings with important government of ficials; NGOs need to stay within the dominant political system to achieve effectiveness. Keck and Sikkink argue that, to evaluate the effectiveness of an NGO, one must look at organizational goal attainment and the political objectives of the group. NGO tactics and strategies should be designed to promote a groups political position, which is associated with a desired outcome. Keck and Sikkink rely more on the evidence of NGO goal attainment versus NGO tactics and strategies to define effectiveness. Bets ill and Corell have developed their own understanding of how to evaluate NGO effectiveness by of NGO influence in a more systematic and consistent fashion would enable researchers to examine more thoroughly the possibility that NGOs affect international environmental 51 Betsill and Corell identity this as process tracing. Evaluating an NGO's causal chain of actions combines all of the information necessar y to evaluate effectiveness on a case to case basis. Process tracing allows scholars to evaluate NGO influence individually on two levels: the intentional transmission of information by NGOs and the alterations in NGO behavior and tactics in response to th is information. To carry out process tracing, the concept of NGO influence must be defined. It seems to vary in context in the way influence is exercised by NGOs, but it centers around the commonality of NGO power. This is arguable defined as an 50 and International Environmental Institutions 721. 51 ions: A Framework for 71.
31 NGO's abil ity to change attitudes and behaviors of governments and corporations, to change policy and negotiations, and to change public opinion. Just as states have power, NGOs exert their resources to gain power whether or not they are facing political opposition on the environmental issue. Historically, it seems that NGOs have attained power specifically because of their specialized knowledge and dissemination of information. The ability to transmit information through tactics and strategies is a common action tha t NGOs use to achieve power in politics. Other scholars such as Timmer take the evaluation of environmental NGO effectiveness and influence one step farther. Timmer claims that social movement e goals including 52 in order to be effective and exert influence. She argues that individual environmental NGOs are effective in their own way because the internal structure of NGOs vary from decentralized to formalized. However, there are still certain objectives that form a criteria of NGO effectiveness. Timmer argues that environmental NGOs as rational political machines should base effectiveness and influence on attainmen t of goals, the impact of their tactics and strategies, the viability of the organization itself, and the survival and self preservation of the organization over time. Literature Conclusions Environmental NGOs have developed from the early American env ironmental movement and have transformed into permanent non state actors. Several political science theoretical assumptions contribute to this conclusion: social movement 52 rna tional and 23.
32 tendencies, group and competition interest dynamics, and ideologically led action cho ices. In addition, conditions and factors affect the ways in which NGOs operate in international environmental politics. All of these add to the literature of how NGOs are constructed and survive in environmental politics. Evaluating the effectiveness an d influence of environmental NGOs is theoretically complicated; thus, an investigation into the prominent environmental NGO, Greenpeace, will contribute to the literature. The complexity of this issue stems from the temporal shift politics has seen as soci ety progresses into a technological decade. To evaluate and process trace these particular explanatory theories, a case study on a high profile and reputable ENGO will serve as proper data for comparison. Greenpeace has been chosen for this evaluation for several academic reasons. The organization has arguably become the emblematic face of environmental politics over the past four decades. From its inception in 1971, Greenpeace has fought its way through several environmental issues such as harmful nuclear testing and illegal hunting of whales. Greenpeace appears to be a high profile, effective, and influential ENGO in global environmental politics; however, that is a subjective assumption. Despite its iconic image, it could be argued that Greenpeace is not as capable of implementing change in politics as its publicity may lead outsiders to believe. Over the past forty years of Greenpeace's existence, the world and politics have radically changed and adapted. Innovations and improvements have been made in global politics, specifically the internet and the use of social media as news sources. Forty years ago, there were a few top newspapers and news channels, but today media coverage has expanded enormously. In addition, there are a variety of new and expans ive
33 environmental issues and concerns. For example, global warming is a multifaceted concern of the environment because it not only affects the atmosphere, but the oceans, forests, and humanity as well. These issues are not tackled by one campaign or type of action; they are long environmental wars that ENGOs must face. However, it could be argued that Greenpeace has not adapted to understand this concept; Greenpeace would focuses on micro environmental battles, compared to tackling the big picture issues l ike global warming.
34 Chapter 2: Case Study of Greenpeace Campaigns ENGOs can either be decentralized or centralized in structure; organizations range widely in morals, ethics, goals, and strategies. Some organizations also exist due to large environmental organizations, [Greenpeace] is not sustained by a broad based green ideology or by extensive scientific and practical conservation activities; according to Fred Pearce, an author of the Green Global Yearbook Greenpeace exists by spectacular 53 McCormick argues that Greenpeace is the perfect example of an early formed radical group that still strives to bring about urgent political and social change. Greenpeace believes it consi sts of to environmental issues at whatever cost necessary. Evaluating Greenpeace's organizational evolution and temporal analysis of environmental campaigns may reve al how the organization continues to exist in the chaotic world of environmental politics. As an ENGO, Greenpeace has defined its social carrying them out through a m ixture of conventional and unconventional strategies and tactics. To shape the political discourse, Greenpeace has historically relied on tactics such as collecting and spending funds for the environment, generating publicity and concern through media atte ntion and focus, disseminating information to the public, and assessing environmental conditions, all of which best represent Greenpeace's political and objective goals in its campaigns. In addition, there are variables used to measure Greenpeace's goals e ffectively. Analysis of the variables of financial resources, media coverage, 53 Green Globe Yearbook, 1996 73.
35 member support, organizational leadership, and public support throughout environmental campaigns will lay a framework for evaluating Greenpeace. The Beginning: The 1970s Greenpeace was one of the first anti nuclear revolutionary forces in the late 1960s into the early 1970s. As the anti nuclear movement gained popularity, early activists and environmentalists shifted from participating in simple demonstrations, to more non violent direct actions against the harmful testing. Greenpeace was originally based in Canada, with members of the early organization protesting US nuclear tests close to the US Canadian border. One of the early creators of Greenpeace was Jim Bohlen, an A merican who based his values on Zen Buddhism and Henry Miller's denunciation of middle 54 Bohlen incor porated this way of thinking into his own Zen/Miller contemporary version of living simply. Bohlen took part in many non violent direct action demonstrations; the most relevant to the beginnings of Greenpeace was the nuclear testing in the Aleutian Islands The US began nuclear testing underground in Alaska, code naming the first blast Milrow. Both Canadians and Americans protested against the first blast: however, there was minimal media attention about both the issue and the protest, despite the fact tha t the US media report was a small one paragraph mention on the inside pages of the Seattle Post Intelligence 55 Protests aside, the US government announced plans in 1971 fo r a second nuclear test of a 5 megaton explosion called Cannikin. On November 28 1969, the Don't 54 Jim Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, (Canada: Black Rose Books, 2001), 16. 55 Bohlen, Making Waves: The O rigins and Futures of Greenpeace, 27.
36 Make a Wave Committee (DMAWC) was created. With a date for the Cannikin blast set, Bohlen and many others organized for the environment. Bohlen and other membe rs of the DMAWC began brainstorming ideas and tactics to stir up media attention and ways they might interrupt the nuclear blast. Coming from a Quaker town, Bohlen was familiar with their history of bearing witness and peaceful protesting. The Quaker rel igion was introduced to Bohlen by known as 'bearing witness' a sort of passive resistance that involves going to the scene of an objectionable activity and registering opp osition to it simply by one's presence 56 Greenpeace based its first campaign on a Quaker example of bearing witness Golden Rule out into the Pacific towards E niwetok Atoll, where they were to 'bear witness' to an atmospheric hydrogen bomb test; the Golden Rule never made its 57 Bohlen and others discussed how constructing a simila r voyage to Amchitka to protest might be the best and most useful way to confront the bomb. Immediately, the media picked up news of the group's plans to sail the Phyllis Cormack into the bombing site, original goal was to bring the public's attention to issues such as nuclear bombing. Pearce 58 Greenpeace believed that by incorporating media cov erage of environmental issues, it was informing the public and clearly presenting the political and scientific 56 Michael Brown and John May, The Greenpeace Story, (New York: Dorling Kindersley Inc., 1989), 8. 57 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 28. 58 Tossed on the High S eas 73.
37 conflicts. In the days to follow, Bohlen and others protested in the streets to raise awareness of their campaign, petitioning Canadian citizen message to the US authorities about the potential dangers of testing 5 megaton bombs on 59 The DMAW committee needed a way to generate fun ds, enough to purchase a boat and make the campaign legitimate. It could be said that, in the meetings leading up to the Amchitka campaign, the name Greenpeace was born; Bill Darnell, a Sierra Club member, combined two of the brainstormed phrases for the g roup, putting green and peace together as one. It is has been claimed that from this point forward, Greenpeace members stood together to fight for the environment. The Vancouver Province spotlighted the new vessel and the DMAWC's campaign, aiming to gene rate public support of the anti nuclear campaign. Bohlen drew from the Quaker ideology and decided to utilize media involvement of their early campaigns. In would have rad io communication with the shore, journalists and a cameraman among the crew, all of which would record the events of the journey and sending reports to radio 60 Throughout their campaign and protests, the Quaker vessel did not have any media onboard, which could have been a reason why the vessel and crew were not successful. The 1950s vessel's only media coverage was that of the authorities impounding the vessel. Greenpeace or the DMAWC wanted full control of what the publi c learned through t he media. Strategically, the Phyllis Cormack's crew 59 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 30. 60 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 11.
38 included journalists, radio commentators, and photographers. One of those reporters included future co director, Robert Hunter, a columnist for the Vancouver Sun With public and media attention beginning to grow, the Phyllis Cormack pressed on and finally set sail on September 15, 1971. One of Bohlen's original challenges of incorporating media into his Greenpeace crew was determining cooperative relationship between a crew of media a nd volunteers. Bohlen needed to decide whether the media members had a say in the decision making parts of the campaign or if they were purely there to witness action. The media onboard were in no way chosen based on their technical skills, but they too we re committed to the cause and the environment. Bohlen refers to the journey as almost a cat and mouse chase or a strategic game of chess between the authorities and the Phyllis Cormack. Much to their surprise, the Greenpeace and DMAWC's protest was gaining nationwide movement against nuclear testing was beginning to grown in intensity and support for [their] action was building and contributions began to flow into the Don't 61 Not only was the US government startin g to recognize the serious nature of the testing, but scientists spoke out with their concerns for the ecology and environment in March 1970: Nuclear Testing in the Aleu tians ; the pamphlet outlined the dangers of 62 Bohlen and his crew became the front liners for the nuclear opposition, exposing the dangers and corruption of the US government As days passed with this excit ing news reaching the crew, Bohlen knew a 61 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 47. 62 Rex Weyler, Greenpeace: How a Group of Journalists, Ecologists, and Visionaries Changed the World, (USA: Holtzbrinck Publishers:2004), 69.
39 decision had to be made about what course of action and confrontation needed to be used anti war movement was focused on the Amc hitka test; the issue went to the Supreme 63 Postponements of the blast continued, and the Phyllis Cormack made its way back Greenpeace support through out the country of Canada and at least a mention in the 64 Greenpeace made one last effort to send another vessel into the confrontation of the bomb. Unfortunately when the Greenpeace Fortune kilometers away, on November 6, 1971, the secretary of the American Energy Council, 65 Greenpeace never made it to the bomb site. According to early Greenpeace members, the voyage to Amchitka was a failure yet a success; the US sti ll detonated bombs at that site, while the organization itself gained initial popularity in the environmental movement. Four months later, because of the media coverage of the Greenpeace protest, the US Atomic Energy Committee announced that testing in tha t particular area would stop. Greenpeace based the media 66 with environmental issues. With an arguably successful beginning, Greenpe ace was eager to take on all environmental issues. After the Amchitka campaign, the early Greenpeace members had 63 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 55. 64 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 15. 65 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 15. 66 Turned Protest The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) K8, 1.
40 aware of the real, and potential, danger of testing nuclear 67 The outcome of the Amchitka blast was not exactly what Greenpeace had aimed for, but nonetheless it was a success. The American Energy Council announced that they were ending testing in the Aleutian Islands due to political reasons; specificall y, there was research done to show that several aquatic species had perished during the first and smaller explosion, Cannikin. Americium 241, a radioactive product emanating from decaying plutonium; a speck of 68 The AEC could not proceed because of the anti nuclear revolution gaining momentum with Greenpeace at the forefront. Throughout this early campaign, Greenpeace relied on ve ry few well established ENGO tactics. As a developing environmental group, they mostly relied on their morals and ethics to guide them. Bearing witness was an important ethical foundation, a lifestyle that emphasized the presence of media, imagery, and dis semination of environmental issues to the public; Greenpeace's goal was to evoke public awareness of the once hidden environmental issues. The Greenpeace Revolution The US was not the only nation carrying out nuclear testing; Britain, the Soviet Union, still exploding nuclear weapons on the Pacific atoll of Mururoa in French Polynesia. This would be the next issue for Greenpeace, and it was to launch the neophyte organization 69 Almost simultaneously, Greenpeace was also fighting the 67 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 67. 68 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 69. 69 Warford, Mark, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, Andre Deutsch Publishers, Britain, 1996, 11.
41 battle against illegal whaling and the hunting of Newfoundland seal pups. These three environmental issues allowed Greenpeace to spread its influence quickly throughout the world. With a variety of campaigns, Greenpeace as an environmental organization saw an increase in monetary support and membership; mobilization of issue content became appealing to many audiences. Greenpeace and its members emphasized certain variable s of analysis throughout its environmental campaigns. Process tracing its tactics and strategies from campaign to campaign over Greenpeace's most influential years, from the early 1970s to the late 1990s, will establish how and why Greenpeace continues to be a high profile ENGO. Greenpeace's new mission to st op the nuclear testing in the Mu ruroa Atoll in French Polynesia was its longest running campaign and environmental battle, which Greenpeace argues it just about destroyed the French government politica lly. This nuclear campaign caught the attention of Greenpeace and specifically early member David off thousands of square miles of international waters around Mururoa [to conduct nuclear bomb testing] defying the maritime law that gave a nation the right to claim only a 19 70 Outraged, Greenpeace planned to sail the Vega into this territory and to challenge France's actions. McTaggar t was able to sail the Vega Mururoa Greenpeace 71 of peaceful protest against the nuclear testing. For days, the Vega surrounded the exterior of the French nuclear territory, utilizing 70 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 17. 71 Weyler, Greenpeace : How a Group of Journalists, Ecologists, and Visionaries Changed the World, 171.
42 LAST NIGHT. GREENPEACE III SIXTEEN MILES NORTHEAST. SITUATION 72 Uncertain whether their message was sent and received, the balloon brought bad news to Greenpeace; signaling the testing of nuclear bombs at the atoll. The situation grew intense, as French vessels tried to collide and destroy the Greenpeace Vega. Simultaneously, the press created headli ne after headline, documenting the harassment between the French and Greenpeace's anti nuclear campaign around the atoll. Greenpeace's presence at the atoll and the constant world wide media coverage esting schedule. At this time in Greenpeace's history, it still had members of the media aboard as crew. In 1973, the Vega returned to the atoll to make amends with the French, and the French government came aboard. The French ] so severely that he was partially blinded in one eye and unknown to them, one of the Vega's crew had photographed the beating and was able to 73 News of the protest and beating was disseminated around the world. In 1974 in respon se, France finally announced that it would limit nuclear testing to underground sites. In reality, there had been a successful outcome, but not a complete end to the testing. Greenpeace utilized peaceful confrontation by merely being present at the atoll a nd by documenting the violent response to their peaceful actions. The international public had become more aware of Greenpeace as an organization and of the environmental issues many governments were avoiding. With the first of many French confrontations behind them, Greenpeace members 72 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 21. 73 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 13.
43 initiated a new campaign to save whale species from illegal and harmful whalers from countries such as Japan and the Soviet Union. In 1975, Greenpeace quickly radicalized its organization and structure after learning of the which] many species were being driven to the brink of extinction by the whaling 74 The key figure responsible for bringing attention to Greenpeace was Paul Spong, a former New Zealand psychologist who had been fired from his position at the Vancouver Aquarium for publicly stating that orca whales deserved to be free. Spong and Greenpeace media member Robert Hunter spearheaded the campaign with Greenpeace, calling it Project Ahab. Warford argued that this campaign served as a significant turning point: the whaling campaign appealed widely to the public so it attracted more members to from all walks of life dedicated themselv es to the campaign; Hunter says it was a fine, if 75 Greenpeace did not want to base its strategies on the scientific arguments against commercial whaling, but instead focused on influencing the public's opi nion on whaling through awareness in the media. Greenpeace with cameras 76 For this campaign, Greenpeace revived the Phyllis Cormack and the Vega. Greenp eace's goal was to expose countries that were not cooperating with the International Whaling Commission's (IWC) ten year moratorium on whaling, a common tactic NGOs use, according to McCormick. Confrontation with these countries would 74 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 33. 75 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 33. 76
44 take the form of sail between a whaler's harpoon and a fleeting pod of sperm whales, acting like human 77 Risks needed to be taken to protect species other than humans; Greenpeace's morals were a driving f orce in the strategies and tactics it employed in the whaling campaigns. For example, with the help of Spong and the location of whale pods, the Phyllis Cormack located a Soviet fleet about 80 kilometers off the coast of California. Zodiacs were deployed, and Greenpeace activists could feel the harpoons fly over their harpoon itself plunged into the back of a nearby whale; Greenpeace had not been able to save that whale, bu t the footage of the harpoon being fired so close to them became the 78 World wide awareness from this footage gained the public's support. The use of media and imagery proved powerful despite the fact the whale was still ha rpooned, but slowly the support and awareness from the international public would strengthen Greenpeace, according to Warford. Greenpeace continued to use this pattern of tactic and strategy by bearing witness and placing themselves between the whales and the 79 At that point in history, Warford claims Greenpeace had become successful; it was creating global public awareness of environmental issues and of the fact tha t dedicated individuals are willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause. Crew member Rex Weyler filmed and shot confrontations specifically with Japanese whalers. His 77 GHI Bulletin No. 34 (Spring 2004), 127. 78 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 15. 79 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 15.
