As the World Burns

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Title: As the World Burns Theoretical Frameworks for Analyzing Domestic Terrorism
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: McKay, Thomas
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2011
Publication Date: 2011


Subjects / Keywords: Terror
Provisional Irish Republican Army
Tamil Tigers
Organizational Framework
Instrumental Framework
Civil Conflict
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: Despite the large amount of research done on terrorism of all stripes, an overall theoretical framework of terrorism has not yet been developed. Political terrorism is a vastly complicated and politically sensitive phenomenon; as a result, the overall state of the literature is incomplete, making any attempts to develop such a model unlikely and possibly even undesirable. Even basic definitions, assumptions, and relational models are still a matter of intensive debate. This study examines two dominant approaches to terrorism analysis, the instrumental/strategic model and the organizational/incentive framework. It contains a breakdown of existing theoretical perspectives on terrorism and applies the instrumental and organizational frameworks to intensive case studies of three prominent militia-type terrorist organizations � the Provisional IRA, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. An analysis of these case studies reveals that the assumptions of the organizational framework are more accurate in examining and analyzing domestic militia-type terrorist organizations. This study does not claim to advance a unified theory of terrorism. Instead, through studying and problematizing the major theoretical perspectives of terrorism, this project will contribute to future attempts to create more realistic analytical assumptions within terrorism theory and thus the findings have direct implications for policymakers and security officials.
Statement of Responsibility: by Thomas McKay
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2011
Supplements: Accompanying materials: CD?
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

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Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
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Classification: local - S.T. 2011 M11
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Permanent Link:

Material Information

Title: As the World Burns Theoretical Frameworks for Analyzing Domestic Terrorism
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: McKay, Thomas
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2011
Publication Date: 2011


Subjects / Keywords: Terror
Provisional Irish Republican Army
Tamil Tigers
Organizational Framework
Instrumental Framework
Civil Conflict
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: Despite the large amount of research done on terrorism of all stripes, an overall theoretical framework of terrorism has not yet been developed. Political terrorism is a vastly complicated and politically sensitive phenomenon; as a result, the overall state of the literature is incomplete, making any attempts to develop such a model unlikely and possibly even undesirable. Even basic definitions, assumptions, and relational models are still a matter of intensive debate. This study examines two dominant approaches to terrorism analysis, the instrumental/strategic model and the organizational/incentive framework. It contains a breakdown of existing theoretical perspectives on terrorism and applies the instrumental and organizational frameworks to intensive case studies of three prominent militia-type terrorist organizations � the Provisional IRA, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. An analysis of these case studies reveals that the assumptions of the organizational framework are more accurate in examining and analyzing domestic militia-type terrorist organizations. This study does not claim to advance a unified theory of terrorism. Instead, through studying and problematizing the major theoretical perspectives of terrorism, this project will contribute to future attempts to create more realistic analytical assumptions within terrorism theory and thus the findings have direct implications for policymakers and security officials.
Statement of Responsibility: by Thomas McKay
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2011
Supplements: Accompanying materials: CD?
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2011 M11
System ID: NCFE004398:00001

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AS THE WORLD BURNS: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING DOMESTIC TERRORISM BY TOM MCKAY A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Political Science New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida May, 2011


ii Acknowledgements This thesis is dedicated to: my father, who taught me that listening is not the same as thinking; my mother, who taught me to hate writing but love having written; my grandparents, whose support was immeasurable; Profe ssor Barbara Hicks, for inspiring the self-confidence and drive that made this study happen; and my friends: Sara, Rikki, Stephanie, Chris, Nolan, Richard, Harrison, Adam, J ordan, Jyoti, Maura, Geoff, Sherlock, Cubie, and the Salsa Shark. I would also like to th ank Dolan for putting up with a frankly unreasonable amount of thesis assistance and Mike f or bearing the cross of roommateship for three monstrous years. Thank you, Andrea – you are my best friend. Most of all it is dedicated to what I will always r emember as my home away from home: New College. Don’t change too much bro. There’s more to running a starship than answering a bunch of damn fool questions. James T. Kirk (3478.2)


iii Table of Contents Acknowledgements……...……………………………………….…………...…….……ii List of Tables and Figures……………………………………….…………...…… ……iv Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………..v Chapter 1: As the World Burns: An Introduction Into the World of Political Terrorism…………………………………………………………………………1 Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks of Terrorism.………… ……………………..…10 Schools of Analysis in Counter-Terrorism…………………………… ……...…..12 Testing the Instrumental and Organizational Framew orks.…………………...…24 Chapter 3: The Irish Troubles and the Provisional I RA...…………………………...28 Context of the Irish Struggle..………………………………….……………. .….34 Emergence, Effectiveness, and Strategic Logic of Vi olence in Northern Ireland……...….…….…………………...……………………...…….. 45 Conclusion…….…….….…….……….…………...……………………....……..65 Chapter 4: The Zeal of Harakah al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS), the Islamic Resistance Movement………...…………………………………………….……………….69 Mujamma’ to Intifada : The Birth and Development of the Islamist Movement in Palestine.……...………………………………………..…….……72 Shura Ijma and the Slide to Fitnah …………………………..…..…….…….…95 Conclusion.…….…….….…….…………………...……………………...……102 Chapter 5: Eelam At Any Cost: The Secular Martyrs o f the Tamil Tigers………...106 Independence, Chauvinism, and Liberalism: Sri Lank a After Independence…..110 Black July: the Explosion into Civil War…………………………… ………….126 Civil War, Negotiations, and Defeat: the LTTE 1993 -2009…………………….136 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………....144 Chapter 6: Towards an Understanding: Lessons Learne d From Comparative Analysis….…………………………………………………...………….……..149 How are Targets Defined and Tactics Determined? …… ………………………157 What is the Real Internal Logic of Suicide Attacks ? ……………………...…...165 When do Terrorists Enter the Mainstream?.……………………… …………….171 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………....176 Bibliography……………………………………………………………….…………..182


iv List of Tables and Figures Figure 1.1 Types of Terrorism Organizations...…………… …………………………...6 Figure 3.1: Three Dimensions of the Irish Conflict, 1969-98......………………….....46 Figure 3.2: Organizations Responsible for Deaths fr om Political Violence...…….....47 Figure 3.3: Casualties as a Result of ParamilitaryStyle Attacks, 1973-98 ………....60 Figure 3.4: Casualties as a Result of Republican P aramilitary-Style Attacks, 19992009...……………………………...……………………………………………..61 Figure 3.5: Casualties as a Result of All Paramilit ary-Style Attacks, 1999-2009…...61 Figure 3.6: Number of Security-Related Shootings an d Bombings in Northern Ireland, 1999-2009……………………………………………………………....64 Figure 4.1: Types of Directives in Hamas Leaflets b y Periodic Distribution………. 79 Figure 4.2: Various Scores of Palestinian Authority Approval Ratings, 1996-05…...85 Figure 4.3: Support for Fatah vs. Islamists in Gaza and the West Bank……….…...87 Figure 5.1: Tamil Employment in Government Services 1956-1970.……………...117 Figure 5.2: Trends in Population, GNP, and GNP PerCapita……………………...122 Figure 5.3: Selected CFA Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka……………..…...143


v As The World Burns: Theoretical Frameworks for Analyzing Domestic Terrorism Tom McKay New College of Florida, 2011 ABSTRACT Despite the large amount of research done on terror ism of all stripes, an overall theoretical framework of terrorism has not yet been developed. Political terrorism is a vastly complicated and politically sensitive phenom enon; as a result, the overall state of the literature is incomplete, making any attempts t o develop such a model unlikely and possibly even undesirable. Even basic definitions, assumptions, and relational models are still a matter of intensive debate. This study exam ines two dominant approaches to terrorism analysis, the instrumental/strategic mode l and the organizational/incentive framework. It contains a breakdown of existing theo retical perspectives on terrorism and applies the instrumental and organizational framewo rks to intensive case studies of three prominent militia-type terrorist organizations – th e Provisional IRA, the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas, and the Liberation Tiger s of Tamil Eelam. An analysis of these case studies reveals that the assumptions of the organizational framework are more accurate in examining and analyzing domestic militi a-type terrorist organizations. This study does not claim to advance a unified theory of terrorism. Instead, through studying and problematizing the major theoretical perspectiv es of terrorism, this project will


vi contribute to future attempts to create more realis tic analytical assumptions within terrorism theory and thus the findings have direct implications for policymakers and security officials. Advisor: Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Political Science


vii “Victory in pieces is an enormous obstacle to those who are inclined to analyze in absolutes.” -J. Bowyer Bell, 2 005


1 Chapter 1 As the World Burns: An Introduction Into The World of Political Terrorism On February 25th, 1996, a young Palestinian man nam ed Majdi Abu Wardah boarded a No. 18 bus in Jerusalem along Jaffa Road. To the other passengers, he seemed unassuming – clean-shaven, dressed like an Israeli, quiet and unsuspicious. No one suspected that he was, in fact, carrying a 10-kilog ram bomb filled with nails, ballbearings, and live ammunition, designed to be wellconcealed in an army kit bag. As the bus passed the Jerusalem Central Bus Station, Warda h pulled a hidden trigger. The subsequent explosion killed him and twenty-six pass engers, injured 48 others, and reduced the bus to a smoking, charred skeleton. 45 minutes later another suicide bomb destroyed a hitchhiking post in Ashqelon, killing a nother man. Exactly one week later, a similar attack ripped an other No. 18 bus, killing nineteen people. The attacks were the deadliest act s of coordinated terrorism ever launched against Israel. In the space of little ove r a week, the unprecedented attacks killed 46 civilians in the heart of the Zionist hom eland and wounded over fifty others, striking unexpectedly and disastrously inside the h eavily protected Green Line which marked the boundary between the State of Israel and the Occupied Territories surrounding it. Who could have done such a thing? Two years previous to the day, an Israeli settler n amed Baruch Goldstein, a member of the far-right Israeli Kach movement, had arrived at the Cave of the Patriarchs,


2 one of the holiest sites in both Judaism and Islam. Kach was devoted to the forced ethnic cleansing of all Israeli Arabs and the military tak e-over of all occupied lands in historic Palestine. Wearing an army uniform and carrying an automatic rifle, Goldstein walked past the military guards without a second look. Min utes later, he entered the section of the cave designated as a mosque for Palestinian worship pers. He then opened fire upon the packed crowd, slaughtering 29 innocent members of t he congregation and wounding nearly 125, and was beaten to death by the furious crowd after a man threw a fire extinguisher at his head. In the subsequent chaos, the Israeli guards, fearing for their life, may have fired into the panicked crowd fleeing the mosque (Hedge 1994). The massacre – a flagrant act of political terrorism – enraged t he Arab population. The resulting riots ended in nearly twenty Palestinian deaths. On the d ay of the Jaffa attacks two years later, a muffled and frantic-sounding man speaking Arabic telephoned in to Israel Radio International claiming that the organization Hamas, the Islamist faction of the Palestinian resistance in the Occupied Territories, was respons ible for the bombings. Referring to the suicide attackers as heroes and martyrs, the caller claimed that the bombings were a commemoration of that horrible day in the Cave of t he Patriarchs. They were also, he said, retaliation for the killing of Hamas bombmake r Yahya Ayyash on January 5th. Promising future violence, the man made no demands. Raised in the poor village of Rafat, the West Bank commander of Hamas, Yahya Ayyash, had become interested in politics and relig ion at an early age. He changed his appearance daily and rarely slept in the same locat ion more than once, always wary that the full might of the Israeli intelligence establis hment was clamoring for his head. Ayyash’s elaborate disguises and sporadic patterns of movements served a growing sense


3 of paranoia in the Occupied Territories. Israeli in formers were seemingly everywhere, and their security agencies were feared for a longstanding assassination campaign of Hamas leaders. Ayyash was well-known for developing sophisticated explosive devices, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak had once remarke d in Parliament, “I am afraid he might be sitting between us here in the Knesset” (C hehab 2007, 55). Known amongst his fellow cadres as The Engineer for his personal supe rvision of Hamas’s explosive-making facilities, Ayyash paradoxically led preparations f or the suicide campaigns later dedicated to his memory. Perhaps noting the irony, Israeli in telligence killed Ayyash by maneuvering a helicopter close enough to his home t o detonate a sophisticated bomb cleverly concealed in a functional cell phone. In many ways, the bomb had become the primary metho d of communication between Palestinians and Israelis. Deteriorating re lations between the State of Israel and the Palestinians languishing in poverty in the Occu pied Territories had led extremists on both sides to engage in wanton acts of destructive violence. The massacre at the Cave of the Patriarchs and the explosions on the road in Ja ffa were two sides of the same coin – a conflict between groups of extremists claiming excl usive ethno-nationalist domination over their perceived homeland. Caught in the middle and increasingly ignored were civilians and moderates who simply desired an end t o the bloodshed. What is Terrorism? As Charles Tilly, a prominent American sociologist and political scientist, observed, “some vivid terms serve political and nor mative ends admirably despite


4 hindering description and explanation of the social phenomena at which they point” (2004, 5). Terrorism is one such word. It functions as a catch-all for a wide and varied degree of violent episodes and organizations, and i n doing so risks becoming analytically useless. The word terrorism rarely provides a usefu l theoretical or academic viewpoint from which to approach a careful investigation of t he situations to which it is applied. As a classification, it serves in many ways to negate and stifle accurate comparisons amongst the phenomena of political violence by non-state ac tors. Politics often stifles a serious academic discussio n of terrorism. Indeed, much of the research on terrorism ignores key systematic co mponents of the underlying causes of political violence. The research itself is highly i deological and tends to myopically focus on terrorism as a kind of “causally coherent phenom enon” (Tilly 2004, 12), when in reality, many organizations labeled as terrorists s hare only a reliance on terror tactics which ranges from occasional to frequent – and thei r strategies and use of terror tactics do not mesh together in a cohesive way. Attempts to define terrorism have resulted in a far -ranging typology, consisting of many definitions which often conflict and contradic t each other. The State Department, for example, defines terrorism as “politically moti vated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or cland estine agents, usually intended to influence an audience” (Ruby 2002). Taken at face v alue, this classification of terrorism would encompass every subnational group that does o r has targeted civilians – it would, in essence, include phenomena ranging from the comm unists in the Russian Revolution to the Sicilian mafia's wars for control of local g overnments in the early 1900s. It groups a wide degree of phenomena together which often hav e little to do with one another. The


5 increasing use of terrorism as a pejorative serves as a convenient label to avoid descriptive analyses that could reveal unpleasant t ruths about the structural and socioeconomic origins of political violence. Many o f the organizations labeled under the common designation of ‘terrorism’ have different or ganizational structures, political motivations, and strategies. Some, such as Hamas, a re even widely accepted amongst their local populations as legitimate security forc es and act in conjunction with political wings that serve as localized substitutes for polit ical administration. As Tilly comments, in many struggles involving terror tactics, “partic ipants – often including the so-called terrorists – are engaging simultaneously or success ively in other more routine varieties of political claim making” (2004, 6). It certainly doe s not help that the label is regularly applied for a political effect, as a tool to underm ine and combat the efforts of groups opposed to powerful interests. Tilly, for his part, does not attempt to define ter rorism. Rather, he emphasizes that terror constitutes a unique tactic that is deployed by all manner of actors, not merely those commonly thought of as classic terrorist orga nizations. In fact, he states quite clearly that terror as a strategy of coercion occur s in a wide variety of environments and is often utilized by security forces or criminal or ganizations in much the same manner as underground groups. Terrorism has some structural c haracteristics which can be identified and analyzed, but its study cannot be ap proached from a unilateral perspective. This simple analysis is important to establishing a basic framework from which analysts can launch a study of terrorism. Two major distingu ishing features of groups are their degree of organizational capacity or specialization in the use of violence and the territorial focus of their attacks. Using these two dimensions, one can classify terrorist


6 groups as being militias, conspirators, autonomists or zealots, each possessing distinct relatable characteristics defined by their basic qu alities (see Figure 1.1). Terrorist militias are groups that use terror tactics domestically and orient themselves within a planned organizational structure. Their operatives are gene rally trained specialists in coercion, composing an ideologically, politically, or otherwi se motivated group that is trained to use strategically and tactically informed methodolo gy in its application of terror in the pursuit of long-term objectives. Although these var ious terrorist subtypes often interact, the four generally retain distinct organizational c haracteristics. FIGURE 1.1: Types of Terrorist Organizations (Reprinted from Tilly 2004, 11) This thesis consists of three case studies of terro rist militias across the globe – the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), Hamas, an d the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The PIRA waged a secessionary war in British-occupied Northern Ireland with the dream of defeating the English colonial fo rces and re-integrating with Ireland.


7 Hamas is a revolutionary Islamist organization desi ring the destruction of the State of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian calip hate, or religious theocracy, which will expand to encompass the entire Muslim world. The LT TE launched a vicious terrorist, then guerilla, war against the state security force s of Sri Lanka and the ethnic majority Sinhalese, becoming famous for their pioneering sui cide tactics and ruthless devotion to the creation of a separate Tamil homeland. Of these three groups, the PIRA demobilized and entered politics under the sister organization Sinn Fein, Hamas became the elected government of the Gaza Strip but continues terroris t and paramilitary activity against Israel, and the LTTE refused to disarm, instead def ending to nearly the last fighter in an apocalyptic battle against the Sri Lankan military. Each of these groups has very different ideological ethnic, and organizational qualities. Ethno-nationalism expert David Rapoport outlines the four successive waves of terrorism as Anarchist, anti-colonial, New Left, an d Religious (2004, 47). Of these, the modern Provisional IRA is most closely associated w ith the anti-colonial movement, but also absorbed characteristics of the New Left group s which combined “radicalism and nationalism;” (56). Hamas and the LTTE are respecti vely proponents of and reactionaries against fourth-wave religious ideology, wherein the ology possesses “a vastly different significance, supplying justifications and organizi ng principles for a state” (61). Despite this, they can be comparatively analyzed based on s everal correlating criteria. All three became highly specialized in their usage of coercio n. Their operational locus is or was almost entirely domestic, with all three committing no or very few international acts of terrorism. Importantly, all three are ethno-nationa list despite their varying degrees of religious hue; the PIRA, Hamas, and LTTE are all or ganizations that utilize ethnic


8 incitement and nationalist devotion as a primary mo tivator of violence. As will be seen, distinct theoretical frameworks ca n be applied to these case studies in the pursuit of effective analysis. The i nstrumental and organizational schools of terrorism research are the most prominent in politi cal science and are the main focus of this paper, although research from psychological an d sociological perspectives is also taken into account. This study aims to problematize and investigate these academic viewpoints with the hope of clarifying which framew orks are most suited to studying the complicated phenomena of terrorism. Questions that will be investigated by this study i nclude: how do these groups maintain constituent support while simultaneously e nacting domestic terror campaigns? How do their targeting strategies relate to support within their claimed constituent communities? Which qualities of terrorist organizat ions contribute to political success or defeat, demobilization, or enhanced likelihood of s uccessful negotiations or the entrance of a terrorist group into mainstream politics? Fina lly, why do some militia organizations, such as the LTTE, refuse to evolve beyond the adopt ion of new strategies of terrorism? What systematic factors contribute to a suicidal 'f ight to the last'? Despite lingering popular perceptions, the debate o n terrorism is not a simple conflict between terrorist sympathizers and those w ho fight against them. Without a deeper understanding of terrorism that pays particu lar attention to its root causes and the way in which paramilitary organizations mobilize in ternally counter-terrorism is doomed not only to short-term defeat, but also to replicat ing mistakes on a fundamental level. Recommendations based on faulty analytical perspect ives can encourage the development of terror-wielding networks on a system atic level. This thesis seeks to


9 identify problematic methodologies of counter-terro rism analysis with the hopes of advancing towards a more coherent and functionally useful model of terrorism. With any luck, the explanation advanced will come to useful conclusions about the historic context of how militia-type terrorist organizations mobiliz ed support, conducted campaigns, incentivized and utilized their operatives, and int eracted with the larger political arena.


10 Chapter 2 Theoretical Frameworks of Terrorism Overall methodological work towards a theory of ter rorism is hampered by two problems. The first is relatively simple: terrorism is an exceptionally complex phenomena. Perspectives ranging from political real ism, rational choice theory, psychology, and organizational process theory can b e applied, but the general body of knowledge that derives from these analyses has not yet coalesced into a widely accepted overall theoretical framework of terrorism. Terrori sm is so extraordinarily complicated and discursively frustrating that, in fact, it has been exceptionally difficult to reach a generally agreed-upon academic definition of terror ism. This debate is muddled by the political, rather than academic, debate surrounding how to define terrorism. As Charles Tilly comments, “no one owns the definitions of ter ror, terrorism, or terrorists. Any working definition of terror excludes some candidat e actions and events” (2005, 18). The second problem is that, due to these factors, “scan t research examines state or system causes of terrorists activity in spite of the pleth ora of media and popular attention to these types of conditions” (Callaway 2006, 681). Much of the research within political science has migrated to game theory modeling and case studi es on the strategy and tactics of specific groups. This research often pokes at syste mic causes of terrorism, but it tends to focus on limited case studies that do not always sh ed light on the ways in which terrorist groups interact with larger systematic influences w ithin the political realm. O'Brien states that “scholarly research on the causes of internati onal terrorism has all but escaped


11 rigorous empirical analysis” (Callaway 2006, 681). Additionally, political scientists often argue that psychological or sociological theories d o not explain terrorism in the manner needed to accurately analyze systemic traits of ter rorism – but, in contrast, these studies also often provide an organizational and social per spective sorely lacked by much of the rationalist literature on terror. To study the phenomena of political violence, it is important to choose a definition of terrorism. Merari claims that without some degree of specificity terrorism “simply becomes a synonym for violent intimidation in a political context and is thus reduced to an unflattering term,” and thus for prac ticality's sake, subnational or insurgent violence is the main component of terrorism (1993, 37). American sociologist Charles Tilly quotes the author of Terror in the Name of God, Jessica Stern, who defines terrorism as “an act or threat of violence against noncombata nts with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience” differing from the State Department's definition mainly in that it includes terror perpetrated by governments (2005, 12). A somewhat more concise definition is p roposed by Robert A. Pape, a specialist in suicide bombing and counter-terrorism who defines it as “the use of violence by an organization other than a national g overnment to intimidate or frighten a target audience” (2005, 9). Many key elements are c ommonly used amongst these varying definitions (Agnew 2010, 132). For the purp oses of this study, we will use Pape's definition, although with a disclaimer that the ter m is sometimes misapplied or misused to categorize groups that utilize the terror strate gy. It should also be noted that terrorism is also utilized by governments as a method of poli tical subjugation and control; however, state terrorism is analytically distinct in its met hods and strategy.


12 Schools of Analysis in Counter-Terrorism Martha Crenshaw's 1987 article “Theories of Terrori sm: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches” identifies a key debate about the nature of terrorism and contrasts two fundamental analytical views of terro rism. The instrumental or strategic perspective, grounded in theories of political real ism, assumes that terrorism is a response to external stimuli. Crenshaw claims that "in this perspective violence is seen as intentional. Terrorism is a means to a political en d” (1987, 12). She emphasizes, importantly, that within the instrumental framework “terrorism is par excellence a strategy of surprise” (14), and that explanations o f why terrorism occurs and why it is such an effective tactic depend as much on the defe nder's lack of preparation as on the capacity and power of terrorist organizations. Deci sions to attack or not are primarily determined by paramilitary groups’ perceptions of p olitical usefulness and short-range opportunity. When a group experiences notable inter nal dissent, “the instrumental model would interpret it in terms of disagreement over po litical goals or strategy” (15). Ideology exists primarily as a guide to intent and actions. The government may respond either through deterrence or punishment strategies. Since defense may be impossible due to an insurmountable array of weak links in the security apparatus, punishment is more credible. Policy responses based on the instrumenta l perspective include denying opportunities for terrorism and reducing incentives to use it (18). Contrastingly, the organizational perspective is ba sed on the idea that “the fundamental purpose of any political organization i s to maintain itself” (Crenshaw 1987, 19). Terrorism is mostly the result of internal gro up dynamics, not strategic action or


13 primarily as a response to external pressures. Cren shaw also explains that most terror groups recruit members based on a variety of incent ives, not just ideological conviction. Therefore, strategies to counter terrorism that vie w it as deliberate and rational strategy may miss important group dynamics. Importantly, she notes that where “purposive incentives are overshadowed by others such as socia l relationships or financial reward, terrorism becomes self-sustaining,” with the stated political goals of the group becoming subordinate to momentum built around terror as purp ose rather than as strategy (Crenshaw 1987, 22). Thereby, "the task of the gove rnment is to encourage disintegration without provoking the escalation of violence" (Cren shaw 1987, 24), because escalation is almost certainly a benefit (and maybe even an objec tive) to the terror organization. Escalation promotes fear and confusion within the d isenfranchised population, and implies the terrorists have more power than they ac tually possess. This effectively helps terrorist organizations by promoting a conception t hat the population is under attack and that the terrorists alone have the capacity to figh t them. The role of an effective counterterrorism strategy then must be to use internal gro up dynamics to dissolve the group, as the response of the population to escalating securi ty measures is unhelpful to maintaining stability. Crenshaw concludes that the organization al perspective is more useful in disaggregating group intentions and values, and tha t policy makers should be cautious that alternate explanations of terror based on diff erent analytical techniques can yield very different explanations and policy recommendati ons. Other analysts, such as Ozgur zdamar disagree, claiming that the instrumental fr amework is more analytically coherent and fulfills more criteria of effective re search (2008, 89-101). Sociological and anthropological theories of terror ism examine the cultural and


14 social environmental factors that lead to terrorist activity. Robert Agnew, for example, poses a general strain theory of terrorism, which p roposes that a range of collective 'strains' (or events or conditions that are perceiv ed as unjust or suboptimal) ranging from “absolute and relative material deprivation” (2010, 132), “territorial, ethnic, and religious disputes resulting from post-colonial efforts at na tion-building,” displacement and repression, to “severe challenges to group identity ... [such as] 'identicide'” are the causes of terrorism (133). However, this method of study h as failed to provide conclusive links between strains or 'grievances' and terrorism. Agne w identifies three weaknesses in academic research on strain theories: that they fai l to describe how core characteristics of strains differ across case studies; that they do no t explain why strains increase terrorism; and finally, that they fail to explain why only a s mall proportion of individuals turn to violence (134). Agnew's general strain theory of te rrorism (GST) seeks to describe the radical and collective nature of terrorism as oppos ed to strain theory's application to more mundane cases of criminal activity. The theory prop osed that collective strains, or those high in magnitude with widespread civilian victimiz ation, those that are “frequent, of long duration, and expected to continue into the fu ture,” and especially those that are perceived to come from powerful 'others' are the mo st likely to result in terrorist activity (137). Explaining groups such as left-wing 'Red' te rrorist organizations in Western Europe, which did not exist in populations experien cing considerable strains, Agnew states it is perception of strain that motivates te rrorist activity. GST also emphasizes that it is likely members of the groups were under speci fically objective strains such as government crackdowns on student protests or a dear th of skilled work for graduates. Agnew's GST seeks to correct the primary failure of previous strain theorists to measure


15 “subjective interpretation of strain” within disenf ranchised communities as well as “key dimensions of strain, including magnitude, injustic e, and the nature of the source” (149). Alternatively, psychological theories of terrorism focus on the psychological aspects of both individual terrorists and terrorist groups. Although early psychological research into terrorism emphasized the psychopathol ogy of individual terrorists (the motivation for this type of research stemming from many policy makers' desire to create a 'terrorist profile'), most contemporary psycholog ical research into terrorism emphasizes that the specific type of political violence embodi ed by terrorist activity is “typically not the result of psychopathology or a single pers onality type,” rather it stems from shared ideological commitment and solidarity within the mo vement (Crenshaw 2000, 409). Modern psychological theory focuses primarily on id entifying the types of individuals that are likely to be drawn into terrorist organiza tions and the psychology of group decision-making within covert terror networks. Psyc hological research into political violence is not limited to investigating the motive s and psychological processes of terrorists, either. Crenshaw refers to Holyoak and Thagard, whose psychological research argues that “'mental leaps' occur when an individua l is confronted by an unfamiliar situation, when the environment seems disordered an d confused” (Crenshaw 2000, 416). This can lead to overreactions in counter-terrorist policy when the threat is surprising and seems relatively urgent – for example, the Clinton administration’s response to the 1998 bombings of embassies in East Africa may have been a result of this psychological mechanism (2000, 416). However, psychological theor y is generally regarded as a complementary rather than central perspective in te rrorism research, since it cannot examine systemic causes of terrorism directly. The research of some experts, such as


16 Marc Sageman (2004), suggests that psychological re search may have more applicability in international conspiratorial networks such as al -Qaeda due to their nontraditional structures. From the instrumental perspective, Kydd and Walter chart a variety of terrorist research to identify five fundamental strategies of terrorist organizations. The core of their argument is that terrorism is a “form of cost ly signaling” (2006, 50). Since terrorists are weak and cannot make credible threats, their on ly option is to publicly demonstrate the extremes they are willing to go to in order to achieve their goals. The first identified strategy is attrition. Hamas bombmaker Yahya Ayyash narrated this strategy closely as a way to “make the cost of the occupation that much m ore expensive in human lives, that much more unbearable” by attacking symbolic and pol itical targets relentlessly (60). The second strategy is intimidation, which works by dem onstrating that the terrorists have the ability to punish whoever they want and the governm ent is unable to stop them (66). While a strategy of intimidation must appear discri minating, it may in fact be highly indiscriminate, e.g., the Provisional IRA's pub-bom ing campaign in the 1970s and 1980s. The appearance of discriminancy is important becaus e it implies the victims were selected on the basis of their opposition to the te rrorist organization. Another strategy is provocation, or the use of indiscriminate violence to provoke the government into an indiscriminate response which radicalizes sections of the population (this idea is explored further in several articles). Provocation is intend ed to induce escalation in the manner Crenshaw implies is a net benefit for most terror o rganizations. The two remaining strategies are spoiling – “persuading the enemy tha t moderates on the terrorists' side cannot be trusted to abide by a peace deal” (73) – and outbidding – “signaling that a


17 group has the will to continue the armed struggle d espite its costs” in order to gain support over a rival organization (76). These two s trategies are used to weaken the ability of moderates to assume primacy both in public suppo rt and during negotiations. All of these strategies are said to be signaling technique s based on incomplete information on both sides; the form a terrorist attack takes is de termined by rational calculation and analysis of whatever data is available. Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson’s research develops the idea of provocation to demonstrate “that if the government has the ability to carry out a discriminating response to terrorism but chooses an undiscriminating one, it reveals itself to be unconcerned with the welfare of the country's citizens” (Kydd and Walter 2006, 70). A discriminating response is one where the focus of counter-terrorism strategy is minimizing harm to the citizenry, while an undiscri minating one is unduly harsh, promoting the (sometimes accurate) view that the go vernment is targeting the civilian population as a potential or realized base of suppo rt for terror. The study uses a similar perspective to Kydd and Walter’s in that it views t errorism as a form of political signaling. Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson propose a game theoretical model that correlates the level of economic damage caused by g overnment counter-terrorism responses with information about the nature of gove rnment – signals that the population can read, understand, and use to make choices about their affiliation with the government and terrorist groups. The two causal mechanisms sha ping terrorist mobilization are the information about the nature of their government re vealed to citizens depending on whether their response is catered to minimizing the suffering of civilians, and the economic damage that results, which lowers the cost threshold for terrorism, since when


18 the population becomes increasingly marginalized, t errorism becomes a more appealing low-cost option to signify their discontent (Bueno de Mesquita and Dickson 2005, 3). The study reaches several conclusions, including th at when governments are able to mount discriminating counter-terrorism campaigns, i t is likely to reduce mobilization. But when any type of government is unwilling to neg otiate, even when mounting discriminating counter-terror campaigns, the damage caused is likely to outweigh learning the government cares, increasing mobilizat ion. Indiscriminate responses are a net win for the terrorists, increasing terrorist mo bilization in virtually every scenario. A discriminate strategy of response comes from anal yst Peter Sederberg who proposes a strategy of conciliation as counter-terr orism. Building on Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's assertion that “You don't make peace with friends. You make peace with enemies,” he claims that by considering terrorism as just one of the strategies used by challenger groups in political struggles, w e push the question of response back into the political arena where it belongs in the fi rst place (1995, 295). Sederberg, although critical of instrumental and realist perspectives, utilizes arguments from both to promote the idea of conciliation as a counter-terrorist str ategy. Prominent in these perspectives is the war model, which posits terrorism as a limited war against the government. Although conventional wisdom suggests the proper response to war is a harsh response (300), Sederberg notes that terrorist organizations in a w ar model seek to seize control of some form of territory. He claims terrorists “hope to in herit the body politic. They benefit little if it is a corpse” (300). The argument emphasizes t he role of contenders in realizing that the war is unwinnable as an absolute victory. By en gaging the enemy in a process of negotiation, the contenders are forced to acknowled ge they are fighting for limited


19 objectives with limited means. Assuming rationality on the part of both actors, Sederberg argues in such a scenario rebel groups must acknowl edge that the war, in order to be successful, is forced to end in a process of accomo dation (301). The second model Sederberg uses is the rational actor model. Typical uses of this argument hold that terrorists use cost and benefit analyses heavily to produce their strategies. A typical rational-choice argument concludes that negotiation s embolden terrorists by demonstrating to them that the benefits of terroris t activity are rising. Sederberg claims that by using negotiations, the government can in f act lure the opposition into a position where negotiation is more effective than terrorism (305). Using concessions aimed at the underlying basis of discontent that produces terror rather than conceding to direct demands, the government is able to undermine recrui tment and resource pools. Strategies such as amnesty and officially recognizing moderate groups push the group back towards normal politics by weakening its stranglehold on lo cal populations. He states that when using conciliation to weaken terrorist organization s, “the combined strategic objective involves transforming the more moderate leadership while promoting the isolation and disintegration of the remaining extremist faction” (307). A corollary of this premise, however, is that radical groups with sincerely held extremist ideology are the least susceptible to this kind of strategy and may warran t a response conditioned around the use of force. Therefore, it is likely that the proc ess of conciliation must be carried out with carrots and sticks. It is plausible to argue t hat these strategies could push groups whose social dominance is threatened by the negotia tion process even further away from it, but Sederberg’s overriding emphasis is put upon the dissolution of the group's organizational coherence by promoting moderate fact ions to break off from more hardline


