This item is only available as the following downloads:
Conceptions of Citizenship and the Democratic Transition Process: Citizenship Policies in Postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe By Maura Letmon A Thesis Submitted to New College of Florida Department of Political Science In partial fulfillme nt of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts Under the Sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida 2011
ii Table of Contents Abstract Introduction Citizenship Democratization 20 Citizenship and the Democratization Process Methodology and Operatio nalization Poland Hungary .............................................................................................. .. Romania Shifting Borders and Shifting Populations: Ethnic Citizenship and Kin state Responsibility Chapter Citizenship as Soviet Republics ... Es tonia Latvia Lithuania Restored States: Ethnic Prefer ences and Democratic Obligations. Chapter The Czec h Republic .. Slovakia Post partition States: Ethnic Boundaries and Self determination Chapter Jus Soli Jus Sanguinis and Naturalization Citizenship, Nationality, and Ethnicity Reinforcing Statehood, Plural Citizenship, and Statelessness External Influences and Europeanization Redressing Past Wrongs .. Conclusions Bibliography 7 3
iii List of Tables Table 5.1 Citizenship at Birth Table 5.2 Loss of Citizenship Table 5.3 Nat uralization Requirements
iv CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND THE DEMOCTATIC TRANSITION PROCESS: CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN POSTCOMMUNIST CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE Maura Letmon New College of Florida, 2011 ABSTRACT T his proj ect is a comparative examination of laws concerning citizenship in eight Central and Eastern European countries over the course of the po stcommunist transition process, and an analysis of the extent to which the transition and subsequent move toward a more integrated European continent has affected conceptions of citizensh ip throughout Eastern Europe. A comprehensive analysis of citizenship laws and other relevant policies before, during, and after the transition to democracy is used i n order to gauge the overall trend of patterns and transformations in citizenship policies. After examining the concept of citizenship and underlining the importance of citizenship in democratization and national determination, data is systematically present ed on citizenship r egulations of eight Central and Eastern European countries. The countries are grouped into three distinct categories those with a history of shifting borders and populations, restored states, and post partition states. Countries are analyzed diachronic ally pre transition and post transition and also compared with each other in the two different periods. This analysis finds that policies across Central and Eastern Europe were divergent before, during, and after the democratic transition process. Th e character o f change over the course of the transition however, provides evidence
v that citizenship policies in the region have not been substantially altered Central and Eastern Europe has developed citizenship policies since 1989 based heavily on et hnicity and aimed at restoring former national communities, strengthening ties of kinship, and redressing past wrongs In the eight cases studied here, t he process of national consolidation and state building, external influences and Europeanization, and a preoccupation with the past have each to some extent influenced postcommunist conceptions of citizenship and the dynamics of citizenship policy. While d ifferent paths of national consolidation and democratization have led to the development of diffe rent conceptions of citizenship, t he overall effect of the democratic transition process appears to be just one of a number of other possible contributing factors in the formulation and implementation of citizenship policies. Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Sciences
vi owhere more absolute than in matters of emigration, Hannah Arendt, 1973
1 Introduction In 1989 a message was sent by the people of Central and East ern Europe. That message was one of anger, dissatisfaction, and frustration with the political leadership of a crumbling communist regime. The revolutions that knocked down the Iron Curtain signaled the end of an era of communist domination, and the begi nning of an irrevocably different geopolitical landscape in the region. The tremors of this democratic transition process, which began more than twenty years ago, are still reverberating across the European continent today. As Europe moves toward an ever stronger degree of economic, political, and social integration, its entire population must come to terms with an evolving concept of what it means to be a European citizen. For the countries of the old Communist Bloc, the move to join a more integrated E urope raises significant historical and normative questions about their individual, as well as collective, conceptions of citizenship. Citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe, from the collapse of its communist regimes through the more recent accessio n processes of many of these countries into supranational organizations like the European Union, may serve as an interesting point from which to observe and analyze the democratic transition process. The idea of citizenship as conceived by the countries o f Central and Eastern Europe is significant to this democratic transition process in its ability to articulate to the rest of the world how
2 these countries wish to define themselves. The nature of citizenship in a country may provide insight into the type of political community the transition process aspires to create. Is there a strong ethnic identity that a country wishes to preserve? If so, then it may rely heavily on the transmission of citizenship rights from generation to generation based on ethnic kin descent ( Baubck 2007, 12). Does a country wish to promote the idea of a more integrated Europe? Then perhaps that country will show little reservation in granting plural citizenship. Does a country wish to adhere to traditional conceptions of sove particular border? Or does the granting of certain citizenship rights transcend geographic location? Who is granted citizenship in a political community speaks volumes to how t hat community perceives itself, as well as how it wishes to be perceived by the rest of the world. The revolutions of 1989 were a rejection of Soviet domination and the communist authoritarian systems that had helped to define the region of Central and Ea stern Europe for the better part of the twentieth century, and an attempt to redefine the region as entirely more open, liberal and democratic. An essential part of that redefinition process is the specification of who exactly is entitled to participate in the new, more open, liberal, and democratic political community. The question driving the following study concerns the extent to which the postcommunist transition and subsequent moves toward a more integrated European continent have affected citizensh ip throughout Central and Eastern Europe. a broad range of political identities. If the scope is narrowed, however, to specific statutes and judicial rulings that define wh at citizenship is and who is eligible to possess
3 it, we may gauge more concretely exactly how a particular political community wishes to define itself (Smith 1997, 2). A country has the ability to refine the flow of im migration and so the character of its own civic identity through the implementation of formal citizenship, naturalization, and immigration policy. The fall of communism presented the societies of Central and Eastern Europe with just such an opportunity to redefine old ideas of citizenship and self government. Through competitive elections, the formation of political parties, and parliamentary debates, democratization provided an open arena for the rational articulation of differences among opposing groups and individuals (Wolchik and Curry 2007, 88). While the forces of democratization were in full swing, they were not immune to the pressure of other outside influences. The transition process also facilitated a potentially dangerous situation, as ethnic rivalries, rampant political and ec onomic corruption, and the rise of illiberal political parties and movements, as well as collectivist and nativist trends, have permeated much of the postcommunist experience (Tismaneanu 2010, 128). As the stark reality of the transition process revealed itself in the form of political instabilit y and virtual economic collapse the optimistic look to an integrated Europe marred by concerns about faltering economies, divided societies, and insecure polities. While there exists great variation across the region, in a number of countries, this insecurity led to a resurgence of support for the repressive former ruling parties (Spencer and Wollman 1997, 2). In the p ast, such repressive parties prohibited the exit of economically valuable populations and resorted to extreme measures to implement this policy (the shoot to kill
4 border policy of the DDR, for example). They also fought hard to push out religious, ethnic, or social groups considered undesirable and incapable of being subjected or transformed to fit some predetermined conception of proper citizenship (Zolberg 2006, 1). Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as Aristide Zolberg points out, States have raided others to abduct valuable populations; encouraged and facilitated the importation of slaves; and stimulated immigration by providing subsidized travel, lands, security, and easy citizenship, or by promising jobs; but they have also prohibited settlement and acted ruthlessly to prevent it (2006, 12) Less dramatically than noted above, modern governments implem ent citizenship and naturalization policy to encourage or discourage certain types of movement. Through such policy the state may pi ck and choose those people it welcomes and those to whom it refuses citizenship. Changes in these policies not only alter the composition identification. Government efforts to harness the force of citizenship and naturalization policy have led to significant changes in state building and community composition throughout the transitioning countries of Central and Eastern Europe. While all nations do essentially make themselves, the unique nature of the postcommunist transition has provided the populations of Central and Eastern Europe with ample opportunities to redefine their own existence through the official selection and control of potential citizens. The desire of these tra nsitioning political communities to distinguish themselves through such policy, however, may clash with particular conceptions of an increasingly unified Europe. Citizenship and naturalization policy is a means for defining as well as demonstrating the v alues held by a particular state. It involves not only regulating the size and diversity of the population, but also privileging certain visions of nationhood, social order, and international engagement (Zolberg 2006, 1). Immigration and