45 ts demanded interviews, eyewitness accounts, making the mission an unqualified success 80 By 1976, Greenpeace had about 10,000 supporters and many groups forming around the world and throughout its whaling campaign, Greenpeace had saved 100 whales and, by keeping whalers from normal hunting grounds 81 In addition, the organization was concerned about the Newfoundland harp seal pups that were being slaughtered for their fur. The one tactic Greenpeace chose to use for 82 The Canadian government took action against Greenpeace, making it illegal to sp ray the pups, forcing the group to change tactics immediately; this caused support and donations to decrease. Greenpeace began to use similar tactics it used for the whaling campaigns. Members placed themselves with the seal pups, disregarding the fact tha t moving a seal pup was a violation of the Seal Protection Act. Media coverage of this infraction by Greenpeace members renewed public support. According to Brown and May, branches of Greenpeace were strengthening and the attention of the media grew, and b y the late 1970's, Greenpeace officially became an international organization with offices opening around the world, advantages of a top down structure; he re created Greenpeace more in the form of a multinational corporation than the conventional democratic and devolved structure 80 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 39. 81 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 43. 82 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 45.
46 83 1980's: A Stronger Greenpeace As Greenpeace became a more globally minde d organization, its issues and campaign targets grew in complexity. Also, with more international support, the environmental organization was receiving donations, grants, and various funds that allowed its campaigns and strategies to grow into what the mem bers envisioned. By 1978 and with a grant of 40,000 pounds from the World Wildlife Fund, Greenpeace purchased the first Rainbow Warrior to re establish its campaigns against illegal whaling and 8, flying both the Greenpeace and United Nations flags to reflect the international nature of her crew of 24, the Warrior left harbor and headed up the east coast of Britain and in passing Scotland, was supported by almost 3,000 people protesting against t he construction of an advanced gas 84 The first campaign vessel was born, and there was added pressure on Greenpeace to go effectively into action against harmful environmental practices. As the Warrior traveled through internation al waters, Greenpeace representatives were constantly setting up political and public press conferences, while the campaigns planned their missions against anti environmentalist practices. The newly strengthened organization was experiencing fast growth, a nd with that came the expectations of successful environmental outcomes. As a result, Greenpeace began to incorporate a mixture of new strategies and tactics into its campaigns. Greenpeace had once lost support during the seal pup campaigns because it had not delivered a desirable or 83 84 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 54.
47 influential outcome environmentally; the activists did not intend to make that mistake again. Greenpeace had to direct its campaigns to engage in a larger range of tactics and in th e process of becoming 'solution 85 To its members, Greenpeace defined successful campaigns differently than theorists may argue. Success to early Greenpeace members, such as moral and spiritual revulsion was still essentially centered on their concern about the impacts on people, not whales, sea lions or liza 86 needed to be changed; Greenpeace took that challenge on. Until this point in the history of Greenpeace, there had clearly been a strategic immediate aim of stoppin g nuclear tests or saving whales. But by being on the front line, by putting themselves in danger and, most importantly, by bearing witness to the 87 and by disseminating this imagery through media, Greenpea ce achieved global awareness. Throughout the whaling campaign, Greenpeace continued to use the tactic of sending inflatable dinghies into the midst of whalers and their harpoons to protect whales. ads of news reporters were 85 Bohlen, Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace, 106. 86 Robert Hunter, Warriors of the Rainbow: A Chronicle of the Greenpeace Movement (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1979), 132. 87 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 15.
48 88 In addition, the Rainbow Warrior and its crew were arrested by the Spanish government in 1980 due to the confrontation and pursuit of whalers in Spain' s territory. Meanwhile, Greenpeace began to employ more conventional tactics, according to McCormick's definition, such as using lobbyists during several IWC meetings. According to Greenpeace, in 1982, it achieved its first real political solution, the ten year moratorium on commercial whaling, while also receiving the Warrior back after her arrest. Brown and May claim that Greenpeace had transformed into a much stronger organization through the utilization of a variety of tactics and strategies. With a mixture of conventional and unconventional tactics, Greenpeace was able to work within the system by sending lobbyists to meet with the IWC and expose non cooperative coun tries, while also shooting and exposing films of whales being harpooned to death and merely using non violent direct whirlwind of activity; protests were taking place around the globe and in the course of a year there were about 50 different actions in support of an increasing number of 89 The whaling campaign specifically saw a shift in power in the IWC, in the favor of whales and the environment. Greenpeace also returned its attentio n the nuclear issue, taking the Warrior back to Mururoa and the French Pacific Islands. As a lobbying tactic, Greenpeace informed the French government of its plans and protest in hopes of working within the political system and coming to some sort of envi ronmental cooperation. However, the French 88 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 67. 89 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 76.
49 peaceful protests would be welcomed as a protector of Pacific Islanders [at the atoll 90 Operation Exodus, as Greenpeace cal led it, was carried out for several reasons, not just as an end to nuclear testing in the islands. In Rongelap [French Pacific Islands], the health of several children and adults began to deteriorate due to the nuclear testing. Greenpeace's goal was to eva cuate the island and bring the islanders to safety. Greenpeace always incorporated media members into their crew and, for this particular campaign, had two photographers on board to bear witness to the entire experience. As a result of their fears, the Fr ench planted a spy aboard the Warrior in hopes of sabotaging Greenpeace's peaceful protests at its final destination of Mururoa. In the summer of 1985, the French spy was able not only to send back all of Greenpeace's preparations and tactics for Mururoa b ut to create an explosion on board. The French wanted to sink the Rainbow Warrior. on July 10, 1985, there was an electric blue flash in the water near the Rainbow Warrior and the New Zealand harbor was r ocked by an explosion. With water gushing into the 91 For the first time in Greenpeace history, a crew member lost his life. Fernando Pereira, a photographer, was so worried about documen ting the ship's sinking that he became trapped on the Warrior Rainbow Warrior 92 for Greenpeace. After the explosion, there was political chaos surrounding the French government. Throughout various hearings and meetings about the explosion and now murder, there 90 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 19. 91 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 19. 92 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Lin e, 21.
50 147 reporters, photographers, and film crews from around the world to record the 93 Greenpeace, intentionally or not, created a success within a horrific failure. In reality, there was not enough strong evidence linking the French government to the murder and arson of the Warrio r in New Zealand. However, justice for Greenpeace and motives of the [French] mission had exposed them to international ridicule and humiliation, and had achieved the exact opposite of its presumed objective; instead, Brown and May argue that it strengthened Greenpeace and allowed the organization to move forward undefeated and spreading its name, influence, and activities across a wider 94 Clearly, immediacy was not the ultimate measure of success in the perspective of Greenpeace and its members. Scholars have noted that Greenpeace's campaigns seem to be isolated events. However, it seems as though members of the organization took this isola gaining international media attention, Greenpeace was able to expose the broader, underlying problems: nuclear proliferation, the over exploitation of wildlife, toxic po 95 These basic issues continue to be a problem in today's environmental politics. Evolution of Greenpeace into the 1990s As Greenpeace moved into a new decade, environmental problems continued to worsen. Greenpeace emerged as a higher power for many reasons. Some scholars such as Zelko argue that, although these early activists held uncompromising views; Greenpeace 93 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 122. 94 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 125. 95 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 17.
51 was one of the first NGOs that took dangerous risks to protect species other than humans. 96 creating its identity and culture through activism, campaigns and the development of a moral philosophy that established the group as an influential non state actor. One could argue that this opinion of Greenpeace that had allowed it to become one of the most high profile ENGOs by the 1990s. Five years after the bombing of the Warrior support for all time high of 4.8 m illion by 1990. With offices opening in almost every country, Greenpeace also became the first environmental NGO in history to establish a permanent 97 making Greenpeace the first NGO to have a permanent base on every continent in the world. Entering into a new decade, Greenpeace faced new responsibilities and decisions for it to continue to be a successful ENGO. of institutional memory abou t Greenpeace's origins and traditional strengths arguing that 98 would lead to international mobilization of certain environmental ideas and values. For Greenpeace to be successful, it only entered into non violen t confrontations if there was a positive result, a solution oriented approach. Warford has referenced former Greenpeace executive director, Thilo Bode, immensely effective pre cisely because they have echoed public so strongly; [Greenpeace] cannot force improvement on our own, but we can help mobilize and inspire enough 96 nal Environme 128. 97 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 21. 98 Storm 75.
52 99 Campaigns centered around nuclear testing and illegal whaling continued to use similar tactics and strategies, ranging from sailing zodiacs to whaler's vessels and hanging a banner illegally aboard, to peacefully protesting and occupying areas of the sea where countries such as Japan were violati ng the moratorium on commercial whaling. Greenpeace returned to such areas as Mururoa not just to protest, but to collect scientific samples of the area to test whether radioactive molecules were present. Other successful campaigns include when on March 21 air balloons flew over the four cooling towers of the French nuclear power plant, to protest against the opening 100 Greenpeace's new goal was to establish campaigns with greater complexity and effec tiveness politically and environmentally. In response, Greenpeace's tactics and strategies grew in sophistication and complexity: contact with international media around the wor ld, coordinated press and publicity for campaigns and actions, drafted press releases, hired photographers and cameramen to cover Greenpeace activities, and edited and distributed videos and pictures for broadcast and publication on television and in ma gazines and 101 Greenpeace's strategies and tactics had come a long way from their early campaigns, of merely including media members as crew. Media, however, was not the only strategy Greenpeace utilized as the political world evolved. The or ganization needed to establish itself as a credible environmental source for international governments. 99 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 160 100 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 173. 101 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 23.
53 The organization began to emphasize the use of scientific research and analysis as a new tactic for political change. Greenpeace now had the ability n ot only to produce its own findings, but to use science in leverage politics, theorized by Keck and Sikkink, and become more centralized and able to tackle potential co ntradictions between campaigns, coordinate scientific efforts more efficiently, and improve the review process, thus 102 Greenpeace employed more conventional tactics to coincide with its no n conventional direct action tactics, like bearing witness. Greenpeace began its campaign for the atmosphere in Helsinki, at the first meeting for the Montreal Protocol, an international agreement to protect the atmosphere against harmful industrial chem only submitted a paper arguing for the complete ban on the production of CFCs, but also staged a protest action outside the conference center, with a team of international 103 Greenpeace's new tactical approach to environmental concern can been seen in the campaign against CFCs and DuPont (a company distributing large amounts of CFCs through industrial products such as aerosols) that damage the atmosphere and the ozone layer. The fight for t he atmosphere was Greenpeace's new focus. This strategic variation was seen constantly throughout the atmospheric campaign. Greenpeace continued to fly hot air balloons with banners demanding DuPont stop CFCs immediately, while publishing papers on early f indings of global warming as an effect of CFC production. 102 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 166. 103 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 159.
54 Greenpeace targeted companies, demanding that a substitute product replace the harmful ones using CFCs. Despite the success of this campaign style, many members like tactics and strategies aimed at solutions interven tion, because the organization was 104 These tensions continued to grow as of Greenpeace. Pearce argues that members were divide d on the strategies Greenpeace should utilize; there was an internal tension within Greenpeace between the older and younger members. As more environmental issues arose for Greenpeace, the struggle to forge an organizational identity was held back by the t protestors that were inclined toward scientific rationalism and a group of younger 105 In the late 1990's, Greenpeace experienced innovation and success in its campaigns. With victories such as the Brent Spar campaign and its campaigns against illegal dumping and the ban at the Basel Convention in 1994, Greenpeace was evolving into a strong ENGO; these victories are self claimed by Greenpeace itself. Greenpe ace expanded its issues and concerns worldwide, focusing not only on whaling and nuclear energy, but also as a strong force against genetically modified foods, C FCs, and global climate change. Greenpeace argues that it experienced success in some of its lo ngest running campaigns: nuclear testing world wide, more importantly in the atoll territory in 104 rm 105 130.
55 French Polynesia, and toxic waste dumping in international waters. Internatio nal Basel Convention in March 1994; this campaign involved conventional tactics such as lobbying, direct actions, and boat campaigns. Victory for Greenpeace was when 65 nations involved in the Basel Convention adopted a complete ban on the export of all ha zardous wastes from OECD countries to non 106 The ban is an example of strong campaigning, using a mixture of tactics and strategies, as well as an example of world wide expansion of the group into global democracy and justice for the environ ment and for developing countries. As the organization grew in size and support, its campaigns began to reflect upon international interests. In addition to its toxic waste victory, Greenpeace finally achieved success with its longest running campaign ag 1996, not only did France, but the US, Russia, China, and the UK signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the UN adopted the treaty into action due to the 107 To achieve this enormous victory, Greenpeace expanded its campaign to China's territory. Strategically, the organization sailed the MV Greenpeace into Chinese territory to protest the Chinese government not initially signing the ban. The vessel was quickly impounded by the government, but the outcome came three months later in 1996, when China finally signed the treaty. Once again, peaceful protest brought about real change for Greenpeace and the environment. ely small organization that continued to fight 'giants' whether they be governments or multinational 106 Greenpeace 1995 Annual Report, 2. 107 Greenpeace 1996 Annual Report, 7.
56 corporations; these giants are fully equipped with a full armory of technological and 108 Gree npeace will never really be as strong as a government or multinational corporation, but it has promised to utilize its support and money effectively to stay as technologically up to date of the early 109 Technology also means competing in politics as a strong organization with strong scientific resources as well. There has been a high priority in not only the data produ ced, but the means of dissemination; many offices use live satellite feeds or maintain a photographic and video library open to world wide media. As Greenpeace approached the twenty first century, it seems that it was already strategically ready for the co mmunications and technological needs of an effective ENGO. As Greenpeace moved through history, it stood strong by the idea of political affirmation of its values: it uses boats, helicopters, inflatables, and all the traditional 110 In fact, Greenpeace recognizes that one action is not enough to bring environmental change; positive change could be the end result of a long chain of events that comes from intensive research and campaigning. This strategy has been key for Greenpeace as world wide environmental issues became more complicated and dangerous for environmental preservation. This strategy is exemplified in Greenpeace campaigns that are long running into the twenty first century, campaigns 108 Greenpeace, accessed February 2012, http://archive.greenpeace.org/comms/review/index.html 109 Greenpeace 1993/1994 Annual Report. 110 Greenpeace 1993/1994 Annual Report.
57 such as nuclear and toxics, and new campaigns such as the fight against global climate change and illegal forestry and ocean practices. In 1997, Greenpeace saw a victory in its campaign against global w UNEP Ozone Award for the development of Greenfreeze (a CFC substitute) or a domestic 111 The year 1997 saw great political ly independent success for the organization as well. Even with new campaigns expanding Greenpeace world wide, it remained loyal to its origins in fighting the environmental effects of nuclear power. Greenpeace campaigners were using a variety of tactics to enforce the treaty ban to which many nations committed. Greenpeace's goals were enforcement and monitoring of the environmental promises made by several wealthy nations. Campaigners erected warning signs on public beaches in France where Greenpeace scie ntists found and exposed high levels of radiation in the water. This dangerous radiation was due to a discharge pipe at La Hague in France. The only victory that came from this exposure was that the French government admitted to the spilling of nuclear was te from the discharge pipe; victory or not, Greenpeace made strategic efforts to collect and disseminate this information. As Greenpeace moved forward, it recognized the fact that fighting for the environment was also inherently a fight for world wide ju stice as well. With a globalizing separated from health, quality of life, democracy, education, economy or trade. More importantly, citizens could then act across borders, not j ust via the media, but 111 http://archive.greenpeace.org/report97/index.html
58 112 Greenpeace claimed it could no longer act for only national interests; its support was world wide; thus its actions were as well. Throughout this expansion, Gre enpeace claims it stayed committed to its values as well as the values shared with the international public in its strategies and tactics. With new commitments, victories continued to occur for Greenpeace. In 1998, Germany finally signed on to the ban of n uclear waste dumping in international waters, and the public continued to be informed of countries that were not cooperative with environmental treaties. Highlighting these lapses in cooperation was key to long term environmental victories for Greenpeace. The environmental organization has achieved these victories through its occupation of dumping vessels or campaigning and peaceful Greenpeace activists boarded the British flagged Pacific Swan to protest against the transportation 'via the back door' of radioactive nuclear waste from France and the UK to 113 Clearly, Greenpeace continued to work as an independent organization that campaigned to stop international envir onmental abuse and emphasize solution oriented goals. Greenpeace began to focus on the idea of transporting reprocessing nuclear fuel internationally, as well as nuclear testing in unsafe areas. Greenpeace's tactical approach was to follow and protest Ja panese vessels that were transporting the reprocessed nuclear fuel. The organization continued to investigate these vessels and non cooperative 112 Greenpeace, accessed February 2012, http://archive.greenpeace.org/report97/index.html 113 Greenpeace, accessed February 2012, http://archive.greenpeace.org/report99/index.html.
59 countries to identify falsification of the vessel transportation. According to the 1999 Greenpeace Annual Report Japan was illegal defying Maritime Safety laws by rite danger worldwide; that shipm ent marked the dawning of a new era in Japan's nuclear 114 Greenpeace made it clear to the international public and government that Japan was gaining power through the shipment of deadly wastes, bringing fear to the environment and to the population on the coast of Japan. Greenpeace followed these vessels with inflatables, identified Japan's illegalities through lobbying, and bore witness to the public. It could be argued that Greenpeace had become too much of an organizational hybrid for its stru cture, which affected major decision making about what strategies it should deploy. Greenpeace needed to decide what was more important to the organization, either expanding its international presence or sticking to its foundations of the message through t environmental issues to which it should be dedicated. Former members such as Paul Watson agree with th eco corporation, [one that is] good at sending out junk mail, but not capable of bringing 115 Other environmentalists such as Warford have presented different evidence about the future evolution of Greenpeace as an effective ENGO. Warford argues that changes in 114 Greenpeace, 1999 Annu al Report. 115
60 the organization were inevitable and essential to its continued existence. When Greenpeace came into existence as the DMAWC in 1971, the public was ignorant about so much about the state of the environment that they were prepared to take daring actions, apparently to the point of putting their lives at risk, to drive their messa 116 Greenpeace captured the public's attention instantly. The public has become more educated and aware of environmental issues. As a result, the images of Greenpeace campaigners positioning themselves with harpoons or putting up banners is not al ways enough to bring effective outcomes. Now in the twenty first century Greenpeace needs to incorporate new and stronger values. Warford states that Greenpeace has its own unique and definitive approach to campaigns and environmental issues. For example, Greenpeace works in unity and harmony rather than in conflict and debate, using discussion and persuasion rather than confrontation, emphasizing environmental justice to bring awareness to the public about issues of concern. Greenpeace argues that it has c ontinued to raise awareness and change behaviors through the education of the public. Greenpeace used an effective variety of tactics to its advantage: a mixture of public awareness, media dissemination, direct action, and lobbying. However, environmenta l issues have become inherently more complicated, and the involvement of Greenpeace continues to be scrutinized by other organizations and states. Greenpeace needed to resolve the internal tensions between members from different generations and the strateg ic decision making for the organization. Some older 116 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 27.