20 ones. Many of these analyses examine the phenomena of ter rorism using assumptions heavily underlying instrumentalist perspectives on terrorism – rationality, terrorism acting specifically as a tool for achieving political goal s, and relations between the state and terror groups determined by levels of power and inf ormation. However, they also utilize theoretical insights stemming from organizational t heory, which acts within these studies as a way to examine the interior dynamics of terror ist organizations. Despite the analytical advantages of organizational theory, cos t-benefit analyses and assumptions of rationality still heavily underlay most modern terr orist theory. To some extent, this is appropriate since terrorists, like all actors, must act rationally in order to fulfill political and tactical objectives, but it is clearly insuffic ient to explain the great degree of complexity and variation in the structure and strat egies of organizations that utilize terror strategies. Heryanto comments that the degree of co mplexity inherent in studying terrorism will “render any rational-instrumentalist view of political violence too simplistic;” for example, “state terrorism is a pur poseful act, not reckless spontaneity; but the actual operation and outcome are usually other than the state's intention, if not actually against its own interest” (2005, 168). The same logic applies to non-state terrorism. As Crenshaw notes, “perhaps the organiza tional theory is one way of completing strategic theory by determining what the values of opponents are, how preferences are determined, and how intensely they are held” (1987, 29). However, the organizational school’s reliance on analysis of the incentive structure of terrorist organizations is also able to encompass much of the discussion typically assigned to the instrumental analysis because it is able to integra te political concerns as one of many


21 individual and group-level incentives. Useful analytic models of terrorism must delve much more deeply than rationalist models, lest important explanatory variables be lef t out of the study, but they must also be sure not to focus too myopically on the individual facets of each case, or the study may cease to investigate useful systemic or relational implications. Tilly attacks dispositional accounts of terrorism, criticizing, for example, St ern’s hypothesis that religiously motivated terrorists “seek to simplify and purify t heir own lives by participating in heroic acts that will simplify and purify the whole world” (2005, 12). He singles out her view of “relational processes not as direct causes but as f actors that promote or inhibit the central cause of terrorism” (20). To Tilly, terror is simpl y a strategy that “involves interactions among political actors... we have no choice but to analyze it as part of the political process” (21). Terrorism occurs within a wider soci opolitical context and it is necessary to analyze the adoption of the terror tactic as jus t one of many processes within a given political arena. In the article “How al-Qaeda Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” terrorism specialist Audrey Cronin identifies the p rimary ways in which terrorist organizations collapse. Nearly 90% of terrorist org anizations disappear within a year of their formation and, of those that survive, well mo re than half collapse inside of a decade (Cronin 2006, 13). Using organizational, developmen tal, and social movement theory, Cronin outlines seven broad factors that cause the collapse of terrorist movements. (1) capture or killing of the leader, (2) failure to transiti on to the next generation, (3) achievement of the group’s aims, (4) transition to a legitimat e political process, (5) undermining of popular support, (6) repression, and (7) transition from terrorism to other forms of violence. (2006, 17-18) Notably, this list includes a variety of factors th at are related to the ability of an


22 terrorist group to achieve political goals, but it also details other conditions that hint at social or internal factors as being highly prominen t in the dissolution of a terrorist group. For example the “organizational decentralization” o f right-wing American terrorists in the 1990s, who operated within a network of loosely lin ked independent cells, fought “against truly effective generational transition,” since it impeded recruitment and organizational evolution (Cronin 2006, 24). Factors such as the popular revulsion inspired by large-scale attacks on civilians, incre asing disinterest in ideology, or offering supporters or members of terrorist groups better pe rsonal social and economic options can also play an important role in undermining cons tituent community support (28-29). Transitions to other forms of violence have occurre d in the Filipino Abu Sayyaf organization and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), where both groups have switched from political terrorism to lu crative criminal activity such as kidnapping, extortion, and drug smuggling. Cronin n otes this as an example of actors within terrorist organizations switching their “pri mary emphasis on collecting resources as a means of pursuing political ends toward acquir ing material goods and profit that become ends in themselves” (31). Analyst Max Abrahms directly criticizes the instrum ental model, identifying deficiencies stemming from three of its assumptions : that “terrorists are motivated by relatively stable and consistent political preferen ces,” that they “evaluate the expected political payoffs of their available options,” and lastly, that the adoption of terrorism comes from the calculation that it will derive the largest political returns (2008, 79). He posits that at least seven ‘puzzles’ or behavioral characteristics of terrorist organization defy these implicit assumptions of the strategic mo del:


23 (1) terrorist organizations do not achieve their stated politi cal goals by attacking civilians; (2) terrorist organizations never use terrorism as a last resort and seldom seize opportunities to become productive nonviolent political p arties; (3) terrorist organizations reflexively reject compromise proposals offering s ignificant policy concessions… (4) [they] have protean political platforms; (5) terrorist organizations generally carry out anonymous attacks, precluding… policy concess ions; (6) terrorist organizations with identical political platforms routinely att ack each other more than their mutually professed enemy; (7) [terrorists] resist dis banding when they consistently fail to achieve their political platforms or when their stated political grievances have been resolved and hence are moot. (82) Abrahm’s critiques are not universally applicable, but together they form a thoroughly consistent picture of the analytical inc ompleteness of the strategic terrorism framework. Most terrorist organizations seem to ful fill at least one of these characteristics; several, such as the resistance to demobilization and infighting between politically identical terrorist organizations are p articularly major problems since they directly contradict assumptions that terrorism is u sed primarily to maximize political utility. At the very least these tendencies indicat e that terrorist groups often have ulterior internal motives that are only loosely related to t heir political platforms. One important analytical component of these ‘puzzle s’ is recognizing militia-type terrorism as the armed wing of a wider rejectionist network than the terrorists themselves, or what Sadri calls “anti-movements” (2007, 40). A partial framework for examining these alternate networks of social and political or ganization comes from Ignacio SnchezCuenca, who uses a modified version of Petersen's s cale of rebellious behavior to identify three degrees of supporters for terrorist organizat ions: those who disagree with armed struggle and the killing of innocents but “vaguely sympathise” with their ends, those who vote for parties associated with terrorist groups a nd participate in social movements that develop around them, and those who directly assist the organization by providing resources or engaging in lesser political violence (2004, 22). While support from the third group is usually implicit, Snchez-Cuenca claims th at a major issue facing terrorist


24 groups is that they require the tacit assistance an d sympathy of the secondary support community as well as “ultimately, at least the nonrejection” of tertiary supporters (2004, 22). Thus, they provide a combination of incentives for support and disincentives for cooperation with the authorities. Domestic militiatype terrorists in particular cannot narrowly pursue political goals at any expense beca use they are highly reliant on constituent support. Testing the Instrumental and Organizational Framewo rks Terrorist organizations use a variety of strategies to accomplish both tactical objectives and long-term goals, and these strategie s involve interactions with a variety of political actors and with a multitude of political processes. However, instrumentalist rationality is just one part of the overall picture Organizational process theory may provide another perspective that can solve some of the analytical shortcomings of instrumentalist approaches. Since it focuses on a p lurality of incentives rather than strategic logic, organizational process theory can accommodate a variety of theoretical perspectives. It is also compatible with a range of explanations and schools of analysis outside the boundaries of political science. For ex ample, the cultural approach to terrorism which “features disparate ideological enc laves identified as 'extremist subcultures' or 'anti-movements', primed by real or perceived events such as external domination or internal oppression, provide a relati onal environment” wherein local norms acquire a “radicalized and rejectionist guise,” cul minating in terrorism organizations and their respective ideologies could be used as a comp lementary anthropological perspective within the organizational framework (Sadri 2007, 34 ). Agnew claims that terrorists


25 “model terrorism; differentially reinforce terroris m – usually with social approval/status; promote the adoption of beliefs favorable to terror ism; and diffuse responsibility for terrorist acts” (2010, 143). Terrorist organization s form from the compounded influence of many different social grievances, and work openl y towards the reinforcement of attitudes that support terrorist actions and goals. They form a network of primary and secondary supporters that can persist even when ter rorism does not seem to be achieving stated political objectives, which complicates the nature of the government response. Terrorist groups can accomplish this because they a nd their associated support networks “allow for the alleviation of a range of individual strains” (Agnew 2010, 143), providing material, social, and identity benefits that contri bute to a sense of solidarity with militant organizations. This challenge is compounded because when “purposive incentives are overshadowed by others such as social relationships or financial reward, terrorism becomes self-sustaining” (Crenshaw 1987, 22). As a result, these networks persist beyond repeated political failures. Terrorist groups and s upport networks are likely to be important in determining the preferences, strategie s, and weaknesses of militia organizations, because the latter rely on a domesti c constituency and must support a high degree of specialization among their members. Addit ionally, organizational process theory is an invaluable part of terrorism research since it is able to link important individual variables which affect the process of co llective action. This focus [on organizations] is appropriate because the groups that [comprise a movement are] actually the arenas in which individual participation became collective action. Concerns about organization -i.e. about wheth er it is open or closed, hierarchical or associative, democratic or authoritarian, eff ective or not -are really concerns about the structures and processes that enhance, sub merge, or alter individual goals and actions in the pursuit of collective goal s through collective action. (Hicks 1996, 94) Thus, there is strong theoretical support for the o rganizational framework as


26 opposed to the instrumental or strategic model. Dom estic militias, as separate from international-conspiratorial, international-zealot, or autonomist terrorists, provide an ideal arena to compare the strategic and organizational m odels. First, paramilitary organizations can be better placed than alternate f orms of non-state terrorism within a political science framework since domestic militias are organizationally complex, large in size, and intensively interlinked with local politi cal and social groups. Despite the lack of a unified model of terrorism, the three terrorist o rganizations comprising our case studies have been intensively examined by a spectrum of ana lysts. There is also a high amount of useful analytical data, since the IRA, Hamas, and L TTE are all very prominent organizations. All three groups have built an alter nate social and political network for disenfranchised populations – a situation defined b y H. Edward Price Jr. as early as 1977 as internal colonialism, where “the population of t he territory is divided ethnically or racially, and one of the two major groups is in ful l political and economic control” (55). These case studies thus constitute a comparable dat a set, whose variations should prove illuminating, particularly given their different ou tcomes to date. Through examining the history and development of each organization, it sh ould be possible to decide which model of terrorism is better suited for analyzing m ilitia-type terrorists. At the same time, the use of more than one model will help to highlig ht more potential explanations for the rise and fall of militia terrorism. This thesis will attempt to address serious questio ns in the field of counterterrorism. What are the root causes of domestic ter rorism? How do paramilitary movements structure themselves and motivate operati ves to perform acts of terror? What, exactly, is the particular importance of ethnic ide ntity and nationalism, and how does this


27 inform the targeting and form of violence? Why do s ome terrorist groups, such as the Provisional IRA or Hamas, enter politics? Do politi cal transition processes reflect organizational learning on how to provide new ways to mobilize support communities, or is politics war by other means? Finally, what organ izational factors motivate a completely counter-productive and suicidal ‘fight to the last’ as happened in 2009 during the containment and destruction of the last organized r emnants of Tamil resistance? Can the organizational perspective on terror act as a way t o explain why the terror strategy does not always result in the outcomes that might be exp ected by instrumentalists? By studying the literature surrounding the cases, usef ul correlations will hopefully emerge which can help develop the theoretical framework of terrorism.


28 Chapter 3 The Irish Troubles and the Provisional IRA They think that they have pacified Ireland. They think that they have purchased half of us and intimidated the other half. They think that they have foreseen everything, think that they have provided against everything; but the f ools, the fools, the fools! They have left us our Fenian dead, and while Ireland holds these graves, Ireland unfree shall never be at peace. -Patrick Pearse Making peace, I have found, is much harder than making war. -Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams Shortly before 3:10 PM on 15 August, 1998, a Spanis h tourist paused to have his picture taken on a sunny day in central Omagh, Coun ty Tyrone, in Northern Ireland. The resulting photo’s unremarkable look makes it all th e more chilling. His child sat on his shoulders; in the background, shoppers can be seen milling around a long line of cars waiting at an intersection. Just to the man’s right a red Vauxhill Cavalier is illegally parked. Its two occupants had just left, walking of f down the road. They had just set the timer on a 300-lb fertilizer-based explosive attach ed to a semtex trigger concealed, unbeknownst to the shoppers, in the car. Mere minutes later, 29 innocent people were dead. O ver 220 were injured. The Omagh bomb was so powerful it blew massive holes in the street, flooding the area with water from severed water mains. Gigantic sprays of shrapnel shredded nearby buildings beyond recognition; days later, an engineer attempt ing to verify the structural integrity of a nearby restaurant for the forensics team recalled …


29 There were some very obvious structural cracks. And that, again, is a memory that will always be with me as we walked through the building. .. the rain was coming through the roof. We scanned the torch it was a very, ver y eerie feeling. Maybe 20 to 30 tables with lunches, cups of coffee exactly the way th ey had been when the bomb went off. And that particular building was packed at t hat stage. And then you felt a stickiness on your feet, and as I turned the torch down I realised I was walking on blood the whole way along the building. So you can only imagine what it must have been like at the time for the people in there. (Quoted in Johnson 2008) The men responsible for this shocking act were unid entified operatives of the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA). The RIRA, in turn, wa s a splinter group of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), which had fought a 30-year war of attrition against the British government, the British militar y, and average Britons to liberate the six northeastern counties of the Irish province of Ulster, which had remained part of the United Kingdom following Irish independence in 1922 due to its high population of proBritish Protestants. The PIRA had in 1998 accepted the terms of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) that established a Northern Irish A ssembly with devolved legislative powers in the hopes of bringing an end to the confl ict, known as The Troubles. The Troubles had claimed thousands of lives despite lit tle hope of either side reaching victory; it caused such destruction and social upheaval that life in Belfast was sometimes compared to London during the Blitz. The RIRA men t hat set the Omagh bomb had hoped that its detonation would derail the peace pr ocess and plunge Northern Ireland back into a state of protracted insurgency. They we re wrong. The events in Omagh sealed the fate of terrorism in Northern Ireland; after th e weariness of 30 years of terror, even the most recalcitrant Irish republicans and unionis ts sought the relief offered by the GFA. The Troubles had started some 30 years earlier in A ugust 1969. Growing unrest with the British government, spurred on by a Britis h response centered mainly around the repression of Irish Catholic communities, was weake ning the United Kingdom’s hold on


30 Northern Ireland. Eventually, the British military was called in to maintain order after a large-scale communal riot in Derry, known as the Ba ttle of the Bogside, broke out. Rioting Irish republican nationalists had clashed R oyal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers following an aggressive demonstration by t he loyalist Apprentice Boys organization. Many, including some old-guard republ icans, “saw the British army sent into the province in 1969 to maintain order as a te mporary savior;” despite the UK’s policy of empowerment of and collaboration with the Protestant community to retain British control, most Irish thought the military pr esence was intended to force both sides into stability (Bell 2000, 79). They were sorely di sappointed when the British army, led into the province with an unclear mandate and given a bewildering free hand to maintain order in any way possible, sided with loyalist Prot estants. Catholic neighborhoods were surrounded, tear-gassed, and illegally searched by soldiers looking for subversives. Areas of Republican support were regarded as military tar gets and patrolled by soldiers who were poorly trained or misinformed in civilian code s of justice or procedures, leading to indiscriminate policing and brutality. The initial welcome given to the British forces, who had once been cautiously regarded as potential savi ors, quickly soured as they failed to reverse the flawed and violent policies of the Roya l Ulster Constabulary, or RUC. The end of 1969 “found a situation of rampant inter nal disarray and a split developed in the Irish Republican Army ranks” (Bell 2000, 78). A coalition predominantly composed of those from mainland Irela nd voted to adopt political activism as a replacement for the failed policy of violence, which sparked a vicious and bitter split between the “Official” (but commonly called the “Ol d”) IRA or OIRA, and the “Provisional” IRA or PIRA. The PIRA, led by Sean Mc Stiofain, promoted a policy of


31 independence and reunification which could only be achieved under armed insurrection. The Provisional IRA would soon command the loyalty of the vast majority of active IRA units within Northern Ireland. Unlike the OIRA, whi ch styled itself as a revolutionary vanguard, the Provisionals had no such illusions as to the willingness of Northern Ireland to openly rebel. As prominent IRA historian J. Bowy er Bell states, they could count on the support of the nationalist republicans but “the gun implied enormous risks and the Irish, as a people, were more apt to resist by less compelling means” (2000, 59). Their mode of force would be more attuned to the times. A rmed with both an incontestable claim to Northern Irish heritage and fortuitous tim ing – the 1960s had marked the beginning of the end for the slow decline of the Br itish Empire – the Provisionals set forth to force out the British armed presence in No rthern Ireland in a war of attrition in which both sides aimed to destroy the others' polit ical will. For the British, this was an aggressive policy of militarized policing and suppo rt of politically friendly loyalists aimed at crippling the capacity of the IRA to conti nue operations. The Provisionals would use terrorism to inflict disproportionate casualtie s on British forces and their loyalist minions in the RUC. The PIRA was highly successful and by the mid-1970s the OIRA had essentially ceased to exist, the term IRA almos t exclusively referred to the PIRA, and by the mid 1980s Sinn Fein, the OIRA's political pa rty, was largely absorbed into the Provisional movement and termed the “political wing .” The IRA first attempted a strategy of defense – wa ves of fresh and inexperienced recruits angered by the British presence and loyali st aggression were armed and sent out to patrol Republican neighborhoods. There was a str uggle for dominance within ethnically divided communities as republican and lo yalist paramilitaries attempted to


32 force each other out, especially in cities such as Belfast and Londonderry. Then “would come IRA provocation against a British army that th e volunteers saw as the primary opponent” (Bell 2000, 80), followed by a war, antic ipated to be long in length, heavy in casualties, but, as the militant PIRA preached, cer tain in victory. The chaos of the early 1970s caught the British go vernment off-guard. By the end of 1970, 153 bombs or incendiary devices had been d etonated in Protestant businesses in the six counties (Simonsen and Spindlove 2000, 80). In 1971, internment – the arbitrary arrest and imprisonment of all “known or suspected IRA members” (Bell 2000, 81) – was imposed in all six counties and over 350 people wer e arrested. The civil rights movement continued to march. On January 30th, 1972, fourteen civilian protestors were shot in Derry as they confronted a military barricade on Bl oody Sunday, an event which promoted and sustained already-high IRA recruitment and symbolized British oppression for years. The loyalist-controlled Stormont governm ent was deposed in March of that year and replaced with direct rule under the Britis h Government's Northern Ireland Office, infuriating loyalists and further alienatin g republicans. The IRA entered secret direct talks with the British government under Mac Stofin, in which he severely overplayed his hand in demanding a three-year timel ine for complete withdrawal from Northern Ireland. In 1973, the Northern Ireland Eme rgency Provisions Act was passed; seen as “draconian,” it gave the security services unprecedented power. Among other things, prohibited bail, allowed the police to hold suspects for 72 hours, reversed the standard of guilt for those arrested for weapons po ssession, and allowed for direct detention orders from the Secretary of State (Bell 2000, 82). These measures resulted in the further social and economic disintegration of t he devolved Ulster region, and political


33 progress towards a solution to the impasse was slow and tortured. The British government attempted to form a consocia tional Northern Ireland Assembly three times – the failed 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, an unsuccessful 19821986 Assembly, and the ultimately successful Belfas t or Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998. Each attempt served as a checkpoint in the progression of the IRA from a purely paramilitary organization to one increasingly invol ved in the direct political process. A series of prominent hunger strikes by imprisoned IR A activists in 1980 and 1981 thrust the Provisionals into an unaccustomed arena: politi cs. The second strike in particular raised media interest after one of the ten protesto rs who perished, Danny Sands, was elected as a Member of the British Parliament follo wing a daring political showdown with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. A Sinn Fein organizer, Danny Morrison, famously stated : Who here really believes we can win the war through the ballot bo x? But will anyone here object if, with a ballot paper in this hand and an Armali te in the other, we take power in Ireland? The Armalite and ballot box strategy, as it was kno wn, was the first major change in IRA policy since the beginning of the mod ern Provisional campaign. It entailed a major, albeit slow, change in the nature of the I RA, and was one of the turning points of the conflict. Sinn Fein increasingly became the pri mary focus of the Republican movement, and the political arm of the movement eve ntually was the key force behind IRA endorsement of the Good Friday Agreement which today promotes the best chance of peace that Northern Ireland has possessed in dec ades.


34 Context of the Irish Struggle In an indispensable article for analysts of the IRA historian Charles Townshend lays out the historic forces which shaped the moder n paramilitary crisis in Northern Ireland. Townshend argues persuasively that conflic t in the six counties of the contested zone is conditioned by a centuries-old tradition of republicanism merged with a political and social doctrine of physical force. The periodic ity of conflict in Northern Ireland and its continual failure to realize full Irish unity i s “noiselessly repaired by the deep and steady force of republican sentiment, historically armored against the shock of failure” (317). Townshend traces the nationalist 'mandate' claimed by the PIRA to stem from three historical conflicts; first, “an attenuated p rojection” of the Irish Civil War of 192223, in which the IRA fought against the Dublin gove rnment and its acceptance of the Anglo-Irish treaty; second, a “communal battle” to assert nationalist supremacy in the face of illegitimate Protestant rule in the North; and third, the 1916-21 Irish War of Independence against British rule (1995, 350). The merger of the political and social character of these conflicts molded the mandate of the Provisionals and provided a clear theater of action within which to pursue goals. Pol itical ends were inextricably entwined and identified with an authoritarian view of social and cultural 'Irishness'. Republicanism was not merely the political objectives sought by t he freedom fighters of the IRA – in the eyes of hard-line nationalists, it was Ireland. Int ransigence to both Protestant and British military dominance withstood innumerable failures t o become what the IRA supposed to be a cultural mandate. This view, characterized by Jonathan Tonge as the colonialist


35 theory of the Northern Ireland conflict, was claime d by J. Bowyer Bell to cause republicanism to be the “dominant dream on the isla nd” (Tonge 2006, 14). A 2000 study found that the major political gains delivered by I RA violence from 1972, “historic communal emnity,” and “exposure to political violen ce,” were major determining factors in the public's future support of paramilitarism (H ayes and McAllister 2001, 919). These factors led successive generations of young Irishme n towards violence and complicated political ends for an end to the conflict. These re sults are backed by a study on IRA recruitment and mobilization by Robert White (1989) who conducted a series of interviews with Northern Irish political activists and analyzed levels of violence in several Irish communities, supporting these finding s. White found that while the level of unemployment was connected to rioting in Northern I reland, the amount of terrorist activity was not. Instead, “IRA activity increased significantly in months following incidents in which the security forces shot down ci vilians... and in which the state was engaged in organized repression (internment)” (Whit e 1989, 1288). As a young nationalist activist said, You saw the RUC coming into the area – they used to invade areas and they'd break down doors and they'd go into people's hou ses and they'd beat them up. … then there was no problem with rioting... [we] took it sometimes one step further... we would actually go along and entice the cops into ambush situations. (Quoted in White 1989, 1290-1291) White found clear evidence that riots started as a result of high discrimination, but that the subsequent justification of increasingly v iolent tactics such as terrorism was primarily the result of the experience of repressio n. He also noted that “people experience emotions and still act rationally, determining cons ciously whether violence is the proper response to the situation;” thus, the choice to eng age in violence is the end of a process of “cognitive liberation” that follows a logical proce ss (1989, 1297). Taken together with


36 Hayes and McAllister's data, the implication is cle ar: initial rioting following the failure of the civil rights marches was primarily motivated by factors of deprivation, but subsequent repression and exposure to violence gene rated a spiral wherein support for terrorism became a much more easily justifiable opt ion, lowering the opportunity costs for terrorist activity and encouraging its cyclical nature. In this light, both the decision of the military to side with loyalists and the imposit ion of internment seem like huge mistakes. Traditional military strategic logic trea ted the IRA like an enemy that could be defeated through harsh repressive measures and over whelming force. In the early 1970s the IRA sought to escalate, while the British sough t to use their superior military, political, and operational assets (Bell 2000, 266). The indiscriminance of repression, however, acted as predicted in de Mesquita and Dick son's study of signaling – it left “the population with the impression that the government is unconcerned with their welfare, increasing the appeal of armed conflict” (2005, 30) In the short term this strategy planted the seeds of militancy in Irish youth, and in the l ong term it ensured that the number of recruits was always enough to supply the IRA's rela tively low operational needs. An underestimation of the IRA's capabilities to strike back – especially their ability to utilize accumulated experience in increasingly cunning and vicious operations – also meant that oftentimes the huge security presence simply guaran teed a ready supply of sitting ducks. Furthermore, the entire premise of military interve ntion was poorly thought-out at the start. British commanders assumed entering Brit ish soldiers were being deployed to defend what was essentially a British territory fro m secessionary ethnic divisions – a colonial war. It was as if that “the problem was a divided society, an ethnic quarrel, not that they, as the republicans insisted, were the pr oblem” (Bell 2000, 273). The British


37 response was a fundamental and disastrous miscalcul ation because this logic assumed that republicans and their base of support in the C atholic community could be defeated militarily and that the loyalist community could be counted upon for support. The British approach did not consider that the internal debate within Northern Ireland was very much Irish, “neither side was 'British', no matter what their slogans and banners claimed” (White 2002, 88). Thus, siding with the loyalists i nstead of acting as a force of neutrality accelerated the decline of the social fabric of the six counties and prevented peaceful steps toward the resolution of Irish identity. It a llowed the Provisionals to paint the British army as preserving the same illegitimate po wer structure in the same unsavory ways as the RUC and the B-Specials and thus severel y escalated the conflict. A selfperception of the nationalist community as victims was not dissuaded by accidental killings, indiscriminate arrests, and the general t one of martial law imposed by the British as a matter of policy. The functionally institution alized 'above the law' status for loyalist paramilitaries set the tone for revenge killings an d sectarian slayings – and since their political objectives were being pursued by the Brit ish army, the loyalist groups were able to pursue internecine violence freely. All this con tributed to a siege mentality in Northern Ireland, where “when the English relaxed any visibl e grip, made any accommodation with Irish interests, it was because compromise or concession served a greater purpose... let the Irish feel free or prosperous when they wer e only less Irish” (Bell 2000, 291). The Provisionals were suddenly free to pursue their age nda with uncompromising ends with the guaranteed degree of support it required to pur sue them, if not accomplish them, and their faith in this particular interpretation of Ir ish history encouraged incalcitrance and resistance to the very end.


38 British Dereliction and the Weakness of the Contain ment Strategy Townshend claims that reasonable skeptics may assum e the case of Northern Ireland resisted British politicization because of two factors: none of the major political parties in Britain wanted to take responsibility fo r resolving the crisis, and the military did not wish to impose order of its own volition. A ccording to Byrne, “the British government was reluctant to increase its involvemen t in Northern Ireland, but had to when international media attention turned on its il licit political position” (2001, 334). From this viewpoint, the six counties represent an unwilling burden on British rule. The outcome has been nearly twenty years of political paralysis in which administrative policy has been determined by the civil service in the Northern Ireland Office and the security of the state has rested directly on the ar my. As an alternative to internment without trial, the judicial system has been red efined to obviate the need for witnesses or juries. The army has looked in vain for cl ear definition of the order it has been committed to restore and for formal powers to impose it. (Townshend 1995, 348). Bryne and Carter agree, and comment that the impac t of British indecisiveness on the Irish dimension was to “[encourage] the politic al violence of the PIRA while solidifying the siege mentality of Protestants” (19 96). British indecisiveness gave the IRA a lasting idea that terrorism would increase the sa lience of the British public with respect to Northern Ireland and force a withdrawal based on the high political costs of the intervention as opposed to its low material benefit s. This, in return, made the loyalist community respond with paranoia and fear, resulting in further radicalization. The net result of this process was “intensified polarizatio n between communities, frustrating attempts of elite accommodation” (Byrne and Carter, 1996).


39 Following the abolition of the Stormont government in 1972, the British and Irish governments attempted to impose a consociational fo rm of governance upon Northern Ireland. Consociationalism is loosely defined as a form of power-sharing wherein politically elite brokers rule on the behalf of the ir respective ethnic communities. In order for a consociational settlement to attain political stability in a region of intense conflict, “political elites must be willing to compromise wit hout alienating their followers” (Byrne 2001, 328). The 1972 consociational agreement repl aced the Loyalist-controlled Stormont government with a shared executive power w hich attempted to quell nationalist violence by guaranteeing “their aspirations towards Irish unity... institutional recognition” (Byrne 2001, 335). However, for this agreement to w ork, it required a political will for hard bargaining involving mutual compromise and a w illingness to work together for political cohesion. The new government failed disas trously to end insurgent violence in Northern Ireland or resolve inter-community ethnic tensions. Byrne attributes this to the fragmented, “competitive and adversarial” (2001, 33 4) nature of the Northern Irish political culture, in which terrorist action had al ready considerably reduced the ability of elites to assuage paranoia over rival factions' pol itical aims, and “the ability of the state to remain inclusive [was] challenged” (Byrne and Carte r,1996). Repeated attempts towards consociationalism during the next couple of decades failed as Northern Irish political elites and the B ritish government were unable to agree upon a functional framework for power-sharing in th e six counties. For example, the 1973-75 Sunningdale Agreement, which attempted to a dminister Northern Ireland, failed due to Britain's extreme reluctance to support an “ executive that would have fallen due to the SDLP’s insistence on an Irish dimension” [direc t Republic of Ireland involvement in


40 administration] for which Irish political will was in the early 1970s considerably lacking (Byrne 2001, 335). It is important to note that non e of these arrangements were intended to be permanent. However, the aversion of the main external political actors – the UK and Ireland – to a deep political commitment on managin g Northern Ireland's political affairs led to weak and contradictory arrangements which re peatedly failed to deliver concrete results. An already bad situation was exacerbated b ecause the British policy at this time was one of limiting costs and deliberately ignoring a detailed understanding of the conflict in order to limit their involvement. The e xistence of a 'double minority', in which both Protestant and Catholic communities feared bru tal dominance by the other party, meant that the tepid response fueled fears of unres tricted reprisals unconstrained by a weak security policy. Illegitimately but pragmatica lly, loyalists and nationalists saw “little alternative but to resort to violence as the result of the gross ineptitude or dereliction of the state” (Wilkinson 1986, 39). The result was the continued tweaking of similar c onsociational agreements in the hopes of finding one that would work, a low-cost so lution which limited constructive engagement and alienated both Loyalist and National ist communities as the security situation worsened. Byrne suggests that a centrifug al democratic model, in which adversarial elites compete for power in an artifici ally imposed political structure backed by “external ethno-guarantors,” was a better prism through which to accurately understand Northern Ireland's politics at this stag e of development (2001, 334). By 1985 and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), the British government accepted the need for a so-called Irish dimension to Northern Ir eland, which allowed for the institutionalized right of consultation of the Iris h government on affairs which concerned


41 the six counties. This arrangement meant that the t wo governments “successfully collaborated to coerce the political elites of both ethnic blocs to negotiate with each other,” but they again failed to promote intercommu nal consensus or the accommodation of community differences (336). However, the AIA di d lay the foundations and framework through which future agreements, such as the more successful Good Friday Agreement, could be negotiated. Therefore, it canno t be discounted as a stop-gap measure which avoided further disintegration of Northern Ir ish political culture. Pruitt examines the development of the Good Friday Agreement using readiness theory, which he defines as a “revision and elabora tion of ripeness theory” (2007, 1524). Readiness is a characteristic of an organization re flecting the opinion of its top leaders with regard to an adversarial party. It has two com ponents: “motivation” to end the conflict (stemming from either a conviction that th e conflict is unwinnable or pressure from a third party) and “optimism” (lowered aspirat ions, working trust, and perceived light at the end of the tunnel) about the outcome o f a conciliation process (1529). They can compensate for each other, but both factors mus t be present for “any conciliatory behavior to be enacted” (1525). Pruitt claims that Northern Ireland's conflict wit h terrorism and the negotiation of the GFA can be understood by analyzing the four tac tics available to elites: continue the status quo of mutual hostile action, escalate, seek allies, and explore negotiation (2007, 1525). The first three are unilateral tactics meant to win a conflict and dominated the IRA's strategy for the first two and a half decades of the conflict. The last is a bilateral tactic which requires the cooperation of an adversa ry. Readiness theory predicts that when motivation rises high enough in opposition to continued conflict, unilateral actions


42 become untenable and must be abandoned. Analyzing b oth British and IRA actions during the end phase of the conflict, Pruitt conclu des that behavioral factors which influence motivation very strongly pushed actors aw ay from unilateral tactics. For example, loyalist paramilitaries were coerced to jo in talks in the late 1990s for fear that failure to do so would leave Northern Irish represe ntation solely in the hands of nationalists, and in particular, Sinn Fein (1537). Likewise, the growing popularity of the more moderate SDLP threatened the organizational co herence and popular support of both the IRA and Sinn Fein, which forced leadership to enter the talks under a mutual coalition. Pruitt concludes that “optimism about the viabilit y of negotiation grew steadily on both sides from 1988 onward” (2007, 1530). A genera lized version of readiness theory called central coalition theory predicts that by th e time parties enter negotiation, “they are motivated to end the conflict and optimistic about what can be achieved from negotiation” (1531). It predicts that when hawks on one side are well-armed, the broader any coalition on that side must be broad enough to include the bulk of the extremists, otherwise spoiler tactics and sabotage will destabi lize negotiations. Thus, negotiation with the PIRA was a necessary and crucial point whi ch allowed the agreements to be discussed and legitimized in the first place (1538) Both the IRA and the British and Irish governments then had incentives to enter negotiatio n, which in the end forced Loyalists to join as well, notwithstanding the exit of the un ionist Democratic Ulster Party (DUP). Although the Good Friday Agreement has managed to deliver a modicum of peace to the region, Northern Ireland remains to a large extent a failed political entity. It was only “the promise of external economic aid in t he event of a peace process, war


43 weariness, reciprocal ceaseres by the paramilitari es, and a recognition by the PIRA that it could not defeat the British government militari ly” which allowed the Good Friday Agreement to function, not a magical realignment in which consociationalist political structures suddenly worked (Byrne 2001, 338). This outcome partially vindicates the instrumentalist viewpoint; violence wound down beca use it was failing to produce the goals of either the IRA or loyalist paramilitary op position. Northern Ireland's political structure remains unstable, unable to effectively a dminister the region, and has been unable to produce a dramatic improvement in the eve ryday lives of Irish citizens beyond the cessation of major terrorist activity. The econ omy remained stagnant and growth did not accelerate following the accords; according to Tonge, Northern Ireland has “been described as having 'an economy more collectivized than Stalin's Russia, more corporatist than Mussolini's and more quangoized than Wilson an d Heath's United Kingdom governments” (2006, 213). The conflict drew down not as a result of effectiv e peacemaking but because both nationalist and loyalist communities had reached th e end of their political will to see pointless violence continue without major changes t o the devolved administrative structure of the six counties. As Pruitt observes, “by 1986, Adams was writing, “‘there is a realization in republican circles that arme d struggle on its own is inadequate’” (2007, 1527). Violence was faltering primarily beca use armed struggle had failed to produce the strategic aims desired by the IRA – and this failure was brewing internal dissent. The same logic applied to moderate members of the Loyalist paramilitaries, even though the ultraconservative Democratic Unionist Pa rty, led by church minister Ian Paisley, walked out of the Good Friday Agreements. Pruitt claims that the agreements