5 naturalization has had the potential to be a disruptive force, as all immigrants constitute a cohesiveness, or identity. New immigrants have been capable of influencing the electoral calculat ions of party leaders and individual candidates, recasting how established interest groups define their policy goals, and even building new ethnic organizations to influenc e government actions (Tichenor 2002, 6). Native populations recognize the capacity of newcomers to dramatically alter a society, and so through citizensh ip and naturalization policy they attempt to assert their authority in deciding the direction of society. Any kind of nationality already involves a delineation of boundary, simultaneou sly expressing inclusion and exclusion (Zolberg 2006, 17). Limits on citizenship imply selection of one group over another. Some perceived characteristics are desirable, while others are not. embrace of the perceived positive characteristics of its inhabitants and the rejection of other perceived negative we are who we are by virtue of what we are not plays a role in the format ion of c itizenship and naturalization policy, a role most noticeable when certain ugly nationalistic sentiments are embraced in the political arena. Economic conditions, the power of social interests, shared national values, public opinion, or electora l realignments have all influenced different perspectives on citizenship policy. Throughout history there has been fierce debate on the economic, social, cultural, and national security consequences of new citizens. Because citizenship policy has such pro found consequences on the nation, regions, classes, society, culture, economics, and politics of a given country, policies governing immigrant admissions and
6 rights have been the object of significant political focus. Questions arise concerning how many n ew citizens are to be admitted, from where and in what status they should arrive, and how the rules governing the system should be enforced. Positive or negative stances with regard to new citizens are usually defined by a wide array of criteria, includ ing objective socioeconomic and cultural attributes degree of skill, education, wealth, religion, language, nationality, and race as well as the moral or political disposition (judged likely or unlikely to commit crime s, or to support or oppose the existing regime) (Zolberg 2006, 16). In almost any immigration situation there are significant groups who believe that newcomers in general, or particular groups among them, would jeopardize the established order. Buildin g upon such an interpretation of the importance of citizenship and naturalization policy, we return to the more specific cases of the postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Observable patterns in citizenship laws have the potential to say much about the progress of the democratic transition how open and liberal (or inegalitarian and nationalistic) a state perceives itself, or wishes to be perceived, and the extent to which a state embraces the weakening of borders and stronger European in tegration. The relationship between perceived state citizenship and perceived European citizenship is also of interest. The objective of this project is to determine the extent to which the postcommunist transition and subsequent move toward a more int egrated European continent has affected conceptions of citizenship throughout Eastern Europe. This objective is to be met through a comparative examination of laws concerning political
7 membership in eight postcommunist states over the course of the postc ommunist transition process. Each of these countries has emerged from a communist regime and successfully gained entry into the European Union. The transition process placed these eight countries in one of three unique positions, each posing its own part icular challenges to the defining of formal citizenship policy. Some states have experienced histories of repeated shifts in borders and populations; others regained their independence becoming restored states after a long period of Soviet occupation; and the last group formed from the break up of existing states. In an analysis of conflicting visions of citizenship throughout history in the United States, Rogers M. Smith traced varying traditions of political discourse concerning civic identity that were used to justify or oppose particular citizenship laws. These varying traditions were used as a way to gauge the extent to which political communities sought to protect or alter various citizenship arrangements in relation to changing political condit ions. Smith posited that in the United States certain political conditions were used to support distinctive civic ideologies articulated through opposition analysis, the fo llowing research project looks to examine similar relationships among traditions of political discourse concerning civic identity, distinctive civic ideologies, and the changing political conditions in the postcommunist democratic transitions of Central an d Eastern Europe and their impact on the formation of citizenship and naturalization policy in the region. The impact of the democratic transition process on citizenship and naturalization policy is to be measured through a comparison of variation in t hat policy across the
8 region of Central and Eastern Europe. The unique historical situation of each state, the existence of strong ethnic conceptions, the role of a diaspora, its categorization as restored, prone to shifting borders, or post partition, an d status in relation to the European Variation across the region in citizenship and naturalization policy should reflect the diversity of experiences of these countries over the course of history from the pre to postcommunist eras including throughout the transition process and accession into the European Union. A common trend is expected, however, in the rise of overarching tensions between the desire of countries to join a more integrated Europe and the desire to assert their territorial sovereignty and maintain a unique national identity following decades of existence within the Soviet Bloc. Elements of the transition and EU accession processes, while serving as pri marily liberalizing forces meant to unite the continent under a broad definition of European citizenship, have also led to a resurgence of certain nationalist sentiments. Liberalization and democratization changes have often created the conditions for the resurgence of inegalitarian ideologies and institution s (Smith 1997, 5). I n the context of the postcommunist transition processes, such sentiments may lead to a tightening of citizenship and naturalization policy and narrowing of conceptions of citizenshi p in individual states. The transition process may thus entail a simultaneous broadening and narrowing of conceptions of citizenship. For the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall and revolutions of 1989 did not mark the end of a transition from communism; rather, they marked the beginning of a transition to democracy. The postcommunist transitions of Central and Eastern Europe have, by their very nature, sought to fundamentally
9 restructure the political and economic syst ems of the region. These countries signaled their intention to join the rest of Europe and the international community, through the embrace of processes of democratization and marketization. The prospect of membership to important international organizat ions, namely the European Union and NATO, offers a model of political integration as well as a means of transcending nationalist competition s of the past (Csergo 2007, 87). These reforms may bolster confidence in a new pattern of governance for the former communist nations. If a more extensive integration of the European continent is to be realized, perhaps such a state of affairs would render past rivalries among states and other groups obsolete? As Zsuzsa Csergo describes, democratization and political integration into Europe present an opportunity to individualist, inclusive notions of 2007, 87). The question as to whether or not this opportunity has been taken advantage of is the subject of this research project. This analysis of the formulation and implementation of citizenship and naturalization policy in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the democratic transition process finds that citizenship p olicies have been reformed in many countri es but they have certainly not moved beyond politics of ethnic and national identity In the eight cases studied here Poland, Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia pol icies emphasize the role of particular domes tic and contextual factors in de termining the configuration and change of citizenship policies. The process of national consolidation and state building, external influences and Europeanization, and a preoccupati on with the past have each to some extent influenced postcommunist conceptions of citizenship and the dynamics of citizenship policy. While
10 d ifferent paths of national consolidation and democratization have led to the development of diffe rent conceptions of citizenship, t he overall effect of the democratic transition process appears to be just one of a number of other possible contributing factors in the formulation and implementation of citizenship policies.