61 campaigning which does not take advantage of Greenpeace's unique niche in the environmental movement as a multinational NGO. 117 While others argue that it pulls people in to an issue and makes them feel that they could be there even when they are not, helps them feel empowered, a part of somet hing, and reassures them that, even if they can't drive in front of whaling ships, they are giving their support to those who can 118 Greenpeace has taken advantage of drawing attention to environmental issues and has mobiliz ed its desired issues. It set the foundations for a global and peaceful community concerned about the environment, but whether this will continue into a future community with advanced technology and complexity is yet to be argued. There seemed to be great tensions internally in regard to how Greenpeace was evolving in comparison to its early beginnings. This is a valid issue to address, and the concerns of whether Greenpeace maintains a successful NGO organizational structure. In 2000 when Greenpeace entere d into a new age of communication, the succes s and effectiveness of the organization need ed critical evaluation. The Future of Greenpeace in the Twenty First Century One major improvement of the organization of Greenpeace as it entered into the twenty first century was the enforcement and strengthening of its science unit. Science was not necessarily a factor included in Greenpeace's strategies and tactics when it originated with the DMAWC, but it now helped legitimize the organization as a global powe ranges from providing advice on specific queries to long term oversight of campaign 117 118 Warford, Greenpeace Witness: Twenty Five Years on the Environmental Front Line, 33.
62 related scientific projects; from involvement in the development of new campaign ideas to 119 Having a science unit allows Greenpeace to contribute to the development of international and domestic policy implementations and regulations. Greenpeace could evaluate and release its opinions from a more educated point of view, with added value. As Greenpeace approached the year 2000, it recognized its new responsibilities as an ENGO. Greenpeace was not necessarily against the revolution of a globalizing world; instead the organization emphasized t he use of alternative and cleaner technologies and environmental choices. Greenpeace started to focus on publicly highlighting the responsibilities and lack thereof for states in environmental issues. Tactics and strategies reflected the goal of environmen nuclear power and oil industries to continuously create widespread [environmental] 120 Greenpeace's goal was to expose this irresponsibility to the public, thus allow ing for a change in public behavior and decision making in consumer interests. Because of globalization, Greenpeace needed to make the public aware that damage to the environment and human health was no less important because it was countered by economic g ains world wide. Public decision making needed to be changed, and Greenpeace aimed to incorporate this new strategy into its goals. The year 2001 marked the thirtieth anniversary of the creation of Greenpeace and the beginning of its fight to save the en vironment. The media created the history of Greenpeace and its tactics and strategies. Creating history through media, shows how much of an environmental impact Greenpeace has made over time. However, as history 119 http://archive.greenpeace.org/rep ort99/index.html. 120
63 and the world evolved, Greenpeace had to ris e to the challenge of a globalizing and inter dependent world. Environmental issues were rising from every corner of the globe, forcing Greenpeace to globalize its campaigns. Until this point, Greenpeace had allowed its activists to be jailed and its boats impounded to change laws, but everything was about to change with the possibilities of the information age. As Greenpeace stated in previous annual reports, it was one of the first ENGOs to be on the forefront of internet use to communicate its goals. Be fore the internet, Greenpeace relied on media broadcasting and the Associated Press to bring awareness of its victories and campaigns. Greenpeace no longer had such limited channels of communication; with the turn of the century any member of the public co uld use the internet and become more aware of environmental issues Greenpeace was pursuing whether they intended to or not. An evolving Greenpeace witnessed expansions of not only its campaigns and communications, buts its values. According to the 2001 A nnual Report, values now included not only bearing witness but, having a voice, conviction, integrity, exposure, empowerment, testament, vigilance, risk, dialogue, vision, independence, and most important, having a global value underpinning its tactics and strategies. These new values were seen in ongoing campaigns such as the fight against nuclear power and disarmament or the exploitation of the oceans. Aside from pressuring governments such as Turkey to cancel nuclear reactor projectors, Greenpeace is sti ll utilizing vessels to protest nuclear zones in international waters. Like the nuclear campaign, Greenpeace continued to work scale commercial whaling which was imposed by the International Whaling Commission in 1986; despite the fact that Norway and Japan
64 121 Greenpeace believes that its core values have strengthened over time, yet it still employed similar tactics and strategies. As a growing international org anization and well known ENGO, Greenpeace's campaigns expanded exponentially. With offices world wide, Greenpeace victories and successes occurred daily. Unlike Greenpeace of the 1970s or 80s, when campaigns were carried out by the few members of Greenpeac e, Greenpeace accomplished more and more every day that passed. The issue content of Greenpeace's various campaigns included, climate, oceans, forests, genetic engineering, toxics, and, as always, nuclear power. Concentrating on multitudinous issues, campa ign tactics began to become more specialized according to concern and environmental goals. For example, in 2003, with the legitimacy of its science unit, Greenpeace released a report indicating the Bush administration's wrongdoings in America's forests. On e year after the report and various peaceful protests to stop importation of Amazon forestry products into the US, nationwide public campaign against this injustice, high lighting how the charges 122 Greenpeace was then working not only for the environment, but for the collective future of humanity; another example of how the organization was publicly highlighting t he right choice to be made for the environment and now global society. Greenpeace also argues that it has demonstrated similar strength specifically in its 121 Greenpeace, accessed February 2012, http://archive.greenpeace.org/Annualreport_2001/index. html 122 Greenpeace, accessed March 2012, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/victories/
65 ongoing campaign against illegal whaling, whether Greenpeace was presenting carcasses of porpoises 123 In this pledge, Greenpeace showed Iceland how much the government could potentially make in tourism for whale v isiting (about $60 million) in comparison to how much it makes on its whaling industry ($3 to $4 million), Greenpeace illustrated how it could make a real change. Greenpeace widened this campaign not only to include the mistreatment of whales, but focused on destructive fishing practices as well. Greenpeace had the resources now to recognize that the world was facing a larger crisis in the open oceans. Greenpeace slowly started to recognize how much it was capable of accomplishing because of the support it was receiving. With almost 40 offices internationally, resources and responsibilities were used effectively to bolster more support through its multitude of environmental campaigns. Greenpeace's original campaigns were carried out through the use of either the Phyllis Cormack or the Rainbow Warrior; as of 2004, Greenpeace extended its fleet to include three more vessels. Member support and monetary grants were the claimed cause of this expansion, and continued financial campaign expansion over time for Gree npeace. Other self claimed victories Greenpeace included were the various ratifications of the Kyoto Protocol against climate change through lobbying and its scientific research, and through online changing behavior of consumers to stop buying from count ries like Argentina, which was involved with killing whales. With more victories and environmental success, Greenpeace attributed its success to its supporters. According to ility 123
66 to work globally and locally, coordinating with colleagues around the world and created enough leverage for Greenpeace to stop the destruction of the world's great ecological 124 This ability lies not only in Greenpeace's perfected activism st rategies and tactics, but in the best science an ENGO could produce. With time, Greenpeace began to emphasize that yes, it still utilized its peaceful non violent tactics (such as blockading or hanging banners), but it was becoming more strategic. Greenpea political, and social research that informed its work and led to effective strategies for 125 The organization was taking advantage of its tools such as the internet to apply its new strategic goals. For exa actions, online activism, and more than 100,000 emails from ocean defenders everywhere, [harmful] seafood suppliers (Gorton's and Sealord) withdrew their active 126 With i mproved strategies and tactics, Greenpeace argues that over its history of environmental change, it stayed strong to being an independent organization that continued to bear witness to protect the environment. In the 2007 Annual Report of Greenpeace, its e xecutive director makes strong statements regarding the organization; he believes that with a globalizing world, Greenpeace has foment change, no matter the circum stances, along with the crucial help from Greenpeace 127 He argues that those conditions are what have made Greenpeace move forward successfully in environmental politics. 124 Gre enpeace 2005/2006 Annual Report, 3. 125 Greenpeace 2006 Annual Report, 1. 126 Greenpeace.org, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/victories/ 127 Greenpeace 2007 Annual Report, 3.
67 Greenpeace believes it stays committed to its campaigns, which is exempli fied in its continued defense against illegal whaling. This commitment continues not because Greenpeace has not achieved success but because it is a long term goal of the organization that brings smaller steps towards overall success for the species. npeace does not give up; despite the passage of the 1986 global ban on commercial 128 Greenpeace continued to protest, yet got arrested for exposing a Japanese smuggling operation of whale meat. In an effective response, G reenpeace supporters bombarded Japanese embassies with emails and letters, leading to the legal persecution of Japanese whalers. Greenpeace saw Japan as not on legal trial for has continued to stay passionate and persistent on environmental issues such as illegal whaling. The more recent era of Greenpeace has exemplified how the use of internet connections has provided support in Greenpeace strategies and tactics. Emails and t he use of social media via Facebook or Twitter have all contributed to minor victories. For example, in May 2010, the Nestle Corporation agreed to stop buying palm oil resources that were manufactured from the destruction of Indonesian rainforests. That de cision was non 129 and its global ancient forests campaign. The concept of supporters is no longer merely a financial indictor fo r Greenpeace. Social media and the internet have gained world wide support in a totally different, yet highly effective form. And in 2010, Greenpeace still attributed its success 128 Greenpeace 2008/2009 Report, 2. 129
68 ve [environmental] goals because of supporters and the millions [of supporters] across the 130 It could be argued that the internet has had an influential e ffect on Greenpeace's ability to be successful, while Greenpeace has also historically remained stringently attached to its original goals and ethics. And lastly, Greenpeace concludes by arguing that its success is based on the promotion of solution oriented strategies. By p on society's environmental choices, Greenpeace is working to eliminate environmental 131 like many uncooperative states do in politics. Clearly, Greenpeace as an organization self reflects and uses these ideals to evaluate its successes and failures in environmental politics. Looking at its history of outlined campaign victories and various m etrics of success such as its finances, membership, and public opinion of the organization, and its adherence to expressed ideals may serve to lend support. In addition, comparing these measures of success to what theorists have academically argued to be e ffective displays of ENGOs is also valuable to this analysis. 130 Greenpeace 2009/2010 Annual Report, 2. 131
69 Chapter 3: Interviews with Greenpeace Affiliates Two interviews were conducted: one with a former Greenpeace official who will be identified as Official #1, and one current official iden tified as Official #2. The purpose of the interviews are to serve as primary sources for assessing Greenpeace's established evolution in environmental politics as an ENGO. The interview questions had the intent of uncovering the self perceived opinions on the strengths and weaknesses of Greenpeace. This intent was accomplished through a variety of questions; these questions however were presented as conversation like objectives. At many moments in the interviews, new questions arose, and the interviewees to ok control of the conversation. Therefore, questions were not identical in each interview because of the conversation like structure. However, the interviews both had similar objectives that were asked of each official, aiming to hold a base set of questio ns constant. Objectives focused on uncovering in depth explication of how Greenpeace as an ENGO has changed tactically and strategically in its campaigns, core ideals, and its organizational functions as an ENGO, all from the perspective of the organizatio n itself. These constant objectives are as follows: describe your affiliation and background history with Greenpeace; how has Greenpeace's core ideals/principles such as bearing witness, non violence, direct action and mass media communication evolved ov er time and in what ways have these values adjusted to the temporal setting; w hat are/have been Greenpeace's long term and short term goals as an ENGO; what does Greenpeace see as its objectives/goals or strategies as an ENGO and is that changing with time and if so what has been the trigger; do you think Greenpeace wants to fundamentally change society; how does Greenpeace prioritize issues internally, please describe the issue
70 variance and how tactics are used from issue to issue; who is Greenpeace's tar get audience; and do you think that Greenpeace has been effective as an individual ENGO and if so, what makes Greenpeace effective in your opinion. Interviews were conducted in Washington DC and Alexandria VA, in March 2012. The interview with Official # 1 took place in an informal setting, while Official #2's interview was conducted in a personal office space. Both interviews were recorded and then transcribed to be included as primary data for the evaluation of Greenpeace's self defined effectiveness. Interview with Official #1 His initial response was, when he first became a part of Greenpeace, he came to the organization as an experienced environmentalist, with his own work in an established He was then asked to clarify what those struggles were and what Greenpeace was lacking as an encounter. as a campaigning organization; Greenpeace has these sort of ebbs and flows of having a great campaign and win, then having a great campaign and lose; they are very much on an emotional roller coaster; it is not just a company that puts out a steady pro duct. giant social change agenda that you overlay all on top of wha t it takes to run a successful medium sized business. Most of [Greenpeace's] challenges came from its indepe ndence. So it can take a very strong stance; it's not beholden because it
71 He referred to a great e xample of this independence when Senator Ted Kennedy was against the creation of the country's first offshore wind farm off the coast of Cape Cod. He fought its creation, while Greenpeace fought to get it built. Senator Kennedy called Greenpeace and told t hem to stop backing the creation of the wind farm. intimidated; there is nothing they can do. This enabled the organization to be really independent. And when an organization [like Greenpeace] is that independent it is going to dive into campaigns at times that won't work and when you dive into too many that don't work, you are going to Official #1 also noted there was often great frustrations and anger w ith the outcomes and effectiveness of the organization. Official #1 compared the organization's ebbs and flows of strength to the ebbs and flows of the American environmental movement. His time with Greenpeace was a time for environmentalism to be at its s trongest, much like when it first started in the Nixon era. However, Official #1 interjected by explaining corporations' and industry's response to a strong environment movement. n, so they developed all sorts of means of green washing and lobbying [that] became far more important and it became exponentially expensive to run campaigns [for Greenpeace]. So the cost for that went up, so the money for that could only come from two places: corporations and unions, neither of which are friends to the trying to confuse people about global warming, trying to re categorize what people like Greenpeace do in the Industry's anti environmental response to a growing Greenpeace posed several problems for the organization. Greenpeace needed to adjust and maintain a flexible enough structure to ensure self survival. it was trying to figure out its governance and I still think that it is evolving [today]. We
72 don't live in a time where a top like Greenpeace. Industry's re sponse made Greenpeace's work highly complex. Official #1 articulated this with an example of issue complexity looking at the unsustainable practices of growing and marketing soybeans. nternational campaigns like on the Amazon, where it will be putting serious pressure on the soybean (soya) growers and understanding the whole business infrastructure: how the soy beans are going out on a road privately paved to ship these beans to Eur soybeans to their chickens so they can feed Europeans by destroying the Amazon. Greenpeace has ways of figuring out how we can do protests in these restaurants, while working with these guy s at a high level, while working against the soya growers, while working in the Brazilian parliament, while working with Greenpeace seems to infiltrate itself into these complex issues, but through a variety of ways. Accordi ng to Official #1, one tactic can be applied to an environmental issue that will solve concerns entirely. Official #1 describes Greenpeace's choice of like what we call a 'global opera'. And a global opera, what you may see, more what like your parents would see is Greenpeace blockading a harbor for example, but what's below that, that 'tip of the iceberg' is maybe 5 years of planning, protesting, in Holland and New Zealand, bl ockades in Spain. Or a takeover of a furniture showroom in Atlanta, and deep s in the jungle with night scopes to find out where the illegal mills were and then how they got to its legitimate shipping, then trans shipping. There had to be people there watching these things at night, while the According t o Official #1, Greenpeace was at its best, sort of like its gold standard for environmentalism, as it battled in the early 2000s. At the time of Official #1's participation, he argues that Greenpeace was struggling to evolve as a truly independent global organization. Official #1 was then asked whether its monetary fund
73 balance out and how the governance works at the international level with funds. keeps about three month you have a lot of contributors you can count on, it's not going up and down, its fairly steady. But country offices make contributions to the international offices the ships and some of those really big global campaigns; it will of Greenpeace such as bearing witness, direct action, peaceful p rotest, confrontation, and argues that it prides itself on maintaining strong core ideals and foundations that power the organization into the future. Greenpeace claims it is an effective ENGO because of this strength. Official #1 had spent almost a decade with the organization, so he had a good sense of temporal analysis in his argument. organi zation was set up almost that it require that it stay true to it. The organization wasn't really set up to maximize fundraising or maximize political access. It's all built to say, let's stay true to these principles. The principles were included that we really took from the civil rights movement and from the Media was also a core foundation upon which Greenpeace built itself in its early stages. According to Official #1, it was Bob Hunter who incorporated media into Greenpeace's Quaker and civil rights ideals. Bob Hunter developed a new way of photography equipment to bring on campaigns. According to Official #1, these early men
74 original foundations o f Greenpeace and the true heart of Greenpeace. This involved through [media] mind bombs was the whaling campaign. t when you get to know whales you know it takes care of its young, eats algae, krill, and phytoplankton So Bob said that the first photos of whales and their calves up against a rusting Russian whaling ship and then shooting exploding harpoons over the heads of the Greenpeacers, that is a mind bomb So soon as you look at that you don't think of leviathan anymore, you think of the state killing this creature so Official #1 made it clear that Greenpeace and all of its core ideals are still based on pure ecology. Greenpeace is not trying to be and can not be a part of a political party. from all governments and corporations. Greenpeace's true foundations are argued to be from ecological knowledge, according to Of made the statement that Greenpeace historically broke through and continues to break into a noisy media environment, prov ing itself not working towards a special private interest, but staying true to ecology. He argues that there is no one tool Greenpeace uses: has to be non viol next question asked of Official #1 was how he thought Greenpeace and its tactics and strat egies have changed over time, from campaign to campaign.