44 “took the form of a conciliatory spiral—a benevolen t circle—in contrast to the conflict spiral that so often underlies the escalation of co nflict” (2007, 1524). The IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries were forced to moderate the ir stances and reach agreement on the conflict primarily because faltering support for vi olence was resulting in the slow death of their organizational capacity to wage violence, not because the power-sharing agreement was an ideal form of Northern Irish gover nance. This interpretation is backed up by poll numbers which demonstrate that, by 2004, Adams had “accepted the view articulated by Tony Blair that the IRA was now an i mpediment to political progress” and had “became increasingly explicit concerning the pr ospect of disbandment of the organization” (Tonge 2006, 62). Byrne contends that Northern Ireland remains an “op timal case where the external ethno-guarantors have successfully worked together to contain and regulate the conict” (2001, 341). Tonge agrees that consociationalism wa s able to manage the conflict and keep it within reasonable boundaries, but it also e nsured “a dependency culture that the peace and political processes have not lifted” (200 6, 213). In any case, it seems that the consociational agreement is simply a continuation o f longstanding British and Irish policy to manage, rather than transform, Northern I rish political culture, and keep violence and instability within acceptable paramete rs. The result has not been a radical reformation of the six counties but simply containm ent in the hopes that ethno-nationalist conflict will die a slow death as paramilitary orga nizations are slowly choked of popular support and material resources. It may be that foll owing the depth and viciousness of the cleavage of political and social institutions acros s Northern Ireland, this is the best that can be hoped for the near future. Byrne argues that eventually, the long-term hope for


45 Northern Ireland may be the creation of a new commu nal identity organized and supported by the “supranational identity of a postm odern EU” (2001, 342). Emergence, Effectiveness, and Strategic Logic of Vi olence in Northern Ireland The reason that political violence has persisted w ith such tenacity in Irish political culture is because it has proved hugely effective – the “primary condition of its adoption, readoption, legitimation, and containment” (Townshe nd 1995, 339). In the political vacuum that characterized The Troubles, violence t ook on a particularly salient role. This was not one-sided. Tonge comments that the list of abuses committed by the British government in maintaining order was “hardly a parad igm of liberal democracy” (2006, 15). The normalization of violence in the region le d to increased use of thoroughly illegitimate and dirty tactics on both sides, exace rbated by hard-liners on both sides of the conflict. Tonge is correct to ask, somewhat sarcast ically, ”what would have happened if such altruism and selflessness had been replaced by partisanship?” (2006, 15) Policies such as internment, and the initial unofficial loya list alliance, seemed to make short-run strategic sense, but ultimately strengthened and le gitimized IRA support, particularly in economically and politically deprived nationalist c ommunities. The use of violence itself was a major factor in determining support for param ilitarism. Violence served the interest of both sides and arg uably replaced the legitimacy of political action, especially in the early stages of the conflict. Hayes and McAllister (2000) identify three primary conflicts operating concurre ntly in Northern Ireland (see Figure 3.1). The first was the low-level war between the P rovisional IRA and the security forces; over the years of 1969-1998, this conflict was resp onsible for the vast majority of deaths,


46 with the security forces suffering 1,031 casualties and the IRA 145. During the Troubles, the security forces were also responsible for rough ly 188 civilian casualties. The second major conflict was an unabashedly sectarian slaught er waged by loyalists against mainly civilian Catholics, largely in a mid-1970s effort t o halt the IRA campaign. These attacks resulted in 781 deaths of innocents. The third dime nsion is the deaths inflicted by the IRA upon civilians. In the 1970s and 1980s, the deaths caused were “largely unintended consequences” of car bombings and other terrorist a cts, but later consisted of a low-level reprisal campaign against loyalist terrorism. This side of the conflict claimed 613 lives. The authors note that one of the most significant a spects of the Troubles was the low level of violence inflicted by paramilitary organiz ations against rival terrorists; in fact, “republicans killed four times more of their own” t han they killed loyalists (see Figure 3.2). These internal killings were the result of se veral factors, not the least of which were the abrupt termination of suspected informants, but also the victims also included deserters and those who had severely mishandled ope rations. Figure 3.1: Three Dimensions of the Irish Conflict, 1969-98 Arrows represent inflicted casualties over time in Northern Ireland. (Reprinted from Hayes and McAllister 2001, 906)


47 Figure 3.2: Organizations Responsible for Deaths fr om Political Violence, 1969-98 (Reprinted from Hayes and McAllister 2001, 904) Instrumental counter-terrorism theorists interpret the level of violence as simply the adoption of the most effective tactic for signa ling political and social positions as well as demanding concessions and action from opposition groups. Organizational theory and cultural approaches to ethno-nationalist terrorism, on the other hand, suggest that the internecine nature of the conflict led to a spiral in which elites were unable to broker political action in the shattered political climate and social and cultural forces propelled various political actors towards violence as the re sult of growing and mutual intercommunity anger. Rank-and-file members of the organ ization played a crucial role in the early phase of the conflict by both lobbying within the IRA for increased violent action and by engaging in oft-unauthorized action by thems elves, which regardless of leadership views on the issue, bred further retributive violen ce as both nationalist and loyalist


48 militiamen felt compelled to defend their ethnic en claves against opposition. This view almost certainly has credence in explaining the ear ly phase of struggle and the initial violent 'spiral' in the early 1970s; “in those earl y days there was a real struggle for supremacy in the housing districts and ghettos of W est Belfast; the feuding was partly ideological and partly material in that they were f ighting for control of the rackets in Belfast and Londonderry” (Simonsen and Spindlove 20 00, 80). Organizational theory then would seem to predict that violence would star t with acts of random violence until the movement could be co-opted by elites, leading t o a stage in which more conventional strategic logic might be increasingly applied. In f act, this is exactly what happened. The low level of violence directed against rival parami litaries is partly a consequence of this effect; nationalist paramilitaries, particularly th e IRA, were encouraged to act professionally for their public image, limiting the degree to which their violence was sectarian. As time went on and IRA attacks became m ore sophisticated, the level of civilian casualties dropped and attacks became more successful at targeting security forces. This pattern does not imply the IRA leaders hip was above making mistakes, though theirs were largely the result of political miscalculation rather than social pressures for retributive violence. These massive e rrors in judgment were shown most aptly in 1996, when the IRA abandoned negotiations in an attempt to “convince the British public that the government was to blame for the breakdown of negotiations”; the result of this policy, particularly the London Cana ry Wharf blast which killed two and injured hundreds, was that 89% of the public blamed the IRA for wrecking the peace process (Hoffman 1998, 147-148). This incident in p articular demonstrates how the IRA


49 needed to carefully balance its use of violence wit h political gains in coordination with Sinn Fein. Attrition and Constraints Ignacio Snchez-Cuenca (2004) has adapted the game theoretical model of a “War of Attrition” – a situation in which neither combat ant can win – into a framework that can explain the way in which the Provisionals waged the ir campaign of terror. Attrition strategies, as designated in the previous chapter, are designed to inflict maximum political cost upon the state actor and its civilia n base of support, which lends itself uniquely suits terrorist organizations. In the Iris h context, this meant terrorism as a tool to frighten and horrify British voters as well as dest roy loyalist community support. This strategy was well-promulgated throughout even rankand-file members of the IRA, as demonstrated by one quote from a Provisional activi st : “I hadn’t a political thought in my head other than I knew w hat we were doing was right because it was to get the ‘Brits’ out of Ireland. The m ore you hurt them, I thought, the more fed up they’ll get and want to get out.” (Snchez-Cuenca 2004, 18) The initial failure of IRA operations in the mid-1 970s to force the British out did not create the attrition strategy as suggested by m any theorists; rather, the 'long war' that resulted was merely a leadership-driven “rational u pdating of the initial beliefs about the British exit rule” (Snchez-Cuenca 2004, 17). Throughout the 1970s debate amongst the IRA leaders hip (and within the rankand-file) had entrenched the idea that escalation o f operations would provide the key to ending British political determination to remain in an occupying role. According to Snchez-Cuenca, “terrorist organizations operate un der constraints in a war of attrition”


50 (2004, 2). Three important dimensions of conflict b ecome political and social support, financing, and the ability of the organization to w ithstand external attacks by the government. Snchez-Cuenca suggests that the relati vely moderate degree of support for the IRA, as well as his statistical model that prov es that arrests rose dramatically in the wake of indiscriminate attacks, proved a major cons training factor on the ability of the IRA to launch increasingly bloody and vicious attac ks. When IRA attacks involved horrific numbers of civilians, such as the 1974 Bir mingham pub bombings that killed 19 and wounded 182 or the 11 deaths of the 1987 Ennisk illen bombing, they were quick to deny responsibility (Snchez-Cuenca 2004,19). Simil arly, when an IRA-conducted “bungled robbery” in 1996 in Adare killed one Garda i detective (Irish policemen were generally considered political 'no-go' targets by t he IRA) and wounded another, the “PIRA acted swiftly to distance themselves from the shooting” (Horgan and Taylor 1999, 14); moreover, the “leadership took the unprecedent ed step of changing the command and functional structures of the organization” by insti tuting stricter regional commands under the firm control of trusted long-time IRA brigadier s (18). These incidents reveal constraints that forced the IRA to balance potentia l political risk against the need to take action. As the peace process progressed, the IRA le adership became much quicker to institute tight controls directed by leadership in order to minimize both initial fallout and the risk of recurrence. This change signified the e nd of an era where “local units had considerable operational freedom,” which had allowe d “the pace of events to be determined for the most narrow operational reasons” (Bell 2000, 142). As Hoffman notes, ethno-nationalist or separatist groups such as the IRA recognize the need to maintain both internal and ex ternal sympathy; this requirement


51 means that a terrorist attack must always convey th at the violence was “both purposeful and deliberate, sustained and omnipresent” (1998, 1 61). The IRA's biggest failures were always actions that failed to signal these qualitie s. Since “the crucial question about the process of terror is not how much damage was caused ? but What message did the damage convey?” (Townshend 1995, 339), incidents such as t he Canary Wharf Attack and Adare demonstrate how terrorist signaling failures can co me from both leadership and the paramilitary membership themselves. Thus, it is imp roper to conclude that terrorist patterns can be fully understood through politicall y-oriented strategic logic; in addition to the miscalculations made from the top-down, individ ual members of the organization possess a capacity to disrupt the patterns of the g roup at large. It is also important to understand that “consensus and local initiative pla y a very large role in IRA tactics” (Bell 2000, 142). Although this quality of the IRA faded considerably with the rise of more elaborate peace processes such as those that led to the GFA, in the two decades preceding “no one was going to be able with any effect to tel l the Republicans of South Armagh to restrain themselves” (Bell 2005,142). Generally loc al officers were free to organize operations and there were only serious changes to a consensus-based IRA command structure when internal problems became very seriou s. Often, then, it becomes difficult to separate individual ambition and the intent of loca l operations from the trajectory of the organization as a whole. Consensus at the top level explains the remarkable continuity of the Provisionals and the lack of serious splits oth er than major defections in 1986 to form the Continuity IRA. A foundational aspect of the IR A was “an agreement not to split: all began with a consensus to continue” (Bell 2005, 143 ). Thus the leadership did not so


52 much lead but represent IRA consensus as it transit ioned in and out of various phases of conflict. Bell claims that despite numerous setbacks, “the I RA perception discounts visible assets in contrast to the power of the dream: histo ry and justice will triumph over the orthodox army or the power of sterling” (2005, 20). It is notable that Bell claims that the IRA's most lasting asset was always “the energy of the dream... [which] parallels to a degree the conventions of a church, can run with mi nimal financing, and cannot guarantee anything but the persistence of the strug gle” (30). The Provisionals would always conservatively readjust their tactics and or ganization to the detriment of transformational goals that would have better serve d its stated political agenda. This conservatism explains both the tactical flexibility of the Provisionals and their reluctance to evolve. As Bell commented, within the IRA… “…the major questions are decided. Only the proper and effective us e of physical force is open to discussion. Politics is a means to enhance the armed struggle or to accept victory.” (52) The trajectory of violence in Northern Ireland sug gests that one key aspect of understanding the conflict is to realize that viole nce created its own organizational incentives separate from the formalized political o bjectives the IRA sought to attain. This feedback loop had the effect of generating the perc eption of violence for its own sake, which is clearly untrue. The structure of the IRA w as “filled with exclusive neighborhood groups” and “despite years of turmoil, change, and challenge, the Provisionals have tended to remain operationally very local” (Bell 20 05, 232-233). As a result, an operation in one location might seem very attractive to the l ocal active service unit while failing to pursue any clear connection to the political agenda Attacks could be based on opportunity as much as strategic logic; as Hoffman comments, “the terrorist campaign is


53 like a shark in the water: it must keep moving forw ard – no matter how slowly or incrementally – or die” (1998, 162), a maxim which very much applies on the local as well as strategic level. Thus, a certain level of d iscordance was tolerated because it operated within a leadership of consensus. Since th e Provisionals operated under such severe material constraints, the PIRA had to be con servative in strategy on multiple levels. Persistent application of violence with lim ited innovation except in finding new ways to maintain the same level of pain became the norm. In many ways this violence and lawlessness became endemic and “undirected, spo ntaneous, often useful as grist to the mill of the armed struggle but an indicator of the nature of the times rather than the tactical direction of the campaign” (Bell 2000, 277 ). Opportunity rather than intensity defined change in tactics as Provisional units soug ht new strategies and were forced to evolve in the face of refreshed denial, but the gri m language of violence remained a primary method of communication in Northern Ireland Financial Incentives for Continued Struggle Horgan and Taylor write that funding is one of “th e most important long-term, fundamental, limiting factors for the development o f a large, sophisticated terrorist group and its political wing” (1999, 3). The IRA had two primary considerations when designing and maintaining its financing network: th e continued purchase of weaponry and munitions and the need to maintain a thorough a nd extensive human resources network. Traditionally, the IRA's money is seen as coming from two distinct sources – diaspora Irish, particularly in the United States, and fundraising in the counties and the


54 Irish Free State through extortion, smuggling, and robbery. Bell claims the diaspora money was always overestimated; it “came in bits an d drabs, a matter of cake-bake sales and dances in suburban halls, crumpled bills in bar s, and almost never great cheques signed with a flourish” (2000,187-188). At first, h e says, the IRA targeted local post offices and state enterprises. When this funding wa s insufficient, bank robbery, “hijacking of trucks, thefts from business” and the “after-hou rs clubs, smuggling along the border, cut-price appliances” (Bell 2000, 189) became the n orm. Kidnapping for ransom was also omnipresent. In addition to prominent businessmen, Shergar, a thoroughbred horse and Derby winner, was ransomed and put down by the Prov isionals after the owners failed to pay the ransom (Horgan and Taylor 1999, 11). The pl ethora of “robberies in Ireland in which the PIRA have been suspected, but for which n o-one has ever been charged, is immense” (Horgan and Taylor 1999, 13). Horgan and Taylor's accumulated estimates demonstr ate that the IRA was able to move a considerable amount of money and do so on a regular and consistent basis (1999, 8-9). As they note, however, it is probably impossi ble to chart all of the Provisionals' funding, and their estimates are fairly crude. What is supported by the evidence, however, is their assertion that as a movement inexorably pr ogresses with little political success, “its activities tend to drift in focus towards othe r things they do well” (17). The PIRA became increasingly innovative and focused on growt h into complicated financial scams that were harder to detect and shut down than earli er ones. For example, the authors describe the evolution of racketeering : Any contractor or business new to an area controlled by one of the paramilitary organizations is approached by representatives of the group concern ed, but now the approach is generally made by an apparently legitimate security compan y that has been established by a terrorist group to provide a legitimate veneer for what remains a simple racket (21).


55 Legitimate security companies were, of course, una ble to compete with an underground organization that relied heavily upon t he threat of reprisal rather than the provision of actual services to maintain security. The terrorists could underbid them, and winning a contract against an IRA-associated privat e security company might result in a brutal beating. Members of the IRA were even able t o occasionally claim employment at these security firms when asked, although they did not work there. Although Bell claims that the Provisionals' stance against drug use was genuine, Horgan and Taylor point out considerable holes in t his story. Almost certainly the IRA was not involved in the direct distribution of narc otics, but it is still unclear as “to the principal reason why ... drug dealers are either th reatened or killed” by militant Republicans (Horgan and Taylor 1999, 29). The polic e service and some drug dealers have alleged the IRA oversees drug smuggling operat ions without placing hands on the product and provides protection, while moving again st dealers' opponents. Either explanation is useful for an organizational analysi s; the IRA provided a social incentive for support (the removal of drug dealers in a neigh borhood) and may have provided its members with an illicit financial incentive (involv ement in the drug trade backed by IRA muscle). Despite this flood of money, Bell contends that mu ch of it was wasted, partially because it was poorly controlled and budgeted. “... the mix of illicit and/or covert funds, illicit purchases for materials and service, and lo cal control means no coherent economic oversight is possible – or attempted” (2000, 191). Command set general policy, such as a ban on all criminal operations with less than £3000 in profit, but the main effect of elite influence was merely to make sure that the actions remained under IRA control, money


56 was kept flowing to commanders, and that adequate f unding was directed to major initiatives such as Libyan arms purchases or the el aborate support network established for the families of IRA members in prison or deceased. The threat of exposure within the movement and generally high morale and commitment k ept the level of on-the-side work, corruption, and embezzlement relatively low despite the marginal payments to rank-andfile members. Vigilantism in the Wake of the Peace Process While active paramilitary violence against the Cro wn security forces seems to have diminished almost to the point of total cessat ion, a less-examined aspect of the conflict has skyrocketed following the implementati on of the Good Friday Agreement : the “surrogate terrorism of vigilantism has gradual ly taken on a higher profile and greater significance” (Silke and Taylor 2000, 250). Through out the Troubles, paramilitary cadres on both sides of the conflict regularly engaged in a policy of vigilante justice. Called “community policing” in paramilitary circles, it se rved as both a method of enforcing control through attacking dissidents and as a way o f building community support. In the 1970s and the 1980s, the form of vigilante action c hosen was often a 'kneecapping' – a point-blank shot fired at the rear of the knee. Tho se kneecapped ranged from common criminals to members of the community who had simpl y crossed the paramilitaries – or, in Catholic communities, had let it be known that t hey supported the RUC or the British military presence. Since the victims were inevitabl y working-class, they “had no choice but to go back into the neighborhood they came from where they are intended to be


57 limping examples” (Conroy 1980) – a powerful signal that the IRA was not to be trifled with. In the wake of the peace process and forced d ecommissioning of arms, shootings fell dramatically, accompanied by an inverse rise i n beatings. The beatings allow the IRA to maintain their image as community defenders whil e simultaneously avoiding violating the peace process. While republican community viole nce is largely focused on fighting civic crime and the homogeneity of the nationalist movement makes vigilante justice in Catholic areas generally targeted at criminals and dissident republicans, members of the loyalist communities “live in constant fear of ‘cro ssing someone who is connected’” (Knox 2002, 181). Loyalist paramilitaries' lack of discipline, the dearth of effective leadership and control mechanisms, and conflicts ov er racketeering and drug territories have resulted in Protestant communities feeling “al ienated, threatened and cowered by the paramilitaries” (Knox 2002, 181). Loyalist lead ers actively encouraged a culture of fear which bled through the fabric of society. We might give them the same punishment back they gave someone els e. Say they beat up somebody, the same might happen to them. For a very s erious offense, say a rape or they really beat somebody badly, they might be kneecapped This is not a normal society. You have to instill fear in those sort of p eople... – Andy Tyrie, head of the loyalist Ulster Defense Association (Quoted in Conroy 19 80) In contrast, former IRA paramilitaries still often retain more respect than their loyalist counterparts; one reason for this was that PIRA members remained deeply engrained within many community member's definition of legitimate justice. Silke and Taylor demonstrated that republican punishment squa ds were larger (38% consisted of six members or more), operated in public with less fear of retribution, and were four times less likely to face prosecution for vigilante offen ses than loyalists (2000, 260-263). Part of the explanation for this difference is political motivated by the republican movement's


58 reluctance to “lose control within their communitie s where they have some social standing and exercise patronage (the 'hard men' ima ge)” (Knox and Monaghan 2001, 910). Part of Republican paramilitaries’ ability to act comparatively openly, however, was certainly related to social approval and the sentim ent provided by at many community members that Republican paramilitaries were providi ng a legitimate security service. Whenever you heard of a “punishment” shooting or beating the fi rst thing came into your head was “what did they do, they must have done somethi ng” because we placed so much faith and trust in the paramilitaries. Now I w ould put a question mark over these things but in our area the attitude is “well it hasn ’t come to my door, I’m sorry for you but as long as they leave mine alone. – A Belf ast citizen in 1999. (Quoted in Knox and Monaghan 2001, 9) There have been several attempts to resolve the un fortunate policing situation but it took several years for any positive effect; in t he interim, some facets of the security situation actually devolved considerably following the GFA (see Figures 3.3-3.5). Noticeably, shootings, beatings, and bombings all i ncreased dramatically following the 1998-1999 period in the absence of attacks against the British security forces; most forms of violence rose, spiking near 2000-2002, and did n ot subside considerably until 20042005. The GFA was supposed to bring a measure of pe ace to Northern Ireland, but the cessation of overt terrorism exacerbated the alread y brutal culture of vigilante justice. Although Republican groups committed the minority o f vigilante violence, beatings and shootings remained an omnipresent part of life in N orthern Ireland, with Republican groups alone committing 231 casualty-inducing shoot ings between 2000 and 2004. The Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ire land, better known as the Patten Commission, was established as part of the GFA in 1 998. Of its key recommendations – which included a 50-50 policy for hiring Protestant s and Catholics, a new code of ethics, community policing emphasis, and the removal of Bri tish symbols – only two were


59 adopted, one of which was to rename the RUC to the Northern Ireland Police Service, and the other was to create an administrative polic ing board. Attempts to implement the Patten recommendations, often listed as a Sinn Fein and IRA prerequisite for ending any involvement in community justice, fell short becaus e of loyalist opposition. Eventually most of the key decisions were implemented followin g the Commission’s final recommendations in their 2001 report, but many poli cies took years to evolve. An alternative attempt was the community restorative j ustice scheme, which is meant to avoid vigilantism by bringing offender and victim t ogether to satisfy their needs for justice without worrying about the fulfillment of p recise and abstract legal principles. In Northern Ireland, restorative justice often took th e form of community boards to discuss crimes between offender and victim and reach approp riate deadlines and actions for the offender to take as a form of repayment. Knox notes that the restorative justice policy “in the short-term does nothing to tackle the vacuum oc cupied by republican paramilitaries within communities” (2002, 178). Although Sinn Fein espoused a great deal of support for community restorative justice schemes, the para military's apparent support for the community restorative schemes for justice was proba bly somewhat cynical. As Knox and Monaghan commented in 2001, “they can initiate and discontinue “punishment” beatings and shootings at will” (9); furthermore, Sinn Fein had a vested interest in continuing an unofficial policy of “community policing”. Sinn Fei n’s eventual acceptance and entry to the Northern Ireland Policing Board in 2007 marked the formal abrogation of paramilitary community policing. Why had vigilantism risen so dramatically followin g the negotiation of an agreement that enjoys the support of most political leaders in Northern Ireland? Mac


60 Ginty et al. claim that modern policy makers and an alysts tend to view demobilization of terrorist organizations as “a “problem-solving” or “problem-oriented” approach to peacemaking” (2006). The result is that modern peac emaking processes focus on fixing structural problems with institutions and manage co nflict manifestations, but they fail to address underlying systemic causes of the conflict. As a result, although immediate results may be achieved by disarming large organiza tions and lowering the scale of conflict, continuing intermittent violence leads to an uneasy sense of peace experienced by locals, perhaps the most outwardly visible failu res of the politically-oriented peace process. The researchers emphasize the relative eas e of studying Northern Ireland because it is a comparatively open and developed so ciety, as opposed to other societies undergoing periods of political violence. Figure 3.3: Casualties as a Result of ParamilitaryStyle Attacks, 1973-98 (Reprinted from Silke and Taylor 2000, 250)


61 Figure 3.4: Casualties as a Result of Republican P aramilitary-Style Attacks, 19992009 22 63 66 55 47 17 6 12 5 18 33 72 36 50 45 19 12 10 13 480 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 8019 99/00 2000 / 0 1 2001/02 20 02/ 0 3 2003 / 04 2004/05 20 05/ 0 6 2006/07 20 07/08 2008 / 0 9 Shootings Assaults Figure 3.5: Casualties as a Result of All Paramilit ary-Style Attacks, 1999-2009 75 190 165 93 26 7 20 103 112 144 116 48 45 41 149 162 76 149 161 76 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 2001 9 99/ 0 0 2 00 0/ 0 1 2 00 1/ 0 2 200 2/ 03 2003 / 04 2004 / 05 2005/06 2006/07 2 00 7/ 0 8 2 00 8/ 0 9 Shootings Assaults (Data for Figures 3.4-3.5 from Police Service of No rthern Ireland 2009, 6)


62 According to a social identity perspective, Mac Gin ty et al. state “those identities that are most likely to be expressed in a given con text are those that are made salient” (2007, 8). This is a particular problem in Northern Ireland, where elite-engineered agreements have failed to promote change in the rel igious and ethnic polarization of local communities, thus enabling continued low-level viol ence. The unsteadiness of the transition process raises “fundamental questions ab out the ability of meta-scale political engineering to encourage attitudinal or identity ch ange” (8). From this perspective, the Good Friday Agreement reinforced these identities t hrough the power sharing agreement between Catholic nationalist and Protestant unionis t communities. Northern Ireland's conflict has become trans-generational, with the sp ecific means of political expression or particular grievances updated without any change to the prevailing ethnic split. Mac Ginty et al. conclude that conflicts and the a ttitudes that provide fuel to them are relatively fluid and thus must demand flexible, “agile transformation responses” that do not merely “minister to conflict manifestations” but attempt to “transform or challenge the attitudes that underpin conflict” (2007, 9-10). They also conclude that top-down processes need to focus on healing identity rifts i n society rather than focus on immediate political issues, and that more effort needs to be placed in integrating localized concerns, as opposed to merely elite ones, in the demobilizat ion process. As Byrne (2001) notes, there have been widespread efforts sponsored by bot h international actors such as the United States and the British government to provide a multi-layer civil society approach to local integration on the island. The results dem onstrate minor improvement, but are not particularly encouraging. Despite the efforts of lo cal organizations such as the Community Relations Council, as of 2001, “less than 5% of the current student


63 population attend integrated schools within Norther n Ireland”. Unfortunately, continued segregation remains, and only a “small but steadily growing middle ground of citizens promoting new values and norms” exists (340). A tru e inter-community peace with tolerant and well-adjusted cohabitation will take a long time to emerge and remains exacerbated by poor economic and social progression on the island since the cessation of hostilities by most major actors. Society in the si x counties remains as fractured as ever along ethnic lines. Combined with the weakness of l ocal governance, such a damaged society has unique opportunities for violence to re -emerge. Vigilantism is one such effect. Perhaps it also, partially, a way by which militan ts simply fulfill roles they are adapted to best – purveyors of violence. Doubtlessl y, the ending of the Troubles left many militants with nothing better to do than continue o ld habits; and the brokenness of culture and politics provided opportunities for former para militaries to pursue old, tried-and-true methods of community involvement. The death of hier archical political violence in Northern Ireland led to a devolved version of Crens haw's “momentum built around terror as purpose rather than as strategy” (1987, 22). It is not a holistic explanation for vigilantism, but it also captures the essence of it s continuance. The continued use of violence is even hard to define entirely as politic al; politics are certainly an element, but there is also a hint of desperate attempts at maint aining organizational and community coherence amongst demobilized paramilitaries reluct ant to give up a legacy of violence intrinsic to both their social standing and sense o f ideological correctness. There also remains a slowly dying culture of violence in North ern Ireland; it may well be that the worst is over, but the persistence of struggle indi cates that more community-centric political agreements are needed to broker a lasting sense of security in troubled societies.


64 From 2001-2003, nearly 10 years after the IRA’s 199 4 ceasefire, there were a combined 913 security-related shootings in Northern Ireland, and 567 bombings; hardly the hallmark of a functioning society (see Figure 3.6). Figure 3.6: Number of Security-Related Shootings an d Bombings in Northern Ireland, 1999-2009 131 331 358 348 207 167 156 58 42 54 66 177 318 178 48 81 20 23 46 71 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 40019 99/ 0 0 2000/01 2001/02 2002 / 03 20 03/ 0 4 2004/05 2005 / 06 2006 / 07 20 07/ 0 8 2008/09 Shootings Bombings (Data from Police Service of Northern Ireland 2009, 5) The ultimate goal in Northern Ireland must be to s trengthen the legitimacy of normal venues of criminal justice. The community re storative paradigm, while certainly much better than lawlessness, did not provide a fin al solution. None of the various political actors with the exception of conservative elements within republican communities felt that restorative justice programs are a long-term substitute for a justice system. Knox notes that an imperfect peace is “diff erentially negotiated across communities where criminality and political violenc e are inconsistent” (2002, 181). The


65 peace process is likely to continue to differentiat e between individual communities and involve multiple levels of stringency, reform, and community planning. Efforts to rebuild the Northern Irish economy and build civil society must go hand in hand with further police reform and the strengthening and establishme nt of effective judiciary procedures. Conclusion The IRA was an organization that, while somewhat d ecentralized, maintained a loosely structured yet self-aware command hierarchy that was well attuned to the political and social reality of the six counties. Sociocultur al theories provide an essential understanding of the roots of the Northern Irish cr isis, and explain the historical and cultural framework which maintained the Provisional s through over three decades of conflict. The organizational perspective of analysi s does an excellent job of explaining how incentives and goals for both leaders and rankand-file members of the IRA evolved over time, leading to the formulation of preference s within the organization and explaining why specific goals were set by the leade rship. However, the ways in which the IRA acted tactically as well as politically in its alliance with Sinn Fein can be amply demonstrated to follow a strong yet flexible kind o f strategic logic. This is well within the analytical framework promoted by instrumentalists, which is highly suggestive that the ethno-nationalist conflict in Nothern Ireland is so mewhat adequately explained on a macro level by this school of analysis. It does not suggest, however, that the instrumentalist framework can be universally applie d to terrorist activity, as evidenced by the methods and strategies used by loyalists. These were far less coherently organized


66 and demonstrate that terrorist organizations do not always possess a sophisticated understanding of strategic logic. Many valuable lessons on managing ethno-nationalis tic terrorist organizations can be learned from the troubled experience of security organizations in maintaining order in the six counties. Most obviously, it becomes readil y apparent that governmental organizations must make better efforts to promote t heir own legitimacy and not just downplay human rights concerns, but actively adjust their own policies and avoid actions that provide easy propaganda victories for terroris t organizations. The key mistakes made by British forces during the conflict period demons trate how even in exceptional circumstances the rule of law must be a paramount c oncern in conflict management strategies. Under no circumstances must even 'frien dly' seeming paramilitary organizations be sided with or allowed free reign – because these organizations operate outside the rule of law, it signals that the govern ment is not interested in preserving the rights of citizens. When the public perceives that the government is uninterested in any but the most utilitarian goals, the natural respons e is further delegitimization of political authority. The situation in Northern Ireland was di re, but it did not reach the level of crisis necessary to “warrant the overturning of the normal judicial review of the police” (Wardlaw 1989, 130). The best argument against the emergency regulations was not in their actual intent or mechanics, but that they cou ld only be enforced through overextensions of government authority. It would be a critical mistake. It is submitted, then, that the key mistakes in ma intaining order in Northern Ireland stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem guided by instrumental logic. The limited goals of containmen t failed to end violence and fared


67 even worse at resolving tensions between communitie s. In fact, the low aspirations of both the Irish and British allowed the conflict to simmer without erupting into full-on civil war. A strange combination of limited politic al will and indiscriminate responses – triggered by the launching of a military campaign w ith poorly defined goals – allowed the IRA to convert the chaos and rioting in 1969 into a highly disciplined fighting force by 1970. Clearly, the sad case of Northern Ireland shows th e danger of underestimating the resolve and mutability of a separatist terror group Even though support for the IRA was low beyond the early 1970s, a failed security polic y had guaranteed ethnic enclaves were sufficiently established as to provide safe harbor for both IRA and loyalist cadres. A consequence of this is that the terrorist organizat ions in many ways were able to take over key roles of both local politics and the economy. T he collapse of the norm of the state's monopoly on violence ensured that militants were se en by many in their constituencies as security forces – most aptly demonstrated by contin ued vigilantism even in the wake of peace accords that have ended most major attacks. C lear evidence also emerges that the Provisionals were able to deeply immerse themselves in the local economy, which exacerbated security concerns even further by intro ducing personal financial incentive to the movement and encouraging turf wars. Most importantly, what the Northern Ireland case d emonstrates is the IRA's proven ability to modulate between different strate gies and forms when under pressure. The Provisionals were able to function as a revolut ionary vanguard, a local protectorate, a criminal syndicate, and a political movement at the same time and just as importantly, do all of these jobs consistently and concurrently. Mo dularity and adaptability was one of the


68 PIRA’s greatest strengths; conversely, their lack t hereof was one of the security forces' greatest weaknesses. The British and Irish security approaches were marked above all by unimaginative planning and floundering execution. G overnment tactics can improve, but it is also important to recognize that clumsiness i s an inherent facet of internal military operation when soldiers are called upon to act as h eavily armed police instead of the jobs they were trained to do. Instrumental thinking capt ures an important dimension of the Irish conflict – the delicate balance between the t error strategy and political success – but strategic-oriented planning and military interventi onism proved to be a failure in Northern Ireland. The tools of organizational and s ociocultural analysis can help determine less immediately evident but more importa nt variables valuable to coherent policy analysis, which would have led to a differen t and more effective response in the Irish scenario.