11 Chapter 1 Theories of Citizenship and Democratization The objective of this study is to analyze the role of the democratization process in altering conceptions of citizenship across postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. Shifts in conceptions of citizenship are to be ass essed through an examination of citizenship and naturalization policy throughout the democratic transition process of eight countries. In order to execute such a study, it is first necessary to address the expansive theoretical literatures devoted to both the broad idea of citizenship and the process of democratization. The following section situates this study within the current academic literature and lays out theoretical support for the connection between the democratization process and the alteration of citizenship policy. Taken individually, democratization and citizenship have been the focus of much research in the field of political science; however, the relationship between democratization and citizenship in transitioning countries has garnered little attention in comparison. Starting with the general literatures on citizenship and democratization, it is possible to construct a few broad conceptual links between the two that will lead to an outline of theoretical support for the hypothesized re lationship between the democratization process and alteration of conceptions of citizenship as expressed through citizenship and naturalization policy. This chapter provides a brief synopsis of academic
12 work concerning citizenship, as well as the democrat ization process, and seeks to explain the ways in which these concepts are interrelated. Citizenship Citizenship refers to the basic tenets of being a citizen. Broadly, it is concerned with the relationships, rights, and obligations that exist between certain qualified individuals and the political community in which they participate. Contemporary theories of citizenship tend to find their origins in one of two distinct models, each with a different balance of emphasis on the individual and the greater political community. The first model appeals to civic virtues of self sacrifice and public mindedness. The second model is derived from a natural law tradition and emphasizes the rights of individuals, representation, and material progress as elements o f citizenship. These early interpretations of citizenship are connected to ideas of attachment to a particular community on the one hand and individual ent itlement on the other. The two perspectives may be further defined as where c itizenship is a function of one's particip ation in a political community; and citizenship denotes full membership rights in a particular political community (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 253). The Republican Model The republican mo del, associates citizenship status with particular rights and duties that an individual assumes in relation to the state. Republican qualifications for citizenship reflect a conception of the purposes of the political community and a view
13 about which indi viduals are able to contribute to, or enjoy the benefits of, the common good, or the freedom of the political community. The republican model originates in the writings of the likes of Aristotle, Tacitus, Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, and Rousseau, and may be traced through distinct historical experiences, from Athenian democracy and Republican Rome to the Italian city states and workers' councils. The key principle of the republican model is civic self rule, found in classical institutions and practic es like the rotation of offices, underpinning Aristotle's characterization of the citizen as one rule is also the focus of Rousseau's Social Contract : citizens are made free and laws legitimate through the participation of citizens in the political process. Active participation in processes of deliberation and decision making ensures that individuals are citizens, not subject s. The republican model emphasizes the importance of political agency to the concept of citizenship. The idea of civic republicanism articulates much of this republican model perspective. The modern civic republican tradition is an extreme form of parti cipatory democracy. It places a strong emphasis on the intrinsic value of political participation for the individual in a political community. Civic participation is held as "the highest form of human living together that most individuals can aspire to" (Oldfield 1990a, 6). Political life is interpreted as superior to the private, and should be the main focus of any citizen. Failure to participate in politics makes one a "radically incomplete and stunted being" (Oldfield 1990b, 187; Pocock 1992, 45, 53; Skinner 1992; Beiner 1992). Another school of thought focused on the role of individual rights and duties to the political community is that of the civil society theorists. These theorists emphasize
14 the necessity of civility and self restraint to a heal thy democracy but deny that either the market or political participation is sufficient to teach these virtues (Kymlicka 1994, 363). Instead, it is in the voluntary organizations of civil society that the virtues of mutual obligation are learned. As Walzer puts it, "the civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learned in the associational networks" of civil society (Walzer 1992, 104). Such associational networks are where "human character, competence, and capacity for citizenship are form ed," because through them an individual may internalize the idea of personal responsibility and mutual obligation and learn the voluntary self restraint which is essential to responsible citizenship (Glendon 1991, 109). And so, one of the first obligation s of citizenship is to participate in civil society. A final approach to citizenship theory in the republican tradition, liberal virtue community. According to liberal v irtue theorists, certain virtues are required for responsible citizenship. William Galston divided these virtues into four groups: (i) general virtues such as courage, law abidingness, and loyalty; (ii) social virtues such as independence and open mindedn ess; (iii) economic virtues such as work ethic, capacity to delay self gratification, and adaptability to economic and technological change; and (iv) political virtues such as the capacity to discern and respect the rights of others, willingness to demand only what can be paid for, ability to evaluate the performance of those in office, and willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston 1991, 221 24). To the liberal virtue theorists, the significance of civic participation stems from the idea that the decisions of government in a democracy should involve free and open discussion, as well as be made publicly (Kymlicka 1994, 366). But as Galston notes, the
15 virtue of public discourse is not just the willingness to participate in politics or to make an in range of views which, given the diversity of liberal societies, will include ideas the listener is bound to find strange and even obnoxious. The virtue of political disco urse also includes the willingness to set forth one's own views intelligibly and candidly as the basis for a politics of persuasion rather than manipulation or coercion" (Galston 1991, 227). Stephen Macedo refers to this concept as the virtue of "public reasonableness." According to Macedo, liberal citizens must give reasons for their political demands, not just state preferences or make threats. Moreover, these reasons must be "public" reasons, in that they are capable of persuading many different kinds of people. Liberal citizens must justify their political demands in terms that fellow citizens can understand and accept as consistent with their status as free and equal citizens (Macedo 1990). The Liberal Model The first broad perspective of citizens hip, the liberal model, originates in the Roman Empire and early modern reflections on Roman law (Walzer 1989, 211). Citizenship meant being protected by the law rather than participating in its formulation nal identity, a legal status rather than a ocock 1992, 37). Political l iberty is important as a means o f protecting individual freedoms from interference by other individuals. However, these freedoms are not confined to the political realm. Although
16 the concept of citizenship may refer to a legal status, it may also stipulate that individuals are entitled to certain rights and benefits as a consequence of their position within a political society. This approach suggests that since individuals participate in a common life, they have rights and duti es to that community. Hence there are moral obligations among individuals because of that shared existence. There may, then, be a connection between the ideas of membership in a social community and citizenship in a political community. Membership in a p articular community may be asserted as a qualification for citizenship; the common good may be seen as what gives value to both community and political organization; and both membership and citizenship may be valued partly because they are not universally available. The idea that citizenship is defined in terms of the possession of rights was predominant in much of postwar political theory. Perhaps the most influential articulation of this postwar conception of citizenship as rights is T. H. Marshall's "C itizenship and Social Class" (Andrews 1991; Roche 1992; Turner and Hamilton 1994; Beiner 1995; Blumer and Rees 1996). According to Marshall, citizenship is essentially concerned with ensuring that each individual is treated as a full and equal member of s ociety. Through granting people an increasing number of citizenship rights a political community can reinforce a sense of membership in that community. Marshall divided citizenship rights into three categories: civil rights, political rights, and social rights (1965, 78). As the rights of citizenship were expanded from one category to the next, the class of citizens also grew larger. Using England as his primary example, Marshall showed that civil and political rights once restricted to white,