75 know is that over the last ten years, is that the way the internet has changed over nternet for a lot of big entities, starts out misunderstood. [Now] we can pipe stuff out to our members, using these new [internet] pipes, just send it out. But then with the way certain softwares developed ,the [information] pipe is as big coming back as it is going out; it is becoming a conversation, becoming networks of communities. We had people saying: give me your stuff Greenpeace, I am going to share it with my [social media] network. All their own modes of networks was putting individual credi communication. Official #1 further explains that Greenpeace now has added the position of an online media director to embrace and evolve with the new wave of communication. is always trying to adjust to social media or, for example, how we work in China, it' s tactics it can use in these new areas; we have far more freedom to push harder here than Furthermore, he argues that in some ways Greenpeace has changed a nd adjusted, but it has stayed true to its core principles. Official #1 was then asked whether he thought there were triggers for organizational adjustment in tactics and campaigns, other than the internet; and if so how this affected Greenpeace. He argue s that the internet and cultural sensitivity were the only two identifiable triggers that have affected Greenpeace's evolution. However, the
76 been more global aware ness of current environmental issues. Having cultural sensitivity and awareness has also affected the way Greenpeace's campaigns are informed. Official #1 was then asked what Greenpeace's long term and short term goals are and how those have changed tempor ally. forests, oceans, global warming, and whales. We focus on the big ecological threats, staying out of local fights, unless you can find campaigns where locals want yo ur help so it can ultimately drive an international campaign. [Unfortunately the goal taking] the most resources and the toughest one that has really strained the environmental movement, is global warming. Because you go from so many of these issues, wh something for which there is an alternative. But global warming is enormous, and it cuts across everything. It has been the beast we have unable to wrestle down so One goal Greenpeace is not incorporating into its long or short term plans is to change or alter the way politics work. have gotten threats from Senator Ted Kennedy, put pressure on Obama, we were going after Gore and Clinton. Our friends were not politicians, our friends were the dolphins and the whales. not trying to stay in the good graces of anyone. Greenpeace is true to its roots; it never cared about lobbying and working on the ay good things about corporations that will be cooperative [with us]. But we have never become co opted by taking th eir money. This is not Another issue that Greenpeace has struggled with internally is prioritizing long term and short term go als. Official #1 was asked to describe the prioritization, along with whether it occurred generationally or not. has been no question that global warming be at the top o f the list [recently]. In the US, they are very focused on shutting down coal plants... depends on where their social media people and direct action people, alongside the ships and the boats and divers. You will get organizers with a different way at looking at the world. And researchers, those who work the lobbying end of it. At its best, its tactic and issue neutral; it doesn't care what the tactics are to win.[We use] the best mix of
77 these, with the least spent resources, to get to that answer and victories. But you In addition to issue and campaign prioritization, there is also mixed variety of ways Gree npeace qualifies its victories and environmental success. Thus, official #1 was the asked to describe, how he thought Greenpeace defined its victories and success. Official #1 focused on qualifying success and victories through the example of its global wa back down would be a success. Or trying to pick interim targets, like how many coal plants you want to get shut down, or a piece of legislation you want to get behind, or For the next objective, Official #1 was asked to describe Greenpeace's target audience; what Greenpeace's targets are in general and specifically for contribut ions? those who have shown some interest in Greenpeace, but then you might have audiences ace targets the public at large. He also established that using direct mail as a tactic to target audiences is wasteful, unsustainable, and not used by Greenpeace. Th internally, because if we are trying to save these ecological systems, for us to be sending out direct mail and to be offering tote bags and stuffed bears from cheap stuff in China, it The next obje ctive Official #1 was asked was whether public opinion matters to
78 opinion of the organization but a subset, our base and what they think, people who reflect those sam e values; and advocating to these ecological systems is how Greenpeace As the interview drew to a close, there were two central questions left to be addressed by the interviewee. First, Official #1 was asked to describe whether Green peace wants to fundamentally change society and how. perspective was no. We wanted to change, to work within the cultural context of the nation you were in; within the US, it is a thriving representative democracy with many environmental problems. Within that context, protect the ecological fabric that gives us our life. It is not so revolutionary that we want to change society, [ perhaps in the 70s] but you don't want toxic ch emicals in things that in subtle ways give us all sorts of problems. You don't want to drive up CO2 levels The interview ended with the following question; Officia l #1 was asked if he thought Greenpeace is an effective ENGO, if it will continue to be an effective ENGO, and what makes it effective. Official #1 described first the political climate Greenpeace exists in and how it operates. What you have right now is a horribly frozen political system, with two extreme parties and they are just shouting at each other and everybody appears to have some kind of special interest going: whether it is the Democrats and the unions or the Republicans and very large corp orations. There does not appear to be a lot of independence. To have an organization like Greenpeace at a time like this when even have to like it, [because you know] they are not lying. [Finally], it only takes people's money [not government or corporations], so even when you disagree important, but it comes from donors. Donors dream that Greenpeace exists; so people In fact, one of the reasons that Greenpeace has grown and matured and why Official #1 still contributes to it is because it still puts all of its income into its campaigns:
79 Greenpeace's effectiveness as an ENGO. [Greenpeace is a] very strong organization, its effectiveness varies over time; there are times it can be more effective than othe rs, and we are not always in control of that. All I can say is that we are coming into a time where the value of this global independent organization will dawn on us as really useful. This time will come where [Greenpeace's] characteristic will be more important than ever 250 million dollars every year [internationally] and be independent, kind of a freak organization but cleanly and well run. Its legal and ethical but tries to push the edge. It makes me feel better that it exists and it's strong. Interview with Official #2 The first objective for Official #2 was to identify his affiliation and background history with Greenpeace. Official #2 said he became a part of Greenpeace right out of college, when he started volunteering for the organization and participating in classic direct action campaigns; for example, in 1992, he helped hang a banner on the Sears ac complish this with Greenpeace. One of his favorite early involvements with Greenpeace campaigns occurred when he oversaw its move into its green office in Washington DC. In the late 90s we were not operating in an environmentally friendly office. We rea lly wanted to have an office that reflected the mission and values of get a real tangible sense of success of what their work is accomplishing. Take for example global warmin g; you work on that for about ten years, hard to really in a tangible way, understand the effectiveness of your work. When you do something like this [office], you have a very tangible, perceivable result of what you did at the end of it. And also something where other people can see the
80 friendly Because we have all the abilities, we just Next, Official #2 was asked to describe his opinion of how or if the core ideals of Greenpeace have changed over time. The interview objective of tactics changing over time was als o discussed. Both interviewees agreed that tactics have changed, but much committed to our core values of non violence and peaceful protests; those things are still very much a part of our signature. And something that we are very much an organization that provokes solutions to global problems by inspiring action. He claims t hat the core foundations are seen through its tactics and gives examples. not just putting yourself between a whaling ship and a whale, that doesn't stop whaling, standing in front of a bulldozer doesn't stop clear cutting. But it does create that image and tells a involved themselves. [The core] philosophical foundations that drive tactics and action Greenpeace tries to create an image of how it wants the world to look at its philosophical foundations. These images are then disseminated to millions of people ; Official #2 argued that these images are then very inspiring. This foundatio behind the tactic of [its] direct actions; it is the creation and the [actual] image that regard to tactical foundations within the organization. at has changed] is that we as a global organization have become much more strategic about how we can use all of our global resources to affect change. In the early days, we had a lot of success, a lot of landmark successes, but there was also struggling between being a global organization and a federation of 40 Greenpeace
81 strategic at leveraging our global resources, the Greenpeace brand, and the collective skills and perspecti ves around the world to achieve true global victories. And I think while direct action is an important part of our signature, it is the strategy aimed at long term and short t erm objectives that are devised on a global level. where we have changed; we have become much better at being more strategic and working towards long term goals while leveraging global resources And a lot of the change in tactics and strategies can be attributed to the internet. The next objective was: what triggers besides the internet has affected tactics, strategies, and campaigns within the organization. According to Official #2, the internet has expanded Greenpeace with a variety of changes compared to its early beginnings. Official #2 claims that the internet has brought about huge changes in its direct actions: specifically, it gives power to the media. In the early years of Greenpeace, if you put yourself between a whaling ship and a whale it made the evening news or the front page of the New York Times. success, but the internet changed that; the true mark of success now is if images go viral on the inte rnet and people are blogging about it and sharing it on their Facebook and newspapers or news programming less significant. The public receives its information from an enormo us numbers of resources now. Official #2 was then asked to identify: what he thought to be Greenpeace's long term and short term organizational goals and if goals have changed over time. His ion in ancient forests, establishing 40% of the world's oceans as marine protected areas, and stopping the trend
82 important goals of the organization. Official #2 responde d with the following descriptions of Greenpeace's temporal evolution. started to lose focus with no lack of things to work on in the environmental field. In some ways it was p hilosophically noble that because we had more resources, we should work on more stuff. But it watered down everything we were doing. So in the late 90s/early 2000s, we made the strategic decision to really focus on three priority campaigns: protecting o ceans, stopping ancient forest destruction, and stopping global warming. So we really shifted to re focus and really have worked hard globally so that our work is global in nature and not just having 40 offices question is that global warming has really changed the way you have to think about everything. The biggest threats to forests and oceans are no longer clear cutting and over fishing its global warming where as environmentalism was all about, protect this forest, protect this body of water, now we have to be much more systemic in focus. Because global warming is not a point source; you Official #2 claims that the internet was not the only trigger for change in Greenpeace; but that a stable flow of income and money also affected campaigns and its ability to survive as an ENGO. Official #2 also touches on the idea that Greenpeace is truly an independent org anization, and it is a challenge not accept to government or environmental organizations that abides by that principle, because we feel that in order to be effective, we need to b individuals and foundations so that there are no strings attached to the money it receives. Income is then used for campaigns, and about 25% of national office income is contributed to the intern ational fund; this serves as income for developing offices or offices with limited abilities to fundraise. Official #2 discussed a theory that may support the idea that Greenpeace has been financially stable; therefore he argued that Greenpeace has become more effective.
83 income levels have continued to rise. That is a good sign of the work we are doing and I think people are still behind us and the work we do. I also think part o f that reason is because Greenpeace has always marketed itself as solely on the mission. [Unlike other organizations that send mail asking for $50 and they will send you a stuffed tiger or a tote bag] In a recession, people don't see that as supporting a seen as much of a cut back. Our theory is that because of that, people will continue to contribute and support the mission of Greenpeace, even in difficult Financi ally, Greenpeace must still be careful when carrying out its direct action about whether in some instances it is worth the costs for what it accomplishes [environmentall before Greenpeace undertakes any campaign or action, it reviews the basic economic cost and benefit analysis. Just as Greenpeace must prioritize its money, it also does the same for i ts issues. Having monetary stability and long and short term issue goals allows for a unique structure and decision making. It is this stability that Official #2 claimed guides Greenpeace's long term and short term goals. He also argued that Greenpeace has been be able to step away from your long term campaigning when certain issues arise like the of issue variability and of the flexibility and adaptability of Greenpeace to tackle any environmental issue at hand. The government had no fly zones over the oil spill and all kinds of things. We were the ones flying into those no fly zones and taking pictures of the oil spill, [sending those images to big media centers]. We were on the ground telling people what
84 wa s really going on, working with people that felt completely disempowered from the government and the fact that their backyard and home is being polluted. So we etc. to establ ish a strong presence. But that's challenging to be able to do that, because everything has inertia and momentum. So if we are working on a long term strategy and we are coming to a key moment to, say, protect the Indonesian crisis happens, hard to make that decision. Those are difficult to make, but we have worked really hard to create a system or The next objective that Official #2 was asked is as follows: do you think that Greenpeace targets a specific audience and how has the organization done so? For the most part, Official #2's answers were similar to Official #1 in that Greenpeace targets those who self identify with the organization, a factor that is often identified through the capacity to make large gifts or have shown an inclination to make a large gift to een identifiable through the board of directors, etc. Greenpeace also tries to do street fundraising to bring up monthly donations: a tactic that does not target any specific demographic. And last, Greenpeace will exchange prospective mailing lists with si milar organizations like the Sierra Club. In terms of communication and campaigns, Official #2 argues that Greenpeace also tends to target certain audiences. Communication its nature, the internet targets a younger au in campaigns, it also depends on the issue. For example, Official #2 referred to the destructive practices of companies that received palm oil. Greenpeace targets companies like Nestle and Burger King that are buying their palm oil straight from the Indonesian
85 policies that pressure the companies to stop; we pressure them to become positive players Because Greenpeace seems to target its campaigns and its donations, it is interesting to look at whether public opinion affects the organization's success or its global reputation. One thing is certain, the opinion or threats of governments and corporation s have never mattered and will never matter to Greenpeace and its done of a lot independent research on public opinion. Greenpeace and support is generally high, but when you get to middle America, especially in small towns, people don't like us and don't tru st us because they don't know who we are. They think of us like Eco terrorists, very misinformed understanding of who we are. A lot of that is because most of our presence and media success is in large metropolitan areas [where people are more informed, look at things in a bigger context, nature of America in general]. In order to be effective, we have to find ways to change opinions in Middle To exemplify how Greenpeace is trying to change the perceptions of Middle Americans, Official #2 described how the organization has aided in local fights against dirty coal plants. Greenpeace is working towards replacing Middle America coal plants with cleaner, renewable energy. Official #2 claimed that Greenpeace has provided more resources to local communities as they fight against coal plants, making them feel a part of a global environmental network. Essentially, Greenpeace is trying to fight off stigmas created by corporate and governmental green washing by gettin g decisions for the shutdown of five coal plants over the last year; this type of organizing or grassroots presence is how we hope to change perceptions of Greenpeace in
86 Next, Official #2 was asked to describe how Greenpeace determines it s environmental victories and success. Once again, the interviewee used global warming and specifically coal plants as an example of how to determine success and environmental victory. of two coal plants in Chicago, two of the dirtiest in the country, or when Nestle agrees to world that can help shift the paradigm and give us a lot more leverage for what w e oceans campaign, it can be that we have gotten a million people to sign and stop [the] Safeway [corporation] from buying unsustainable tuna. You try and have these intangible things measured to be tangible. You can do it through media hits or public opinion polls or just by being in communities and looking at their perceptions or how they have c Official #2 was then asked if he thought Greenpeace was trying to fundamentally change society and if so, how has it accomplished this? environmental l egislation of the early 70s, they happened because there was a shift in society. That was then codified in Congress through legislation. We really see our role in society as working towards making that shift happen. You have to change the consciousness, the cultural priorities, and create cultural momentum in provoke solutions to global problems by inspiring action. And when you inspire people to be concerned and get inv olved, that is the momentum that creates a Greenpeace survives as an ENGO because it wants to change society fundamentally to protect the environment. Official #2 claimed that Greenpeace has to ge corporations and the governments that serve them [that] are doing immense amounts of damage to the environment and have millions of dollars their favorable laws are i nstituted; Greenpeace does not have the money to do that.
87 Instead, Official #2 argued that Greenpeace has the powerful force to organize people and priorities in order to The last question Official #2 was asked was if he thought that Greenpeace has been an effective ENGO and if it will continue to be one in environmental politics. His response identified a model that he believes Greenpeace has es tablished in the corporate world that has allowed Greenpeace to be effective. It is the campaign against Kimberly Clark against wasteful paper producing procedures that set this precedent. Generally, ive, and I think that one of the Greenpeace ran a campaign against Kimberly Clark because 100% of its disposable paper products were made from virgin pulp in the Cana dian Boreal Forest. Greenpeace wanted the products to be made with a higher recyclable content, but for five years, Kimberly Clark fought Greenpeace's demands. It cost the company millions of ir product because of said ok, we give up, we agree to what yo u want us to do. They signed a con tract and then we established benchmarks that they have to follow, to make sure that they are moving towards what they complied to agree to. Since then, this e then most of the corporate targets that we take on have caved to our demands in a matter of months. And we think that a part of that is the model created from Kimberly Clark. Corporations now [know we] are going to fight every step of the way until th ey finally give in, so [they should] just [give in] now. Plus they saw the benefit Kimberly Clark gave in; they stand at the podium saying Greenpeace and we are saying KC is doing the right thing and working towards becoming a green company. And the ter m green is a very marketable term; people really like it when you do the right thing. They say, let's avoid the pain, take advantage of what is going to happen, it's inevitable and lets work with them in
88 Off icial #2 believed that with each victory like the Kimberly Clark campaign, my mind is the mark of true effectiveness; we can get companies to change their practice just Corporations now fear the presence of Greenpeace and the damage it could potentially inflict on their product and revenue. Official #2 explained how Greenpeace has perfected a way to get consumers to pressure companies and leverage their power to changes their practices. In addition, Greenpeace has historically done what is called re we do is take their logo with their Kleenex font and turned it into 'Kleercut'. So then the brand in which they put millions of dollars suddenly now means cutting down ancient according to Official #2. Final Statements Both interviews served a purpose; to establish primary data regarding the effectiveness of Greenpeace as an ENGO. The goals of the interviews aimed to be the same, by conducting each interview with similar but not identical objectives. Each official offere d similar content in his interview, yet there are some distinctive differences. There are several identifiable topics of discussion in both interviews: variability in tactics and strategies, organizational variability over time and across campaigns and the indicators of effectiveness defined by the interviewees. In addition, there are several issues that arise when evaluating these various topics. Based on both interviewees' answers, anecdotes and comments, there are a few
89 identifiable trends regarding G reenpeace's tactics and strategies. It could be argued that Greenpeace's strategies and tactics do not vary from issue to issue. When Greenpeace initiates a campaign, for example, against illegal logging of timber, Official #2 made the statement that strat hanging a banner on a ship transporting the illegal timber, thus getting arrested for illegal occupation. Based on this campaign perspective and the data collected from both interviews, it seems as though Greenpeace uses an ideological pattern for its choice in strategies and tactics for each environmental issue. However, its goals remain constant, and so do its strategies and tactics. In addition, many of its historical campaigns such as i ts fight against nuclear testing and illegal whaling have been somewhat assimilated into a general pool of concerns and have lost Greenpeace's focus. The main focus of Greenpeace seems to be a battle against corporations. However, these small battles again st the corporate world are seemingly more important for Greenpeace to win, compared to the big picture environmental war that is ongoing in international politics. Greenpeace arguably does not vary the structure of its campaign tactics and strategies; th erefore, it could be assumed that actions are fueled by instead, its institutional authenticity of its ideological values. Greenpeace promotes itself as an authentic organization true to its core values such as non violence, independence, and direct action which might necessarily be changing policy or negotiations. At numerous points throughout the interviews, both officials make it clear that Greenpeace has never claimed t
90 Therefore, Greenpeace potentially is satisfied with defining its effectiveness through the suppo rt of donors and thus remain independent. Greenpeace must then structure its strategies and tactics to appeal to its donor base to keep it financially stable. This may be a constraint driving Greenpeace's environmental campaigns. Environmental issues have less of an impact on how the organization chooses its strategies and tactics compared to Greenpeace's ideological values. Both interviews present data that displays Greenpeace being an ENGO focused on micro issues and environmental battles, compared to m acro environmental issues. interview with Official #1 there is an example of this micro vers us macro success in environmental politics: when Official #1, described his move into a green office in early work on that for about ten years, hard to really, in a tangible way, understand the effectiveness of your work [in politics]. When you do something like this [moving into a green office], you have a very tangible, perceiva ble result of what you did at the end of effective organization. It seems as though Greenpeace is merely satisfying its supporters and keeping up with its organizationa l authenticity compared to making an impact on environmental issues or concerns. Based on this behavior and data taken directly from Greenpeace affiliates, it is hard to determine what Greenpeace is effectively doing for the environment besides
91 sustaining itself as an ENGO. Both officials agreed that Greenpeace has stayed true to its core foundations and it has, but it is arguable whether Greenpeace is doing all it can to protect the environment. To be an effective and successful organization, environmenta l issues and concerns should have more of an impact on the organizational structure and behavior of Greenpeace overall. Clearly, the interviewees' indicators of success for Greenpeace are not sufficient to evaluate whether the organization is an effective ENGO in environmental politics, compared to whether Greenpeace successfully exists as an ENGO.