69 Chapter 4 The Zeal of Harakah al-Islamiyyah (HAMAS), The Islamic Resistance Movement Engaged in vanities we killed each other. and here we are like crumbs. In the cafes of the East we [pass the time] in swatting flies, wearing the masks of the living. We are placed in the dunghill of history mere shadows of men. -'Abd al-Wahab al Bayati, 1968 (Lustick 1990, 540) Given the methods used by the Israelis, we consider the door t o hell is open. – Gaza Hamas leader Sayeed Siyam (Pape 2005, 32) The year 2006 was expected to be historic for Pale stinians, a long-dispossessed and downtrodden people who had been displaced by th e establishment of the State of Israel nearly sixty years prior. It was the first t ime in a decade that elections were to be held for the Palestinian Legislative Council, the l egislative branch of the Palestinian Authority (PA), the de facto government of the West Bank and Gaza strip since its establishment in the Oslo accords in 1994. Backers in the United States and Israel expected the ruling Fatah party, which had dominate d Palestinian politics for decades, to win and legitimize the PA and its ongoing peace neg otiations with Israel. Instead, Harakhah Al-Islamiyyah, the Islamic Resistance Move ment, commonly known by its acronym Hamas (which in Arabic translates directly as zeal), and Palestine's most prominent Islamic terrorist organization, won in a landslide. Hamas's Change and Reform List won 74 out of 132 seats to Fatah's 45 (Frisch 2010, 1058). Their showing in the local districts was particularly disastrous – 17 went to Fatah versus Hamas's 45. While the


70 West Bank remained under Fatah control, the Gaza st rip was essentially overrun by Hamas legislator-elects. As author Zaki Chehab comm ents, key players in the Israeli and American administrations were blindsided. In turn, “Palestinian commentators were bewildered by the ignorance of ... US officials of the depth of the hostility felt by Palestinians towards their own leadership and Israe l” (Chehab 2007, 2). What had previously existed as a terrorist organization had successfully entered government – and, what more, Hamas had entered the political process and taken control of Gaza without renouncing terrorism. Israel and its allies feared that in the process, Hamas had mainstreamed Islamist violence against the Land of Zion and thrown the future of any attempts to make peace with the Palestinians into d oubt. Hamas was openly committed to the destruction of the State of Israel and the esta blishment of an Islamic caliphate in Palestine, from which it would export its own Islam ic revolution throughout the region. It was known for vicious terrorist campaigns in the na me of jihad, or struggle, against Israeli civilian and military targets, which includ ed rocket attacks, car bombings, and most notoriously of all, suicide bombings, whose pe rpetrators were honored as the highest of martyrs for the Palestinian and Islamic cause. A review of the scholarly literature on Hamas reve als two well-defined and opposing camps. Unsurprisingly, mainstream American and Israeli scholars have tended to maintain a pro-Israeli line, arguing that the ri se of Hamas is an unmitigated danger to the peace process and regional security. General Mi chael Herzog, an Israeli Defense Force (IDF) strategist, argues that despite enterin g the democratic process, “Hamas will simply use political participation as another vehic le for pursuing its alarming core objectives” (2006, 84). Increasingly, however, anal ysts from all backgrounds have begun


71 to openly criticize the Israeli role in the conflic t as aggravating and alienating Palestinians, identifying several Israeli policies as instrumental in not only increasing the appeal of radical Islamist organizations such as Ha mas but in being counter-productive to Israeli security. Realist political scientist John Mearsheimer encapsulates this view with the sentiment that “Israel is on a disastrous cours e that it seems incapable of reversing” (2010, 10). The debate on Hamas and its role in Pal estine is so hotly politicized and intertwined with the fate of Israel that these disa greements have taken on the veneer of a referendum on the physical and moral justifications underlying Israel's existence in and of itself. The hyper-focus on the Israel-Palestine conflict has been shaped for over a generation by intensive media coverage, vicious act s of internecine bloodletting, and perhaps most of all the strange specter of a clash of civilizations – the beguiling view that the violence is the manifestation of a conflict bet ween a secular and modern West and a backwards Islamic Middle East. This broad view of events does little to enlighten or inform serious analysis of organizational, strategic, and sociocultural aspect s of Hamas. All it can do is paint with a broad brush an overly simplistic version of an exce ptionally complex conflict, explaining little else than that Hamas is the mortal enemy of Israel, leaving out crucial questions. To interact with Hamas it is necessary to chart the fo rmation and growth of Hamas into its current form and to analyze the ways in which the n ascent movement strategized and matured. Without understanding its motives and tact ics – without understanding what can lead someone to take his own life and countless oth ers with a suicide attack – there is scarce scope for interaction other than mutual atte mpts at destruction. If radical groups like Hamas are to be co-opted or undermined and the violence to be ended, analysts must


72 avoid the notion of Islamist groups as inherently “ rigidly dogmatic compared to their secular counterparts” and investigate the ways in w hich “'religion' can both facilitate and prevent violence” (Gunning 2008, 11). They must als o problematize the way in which Islamist terroristic violence was conducted and leg itimized, how it evolved in reaction to political and military pressure, how the political throne of Gaza was opened to Hamas. Mujamma’ to Intifada: The Birth and Development of the Islamist Movement in Palestine In Inside Hamas Palestinian reporter Zaki Chehab describes an int erview with Sheikh Yassin in which the founder of Hamas laid ou t four clear stages for the group's development. The first stage was the development of charitable organizations and social committees which would "open their doors to the you ng and old – anyone who could play a role in resisting the occupier" (2007, 21). This was a prelude to the confrontation of the Intifada and the bolstering of all Palestinian resi stance, which Yassin claimed Hamas had the sole role in organizing. The third step was to develop its military capacities inside the occupied territories, and the fourth was to “see Ha mas moving beyond the Palestinian dimension,” engaging with other Arab allies (22). T his last tactic was in direct response to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whi ch had asserted Palestinian independence in all resistance activities. In retro spect, Hamas did follow this basic trajectory, although it had less control over the p rocess than originally anticipated. The following sections will chart Hamas’s development t hroughout the period 1986-2010 and analyze whether the instrumental or organizational school of analysis provides more insight into its growth and perpetuation.


73 In 1945 and 1946, thousands of Jews flocked from w ar-torn Europe to historic Palestine in the wake of the Nazi Holocaust. The ph ilosophy of Zionism, or the right to self-determination of the Jewish people in a sovere ign homeland, was primarily a response to growing anti-Semitism in Europe and dev eloped throughout the worldwide Jewish diaspora since the 1897 publication of Theod or Herzl’s Der Judenstaat A recalcitrant British colonial administration had at tempted to restrict the flow of Jewish immigrants by illegalizing it and suppressing advoc ates of Israeli statehood, but by 1947 the British considered the situation nearly out of control. A Jewish terrorist organization known as the Irgun Zvai Leumi launched a series of attacks against British soldiers and Arab Palestinians, having “studied the tactics of t he Irish Republican Army’s Michael Collins” (White 2002, 100). Irgun, along with other Jewish militant groups such as the Stern Gang and Haganah, had found considerable succ ess in rendering the British colony politically untenable. Following spectacular attack s such as the 1946 King David Hotel bombing and massive Jewish discontent with colonial rule, the British Mandate collapsed in 1947 and the United Nations established the stat e of Israel. Palestine sunk into civil war as the British administration withdrew. Neighbo ring Arab countries, determined to nip the Zionist enterprise in the bud, launched the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, during which over 725,000 Arab Palestinians fled, emigrated, or were otherwise expelled from their homes and their property was seized by the victorio us Israeli government. The mass exodus allowed Israeli consolidation and the stabil ization of the new state of Israel, which was further involved in a series of wars with its A rab neighbors until 1973. The 1967 SixDay War resulted in a humiliating defeat for the Ar abs and an illegal Israeli expansion into what is now known as the Occupied Territories – the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan


74 Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. Israeli forces in stituted civil administrations in these regions under Israeli political supervision. At the same time, Palestinian nationalism was in a scendance. Confronted, however, with “what was perceived by Arabs as an ex traordinarily high level of Israeli military proficiency” (Lustick 1990, 542), there we re few options left to militarist movements within the Palestinian community. They co uld emulate the actions of the Algerian revolutionaries who had savaged the French out of Algeria from 1954-62, but “Israeli Jews outnumbered Arabs two to one and roug hly equaled the total of Palestinians” that existed anywhere, leading to the realization that no amount of “violence of which the Palestinians were capable co uld ever itself directly destroy Israel or induce its capitulation” (542). Instead violence was utilized primarily to challenge Israeli dominance and to goad Israelis into counter -attacks which would alienate them from world opinion (543). The secular Palestine Lib eration Organization, the primary paramilitary resistance organization, took center s tage in world attention as a series of vicious terrorist attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets orchestrated by the Palestinian resistance shocked the world. Most nota ble amongst them was the 1972 Munich massacre of 11 Israeli Olympic athletes, but the repertoire of the Palestinian resistance also included plane hijackings, stone-th rowing, stabbings, shootings, and bombings. One of the most important developments of this period was a Palestinian realization that controlled use of violence dramati cally increased media coverage of the conflict and heightened their chances for mediated settlement. However, neither this violence nor the continuous wars between the Arabs and Israeli had resulted in the liberation of Palestine The weakening of traditional pan-Arab


75 loyalties in Palestine was the direct result of the Arab states’ devastating defeat in the SixDay War. Gunning claims that “Arab Nationalism was discredited as the scope of the Arab defeat sank in, creating space for the re-emer gence of both Palestinian nationalism and Islamism” (2008, 29). As a result, over the com ing decades Palestinian nationalists took center stage and by 1976 had succeeded in defe ating traditional elites in municipal elections (Gunning 2008, 30). At the same time, an absence of civil infrastructure in Palestine provided opportunities for the Muslim Bro therhood, which seeks Islamic revival throughout the Arab world, to organize. Thr ough the legal registration of alMujamma’ al-Islami, or the Islamic Center, in 1976 by Sheikh Yassin, Islamists gained a crucial role in providing community services otherw ise unavailable. They also were able to infiltrate civil society and thereby seize contr ol of unions, professional associations, and the student governments of Palestinian universi ties, which in the lack of a selfgoverning authority became the primary arenas of po litical contest (Gunning 2008, 33). From this time forward, these parallel political mo vements would characterize the development of Palestinian society. The Islamist-se cular split is now considered the defining internal Palestinian conflict. In the Gaza Strip, where support for Islamism has b een greatest, a “conducive combination of urbanisation... concentrated poverty an emerging lower middle class, and conservative culture” allowed “the Brotherhood’s ac tivist approach to Islam to flourish” (Gunning 2008, 31). Israel tacitly accepted the dev elopment of the Islamist movement, considering it a safety valve that countered the bu rgeoning power of the secular nationalist movement. According to one source, Isra el even provided some funding “to identify and channel towards Israeli agents Hamas m embers who were dangerous


76 terrorists” (Sale 2002), hoping to encourage the mo vement to grow in power while neutering its offensive capabilities. When the Occu pied Territories later sprung into open rebellion from 1986-1992 in what is now known as th e First Intifada, this would be recognized as a serious mistake. The Mujamma’ was confronted with a serious dilemma. While conservative elements in the organization were ideologically pre disposed against open violence, the Intifada made the leadership “feel constrained to s ubmit to the pressure of their young militants and adopt an actively combatant posture, consistent with the Palestinian’s public mood and expectations” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 35). The unprecedented change from a policy of slow Islamization of society to one of im mediate violent jihad “was thus largely a matter of survival” (35). In 1987, the creation o f Hamas, the openly militant branch of the Mujamma’, was announced through flyers, graffit i, and public rallies. It consisted of three branches: the Majlis Al-Shura, a consultative council composing political policy and including an external Political Bureau, the Izz Ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades or military wing later formed in 1992, and the third b ranch, its extensive social welfare wing. Fearful of Israeli retaliation, the Mujamma’ leadership carefully distanced itself from Hamas in public and restrained the young Islam ists from differentiating themselves from the overall resistance movement. Instead of pu shing a purely Islamic agenda, Hamas instead “reappropriated the secular elements and symbols of Palestinian nationalism as already defined by the PLO” (15), th ereby firmly couching its particular brand of Islamism within the framework of a more-or -less united Palestinian resistance. The intrafada or internal violence during the uprising, also sa w mass executions of Palestinians accused of collaboration with the Isra eli occupation forces. Although data on


77 internal violence during the intrafada is spotty, t he scale of these operations is generally agreed to be massive, and various resistance factio ns are accused of executing well over 1,000 Palestinians, often in public areas where the fear inspired was greatest. Palestinians were stabbed, hacked with axes, shot, clubbed and burned with acid. The justifications offered for the killings varied. In some in stances, being employed by Israel's Civil Administration in the West Bank and Gaza was reason enough; in others, contact with Jews warranted a death sentence. Accusations o f "collaboration" with Israel were sometimes used as a pretext for acts of personal vengeance. Women deemed to have behaved "immorally" were also among the victims. (B ard 2011) While the PLO was often accused of indiscriminately utilizing violence – PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat authorized the execution of 1 20 Palestinians – Hamas militants gained a reputation for not resorting “to internal violence to discipline its members or settle internal disputes,” and “Hamas is typically considered by informed observers to have been more meticulous in its investigations… an d less prone to killing suspected collaborators for other reasons than intelligence c ooperation” (Gunning 2008, 129). This comparative restraint was one factor that generated amongst Hamas loyalists a sense of greater solidarity and responsibility in its operat ions than seen in the PLO. Later, the illegal 1992 deportation of 415 Hamas activists to southern Lebanon, where Hizbollah members taught them the fundamentals of operational planning and strategic use of terrorist tactics, would accelerate the process of radicalization and enable Hamas to utilize ever-increasing violence both beyond the le ngth of the Intifada and into Israeli borders. The move to include foreign nations in the resistance also allowed Iranian agents to wield considerable influence over Hamas's milita ry capability. As Chehab states, "many shipments of weapons which were either interc epted by the Israeli navy in the Mediterranean Seas, seized on land in Jordan or whi ch successfully reached their intended destination, had one thing in common. They all originated in Iran" (2007, 143).


78 Mishal and Sela charted the contents of the first 30 leaflets issued by Hamas over the course of the first Intifada (see Figure 4.1). The first discovery was that calls for violent action – such as “throwing stones and fireb ombs, building barriers, burning tires, wielding knives and axes, clashing with the Israeli forces, and attacking collaborators” rose from 30.5% of directives in the first ten leaf lets to nearly 39.5% in the 20-30th (62). Paradoxically, despite this rise in the number of c alls for violent action, Hamas reduced its calls for complete severance of economic contac t with Israelis from 27.8% to 4.8% of instructions (2000, 62). This shift was abrupt and reflected the Hamas leadership’s realization of flaws in its overall strategy. Hamas had “calculated its strategy on a costbenefit basis and so now was trying to avoid a slid e into absurdity,” while simultaneously recognizing the "Palestinians' growing awareness of the role played by violence in promoting the Intifada and producing political gain s" (62-64). The key for Hamas was to maximize the level of violence it could instigate w ithout instigating a full-on collision with Israeli security forces the organization could not possibly hope to win. Calls for severance of contact –such as refusing to work in I sraeli territory, resigning from the Civil Authority, developing an internal economy, wi thdrawing money from Israeli banks, and most notably, upholding “the routine of class d espite the protracted closure of educational institutions” (60) – many of which were controlled by Islamists – both would weaken the economic bargaining power of Hamas’s con stituency and increase pressure from Israeli hardliners to strike back if the econo mic costs mounted significantly. Thus, rhetoric lost to pragmatism, and the theoretical le sson learned by Hamas was that jihad was not “an ultimate goal but a political instrumen t wielded by political considerations” (64). Accordingly, the data demonstrates that Hamas was forced to sideline a suicidal


79 push for ideological purity in favor of pragmatism and capacity-building. Indeed, Hamas lagged behind other organizations such as Islamic J ihad in ramping up the military wing of their operation, only escalating their technique s to include widespread bombings and suicide attacks following the 1992 deportations whi ch strengthened the hardline exterior leadership. Figure 4.1: Types of Directives in Hamas Leaflets b y Periodic Distribution (absolute numbers) Period 1 2 3 Type of Directive (# 1-10) (# 10-20) (# 20-30) Total Violent 11 16 25 52 Non-Violent Severance of Contact 10 11 3 24 Disobedience 7 2 19 28 Acts of Solidarity 8 11 16 35 Total 36 40 63 139 Percentage of Directives 25.9 28.8 45.3 (Reprinted from Mishal and Sela 2000, 61) The signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords between the P LO and Israeli leadership, which negotiated an end to the Intifada in exchange for the institution of a self-governing Palestinian Authority in the Occupied Territories, was anathema to Hamas and signified a growing divergence between secular and Islamist nat ionalists. In response to the Accords Hamas members utilized their newfound experience in terror tactics to launch a devastating wave of suicide and car bombs against I sraeli civilians within the boundaries of their own state. The first Hamas suicide attack against Israelis in Israel occurred on April 6th, 1994, when “seven civilians were killed in a car-bomb attack on a bus in the center of Afula” (Alexander 2002, 15). This blast w as followed promptly by an attack on the 13th in Hedera which killed four civilians and one soldier and later by an October


80 attack which killed “twenty-one Israelis and one Du tch national” in Tel Aviv (Alexander 2002, 16). The aim of the attacks was clear, as sta ted by Qassam leader Sayeed Siyam: “Their assassination policy and the bombardment – a ll this theater of war inside Palestinian villages and homes – we respond to that by seeking to make the Israelis feel the same, insecure within their own homes” (Pape 20 05, 32). Suicide bombings were also a response to relative military advantage; Chehab n otes “when the Ez Ed Din Al Qassam Brigades began their attacks in 1991, they had at t heir disposal no more than twenty machine guns which remained the sum total of their arsenal until the year 2000,” many of them obsolete, inaccurate, or in poor condition (20 07, 43). Attacks continued until 1996, when in February and March a series of suicide bombs in Jerusalem, Ashkelon, and Tel Aviv killed 5 9. This campaign constituted a violation of a tacit agreement between Hamas and th e PA not to launch attacks from PAcontrolled areas, an essentially unenforceable deal which had seemed likely to collapse from the onset. The bombings were the absolute “wor st terrorist assault ever launched against Israel,” and Hamas was forced to "take a pa ssive line, reiterating that it would not veer from its policy of averting a full-blown inter nal Palestinian confrontation" (Mishal and Sela 2000, 76). Mishal and Sela argue that the bombing allowed the Netanyhu administration's election and the subsequent “shift in Israel's approach to the Oslo process, in which partnership with the PA was repla ced by force and procrastination” (2000, 77). However, this view is contradicted by s ome Israeli analysts and Gunning as a mischaracterization of Hamas’s strategy. An Israeli official contradicted the official statement that the bombings were instigated at Iran ian behest to sabotage the election, claiming the bombings “were most probably a direct reaction to the assassination of


81 ‘Ayyash [the prominent Hamas bombmaker killed in Ja nuary] and had no far-reaching political goal” other than mere deterrence (Mishal and Sela 2000, 211n44). Gunning notes that “it would have made more tactical sense to stage the attacks nearer the actual May 29 elections – rather than three months before” (2000, 210). Hamas’s own leaflets distributed by the bombers similarly suggest that t he aim of the bombing was to force the end of Israeli targeted assassinations and to force the Israelis to accept a truce (Gunning 2000, 211). Previous Hamas bombings had also failed to weaken the Labour Party government. Bloom (2005, 19-44) suggests that three factors, “o pposition to the peace process, retaliation for Israeli actions, and intra-Palestin ian rivalry” need to be understood to “explain the timing and occurrence of violence” (Gu nning 2008, 209). Bloom and Gunning’s analysis directly contradicts Kydd and Wa lter’s (2002, 280-284) claim of the bombings as a successful use of the spoiler strateg y. Internal concern over Hamas’s continued survival also explains much of the scale of the attacks; the peace process meant “limited resistance opportunities and no guarantee that Hamas would be able to translate its grassroots support into political power” (Gunni ng 2008, 211; Mishal and Sela, 2000, 122-130). Pape suggests that the attacks may have b een intended to accelerate Israeli administrative withdrawal from the Occupied Territo ries (2005, 66-73). Taken together, these contesting explanations prese nt a credible alternative to the instrumental conclusion, demonstrating that Hamas’s tactical sense during this period was not as coherent or effective as official Israeli st atements would suggest. The contestation amongst analysts also highlights a difference betwe en instrumental and organizational theory, wherein Hamas violence is respectively expl ained as directly tactical and other-


82 based or motivated by variety of internal concerns. To some extent, the instrumental conclusions extend a degree of strategic credence t o the movement it does not deserve. Hamas benefits from a political environment that af fords it uncontested acceptance of its strategic and tactical competence – and it also emb oldens hardliners on the other side of the battle who can portray Hamas possessing more ac umen and foresight than it truly has, making them seem like a more dangerous threat to th e long-term survival of Israel. A serious constraint on the development of Hamas is an elaborate Israeli informer network consisting of “in excess of 20,000” (Chehab 2007, 69). Chehab's book is full of allegations that Israeli Shabak agents run elaborat e collaborator rings inside Palestine, utilizing coercion and blackmail to ensure that the re is a never-ending supply of Palestinian spies. One such informer was Haider Gha nem, who claims he was offered a job in journalism for what he believed was a legiti mate strategic studies center that later was revealed to be an elaborate Israeli spy net. Ac cording to Ghanem, Shabak operatives then threatened him to continue supplying informati on, saying “you've been working for us for nearly a year and we have all these reports you have been sending us” (73), the obvious implication being that his safety would be at risk if he stopped supplying information. Once recruited he was assigned to incr easingly elaborate operations, including ones in which he recruited and supplied m embers for fake Al Qassam or Islamic Jihad cells and then lured them into ambush es, after which “Israeli forces would then claim they were forced to attack” (77). These operations were often successful. It was Palestinian informers, for example, that finall y led IDF forces to Hamas bombmaker Yehia Ayyash.


83 Suicide Bombing and the Slide to Palestinian Civil War The period from 1996-2000 marked a period of relat ive calm from Hamas, which was unable to continue its all-out terrorist campai gn due to a combination of increased Israeli pressure and massive public disapproval of the violence. Gunning notes that support amongst Palestinians for suicide attacks wa s a mere 20% during the mid-1990s and only escalated to “some 40 per cent in the late 1990s” (2008, 48) as the Oslo process failed to derive dividends. Unfortunately, despite a brief economic upswing in the late 90s, by 2000 Israeli border closures and other sanc tions had driven “approximately one in five Palestinians” under the poverty line (49). Une mployment increased nine-fold and the Gross National Product in the Territories decreased by 18 per cent from 1992-1996 (49). The worsening economic climate and continued failur es of the peace process, perceived as entirely Israeli failures by Palestinians, contr ibuted to the spiraling political mood. The eventual result was the 2000-2005 Al-Aqsa Intifada which was sparked after Likud party leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount with a n escort of some 1,000 Israeli police officers. The violence visited upon both Israeli an d Palestinian citizens during this period made the previous Intifada look comparatively peace ful, with over 1,060 Israelis and 5,500 Palestinians killed. Figure 4.2 demonstrates how Palestinian faith in the PA was strongest in 1996, but had plummeted by 2000 with t he collapse of Oslo. This descent continued throughout the Al-Aqsa Intifada until the death of Yasir Arafat and the installation of a new government, but by then the d amage had largely been done. The Al-Aqsa Infitada was marked by a convergence o f two tactics used by Hamas in the past. Internal resistance against occupation forces was combined with external


84 violence in the form of a massive suicide bombing c ampaign against Israeli civilians inside Israel. Al-Aqsa also allowed Hamas to solidi fy its constituent support, and these tactics became the model for other resistance group s such as Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades. Gunning explains that “in contrast to the 1990s, when Hamas had to carefully calibrate its suicide operations, and justify them with reference to Israeli intransigencies,” support for suicide attacks was now in the area of 70-80% as a result of growing dissatisfaction with the PA and its policies (2008, 50). From September 2000 to August 2005, 51 suicide attacks killed 515 Israelis; just 0.6% of attacks were responsible for over 50% of the deaths (Benmelech and Berrebi 2007, 225226). Hamas was responsible for 39.9% of attacks, and combined with Palestinian Isl amic Jihad, an organization with which it worked closely, Islamists were responsible for 65.5% of the attacks (Benmelech and Berrebi 2007, 227). PLO leader Yasir Arafat was placed in a difficult political position. The attacks were so effective and widespr ead that militants from his own pronegotiations party, Fatah, formed their own suicide operations organization known as the Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade. The crisis had become a poisonous stalemate. As Israel’s peace partn er, Arafat would get nothing until he had destroyed Hamas. But Arafat could n ot destroy Hamas without destroying himself, because by now the Islamist mo vements represented a significant body of Palestinian opinion no longer believing in the [Oslo Accords] that nominally, at least, made Arafat and Israel peace partners in the fi rst place. (McGeogh 2009, 272) A targeted assassination policy by the Israelis of Hamas leaders may have played a role in encouraging direct reprisals by Hamas. Fo r example, an assassination campaign in July-August 2001 that killed twelve Hamas member s was followed by a Hamas suicide campaign in August and September that killed 18 and wounded 234 Israelis. Likewise, an autumn assassination operation that year killed 11 other Hamas members and was


85 promptly followed by two suicide operations that ki lled 26 and wounded 248 (Gunning 2008, 215). Several authors note that the ceremonie s following assassinations of Hamas leaders were “more a call to arms than a funeral” ( McGeough 2009, 287); the assassination of Sheikh Yassin in 2004 resulted in over 200,000 mourners crowding Gaza streets, shooting automatic weaponry into the air a nd chanting Islamic slogans. That Yassin was sometimes considered a voice of moderati on within Hamas and had “championed the notion of a hudnah, or long-term ce asefire, since the early 1990s” was ignored by Israeli authorities (Gunning 2008, 102). Figure 4.2: Various Scores of PA Governance and Leg itimacy Approval Ratings, 1996-2005 43 21 21 16 19 35 64 44 40 32 37 41 49 76 83 85 82 84 87 71 47 33 35 35 38 44 23 230 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 1996200020012002200320042005 Democracy Performance Concerned with Corruption Support President (Reprinted from Shikaki 2006, 6)


86 Likewise the subsequent assassination of leadership successor Abdel al-Rantisi led to the ascension of the exterior leadership’s h ardline clique in Syria under Khalid Mishal, who had repeatedly refused to respect PA ce asefires with Israel (McGeough 2009, 291). However, if the argument advanced by Gu nning, Pape, and Bloom is accurate, it suggests that the assassination policy increased the appeal of the more radical elements of Hamas and encouraged reprisals. Instead of assassinating Hamas leaders, arresting and putting them on trial would have limi ted Hamas’s ability to portray the dead as martyrs while simultaneously reducing the abilit y of more rabid Hamas leaders to seize greater control of the organization. By the end of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Fatah could “il l afford Hamas’ continued opposition to the system, given the changed balance of power” (Gunning 2008, 50). One major result of the Al-Aqsa Intifada was a “weakeni ng of the PA’s infrastructure, as Israel began targeting the PA’s security services and with holding Israeli-controlled revenue in response to Palestinian acts of resistance” (Gunnin g 2008, 49). Withdrawal of Israeli support – exacerbated by the 2005 unilateral withdr awal of all Israeli settlers and security forces from Gaza, which left the PA to deal with Ha mas and opposition militants on its own – coincided with public discontent with the PA to form an environment conducive to political expansion by its rivals. Thus, Hamas’s de cision to enter politics was as much shaped by the political opportunity structure as by a desire to seize control of Gaza. In 2004 the movement entered the PA municipal election s and in 2006 it entered the PA’s legislative campaigns. Their entry into politics wa s a massive, if temporary success for the movement. Figure 4.3 illustrates how support fo r Islamists grew considerably from 1993-2005 (because the data set includes polling fr om the Fatah stronghold of the West


87 Bank, it considerably underrepresents support for I slamists in Gaza). By 2005, even with the demise of the increasingly unpopular Arafat and his replacement by Mahmoud Abbas, support for the Islamists had grown considerably an d remained higher than at any point in the history of the Territories. Figure 4.3: Support for Fatah vs. Islamists in Gaza and the West Bank 41 55 37 28 28 23 28 39 23 13 17 25 30 30 32 34 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 19931996200020012002200320042005 (postArafat) Fatah Islamists (Reprinted from Shikaki 2006, 7) While Islam is the core of Hamas’s militant ideolo gy and is the backbone of its paramilitary and social programmes, “it is only one influence and source of authority among others; and the way Islam is interpreted is i nfluenced by the wider socio-economic and political context within which Hamas operates" (Gunning 2008, 167). Gunning claims that while Hamas' election manifesto contain s an assurance to “establish Islamic Shari'ah as the main source of legislation in Pales tine” (167), and among other things calls for Islam to be the foundation of education a nd for Islamic moral standards to govern the behavior of women, the majority of the d ocument “reads like that of any 'secular' political party” (167). The document focu ses mainly on "housing, health, agricultural policy, improving education and scient ific research, increasing government efficiency and reining in the security agencies" (1 67) and these issues are discussed in


88 secular rather than religious terms. Much of what H amas advocated, and correspondingly, what its supporters demanded seem to have had less to do with Islam than with returning a degree of functionality to Palestinian self-gover nance. This platform in itself was a radical change from their position over a decade ea rlier when they were fundamentally opposed to the Oslo Accords. It signaled a signific ant change, if not in Hamas's political philosophy, as least in their pragmatic attitudes o n how best to build organizational capacity. As Gunning noted, Hamas enjoyed considera ble support from constituency groups not traditionally associated with Islamists… According to the PSR Exit Poll (February 2006), a signifi cant percentage of those who considered themselves 'somewhat religious' (38 percent) or 'not religious' (19 percent) said they had supported Hamas in the 2006 elections, wh ile nearly half of those who considered themselves religious (48 percent) did no t support Hamas. The figures for Fatah were 40 per cent, 44 per cent, and 49 per cent respectively. (2008, 165) Gunning notes that “because the municipal election s were staggered, and legislative elections imminent, Hamas had an extra stimulus to deliver soon” (2008, 152). As a result, they were quick to implement infrastru ctural improvements ranging from restoring power and water to long-neglected communi ties to the installation of streetlamps and road reinforcements. Hamas was so i n tune with “the popular demand for concrete changes and of the symbolic capital of rep utation” (153) that it filmed cleanup and repair operations to use as propaganda for futu re elections. The rapidity of change added insult to Fatah's injury by reinforcing their reputation of “corruption and inefficiency;” Hamas' electoral strategy and charit ies openly emphasized their oftrepeated stance of offering "services to anyone in need, not just those who support it" (153-154).