17 property o wning, Protestant men were gradually extended to women, the working class, Jews and Catholics, blacks, and other previously excluded groups. For Marshall, the fullest expression of citizenship requires a liberal democratic welfare state. By guaranteeing civil, political, and social rights to all, the welfare state ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society, able to participate in and enjoy the common life of society. Without these rights, people will be marginalized and unabl "passive" or "private" citizenship, because of its emphasis on passive entitlements and the absence of any obligation to participate in public life (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 354). Following a set of rights and responsibilities, but rather it is also an identity, an expression of one's membership in a political community. Marshall saw citizenship as a shared identity t hat would integrate previously excluded groups within British society and provide a source of national unity. He was particularly concerned with the integration of working classes, whose lack of education and economic resources excluded them from the "comm on culture" which should have been a "common possession and heritage" (Marshall 1965, 101 2). other scholars have taken issue with elements of his analysis. In his emphasis on the inclusive properties of citizenship and national unity, Marshall failed to account for the increasing social and cultural pluralism of modern societies. Cultural pluralist theorists argue that citizenship must account for the various differences among members of a political community, not simply try and eliminate them
18 (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 370). Cultural pluralists believe that the common rights of citizenship, originally defined by and for white men, cannot accommodate the special needs of m inority groups. These groups can only be integrated into the common culture if differentiated citizenship argues that members of certain groups are incorporated into a political community through the group as well as individuals, and that their rights depend, in part, on their group membership (Kymlicka and Norman 1994, 370). In advocating for differentiated citizenship cultural pluralists raise a number of challenges t o traditional conceptions of citizenship, in which citizenship is, by definition, concerned with the treatment of people as individuals with equal rights under the law. One of the most influential theorists of cultural pluralism is Iris Marion Young. Acc ording to Young, the attempt to create a universal conception of citizenship which transcends group differences is fundamentally unjust because it oppresses historically excluded groups: In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppre ssed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce the privilege; for the perspective and interests of the privileged will tend to dominate th is unified public, marginalizing or silencing those of other groups (Young 1989, 257) Critics of differentiated citizenship worry that if groups are encouraged by the will cease to be "a device to cultivate a sense of community and a common sense of purpose" (Heater 1990, 295; Kristeva 1993, 7; Cairns 1993). Nothing will bind the various groups in society together and prevent the spread of mutual mistrust or conflict ( Kukathas 1993, 156). Some argue that multicultural rights also act as an obstacle to the process of integration for immigrants by blurring the division between the old nation and citizenship
19 ng affiliation with their new country may be based on the willingness of immigrants and their new political community to welcome cultural difference (Kymlicka 1994, 372). Self government rights, however, do raise problems for traditional conceptions of c itizenship identity. While both representation and multicultural rights take the larger political community for granted and seek greater inclusion in it, demands for self government reflect a desire to weaken the bonds with the larger community. If democr acy is the rule of the people, group self determination questions the definition of Self its own historic rights, territories, and powers of self government, and each, the refore, with its own political community. National minorities may assert that they are distinct peoples, with inherent rights of self determination that were not relinquished by their (sometimes involuntary) federation with other nations within a larger co untry. Indeed, the retaining of certain powers is often explicitly spelled out in the treaties or constitutional agreements that specified the terms of federation (Kymlicka 1994, 375). If citizenship constitutes membership in a political community, then in creating overlapping political communities, self government rights necessarily give rise to a sort of dual citizenship and to potential conflicts about which community citizens identify with most deeply (Vernon 1988). Moreover, there seems to be no clea r stopping point to the demands for increasing self government. If limited autonomy is granted, this may fuel ambitions of nationalist leaders with visions of their own undifferentiated nation state. Refusing demands for self government rights may simply a ggravate alienation among these groups and increase the desire for secession (Taylor 1992, 64).
20 Hence, demands for self government raise a problem for proponents of both common citizenship and differentiated citizenship. How is it possible to construct a common identity in a country where people not only belong to separate political communities but also belong in different ways? This philosophical question may find at least a partial answer in the examination of the process and formulation of citizenshi p and naturalization laws. This question will be addressed further throughout the remainder of this research project, incorporating elements of both republican and liberal models of citizenship. Democratization In contrast with the primarily philosop hical arguments present in much of the academic literature on citizenship, contemporary academic literature on democratization is more oriented towards institutions and processes. Scholars have focused on the necessary conditions and prerequisites for the creation of a stable democracy as well as the economic, political, and social dynamics of democratic transition and consolidation. are subject to broad and highly varied inte rpretations, from minimalist conceptions (democracy defined by the presence of fair and regular elections) to more complex interpretations (requiring not only elections, but particular economic systems, political institutions, civil liberties and politica l rights). A detailed examination of the whole of democratic theory is far beyond the scope of this project; however, before addressing specific theoretical approaches to democratization, it is necessary to briefly clarify what the process entails.
21 Dem ocracy is generally understood in a minimal and procedural way by scholars concerned with the transition process (Schumpeter 1954; Dahl 1971). For the purposes of this project a democratic state is defined through the existence of fair and competitive ele ctions, the protection of basic civil liberties, and respect for the rule of law. Democratization is the process through which a state adopts such a regime. political of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the More specifically, transition to democracy is considered to be over when an agreement on democratic rules is reach ed successfully (Di Palma 1990), which may include the adoption of a new constitution and free elections. Studies of transitions provide insights into the dynamics of political change and gauge the outcomes of this process in broad 2000 ). A consolidated democracy subsequently refers to a state in which a large majority of the population accepts the democratic institutions as legitimate and where these institutions persist relatively unchallenged. The basic tenets of democracy must be a ccepted by citizens who participate in various aspects of civil society. Democratic consolidation consists of defining and fixing the core rules of democratic competition (Di Palma 1990). The phase of consolidation is characterized primarily by the increa sed importance of institut ional structures, specifically i n influencing the behavior of political
22 actors. Consolidation involves the partial redefining of agreements, arrangements, and institutions that emerged from the process of transition, and the affir mation, strengthening, and routinization of these provisions (Kopecky and Mudde 2000, 520). Contemporary literature on the topic of democratization looks to explain the emergence and survival of democracy (Vanhanen 1990, 39). Certain patterns of economic social, and cultural conditions may be more favorable to the rise and further more well to 1959). Another noted scholar, Robert Dahl listed five conditions that are most favorable for the development of stable democratic rule: (1) leaders do not employ coercion, notably through the police and the military, to gain and maintain their power; (2) a modern, dynamic, organizationally pluralist society exists; (3) the conflictive potentialities of subcultural pluralism are maintained at tolerable levels; (4) among the people of a country, particularly its active political stratum, a political culture and a system of beliefs exists that is favorable to the idea of democracy and the institutions of polyarchy; and (5) the effects of foreign influence or control are either negligible or positively favorable (1971, 314). Theories of democratization cover a wide range of perspectives, four of which are most prominent. The first, modernization theory, is concerned with the importance of capitalist economic principles for democracy. Agent based theories are interested in the dynamics of elite behavior in the transition and consolidation processes. Political culture theories focus on the centrality of particular values and presence a civic culture to
23 democracy. And finally, globalization theories address the role of evolving international conditions on domes tic democratizing processes. Modernization Theories Modernization theorists posit that changes in the economic base of a society lead to changes in its social structures, which in turn affect the political sphere. According to this theory, industrial ization spurs changes in the division of labor, leading to urbanization, increased levels of education, and new forms of communication technology, which then serve as preconditions for the development of democratic institutions (Lipset 1959). The high corr elation between level of economic development and democracy has been noted by many authors (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991; Przeworski and Limongi 1997). along with capita Vanhanen 1990, 39). Daniel Lerner hypothesized that urbanization starts modernization and is followed by increased literacy, media exposure, and economic and political participation. According 64). to do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain 1959, 49). Przeworski and Limongi show that once democratization has occurred it survives in countries above a certain level of economic development. Among countries below that threshold, the probability of a reversion to authoritarianism rises as the lev el of economic development falls (1997).