92 Chapter 4: Metrics of Success When Greenpeace began its environmental journey almost forty years ago, it established a number of key principles and values. According to primary and secondary research, the values guided Greenpeace's campaigns and its actions, strategies, and tactics. Greenpeace's founding principle was based directly on the Quaker religion and form of protest and passive resistance that involves going to the scene of an objectionable 132 Greenpeace has claimed it is an effe ctive ENGO through its ongoing commitment to its core values of bearing witness to environmental injustice by committing to non violence independence, and promotion of solutions to environmental issues. And in a rapidly evolving world, Greenpeace has de fined this commitment through its forty years of environmental victories. On its website, Greenpeace has recorded descriptions of world wide victories that occur almost daily (see Appendix A). Both objective and subjective indictors and metrics of success can be used to evaluate whether Greenpeace has adapted its structure to accommodate the changing world. This evaluation is accomplished through analyses of indicators of success. The first indicator is the analysis of Greenpeace's financial reports, compar ing income and expenditures over time. The second indicator looks at a variety of environmental public opinion polls that investigate data on perceptions of the environmental movement, concerns of global warming, and the valuation of the economy compared t o the environment. And the last indicator evaluates what Greenpeace has self defined as environmental victories over the 132 Brown and May, The Greenpeace Story, 8.
93 last forty years. These environmental victories have been categorized according to issue and will be compared objectively and subjectiv ely. First, before analysis of the metrics of success, it must be established what Greenpeace members and volunteers believe to be its core ideological foundations; what it employs in its campaigns and how this ethic has evolved. Greenpeace defines succe ssful campaigns, therefore defines itself as an effective ENGO, through the environmental victories, and by going to the scene of environmental destruction, we do not only register our opposition, we show the world what is going on, and peacefully stay 133 to bring a solution to the problem. The organization claims it utilizes the tactic of non d ebate and end environmental problems. In doing so, members are either participating in local government sit ins or scaling an oil rig to hang a banner; either one is a peaceful direct 134 Greenpeace's potential goal of direct action techniques is to show that there are alternative solutions to almost every environmental problem. Greenpeace claims that its use of direct action is the reason it has gained respect and validity from internatio nal and domestic governments and the public. However, the proposed indicators of success will establish a different, comparable analysis of environmental success for the organization. Greenpeace Financial Background Greenpeace argues that it is an inde 133 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how is greenpeace structured/financial/. 134
94 financial independence from political or commercial interests by not accepting money 135 Money is not accumulated from advertising, but is derived from membership contributions and foundation grants, generating enough to power the organization. And in numerous annual reports, Greenpeace continues to argue that this behavior brings income to t he organization that potentially aids in its environmental success. Analysis of the Greenpeace International and Greenpeace USA reports will establish two metrics for evaluating success, by looking at success on a micro and a macro level for the organizat ion. To clarify, there is a difference between Greenpeace International/Greenpeace Fund and Greenpeace USA. Historically, the group of Americans including Bohlen, coined the Greenpeace name in 1971 in Canada. However, according to Rex Weyler, the Greenpeace entity in the US was Greenpeace San Francisco, founded in 1975, followed by groups in Seattle, Portland, Denver and elsewhere; these offices became 136 Almost simultaneously, Greenpeace International was founded in 1980, setting up its main office in Amsterdam. Greenpeace International processes on g 137 Essentially, Greenpeace International is an overarching body in correlation with Greenpeace Fund, which is a collective fund for all income and expenditures. Each month, national offices contribute a certain amount of their in come to the International office and fund, to aid in the development of new offices 135 136 Greenpeace History: Chronolog y, the Founding of Greenpeace. Accessed March 2012, http://recommendable/greenpeace/greenpeace history/chronology/. 137 Greenpeace International, accessed March 2012. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how is greenpeace structured/governance structure/.
95 or to make funds available to offices in developing countries without the ability to fundraise. Greenpeace USA is currently established as a single entity, consistently c onnected to the Greenpeace International Fund. Greenpeace International requires income contributions from established offices to aid in developing countries. According to Greenpeace, this process ensures the optimum use of supporters' financial donations. For this particular data collection, the only Greenpeace USA reports used have been archived back to 2003. These are the only financial reports available for comparison. In addition, a few more reports for the international finances were recovered for th is section. Specifically, reports dating back to 1995 will be used for the analysis of Greenpeace International. Similarly, there is the same issue of recovery for the numbers of supporters for Greenpeace world wide. This is the only recoverable data avail able; however, the available reports serve as an important factor in Greenpeace's organizational evaluation. According to Greenpeace's financial reports, the organization devotes most funds to the core responsibilities of an ENGO, such as campaigns, stay ing true to its core values in theoretic application. Greenpeace argues that it has received funds from donors because they are attracted to core values the organization embodies; donors admire Greenpeace's courage to take action not only for the environme nt, but for humanity as well. In the available reports, all information about the organization's monetary decisions is made available to the public. For the purpose of this particular analysis, several sections of Greenpeace's finances will be examined: th e total income, total expenditures and total international number of supporters over time are displayed. Figure 1 compares total income and expenditures for Greenpeace USA; Figure 2 compares income and
96 expenditures for Greenpeace International, and Table 2 displays the number of Greenpeace International supporters throughout the organization's existence. It should be noted that in Figure 1, the only recoverable data to compare for Greenpeace USA's income and expenditures begins in 2003; for the same reason Figure 2 begins with data in 1994. Figure 1. Greenpeace USA income and expenditures 1971 2010 As shown by Figure 1, the income and expenditures for Greenpeace USA have steadily increased over time. Income and expenditures seems to have remained variable over time, balancing out at the end of each year. There are a few years to take note of, as they could be identified as outliers to the annual reports. In 2007, Greenpeace USA received a bequest from a donor that increased the organization's income dramatically. From various donors and foundations, the organization received about $20 million in 2007, compared to the income level in 2006, which has about $14 million. It could be argued that the financial records made available by Greenpeace show a slow and steady increase in funds and income. Aside from the year 2007, which is an outlier showing an
97 in crease in income due to a bequest, the organization has consistently grown into its reputation as a high profile ENGO. Figure 2. Greenpeace International income versus expenditures 1971 2010 As seen in Figure 2, the income and expenditures for Greenpe ace International from the years 1994 to 2010 have also steadily increased. However, there were some comparative fluctuations in both income and expenditures over time. Overall, the income and expenditures for Greenpeace International seem to have balanced out from year to year. In addition, there are also some years that are identifiable as outliers to growth and progress for Greenpeace International. According to the 1998 Greenpeace International Report, the organization was in a stable financial situatio wide net income at US$101 million, and a surplus of $7 million, [it used the surplus to start] modernizing the Greenpeace fleet and investing in the development of new Greenpeace offices in non 138 In addition, according to the 2009/2010 annual 138 Greenpeace 1998 International Annual Report. accessed March 2012, http://archive.greenpeace.org/report98/index.html.
98 international report, there was a $12 million decrease in Greenpeace's net assets, which clearly affected its income level. There were also similar decreases in income, as well as expenditures throughout a fi ve year period in the early 2000s. Despite economic downturns, Greenpeace International never ran a deficit and continued to stay afloat as an ENGO. In addition, it has been noted by an independent auditor of both Greenpeace USA and Greenpeace Internationa non governmental organization is the net level of fundraising costs, which for Greenpeace has continued to increase since its inception in 1971. Table 2. Greenpeace International Supporters 1 971 2010 Year Supporters 1917 1994 NO DATA AVAILABLE 1995 2900000 1996 NO DATA AVAILABLE 1997 2500000 1998 2400000 1999 2500000 2000 2650000 2001 NO DATA AVAILABLE 2002 2800000 2003 2800000 2004 2700000 2005 2700000 2006 2800000 2007 2900000 2008 2900000 2009 2900000 2010 2800000
99 139 of a particular period. There are also millions of people who an online activist or part of a local grassroots project. As seen in Figure 3, from the available data, Greenpeace's world wide supporters have also steadily increased with little fluctuations. The fluctuati ons shown in the graph which exhibit zero supporters, means there was no available data for that year in supporters. Public Opinion Data The foundations of Greenpeace were arguably based on public self organization for environmental concerns. Therefore, the opinion of the public about environmental or ecological values, perceptions, and attitudes or awareness of certain issues like whaling or nuclear energy could serve as an objective indictor of ENGO effectiveness. Evaluating past and current public opi nion polls from a political database could establish whether or not Greenpeace has legitimatized its reputation and to what to degree is it recognized and respected. The visibility and the ability of an organization like Greenpeace to change opinion could be considered a metric for determining ENGO success. As Keck and Sikkink have argued, ENGOs like Greenpeace try to influence policies and transform the way issues are handled, implemented, and debated in environmental politics; they therefore identify Gree npeace as a communicative structure. The following public opinion data has been taken from the Gallup polls website online. All data was accessed during the month of March and evaluates indirect values 139 http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/#Questions%20about%20Greenpeace%20membe rship
100 and perceptions and examines specific environmental issues that Greenpeace has historically focused on. The data include a variety of specific topics such as environmental issue concerns, the perceived impact of the environmental movement, the safety and support of nuclear power, environmental concern in th e United States, and valuation of environmental protection in the US. All polls are taken from Gallup; after researching other comparable public opinion databases, there were no polls found to include for comparison. In 2010, a poll was taken to measure the American public's worry and concern about environmental problems. Figure 3 displays worry about environmental problems, Figure 3. Concern for environmental problems Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/126716/environmental issues year low concern.aspx Based on this poll, Americans' concerns for the environment and its problems have d eclined. This decline could be attributed to the perception that American environmental conditions are improving, compared to other nations. It could then be argued that many Americans feel as though organizations like Greenpeace are working to improve th e environment.
101 More recently, in 2012, Gallup displayed a variety of polls that look at an important concern for the American public: global warming. Gallup has collected data focusing on perceptions of worry, opinions on the effects of when global warmi ng will happen, the public's opinion of news reports about global warming, and perceptions of the primary cause of global warming. As seen in Figure 4, about 55% of Americans currently worry a great deal or a fair amount about the issue of global warming. This statistic is up from the previous year, but it is much lower than its peak of 72% in 2000. According to Gallup, this personal worry about global warming may be significantly related to current and past politics and ideology. It could be argued that Gr eenpeace as an ENGO has failed to influence the public's perceptions about the threats global warming presents to the environment. Figure 4. Personal worry about global warming in the US Source : http://www.gallup.com/poll/153653/Americans Worries Global Warming Slightly.aspx Americans were also polled to describe their views on the effects of global warming and when these effects will take course. Figure 5 displays the percentage of the public polled who believe global warming has already begun, will begin at a future time, or will never happen. From 1998 to 2012, it is important to note that the percentage of
102 those polled believe global warming has already begun increased from 48% to 52%; however, there was also a similar increase in those who believe global warming will never happen, increasing from 9% to 15%. Figure 5. Opinion of the effects of global warming Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/153608/global warming views steady despite warm winter.aspx It is also interesting to look at the public's opinion about medi a reporting of global warming, based on the fact that Greenpeace has historically utilized the media as a key strategy to raise environmental awareness. Figure 6 analyzes Americans' beliefs about the media and how it has portrayed global warming. Based on the data collected by Gallup, the percentage of those who think reports are exaggerated have increased over time, while those who think reports are correct have decreased. It could be inferred that the media is damaging the environmental perceptions of glo bal warming.
103 Figure 6. Opinions of news reports about global warming Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/153608/global warming views steady despite w arm winter.aspx One poll looks at what Americans think is the primary cause of global warming. According to Gallup, most of the controversy over global warming concerns its cause: by human activities or natural causes. It is not necessarily a concern over whether there is a measurable increase in the average temperature of the earth. Figure 7 displays the distribution of the public polled on this particular issue. Figure 7. Opinions of the primary cause of global warming
104 Source: http://www.gallup.com/poll/153608/global warming views steady despite warm winter.aspx toward the environmental movement, essentially looking at US attitud es about the impact of the environmental movement and how or if they support the movement. Figure 8 displays these percentages over the past decade. Over time, the percentage of the American public that was particularly active/sympathetic towards the envir onment movement has slowly declined. In fact, both the neutral and unsympathetic percentages have risen. The public is progressively becoming less involved in the American environmental movement. Figure 8. Orientation toward environmental movement Sour ce : http://www.gallup.com/poll/127484/40th Earth Day Image Green Movement Positive.aspx Another poll identifies the level of importance in a comparison of environmental
105 protection to economic growth of the US economy. Figure 9 shows how Americans have prioritized protection of the environment versus economic growth from 1985 to 2007. From 200 7 to 2011, the American public has steadily started to prioritize economic growth over the protection of the environment. American values have changed as the world has become more globalized; it could be argued that protecting the environment is seen as mo re of a luxury than protecting economic domestic growth. Figure 9. US environmental protection versus economic growth Source : http://www.gallup.com/poll/1615/Environment.aspx Environmen tal Victories Greenpeace International claims to have accomplished a wide range of environmental victories from its inception in 1971: specifically, 118 environmental victories since it first sailed to Amchitka in 1971. The organization outlines these sel f defined victories on its website, including all victories it believes to have been accomplished through any national Greenpeace office. In this analysis, the victories have been categorized into seven categories: nuclear energy, whaling, forests, toxics or hazardous chemicals, oceans, global warming, and miscellaneous issues such as
106 genetically modified metric both subjectively and objectively, to assess environmental success from an aca demic perspective. Objectively, there are 118 environmental self claimed victories of Greenpeace on its timeline. Table 3 displays the distribution of victories according to the seven issue areas. After categorizing the victories, the distribution is une ven; forests, toxics/hazardous chemicals and global warming dominate most of the victories, while nuclear, whaling, oceans, and the miscellaneous category (like GMOs) make up the rest of the distribution. Table 3. Distribution of Greenpeace environmental victories Nuclear Whaling Forests Toxics Oceans Global Warming Misc. (GMOs) Number of Victories by Issue 9 9 27 26 12 25 11 These environmental victories can be further categorized into degrees of success, ranging from one to four: four being a substantial ban or treaty in international environmental politics which could or could not be attributed to a Greenpeace action or cam paign; three being a change in behavior or attitude that has not been outright attributed to Greenpeace actions; two being a Greenpeace action or campaign that has changed the behavior or attitudes of a government, corporation, or the public; and one being an action or campaign that Greenpeace has simply carried out with very little environmental effect in politics. Table 4 shows the number of victories based on the
107 degree of success categorization, and Table 5 displays the distribution of victories from ye ar to year, in addition to the degree of the years' victories on the indicated scale of one to three. Table 4. Degree of Greenpeace victories from 1 to 4. Amount of Victories by Issue Area Degree #1 Degree #2 Degree #3 Degree #4 Nuclear 1 2 1 5 Whaling 0 6 0 3 Forests 1 8 4 14 Toxics 0 12 4 9 Oceans 0 2 1 9 Global Warming 4 11 1 9 Misc. (GMOs) 3 2 2 4 TOTAL 9 43 13 53 Table 5. Amount of Greenpeace victories from 1971 2011 according to degree Years Degree #1 Degree #2 Degree #3 Degree #4 TOTALS 1971 1980 0 2 0 1 3 1981 1990 1 1 0 4 6 1991 2000 1 3 2 14 20 2001 2011 7 37 11 34 89 Based on Table 4, about 50% percent of Greenpeace's victories lie in what is considered to be a substantial ban or treaty/policy creation in environmental politics or #4, possibly attributed to Greenpeace's actions. There is an uneven distribution of the remaining degrees of success, degree #2 follows with about 37 of the 118 victories, degree #3 has 13 and 9 for degree #1. It could be argued that about 50% of Greenpeace's
108 self defined victories are in fact not considerably impacting environmental politics And in Table 5, data shows that most of these self defined victories happened in the last ten years. This evidence might support the argument that Greenpeace has been successful in adapting its structure to bring about more environmental success. However the number of degree #2 victories is still higher than #4, meaning that there fewer globally impacted changes being made by Greenpeace. Subjectively, some of what Greenpeace claims to be environmental victories may be mere obstruction of corporate oper ations or a true change in environmental politics for the positive. Greenpeace generally identifies success on a large sliding scale; analyzing several specific example of this identification will establish an explanation of the degrees of success assigned In addition, degree of success was given to certain victories based on the descriptions used by Greenpeace to establish how the victory was carried out environmentally and politically. For example, numerous victories describe how corporations like Dell because of Greenpeace actions, is a vague classification of a victory. It is hard to determine whether this corporate promise was actually implemented and what this promise entails for environ mental protection realistically. Or Greenpeace describes how a assessment does not indicate a true mark of environmental success. A victory on its timeline could be as micro level as having the US abandon nuclear testing grounds in the Aleutian Islands or pressuring the International Whaling Commission to implement a whaling moratorium. There is a distinct difference in creating real environmental solutions compared to bearing witness and ethical
109 occupation. Real environment success is the creation of new policies, proper implementation of treaties, or the international banning of harmful environmental practices. Hanging banners or peacefully protesting may not be vie wed as effective, although the potential pressure from these actions may or may not lead to effective environmental change. seal pup skins in response to public criticism trigge red by Greenpeace actions in 140 This is an example of when Greenpeace's actions of bearing witness brought about tangible success for seal pup populations. However, in 1985, Greenpeace claims h nuclear testing in the South Pacific again becomes the subject of international controversy, particularly following the sinking of Greenpeace's ship, The Rainbow Warrior 141 It environmentally successful; it could just be the environmental awareness of a particular issue. There is another issue in the way Greenpeace has determined environmental success, as it attributes many victories to its continuo us actions and pressures. It seems a little forward that Greenpeace can term an environmental achievement, a victory solely based on its actions and strategies. Another self defined victories was in 1999, when Japan was ordered to stop its experimental fi shing of Southern Bluefin Tuna by the International Law of the Sea Tribunal or in 2003, when 30 million people worldwide created one of the largest anti war protests in history. Victories like these are arguably vague as to how environmentally 140 141
110 successful t hey are; specifically it is hard to define how Greenpeace has single handedly assisted in environmental change through tactics and strategies. There is also the issue of implementation, and whether Japan stopped its experimental fishing of the Southern Blu There is a difference between ordering nations to stop harmful practice and having the d] defeat a major drive by pro whaling nation Japan and its supporters to re introduce introduction would have been disastrous 142 On its victories timeline, Green peace has identified various environmental successes that have positively impacted the environment and various issues of international concern. For example, according to Greenpeace, in 1989 a UN moratorium was passed to prohibit large scale driftnet use wh ich was possibly a response to the destructive fishing practices Greenpeace exposed to the public. Another realistic victory received wide international attention [there fore] France, UK, US, Russia and China [then] 143 In 1997, Greenpeace claims and others, ministers from industrial ized nations adopt the Kyoto Protocol agreeing to set legally 144 Greenpeace can attribute its pressuring campaigns and actions to tangible environmental success in the form of an international treaty. 142 143 144
111 In 2010, about 80,000 hectares of Finland pine forest was declared off limits to industrial logging corporations. Greenpeace notes that this declaration followed its eight year campaign against Finland's unethical corporations, with the support of Finland' s indigenous Sami leaders as well. Clearly, Greenpeace's actions can lead to tangible environmental victories; however, not all of its claims reflect true environmental change or success. Its victories must be differentiated between tangible success and s imply obstructing operations. Greenpeace may do an excellent job driving up economic costs for corporations and changing consumer behavior, but this obstruction may not constitute an effective enough change or success in politics. Final Analysis Lookin g at these direct and indirect metrics of success, the effectiveness of Greenpeace as an ENGO is examined. Several conclusions can be made based on these indicators. It could be argued that Greenpeace has been a fairly successful ENGO based on various indi cators. A significant number of self defined victories could be considered influential in environmental politics and have an impact on issues. In addition, comparing income and expenditures over time shows that financially, Greenpeace USA and International have steadily increased in stability over time. Self survival as not only an organization but as a functioning business displays effectiveness. Maintaining its donor base displays financial stability but not necessarily environmental influence and success in politics. Without a doubt, Greenpeace continues to be financially stable because it has not strayed away from its core foundations and environmental ideology. However, this analysis does not necessarily translate to Greenpeace using these tactics and s trategies to bring about change for the protection of the environment.