89 In retrospect, the election of Hamas should not ha ve been nearly as surprising as it was to most Western observers. A combination of Isr aeli intransigence to the peace process, Hamas's success in provoking Israeli overr eaction, and Fatah's widely accepted corruption and inability to deliver significant ret urns either on the Oslo Process or even in improving the day-to-day lives of average Palestini ans promoted a political environment demanding radical change. Particularly important is that the Palestinian Authority was so widely discredited that Hamas was able to directly enter the political structure in Palestine without legitimizing it. In fact, the ele ction results were widely viewed as a protest vote, which may explain in part the moderat e levels of secular support for Hamas. Chehab notes that Hamas hired a veritable army of p olitical analysts, sociologists, and communication specialists, while Fatah seemed hopel essly out-of-sync and contributed to its own downfall by running multiple candidates for the same positions (2007, 1-14). In the district of Nablus where six legislative seats were available, for example, Hamas ran five candidates who each won a seat. Fatah ran six candidates, winning only one seat, perhaps because most of the additional sixteen inde pendent candidates were affiliated with Fatah and split the vote (Gunning 2008, 155). After the election, tensions between Hamas and the PA quickly degenerated and led to a conflict in late 2007-2008 during which Ha mas militants finally broke the longstanding policy of moderate co-existence and ejecte d Fatah from the Gaza Strip. According to David Rose (2008), the Gazan civil war was actually the result of a massive intelligence blunder on the part of the outgoing Bu sh Administration. Unable to stomach a Hamas government in Gaza, American diplomats issu ed a series of demands to Hamas and indicated to a heavily foreign-aid reliant Pres ident Abbas that he would be expected


90 to act against Hamas. The memo, delivered by the ge neral consul in Jerusalem, said bluntly that... ...the time has come for you to move forward quickly and decis ively... Hamas should be given a defined period of time in which to respond the y either accept a new government that meets the Quartet principles, or they reject it. .. the consequences of Hamas' decision should be made clear: if Hamas does not agree with in the prescribed time, you should make clear your intention to declare a state of emergency and form an emergency government explicitly committed to that platform. (Rose 2008) Hamas was keyed into the upcoming putsch by an Al-Majd article that published the Action Plan and revealed the arms build-up by t he PA, as well as the arrival on the Gazan border of uncharacteristically well-trained a nd equipped Fatah National Security Force recruits fresh from Egyptian training. Accoun ts of events diverge from this point; while PA spokespeople asserted Hamas had been attem pting from the start to seize control of all Gaza, Hamas leaders claimed that rec ognizing an immediate crisis, their initial objective was to force the withdrawal of th e PA's Preventive Security Service responsible for a wave of detentions and abuses of Gazan Hamas detainees. When these security units fled, “armed units that were nominal ly loyal to Fatah did not fight at all. Some stayed neutral because they feared that, with Dahlan [the commander of Fatah in Gaza] absent, his forces were bound to lose” (Rose 2008). Hamas saw an opportunity and seized it, illegally taking control of PA buildings and engaging the Fatah security force. The fighting was vicious – Hamas used explosive rif le ammunition and subjected Fatah fighters to summary execution. Unable to resist, Fa tah was so weak that it was essentially routed out of Gaza. If one takes Hamas at its word, then according to Al-Aqsa commander Khalid Jaberi, the attempted coup was so badly planned and executed that... “Since the takeover, we’ve been trying to enter the brains of Bush and Rice, to figure out their mentality. We can only conclude that having Hamas in co ntrol serves their overall strategy, because their policy was so crazy otherwise." (Rose 2008)


91 To say the least, the operation failed to achieve i ts objective. Instead of dealing diplomatically with the Hamas government – which Am erican and Israeli leaders claimed would legitimize the groups' political victory – th ey chose instead to attempt to depose it. Ironically but perhaps not surprisingly, Fatah was so weakened after a decade of Israeli efforts against it that it was unable to effectivel y flex its muscle and an even more incalcitrantly anti-Israeli government took control It appeared to many Palestinians who bought Hamas’s explanation that as soon as Hamas ha d begun to play by the rules of the game even slightly, the opposition merely changed t he rules. Worst of all for the peace process, Hamas was now in control of Gaza and there was less hope for reconciliation with the PA than ever. Once again, however, the war demonstrated that Hamas had been relatively cautious in its approach to internal Pal estinian politics until it seemed that the confrontation was inevitable. In the weeks before t he civil war, Hamas activists had repeatedly warned that the military build-up in the strip and associated brutality against Hamas activists “warranted the immediate eye-for-an -eye retribution of qassas the spiritually sanctioned killing of a killer, or the injuring of an injurer, and so on” (McGeough 2009, 373). Commentator Sever Plocker “we nt out of his way to disagree with Hamas” but claimed “Hamas did not ‘seize contr ol’ of Gaza... it took the action it needed… disarming and destroying a militia that ref used to bow to its [legitimate] authority” (as quoted in McGeough 2009, 377). In th e interests of its survival as an organization it felt compelled to act and intervene before Fatah security forces could strike and trigger a potentially more massive war. Even more ominous was that it now had control over the hastily abandoned Fatah arsena l, including “dozens of mounted machine guns, more than seven thousand American M16 assault rifles and eight hundred


92 thousand rounds of ammunition,” convoys of military and police vehicles, and “dozens of long-range rockets, anti-tank missiles, and tons of explosives” (378-379). If Hamas was indeed planning on pursuing an all-out assault on I srael, the operation had simply cast it closer to its goal. While certainly a failure for the Bush Administrati on, the coup attempt did indeed serve the interests of hardliners on all sides exce pt for Fatah. The Israeli right-wing saw their negotiating power in the West Bank enhanced a nd the Palestinian resistance was now firmly divided between two political poles. Ham as benefited from both a political legitimization and a surprisingly strong put-down o f Gazan opposition. Hamas, with its suicide bombing wings crippled by the assassination s of key leadership, launched waves of Qassam rockets into Israel. Fully 64% of Palesti nians supported the rocket attacks in 2006 (Bronner 2008). Israel retaliated with a three -week offensive during the winter of 2008-2009 that killed between 1,166 to 1,400 Palest inians, of which, in a disputed figure Hamas interior Fathi Hammad stated up to 700 were i ts fighters (Agence France-Presse 2010). A January 2009 poll found that the war had i ncreased the popularity of Hamas, with 53.3% of respondents in the West Bank and 35.2 % in Gaza viewing Hamas as victorious in the conflict, while trust in Hamas ro se from 16.6% the previous November to 27.7% (Jerusalem Media and Communications Center [JMCC] 2009). These numbers are partially explained by the doubling of Hamas’s popularity in the West Bank during the conflict from 12.8 to 26.5% (JMCC 2009). According to chief PLO negotiator Saed Erakat, tri lateral negotiations among the United States, Israel, and the PA in 2008 and 2009 were unable to reach any sort of agreement because Israeli concessions to a State of Palestine were almost insultingly

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93 weak (2009, 197-201). For example, where the PLO de legation requested control of East Jerusalem and a reduction to 1.9% Israeli control o f the Occupied Territories, the Israelis under Ohmert were only willing to offer control of Arab districts of the city to Palestinians and proposed Israeli annexation of 6.5 % of the West Bank in exchange for just 5.8% of the smaller 1948 territory. Even the B ush administration seemed frustrated by Israeli delays, with President Bush stating in a meeting with Abbas, “the Israeli side has fallen in the whirlpool of its internal problem s and evaded the agreement” (199). In the middle of all this, Hamas rocket attacks on Isr ael provoked a UN-condemned assault on the Gaza strip in December 2008 which killed ove r 1,100, of which roughly 700 were members of the Hamas security infrastructure. By Se ptember 2009 and a new American administration, previous negotiations had largely c ollapsed, and it appeared that American negotiators had been successfully pressure d from or found they had no political muscle to make the Netanyhu government accept a hal t on construction of settlements in East Jerusalem (200-201). Linking the failure of th e Fatah-led PA to make any significant progress on a peace agreement since 2000 to the ris e of Hamas and the subsequent Israeli attack on Gaza, Erakat distributed his accounts of the failed negotiations to foreign diplomats as “a warning that the Palestinians had o ptions other than continuing with futile negotiations” (197). Hillel Frisch (2010) examined Hamas's outbidding a nd intimidation strategies and sought to explain why terrorists might switch from fighting the government to fighting other opposition groups in order to establish domin ance in the internal arena, which he defined as the political dynamics between terror or ganizations operating in the same theatre. He concludes that “rebel forces facing dim inishing returns from a successful

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94 tactic with no effective substitute are likely to s witch from conflict with the government to achieve dominance in the rebel camp even if this hurts the movement” (Frisch 2010, 1050). This is due to effective counter-terrorism – when the government attacks a variety of terrorist nodes, every form of attack becomes mu ch more difficult to pull off, analogous to a decrease in resources (1050). Thereb y, when Hamas suicide campaigns became increasingly difficult to maintain due to re source strain and Israeli security improvements, Frisch would predict that Hamas would return to a period of power consolidation because it was a more strategically e fficient option and ensured that the organization could maintain continuous momentum on limited resources. In this view, terrorist groups are thus forced to switch to the i nternal arena to bolster their position and ensure group survival out of a cost and benefit ana lysis (1051). Frisch notes that this strategy was highly successful in the past decade f or Hamas, and asserts that this strategy is the result of a belief that “however costly the drive for internal hegemony may be in the short-run, it will payoff in the long-run” as H amas is better placed to recruit, gather resources, and plan attacks in a less contested loc al political arena, thereby preparing itself for a subsequent war of attrition (1062). Gr oups may also utilize the opportunity afforded by successful short-run action against the government that is beginning to lose its effectiveness by switching to the internal aren a in order to “cash in on the prestige it accumulated against the external foe” to solidify i tself as the 'true' opposition (1062). Hamas's bid for internal hegemony in the 2000s came at the cost of the overall Palestinian cause, however. The number of checkpoin ts on Palestinian movement bloomed from only 30 in 2000 to 526 in June 2006, a nd GNP per capita in the PA was 40% lower (1061).

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95 Shura, Ijma, and the Slide to Fitnah The two key Islamic principles underlying Hamas' p olitical philosophy is the need to respect shura or "consultation, education, and socialization," and ijma or "consensus," amongst the Islamic community, simultaneously (Gunn ing 2008, 59-61). To Hamas, divine authority derives from Allah and provides th e moral boundaries of a proper life and, in doing so, defines true freedom as that beha vior within the limits dictated by the Prophet Muhammad. Since God cannot rule directly, h owever, Islam “needs human agents to turn it into codified law and enforce it” who “must always operate within the framework of natural law” (71). Contrastingly, the principle of consultation means that these agents must work with the people for “without a social contract, those who govern are dictators, however divinely inspired” (67). Con sultation is reflected in the commonly remarked upon tension between Hamas's need to engag e in conspicuous violence to retain credibility as an authentic alternative to t he PLO at the same time that it cannot bring a level of slaughter that would alienate supp orters. Gunning argues, and Hamas openly admits, that much of this philosophy is info rmed by Western philosophers such as Locke, who claimed that while "the legislative ... be the supream power in every commonwealth,” "the rules that they make for other mens actions, must, as well as their own... be comfortable to the law of nature, i.e. to the will of God" (70-71). Perhaps informed by its political philosophy, whic h like much of Islam is utilitarian as well as spiritual, “Hamas' political violence has not usually been directed at the civilian structures of government, and that it has not sought to use violence to directly influence elections” (Gunning 2000, 193). While its violent rivalry with Fatah is indeed a

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96 threat to the democratic process in Palestine, Hama s recognizes that attempting to intimidate civilian Palestinians near election time s would alienate its constituency. Violence would eliminate their key advantage, their image as being more honest and accountable than the other political parties in the PA – which was supposedly based in religious doctrine. Violating this trust would inva lidate Hamas’s claim to possess either shura or ijma and thereby delegitimize the organization, and the potential civil war would annihilate its pretense of “socialising people into willing the Islamic state” (85). Mishal and Sela, for example, produce an internal Hamas strategic document released internally prior to the original 1993 PA e lections, which listed its options in dealing with the major change in the political aren a. The four options were to participate in the elections, call for a boycott, disrupt the e lections via force, or participate covertly under an assumed name. Of these choices, the Hamas memo stated… …our power enables us to undertake all the alternatives presented ex cept one, which we must avoid, namely, confrontation and disruption of t he elections. The chances in realizing this goal seem poor and entail great risks ... [Fatah] would be then supported by Israel and the international media... the populat ion might blame us because it will be easy for them believe that Hamas first used fo rce to impose its will on others (Mishal and Sela 2008, 128). This risk is highlighted by Gunning's note that by the late 1990s "60,000 personnel were employed by over ten security servic es, providing a 'police'-to-population ratio of a staggering 150:1" (2000, 44). That Hamas later attacked the Fatah-controlled security forces was both a sign of how widely despi sed the Fatah administration had become and of Hamas' determination to consolidate i ts growing strength. Contrastingly, Hamas still has not used violence to disrupt an int ernal Palestinian election, sensing that such a move would disastrously weaken its political base. Instead it has chosen to stall the 2010 elections, claiming electoral “procedure i s invalid because president Abbas has

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97 no legitimacy and is not fit to organise such elect ions” since Abbas has stayed beyond his terms of office (Bakr 2011). Since “gaining politic al influence involves compromise in which pragmatic gains must be balanced against losi ng ideological purity” (Gunning 2008, 159), Hamas mainly restricted its violence to Israelis and their suspected collaborators. The organization largely refrained f rom Palestinian infighting until they sensed that Fatah was so widely viewed as corrupt a nd illegitimate that it could attack without risking the political losses that would be incurred by the ideological corruption of a civil war. Its ideological aversion to fitnah (sedition), or the fighting of one’s brothersin-Islam, was also a major constriction on its abil ity to act. When the barriers broke, however, the fighting became swift and brutal, even following Fatah’s ousting from Gaza. Fatah and Hamas have in the past set off bombs in each other’s car s and houses and made sweeping arrests in both Gaza and the Abbas-run West Bank. Armed forces have kidnapped members from both sides. They have accused each other of “colluding” with Israel to gain political power. They have shot each other in the streets of Gaza’s city center and pushed each other from rooftops of high rise buildings. The Palestinian groups behave much like mafia families and engage in ruthless warfare for dominance. The recent bloodletting among t he “families” in Gaza is likely only to escalate the mob war. (Jewish Virtual Li brary, 2009). Like a crime war, however, the violence is largely limited to those somehow involved in the struggle over power, such as member s of the organizations’ security forces. Both Hamas and the PA’s targeting of civili ans is largely limited to action against those suspected of collaboration with the Israelis; the killing of noncombatants is unacceptable but continued aversion to killing Pale stinian civilians has been a limiting factor preventing the slide of the Occupied Territo ries into further all-out slaughter. Hamas ideologically justifies the killings in the c ivil war by classifying the slain PA forces as apostates, beyond the protection of Islam – a harsh change from before the elections, where despite their mutual disdain, even Dahlan provided shelter and

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98 intelligence to shield Hamas leaders from Israeli a ssassination (Chehab 2007, 125-127). Much of the violence visited upon other segments of the civilian population has been the result of the cramped quarters of Gaza, where milit ants have little room to maneuver and fighting between Hamas forces and the IDF almost in evitably results in large-scale collateral damage. To some extent these deaths repr esent the harsh reality of Palestinian life rather than an ideological disregard for human lives. Likewise, Hamas was slow to impose an Islamic visio n on the Gaza Strip. A March 2010 BBC article interviewed women in Gaza as king their views of the changes in society: When it comes to the rules, such as Hamas making girls wear lon g dresses in school, or forbidding wearing trousers, it didn't last very lon g… People here didn't accept it because this is personal freedom. Even some men in Gaza refused. Since Hamas took over I haven't felt any direct pressure on attit udes against women…But there are people with more extreme views in the lower levels, people who don't like the idea of women even leaving the house. There may not be many of them now, but the numbers will increase unless conditions in Gaza improve. ( ) Hamas’s slow march to Islamization can be explaine d on several levels. First, Hamas campaigned on a reform ticket that criticized the oppressive and indiscriminate nature of the PA security forces. A rush to impose Islamic ideals on society would be counter to their stated program of socialization in to a new religious order and potentially alienate moderate members of the electorate. Second arily, Hamas’s entry into government was a matter of long-term survival and despite the unexpected strength of its electoral campaign, it was unprepared for immediate political ascendency. Chehab notes that while Hamas was unprepared for the majority government it won, saying that the victory “left, as we say in Arabic, a ‘bitter taste’” (2007, 209). The combined pressure by Israel of severely restricting Gazan movement and the “perple xing economic plight caused by the

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99 blocking of free-trade channels” added to a “hellis h daily life” and a severely negative “impression of the new Islamic government” (Chehab 2007, 205). Thereby, “tension between Hamas’ defence of individual rights and its subjecting these to the rights of its particular understanding of community” becomes para mount to any understanding of Hamas actions in governance (Gunning 2008, 85). Ham as simply does not have the political strength to impose radical changes in soc iety at a time when nearly every aspect of Gaza is in some form of extended crisis. Convers ely, radicalization can be expected to increase as economic conditions in Gaza continue to spiral out of control, weakening the traditional limiting factors on Hamas hardliners. T he net result is that policies such as the blockade, “in attacking and isolating Hamas… [are] merely making the movement more popular” without Hamas having to exert any of its o wn muscle (Chehab 2007, 225). If resources are choked off so dramatically that Hamas is unable to continue normal functions of government entirely, then moderates wi ll be weakened. In doing so, the hardline clique in Hamas will be emboldened, and vi olence, accelerating Islamization, and further degradation of the peace process may be inevitable as they assert their role in the political order. Solipsistic Violence Versus Pragmatism Professor Ian S. Lustick had hope for the peace pr ocess based on the progression from "solopsistic" violence to "other-based" violen ce, or the evolution of terrorist acts committed by both sides from those intended to plac ate a constituent audience's desire for revenge to those intended to reach political object ive or force concessions. For example,

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100 the early violence of Zionist settlers against Arab s was “motivated not only by considerations of self-defense but by the desire to set inspiring examples of physical prowess and heroism to Palestinian Jews and to prov e to Diaspora Jews the validity of an important dimension of Zionist ideology” (Lustick 1 990, 522). In 1955 Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett stated that “we justify the system of reprisal out of pragmatic considerations… without justifying the principle of pure revenge but without meaning to, we have eliminated the mental and moral brakes on t his instinct and made it possible... to uphold revenge as a moral value” (531). Ghassan Kan afani, a prominent People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) guerilla, si milarly justified acts of terror and violence as “a classic example of Che Guevara's foco theory of revolution,” which advocated “dramatic displays of violence, not to de stroy or intimidate the enemy, but to arouse the fighting spirit and the solidarity of th e 'oppressed'” (536). Lustick's hope was that pragmatism could replace the mutual cycle of s elf-mobilizing violence and that the arrival of strategically motivated, rather than pur ely vengeful, terrorism would signify that social and institutional desire for an end to the conflict was gaining pre-eminence. This argument explains some of Hamas' success in d isrupting the peace process across the years as well as its internal rise to su premacy. It is obvious Hamas uses solipsistic violence to mobilize its constituent co mmunities. This violence, however, was also pragmatic. A Hamas publication released in the wake of the 1996 February-March suicide bombings justified suicide attacks as both solipsistic and instrumental; while they were "implicitly justified by the desperate reality of the Muslim world under the yoke of Western domination" and the need to confer “the sta tus of martyr ( shahid ) on those who fell,” they also “must be strictly subordinated to the public interest and not be based on

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101 emotion or unsound beliefs” (Mishal and Sela 2000, 77). Hamas essentially constitutes in some respects both a revival of solipsistic violenc e and its calculated and proper use in long-term strategy. While this kind of violence was not especially new to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, Hamas was able to use it a sp oiler and provided convenient excuses for hardliners to draw away from the peace process. Gunning uses Bourdieu’s highlighting of trust “as the key characteristic en abling politicians to have authority” (2008, 131), wherein trust enables representatives such as clergy or political leaders to claim the voice of the group. Combined with a proce ss of self-consecration, trust “facilitates eliciting obedience and silencing diss ent, without, importantly, being seen to do so” (Gunning 2008, 132). Hamas was better placed to exploit this cycle because its “ideology and, crucially, the practice of its leade rs, places greater emphasis on selfsacrifice, piety, and service, and on the acquisiti on of religious knowledge” (Gunning 2008, 135). Compared to Fatah’s perceived record of betrayal of the nationalist cause, corruption, and weakness, Hamas is better placed to legitimize its rule through the trust gained through constant exposure to external risk v ia the assassination policy as well as the sacrifice made by Hamas suicide bombers. Slowly it took over the role of independent religious authority in the Territories and thus was able to use solipsistic violence as a way to increase its appeal in lieu of any progress made by the faltering, secular PLO. Simultaneously, however, it combined t his increased authority and trust with a sharp understanding of solipsistic violence’ s role in mobilizing and utilizing support. Thus, Hamas remains an organization primar ily struggling to balance its internal Palestinian authority with the need to maintain eno ugh conflict with Israel to demonstrate its commitment, while avoiding pushing the envelope too far. This viewpoint explains the

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102 primacy of organizational goals and the need to mai ntain support without provoking Israel into too many repeats of the 2008-2009 Gaza War, despite this policy’s occasional failures. It also explains why Hamas moderates have repeatedly announced a desire for ceasefires, recognizing that overdrawing from their limited ability to project power externally would result in enough violence to viola te the trust held by their constituents. Conclusion The most important lesson to learn about Hamas is that it cannot be analyzed from a perspective that views it as a unitary actor. Ins tead, it is more useful to attempt to envision it as first the political and paramilitary arm of a broad Islamist movement which very much needs at least the tacit acceptance of se cular and nationalist Palestinians to survive. Within the scope of this movement there ar e roles for multiple actors. These actors include, in addition to the hardline cadres and leadership, relatively moderate secondary supporters as well as atypically affiliat ed political elites who used the banner of Hamas to win former Fatah government posts. In t his light it seems questionable to assert whether Hamas can act with as much control o ver its political direction as instrumental theories imply. Clearly that the patte rn that Hamas has followed is one of survival and growth rather than the single-minded p ursuit of ultimate political or theological objectives; it has conservatively sough t the maximization of interim political, military, and social capital instead of suicidal ag gression. This is directly in line with the organizational thesis. Hamas, realizing its own lim its, has acted less with incisive direction and focus than with effective utilization of limited and sporadic opportunity. Decisions that contradict group ideology have been repeatedly taken, albeit cautiously, to

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103 capitalize on short-term gains instead of charging headlong into the gap. Although such a policy does advance somewhat Hamas’s long-term goal s, the obvious impossibility of reaching them encourages moderates within the movem ent into exploring medium-term goals such as long-term ceasefires and political in volvement in Palestinian governance that extends beyond merely building military capaci ty. Israeli security policy has focused on disabling H amas much as a military entity; Israel has targeted its leaders for assassination a nd launched strikes on its strongholds in an attempt to undermine its paramilitary capacity b oth to attack targets inside Israel and to resist within the occupied territories. However, the scope of rights of Israeli selfdefense is an entirely different question from whet her or not the strategy has been working. The stalemate in Palestine and in particul ar Gaza illustrates that it has not worked, as far as weakening the movement is concern ed. Growing international outcries against actions such as the violent 2010 boarding o f aid ships bound for Gaza are weakening international support for Israel and rein forcing Hamas hardliners. Effective policy should chip at the roots of Palestinian disc ontent rather than encouraging a siege mentality. Hamas cannot be destroyed, but it could be neutered. A dual strategy of strengthening the PA’s legitimacy by encouraging de mocratic ideals in practice and reducing corruption while strengthening the appeal of moderates in the political wings through greater concessions and acknowledging it in negotiations. Failure to do so gives incentives for Hamas to capitalize on its implicitl y growing political support while slowly lowering the opportunity costs of violence and blan ket opposition. Hamas has already been legitimized in the eyes of most Gazans by its electoral victories and doing so has cemented itself as a permanent part of the politica l sphere in Palestine – and this

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104 legitimization cannot be undone. Additionally, rese arch suggests that previous methods of conflict resolution – such as the Oslo Accords – ar e fatally flawed. As Pape (2005) writes… Incremental compromises are often proposed as a way of 'buildi ng confidence,' but they also provide time for spoilers the terrorists t o commit more violence, undermining support for compromise on both sides. This is what happened to the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords, leading to the second intif ada. Hence, concessions make sense only if they actually satisfy most of the national community that the terrorists come from, and are then made all at once in a single st ep. (Pape 2005, 239240) Terrorists are likely to view such ‘incremental’ co mpromises as an implicit betrayal of their communities. Members of Hamas, as well as average Palestinians, also are more likely to see such approaches as ineffecti ve and insincere when both parties drag their feet. This is not to say negotiations are use less; far from it, as they offer the only possible resolution to the Israeli-Palestine confli ct short of the annihilation of one side. Hence, a fundamental reevaluation of Israel’s goals in the West Bank and Gaza is necessary. Israeli policymakers need to calculate n ot just whether occupation and deterrence is sustainable politically, but question the goals it is intended to reach, namely whether Israeli policy towards the Palestinians is making Israelis safer. Mismanagement and frequent stalling of the agreements under Oslo delegitimized the PA and opened the door for Hamas’s ascendency. Now as Hamas struggles to deal with adapting to governance rather than merely resistance, peacemake rs on both sides have an opportunity to dramatically reconsider conflict management poli cies. The conflict is not merely political but reflects a deep well of social discon tent in both the occupied territories and those under Hamas control. Hamas offers a wide arra y of personal incentives for membership or cooperation, including charity, solid arity and identity, community respect, and now, the command of government institutions in Gaza with all their economic and

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105 political power. Whether or not Hamas’s complicated network of organizational processes will direct its energy towards building a better Pa lestine or killing and maiming Israelis depends largely on whether Israeli leaders are will ing to make large-scale concessions which appeal primarily to everyday Palestinians. Do ing so will raise the opportunity cost of violence by making it politically unpalatable an d force Hamas to find other ways to mobilize and retain its support, hopefully by focus ing on its social and political institutions. Hamas is the only negotiating partner left in Gaza, which means that they will need to have a role in any agreement. However, entering into agreements with Hamas carries its own risk; namely, that the same p rocess will repeat itself, accords will stall in negotiation or implementation, and Hamas w ill eliminate any consideration of further talks. This means that negotiations have to be conducted in good faith and possess a sensitivity to Palestinian demands. There is hope however, in central coalition theory’s observation that when parties enter talks “they are motivated to end the conflict and optimistic about what can be achieved from negotiat ion” (Pruitt 2007, 1531). Drawing in Hamas will not only reduce the chance of further sp oiler tactics, but breed optimism in its ranks about the possibility that consultation and c ompromise will further Palestinian goals. For that to happen, however, there needs to be major reversals in policy. Otherwise conflict will be the only possible course of action

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106 Chapter 5 Eelam At Any Cost: The Secular Martyrs of the Tamil Tigers We have to do some actions first. People will follow us. Yo u (armchair) intellectuals are afraid of blood. No struggle will take place without kill ings… You people live in comfort and try to prove me wrong. So what should I do? T ake cyanide and die? LTTE commander Velupillai Prabhakaran (Richardson 2005, 48 0) I've heard reports of the LTTE bleeding prisoners to death, sometimes after torture, refrigerating the blood and keeping it for battlefront transf usions, a darkly ironic reminder that Tamil and Sinhalese blood has been mixed for mill enia. Writer Stephen Meadows (2010, 263) On May 16th, 2009, a seemingly unstoppable militar y offensive by the Sri Lankan Armed Forces destroyed the last remnants of the int ernationally proscribed terrorist organization Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE ) in the cramped northeastern district of Mullaitivu after a blistering year-long war. Tens of thousands of civilians trapped in a government no-fire zone were killed as heavy bombing and indiscriminate gunfire raked a 10 kilometer zone where the last of the Tiger leadership, still led by their absolute chief Velupillai Prabhakaran, held out in a suicidal fight to the end. The destruction of the LTTE marked the end of a 27-year -long separatist war in which the ethnic minority Tamils of the north had attempted t o secede from the majority ethnic Sinhalese government based in the southwestern capi tal of Colombo. According to the UN, between 80,000 and 100,000 people had been kill ed in the separatist war, with untold numbers of injuries and a devastating long-t erm effect on the Sri Lankan economy. The conflict was characterized by massive leadershi p failures in both the Sinhalese-

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107 dominated Colombo government and an increasingly ex tremist Tamil elite circle centered in Jaffna. Many have noted the shocking disparity b etween the beautiful island and the bloodthirsty political violence that has plagued Sr i Lankans since the mid-1970s; countless political, social, and community leaders were assassinated by both government hit squads and LTTE suicide bombers. Civilians, bot h Sinhalese and Tamil, were subjected to massive human rights abuses by governm ent forces and to a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing in the North. In the end, the w ar did not bring the prophesied Eelam promised by Tamil militant leaders. Instead, all it did was stain the hands of successive Sri Lankan political elites with the blood of innoc ents asked to pay the price for dueling chauvinist-nationalist ideologies. The LTTE was founded in 1976 in the far-north city of Jaffna by the Tamil militant Vellupillai Prabhakaran as a successor to earlier Tamil separatist organizations such as his former group, the Tamil New Tigers. Pra bhakaran sought to “refashion the old TNT/new LTTE into an elite, ruthlessly efficient, a nd highly professional fighting force” (Hoffman 2006, 139). To do so, he kept the numbers of LTTE recruits small, implemented military standards for training, and en forced an extreme degree of discipline within the group. “The groundwork was thus laid ear ly in LTTE’s history for the culture of individual self-sacrifice that eventually manife sted itself in the employment of suicide tactics” (139). Prabhakaran prepared for an upcomin g war with the Sri Lankan government to establish Tamil Eelam, a semi-mythica l Tamil homeland based in the northeastern regions of Sri Lanka, by relentlessly extinguishing local political and military competition in both the LTTE and the great er Sri Lankan Tamil community. When ethnic riots erupted in Colombo in 1983, the o rganization enjoyed a higher degree

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108 of readiness and preparation for the civil war than the government itself. Mixing ruthless tactics with political savvy, Prabhakaran and the L TTE leadership were able to continue the war for Eelam for over two decades, maintaining the organization through a bewildering series of political successions in the Colombo government, four rounds of negotiations, and internecine violence that threate ned to tear the fabric of Sri Lankan society apart. The LTTE was particularly noted for its strong Tamil diaspora support, its covert and overt operational strength, and pioneeri ng the use of suicide belts in the Black Tigers, their elite suicide operation cadre. Much of the failure of both Sri Lankan and foreign political leadership to bring resolution to the crisis was deeply rooted in postcolonial ethnic enmity that grew virulently in the years following Sri Lankan’s inde pendence in 1948 to become the defining focal point of the conflict. Asoka Bandara ge claims that analyses of global conflict including that of Sri Lanka, “attribute th em overwhelmingly to ethnicity,” specifically contextual liberal explanations that e mphasize “the changing nature of ethnic identity seeing it as a socially constructed phenom enon that is also available for instrumental use” (2009, 9-10). However, the war wa s also engineered by a massively failed development model that experimented with sev eral types of management schemes to no avail. Analyst John Richardson claims debates on the roots of the Sri Lankan civil war are “really… about why successive Sri Lankan go vernments and other key actors were, prior to the mid 1980s, unable to achieve eff ective, sustainable development” (2005, 46). He claims that neither ethnic divisions colonial legacies, ruling class exploitation, counterproductive reforms or bad lead ership were individually to blame, but that studying the way that these individual factors were linked in a complex system of

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109 conflict development is important to gaining any un derstanding of the causes of war. Sri Lankan independent politician R. B. Herath claims t hat “the politics of the postindependence leaders have evolved into an oligarchi c ruling system dominated by a few dynastic-type elite leaders, disguised as democracy ,” which fractionalized society in the south and encouraged Tamil separatism (2002, 179). These and other analyses express discontent with traditional Western academic models wherein “contemporary liberal analysis takes a group-based approach to ethnic con flict,” analyzing of the Sri Lankan war as “a national question pertaining to group rig hts” (Bandarage 2009, 25). Bandarage claims that such models thereby inherently accept t he dangerous concept of a Tamil homeland and legitimize LTTE separatism if not its tactics. However, appreciating the conclusions and techniques of these liberal models is an important basis for effective analysis of conflict causes and solution in Sri Lan ka. Understanding the roots of the Sri Lankan civil co nflict is inherently important to successful analysis of the LTTE’s formation, growth and development. Investigation of these factors provides important insight into the o rganizational motives of the LTTE throughout its history and will help explain the wa ys in which the group interacted with its political environment. Specifically examining t he various ethnic, religious, political and military imperatives that defined and evolved t he LTTE’s mission can also help explain why the LTTE was exceptionally resistant to political rehabilitation and absorption into the mainstream politics of the Sri Lanka government. The Sri Lankan conflict also provides an invaluable case study tha t can problematize the assumptions of both the instrumental and organizational terrorism theses. Careful analysis of the ecosystem of conflict in Sri Lanka will help in the construction and development of better

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110 explanatory models of terrorism and in identifying which existing models are more accurately suited to explain the intransigent cours e of the LTTE. Independence, Chauvinism, and Liberalism: Sri Lanka After Independence The coastal regions of Sri Lanka were occupied wit h little difficulty by British colonial forces in 1796. In 1803, the forces of Bri tish Ceylon attempted to move into the interior Kingdom of Kandy, and were repulsed until 1815, when “the Chiefs were attempting… to crown one among themselves as the ne xt Sinhalese king” and invited the British presence to depose the unpopular Sinhalese king under the Kandyan Convention (Herath 2002, 27). Bandarage explains that what is now called the “traditional Tamil homeland” by Tamil nationalists actually “constitut ed the Northern and Eastern provinces carved out by the British largely from the Kandyan kingdom rather than a unified Tamil political entity” claimed to have existed for thous ands of years (2009, 29). The British failed to turn native Sri Lankans into menial labor ers and thus imported southern Indian Tamils to work the extensive plantation networks in stituted on the island. Some estimates claim over one million Indian Tamils were shipped i nto Sri Lanka in the 1840s and 1850s alone (Bandarage 2009 30). These workers were used in the common British strategy of divide and conquer, as the colonial rulers exacerba ted and manipulated ethnic tensions to maintain control over the disparate ethnic groups i n Sri Lanka. Many Sinhalese peasants were rendered landless, instituting large-scale Sin halese poverty which later became the root of the communist JVP (People’s Liberation Fron t) movement in the next century. Bandarage writes that an abundance of English schoo ls in the north disproportionately advantaged Sri Lankan Tamils who entered the Britis h Civil Service.