24 While a moderate positive correlation between democracy and economic development may be observed, there are other hypotheses concerning the relationship. For example, not every capitalist system is democratic. Ro bert Dahl states that modern great as to bring about severe violations of political equality and hence of the democratic economic development leads to a higher likelihood of democracy. He argues that it is impossible to explain democratization by the same factors in all parts of the world lopment may act as an indication of some other explanatory variables. These other variables may be accounted for by the other three theories of democratization. Agent Based Theories Agent based theories make the case that democratization is possible, although more or less likely, in a variety of structural contexts. This perspective focuses on the role that political leaders or strategic elites play in the democratization process. In agent based theories the primary causal variable during transitions is elite bargaining and, in particular, the strategic interaction between leaders of the former regime and representatives of the opposition forces. Different patterns of elite interaction then have an impact on the prospects for democratization and influe nce the institutional features and quality of the democracy that emerges (Gans Morse 2004, 326). Within the agent based theories, another often repeated claim is that pacts between elites facilitate successful transition to democracy (Burton et al. 1992; Karl
25 or alternating in office, distributing the spoils of office, and constraining policy choice in areas of high salience to the groups involved, while excluding oth er groups from office, stronger outgoing regimes are able to negotiate transition outcomes more favorable to themselves than those forced out by crisis. Further, regimes exiting during economic crisis have less ability to obtain favorable opposition agreement (Geddes 1999, 120). Authors have developed agent based theories to explain both the transition to and consolidation of democracy. Dankwart Rustow rejected the idea that the development of democracy depends on a set of economic and social preconditions (the one key exception being the precondition of national unity, defined as a preexisting agreement about the territorial boundaries of the nation state). He instead f ocused on the role of human actors in the process of democratization, arguing that democracy results from a political struggle political leaders to accept the existence of diversity in unity and, to that end, to Juan Linz also argues that leadership is responsible for much of the success in consolidating new democracies. He states that lead ership in transitioning states arbitrary power, and of the possibility to change governments peacefully, and at the same time they must convey to them the impossibility of overc oming in the short run the dismal legacy of some n ondemocratic rulers and the ac cumulated mistakes that have led or contributed to their present crisis ." (Linz 1990, 162) Vanhanen success of democracy presuppose[s] the distribution of economic and intellectu al power among various soci al groups and their elites rather than a high level of economic
26 Political Culture Theories The third classification of de mocratization theories is associated with the social structure and political culture of society. These theories perceive a healthy civil society as important for democratization, as it provides a population with a sense of unity and common purpose, as well as a social network through which to organize and challenge the power of the state hierarchy. Involvement in civic associations also prepares citizens for their future political participation in a democratic regime. Finally, horizontally organized social networks build trust among people and trust is essential for functioning of democratic institutions. According to these theories, during the transition process the organizations of civil society that were suppressed under authoritarian rule often reapp ear on the political stage, including trade union associations, professional groups, and university associations. The transition toward democracy creates a more open environment in which the associations of civil society have much better possibilities for functioning. Such transitions are accompanied by decisive upsurges in popular mobilization and organization. Civil society is strengthened, which improves the conditions for democracy and simultaneously makes the reversal to authoritarian rule more diffic ult (Srensen 2010, 452). The emergence of a stronger civil society in the context of the struggle for democracy has then many implications. These diverse associations constitute the plural society that is an important precondition for a thriving democrac y. Their internal organizations also create forums for the education of citizens in democratic decision making. In this sense, the associations can act as frameworks for democracy (Sandbrook 2000).
27 In the 1960s, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba conduct ed a comprehensive study of civic cultures that influenced much of this literature. Their main findings claimed that a certain civic culture is necessary for the survival of democracy. The theory of civic culture proposed by Almond and Verba postulates th at the viability of democratic institutions is affected by attitudes such as belief in one's ability to influence political decisions, feelings of positive affect for the political system, and the belief that other citizens are basically trustworthy. Count ries with high levels of these civic culture attitudes are expected to be more likely to adopt and sustain democracy over time than countries with low levels, regardless of socioeconomic factors such as level of economic development (Muller and Seligson 19 94, 635). According to Caroline Boussard, civil society plays two roles in democratization. First, it acts as a countervailing power to the government. In this role, civil society is made up of many organizations that serve a positive purpose for democr acy. Second, and more important to democratization, civil society acts as a proactive democracy building force. In this second role, organizations are not simply valuable because they are associations, but because they explicitly have the public good in mi nd and operate within democratic frameworks themselves. In order for civil society to best function in its 2002, 165). Finally, Boussard argues that in order to be successful in democratization, organizations that are a part of civil society must be able to maintain autonomy from the governments and organizations that fund them.