112 Making changes in policies or canceling environmentally harmful corporate contracts are more tangible and legitimate types of environmental effectiveness, not just obstructing operati ons to create awareness or having stable finances. Many of Greenpeace's self defined environmental victories border on this distinction. Based on the analysis of Greenpeace's perceived victories, it could be argued that its actions and behavior have won se veral micro level environmental battles. Greenpeace's actions appear to be situational, or target very small actors in the global scheme of politics. It must be noted that Greenpeace achieves these small scale victories through its established core values, which are exhibited in its tactics and strategies. In addition, Greenpeace takes advantage of only certain types of opportunities: opportunities to change corporate or government behavior that may eventually led to a ban or policy change, but for the most part the impact is at a micro level. Globally, Greenpeace is slowing working towards large scale environmental battles through its campaigns and direct action tactics. In addition, public opinion data shows that the value and importance of the environme nt has steadily increased, yet awareness of issues and their environmental implications may not be great enough to influence US perceptions. If Greenpeace's main organizational goal is to change environmental perceptions and behaviors, the data do not supp ort the contention that this goal has been realized completely. Clearly, many arguments can be presented based presented metrics of success; Greenpeace may be successful in some sense of the term, but many other factors should be considered when determinin g environmental success. Trends shown in environmental public opinion polls provide measures by which Greenpeace's success can be rated. In secondary research of Greenpeace, many members
113 and other investigators have made the argument that one of its goa ls is to bring about environmental awareness and change the public's attitudes and behaviors. If this was a measure that revealed environmental success for Greenpeace, the polls in this chapter would say otherwise; in fact, environmental perceptions on iss ues such as climate change are skewed. Currently, a smaller percentage of the American public believes that media reports on global warming are exaggerated and that the effects of global are less likely to happen. Also, not only has a high percentage of th e public become less sympathetic to environmental issues, but there is an increase in the percentage of the American public that values economic growth over environmental protection. Overall, these public opinion polls in some ways diminish the idea of Gre enpeace being an effective ENGO. It could be argued that Greenpeace to a degree is an environmentally effective NGO. However, it is hard to attribute success to such factors as financial stability and self defined environmental victories; all indicators m ust be taken into account, such as public opinions. Greenpeace could be considered a more micro level oriented organization that survives for the purpose of carrying out its ideological actions.
114 Chapter 5: Analysis and Conclusion Greenpeace is one of the most reputable and popular ENGOs and is, therefore, worthy of study as an example of this type of environmental organizations. There were many goals driving this thesis and its research. Generally speaking, the purpose of this thes is was to gain an in depth understanding of Greenpeace's emergence, values and ideology, strategies and tactics, and overall effectiveness in the context of social sciences literature on environmental non governmental organizations. Greenpeace was chosen f or examination because of its iconic reputation over the last four decades in global environmental politics. However, more specifically there were numerous questions that remained unanswered about the organization and its true effectiveness. In fact, the a daptability of Greenpeace as an ENGO has been called into question in this thesis; in a rapidly changing world, it remains unknown if Greenpeace has been evolving or continues to operate as it did in the 1970s or 1980s. Thus, this study specifically asse ssed whether or not Greenpeace's strategies and tactics as well as effectiveness has varied across environmental campaigns or over time and, if so, how Greenpeace has varied, or if not, why it has not done so. Originally, the premise was that Greenpeace is surviving in global environmental politics for several possible reasons. First, each issue campaign such as nuclear power, presents its own unique constraints or opportunity, like a political opportunity structure defined by Brulle. Therefore, tactics and strategies would not be similar from issue to issue. Or second, the world has changed considerably compared to the late 1970s and 1980s; therefore information technology and communications are growing exponentially. Tactics and strategies of organizations like Greenpeace should be improving and becoming more
115 effective in politics. Through a variety of analyses, evaluations, and primary research, these objectives and inquiries have been accomplished. Questions have been answered within four parameters: a theoretical analysis of non governmental organization and environmental politics literature; a historical analysis of Greenpeace's development and notable campaigns in the environmental movement; personal interviews with two Greenpeace affiliates; and an evaluation of indicators of success such as income levels and public opinion polls. Greenpeace's historical role in politics has been characterized in this thesis. Greenpeace is an organizationally pure ENGO in global politics. Greenpeace operates throug h its ideological foundations of bearing witness to environmental injustice. Functionally, it may not be impacting issues as much as its reputation may lead the public to believe. Unlike its reputation of changing the world, Greenpeace may be altering beha viors and attitudes of corporations or governments on a case to case basis, as well as getting media coverage, Greenpeace is not necessarily changing political negotiations. This may be Greenpeace's operational flaw in politics, but it survives because of its supporters and donors and its success in micro environmental battles. Greenpeace stays organizationally true to its foundations and carries out specific goals, rather than implementing tangible large scale change in the environment, such as mitigation of global warming or protection of the oceans. In addition, it still must be established whether Greenpeace's role in environmental politics is consistent with the literature and theoretical assumptions of political scientists. This chapter applies researc h gathered in the case study of Greenpeace to the theoretical issues identified in Chapter1. Finally, the
116 central concern of the thesis will be resolved: has Greenpeace been an effective ENGO and does its structure allow the organization to continue to inf luence environmental politics? Values and Existence Environmental issues are still very much a part of the political agenda in the United States as the US continues to encounter heavy globalization, which continually intensifies several environmental is sues and concerns. Activism is following a similar trend, evolving to become more a part of daily global politics. Gemmill and Bamidele Izu have theorized that NGOs like Greenpeace have been able to harness civil society and its demands into a stronger pol itical power and influence for environmental issues. According to these scholars, Greenpeace is going to operate to effectively please its chosen part of civil society. Organizations like Greenpeace have come to embody the values of a select portion of soc iety, based on member values and ideological foundations aimed at environmental protection. Brulle argued that ENGOs all take on a discursive framework or a collective identity as they establish themselves in environmental politics; it could be argued that Greenpeace has an ideological framework by which it operates. Brulle is correct in saying that a framework will guide an organization's way in which it networks and interacts in the environmental movement. Based on the historical analysis of campaigns a nd specifically on the interviews, Greenpeace frames its projects on deep ecologists, in Brulle's terminology and according to McCormick's definition of a radical discursive framework. McCormick argues that radical groups have become disillusioned by the m ainstream methods and the goals of environmentalism and relies heavily on the use of direct action to bring social change in
117 environmental politics. Greenpeace interviewees made it clear that the organization orations. Therefore, it could then be argued that its confrontational campaigns and goals make the organization radical in a way that it stands alone, not really integrating itself into the mainstream methods of lobbying or meeting with governmental offici als to work on environmental agreements. Instead, Greenpeace re brands a company's logo to change consumer behaviors and attitudes, thus hurting a corporation economically. Greenpeace would not be considered what Dalton defines as pragmatic reformers or insiders to the system; through its ideological framework, Greenpeace engages to protect ecology. This framework defines the position that Greenpeace occupies in the environmental movement. Greenpeace represents a clearly recognizable portion of the enviro nmental movement and of civil society as well because it embodies a narrowly defined set of goals within this framework. However, Greenpeace officials interviewed indicate that Greenpeace has only evolved in ways to maintain its support from donors who agr ee with its environmental ideological framework and values. In the personal interviews, each official was asked to describe how Greenpeace's goals have adapted over time, and clearly they have not. Official #1 made it clear in his interview, that Greenpea ce would rather stay true to its values and continue to be respected by others, than to change Greenpeace is doing its part in politics, meanwhile the world is evolving and environmental issues becoming more complex. Strategies and Tactics Strategies and tactics also affect an ENGO's ability to be effective or influential in
118 global politics. As Switzer and Bryner have argued, NGOs are a type of political group that repres ents a competing social interest in global negotiations. NGOs have stepped up to this responsibility because of the lack of global authority for proposing and enforcing negotiations, as McCormick has argued. Because NGOs represent civil society, their stra tegies and tactics will reflect the organization's morals and values rather than economics or capitalistic concerns. Keck and Sikkink argue that with the boomerang effect as they call it, NGOs like Greenpeace will amplify the demands of a severed party lik e the environmentalists by sharing information, attaining political visibility and gaining access to different publics. The boomerang affect occurs when Greenpeace successfully pressures governments or corporations to change behavior or attitudes through t he described tactics. In addition, Gemmill and Bamidele Izu identify various roles of civil society that are considered most important in environmental politics: and po licy development processes, performing operational functions, assessing environmental conditions and monitoring compliance with environmental agreements and 145 Greenpeace's choice in tactics and strategies falls under wha t Dalton considers to be unconventional and conventional tactics. More specifically, Greenpeace's goals are fundamental rather than expressive or pragmatic or politically instrumental. Greenpeace has chosen not to pursue conventional channels of policy cha nge and has enforced the idea of challenging the political establishment to bring about change and awareness. Self claimed environmental victories have documented this goal attainment, and possible 145 Gemmill and Bamidele Izu, The Role of NGOs and Civil Society in Global and Environmental
119 victories of behavior and attitude change have been attrib uted to Greenpeace campaigns or actions. Greenpeace's actions and therefore victories do agree with what Dalton believes to be a new participatory style in environmental politics: one that relies h eavily on direct action and has decentralized, nonhierarchi cal, and expressive forms of behavior. Greenpeace's choice of action relies solely on its social identity as a group and political actor, not its ability to implement real change in overarching environmental problems. Greenpeace could theoretically choose other tactics such as lobbying and become a more flexible and adaptive ENGO that does promote real environmental change. Greenpeace does not necessarily analyze information; it may merely disseminate it to the media. Interviewees made it clear that Green peace will do its best at agenda setting in politics by making it transparent to governments when parties are neglecting or harming the environment. And it could be debatable as to how well Greenpeace is assessing and monitoring compliance o f environmental agreements; with out a doubt Greenpeace occupies certain environmental sites and pressures corporations to change their behaviors. All of which may lead to stronger compliance, but it is difficult to specify how and if Greenpeace and its actions or campaig ns are particularly effective and influential. Greenpeace does strive to gather, exchange, and disseminate environmental information to the public, as McCormick argues NGOs theoretically do. NGOs like Greenpeace try to take advantage of their political com parative advantage and resources by engaging in thes e tactics. However, it is easy to agree with Raustiala's argument that Greenpeace is an ENGO that can be referred to as a guardian of the environment. As shown by the public opinion polls carried out by G allup on such issues as global warming, Greenpeace is not changing public opinion and creating effective changes in
120 many issue areas. Yet the organization is still in the field, pressuring corporations and governments, aiming to ideologically protect the e nvironment. More specifically, it is safe to say that there is no right or wrong choice of tactics for an ENGO. These organizations have a variety of methods at their disposal, but moral and ethical foundations will guide the choice of tactics, strategies, and therefore goal attainment. Greenpeace's choice in campaign tactics and strategies certai nly adheres to this principle. Greenpeace will accomplish its goals through adherence to its core values, ideological tactics, and strategies such as oc cupation, re branding, and corporate pressuring. It could be argued that Greenpeace uses what most transnational advocacy networks use to accomplish their political and issue sensitive goals: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics through its tactics and strategies. For example, Greenpeace uses symbolic politics in many of its campaigns against the corporate world, specifically in its campaign against Kimberly Clark. Official #2 in the primary source intervi ews stated that Greenpeace re branded the Kimberly Clark logo production practices of clear cutting ancient forests. In addition, Greenpeace's tactics and strategies choice correlates with parts of the literature. Greenpeace would rather argue that its origins and traditional strengths are the central tier in the decision making of strategies and tactics. According to Pearce, with this tactical approach and only entering int o non violent confrontations, Greenpeace would be successful. NGOs like Greenpeace have a multitude of tactic and strategies options; there is no one specific method these organizations should utilize.
121 In addition, Greenpeace's choice in tactics have not adapted over time or shown any change. In fact, based on historical analyses of its campaigns, Greenpeace's tactics Interview data shows that Greenpeace thinks it has per fected its tactics and political leveraging in campaigns; it believes that the precedent it set in the Kimberly Clark campaign is effective, and it continues to use it for every campaign. Other constant tactics Greenpeace uses in politics include leverage politics, attacking the morality of environmental practices or making environmental violations aware to the public. Greenpeace attacks a government or corporation by what Keck and Sikkink define as shedding light on a party's inability to follow appropriat e environmental codes, like when corporations were using palm oil in their products. Greenpeace has also perfected so called symbolic politics over time. Time and time again Greenpeace has created imagery of environmental damage and non compliance with the help of the media or, more recently, social networking, which has been documented in the historical narrative of Greenpeace The last theoretical tactic Greenpeace has been known to use is the idea of information politics, how the media or public opinion responds to the issues and concerns brought forth by Greenpeace. Greenpeace has been fairly successful at bringing media attention to its campaigns and issues. McCormick argues that media coverage of environmental issues is by far the most important method an ENGO could implement in its goal attainment because the media is more sympathetic to their cause. Public opinion data does not always show a change in public attitudes or behaviors, quite the opposite in fact. Polls show disbelief in global warming, or higher valuation of the domestic
122 economy compared to environmental protection. However, there are other factors such as economic hardship that may alter one's opinion on the protection of the environment versus economic growth or basic needs. Other tact ics such as monitoring or implementing compliance agreements are common identifiable tactic of NGOs. Raustiala's argument applies more directly to the case of Greenpeace. Instead of being worried about monitoring compliance, Greenpeace is worried about the particular violations of parties. For example, historically, Greenpeacers have positioned themselves between harpoons and whales to bring media attention to the illegal whaling done by countries such as Japan. This tactic may be more commonly seen by Gree npeace compared to the idea of submitting credible data and research to aid in political processes. Based on primary and secondary research, it is a rare occurrence if Greenpeace has tried to enhance the ability of states to regulate environmental politics through credible, scientific information. The key issue with Greenpeace's choices is tactical stagnancy because the world, global politics, and certainly the environment are always changing; Greenpeace has chosen to use similar tactics and tactics over time. The organization lets factors such as the level of foundation funding and organizational governance rule its tactical choices towards goal attainment. According to the personal interviews, Greenpeace does not necessarily target the public at large. It will exchange member lists with other similar organizations like the Sierra Club to find supporters, but it does not believe in the use of direct mailing to target supporters. Greenpeace is also unlike other ENGOs when comparing its choice of tactics an d strategies choice to what Brulle has argued are the most utilized tactics according to percentage distribution. For example, protest is only
123 used about 2% of the time, while political advocacy is used 28%. Greenpeace does not follow what Brulle argues in regard to funding controlling an organization's forms of action. In fact, Greenpeace's funding only comes from donors' appreciation for Greenpeace's choice in unconventional, ideological actions. Dalton's theoretical arguments reflect Greenpeace much mo re appropriately: ideology is the core element that shapes Greenpeace's perspective on environmental organizations to select certain political actions that are considered to be suitable, 146 Greenpeace favors unconventional actions because they challenge dominant social and economic norms. Greenpeace does not use the conventional political channels, engaging instead in more expressive, radical public displays such as protests or media covered occupations. Therefore, defining Greenpeace as an effective ENGO is a more complicated issue than originally argued. Effectiveness In general, ENGOs and NGOs have inte grated themselves into global politics to stand alongside states and represent concerns of civil society. Aside from establishing themselves through discursive frameworks, these organizations have become political participants through their values and goal s. Political scientists agree that ENGOs have become a part of global politics; however, the degree of effectiveness of the organizations can be determined on an ad hoc basis. A few theoretical assumptions that stand out in the literature are based on Keck and Sikkink's, Timmer's and Raustiala's arguments. Keck and Sikkink believe that organizations like Greenpeace rely on organizational goal 146 Dalton, 16.