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111 In 1925, the Sinhalese constituted 42.5 percent of the govern ment medical service and 43.6 percent of the civil service, whereas, the Sri Lankan Tami ls made up 30.8 percent of the medical services and 20.5 percent of the Civil Servi ce although their respective proportions in the island’s population were 67 per cent and 11 per cent. (Bandarage 2009, 31) This historic structural imbalance in the administr ation of the island would continue throughout the independence period, becomi ng a major source of Sinhalese grievances. Various other structural imbalances, su ch as Sinhalese Buddhist underrepresentation and Tamil overrepresentation in government advisory posts, contributed to the psychological characterization o f the Sinhalese as a majority with a minority complex and the Tamils a minority with a m ajority complex. Despite this, throughout the first twenty years of the twentieth century “unity between the Sinhala and Tamil elite” persisted “with the assumed parity bet ween the ‘two majority communities’, the Sinhalese and the Tamils” (Bandarage 2009, 33), with the Eurasian Burghers and the Muslims composing a smaller ethnic bloc viewed as t he actual minorities on the island. The 1931 the Donoughmore Commission introduced univ ersal franchise through territorial representation, making Ceylon one of th e first British colonies to extend the vote to both men and women as well as the working c lasses. Bandarage writes that both Sinahalese and Tamil elites opposed these reforms. The Sinhalese feared political dissolution via the large numbers of imported India n Tamils on the island, while “Tamil leaders… were even more strongly against universal franchise which they feared would guarantee permanent Sinhala political dominance and empower Tamil low castes against vellala (a high-ranking Tamil caste) privilege” (2009, 36) Against this backdrop was the emergence of a Sinhalese Buddhist ideology inspired by an idea of “the Sinhala nation [as] the historical custodian of Buddhism,” “a miss ion entrusted to the Sinhala” (Little

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112 1994, 25). The movement, founded by the monk Anaga rika Dharmapala, was also anticolonial; Dharmapala’s history of Sri Lanka claimed … This bright, beautiful island was made into a paradise by the Aryan Sinhala before its destruction was brought about by the barbaric vandals… The bur eaucratic administrators… have cut down primeval forests to plant tea; h ave introduced opium, ganja, whisky, arrack… have killed all industries and made the p eople indolent. (Little 1994, 24). Dharmapala’s ideology disregarded the “classical B uddhist emphasis on nonviolence and on the requirement that monks forsw ear war and politics” (Little 1994, 29). Importantly, it emphasized the anxieties that the Sinhalese were a marginalized people, crowded by hordes of South Indian Tamils, B ritish intruders and other vandals, and instituted an imperative to defend the holiest land of Buddhism against all transgressors (Little 1994, 32). These factors comb ined to form an ideology of Sinhalese dominance, backed by a class of ethnocratic monks, “compared with which the concept of a multiethnic polity was a meaningless abstracti on” (Little 1994, 36). Conversely, Tamil chauvinistic politics were rising as well; “i t seemed… self-evident to the Sri Lankan Tamils… that with the termination of British rule and the end of colonialism the country ought to revert to its time-honored pattern s of ethnically divided governance,” referring to the ancient Tamil kingdom that had pre -existed Portuguese destruction in the sixteenth century; such a view, however, deliberate ly disregards historic ethnic heterogeneity throughout Sri Lanka, as well as igno res that the concept of homogenous governance only became pre-eminent in 20th century Sri Lanka (Little 1994, 42). Tamil elite leaders such as S. J. V. Chelvanayakam entert ained close links with political organizations in Tamil Nadu, a Tamil southeastern s tate of India. Forming the Federal Party or ITAK one year after independence in 1949, the Sri Lankan Tamil political elite also attempted to cultivate a relationship with Ind ian Tamils in Sri Lanka and “worked

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113 zealously to ‘manufacture’ such an identity exagger ating primordial Sinhala versus Tamil antagonism” in much the same manner of Buddhist rev ivalism (Bandarage 2009, 40). While at the time the ITAK’s open secret of a separ atist agenda seemed “futile and extremist,” “the tides of Tamil separatism and Sinh ala extremism were rising” (Bandarage 2009, 38). By the 1930s it was common se ntiment among some Tamils that the Sinhalese people of the precolonial era had con sidered themselves merely an offshoot of the Tamil kingdoms. The introduction of modern n ationalism blurred the actual political arrangements, which were “‘floating rathe r than fixed’ boundaries, with relatively amorphous and variable lines of authorit y, and with considerable local autonomy and ethnic heterogeneity,” and replaced th em with the concept of absolute and inalienable national power (Little 1994, 42-44). Independence and Modernization Independence was granted in 1948 to Sri Lanka unde r the leadership of the United National Party (UNP) and D.S. Senanayake, a member of an elite English-speaking group whom the British had “groomed as leaders with a pra gmatic and secular disposition, suspicious of primordial attachments of any kind,” educated and worldly (Little 1994, 52). He angered Indian Tamils by disenfranchising t hem from citizenship in 1948 and 1949, instituting laws that limited citizenship to those who could prove seven years of residence (Bandarage 2009, 38). The law was ostensi bly meant to institutionalize a conservative definition of Sri Lankan citizenship b ut unmistakably carried undertones of deliberate disenfranchisement, removing a major obs tacle to Sinhalese dominance. The

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114 voting on the bill, which was primarily split acros s class rather than ethnic lines, reflected contradictory pressures of the democratic process e merging in early post-independence Sri Lanka. While “universal franchise, territorial electorates, and majority politics no doubt worked against the interests of minorities, w ho would have preferred quotas and special constitutional protection,” democracy at th e same time “eroded traditional bases of leadership and power and produced deep divisions within the Sinhalese society itself,” opening the way for the jockeying of chauvinist pol itics as a method of protecting elite power structures (Tambiah 1986, 68). Senanayake’s g overnment failed to cultivate a working democratic environment because it both radi cally underestimated the growing divides in society and also was essentially reliant on the power of the English-cultivated elite. When these post-colonial rulers failed, much less cosmopolitan populist movements were quickly able to take power. Following D.S. Senanayake’s 1952 death and two sho rt-lived UNP Prime Ministers including his son, a more radically chauv inistic government under Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) rose to power in 1956. The secret to Bandaranaike’s political succes s was “his ability to harness the growing resentment and discontent among the Sinhala majority over the failure to achieve their national aspirations,” “enraged that the Tamils and other minorities might dare to obstruct the fulfillment of their historic destiny” (Little 1994, 62). He openly utilized ethnic chauvinism as a political tactic, “ claiming that the Sinhalese were engaged in a ‘life or death struggle’ to preserve their lan guage and that ‘parity to both Sinhalese and Tamil will only lead to the deterioration of Si nhalese which may disappear from Ceylon within 25 years’” (DeVotta 2005, 148). Backe d by the increasingly powerful

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115 political bikkhus or nationalist Buddhist monks, Bandaranaike campa igned on his implementation of the 1956 Sinhala-Only Act which w ould mandate that all government business be performed in the Sinhalese language, di vesting the power of the traditional Tamil stronghold in civil service. The law “marked a turning point in Sinhala-Tamil relations and a descent into violence,” with ITAK-l ed protests in front of Parliament being assaulted by Sinhalese mobs and with riots in peasant settlements in the East (Bandarage 2009, 46). Bandaranaike’s government als o had to face mounting Tamil discontent with the internal relocation plan which aimed to relocate mostly Sinhalese landless peasants into the northern Dry Zone, conta ining the “Northern, North Central, and Eastern provinces... [which] constituted less t han one-third of the population, but… covered more than two-thirds of the island’s land a rea” (Bandarage 2009, 48). Traditionally, this internal colonization plan has been taken as motivated by a desire for Sinhalese hegemony by the Colombo government, but i t also was influenced by severe economic pressures. Between 1946 and 1953 Sri Lanka ’s population increased by 2.8% yearly and landless families increased from 26% of all agriculturalists to 53% in 1963, which necessitated some manner of finding permanent settlements for the dispossessed population (Bandarage 2009, 48). Pressured by an ITAK ultimatum that threatened mas sive civil disobedience, the government negotiated the 1957 Bandaranaike-Chelvan ayakam Pact, which offered substantial concessions to the Tamils, including li miting the number of Sinhalese settlers, giving substantial authority to the regional counci ls, and even allowing the merger of the regional councils in the North and East, “creating the basis for a separate Tamil administrative unit” (Bandarage 2009, 49). Sinhales e protests against the agreement

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116 became politically costly and Bandaranaike canceled it in 1958, resulting in massive ethnic riots instigated by both sides with the taci t consent if not involvement of both Sinhalese and Tamil officials. Bandaranaike himself “who voiced many of the political sentiments and aspirations of the Sinhalese masses, proved unable to direct or control them” and was assassinated by the radical Buddhist monk Talduwe Somamara in 1959 (Tambiah 1986, 134). By 1960, when Bandaranaike’s wife Sirimavo assumed power, “a culture of ethnic outbidding had become entrenched” (DeVotta 2 002, 88). De Alwis writes that “her major platform was that she was merely carrying out the political pledges her husband had made to his beloved voters, like any dutiful wi fe” (1995, 149). However, Prime Minister Sirimavo thoroughly embraced Sinhalese-Bud dhist policies, “promptly encouraged linguistic nationalism and Buddhist supr emacy,” and “insisted that the full implications of the Sinhala Only Act be enforced” ( Little 1994, 72). The result, seen in Figure 5.1, was a massive Tamil decrease in governm ent employment, traditionally the cornerstone of Tamil economic security. This devast ation of Tamil employment in the civil sectors led Tambiah to conclude “it is no exa ggeration to say that in the first two decades since independence the most important facto r contributing to ethnic tension and violence in Sri Lanka had to deal with the bread-an d-butter issue of ‘middle class’ and ‘white-collar’ employment in the governmental and c ommercial sectors” (1986, 74-75). The educated middle class in the Tamil and Sinhales e communities did not openly engage in violence during this period, but the combined ef fect of elite-driven political pressure and the naked denial of lower-class aspirations mob ilized lower-class rioting and thuggery.

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117 Table 5.1: Tamil Employment in Government Services, 19561970 30 50 60 40 40 5 5 10 1 50 10 20 30 40 50 60 70Ceylon Administrative Service Clerical service Engineers / Doctors Armed Forces Labour force (Phadnis 1979, 348) Percentage of Workforce 1956 1970 In 1965, the UNP returned to power under Dudley Se nanayake, the son of the previous Prime Minister Senanayake. Again, an “atte mpt at a flimsy devolutionary scheme was made possible when UNP and [ITAK] leader s agreed to the so-called Senanayake-Chelvanayakam (S-C) Pact of 1965,” but t he SLFP sabotaged the agreement by claiming the UNP and ITAK were conspiring to dis member the country (DeVotta 2005, 152). Mrs. Bandaranaike and the SLFP then ret urned to power in 1970, forming a coalition government with two Communist parties (La nka Sama Samaja Party [LSSP] and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka [CPSL]). One r esult was that “her second government introduced higher-education policies tha t drastically increased the number of Sinhalese who gained admission to universities whil e better-qualified Tamils were turned away as members of a statistically ‘overrepresented ’ group” (DeVotta 2002, 89). Despite these measures, the attempts to placate a growing c lass of rural, educated, and unemployed Sinhala youth backfired, provoking a 197 1 insurrection by the People’s Liberation Front (JVP) in the southern sections of the country. The JVP’s “Marxist

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118 ideology was directed primarily against the Sri Lan kan state and the Sinhala ruling class, not at the ethnic Other, and an explicitly Buddhist nationalism was absent” from their political program (Bandarage 2009, 56). The JVP’s a ttacks on Indian business interests, Indian Tamil plantation workers, and foreign intrus ion in the economy prevented the JVP and Tamils from uniting on a class basis, and contr ibuted to growing ethnic tension. In response, the government launched a brutal and indi scriminate crackdown. Bandarage notes that estimates of the number of security pers onnel, JVP members, and uninvolved civilians killed in the insurgency “varied widely f rom as low as 1,200 to as high as 50,000” (2009, 57). Democratic socialist economic p olicies did not function as intended; “the Sri Lankan economy became ‘a highly restricted and regulated or closed economy’: the growth rate fell below 3 percent, and unemploym ent rose to almost one quarter of the labor force in 1976” (Bandarage 2009, 58). Basic pr ovisions such as rice and cloth had to be rationed by the state, creating conditions of sy stematic deprival, and little headway was made on dramatic plans to replace the peasant c olonization policy with a collective agricultural system. Facing increased economic pres sure and social dissolution, the main Tamil groups Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK or Lanka Tamil State Party), the Tamil Congress, and the Ceylon Worker’s Congress of India n Tamil plantation workers, “formed the Tamil United Front (TUF, later to becom e the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF]) on 4 May 1972, and openly advocated a separ ate state for the Tamil-speaking areas of the Northern and Eastern provinces” (Banda rage 2009, 65). Ultimately, “as A.J. Wilson put it, ‘the option for the Tamils of workin g within the framework of ‘Sinhalese first’ and reconciling themselves to second-class s tatus was never seriously considered;’”

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119 the majority found the notion unsatisfactory and cl amored for an alternate social framework (Bandarage 2009, 62-63). Fragile Stability, Neoliberalism, and the Roots of Civil War When the UNP returned to power under J.R. Jayawarde ne in July 1977, popular discontent with the mismanagement of the country an d “the SLFP’s highly unpopular dirigiste and autarkic economic policies,” as well as promis es to accommodate Tamil demands for devolution, won the UNP considerable su pport across all ethnic groups (DeVotta 2002, 89). Unfortunately, institutionalize d discrimination and marginalization had, in much the same manner as during the previous JVP insurrection, radicalized many young Tamil men. Many of them began engaging in pol itical violence under the banner of the TULF. Jayawardene replaced the 1972 Constitutio n in August 1978, instituting a multi-member proportional representation system in the reformed Parliament and creating the extremely powerful post of Executive P resident which he was able to take without election. The new Constitution made Tamil a n official language, “its framers ignored the northern insurgency’s increasingly radi cal character and failed to accommodate seriously the now more urgent Tamil dem and for devolution” (Devotta 2002, 89). The formation of the LTTE in 1976 marked the transition to open militancy. The LTTE claims that between the 1972 founding of t he Tamil New Tigers and July 1978, they killed twenty policemen, five politician s, and five informers, along with other crimes such as bank robbery and organized crime (Ba ndarage 2009, 97). Military forces called to the Northern and Eastern provinces acted in a “ham-handed” manner with

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120 widespread human rights abuses. This repression and “disappearing opportunities for Tamils in the state sector galvanized the Tamil ins urgency” (DeVotta 2002, 90). Jayawardene, “having made himself executive Preside nt… rather than accommodate the Tamils’ legitimate grievances, sought to muzzle the burgeoning Tamil rebellion,” passing the authoritarian Prevention of Terrorism Act in 19 79 “which allowed the security forces to arrest, imprison, and leave without trial anyone they considered to be a threat to national security” (DeVotta 2005, 153). The LTTE an d other armed Tamil groups were proscribed in 1978, a two-pronged strategy designed to de-legitimize “agitation for political independence (with which terrorism had be en conflated) thereby enabling the ‘securitisation’ of the issue; [and] it mobilized S inhala sympathy for the regime and its actions; and… accomplished the same abroad” (Nadara jah and Sriskandarajah 2005, 91). The move to a militarized response against the Tami l independence movement, however, would also radicalize the Tamil community. Attempting to correct the ineffective policies of the previous socialist government, President Jayawardene instituted from 1977 onwards a massive change in policy known in Sri Lanka as the Open Economy. Post-1977 economic liberalization and the policy mix popularly known as structural adjustment under terms set down by the IMF and the World B ank promoted exportoriented production, devaluation of the local currency, liberali zation of imports, privatization of state-owned sectors, social service cutbacks, and removal of food subsidies and price controls on consumer goods. Incentives f or foreign investment were introduced, and restrictions on movement of capital, good s, and services between the country and the outside world were removed... total government expenditures for food, education, and health declined from 42 percent to 26 percent of the budget between 1971 and the 1978-1980 period. (Bandara ge 2009, 77). The main projects under the Open Economy, such as the development of Colombo, tourism, and housing did not benefit the N orthern or Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. In fact, the policies had the effect of inte nsifying development in the southwest

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121 localized around Colombo, and “polarization within the urban areas sharpened in the aftermath of liberalization,” with the Gini coeffic ient measure of economic inequality rising from 0.39 to 0.59 in Colombo and from 0.33 t o 0.48 in the Northern Province, Trincomalee, and Batticoloa (Bandarage 2009, 79). T he restructured “export oriented and import dependent economy remained vulnerable to glo bal price shocks” (Richardson 2005, 382). Worse was that the inflow of foreign ca pital increased corruption by the Sinhalese elite. Tambiah claimed that the UNP gover nment, while officially devoted to free enterprise and development “also spawns and ha rbors populist and chauvinist politicians who use the patronage system as a net i n an ocean of an impoverished floating and thrashing urban and semiurban populace to catch shoals of clients and henchmen… they use this poor-quality catch to provide arsonis ts and thugs in their pursuit of power” (1986, 83-84). By the time 1981 came to a close, th e initial economic boom generated from 1978-1980 was being short-changed by a “combin ation of rising government debts, high inflation, worsening trade deficits and stagna ting economic performance,” which increasingly hurt ordinary Sri Lankans and forced t he slashing of popular social programs (Richardson 2005, 447-448). The initial reforms pro duced a spurt of industrial development while lessened consumer austerity promo ted domestic demand, but it was ultimately an unsustainable policy. Figure 5.2 demo nstrates Sri Lanka’s astounding initial growth where the GNP rose by a dramatic 25% in 1977 but these gains proved illusory. As Richardson explained, the Open Economy’s insiste nce on reducing the state budget “weakened government social safety nets” and thus p laced a disproportionate share the risk of liberalization on Sri Lanka’s poor; additio nally, “investment incentives, along with [and such as] reduced tax burdens on high incomes” began to dramatically widen

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122 economic disparity (2005, 448). Figure 5.2: Trends in Population, GNP, and GNP PerCapita in Sri Lanka (Reprinted from Richardson 2005, 449) By the close of 1982, an immediate economic crisis was developing and the government was not prepared for the systematic shoc kwaves that would reverberate throughout Sri Lankan society. Jayawardene’s civil service became increasingly ethnically homogenous and politicized. His attempts to move Sri Lanka towards a oneparty nationalist state turned the civil service in to “a moderately effective instrument for implementing the President’s will, but not for info rming him when things were going wrong” (Richardson 2005, 464). The UNP government w orked continuously to suppress dissent; heavy-handed putdowns of a 1980 general st rike “virtually destroyed the union movement… 40,000 workers were dismissed from their jobs, mostly in the government sector and many of them were never reinstated” (Ban darage 2009, 97). Sirimavo Bandaranaike was charged with corruption, which, co upled with a series of restrictive

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123 election laws, prevented her from challenging the U NP in 1982. Jaywardene circumvented the democratic process that year, aski ng for a referendum to extend his rule for six more years rather than hold elections in 19 83. His government claimed a mandate, but a Civil Rights Movement report noted 62 percent of registered voters “voted for a general election or had nothing to say, due either to indifference or to being prevented… from coming to the polls to express their wish” ( Logos 1983, 105). The Northern and Eastern provinces voted almost exclusively against the referendum. Jayawardene’s UNP government secured its power but rapidly lost polit ical legitimacy and grassroots support. Contributing to the growing divide between Tamil an d Sinhalese society was a variety of demographic considerations that were uti lized by ethnic elites to promote chauvinist agendas. The “ultra-poor rose from less than 20 percent in 1977-78 to about 25 per cent in 1981-82,” and more than 30 percent of S ri Lankan school children were “chronically undernourished” (Richardson 2005, 451452). The most heavily populated southern and southwestern areas of the Sri Lankan W et Zone, “next to Colombo the most urbanized districts and containing the largest prop ortion of the volatile literate secondaryschool leavers,” became major exporters of migrants to both Colombo and the viciously contested “fringe zones of peasant resettlement” (T ambiah 1986, 50). These youth could not find ready employment and thus a large pool of educated Sinhalese and Tamil poor were pooling in the areas most vulnerable to confli ct. The 1981 census reported a sex ratio (of male to female) in the country as a whole as 103.1, but in the dry-zone peasant resettlement areas Sri Lanka was “disproportionatel y male”: Anuradhapura (total 113.4; urban 127.0, rural 112.4), V avuniya (total 113.6; urban 124.5, rural 111.1), Polonnaruva (total 129.8; urban 142 .4, rural 128.8), Trincomalee (total 115.3; urban 114.4, rural 115.8), Mullaitivu (to tal 122.8; urban 119.8, rural 123.1)… Colombo also reported the next largest imbalance (total sex ratio 110.6; urban 113.6, and rural 102.2)… these figures point to t he probable existence of

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124 floating populations of young males either unmarried or liv ing without spouses... in the growing towns of the remote provinces and in Colombo. (Tambiah 1986, 50-51) Semi-educated, unmarried, and disproportionate pop ulations of young males – the largest participant demographic in political violen ce – were then congregated in exactly the provinces where the worst phases of conflict wo uld break out in the future as both Tamil and JVP insurgencies intensified. These popul ations of young men, chronically dispossessed, would soon form the core of militant cadres in the country. The Jayawardene government’s first term resulted i n a rapidly deteriorating socioeconomic situation, which exacerbated ethnic t ensions and reinforced the position of Tamil extremists. Tamil militants were also being f unded by India after the 1977 economic liberalization campaign increasingly drew Sri Lanka towards a Western alliance. Close ties to the IMF and the World Bank and “rumors that the US was planning to establish a military presence in the strategic p ort of Trincomalee” all played a role in worsening relations with the Indira Ghandi-led gove rnment (Bandarage 2009, 100). After her re-election in 1980, Ghandi’s decision to provi de extensive covert funding and toleration for Tamil militant training camps in sou thern India was “believed to have stemmed from two motivations: concern with Indian s ecurity in the region and the Congress Party’s need for the electoral support of Tamil Nadu,” where a heavily Tamil population supported Sri Lankan Tamil separatism (1 00). Indian support for Tamil separatism, especially systematic networks of fundi ng and logistical support by Tamil Nadu political elites, played a major role in armin g and readying Tamil militants in Sri Lanka for the upcoming civil war. The bipolar ethnic thesis criticized by Bandarage t hus is characterized by a lack of consideration of the various non-ethnic factors tha t contributed to Tamil separatism and

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125 Sinhalese authoritarianism. Primordial hatred betwe en Sinhalese and Tamil was not an ongoing and intrinsic legacy of Sri Lankan history, but rather invented and exacerbated by political elites both within Sri Lanka and in ne arby India after independence. The ethnic bipolar model also ignores significant diver gences within traditionally assumed ethnic homogeneities, giving power to the symbolic and rhetorical applications of ethnic primordialism. Thangarajah, for example, writes tha t political divergences remained within the Tamil communities by the onset of the 19 83 civil war; “education and employment in the North and a thread to the land th rough largely a state-sponsored land colonization in the North-Central and Eastern Secto rs… communities in the so-called Tamil areas having specific political, socio-econom ic, and cultural conditions... are bound to have different ways of life” (1995, 188). Indian Tamils felt little attachment to the separatist cause and allied themselves to the Colom bo government. Sinhalese militancy was primarily motivated by economic deprivation and the JVP insurrection did not openly lash out at Tamils. Scott argues that a majo r failure of both political leaderships was that they failed to “disconnect the story of th e past from the politics of the present” (1995, 30). In this light it seems probable that by 1983 a major separatist campaign was inevitable, the culmination of an elaborate path-de pendent slide towards mutual chauvinism. Political elites in Sri Lanka had forme d a political system that responded to political, economic, and social demands through rea ctionary exclusion and scapegoating of other ethnic groups. Problematizing the bipolar ethnic model during the formation of the civil war period is important to analysis of LTTE strategies, because it provides considerable insight into the LTTE’s various imperatives. Accura tely interpreting these imperatives is

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126 in turn crucial to analysis utilizing the organizat ional framework, especially in explaining how “the resort to terrorism reflects the incentive s leaders provide for followers and competition with rivals” (Crenshaw 1987, 27). This complex internal sociopolitical structure preceding the 1983 descent into war thus clarified, the next step is charting the growth and modulation of the LTTE in the secondary post-independence period. Black July: the Explosion into Civil War On 23 July 1983, LTTE militants in the northern ci ty of Jaffna ambushed and killed 13 Sri Lankan soldiers. The arrival of their bodies in Colombo the next morning sparked riots when a mob of Sinhalese, initially ch anting anti-government slogans, was subverted by gangs of pro-government thugs who quic kly turned the mood into one of Tamil hatred. Although previous race riots had brok en out in 1977 and 1981, what is now referred to as Black July was unprecedented and ter rifying. …the 1983 eruption showed organized mob violence at work. Gan gs armed with weapons such as metal rods and knives and carrying gasoline (freq uently confiscated from passing motor vehicles), and, most intriguingly of all, because it indicates prior intent and planning, carrying voter lists and addresses of Tam il owners and occupants of houses, shops, and other property, descended in waves to drive out Tamils… a breakdown that was caused as much by the active participation or pas sive encouragement of the ultimate guardians of law and order–the pol ice and army–as by inflamed criminal excesses… (Tambiah 1986, 20-24). Prominent Buddhist monks such as Elle Gunawansa led riots “with hit lists in hand,” behavior “not only reprehensible but crimina l” (Bandarage 2009, 109). There was substantial evidence that the riots were not a gras sroots outbreak of ethnic hatred but a pogrom intended to destroy Tamil economic holdings and mobilize Sinhalese in line with the government. Jayawardene himself did not declare curfew “until 2 pm on Monday 25 July, when the worst was over… [in other areas] cur few was declared only after mobs

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127 had already rampaged against the hill country Tamil s” (107). Between 200-2,000 Tamils were killed, and 30,000 were made unemployed (105). Some 100,000 fled the country, the poorer to Tamil Nadu, while “the educated profe ssional elite with access to English education… were able to emigrate to the West” (116) These hastily-formed Tamil communities abroad would form the basis of a massiv e diaspora-insurgency network which provided the bulk of future LTTE financial re sources. Prabhakaran, the LTTE leader, himself fled to Tamil Nadu and set up organ izational headquarters there. Previously, traditional Tamil political elites in the TULF and other political organizations had relied on the separatist militant s to bolster their image, presuming that they were a force that could be manipulated and con trolled. Black July almost immediately delegitimized democratic participation in the Tamil community, and “armed Tamil groups began to fill the power vacuum and to monopolize the Tamil political agenda” (Bandarage 2009, 111). A final attempt in l ate 1983-1984 by the TULF to negotiate a settlement in partnership with the Indi an government failed, and Indian support for the Tamil militants increased. While th ere were only 300 organized militants at the time of Black July, “sanctuary, finance, tra ining, and weapons by the central government, by the central government of India, the state government of Tamil Nadu, or the insurgent groups themselves” brought the number to over 20,000 (Bandarage 2009, 114). Indian media coverage of Black July had quick ly transformed Tamil Nadu “into the most important external mass base of support for th e Eelam movement” (Venugopal 2003, 13). Both the national army and the militants in particular the LTTE, descended into naked terrorism and abuse. Under the force of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, government soldiers and policemen targeted the lead ers of Tamil civil society, some of

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128 the few remaining advocates of nonviolence. However those leaders also “[spoke] out publicly against human rights abuses perpetrated by both sides, militants as well as the security forces” and in doing so were “visible, out spoken, and vulnerable” (Richardson 2005, 487). The Jayawardene government repression, combined with the marginalization of the TULF, thus eliminated the last peaceful repr esentatives of the Tamil people. The LTTE in particular took the mantle of separatism at any cost; much as a firm in a competitive market, its hard-line ideology, superio r access to weaponry and skilled personnel, and singularly focused leadership acted as comparative advantages which compelled it to establish a monopoly on Tamil repre sentation and eliminate competition in order to grow the organization at the cost of th e wider Tamil community. Tamil leaders had failed to recognize the unique brand of militar ism the LTTE practiced. I don't think Prabhakaran was a Tamil nationalist. He was jus t a criminal. What happened, at the beginning of the Tamil problem, was that th e militants got used. People like him were used by the politically motivated people. You understand? He was used. He was a criminal. For him it was an adventure. But Prabhakaran couldn't put his gun down. He had no choice. He came from a poor town – People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) l eader Dharmalingam Siddharthan (quoted in Meadows 2010, 121) Ideological, Organizational, and Tactical Roots of LTTE Extremism Prabhakaran directed his organization with brutal e fficiency and an unyielding belief in the coercive power of violence. As a chil d, he had exhibited signs of antisocial behavior such as murdering animals. Committed to wh at he viewed as an inevitable war, Prabhakran “would tie himself up, get into a sack a nd lie under the sun the whole day,” even inserting pins into his nails to prepare himse lf for torture; at the age of 18 he wounded himself attempting to make an improvised ex plosive (Swamy 1995, 52). In

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129 adulthood, however, Prabhakaran cultivated an image as an indomitable warrior willing to commit any act for the prophesied Eelam. His fir st kill had been in 1975 at the age of 20, when he murdered SLFP politician Alfred Duraiap pah, the Tamil mayor of Jaffna. Now the LTTE commander particularly treasured a rev olver taken from the body of a policeman he murdered, which he used to impress fel low cadres with his impressive fast draw skills (Goertzel 2002, 104); according to Swam y, he had personally taken part in the July 23rd ambush which triggered Black July, firing at the s urprised soldiers and being “assigned the task of finishing off survivors in th e truck” (Swamy 1995, 90). Prabhakaran’s image eventually developed into a sem i-mystical cult of personality which served to justify any amount of bloodshed – and any targets – he and the LTTE command deemed strategically necessary. Under his direction LTTE tactics of the 1983-1987 period included instigating reprisals, suicide bomb ings against Sinhalese civilian and security targets, intimidation, beatings, and assas sination. Reprisals were perhaps the most crucial in mobilizing militant support: “…in a typical scenario, LTTE or PLOTE cadres would carry out a successful guerilla attack, perhaps killing one or two security officers… [civilians] giving evidence against a militant hit squad was akin to signing thei r own death warrants… frustrated by this wall of silence… in the worst cases, secur ity forces would ‘go on a rampage’ of burnings, lootings, beatings and killings” (Ri chardson 2005, 501). This kind of operation was somewhat illogical, but reflected tactical incentives for militants given by their higher degree of organizat ion and training compared to the government forces. Had the Sri Lankan security forc es been more professionalized, the tactic could have backfired and the militants could have been increasingly forced into open combat with the national army, which was avoid ed during the LTTE’s early mobilization phases. At the same time LTTE began at tacking settlements in the Dry Zone areas, while “the Sri Lankan state and Sinhala elit es recruited impoverished Sinhalese to

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130 hold the frontier without giving them adequate prot ection” (Bandarage 2009, 121). This ill-planned government policy created endemic cycle s of violence in the communities most vulnerable to radicalization. Other attacks ex tended beyond the disputed settlement areas; a May 1985 massacre by the LTTE on the holy Buddhist site of Anuradhapura killed 146 civilians. Gaining a reputation as effic ient and deadly, the LTTE was the most organized and capable faction in Tamil militancy. T heir ideology, never intellectually complex, emphasized that the creation of Eelam coul d only be achieved through war and sacrifice. Prabhakaran believed that the only succe ssful tactic to produce the desired outcome was “discipline, unwavering commitment, loy alty and a long-term violent struggle” (Richardson 2005, 480). Prabhakaran furth ermore had a “near-total disinterest in Marxist politics and ideology,” preferring inste ad to focus squarely on separatism as the cornerstone of all LTTE actions; he only recrui ted the journalist Anton Balasingham to compose a manifesto when it became obvious the o rganization required one (Swamy 1995, 69). Epitomizing the LTTE’s absolute commitme nt to separatism, Prabhakaran was instrumental in developing two of the LTTE’s most r ecognized symbols, the elite Black Tiger suicide wing and the distribution of cyanide pills to every cadre. The LTTE… …required [a Black Tiger] to train for a year or more. In add ition to training the bomber on methods of walking, dress, facial expressions, and gestures, the Black Tigers also had a research unit that tested the effects of explosiv es on goats and other animals. Something about the program was successful: the LTTE conducted more suicide operations than any other organization in the world. (Meadows 2010, 238) Glass suicide pills containing cyanide, which would lacerate the gums when bitten and allow the poison to enter the bloodstream, were widely issued to LTTE fighters and in particular the Black Tigers. Cadres were instruc ted to “kill themselves and avoid capture should they fail to carry out their mission otherwise ‘they will face some more painful form of death at the hands of the LTTE’” (V an de Voorde 2005, 187). Martyrdom

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131 became an important aspect of the LTTE ‘culture’ an d elaborate propaganda campaigns celebrated the sacrifices of the fallen. For exampl e, “coffins of the dead are ceremonially draped with the LTTE flag and local school bands ar e press-ganged into conducting march-pasts at the head of mourning processions,” w hile “commemorative bill boards,” Tiger monuments to the dead, and even “official LTT E photograph albums dedicated to the martyrs” all formed differing components of an extensive campaign designed to promote the cult of sacrifice and martyrdom within the Tamil areas (de Silva 1995, 181). Widespread Tamil antipathy towards the idea of rema ining within an increasingly authoritarian Sri Lanka was exacerbated by Sinhales e Buddhist chauvinism and resulted in commitment, even through extensive and unimagina ble suffering, to the idea of a nonnegotiable independent Eelam. However, the formatio n of the LTTE’s culture of martyrdom needs to be understood as the product of a complex interplay of internal factors in the North and East, including active LTT E manipulation under the domineering Prabhakaran; the widespread relative disenfranchise ment of Tamil youth, resulting in hopelessness and a deep sense of alienation; and wi despread intimidation of dissent by both the LTTE and government allowing a political a nd social vacuum that encouraged extremism. Elimination of Domestic Opposition and Power Consol idation Despite the growing preeminence of the LTTE, severa l Tamil militant groups were still active, such as the PLOTE, Tamil Eelam L iberation Organization (TELO), Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students (EROS) and Eelam People’s

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132 Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). While these groups were allies in the separatist war, they were neither as radical nor as unwilling to compromise as the Tigers. Enraged when TELO cadres beat two and killed one of the LTT E members, and losing patience with the other organizations’ comparative lack of d iscipline, Prabhakaran ordered a wipe of the opposition. In 30 April 1986 “disciplined LT TE hit squads moved against 24 TELO camps simultaneously” and chased down survivors for a three-day period killing nearly all (Richardson 2005, 531). The EPRLF was soon also attacked and weakened. With the marginalization of the militant opposition, Prabhak aran returned to Jaffna in the north and exercised unilateral command of the LTTE. In the so uthern provinces there was only one group that “offered a militant agenda to the Sinhal ase,” a resurgent JVP that aimed “to use propaganda, terror, sabotage and assassinations to eviscerate Sri Lanka’s governmental, economic, and security institutions” (Richardson 2005, 534-535). The JVP was proscribed following the Black July riots amids t government claims of involvement; the forced switch to an underground basis would soo n explode into a second insurgency. By 1987 the Sri Lankan leadership had tired of incr easing attacks on civilians and launched a major offensive on the LTTE-controlled J affna area called Operation Liberation. Despite coming exceptionally close to d efeating the LTTE and capturing or killing Prabhakaran, massive human rights abuses co mmitted by the army, including indiscriminate bombing and the air force’s use of p etrol to clear wide areas, angered Tamil Nadu politicians who demanded intervention. I ndia dropped 22 tons of relief supplies on Jaffna on June 4th, angering the UNP go vernment (Bandarage 2009, 131). Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi’s hints at direc t military action forced Jayawardene to sign the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord in secrecy which, in addition to bringing an

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133 military Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) onto the island, joined the Northern and Eastern provinces preceding a referendum to determi ne the new province’s permanency, made Tamil an official language, and ordered the ce ssation of hostilities within 48 hours and surrender of militant arms and restrictions of all government troops to barracks within 72 hours. Bandarage alleges that “with one s troke of the pen, the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord brought Sri Lanka into the Indian security f old… [turning] Sri Lanka into a satellite state akin to Bhutan and Sikkim” (2009, 1 34). The Accord enraged many Sinhalese, especially the JVP, which began two vici ous insurgencies between the years of 1987-1989, prompting an unprecedented orgy of repri sal and counter-reprisal between insurgent hit teams and government death squads whi ch left some 40-60,000 dead. The JVP insurrection had few “identifiable landmarks;” instead, it was a sustained campaign of attrition primarily directed against mid-level g overnment officials, UNP supporters, and populations which had failed to comply with JVP directives; an offshoot of the group, the Patriotic Liberation Organization (DJV) murdered over seventy members of Parliament in a four-month period in 1987 (Richards on 2005, 537). Pro-government death squads “terrorized villagers by targeting the innocent neighbors and friends of suspected JVP supporters” (Oberst 1992, 129). The w ould-be revolution was crushed by massive escalation of the state terror campaign, in cluding several hundred killings a week and the liquidation of entire villages such as Kund asale. At the same time, the IPKF in the northern section of Sri Lanka was running into considerable difficulties enforcing the terms of th e Accord. While most of the militant groups surrendered their weapons and engaged in pro vincial and parliamentary elections in 1987 and 1989, the LTTE refused to surrender its arms despite prior agreement,

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134 “demonstrating that it was never serious about disa rmament, peace, or the accord” (Bandarage 2009, 147). The EPRLF-dominated governme nt which managed the merged provincial region was in favor of an Eelam under In dian protection, but the LTTE “knew that India did not want a separate Tamil state,” an d merely wanted to enforce its will on the Sri Lankan government (Bandarage 2009, 152). In dia thus had to manage the EPRLF as a puppet regime which could not coexist with the LTTE. In September and October of 1987, the head of the LTTE’s political wing, Tileep an, staged a hunger strike against the IPKF, and upon his death the LTTE organized massive anti-Indian riots and soon attacked Indian military units. After the LTTE killed five I ndian “para-commandos and ‘necklaced’ them” on October 8th, it was announced by both governments that the “LTTE would no longer be accommodated” and a massive coun ter-insurgency operation began (Bandarage 2009, 149). While the LTTE was forced ou t of Jaffna, it merely melted into the jungle and continued to fight “the IPKF, which could not calm the violence despite being reinforced from its initial strength of 3,000 to more than 70,000 troops” (DeVotta 2002, 90). While in theory the IPKF was there to pr otect civilians, poor discipline and an unclear political objective subverted this objectiv e. More often, Jaffna’s hapless Tamil residents… were objects of their rage and frustration… to [the IPKF], Jaffna Tamils did not seem ‘o ppressed’. There seemed to be a large prosperous middle class and living conditions for even the poorest were better than the villages from which they had come. When these p eople, instigated by the LTTE, began to insult and humiliate them, they foun d it hard to respond passively, as they were ordered to do. (Richardson 2005, 533 ) The LTTE took advantage of the chaos to eliminate t he remaining rival militant groups, helped by their disarmament under the accor d. Fearing that the LTTE would destroy the Tamil militant groups that remained all ied with the IPKF, the Indian government “trained and rearmed” them, with the pro vincial government under the