28 Referring to social structure, independent class of town dwellers has been an indispensable element in the growth of contrast, Gran Therborn claims that democr brought about in a popular struggle against the leading sections of the bourgeoisie ( 3, farmers, labor, and the urban middle class forg e a political coalition to press for democracy. Globalization Theories While the preceding three classifications of theories focus attention on the internal dynamics of the democratization process, globalization theories argue that external actors can ei ther help or hinder democracy and democratization in specific countries. According to globalization theories, in addition to domestic developments, democratic pressures from other countries and assistance from international organizations have weakened the physical basis of authoritarian rule by cutting off economic and military aid. The pressures have also weakened its moral basis by encouraging people to realize that "democratization is the necessary ticket for membership in the club of advanced nations" (Chull Shin 1994, 152). Globalization involves the movement of capital, goods, services, people, ideas, and even diseases across national borders. Furthermore, globalization suggests a greater level of interconnectedness among different populations (Georg e 2004, 657). Accordingly, both democratization and free market economics are thought to flow from
29 this process, as information encourages people to seek out new economic opportunities and become more politically involved. Citizenship and the Democratizat ion Process In a democracy, the source of all authority the legitimate basis of all power is the collective body of the people, the citizens of the polity. There is popular sovereignty of the citizens and thereby government by consent of the governed A citizen is a full and equal member of a democratic nation state (Mouffe 1995, 217). A discussion of democracy inevitably reaches the subject of citizenship. Citizenship is the bedrock upon which a democratic society is constructed. Citizenship, howe ver, consists of more than voting or fulfilling public obligations. Its significance is found not only in choosing political leaders and participating in the political system; democratization of the state and of politics is only made possible through an honest, open and critical dialogue between government and its citizens. To have such a dialogue requires accountable leadership and an autonomous civil society which is strong a nd organized. In the same regard, the state must be transparent and a part of the life of its citizens. In some states, citizenship is based on the place of a person's birth, which is known as jus s oli citizenship. In other places, the status of citizen i s based on the citizenship of one's parents, which is known as jus s anguinis citizenship. Some countries use both bases for ascribing citizenship. Further, most democratic states have established legal procedures by which people without a birthright to cit izenship can become
30 naturalized citizens. Equality before the law is one fundamental right of the citizen; other examples are such political rights as voting and participating in public interest groups. Constitutions may make a distinction between the rig hts of citizens and of inhabitants of the political community who are not citizens. Current debate over rights, responsibilities, and citizenship has emerged in part nd collective. Each person has multiple identities defined by race, gender, religion, class, ethnic and racial minorities, have been consistently excluded from many societies. By becoming aware of their own particular identity and the forces that discriminate, these groups become engaged politically. They express their citizenship by exercising and working to expand and enforce their rights. Identity politics can, on the one hand, help to build political bonds of solidarity among people of shared identities. On the other hand, such an approach can also lead to discriminatory forms of politics that focus narrowly on individual group interests. By forming alliances with others on issues of common concern, excluded groups can more effectively advance their rights and build more inclusive societies. In the process, their efforts hold the potential for generating new ideas about the practice of politics and citizenship whic h, in turn, can encourage the creation of new rights. The people of a democratic country or nation state may have various and overlapping identities. However, the single identity possessed equally by all citizens of the polity, regardless of differences, is civic identity. Held in common by all citizens, civic identity is based on freely given commitment to certain civic principles and values
31 of the democracy. Rather than legally defining the composition of a political community as formal citizenship does civic identity refers to a more informal arrangement between individuals and the state as to how a community wishes to be perceived. Citizenship is the social and legal link between individuals and their democratic political community. The status of c itizenship entails very important responsibilities and duties that must be fulfilled for a democratic state to exist. The rights to vote, to speak freely on public issues, and to participate in voluntary organizations, for example, have little or no signi ficance in political and civic life unless citizens regularly and effectively use them. "Citizenship is the fundamental institution that connects the individual bearer of rights to the protective agencies of the state. The civic realm of the state provide s the main channels through which individuals can participate politically and share in governance" (Klusmeyer 1996, 97). While citizenship and democratization are highly debated concepts, they each help define what kind of political system a particular sta te aims for, and the roles, rights, and responsibilities of its population. Thus citizenship, viewed as the acknowledgment of entitlements and duties, is a legal status but it is also the culmination of incorporation into a society. The nations of postcom munist Central and Eastern Europe have witnessed shifting political landscapes, fluctuating national identities influenced by processes of European integration, globalization from above and regional devolution from below. A number of questions arise from the general interest in citizenship as a way to understand the democratization process in this region of the world. As Sarah Benton (1991) notes, the significance of rights designated in citizenship emerges in periods when the exercise of power is called into question. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe
32 experienced this turn of events as the many communist regimes collapsed. As these countries assumed the transition to democracy, they were faced with the task of instituting governments that woul d recognize rule by the people. A key part of that As stated above, citizenship is generally defined as the righ ts and obligations that designate individuals as full members of a political community. Over the last two decades the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have joined the European Community in addition to redefining their own political systems. The fun ctions of the state are increasingly divided across a more integrated Europe, and the quality of citizenship is even further determined by an increasingly complex mix of rights, entitlements, obligations, and responsibilities stemming from the membership o f superposed political communities. Also, conceptions of citizenship have to respond to processes of internationalization. The European continent is increasingly governed through supranational and subnational bodies with overlapping economic, social, and political functions. There are several ways in which this issue is significant in the context of citizenship. Rights and obligations derive from attachment to territory, a tie that is a central aspect of the concept of state sovereignty. With European in tegration this concept has become less secure, however, and hence has generated calls for other relationships to territory which would reduce the social contractual dimension of membership of the nation state. Citizenship has not only involved the extensi on of rights, but has often also brought about the exchange of cultural and collective rights of a territorial cultural
33 minority in the pursuit of a homogeneous nation state (Kofman 1995, 126). Having l arge numbers of resident ethnic minorities without ci tizenship is considered to clash with the principles of representative democracy (Brubaker 1989; Layton Henry 1991). In another approach, states may look to attribute rights on the basis of residence and the contribution of immigrants to the economic, soc ial, and political life of the community. Standing alone, traditional models of citizenship and democratization do not constitute a comprehensive method of analysis of altering conceptions of Central and Eastern European citizenship. In these states that have only recently acquired democratic institutions, the relationships between civil, political, and social rights and the workings of civil society are still solidifying. In the countries of communist Central and Eastern Europe, dissidents encountered a weak civil society under a totalitarian communist state (Keane 1988). During and f ollowing the revolutions of 1989, new realms of civil society have been created. Citizenship and the scope of its application, especially in relation to newly created nation al minorities, have undergone their own transition process. The relationships between civil society and the state, the public and the private, and the mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion that regulate membership of political communities are all signific ant to conceptions of citizenship and democratization. Citizenship is a fluid concept that may be affected by elements of the democratization process. Changing conceptions of citizenship are marked by battles that determine whose concerns get incorporate d as legitimate and whose get excluded. The outcomes decide who is considered a full citizen and who is not. And so, questions arise as to the nature of the emerging democratic society. What kind of citizenship does a state wish to promote?