124 attainment in politics or the desired outcome of the group. This is highly idealized or specialized, defining influe nce solely based on what the organization itself wants to achieve. However, looking at Greenpeace's income and expenditures over ti me has shown stability and self preservation, therefore goal attainment through support. Keck and Sikkink's assumptions would therefore apply to Greenpeace, making it influential based on organizational goal attainment. In addition, Timmer also agrees with Keck and Sikkink; she believes that ENGOs are rational political machines and that their effectiveness is based on the attai nment of collective goals, the impact of direct action tactics, and their viability and self preservation over time. Greenpeace is a perfect example of this, maintaining a balanced budget, with membership increasing steadily. However, the case of Greenpe ace is not applicable to Raustiala's findings; Greenpeace is not an organization that achieves its influence through conventional tactics, like lobbying or holding informal meetings with important government officials. The organization is far from staying within the dominant political system, evident in the historical analysis of Greenpeace. Take, for example, Greenpeace's confrontation with the French police while it was protesting nuclear testing with The Vega; some participants were arrested and brutally hurt. Also, when Greenpeace violated the Marine Mammals Protection Act, members sprayed seal pups green to inhibit hunters from clubbing seals to death for their furs. Based on its campaigning history, Greenpea ce chose to face the law's consequences if it meant preserving the environment or getting media attention about the issue; this confrontational approach does not equate with working within the dominant political system. Without a doubt, Betsill and Corel
125 relationship between NGO access and influence in international environmental 147 NGOs like Greenpeace may accomplish their goal of engaging in environmental politics, but their outcomes do not necessarily show influence or affect political negotiations. The core principle that these scholars are arguing about is the idea of NGO participation and therefore influence in politics. Instead, focus should be on a causal chain of actions that an ENGO like Greenpeace will engage in versus becoming a vocal participant in political negotiations. Betsill and Corell define NGO influence and effectiveness as an organization's ability to change the attitudes and behaviors of governments and corporations, to change policy and negotiations, and to change public opinion. NGOs like Greenpeace will exert this type of influence regardless of the political climate. NGOs like Greenpeace have only achieved this influe nce through the dissemination of information through media. Greenpeace believes that it has the power to change attitudes and behaviors through media; according to the personal interviews, Greenpeace has been highly successful like in its campaign against Kimberly Clark. And last, it could also be argued that Greenpeace as an environmental organization does not take advantage of what Brulle terms as political opportunity structures. It does not seem that Greenpeace has taken advantage of what Brulle descr ibes to be times where there is a window of opportunity for NGOs to mobilize for policy negotiations. An example of this, is Greenpeace's presence at the recent gulf oil spill; in the personal interview, Official #2 discussed Greenpeace's presence at this 147
126 the first on site and was able to get some of the first photos that showed the media the environmental implications of the spill. However, there was little elaboration as to what else Greenpeace was able to accomplish by taking advantage of this particular environmental opportunity. Official #2 stated that Greenpeace was able to establish grassroots connections in the area of the spill, but the real impact o f Greenpeace's presence in the gulf is unknown. Final Observations Overall, it could be argued that this thesis and its associated research has accomplished what it set out to do: an in depth analysis of an ENGO and an evaluation of its effectiveness in global politics. The most important findings could be considered the concept that in reality, Greenpeace's reputation may not be truthful. Greenpeace is surviving in the realm of environmental politics, but its early success was far more influential that its small scale successes are today. It could be argued that the environment will be more protected with Greenpeace's presence in society, but the organization could do far more influential campaigns to conquer issues such as species depletion or global wa rming. Greenpeace as an environmental organization is truly what it says it is; an ideological environmental group that stays true to its core values, independent, and wants to protect the environment. During my research, my findings have altered my origi nal view of Greenpeace and ENGOs in politics and the ability to influence. Previous to thesis research, I assumed that Greenpeace aimed to impact the environment and to fundamentally change the world. It has now been established that the organization may h ave this outlook, yet it may not accomplishing its goals as it did in the early years. Greenpeace could be criticized
127 from a variety of different angles, but it remains a thriving and influential ENGO in global politics. This thesis points out its faults b ut also its advantages in politics; Greenpeace will continue to survive in the chaotic world of environmental global politics.
128 Appendix A Greenpeace Self defined Environmental Victories December 2011: Facebook 'friends' renewable energy sending a message to energy producers to move away from coal. Facebook now has a siting policy that states a preference for access to clean, renewable energy supply for its future data centers the places where its computers live. Coal power is st ill a feature of Facebook for now, but as they say in the IT sector it's been deprecated. October 2011: habitat. As part of its new commitments, Mattel has instruct ed its suppliers to avoid wood fiber from controversial sources also aims to increase the amount of recycled paper used in their business, as well as to boost the use of wo od products certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) September 2011: H&M, Adidas, Nike and Puma have committed to eliminate discharges of hazardous chemicals from across their entire supply chains, and their entire product life cycle by 2020. The Detox campaign launched in July 2011 with the release of the Dirty Laundry report, which documented the results of a yearlong investigation that uncovered links between major fashion brands and two textile facilities in China found to be discharging hazar dous chemicals into the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas. Further investigations by Greenpeace revealed that shoppers around the world are buying contaminated clothing and unwittingly spreading water pollution when they wash their new garments. The landmark commitments from the 4 brands are an important first step in the journey towards a toxic free future, and Greenpeace will continue to monitor and work with the brands as they prepare their Detox Action Plans. March 2011: Princes, a leading tinned tuna bran d, finally got your message that canning ocean destruction is unacceptable. Thanks to your efforts the company has just announced a plan to change the way it gets its tuna. After receiving over 80,000 emails from Greenpeace supporters, Princes said it will no longer rely on indiscriminate and destructive fishing methods that kill all kinds of marine creatures like sharks and rays. December 2010: After two and a half years of hard work in Japan to expose corruption at the heart of the whaling industry th e Fisheries Agency of Japan (FAJ) admitted that their officials received free whale meat ethics code, apologized to the Japanese public and announced p lans to take disciplinary action against five officials. December 2010: 80,000 hectares of pine forest in northern Finland are declared off limits to industrial logging following an eight herders. November 2010: year campaign against climate killing chemical HFC catalyzes a groundbreaking commitment when the 400 companies of the Consumer Goods Forum of the US agree to climate friendly refrigeration beginning in 2015. Septemb er 2010: Over one million signatures calling for a moratorium on genetically modified (GM) crops were delivered by Avaaz and Greenpeace to John Dalli, Commissioner of Health and Consumer Policy, at the EU Commission in Brussels. The signatures were printed on the world's largest piece of art made by one man a 3D hand painted scene of an organic farm with agricultural biodiversity that is GM free. It represents the way most Europeans want their food and fields. July 2010: Following a ten year Greenpeace ca mpaign, Europe bans the trade in illegal timber a great leap forward in the struggle to protect the world's forests and climate. May 2010: Over 25 years of Greenpeace efforts to expose and oppose nuclear waste shipments from France to Russia end in victo ry when Russia puts an end to the practice. The illegality of the shipments was confirmed when French officials admitted that the stated intention to reprocess and return the fuel was false. Attention to the shipments was sparked in 1984 when Greenpeace re vealed that the shipping vessel Mont Louis, which sank in the North Sea, was carrying Uranium Hexaflouride. May 2010: A new policy commits Nestl to identify and exclude companies from its supply chain that own or manage 'high risk plantations or farms lin ked to deforestation' This would apply to Sinar Mas, a palm oil
129 and paper supplier and Cargill, one of Nestl's palm oil suppliers, which purchases from Sinar Mas. Nestle's announcement sends a strong message to the palm oil and paper industry that rainfo rest destruction is not an acceptable practice in today's global marketplace. May 2010: The biggest, most ambitious forest conservation deal ever is announced: The Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement After more than seven years of hard fought campaigning to end the on going destruction of Canada's Boreal Forest, Greenpeace and eight other non governmental organizations have agreed to a truce with the logging industry. May 2010: Nestl agrees to stop purchasing palm oil from sources which destroy Indonesian r ainforests The decision caps eight weeks of massive pressure from consumers via social media and non violent direct action by Greenpeace activists as the company concedes to the demands of a global campaign against its Kit Kat brand. May 2010: Plans for a third runway at Heathrow airport are axed by the UK government. Greenpeace opposed the plan because it ran contrary to efforts to reduce carbon emissions in the UK, and co purchased, with 91,000 supporters, a plot of land that would have made the runway impossible to build. February 2010: Indian computer manufacturer Wipro announces the launch of a new PVC and BFR free computer after several years of pressure by Greenpeace on tech companies to provide toxics free electronics. November 2009: Household ch emical giant Clorox announces a phase out of the use and transport of dangerous chlorine gas in the US, bowing to years of pressure on the industry from Greenpeace. October 2009: Apple clears the last hurdle to removing toxic PVC plastic in its new Macboo k and iMac capping the "Green my Apple" campaign with a win and making Apple products safer, easier to recycle and causing less pollution at the end of their life. October 2009: Plans to build the Kingsnorth coal power plant are shelved following a three year campaign by Greenpeace to stop the first new coal plant build in 20 years in the UK. A landmark court case in 2008 acquitted six Greenpeace activists of criminal damage on the grounds that their actions against the plant were just ified to stop greater damage from climate change. August 2009: In a tremendous victory for ancient forests, Kimberly Clark the company known for its popular brands like Kleenex, Scott, and Cottonelle announces a policy that places it among the industry l eaders in sustainability The announcement brings the five year Greenpeace Kleercut campaign to a successful completion. August 2009: After seven years of Greenpeace pressure, Finnish government owned logging company Metshallitus agrees to leave the tall trees of the old growth forests of northern Lapland standing and with them, the livelihood of the Smi people. April 2009: Germany announces that it will become the sixth EU country to ban the cultivation of Monsanto 's genetically engineered (GE) maize MON810 the only GE crop that can be commercially grown in the region. March 2009 : The construction of an open pit coal mine in Poland where Greenpeace set up a Climate Rescue Station in December 2008, is suspended stopping around 50 million tons of CO 2 from being released into the atmosphere. March 2009: The Great Bear Rainforest protection agreement comes into force in Canada capping one of Greenpeace's longest running campaigns by protecting an area half the size of Switzerland from logging. The c ampaign was won with direct non violent action on the ground, consumer pressure, stockholder actions, and thousands of online activists worldwide. February 2009: Following a six month long Quit Coal campaign by Greenpeace, the Greek Minister of Developmen t states that the government is not considering coal or nuclear power as part of Greece's energy future. Instead the Greek government will be rewriting its Long Term Energy Plan to exclude coal and promote renewable energy and energy efficiency. February 2 009: Electronics giant Philips bows to pressure from Greenpeace and consumers and becomes a
130 leader in environmentally friendly take back policies for electronic waste An ambitious policy of global take back exceeds legal requirements in many countries. S eptember 2008: Six Greenpeace UK volunteers are acquitted of criminal damage by a Crown Court jury in a case that centered on the contribution made to climate change by burning coal. The charges arose after the six attempted to shut down the Kingsnorth coa l fired power station in Kent in 2007 by scaling the chimney and painting the Prime Minister's name down the side. The defendants pleaded 'not guilty' and relied in court on the defense of 'lawful excuse' claiming they shut the power station in order to defend property of a greater value from the global impact of climate change. The landmark case marks the first victory of the 'lawful excuse' defense in a climate change case in Britain August 2008 : After our campaign in the 1990's against toxic PVC the US Congress somewhat belatedly follows Europe's lead of outlawing toxic PVC in children's toys July 2008 : Ferrero (famous for its Nutella brand) becomes the latest large palm oil user to changes its position to support a moratorium on cutting down trees in Indonesia for palm oil plantations May 2008 : After just three weeks of actions, a hugely popular spoof advert and 115,000 online signatures Unilever changes its position to support a moratorium on cutting down trees in Indonesia for palm oil plantations March 2008 : After a campaign in Argentina the Government announces a ban on energy wasting incandescent light bulbs December 2007: The World Bank's private lending arm, the International Financ e Corporation (IFC) decides to sell its equity stake in Olam International Limited Olam's involvement in illegal timber trade was first detailed in our Carving up the Congo report published earlier this year. The report illustrated how Olam was holding f orest land in the Congo granted in breach of a moratorium on the granting of new logging titles, which the World Bank itself had helped to establish. It also described how Olam was sourcing timber from destructive and illegal operations through de facto su bcontracting agreements with third party suppliers involved in illegal logging. December 2007: The Irish Government announces what will be the EU's first ban on energy wasting incandescent light bulbs by as early as January 2009. This simple but histori c step came as governments met in Bali to discuss next steps on tackling the global climate emergency. Over the past year, a number of EU countries have talked about similar bans, but Ireland is the first to act. November 2007: Together with other environ mental groups, Greenpeace gets 1.5 million signatures of support and pushes through Argentina's first federal forest protection law The new law includes a nationwide one year moratorium on clearing of native forests while forest management regulations are put in place. After a year, any jurisdiction still lacking regulations will continue to be prohibited from issuing new logging and land clearing permits. The Forest Law also establishes environmental impact studies and public hearings measures that will help protect forests where indigenous people live and small scale farmers. May 2007 : After four years of Greenpeace campaigning to bring an end to deep sea bottom trawling, representatives from countries around the world gathered in Chile to carve out a fisheries agreement for the South Pacific region protecting it from this incredibly destructive fishing method. From September 2007, bottom trawling vessels in the region will not be able to fish in areas that have, or are even likely to have, vulnerable marine ecosystems unless they complete an assessment showing that no damage will be caused. May 2, 2007: Apple announces a phase out of the most dangerous chemicals in its product line in response to a Webby award winning online campaign by Greenpeace an d Apple fans worldwide. The campaign challenged Apple to become a green leader in addressing the electronic waste problem. March 7, 2007: The New Zealand government announces cancellation of proposed coal burning power plant Marsden B. Greenpeace and loca l activists had mounted a four year struggle which involved a nine day occupation, high court challenges, protest marches, a record numbers of public submissions, Surfers
131 Against Sulphur, public meetings, and a pirate radio station. February 15, 2007: In a major blow to the UK government's plans to reinvigorate nuclear power the High Court rules their decision to back a programme of new nuclear power stations was unlawful on the basis that they had failed to adequately consult citizens and groups who oppo se nuclear power as a dangerous distraction from real solutions to climate change. September 27, 2006: Estonia launches an investigation into the Probo Koala following three days of blockade by the Greenpeace vessel Arctic Sunrise. It is the first officia l action against the ship, which poisoned thousands and killed eight in the Ivory Coast when it dumped a cargo of toxic waste that had been refused by the Netherlands. After dumping its deadly cargo, the ship simply sailed to Estonia unhindered until Green peace took action. July 25, 2006: McDonald's agrees to stop selling chicken fed on soya grown in newly deforested areas of the Amazon rainforest, then becomes instrumental in getting other food companies and supermarkets, such as Marks & Spencer, Sainsbu ry's, ASDA and Waitrose, to sign up to a zero deforestation policy as well. But it goes even further than that, and pressure from all these companies forces their suppliers, the big multinational soya companies such as Cargill, to agree a two year moratorium on buying soya from newly deforested areas June 26, 2006: Dell becomes the latest company to promise to remove the worst toxic chemicals from it products closely following the move of its rival HP. Both companies have been pressured by us to m ake their products greener and help tackle the growing mountain of toxic e waste. May 31, 2006: Despite heavy lobbying by the nuclear power industry, Spain has confirmed that the country's 8 operating plants will be phased out in favor of clean, renewable energy. Spain joins Sweden, Germany, Italy and Belgium as the fifth European country to abandon nuclear power April 3, 2006: After months of pressure, consumer actions, online activism and more than 100,000 emails from Ocean Defender everywhere, seafood suppliers Gorton's, Sealord and parent company Nissui withdraw their active support for Japanese whaling Whalers announce that the 32 percent share in whaling operations owned by these commercial corporations will be transferred to a "public interest ent ity." The retreat isolates whaling economically and probably scuppers plans to find new markets for whale products. March 9, 2006: Electronics giant Hewlett Packard commits to a phase out plan for a range of hazardous chemicals in its products. February 16, 2006: French President Chirac announced the dramatic recall of the asbestos laden warship Clemenceau -it will be turning around and going back to France. Our actions, emails to Chirac and an embarrassing international scandal left France with little choice but to abandon the misguided attempt to dump its own toxic mess on India. February 14, 2006 : An area twice the size of Belgium has been given greater protection in the Amazon after a Presidential decree. The decree by President Lula of Brazil to cr eate the 6.4 million hectare (around 16 million acres) conservation area is a great victory for the people of the Amazon battling land grabbers, cattle ranchers and loggers. The decree calls for around 1.6 million hectares to be permanently protected and t otally off limits to logging and deforestation. February 7, 2006: Take ten years of difficult, dangerous, and at times, heartbreaking work. Add thousands of activists from around the world -some who sent emails, some who stood on the blockades, some wh o voted against destruction with their wallets. Some who were beaten, some who were sued, some who were arrested. But eventually common sense has prevailed and one of the world's treasures, the Great Bear Rainforest, is saved from destruction