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135 control of the EPRLF’s militia Civil Volunteer Forc e enlarged and trained into a new Tamil National Army (Oberst 1992, 129). Unfortunate ly, the new force “originated forced conscription” of youth into Tamil militant organiza tions and “the IPKF was involved in the training of hundreds, if not thousands, of yout hs” (Bandarage 2009, 151). When Jayawardene’s term of office ran out in 1989, his U NP successor Ranasinghe Premadasa was firmly committed to getting the Indian military presence out of Sri Lanka as quickly as possible. Stunningly, the LTTE and UNP found the mselves temporary allies in the mutual desire to remove the IPKF. In April 1989 a c easefire was declared without the requirement of disarmament; the government is alleg ed to have provided weapons and equipment to the LTTE to accelerate the Indian with drawal by the official October 1989 date. The short-lived secret alliance, however, resulted in an even worse situation for the UNP government. The Tamil National Army control led by the EPRLF “immediately collapsed, and with almost no effort the LTTE impro ved their position by taking possession of huge stocks of sophisticated weapons and supplies” (Little 1994, 8). LTTE cadres took control of Indian military posts and ba ses before Sri Lankan military units could resume control and immediately broke off talk s with the government, starting a renewed Eelam War II in June 1990 (Bandarage 2009, 153). Shocking displays of violence accompanied the start of the new war, incl uding the killings of some 600 Sinhalese and Muslim policemen in Batticoloa and Am para who “had orders to surrender from Colombo based on false promises of safe passag e from the LTTE” (Bandarage 2009, 153). Ethnic cleansing began in the Northern and Eastern provinces, with tens of thousands of non-Tamils forced to flee. In 1990 the LTTE conducted “the expulsion of

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136 the Muslims of the northern province (about 80,000 people in all) by the LTTE… and seizure of their property, including houses and oth er buildings and jewelry and cash” (K.M. de Silva 2011, 241). Although demographic inf ormation is difficult to come by during these years, it is generally agreed that fro m 1987 onwards virtually no Sinhalese lived in Jaffna, which, coupled with the cleansing of Muslims, allowed LTTE totalitarian control over the city. Assassinations, bombings, an d terrorism resumed; the Defense Minister Wijeratna, “who had finished the JVP and w as expected to do the same to the LTTE,” was killed by a suicide bomb in Colombo in M arch 1991 (Bandarage 2009, 153). Former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi, who was campaigning for re-election on the basis of a renewed campaign in the north of Sri Lan ka, was assassinated in May in Tamil Nadu by the female LTTE suicide bomber Thenmozhi ‘D hanu’ Rajatnaram. President Premadasa, who in 1993 was planning a major offensi ve against the LTTE in the north, was himself the victim of a suicide bomber during a Colombo election rally on May 1st. Both Premadasa and Ghandi had paid for their collus ion with the LTTE with their lives, and the group remains the only terrorist organizati on to have successfully assassinated a sitting world leader. Civil War, Negotiations, and Defeat: the LTTE 19932009 The LTTE emerged from the aftermath of the Indian i ntervention and the subsequent period of chaos as the de facto rulers o f the Northern province and controlling significant tracts of territory in the East. The ot her Tamil militant groups, which had displayed some degree of equivocation as to their u ltimate commitment to the independent and sovereign Eelam imagined by Prabhak aran, had by this time been so

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137 thoroughly ravaged that they could offer no resista nce to the LTTE. Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah write that “the guerilla war of the 1980s gradually changed to one in which both the LTTE and the state controlled differ ent areas of the Northeast and launched full-scale military offensives against eac h other” (2005, 92). The next sixteen years saw the transformation of conflict from a tra ditional terror campaign by both LTTE and government forces into a more largely conventio nal civil war. Premadasa’s successor, Ranil Wickremasinghe, lost t o the SLFP candidate Chandrika Kumaratunga in the 1994 elections, who fo rmed a coalition government called the People’s Alliance with a variety of smaller Mus lim and Socialist political parties. She accepted “all the major grievances of the Tamils, e .g. language, education, land settlement, law and order, administration, and the overarching demand for regional autonomy” (Bandarage 2009, 156). At the start of 19 95, a comprehensive ceasefire was announced, and the government entered talks with th e LTTE under the growing pressure of the international peace lobby. The so-called ‘de volution’ package that emerged throughout the talks was based on the earlier Banda ranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact and the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and offered a substantial deg ree of political autonomy for the Tamil population in the Northern and Eastern region s. Sinhalese nationalist opinion was largely against the package; a group of Sinhalese a cademics observed, for example, “‘nearly 50% of the Tamil population (excluding the hill country Tamils) live harmoniously’ with the Sinhalese,” and claimed the package would undermine the island’s pluralist tradition (158). Despite the Kum aratunga government’s early efforts, the peace package failed before it could even be introd uced in referendum. The “UNP sided against the Kumaratunga devolution package... such opposition has been interpreted as

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138 ‘ethnic outbidding’ and attributed to Sinhala chauv inism,” but Bandarage also argues “it needs to be seen as a problem inherent in parliamen tary democracy” (161). Continued and deliberate LTTE opposition to any solution shor t of absolute independence, under specific pressure from Prabhakaran, constituted ano ther sort of obstacle entirely. The LTTE broke the cease-fire on April 19, sinking two patr ol boats and then shooting down two troop transport planes, killing all n inety-seven persons on board. An LTTE massacre of forty-two Sinhalese villagers in a coastal t own north of Trincomalee and the assassination of a Buddhist priest, both o n May 26, along with new reports of "disappearances," extrajudicial executions and tortu re by Sri Lankan security personnel, were indications of how far the country w as from the peace envisioned only months before. By the time the government un veiled its proposal for a political settlement in August, featuring a plan to devolve central control to regional councils determined in part along ethnic lines, the war was again in full swing. (Human Rights Watch Report on Sri Lanka, 1996) Increasingly, international opinion was turning aga inst the LTTE, with observers noting their use of child soldiers, hostage-taking, civilian shields, and the continuing suicide campaigns (Human Rights Watch, 1996). The b reakdown of the talks allowed Eelam War III to begin, which started with a massiv e government offensive. Sri Lankan government forces were able to retake the Jaffna pe ninsula in 1995, and by 1996-1998 the LTTE was again reduced to defensive measures in the Vanni jungles. By the end of this period government analysts largely believed th e LTTE was on its last legs. In 1999, however, the LTTE managed to launch a major series of counter-offensives “that not only recaptured the territory it had lost since 1996 but also overran the Sri Lankan Army’s largest base complex at the neck of the Jaffna peni nsula,” forcing the military forces in the North to be reinforced by air and sea (Nadaraja h and Sriskandarajah 2002, 96). In 2001, the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress defected from the People’s Alliance, forcing the dissolution of parliament and new elections, which brought Ranil Wickramasinghe of the UNP to the post of Prime Minister. According to Ban darage, the defeat of the People’s Alliance was “due to the widespread sentiment that it had destroyed the economy and

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139 government institutions, elevated corruption in pub lic life, mishandled the war, and caused the unnecessary slaughter” of thousands of y outh (2009, 176). Interestingly, the UNP coalition included the TULF and remnants of the EPRLF and TELO, which “accepted the LTTE as ‘sole representatives of Tami ls’, becoming what critics have called ‘mindless and soulless puppets’ of the LTTE” (Banda rage 2009, 177). The war was further delegitimized by the LTTE’s proposal of a m onth-long ceasefire to the UNP government and its allies within, leading to a Norw egian delegation negotiating a ceasefire agreement (the CFA) between Sri Lanka and the LTTE on 21 February 2002. LTTE ‘State-Building’ and Diaspora Support The CFA period lasted from the signing of this agre ement until nearly the end of December 2005. Within its provisions were the estab lishment of a Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (the SLMM), the removal of the embargo on r ebel-held territory, and in August, a lift on the ban on the LTTE. The international co mmunity considered the three years of the cease-fire as an unprecedented step towards pea ce, but it also created a de facto LTTE state in the North and its pockets of controlled te rritory in the East. In Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi, LTTE judiciary and police organs emerg ed, where it could be observed that “the police and judiciary maintain a high degree of rule of law in LTTE-controlled areas,” whether as a result of “community embeddedness” as proclaimed by the Tigers or authoritarian control over daily life as charged by critics (Stokke 2006, 1028). LTTE representatives openly taxed the population, includ ing “a range of direct and indirect taxes in both the areas it controls and in territor ies held by the Sri Lankan government,”

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140 with public servants ‘asked’ to donate a percentage of their salary (Stokke 2006, 1034). A dual state structured developed wherein official fi nancing was provided largely by the Sri Lankan government but where, simultaneously, all pu blic servants knew their ‘real’ bosses were the Tigers. The LTTE quasi-state’s hier archal structure developed as the result of Sri Lanka’s historic majoritarian politic s, ethnic cleansing within its territories, and a historic LTTE focus on security and military preparedness. With the collapse of Tamil Nadu support following the Ghandi assassinati on, the new Tamil state was heavily dependent on the Western diaspora which it had star ted cultivating for financial support in the mid-1990s. …by the mid-1990’s, some experts believed that 80 to 90 percen t of the Tamil Tigers’ military budget came from overseas sources, including contribut ions from the diaspora, and income from international investments and busines ses… The Tamil Tigers established computer databases to keep track of individuals who contributed, including their addresses and telephone numbers. It also util ized public records and information from supporters to keep track of Tamils in the community, including changes of address and new arrivals. Many Tamil households and b usinesses, if not the majority, received regular visits from representatives of f ront organizations for the Tamil Tigers, seeking contributions. (Becker 2007, 5) Tamils in the West were “subject to death threats, beatings, property damage, smear campaigns, fabricated criminal charges, and e ven murder” as a result of refusing to pay or expressing open dissent (Becker 2006, 14). T hough such threats were rarely carried out, the effect of punishment when it did h appen was disproportionate, causing dissenting Tamils to leave in a constant climate of fear. According to Human Rights Watch, diaspora Tamils who visited Sri Lankan terri tory under the auspices of the CFA were pressured for money in the form of $1 a day fo r the time they had been out of the country by LTTE border guards in addition to a ‘tax ’, often with the threat of harm happening to themselves or relatives (36-38). This systematic picking of Tamil pockets was facilitated by the Tigers’ extensive computer d atabases on those living in the

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141 diaspora, providing extensive evidence that Tamil N GOs in the West actively worked with the LTTE despite international proscription. According to Stokke, predictions for the future nat ure of the LTTE Eelam were firmly divided between “pro-LTTE” groups who argued that the LTTE would “be both willing and capable of transforming itself and the state apparatus towards a more enabling and democratic form of governance” if the Sri Lankan government would grant independence, and critics who argued “the Tamil Tig ers’ political record shows that substantial devolution of power to the northeast un der LTTE control is more likely to produce authoritarianism” (2006, 1035). The CFA fol ded, however, before any predictions could be tested, partially because “the Norwegians and the SLMM were ineffectual in making the LTTE respect the ceasefir e as Tigers continued to violate the 2002 CFA” (Bandarage 2009, 196). The limitations of the bipolar ethnic model, which urged greater devolution as a solution to the confl ict, also became apparent when the LTTE commander of the Eastern province, V. Muralith aran or ‘Colonel Karuna’, broke away from the parent organization, forming a new po litical party called the Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers (TMVP) which joined the democrati c process. Critics alleged that the TMVP wing of the Tigers, which was allowed to carry arms allegedly for fear of LTTE retaliation, was merely a government front group pa id to fight the LTTE in violation of the CFA. However, the split was made possible becau se “the eastern LTTE cadres felt that although they sacrificed disproportionately fo r the separatist war, they were left out of the benefits of the Norwegian facilitated ‘peace process’” (Bandarage 2009, 195). The LTTE also was becoming dissatisfied with the govern ment’s refusal to implement “its maximalist position put up for discussion in the fo rm of Interim Self Government

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142 Administration” which would have ensured the LTTE’s preeminence in a future Northeastern province (Mayilvaganan 2009, 26). Talks had begun to fold in 2004, but the ascension of a SLFP government in alliance with the JVP, which had re-entered politic s in the 1990s, under the hawkish new President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2005 sealed the deal with the government seeking to “mobilize international opinion against the LTTE as a terrorist organization,” raising objections to Norway’s role in the process as biase d and unhelpful, and generally hardening its stance on the peace process (Mayilvag anan 2009, 28). As seen in Table 4.3, the LTTE also undermined its bargaining position vi s--vis the government by engaging in disproportionate human rights abuses in the five years following the establishment of the CFA. Bagree argues that the Sri Lankan civil wa r had evolved into a “system which serves important political, economic and psychologi cal benefits to a range of actors, most notably the conflicting parties themselves. In othe r words, while violence in Sri Lanka harms many people (directly and/or indirectly), it also serves a range of powerful interests” (2008). The LTTE’s rejection of the acco rds in particular reflects its record and image as the final representatives of the Tamil peo ple; accepting a deal that was short of fully independent Eelam could prove both humiliatin g and politically devastating, leaving the Tamil community to wonder why so many youths we re asked to die for a suboptimal outcome and threatening the LTTE’s future political prospects. Faced with the probability that the talks would aga in fail and the government was rearming for a final offensive, the LTTE decided to launch one of its own, increasing attacks on civilian and security personnel. After t he assassination of the Sri Lankan Deputy Chief of Staff Parami Kulatunga in 2006, fol lowed shortly by the attempted

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143 assassination of Defense Secretary Fonseka, “the at mosphere was too vitiated for the peace moves to restart,” and Eelam War IV began (Ma yilvaganan 2009, 26). With the help of the Karuna-led faction, the government quic kly reclaimed the Eastern province. In 2007 up to 3,345 LTTE cadres were killed as oppo sed to roughly 500 in the security forces; by September 2008 that number had spiraled to 6,800 LTTE to the government death toll of 674, irreparable losses compounded by the death of Anton Balasingham, their chief spokesperson, from stomach cancer in 20 06 (Mayilvaganan 2009, 31). Widespread human rights abuses by the government, i ncluding “displacement and killing of civilians, abductions, disappearances, torture, media restrictions” among others, were overshadowed in the international community by the Tigers’ ruthless terrorist tactics, demonstrated in Figure 5.3 (Bandarage 2009, 209). Figure 5.3 : Selected CFA Human Rights Violations i n Sri Lanka (22 February 2002-30 April 2007) (Reprinted from Bandarage 2009, 191; Sources: Viola tions Ruled by Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, ‘Secretariat for Coordinating t he Peace Process’, online, available at: peacesrilankacom accessed 9/13/2008)

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144 Although their international diaspora support netwo rks remained strong, and many Tamils still felt that the LTTE was their best hope against Sinhalese chauvinism, the Sri Lankan military had become too powerful to defeat militarily. Despite the growing strength of the Sri Lankan Army, the 2009 defeat of the LTTE and the death of its leader Prabhakaran surprised even the government (de Silva 2011, 237). Conclusion Instrumental theories consider the end of a terrori st organization as being inherently tied to the failure to reach political g oals. Predictively this framework would seem to indicate that the Tigers would collapse whe n there seemed to be no hope of forming Eelam. However, the LTTE did not surrender, dissipate, or cut and run, the attempts of some cadres to flee the war zone notwit hstanding. Instead they brutally fought on to the last man, unsympathetic to the mas ses of civilians dying around them as a result of their fatal stand; in the last weeks Ti ger cadres fired indiscriminately upon civilians resisting continued conscription of child ren or attempting to flee the so-called Safe Zone (Natarajan 2009). Cornered, urged on by a fanatical leadership, and mired in a suicidal culture of martyrdom, it is not surprising that the cornered LTTE fought on to the last. Perhaps Prabhakaran and his inner circle clun g to hopes that there would be another foreign intervention to prevent ultimate defeat, or perhaps disarmament or the collapse of the armed wing was too bitter a pill to swallow. As most of the LTTE leadership was killed, it is probably impossible to get an accurat e account of those last days; however what is clear is that the organization had lasted b eyond a realistic chance at victory and thus was relying purely on ideological will and tot alitarian tactics to keep organizational

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145 momentum. Instrumental theories possess little unde rstanding of these internal mechanisms and are restricted to viewing the extern al signals and actions of an organization, which leaves policy leaders with litt le ability to prepare for erratic or illogical strategic movements. Organizational analysis predicts instead that the t ermination of a terrorist group will result when the organization disintegrates fro m the failure of internal dynamics to maintain momentum. Defense analyst Sunit Bagree, fo r example, writes that “Prabhakaran was a tyrannical egomaniac... [he] did not trust his own subordinates to operate a different version of the rebellion if req uired. There was no plan for the LTTE to transform into a cellular network structure for urb an-based assassinations and attacks on key strategic installations” (2010). Similarly, the major defections of the Karuna group and foreign assistance from China and Pakistan to t he Sri Lankan government played a role in undercutting the LTTE's access to diaspora funds and strengthening the government military position (Bagree 2010). Even wi th their superior firepower and evolving tactics, the Sri Lankan military command w as surprised at how quickly the LTTE lost territory in the end phase of the war. Th is indicates that many of the series of debacles that plagued the LTTE’s conduct of Eelam W ar IV were the result of internal miscalculations and mismanagement. While Prabhakara n’s elimination of any Tamil internal opposition had made the LTTE the predomina nt actor in Tamil politics, this dominance coupled with its extremism left little sp ace for the LTTE to maneuver once talks folded. De Silva theorizes that while the key to the LTTE’s success was its efficient organization and effective manipulation of emotiona l symbolism, its insular and

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146 hierarchal nature rendered it “unable to transcend the cognitive maps of the world and of reality” (1995, 179). In doing so the LTTE effectiv ely denied agency to the outside world, and became “trapped within the ‘combat mode’ and ar e uncomfortable, therefore unsuccessful, when operating in other scenarios, su ch as in negotiated political settlements” (1995, 179). The emotive propaganda pu blished by the LTTE, its brutal tactics, and its singularly focused separatist ideo logy reinforced its perception of all opponents as absolute enemies. Multiple failures of the peace process compounded this polarization, a dynamic which the organization fed by using the ceasefires to rearm, regroup, and launch enough attacks to maintain driv e while avoiding abrupt abrogation. Although the group had no ideological basis beyond Tamil separatism, it emphasized communal ties, self-sacrifice, and an apocalyptical vision of Sinhalese victory, creating powerful social incentives and personal meaning for LTTE membership. However, growing domestic and international dissatisfaction with the Tigers’ brutality led to a growing sense that the organization had outlived it s uselessness. Although it had brought the plight of the Tamils to a world audience, even the LTTE could sense that popular perception was turning against it. With the defeat of the Tigers, the Rajapaksa admini stration has the ability to correct the wrongs of the past by extending its han d to the Tamil community. De Silva argues that the essential steps to recovery in the decimated Northern and Eastern provinces must be a multi-pronged process of econom ic reconstruction, redevelopment of destroyed infrastructure and housing, restoration o f political parity in the face of the gap of the LTTE, the disarmament of pro-government mili tias, and effective coordination with regional powers such as India and China (2011) Any final solution to the Sri

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147 Lankan Civil War must accommodate Tamil as well as majoritarian Sinhalese grievances, with perhaps the most important factor being humani tarian aid and reconstruction of Tamil areas devastated by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces, and decades of economic and social devastation wrought by the conf lict. Bandarage cautions against returning to a federal devolution model, arguing th at with the end of the war, the devolution of power “is unlikely to address [the] f undamental issues of economic democracy and political participation that are impo rtant to all Sri Lankans, not just a single ethnic group” (2009, 223). Contrastingly, K. M. de Silva encourages the development of local institutions as a check on the power of the government to further manipulate and degenerate democracy in the Northern and Eastern provinces, stating specifically the need for the formation of a provin cial council for the Northern province and the reestablishment of village councils demolis hed by the LTTE in the North and East (2011, 248). A thorough discussion of the vari ous institutional structures which could be built in a new northern Sri Lanka is outsi de the scope of this study; what is certain is that without a model of governance that caters to Tamil aspirations, victory over the LTTE will merely usher in a Sri Lanka plagued b y distrust, alienation, and ethnic enmity. The possibilities for a renewed surge of vi olence, then, will be far greater. Sri Lankan government policies promoted severe econ omic hardship, alienation, and a sense of fear within the Tamil community. Thi s process was compounded by a burgeoning Sinhalese ethnic identity that claimed h egemony over Sri Lanka’s heritage, culture, and politics, and which both exerted press ure on and was utilized by a series of government leaders who prioritized control and mani pulation over the development of a free and open society. At the same time, however, T amil political elites contributed to the

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148 problem by crafting a mutually exclusive cultural s pace that envisioned a resurgent Tamil nationalism threatened by an ethnically homogenous and barbaric Sinhalese giant. When it became clear that Tamil separatism was a growing threat, Sri Lanka’s political leaders repeatedly scuttled chances of a potential devoluti onary scheme and instead chose to engage in ethnic jockeying to further their persona l ends. Tamil groups such as the TULF sought to utilize militants to pressure the governm ent into accepting a deal, but did not envision the Pandora’s Box of violence and bloodshe d that was unleashed on Tamil and Sinhalese alike. Sri Lanka, whose future had seemed so promising in the early years after independence, had slid to a country marked by autho ritarianism, extremism, and bloodshed. By Black July, the possibility for recon ciliation had become remote.

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149 Chapter 6 Towards an Understanding: Lessons Learned From Comparative Analysis If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him. I f he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irrita te him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, giv e him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. If sovereign and subject are in ac cord, put division between them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. Sun Tzu, The Art of War …Suppose we were… an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, in vulnerable, without front or back, drifting like a gas? Armies were like plants, immobile, firm-rooted, nourished through long stems to the head. We might be a vap our, blowing where we listed. Our kingdoms lay in each man's mind; and as we wanted nothing material to live on, so we might offer nothing material to the killing Lt. Colonel T. E. Lawrence As the cases of the three ethno-nationalist movemen ts analyzed previously demonstrate, political and social setting greatly d ifferentiates the means and methods with which terrorist militia operate. While Norther n Ireland, Israel, and Sri Lanka all suffered from periodic terror campaigns utilizing m any of the same tactics, strategies, and methodologies, terrorism took a different course in each. Northern Ireland saw the failure of a non-violent protest campaign cause the splinte ring of the Official IRA and the remobilization of a significant armed movement unde r the Provisional IRA; the PIRA then slowly transitioned from an ‘underground’ mili tant faction with specific strategic precepts to the aging and slowly disappearing partn er of a more powerful political wing under Sinn Fein. In Palestine, Hamas was the offsho ot of a burgeoning Islamist movement that found ample room to grow in the space left by an increasingly

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150 delegitimized secular opposition; now it too is reentering the political arena, but under pressures which threaten its own ideological precep ts by which it claims legitimacy. It is perhaps accurate to say that by comparison the LTTE broke off from the political process almost completely, reliant heavily on external fund ing and support to mobilize its rapid absorption of all authority in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka. Its failure to evolve from a purely militaristic and xenophobic mode to one whic h that effectively maneuver within a political environment was a product of internal hie rarchies, a lack of Tamil opposition, and the LTTE’s possession of disproportionately str ong financial and military resources whose sources were largely foreign and thus insulat ed from the impact of the war on the contested provinces themselves. Although all three of these organizations utilized terrorist tactics, the dissonance between their political obj ectives, strategies, and evolution calls into question the analytical value of the label of terrorism itself. Rather, comparative analysis brings forth a realization that use of the terror tactic does not in and of itself denote shared characteristics beyond terrorism’s ut ilization. Instead social, economic, and political factors interact with a terrorist organiz ation’s environment to produce different modes of internal organization and external interac tion. Thus the first and easiest conclusion about terrorism studies is that study of any terrorist movement must be accompanied by meticulous and individualized resear ch; comparative studies have to be grounded in specific and localized understanding of both sociopolitical environments and the differing personal and organizational incentive structures that produce terror as the strategy of an organization. Instrumental methodology provided a robust and well -developed literature, laden with its own assumptions, which constituted a basis from which other schools of analysis

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151 have grown and critiqued. What is clear is that bec ause it relies purely on external observations it is insufficient to capture how and why these organizations reach internal decisions and operate within the wider political co ntest. The organizational method also suffers from a similar myopia, mainly because its f ocus on analyzing the internal dynamics of the terrorist group is contradicted by a severe lack of applicable data. End results and the political environment, as analyzed by statistical data about the number and intensity of terrorist actions, economic signifiers terrorist communiqus to the outside world, etc., are all readily available in some mann er or another. Internal disagreements, de facto vs. de jure power distribution, the concerns which direct and mobilize human and capital resources, the internal logic of extern ally confusing actions, all factors important to study under the organizational framewo rk, are not – at least as long as the terrorists remain entrenched in an underground cult ure, unable or unwilling to exert influence through alternative means. These case studies of the PIRA, Hamas, and LTTE hav e illustrated that while the organizational process school’s emphasis on interna l mechanisms is illuminating and allows for a better understanding of each movement than the instrumental framework, it is characterized by a lack of parsimony and evidenc e that could produce concrete observations. This is not necessarily a failure of the organizational framework but reflects the lack of information and ambiguity that is commo n when analyzing terrorist organizations. Instrumental theory’s emphasis that terrorism is a political tool utilized to achieve specific political ends is similarly incomp lete, because terrorism rarely accomplishes an organization’s stated political obj ectives. Various explanations from different schools have been advanced within the ins trumental framework to explain this

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152 disjuncture. An advocate of the psychological approach may suggest that it is the act of violence in a terrorist’s mind that matters; so long-term ideologi cal objectives would not be defining success. Or an organizational approach analyst might argue, as long as the terrorist organization survives, the success is achieved. For an advocate of the instrumental approach, attaining the political ends are important so the survival of the terrorist organization even though the ultimate aims canno t be achieved could be explained by the achievement of so-called intermediary aims. (zdamar 2008, 92) Instrumental theory’s basic assumptions about the n ature of terrorism allow it to be intellectually complete as far as constituting a n effective analytical framework are concerned, but the very assumptions that provide it s efficiency and ease of use undermine an analyst’s ability to determine the preferences a nd internal dynamics that guide a terrorist group’s utilization of the terror tactic. In the organizational approach, terrorist groups… …are taken as self-sustaining and they do whatever necessary is to survive. Organization delivers goods to the members to keep them in the organization. These can be tangible goods or public goods… or even be intangible g oods like respect, of feeling of belonging to a network of social relationships. ( zdamar 2008, 93) Other factors that are taken into consideration in the organizational framework include the competitive environment within which te rrorists function; to sustain themselves and succeed in the market, terrorist gro ups provide varying sets of incentives and resources to their members and attempt to becom e social centers of the community. These behaviors can clearly be seen in the actions of various terrorist groups. The IRA justified criminal activity such as extortion, robb ery, and fraud in the pursuit of its goal of a united Ireland, but these functions of the group eventually became self-sustaining in their own right. For example, Horgan and Taylor rep orted that “one senior figure within the PIRA's southern command based in Dublin was sai d to receive a figure close to £6,000 at one Christmas during the 1994-96 cease-fi re 'to keep him happy'” and prevent him from carrying out attacks that could sabotage t he PIRA’s negotiations (1999, 7).

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153 While ostensibly such payouts were intended to prot ect against a failure of the ceasefire and thus safeguard an intermediary political object ive, the very fact that the PIRA was forced to bribe one of its own commanders into pass ivity is indicative of a complex network of varying personal incentives for group me mbership. These incentives were utilized by group elites to maintain unity within t he organization despite internal dissent over its political activities. Furthermore, as Bell observes, “the Provisional IRA was in theory and usually in practice a democratic army, s electing its leaders from the available talent” rather than from a hierarchal structure; si nce in many the “dream of the Republic was the single incandescent engine” of their depriv ed lives, IRA membership meant that “prominence and opportunity often came to those who would never have found another route to achievement” (2000, 113-125). Membership i n the organization and the act of pursuing its goals became in and of itself a major incentive to those who were otherwise denied an empowering self-identity in the economic and social wasteland of Northern Ireland. Similar, if not more radical, structures o f identity were observed by P.L. de Silva in his study on the LTTE… The cadres of the LTTE construct their identity in oppositi on to the other (i.e. the enemy stereotype), in accordance with the truth and reality of the master narrative constructed by the organization’s hierarchy (as they have no access to any other)… a vivid instance of this can be seen in the story narrated to me b y an ex-LTTE field commander. He told me, pointing to his throat, “The knife i s here,” and said, “I could walk out (of the window) at any time”… the reason for this, he explained, was his feeling of bereavement and loss after leaving the organisation.. [that] was literally everything to him – father, mother, brother and sister. (19 95, 180-181) When an organization fails to attain political goal s, then, the effect is not necessarily to delegitimize participation or involv ement and cause collapse, because there is an elaborate series of incentives and meanings i mparted to group membership that are largely unrelated to ultimate strategic ends. The k inds of incentives offered by terrorist networks to participants in the political market ar e not restricted to members, either.

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154 Hamas’s extensive charity network, in tandem with i ts religious character, allowed for the group to build trust and support among its supposed constituents. The combination of 'religious' knowledge, piety and mosque an d community involvement has enabled Hamas leaders to claim some of the capital traditionally reserved for shaykhs, 'saints' and 'religious' functionaries ... Hamas has come to perform some of the vital functions once performed by these tr aditional authority figures (Gunning 2008, 123-124) This symbolic capital was translated directly to th e kind of political capital that allowed it to gain electoral support in Gaza, and a lso led to Palestinians supporting Hamas through actions such as shielding and protect ing Hamas operatives. The instrumental framework has little way of invest igating the elaborate networks of incentives – whether financial, ideological, ide ntity-based, or otherwise – that sustain it even though terrorists rarely achieve their ends These incentive networks and the competitiveness of the terrorist market also explai n why terrorist actions do not necessarily reflect ideological values (Crenshaw 19 87). One example is the LTTE’s decision to eliminate other Tamil militant groups r ather than ally with them; both Prabhakaran’s obsessive character and the relative military advantage the LTTE enjoyed over the various opposition factors were incentives to consolidate and cement control at the overall cost of the movement. The difficulty of the organizational approach is in articulating the various ways in which terrorists a cquire and utilize social and political capital in the absence of any theoretical assumptio ns about the nature of individual groups; indeed, within the approach “terrorist acts are assumed to appear inconsistent, erratic and unpredictable” (zdamar 2008, 94). Thus it is necessary to situate analysis of terrorist acts with a variety of hypotheses about w hat the act was intended to accomplish, not merely the advancement of ultimate or intermedi ary political goals. Terrorism is as much a social as political phenomena, even if it is intended to accomplish specific

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155 political objectives. For this reason, an overdue e mphasis on the interior structures that mobilize and utilize individual and group allegianc e is required as a complementary approach to the instrumental framework. Organizatio nal theory is particularly well constructed to do this, since it is open to a wide variety of complementary multidisciplinary approaches. Instrumental theory only has one explanation of ter rorism's evolution – that it is an effective political tool for weak actors. Organi zational theory sees the resort to terrorism as the result of a complicated interplay of individual incentives within the organization. Since the case studies of terrorist g roups displayed wide variety in the economic and political environment that produced th em, it seems that the rational-choice methodologies cannot produce a predictive model of when exactly the opportunity costs for organized use of terror are low enough to produ ce the formation of a terrorist group. Social or ethnic groups with the most legitimate gr ievances are not always the ones who resort to terrorism. What does seem crucial is when “the social contract that binds individuals and social structures loses its legitim acy. Chaos, or in Durkheim's words, anomie takes the place of social order” (Kayaoglu 2 007, 100). When the structures that had formerly ensured some measure of belonging to t he source of authority are disrupted – either through policies which induce hopelessness economic deprivation, or discrimination, or through the imposition of illegi timate control – common values that bound society are delegitimized in increasing segme nts of the population, leading to the development of alternative values such as martyrdom dehumanization of other ethnic groups, etc. The cultural approach highlights how “ real or perceived external threat or internal repression fosters a sense of defeat, depr ession, and disenfranchisement that

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156 accelerates the formation of extremism” (Sadri 2007 40). Merton argued that “social disorder and anomie results from individuals motiva ted to live up to the cultural value of success, but with no or with inadequate institution al means, whereby they find different alternatives… even if it is through crime” (Kayaogl u 2007, 101). Individuals seeking meaning or purpose in an unstable social environmen t marked primarily by the profound illegitimacy of typical authority may be drawn to r adical groups; for example, most terrorist organizations focus not on recruiting tho se most committed to their shared political goals but the “socially isolated,” partic ularly young, directionless, and unemployed men (Abrahms 2008, 99). Abrahms suggests that the result is that most terro rists act to maximize their social solidarity, becoming “far more tight-knit than othe r voluntary associations” because of the extreme personal risk involved in participation ; thus, these susceptible individuals find some refuge from widespread social anomie in t errorist groups (2008, 99-100). To some extent the development of societal anomie is u nquantifiable; however, specific conditions that intensify disconnection from author ity and intensify alienation can be observed across all of our case studies. The compon ents which spawn militia-type terrorist organizations include perceived if not ac tual economic and political disenfranchisement, especially relative to a politi cally competitive and dissimilar ethnic group; manipulation of ethnic identity by jockeying social and political elites; and the failure of moderate political processes to accompli sh positive change. These three factors combine to produce social conditions that promulgat e radical ethno-nationalist ideologies and lower the opportunity costs for some form of po litical violence. Successful, or at least powerful, ethno-nationalist militias seem to requir e all three variables to form. Specific

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157 factors, such as the disproportionate presence of y oung, unemployed men, a religious difference between target and terrorist communities foreign funding and resources, and cultural dispositions all play a role in intensifyi ng or modifying the types of violence or strategic goals pursued, but the ultimate resort to political violence seems to be social anomie in conjunction with the three main component s. Certain aspects such as political chauvinism, heavy-handed or incompetent security re sponses, internal competition between militant groups, structure and success of n egotiations, etc. also modify the individual and group incentives for the level of vi olence and the possibilities of diversification of the struggle back into the polit ical mainstream. The remainder of this chapter will focus on the thr ee most comparable factors of the ethno-nationalist organizations in this study f rom an organizational theory standpoint: the selection of targets of political violence and the tactics adopted; the internal logic motivating suicide attacks; and finally, an analysi s of the structural factors that produced either an entrance into or rejection of mainstream political participation as a complementary strategy to the use of terror. How are Targets Defined and Tactics Determined? The strategic model predicts that targets of terror ism would be selected on the basis of political objectives or their intermediate precepts. The major failure of the instrumental framework in determining who will be t argeted for violence and why is in assuming that the terrorist organization will in fa ct act strategically. An overwhelming focus on political ends precludes understanding tha t terrorist objectives may not be attainable or desirable for the group in the first place; as Abrahms critiques, “terrorist