34 What skills, a ptitudes, and values will citizenship demand? What are the responsibilities of the state to its citizens? Methodology and Operationalization Having considered the theoretical relationship between citizenship and democratization, it is possible to begi n an empirical analysis of this relationship in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. Has the democratic transition process led to new ideas as to what it means to be a citizen? This project hypothesizes that the postcommunist transition and subseque nt move toward a more integrated European continent have affected conceptions of citizenship throughout Eastern Europe. This hypothesis is to be tested through various methods of institutional analysis and the comparative examination of laws concerning pol itical membership in eight postcommunist states over the course of the postcommunist transition process. Case studies of these eight postcommunist states constitute the primary mode of analysis of variation in citizenship and naturalization laws in Cent ral and Eastern Europe. Bennett concisely defines a case case study By identifying and distinguishing between dependent and indep endent variables (respectively, laws pertaining to citizenship and elements of the democratic transition, for example), comparative case studies examine variation across multiple cases. They systematically explore similarities and differences based on a p redetermined set of cases. Case studies may be utilized in the development of generalized theories, and also provide a means of historical explanation
35 historical outcome in which key ste ps in the sequence are in turn explained with reference their capacity to identify new or omitted variables and hypotheses, examine intervening variables and make caus al inferences about a particular phenomenon, develop historical explanations of particular cases, achieve high levels of construct validity, and use contingent generalizations to model complex relationships (Bennett 2004, 19). Case study methods, however, are also subject to issues of case selection bias, case independence, and the problem of perfectly controlling case comparisons. Case study methods may be limited in their capacity to make generalized claims outside their immediate empirical domain, and may lead to indeterminate research findings, being unable to isolate a single causal explanation (Bennett 2006, 20). Institutional analysis research methods are focused on the systematic study of actor behavior in relation to various established instituti ons, including the structures, procedures, social norms, and mechanisms for governance present in a society. This project looks to account for changes in behavior related to citizenship and naturalization policy in the context of the democratic transition process, a chain of events necessarily tied to institutional change and development. Methods of institutional analysis incorporate questions of how individuals and groups construct institutions, how institutions function in practice, and the effects of i nstitutions on society. Specifically, the historical institutionalist approach allows for the consideration of historical factors and localized conditions, as well as their impact on a particular case study. This approach follows the advance of political institutions over time and the extent to which they have been affected by historical conditions. As the products of historical processes,
36 institutions are perceived as bound to their own particular social context, and in turn offer a unique frame from wh ich a case may be analyzed (Thelen 1999). The role of institutions is essential to any discussion of the process of democratization. The structures, procedures, social norms, and mechanisms of governance in the case studies to be discussed have all been influenced by the democratic transition process. As such, elements of institutional analysis offer a useful means of investigation. Common research methods in political science must account for methodological issues such as concept formation, case select ion, and causal analysis. Within case analysis involves examining causal relationships with reference to multiple features of individual cases and the examination of the overlapping processes that link the variables outlined in a hypothesized causal relati onship (Mahoney 2000, 387 424). Within case analyses include pattern matching and causal narrative (Mahoney 2000, 387 424), the analysis process observations 266) and the congruence method (George and Bennett 2005). Another form of within case analysis specifically relevant to this project is process tracing. According to George and Bennett (2005) research methods should be concerned with the development and testing of theory in ways that address the causal processes of the political realm, the mechanisms that link causes to effects The authors argue that causal mechanisms are central to causal explanation, and that case studies and within case analysis are the methods best able to examine the operat ion of causal mechanisms in detail (George and Bennett 2005, 12 21). The y also argue that process tracing is the most appropriate method for examining such causal mechanisms. According to George and Bennett:
37 In process tracing, the researcher examines hist ories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening ethod attempts to identify the intervening causal process the causal chain and causal mechanisms between an independent variable and the outcome of the dependent varia ble. (George and Bennett 6, 206) Process tracing may be used to establish which of many possible explanations is consistent with a chain of events, from the hypothesized cause to the observed effect (Bennett 2006, 22). In its attempt to follow processes in their entirety, process tracing may also be susceptible to methodological problem s. Measurement error and omitted variables are a distinct possibility, as it would be impossible to fully account for every conceivable detail in a continuous process under examination. This project incorporates the approaches of case study methods, ins titutional analysis, and process tracing as a means of explaining altering conceptions of citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the course of the democratic transition process. The comparative case study format allows for an examination of variation in experiences and outcomes across the region under investigation, as well as a means of making practical and theoretical generalizations about that region in regards to citizensh ip and naturalization policy. Withi n each of these cases, the role of various institutions in influencing conceptions of citizenship must be accounted for, specifically as they pertain to the democratic transition process. Changes in economic, social, cultural, and political institutions, traced over time, may provide i nsight into changing conceptions of citizenship. Following the course of the democratic transition process, inferences may be made concerning the causal mechanisms behind observable shifts in conceptions of citizenship.
38 Explanatory Variables When lookin g at the transition processes across Central and Eastern Europe, it is possible to differentiate similar characteristics but also very differing patterns in paths to tran sition period all serve as points of interest. The similarities, but also differences, across the region have in many ways been the result of the impact of past communist political and economic systems. Different courses of economic, political, and social change have an impact on the way democracy is understood and put into practice. The purpose of this study is to look at the transition from a comparative perspective and analyze its impact on conceptions of citizenship. The democratic transition process will be analyzed as a primarily temporal variable, spanning the period between the collapse of communist regimes and the present. Democratic transition is understood as a political process aimed at establishing a democratic political system. This project recognizes the completion of a democratic transition as defined by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan as: when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to produce an elected government, when government comes to power that is the direc t result of a free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, legislative, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies de jure. (L inz and Stepan, 1996, 3) The main points of concern for this project are the ways in which the democratic transition process shapes political discourse concerning civic identity, distinctive civic ideologies, and changing political conditions in the pos tcommunist democratic transitions of Central and Eastern Europe, and their impact on the formation of citizenship and naturalization policy in the region. In order to assess that impact, the process of democratization is broken into five broad components, each of which may explain certain
39 institutional developments relating to citizenship and naturalization policy. The democratic transition of each case is examined in the context of its (1) individual political historical situation, (2) economic changes, (3) political leadership, (4) civil society, and (5) international influences. Dependent Variables vague ideas about a broad range of political identities. If the scope is narrowed, however, to specific statutes and judicial rulings that define what citizenship is and who is eligible to possess it, we may gauge more concretely exactly how a particular political community wishes to define itself, and hence how it conceives of citizenship (Smith 1997, 2). A country has the ability to refine the makeup and texture of its own civic identity through the implementation of formal citizenship and naturalization policy. An intensive case by case analysis of previous and existing l aws concerning citizenship and naturalization serves as the dependent variable for this project. Specifically, laws are examined in four dimensions: (1) citizenship acquisition, (2) citizenship loss, (3) dual citizenship, and (4) current issues regarding citizenship. It is hypothesized that elements of the democratic transition process, defined by the five components above, lead to changes in these policies and in turn reflect changes in conceptions of citizenship. Case Selection This research project is concerned with the impact of the democratic transition process on citizenship and naturalization policy in the specific region of postcommunist
40 Central and Eastern Europe. The individual cases of Poland, Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, t he Czech Republic and Slovakia will all be addressed. Each of these countries has emerged from a communist regime and successfully gained entry into the European Union. The democratic transition process placed these eight countries in one of three uniq ue positions, each posing its own particular challenges to the defining of formal citizenship policy. Poland, Hungary, and Romania fall into the first group, as states prone to shifts in populations and geographic borders. The states in the second group, states These three countries shared the experience of regaining autonomy after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The countries of the third group each emerged as new states after the b reakup of an old state. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are part of this partition states Differing traditions of civic history and participation are expected to lead to differing paths to defining citizenship. However, through the ir shared experience as postcommunist nations transitioning to democracy, certain patterns in regards to the evolution of citizenship may bridge the gaps across the region. By defining comparing, and contrasting citizenship policy before, during, and aft er the postcommunist transition, the explicit effects of democratization on citizenship policy should become apparent.