132 January 1 3, 2006: Our Argentine Ocean Defenders hit Nissui in their pockets. Nissui own about one third of Kyodo Senpaku -the people who run the Japanese whaling fleet. Our cyberactivists convinced a major Nissui client in Argentina not to buy from a corporation involved in the killing of whales November 28, 2005 Swiss voters vote no in a referendum to determine whether genetically engineered (GE) crops and animal scan be grown in the alpine nation during the next five years. Their verdict in each and every on e of the three main languages was the same; nein, non, no, to GE. November 24, 2005 The city of Buenos Aires announces plans to implement a zero waste policy after a campaign by Greenpeace in Argentina. The plan aims to reduce dramatically the 4 5000 ton s of waste the city dumps every day. Buenos Aires is the largest city so far to announce a zero waste plan. 27 October, 2005 The intervention of some home grown celebrities finally tips the balance in favor of protecting the forests of northern Argentin a after a long fight by Greenpeace and the indigenous Wichi people. October 4, 2005 Electronics giant Motorola and health and body care companies L'Occitane, Melvitacosm and Alqvimia are the latest companies to drop the most toxic chemicals from their p roducts. August 17, 2005 Electronics giant LG announces that it is committing to eliminating toxic chemicals from their entire consumer electronics range. July 5 2005 Bad Barbies, toxic Teletubbies and rotten rubber ducks could have been slowly poisoning small children. The very chemicals that made these toys so soft and tempting to teething toddlers have been shown damage organs in animals. But the European Parliamen t has banned manufacturers from using six of these toxic chemicals freeing Europe from many toxic toys for good. April 29, 2005: Sony Ericsson announces that it will be phasing toxic chemicals out of its products. This is the result of the thousands of p articipants in our online action to pressure electronics companies to come clean. Sony Ericsson joins Samsung, Nokia and Sony as electronics companies who are phasing toxic chemicals out of all their products. March 22, 2005: Photocopy giant Xerox agrees to stop buying timber pulp from StoraEnso the Finnish national logging company which is cutting down one of Europe's last remaining ancient forests. Following pressure by Greenpeace cyberactivists, the company agrees a new procurement policy, ensuring th at suppliers do not source timber from 'old growth forests, conservation areas or other areas designated for protection.' November 11, 2004: Following years of campaigning in the Amazon by Greenpeace and other environmental organiz ations the Brazilian gov ernment stood up to the powerful forces of illegal loggers and greedy soya and beef barons by creating two massive protective reserves. The presidential decree has protected 2 million hectares of the Amazon forest by creating the Verde Para Sempre and Rioz inho do Anfrisio extractive reserves. November 4, 2004: Bayer conceded to Greenpeace India that ALL its projects on genetically engineered (GE) crops have been in a letter sent by Aloke V. Pradhan, head of Bayer's Corporate Communications i n India. This announcement followed earlier actions by Greenpeace outside Bayer's head office in Mumbai. October 29, 2004: MQ Publications (MQP) in the UK becomes the first UK publisher to publicly announce its collaboration with the Greenpeace Book Campa ign. MQP has committed to phasing out paper that is not 'ancient forest friendly' Their next five books, including 'The Armchair Environmentalist' will be printed on 100 percent recycled paper. They have also publicly challenged all UK publishers to follo w suit. October 29, 2004: Greenpeace efforts to achieve tighter controls on the notorious ship breaking industry result in an international agreement to treat obsolete ships as waste Treaty commitments by 163 nations can be expected to increase demands f or decontamination of ships prior to export to the principle ship breaking countries of India, Bangladesh, and Turkey. It will also create new demand for the development of "green" ship recycling capacity in developed countries. October 22, 2004: A decade of lobbying, scientific research, and direct non violent action by Greenpeace
133 and environmental groups around the world comes to fruition as Russia ratifies the Kyoto Protocol bringing to force the world's sole global effort to address the dangers of glo bal warming. September 30, 2004: Cyberactivists in Japan halt introduction of recycling unfriendly and unreturnable plastic bottles when beer manufacture Asahi bows to citizen pressure. September 1, 2004: Ford Europe announce a reversal of the decision to scrap its fleet of fuel efficient electric Th!nK City cars and instead investigate sending them to eager customers in Norway. Pressure applied by Greenpeace and web based cyberactivists convinced Ford to Th!nk Again. When charged by electricity from rene wable sources, these cars help fight the biggest threat to our planet: climate change. July 20, 2004: Queensland Energy Resources announce an end to the Stuart Shale Oil project in Australia. Greenpeace campaigned against the project, which would have pro duced oil with four times the greenhouse impact as oil from the ground, since 1998. The project cost millions of dollars in government subsidies which should have been spent on renewable energy. June 22, 2004: Unilever, Coca Cola and McDonald's promise to phase out climate killing chemicals in their refrigeration equipment In 1992 Greenpeace launched Greenfreeze with the help of two scientists who pointed out how to avoid HFC's altogether. We found an old fridge factory, appealed to our supporters to pre order enough units to finance a refit, helped build the market and Greenfreeze was born. Today there are over 100 million Greenfreeze refrigerators in the world, produced by all the major European, Chinese, Japanese and Indian manufacturers. June 17, 2004: Consumer power scored a victory following the announcement from electronics giant Samsung that it plans to phase out hazardous chemicals in its products. Seeing its brand name products graded red as containing hazardous chemicals on the Greenpeace database, prompted the company to do the right thing on dangerous chemicals. June 10, 2004: Publishers of 34 Canadian magazines pledged to shift away from paper containing tree fiber from Canada's ancient forests thanks to ongoing pressure from the Marke ts Initiative coalition, of which Greenpeace Canada has a key role. The coalition has similar commitments from 71 Canadian book publishers including the Canadian publisher of Harry Potter, which printed the Order of the Phoenix on AFF paper in June 2003. G reenpeace Canada's work to protect its forests also encouraged Cascades as the second largest producer of tissue products in Canada to commit to an Ancient Forest Friendly purchasing policy June 1, 2004: Iceland steps back from plans to kill 500 minke, s ei, and fin whales over two years announcing a quota of only 25 minkes for the year. Greenpeace web activists fueled domestic opposition by gathering 50,000 worldwide signatures to a pledge to visit Iceland if the government would stop whaling. With a pot ential value of more than US$ 60 million in tourist spend, against a whaling programme which generated 3 4 million in profits, the pledge dramatically illustrated that whales are worth more to Iceland alive than dead May 11, 2004: Thanks to years of pres sure from environmental groups, the consumers, our cyberactivists and Greenpeace, we can celebrate a victory for the environment following the announcement by Monsanto that it would suspend further development or open field trials of its genetically engine ered Roundup Ready wheat Monsanto stated that it was deferring all further efforts to introduce the crop and that it was discontinuing breeding and field level research of the wheat. This follows a similar announcement in 2003 when the company announced i ts withdrawal from the development of pharmaceutical crops. April 2, 2004: The UN International Maritime Organization (IMO) designate the Baltic sea as a "Particularly Sensitive Sea Area," a decision which Greenpeace advocated for years. The IMO regulates shipping worldwide, and the new designation means tougher restrictions on oil tankers and other dangerous cargo vessels. The move was vehemently opposed by the shipping and oil industries. March 31, 2004: Following the controversial UK government approva l of genetically engineered (GE) maize for commercial planting, the only company authorized to grow GE maize withdraws its application In a victory for activists and consumers across Europe who lobbied for tougher legislation and boycotted GE products, Ba yer Crop science a German company authorized to plant an herbicide resistant variety of maize known as Chardon LL, said regulations on how and where the crop could be planted would make it "economically non viable." Chardon LL was the crop pulled up by Gr eenpeace UK activists in 1999. The
134 activists were acquitted of charges of criminal damage when the court agreed they were acting in the interest of protecting the environment. February 18, 2004: The Stockholm Convention comes into force following years of lobbying by Greenpeace and other environmental organisations. A key feature of the Convention calls for the elimination of all Persistent Organic pollutants They include intentionally produced chemicals, such as pesticides and PCBs, as well as by products such as cancer causing dioxins that are released from industries that use chlorine and from waste incinerators. February 4, 2004: Esso loses its court case against Greenpeace in France. As part of our "Don't buy Esso, Don't buy Exxon/Mobil" campaign, we d eveloped a parody of Esso's logo with a double dollar sign: E$$O, which the oil giant (which trades under the name Exxon/Mobil in other parts of the world) attempted to censor. In a victory for freedom of expression on the web and for our campaign against the world's #1 environmental criminal, the French court defended the logo as an exercise in free speech. November 2003: Thanks to intensive lobbying by cyberactivists around the world, Greenpeace prevails against and attempt by Flag of Convenience States to remove the organization from the International Maritime Organization the UN body charged with regulating shipping worldwide. Greenpeace action against unsafe oil tankers, such as the Prestige, had led to the ouster attempt on purported "safety" grounds. August 2003: The Deni, indigenous peoples of the Amazon celebrate t he end of an 18 year campaign to mark their land as protected from logging. 13 Greenpeace volunteers, including a member of the cyberactivist community, used GPS technology and a helicopter for a month to create an "eco corridor" around 3.6 million hectare s of land May 2003: Intense lobbying efforts by Greenpeace and Global Witness results in UN Sanctions on Liberia for illegal logging February 26, 2003: A French court agrees to lift an injunction against Greenpeace for creating a parody version of the Esso logo. In July Greenpeace was ordered to remove the logo from its website. On appeal, the court agreed the depiction on a website branding the oil giant Environmental Enemy Number One was protected speech February 15, 2003 : 30 million people worldwid e create the largest anti war protest in the history of humankind February 7, 2003 : McDonalds in Denmark bows to pressure and takes a leadership position in opening its first restaurants that use no climate killing chemicals for refrigeration A campaign by Greenpeace cyberactivists three years ago had led to a similar decision by Coca Cola to phase out HFC/HCFCs and adopt Greenpeace's innovative "Greenfreeze" technology. 2002: Brazil declares a moratorium on export of Mahogany following revelations of the extent of illegal logging and timber trade. Greenpeace actions around the world help enforce the ban. 2002: The European Union, followed by Japan, ratifies the Kyoto Protocol on climate change Intensive Greenpeace lobbying must continue because, for the protocol to enter into force, 55 parties to the convention must ratify it. 2002: Greenpeace helps defeat a major drive by pro whaling nation Japan and its supporters to re introduce commercial whaling through the International Whaling Commission. The r e introduction would have been disastrous for whales, which are now protected under the 1982 commercial whaling ban. 2001 : Greenpeace turns 30 years old in September. The environmental group has grown from a small band of inspired volunteers to an international environmental organization with offices in 30 countries. As always, Greenpeace thrives on committed activism and widespread, growing public suppor t. 2001: After years of negotiations and pressure from Greenpeace, a global agreement for the elimination of a group of highly toxic and persistent man made chemicals (Persistent Organic Pollutants or POPs), became a reality in May 2001 when a UN Treaty ba nning them is adopted. 2001: A historic agreement with logging companies is reached on the conservation of Canada's remaining coastal rainforest and approved by the government of British Columbia. This follows years of campaigning by Greenpeace, most recen tly targeting the trade and investments of companies involved in logging the
135 endangered Great Bear Rainforest. 2001: Greenpeace lobbying, together with earlier expeditions to the Southern and Atlantic Oceans exposing flag of convenience (FOC or "pirate") v essels, are instrumental in the adoption of an "international plan of action" to combat illegal fishing in international waters 2000 2001: An ever increasing and significant number of European retailers, food producers, and subsidiaries of multinational c ompanies guaranteed to keep genetically engineered ingredients out of their products due to consumer pressure. Thanks to its consumer networks in 15 countries, Greenpeace tests products, collects information about food products and policies and exposes con tamination cases. 2000: Further to Greenpeace's April May expedition exposing pirate fishing in the Atlantic, an import ban is adopted on all bigeye tuna caught by FOC vessels in the Atlantic 2000: Turkey's plans to build its first nuclear reactors at Akkuyu as part of a larger project to construct 10 reactors by the year 2020, is finally cancelled in July after eight years of campaigning by Greenpeace and others. The only remaining market for all major western nuclear companies is China. 2000: The Bios afety Protocol is adopted in Montreal, Canada It aims to protect the environment and human health from risks of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) by controlling international trade of GMOs. Greenpeace has campaigned to stop the irreversible release of GMOs into the environment and to protect biodiversity from genetic pollution since 1995. 1999 : Nine countries ban the use of harmful phthalates in polyvinyl chloride (PVC) toys for children under three and the EU introduces an "emergency" ban on soft PVC teething toys 1999: Japan is ordered to stop "experimental" fishing of Southern Bluefin Tuna by the International Law of the Sea Tribunal. 1998: The Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty comes into force. 1998 : A historic accord, the OSPAR Conv ention, bans the dumping of offshore installations at sea in the North East Atlantic The Convention also agrees on the phasing out of radioactive and toxic discharges, as proposed by Greenpeace. 1998: The oil company Shell finally agrees to bring its infa mous offshore installation, the Brent Spar, to land for recycling Greenpeace campaigned since 1995 to persuade the oil company not to dump disused installations in the ocean. 1998: After 15 years of campaigning by Greenpeace, the EU finally agrees to pha se out drift net fishing by its fleets in EU and international waters by the end of 2001. France, Italy, the UK and Ireland, continued drift netting in the North East Atlantic and Mediterranean after Japan, Taiwan and Korea stopped driftnet fishing on the high seas when the worldwide ban came into force at the end of 1992. 1998: Logging giant MacMillan Bloedel announces it will phase out clear cut logging activities in British Columbia, Canada 1997 : After campaigning for urgent action to protect the climat e since 1988 by Greenpeace and others, ministers from industrialized nations adopt the Kyoto Protocol agreeing to set legally binding reduction targets on greenhouse gases. 1997 : Greenpeace collects the UNEP Ozone Award for the development of Greenfreeze a domestic refrigerator free of ozone depleting and significant global warming chemicals. 1996: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is adopted at the United Nations. 1995: Following a high profile action by Greenpeace, and public pressure, Sh ell UK reverses its decision to dump the Brent Spar oil platform in the Atlantic Ocean. 1995: Greenpeace actions to stop French nuclear testing receive wide international attention. Over seven million people sign petitions calling for a stop to testing. F rance, UK, US, Russia and China commit to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 1995: Following a submission made with Greenpeace support, UNESCO designates Russia's Komi Forest
136 as a World Heritage Site 1994: After years of Greenpeace actions against whaling, the Antarctic whale sanctuary proposed by France and supported by Greenpeace, is approved by the International Whaling Commission. 1994: Greenpeace actions exposing toxic waste trade from Organization for Economic Co operation and Development (OECD) to non OECD countries culminate in government negotiation of the Basel Convention banning this practice. 1993 : The London Dumping Convention permanently bans the dumping at sea of radioactive and industrial was te world wide 1992: France cancels this year's nuclear tests at Mu ruroa Atoll following the Rainbow Warrior visit to the test zone, and vows to halt altogether if other nuclear nations follow suit. 1992: Worldwide ban on high seas large scale driftnets comes into force. 1991: The 39 Antarctic Treaty signatories agree to a 50 year minimum prohibition of all mineral exploitation in effect preserving the continent for peaceful, scientific purposes. 1991: Major German publishers go chlorine free after Green peace produces chlorine free edition of Der Spiegel as part of campaign against chlorine bleaching. 1989: A UN moratorium on high seas large scale driftnets is passed responding to public outrage at indiscriminate fishing practices exposed by Greenpeace. 1988: Following at sea actions, and submissions by Greenpeace, a world wide ban on incinerating organochlorine waste at sea is agreed by the London Dumping Convention. 1985 : French nuclear testing in the South Pacific again becomes the subject of internati onal controversy particularly following the sinking of Greenpeace's ship, the Rainbow Warrior, by the French Secret Services. 1983: The Parties to the London Dumping Convention call for a moratorium on radioactive waste dumping at sea As a result of Greenpeace's repeated actions against ocean dumping, this is the first year since the end of the second world war where officially no radioactive wastes are dumped at sea. 1982: After at sea actions against whalers, a whaling moratorium is adopted by the I nternational Whaling Commission. 1982: EC bans import of seal pup skins in response to public criticism triggered by Greenpeace actions in Canada. 1978: Greenpeace actions halt the grey seal slaughter in the Orkney Islands, Scotland 1975: France ends atmo spheric tests in the South Pacific after Greenpeace protests at the test site. 1972 : After the first Greenpeace action in 1971, the US abandons nuclear testing grounds at Amchitka Island, Alaska Source: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/victories/ \
137 Appendix B List of Interview Objectives Overall I would like to address a few different concepts; the basic history with Greenpeace/affiliation. How have Greenpeace's Core Principles (bearing witness, non violence, direct action, mass media communication, and confrontation supported by quiet diplomacy and research) evolved over time, if at all? And in what ways have these tactics adjusted to the tempor al setting? What are/have been Greenpeace's long term and short term goals as an ENGO? What do they see as their objectives/goals or strategies as an ENGO? Is that changing with time; and if so what has been the trigger? Does Greenpeace want to funda mentally change society as an ENGO? How does Greenpeace prioritize issues internally? Describe the issue variance and how tactics are assigned according to issue. Who is Greenpeace's target audience? Do you think that Greenpeace has been effective as an individual ENGO? If so, what makes Greenpeace effective in your opinion?
138 Works Cited Global Environmental Politics 1:4 (November 2001): 69 71. Bohlen, Jim. Making Waves: The Origins and Futures of Greenpeace Canada: Black Rose Books, 2001. Brown, Michael and John May. The Greenpeace Story. New York: Dorling Kindersley Inc., 1989. Brulle, Robert J. The Handbook of Politics: State and Civil Society in Global Perspective. New York: Springer Publishers, 2008. Dalton, Russel J., and Robert Comparative Political Studies Vol. 36 (2003) 2 20. Gallup Polls. Accessed April 2012. http://www.gallup.com/poll/146939/Majority Americans Say Nuclear Power Plants Safe.aspx Gemmill Barbara, and Abimbola Bamidele Global Environmental Governance: Options and Opportunities (2002) 1 24. 2011. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/how is greenpeace structured/financial/ Greenpeace 1998 International Annual Report. Accessed March 2012. http://archive.greenpeace.org/report98/index.html Greenpeace International. Accessed March 2012. http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/history/Victories timeline/ http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/our core values/ Greenpeace International. Accessed April 2012. htt p://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq/#Questions%20about %20Greenpeace%20membership
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