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158 attacks tend to close – not open – the bargaining s pace between what terrorist groups demand and what target governments are willing to o ffer” (2008, 83-84). The organizational framework, however, directs the atte ntion of an analyst studying a terrorist organization to the various individual and group-le vel incentives that shape preferences for tactics and strategies. This model predicts tha t the overall result of these internal processes will result in a terrorist campaign that does not reflect strategic logic, often resulting in illogical target selection. Often terr orist strategies (particularly attacking civilians) are not politically popular or worsen th e possibility of achieving ultimate political goals, which does not necessarily preclud e that terrorists are calculating costs and benefits rationally, but reflects that internal constraints prevent them from pursuing a unified and coherent strategy. The IRA, LTTE, and Hamas all utilized attacks again st civilians as a major cornerstone of their militant strategy during at le ast some portion of their campaigns. The LTTE, and to a lesser extent Hamas, also engaged in feuding with other militant organizations, which weakened their ability to purs ue stated objectives, but consolidated domestic control and served a variety of alternate goals. Neither of these two applications of violence fit within the strategic model; the com mon rebuttal of this criticism is that the terrorists have erred in their strategic calculatio ns or that they are acting to strengthen their position in the long term. It seems both orga nizational and instrumental analysis can bring some light to bear on these theoretical dilem mas. On one hand, terrorist groups may be acting strategically to maximize their capacity to obtain goals in the long term. This philosophy was prominent in Prabhakaran’s justifica tion of the elimination of LTTE opposition within Tamil areas. Hamas’s reluctance t o be involved in fitnah with the

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159 secular Palestinian opposition was conditioned by a philosophy that emphasized the need to school and train other members of the Palestinia n community into Islamic thought slowly. However, other dynamics emerge in both case s. As a symbol, the cyanide capsule and an emphasis on martyrdom “gave the LTTE an edge in the struggle with other fighting groups for Tamil support;” thus LTTE membe rs perceived they had a moral right and mandate to solely represent the Tamil community (Roberts 2007, 18). Similarly, Hamas’s preemptive strike against Fatah was the res ult of growing suspicion and fear that Hamas would be destroyed and scattered by a PA seiz ure of Gaza and was not as is commonly portrayed an act of strategic expansionism In fact the result was probably to marginalize the moderates who were willing to strat egically negotiate with Israel and the PA by ruining any possibility of trust; the most ra tional and forward-thinking Hamas members were the elements of the group hurt the mos t. Another dilemma is that terrorist attacks inevitabl y bring some form of retribution from the security forces, likely worsening the grou p’s position. Formulating this into the strategic model, Kydd and Walter refer to this stra tegy as provocation, “to goad the target government into a military response that harms civi lians within the terrorist organization’s home territory,” and thus is a delib erate strategy to convince the civilians that the government is “so evil that the radical go als of the terrorists are justified” (2006, 69-70). Bell observed that provocation was a signif icant cornerstone of the IRA’s early strategy. ...there has always been provocation as operations drive the autho rities into a desired response... provocation is the IRA's operational escalation, rai sing costs and assuring British response. That response as often as not makes further provocation necessary but also costly. (Bell 2005, 279)

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160 The IRA’s own Green Book claims one objective of it s strategy was to “make the Six Counties as at present and for the past several years ungovernable except by colonial military rule.” Thus provocation was intended to en courage a British response, stretch out their forces allowing for easy attacks, and force t he British to reveal their true face by engaging in disproportionate and draconian response s. IRA provocation occasionally served to goad the British into a favorable reactio n, as it did when detainment without trial was imposed in August 1971. More often, howev er, it escalated the security presence, making operations harder to conduct and f orcing IRA gunmen and bombers to search harder for opportunities of attack. This out come served some benefit in that subsequent IRA attacks became more impressive; with tanks and soldiers in Belfast, successful operations then took on an air of David versus Goliath. However, what the strategic model fails to take into account is that, without some form of government escalation and response the conflict would not have materialized in the first place. The period of IRA provocation took place during the ear ly 1970s when recruits were attempting to join the organization at a far faster rate than it could train or arm them. Thus there were significant pressures from their co nstituent communities, the new militants, and the IRA command to utilize their adv antage as quickly and forcefully as possible. Provocation was intended to goad the Brit ish government into embarrassing and discrediting itself, but it was much too imprecise a strategy to accurately gauge the British response. At best, it was logical in the sh ort term and did not materialize into a coherent strategy. By the mid-1980s to 1990s, the IRA’s options for ta rgets were increasingly limited, leading to some occasionally bewildering m issions, such as the assassination of

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161 Dublin crime boss Martin Cahill in 1994 “for uncert ain purpose and to mixed reviews” (Bell 2005, 283). Fearon claims that after a few ye ars of conflict, “fighters on both sides of an insurgency typically develop accurate underst andings of the other side’s capabilities, tactics, and resolve,” but the IRA co ntinued reflexively utilizing terrorist tactics long beyond the point it was plausible to f orce the British out of Northern Ireland (2005, 290). IRA operations in Britain, such as the pub bombing campaign, strengthened British resolve against the IRA and made it easier for them to justify a continued occupation. Organizational theory provides a viewpoint to expla in this lack of strategic adaptation. As Crenshaw notes, terrorist organizati ons are not fundamentally dissimilar from corporations in that their primary objective w hen hard-pressed is to continue operations (1988, 22). The natural systems approach emphasizes that “most individuals engage in a cost-benefit analysis of whether to par ticipate in an organization based on its personal inducements, which have little if any conn ection to the organization’s goals” (Abrahms 2008, 95). A main psychological incentive of involvement in terrorist groups is that, due to social factors in a terrorist’s “speci fic nation and province,” he or she “may enjoy considerable popular support and conscientiou sly serve his society in a prosocial way” (Victoroff 2005, 13). The predominant psycholo gical approach, group process theory, argues that rebellious subcultures coalesce around the perception of intolerable conditions. The key observation of this school is t hat within terrorist organizations “collective identity subsumes individual identity,” eventually leading to continued group solidarity even in the face of growing opposition ( Victoroff 2005, 30). Many terrorist organizations maintain group solidarity through a v ariety of methods, one of which is

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162 manipulation of exit costs. Hamas was comparatively restrained in its executions of suspected informers within its ranks and the genera l population during the Intifadas compared to the PLO, which no doubt legitimized mem bers’ perceptions of themselves as morally superior to the secular opposition (Gunning 2008, 129-130). In comparison, the cyanide pills dangled around LTTE cadres’ necks ser ved as a constant reminder that not only was allowing oneself to be captured a betrayal of the Tamil community, membership in the Tigers meant death or victory – no other opt ions. A variety of incentives and potential punishments work in militant circles to e nsure that members of terrorist groups remain committed to the tactics utilized by the org anization previously, even if they have proven ineffective. Accordingly, it might be predicted that government escalation could have a number of unintended effects. Indeed the impact of military involvement worsened the situation in all of the cases studied here. Militar y introduction into ethnic civil conflicts has multiple outcomes. First and most important is that military and police forces have completely different roles in society; broadly spea king soldiers are trained to kill and defend or take territory, and police are trained to maintain civil order through a variety of tactics of which overt violence is only one. Since “whether or not forces are effective depends on both their intrinsic capabilities and th e missions they are assigned,” the military responses in our case studies were marked by both the systematic inability for armed forces to fight an ephemeral foe while dealin g with a lack of political direction (Richardson 2005, 584). When the military is called out to combat a foe who has primarily tactics of attrition with unclear objecti ves, it is very likely that the military presence will result in increased militancy and ter rorism. The reasons for this are twofold;

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163 while police generally have some connection to the community, military forces are more foreign, and soldiers are an even easier operationa l target to justify. Furthermore, military involvement signals that the government has come to the conclusion that paramilitarism has overwhelmed its civil capabilities for conflict resolution, resulting in the widespread perception that the conflict has become a military rather than civil issue, therefore legitimizing resistance. As Bell observed on the IR A, “once the shooting started, the major effort would be escalation, more of the same, operational matters... so strategy became tactics. Intelligence focused on military op erations rather than on dissecting British diplomatic intentions or the intentions and agenda of the Irish voter” (2005, 241). Both the instrumental and organizational framework indicate that a terrorist movement that perceives it has achieved military parity with the government then has thorough incentives to remain militarized; instrumentally, a valuable intermediary political goal has been achieved through a successful tactic, and orga nizationally, there is now a wide range of actors invested in pursuing, if not escalation, then at least a maintenance of the new status quo. Furthermore, the introduction of the mi litary to combat terrorism does not reduce violence or stabilize a troubled region; Ric hardson notes dramatic increases in violent conflict intensity in Sri Lanka following t he militarization effort after 1983. By 1988 violent conflict had become the predominant co ncern of the Jayawardene administration overshadowing all other functions of government (Richardson 2005, 528530). Bandarage likewise identifies the paramilitar y repression of the Jayawardene government, which involved off-duty police and mili tary personnel, as playing a “significant role in both the deterioration of publ ic trust in the government and the worsening of Sinhala-Tamil relations” (2009, 97-99) However, she also notes that it was

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164 not until the introduction of direct Indian militar y involvement that the LTTE began to organize itself formally into a more conventional g uerrilla force. Prabhakaran and the insular LTTE leadership “were always a primarily mi litary organization,” and by the 2000s this culture had embedded so deeply into the Northern and Eastern provinces that when ceasefires broke down civil servants employed “in the political wing, and police or Peace Secretariat” were recalled to perform militar y duties (Philipson 2009, 107). In Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, and Palestine, the lin e between police and military became blurred, thus making it hard for civilians to trust law enforcement personnel. Complicating analysis of target selection is the ac tive manipulation of ethnic identity by elites in both the government and param ilitary arena to legitimize violence against competing social groups. This manipulation has led to a dominant bipolar analysis of terrorism (particularly the ethno-natio nalist subtype covered in this study) that approaches ethnic identity as an immutable factor o f terroristic civil conflicts. These assumptions also have to be problematized. As Ismai l observes: ...identities cannot be taken for granted; that they are fluid, transient, always in flux, never permanent; and that they alter (discursively) precisely becaus e they are constructs. If they were 'real' stable and eternal, they wouldn' t change. (1995, 66) It is more analytically coherent to envision ethnic identity as a complicated web of links among various social groups, which themsel ves are rarely homogenous. Actions that inflame ethnic tensions should be conceptualiz ed as having reverberations throughout the wider social network, but they are n ot absolute. Violence does not occur across concrete ethnic lines; instead the selection of victims becomes blurred in the systematic and continuous redefinition of social id entity. This partially explains why terrorist organizations are continually subject to flux in determining the legitimacy of different targets across social and ethnic lines. T he IRA's redefinition of Catholic

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165 civilians designated collaborators and subsequent r eversal demonstrates this aptly, as does the LTTE's systematic elimination of domestic opponents despite their shared Tamil heritage and commitment to the separatist cause. Th e instrumental argument which claims that targeting is meant to affect specific a udiences often overemphasizes the strategic logic which goes into selection and can c ause an equally poorly planned response. Terrorist targeting is fluid and often se ems incoherent from an ideological standpoint but correlates with individual actors' p erceptions of which targets can be justified, modulated by a continuous process of soc ial and ethnic reevaluation. Instead, the preferences of various actors within terrorist organizations change along with the consistently changing backdrop of environmental, so cial, economic, and political variables. What is the Real Internal Logic of Suicide Attacks? The most prominent instrumental analysis of suicide terrorism is Robert Pape's 2005 book Dying to Win which argues that suicide tactics are a successfu l strategy by which weak actors can induce leverage against a tar get government. On a fundamental level, Pape claims suicide terrorism to be nearly u niversally induced by a “common... specific and secular goal: to compel modern democra cies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be t heir homeland” (Pape 2005, 4). He argues that “the only coercive strategy available to suici de terrorists is punishment,” “to cause mounting civilian costs to overwhelm the target sta te's interest in the issue dispute” and cause concession (30). Since it is extremely diffic ult to evaluate the effectiveness of a particular terrorist tactic, terrorists are as incl ined as any other actor to attribute success to

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166 their involvement and actions. For example, Hamas s pokesperson Ahmad Bakr claimed that “what forced the Israelis to withdraw from Gaz a [in 1994] was the intifada and not the Oslo agreement” (70). Furthermore, Pape emphasi zes that suicide bombing is not primarily anomic, but instead is a form of altruist ic suicide, in which the would-be bomber intentionally sacrifices his life for the su pposed good of his community. However compelling Pape's explanation is, it is not complete. Bloom, for example, criticizes Pape's and others' research for “the misleading analytical assumption of voluntariness” (2008, 583). He notes several exa mples of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations handcuffing potential suicide bombers to the wheel, remote detonators at the ready, and other cases in which car bomb driver s were under the impression that they were smuggling contraband. By 1990 the IRA had evol ved a similar tactic; while previously they had forced civilians to plant bombs by kidnapping their families, now they were conducting operations in which "the drive r would not have the opportunity to escape" (586). What seems significant is that altho ugh the IRA embraced the notion of self-sacrifice and martyrdom (through hunger strike s, nearly suicidal missions, and consistent risk of arrest), either members of IRA s ervice units were unwilling to conduct suicide operations or the leadership was reluctant to order them. And although "there was a virtual hierarchy of acceptable targets in which civilians were generally unacceptable except under the most extreme circumstances," opera tions such as the October 24 1990 detonation of three simultaneous coerced-driver car bombs were deliberately engineered to showcase that the drivers were civilian collabor ators with the British security forces (594-595). Three explanations emerged; first, that the IRA was signaling to the British that they had fundamentally altered their tactics; an IRA bomber claimed that they were

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167 designed to “shake the Brits out of their complacen cy: (596). Alternatively, the bombs were described as revenge for the shooting of top I RA men by the Special Air Service (SAS) at Loughgall in Armagh. A more interesting th eory notes that the British had been intensifying their fortifications in the six counti es and modernizing their intelligence operations; the attacks were in response to British intelligence capabilities and intended to demonstrate that these gains “had not blunted th e overall efficacy of its [the IRA's] mobility and ability to shock” (597). Notably, form er IRA members involved in the attacks claimed that, when they had previously been under interrogation, British security personnel “mocked them about the futility of their tactics,” introducing the possibility that to some extent the attacks were a form of IRA gloating (598). In either case, the reaction to the operation was uniformly negative, e ven across republican spheres; one pro-IRA community member complained to the IRA that the operation had made them “look like those fanatics in the Middle East” (601) In either case, the IRA Army Council had seemingly completely misjudged the mood of even its own constituency. Amazingly the ta ctic was not completely abandoned; a subsequent bombing in February 1991 followed the same script but instead coerced a Protestant man to drive the bomb. Bloom argues that the attacks may have been tacitly accepted by moderate elements in the IRA’s internal political arena, led by Gerry Adams, to discredit hardliners; alternatively, it may have been an attempt by the hardline elements to sabotage ongoing negotiations (2008, 606). In ei ther case it is important to look at the internal dynamics of IRA to determine why coerced-b omb attackers were utilized again despite the obvious outrage it inspired in virtuall y everyone in Northern Ireland. IRA leaders may have simply made a disastrous miscalcul ation; one possible theory is that

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168 having found a tactic that was able to strike beyon d British complacency, IRA members were reluctant to give it up even when it was clear it was hurting the movement as a whole. Suicide terrorism is rarely a strategy of first res ort. Michael Roberts criticizes Pape's focus on the strategic logic of suicide atta cks, noting that the first LTTE suicide bomb, an attack on a military base in the Jaffna pe ninsula, took place when "the foundations of devotional commitment to death-for-c ause were firmly in place already" (2007, 8). The attack was justified by the LTTE as necessary because they lacked the military power to overtake the base by force and wa s possibly inspired by previous Hezbollah attacks, which points to strategic calcul ation and rational choice. While Roberts admits that suicide missions “have indeed b een an important facet of the LTTE operations not only as a weapon in a beleaguered co ntext, but as precision strikes that decapitate key leaders at moments of import for the LTTE's political objectives,” he argues that Pape's analysis gives too much credence to suicide attacks for the group's success (2007, 26). By overstating the impact of su icide missions, the social and religious influences behind martyrdom are sidelined. Furtherm ore, the characterization of the LTTE as secular is misleading, because deeply roote d Tamil Hindu religious concepts were key in realizing the cult of suicide. While th e LTTE was officially secular, where “supra-mundane forces are intrinsic facets for some actors and for some part of the local constituency,” the concept of secularism becomes so mewhat meaningless (2007, 10). LTTE suicide bombs were certainly motivated by inst rumental logic, but the use of attacks was enabled by a far broader cultural conte xt. The widespread cult of martyrdom indicates that the bombings were prized as fulfilli ng a religious or cultural mandate just

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169 as much as they were a military tool. In opposition to the view that suicide bombing is a phenomena spread throughout all levels of Palestinian society, Khashan also arg ues “political Islam does indeed play a crucial role in fomenting proneness to participatio n in suicide attacks, especially among refugee camp inhabitants, where dismal poverty coal esces with radical Islam” (2003, 1063). His review of dispositional predictors found significant evidence that suicide bombing is highly linked to refugee camp poverty an d “a deep sense of national humiliation, which bombers seek to redeem by politi cising religion, not through breaking away from it;” thus “maltreated young laborers and those unable to find a refuge abroad” become suicide bombers (Khashan 2003, 1062-1063). I t is more than reasonable to assume that many potential suicide bombers believe they are acting rationally when instead they are under immeasurable and extended ps ychological duress. Berman and Laitin argue that Hamas bombings are rat ional since "apprehension is far more dangerous for the organization than the at tacker dying because an interrogated attacker exposes the other operatives" (2005, 18). Substantiating this logic, they measured a disproportionate number of suicide attac ks on the Israeli side of the green line; while there were 17,405 attacks in the West B ank and Gaza, only eight people died from a suicide operation as compared to 401 in Isra el from 730 attacks (Berman and Laitin 2005, 23). Hard targets are more likely to b e the focus of a suicide attack because the high costs of coordinating a suicide operation can only be justified if the target is highly valuable. Therefore they conclude suicide te rrorism is highly rational, at least from the perspective of the bombers' handlers. Berman an d Laitin argue that terrorist organizations function as clubs which provide incen tives such as social services to

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170 members and the community. They propose two separat e models for suicide terrorist organizations; while Hamas “reduces the risk of def ection by augmenting the inside options of members with benign local public goods,” an organization such as the LTTE “reduces the risk of defection by destroying outsid e options of members with a pervasive public bad – threat of attack from the club itself” (2005, 26). The contrast is highlighted by Hamas' emphasis on charity and social service as opposed to the LTTE's distinctive militarism. As far as suicide bombings are concerne d this distinction, however, overlooks a considerable gray area within which many LTTE sui cide bombers have not been coerced, while Hamas martyrs are often equipped wit h remote detonation devices to ensure success. In either case, the attribution of rationality rest s upon the precept that the handlers are acting to coerce opponents and not engaging in solipsistic violence. This is hard to measure, although as Abrahms suggests, the coercive logic of suicide attacks is disputable since realistic demands are rarely issued and almos t never prior to the attacks (2008, 90). If the strategic logic of a suicide campaign was in tended to maximize its coercive capacity this could be expected to happen more than it has. At the very least, initial suicide bombings would be followed with direct dema nds for policy concessions with the threat of continued attacks. Rather, it is more lik ely that suicide operations partially arise from internal group dynamics such as ideology, reli gious motivation, and the consistent need to engage the enemy and maintain momentum even when the specifics of timing and targeting may have little strategic value. For example, conventional knowledge indicates that indoctrination or 'brainwashing' is actively utilized by suicide organizations to recruit bombers. Instead Berman and Laitin sugge st that “the combination of beliefs

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171 necessary for a rational martyr is not so very unli kely,” and that would-be bombers could be attending religious services known to be screene d by terrorist handlers as a way of signaling their willingness to die (2005, 11). In s uch a context, it is hard to imagine a terrorist group discontinuing suicide bombings even if there was evidence suggesting that it was ineffective at coercing the government, sinc e community support would supply the necessary organizational momentum. In any case, the tactical logic of suicide bombing as an effective tactic clearly appears to be just one of many internal factors affecting a terrorist organization’s decision as whether or not to engage in a suicide campaign. Other incentives are solipsistic, member-driven, or simpl y reflect cultural factors (whether community-wide or within the context of the organiz ation’s subculture) that predispose members to engage in suicidal violence. An instrume ntal framework can only explain part of the story, albeit an important one. When do Terrorists Enter the Mainstream? Cronin’s research suggests that a major factor in t he decline of terrorist organizations is the inability to transfer the mili tant cause along generational lines (2006, 19-24). In the specific context of domestic ethno-n ationalist movements, this is particularly important, since their constituency an d pool of potential recruits is locally determined. Cronin notes that the internal politics surrounding first and secondgeneration memberships in terrorist organizations i s highly sensitive and thus generational succession can trigger the decline int o irrelevance or split of a group (2006, 19-24). While terrorist groups that fade on a gener ational basis tend to have extremist political or religious ideologies, those based on s trong territorial or ethno-nationalistic

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172 basis are more likely to split or enter negotiation s. These processes imply not only dissent over political objectives but strong social divides within the groups themselves and with their constituencies. By 1990, for example, the IRA had a new generation of sophisticated Sinn Fein leaders “probing future options and old a ssumptions” (Bell 2005, 306), but they were complemented by a new generation of young people who “abhorred the trinity of Provisional support – country piety, Gaelic paro chialism, and Irish patriotism – [who] found the campaign horrid, the IRA evil, their pret ensions outrageous“ (176), “not legitimate descendants of patriots but mad-dog murd erers” (217). The splits which followed the GFA in 1998 were not merely the result s of the PIRA's political calculations but a move designed to position Sinn Fein within ev olving social norms. (Another powerful argument against the strategic logic of te rrorism comes in the form of militant splinter groups such as the Real IRA, who must have been taken into account that any successor organizations would have almost nonexiste nt chances of attaining a united Ireland through continued terrorism.) There was con siderable overlap between Sinn Fein and IRA memberships and constituencies and thus the matter became one of organizational survival of the overall Republican m ovement. Neither paramilitarism or politics seemed likely to grant the North to an Iri sh Free State, but disastrous incidents such as the 1998 Omagh bomb revealed that the remai ning hardliners had a comparatively unrealistic conception of how best to continue the struggle. Hamas’s evolution into a political entity cannot be satisfactorily explained by this generational process. Importantly, Hamas suicide at tacks continued until early 2005, just one year before it entered politics; the social cap ital acquired by martyrdom operations was also a significant form of propaganda utilized in their electoral strategy. As Gunning

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173 notes, although paramilitary figures did not direct ly enter elections as candidates, “Hamas candidates in Nablus launched their campaign from t he home of assassinated bombmaker Yahya ‘Ayyash, thus capitalizing on the symbo lic capital of one of the [al-Qassam] Brigades’ most famous martyrs” (2008, 175-176). The Hamas decision to enter politics was conditioned by historic internal cautiousness a bout the efficacy of direct political involvement and fears that it could pollute the mov ement’s overall ideological purity. That Hamas entered politics at all signaled that it viewed the 2006-2007 Palestinian elections as a way to redefine the internal politic al arena in Palestine and considered the existing structure so devoid of legitimacy that its entrance could not affect it ideologically. From the perspective of Hamas hardli ners, this decision became a major miscalculation because Hamas was now inherently tie d to the processes of balancing governance with its paramilitary operations. It the n becomes exceptionally important to attempt to strengthen moderate elements in Hamas, w hile simultaneously pursuing policies that attempt to convince the more recalcit rant faction’s membership of politics’ efficacy. The danger, as noted by Abrahms, is that many terrorists are motivated by social incentives and that forcing portions of a movement into insularity may not decrease their commitment to violence (as what happened following the split of the conservative PIRA elements into a number of marginal yet violent fact ions, resulting in the Real IRA Omagh bombing). Since Hamas is an organization primarily structured around social and religious solidarity, as emphasized in the prominen t role of the Mujamma’ and its charity wings, this is a particularly salient risk. Relativ e extremists in Hamas’ Political Bureau and al-Qassam Brigades may “seek to prolong [their] existence, even when doing so impedes [Hamas’] official goals” (Abrahms 2008, 101 ). Abrahms further recommends

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174 disrupting the social networks within terrorist org anizations by sowing discord amongst its members as a way to cause organizational collap se and reducing the need for populations to seek refuge in extremist subcultures as a way of dealing with individual and social anomie (2008, 104-105). An effective str ategy to rein in Hamas would thereby de-emphasize militarization and securitization resp onses and encourage the development of parallel moderate movements. As noted, Israeli p olicy towards the Palestinian Authority historically was to ensure domination of PA elites while simultaneously remaining stubborn on the peace process, resulting in a culture of corruption and inefficacy that allowed Hamas’s entry into the poli tical arena. The ironic positive was that there was a period of time to reconcile Islamist an d secular divisions in Palestinian society by encouraging mutual reliance and developm ent. However, this path did not serve conservative Israeli or American interests, a nd the opportunity may have been temporarily lost. This cannot happen again given th e risk of a further implosion of moderate Gazan political society, which could end i n more suicide campaigns, more extremism, and further commitment to violent tactic s in the resistance. With the demise of the LTTE without an effective pa rallel political program, discussion of the LTTE’s political evolution seems somewhat moot. It must be considered that neither the LTTE nor the government ever reall y had an interest in the peace process in the first place, instead mutually using these ne gotiations as periods in which to re-arm and prepare for the next phase of conflict. The val ence moment in which political reconciliation between Tamil and Sinhalese society was possible seems to have been largely lost by the time LTTE cadres began attackin g Indian peacekeepers in 1987. Subsequent negotiations appeared to dissolve when n either side was able to stomach the

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175 unappealing properties of intermediary settlements. On the LTTE side, this rejection of settlements can be attributed to the organization's wholesale commitment to “combat mode,” and the lack of “endorsement of dialogue and negotiation as constructive measures for opponents to voice each others’ standp oints and to accept multiple authenticities” (de Silva 1995, 184). The major pos t-LTTE step that must be taken is to find a measure of political space in Tamil areas in which these decisions can be discussed peacefully. The Northern and Eastern provinces must construct a new political identity organically, complemented rather than imposed by th e Sri Lankan government. Thus, some measure of devolution of power is important to resolving continued ethnic tensions and creating breathing room for Tamil society to re construct itself. It is also crucial to tie these measures to building constructive links with the larger Sri Lankan polity. Asoka Bandarage claimed that regional devolution is not a realistic approach because ideological and material support for Tamil separati sm came “from the Tamil diaspora elite and the worldwide Tamil community, making the Sri Lankan separatist struggle a transnational phenomenon increasingly removed from domestic realities” such as growing Tamil populations across the island and the relaxation of discriminatory policies (2009, 219). By contrast, K.M. de Silva highlights that the authoritarian repression of the LTTE had necessitated some degree of devolution, si nce the geographic centers of Tamil separatism could not develop an independent civil s ociety, democratic institutions, or structural conditions favorable to independent thin king on even an individual level. The democratisation of the northern and eastern provinces will r equire the establishment of a provincial council for the northern provi nce. The elections to that provincial council will enable political parties and individuals to vie for positions in that council. And such a council will give the Tamils of the northern province opportunities in fashioning the development of that provin ce; indeed, to become a force in the democratisation of the province. K.M. de Silva 201 1, 248).

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176 The Sri Lankan experience with terrorism is marked by both immeasurable tragedy and systematic miscalculation, as well as c ynical manipulation of ethnicity, history, and politics by a chain of political, mili tary, and social elites. The end result of this process was militarization and the suppression of independent sociopolitical identity for both the Tamils and Sinhalese. Future policy ne eds to examine critically the evolution of the Sri Lankan culture of violence and create op en spaces through which critical and cosmopolitan thinking can be encouraged throughout all levels of society. Conclusion Examination of our case studies has revealed that instrumental or strategic analyses of terrorist organizations and their attac ks are insufficient to explore the deeper range of internal politics and decision-making whic h manifest themselves in terror groups’ operational activities. In fact, it can be argued that many of the conclusions reached by the instrumental framework are highly mi sleading and mischaracterize important, fundamental aspects of terrorist activit y. Ethno-nationalist terrorist movements are commonly regarded as the classic prototypes of terrorist strategies and tactics, wherein the strategic and political efficacy of ter ror was birthed and modulated into the more analytically complicated and modern use of vio lence by transnational groups such as al-Qaeda. The strategic theory of political terr orism, however, has been unable to articulate coherent or functional counter-terrorism policies even in response to this prototypical stage of terrorism; since it focuses o n parsimony, deriving its comprehensibility from the manner in which “the int entions of actors are inferred from their behavior according to logical rules,” it is u nable to determine conflicting internal

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177 pressures which in turn define the preferences of i ndividual and group actors within a terrorist organization. It is limited by its assump tions and thus is forced to characterize illogical or strategically counterproductive action s by terrorist groups as the result of tactical miscalculation, even on the occasions when previous or concurrent processes have established logical antecedents. The result is that security and particularly military organs of governments, inherently tied to realist c onceptions of conflict, base their patterns of response and reaction on theoretical as sumptions that do not fully apply to terrorism. A clear example is the emphasis on deter rence (Crenshaw 1988, 18-19). Deterrence policy focuses on denial, comprehensive defensive measures against terrorist attacks, and retaliation, the threat of punishment in retribution for political violence. As demonstrated, however, these policies have proven i neffective in deterring terrorist activity. Defensive measures, even to the extreme, can only deflect some of the attacks some of the time. The construction of fortified mil itary positions on the Northern Irish border and the separation barriers between Israel a nd Palestine merely motivated terrorists to develop more creative methods of atta ck. Similarly retaliatory measures that take the form of increased securitization (epitomiz ed in direct military intervention) have been demonstrated to be inconsistent at best and re inforcing terrorist solidarity and communal support at worst. The escalation of the Sr i Lankan civil war, retaliatory attacks by Hamas, and the inefficacy of the British militar y to enforce peace in Northern Ireland demonstrate that retaliatory measures can further d istort conceptions of legitimate authority and legitimize violent political actions by non-state actors. Here the evidence clearly demonstrates the analytic al superiority and efficacy of the organizational process framework. While the ins trumental school views terrorism as

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178 inherently political, organizational theory views t he establishment and continuance of terrorism as the result of a complex web of interna l group processes and incentives. Crucial to its success is its ability to integrate a large variety of interdisciplinary approaches in determining the varied preferences of actors inside a terrorist network. In fact, the organizational approach has the ability t o include some of the political focus of instrumentalist approaches as one of the various fa ctors that motivate terrorists. A focus on internal dynamics does not preclude seeing a ter rorist organization’s political goals as an important factor in determining its preferences. Rather, it simply relegates the instrumental use of terrorism to the role of one of many differentiated and often contradictory propensities that institutionalize te rror tactics within extremist subcultures. Organizational process theory becomes a systematic way of investigating the processes by which terrorism arises, evolves, and ends, inste ad of post-hoc rationalization of a consistent set of analytic assumptions to a thoroug hly inconsistent array of varied terrorist organizations and actions. In doing so, it gives ri se to a new generation of policy analyses and recommendations that address with the ‘terror p roblem’ in more creative and innovative ways. Modern terrorism analysis commonly takes the internal dynamics of terrorist organizations into account in determining counter-terrorist strategies. What is needed is to divorce the evolving field of terroris m research from outdated assumptions and models. This evolution will not discredit all o f instrumental research – it will instead position instrumental and associated schools of str ategic and rational-choice analysis within a wider framework. Doing so is a good step t owards a more functional and coherent model of terrorism that recognizes a const ant need for reevaluation of previous assumptions and theoretical approaches.

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179 It is also important to realize that purely instrum ental models of terrorism serve a variety of actors including those who inadvertently or purposefully contribute to the descent of civil conflict into internecine ethnic w ars. A focus on terrorism as purely a political tool utilized by non-negotiable extremist s rather than as evolving out of broader social movements serves to legitimize disproportion ate responses to legitimate fears of social dissolution, physical harm, and economic tur moil that arise from ethnic conflicts. To borrow a concept from organizational theory, it is not unrealistic to assume that inflexible government officials and beneficiaries o f securitization responses (such as hard-line elements within a national military) can derive a wide array of incentives and benefits from conflict responses that worsen signif icant aspects of the broader domestic context. In this way, the mechanisms by which gover nments and terrorist organizations operate are not fundamentally dissimilar. This is n ot a new conclusion, but an important one to take into account when considering the ways in which government responses to terrorist activity are developed. Analysis of terro rism then must be particularly careful to emphasize ways in which both governments and terror ist organizations can be made to break from harmful processes of path dependence. Un derstanding and promulgating that terrorism is a tactic used by varied actors (includ ing governments) rather than a catch-all term for a specific classification of sub-state act or is an important step in regulating counter-productive, harmful, or abusive responses. In his analysis of the IRA, J. Bowyer Bell makes a significant observation: that “victory in pieces is an enormous obstacle to those who are inclined to analyze in absolutes” (2005, 52). This sentiment could not be more relevant to the development and evolution of analytical frameworks of terrorism in the modern era. Security and terrorism

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180 specialists as well as government officials, confli ct journalists, and NGO employees must be open to new ways of thinking and consistently se ek new approaches to combat political violence. Old methods of analysis must be critically examined and problematized; organizational process theory is no exception. Its complex nature and reliance upon difficult-to-obtain internal informat ion about terrorist groups complicates the efficient and articulate reporting necessary to coordinate effective counter-terrorist policy. As zdamar argues: …the approach is inherently complex and far from being parsimon ious; it doesn’t provide us with a context in which we can make general descriptio ns, find regularities or make predictions about terrorist behavior because it is assumed that most terrorist acts are random, and have sui-generic characteristics. (2008, 95). In this respect the instrumental approach has some value in initial appraisal and theoretical construction of terrorist activity. How ever, it is clearly insufficient to map a comprehensive understanding of terrorism. The organ izational school provides a more analytically focused and integrative approach. Its complexity should be viewed as an advantage rather than a detriment. The strategic mo del asks “what political goals did this act of terrorism intend to advance?” Organizational theory instead asks “why did this act of terrorism occur?” Finally it is important to recognize that, regardle ss of whether terrorism analysis is grounded in instrumental, organizational, or oth er approaches such as sociological or psychological schools, these frameworks only provid e a partial piece of the picture when approaching ethno-nationalist terror groups. As emp hasized in this study, terrorism should be understood as evolving from a variety of broader sociopolitical movements, and the terror tactic itself is only one of many st rategic options pursued by specific members of these countercultural mobilizations. Thu s there is a general context that can

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181 provide significant insights into tying terrorism a nalysis into systematic observations about the processes that generate political violenc e. Richardson, for example, developed a computer-modeling approach to the Sri Lankan civil war that emphasized the convergence of economic data, political trends, and indicators of unrest and violence to create an early-warning system for civil distress ( 2005). Contrastingly, Lustick’s 1994 article on terrorism in the Arab-Israeli conflict d id not utilize statistical analysis, but instead integrated contemporary counter-terrorism a nalysis with a broader historical and social-psychological perspective. These approaches provide extensive contextual data without which it is hard to generate clear understa ndings of the terror strategy. Unlike a terrorist organization, the field of terrorism anal ysis cannot afford to be single-minded, absolutist, or insular.

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