41 Chapter 2 Shifting Borders and Shifting Populations: Poland, Hungary, and Romania These three cases have been grouped togethe r as states with legacies of shifting borders and shifting populations. The nations of Poland, Hungary, and Romania have all experienced their own unique forms of state and population changes, almost routinely, since the 19th century. In the 19th centur y, the lands of Central and Eastern Europe existed as the meeting place of four empires: the German, Austro Hungarian, Russian and Ottoman As these empires dissolved, the political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe included major revolutionar y periods and experiments with various modern political ideologies, including liberalism, nationalism, communism, fascism, and democrac y. This chapter address es how the maps of Poland, Hungary, and Romania have changed throughout recent history, and what t hose changes have meant for the inhabitants of the r particular citizenship and naturalization policies. With border shifts and regime changes, the populations of Poland, Hungary, and Romania were forced to make stark decisions that often pitted their citizenship, religious beliefs, family commitments, ideological affinities, or economic interests against one another. They were subject to increasing violence from aggressive states to achieve
42 radical ideological goals, reaching th eir lowest point in the genocide of World War II an event that significantly altered the ethnic and political fabric of the entire region, permanently shaping its ide as of citizenship. One can thus tie the history of geographic shifts in Poland, Hungary, and Romania to population disputes and the formation of citizenship and naturalization policy. This chapter foc uses on the impacts of the various historical legacies and the d emocratic transition processes on the evolution of citizenship and naturalizati on policy in Poland, Hungary, and Romania. Continuities and breaks in the transition from communist to postcommunist policies of national membership are hypothesized to coincide with altering views on what it means to be a citizen. In order to asses these changes, the focus here is on the legal dimension of state citizenship, which is regulated mainly by const itutions and citizenship laws. O ne of the most striking components of p ostcommunist citizenship policy is the right to reacquisition of citizenship by former the massive repatriation of citizens stripped of their citizenship throughout the postwar and communist periods. Much of the citizenship policy in these c ountries seeks to return individuals to earlier status and to restore their rights or property, prior to a loss, injury or abuse. In postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe, the concept of restitution involved the process of undoing communist legal and po litical abuses and dispossessions. This type of restitution appears central to postcommunist legal and political transformation, which was aimed at the restoration of the pre communist status quo.
43 Poland Citizenship and naturalization policy in Polan d serves as the first vantage point from which to examine such policies across postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. Conceptions of citizenship in Poland have been shaped by a number of influences over the past century, not the least of which involved borders and population shifts. Uncovering the role of the transition to democracy on Polish citizenship and naturalization law inherently includes an examination of the development of the legal notion of Polish cit izenship over a significant period of time. Tracing the path of Polish citizenship laws before, during, and after democratization reveals that conceptions of citizenship in the Polish state have changed little. Interpretations of citizenship in Poland app ear less affected specifically by elements of democratization than hypothesized. The main drivers behind current citizenship laws stem from the aftermath of World War II and subsequent displacement of populations in past there has been an emphasis on redressing past abuses of citizenship law through extensive repatriation legislation. Such legislation in Poland, and citizenship laws in general, have consistently sought to maintain a particular ethnic makeup, favorin g the continuation of an ethnically homogenous Polish state. The transition to democracy triggered a few notable changes in citizenship policy (the dissolving of certain agreements concerning dual citizenship among the former communist states, for example) however, the effects on overall conceptions of citizenship are difficult to discern. The most striking characteristic of citizenship laws in Poland since the collapse of communism is their preoccupation with redressing past wrongs.
44 Pre transition Cit izenship Modern regulation on Polish citizenship began with the re recognition of the Polish state in 1918. The population of the recreated Polish state was ethnically heterogeneous and included citizens from Russia, Germany, and Austria Hungary. Decisi ons as to who had rights of Polish citizenship were therefore addressed through international treaties. The most important of these was the 1919 Polish Minorities Treaty, signed by Allied and Associated Powers and Poland. According to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the main aim of such treaties was to prevent new states and states religious or linguistic grounds to certain categories of persons, in sp ite of a link which 2010, 2). Since then, there have been three significant pieces of legislation enacted in 1920, 1951, and 1962 regarding Polish citizenship These three acts share certain common features that provide a foundation for analyzing Polish conceptions of citizenship. First, citizenship at birth in Poland relies on the principle of jus s anguinis meaning the status of a citizen is based on the ci tizenship of one's parents. Second, country have played an in important role in shaping citizenship legislation. And finally, citizenship laws in Poland have focused on iss ues pertinent to the diaspora nationals naturalization.
45 The Act on Nationality of Poland of 1920 was the first statute on citizenship in an independent Poland. The Ac t of 1920 gave the right to Polish citizenship to every person regardless of gender, age, confession, or nationality, who was settled on Polish territory if they did not have the right to any other nationality, who was born on the territory of Poland, or w ho was entitled to Polish citizenship under the terms of the international treaty (Art. 2; Grny 2010, 3). At the end of World War II, agreements signed among Stalin and other allied leaders radically altered Polish territory. In losing eastern lands, Po land was faced with the problem of repatriating Polish citizens from the new Soviet territory. Repatriation agreements between Poland and the Soviet Union stated that people of Polish and Jewish ethnicity, who had been Polish citizens as of September 17, 1 939, were entitled to move Polish citizens and automatically lost their foreign citizenship upon return to Poland. The repatriation agreements signed with the Soviet U nion also concerned the resettlement of Polish citizens of non Polish [Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, and other] ethnicities to considerable importance. These agreements w ere based not on republican or liberal ideas, but rather ethnic conceptions of citizenship. The largest group expatriated from Poland in the post war period consisted of ethnic Germans (Grny 2010, 4). They were officially excluded by the 1946 Act on t he Exclusion of Persons of German Ethnicity from Polish Society, part of a larger movement throughout Eastern Europe after World War II to repatriate Germans living abroad. The act addressed the citizenship of ethnic Germans, specifically whether or not th ey were of
46 Polish origin and capable of assimilation in Polish society. Polish nationality was granted only after a special verification procedure. As a result, sizeable portions of the Polish population, namely non verified citizens and recognized German s, were refused Polish nationality. The physical displacement was intended to be permanent for all Germans who lived east of the Oder Neie line (Schulze 2006, 368). They were forced to settle in what remained of Germany without the possibility of visitin g their former homes. It is estimated that between 12 and 14 million Germans were affected throughout the greater region of Eastern Europe by this population relocation, from the East to the West (Schulze 2006, 367 368). Ethnic Poles, however, even those w ho had been German citizens before the Second World War, were allowed to stay in Poland and retain Polish citizenship. The 1951 Act on Polish Nationality also held provisions based on issues of ethnicity. The Act required residents of the regained territo ries to obtain documents certifying their Polish ethnicity. It also specified that repatriates were to receive the rights of Polish citizenship. Again, Polish citizenship was based primarily on ethnic criteria. Another Act on Polish Citizenship was passe d in 1962. This Act remained in effect, without any major amendments, until the end of the communist era in Poland. It did not challenge the rules of acquisition and loss of Polish nationality included in the 1951 Act. The 1962 Act did not directly address the issue of Polish ethnicity, although it maintained special rights to repatriates returning to Poland (Grny 2010, 4). citizenship was further solidified in the late 1960s. Po lish authorities officially challenged the loyalty of Polish citizens of Jewish origin. These people, who were perceived as
47 having compromised loyalties, were forced to leave Poland after signing a document expressing their intention to renounce their Poli sh citizenship upon assuming Israeli citizenship (Stola 2000). These practices demonstrate how the concept of Polish ethnicity and its relationship with the right to Polish citizenship were exploited in Poland under the communist regime. Furthermore, the communist authorities often required Polish emigrants to relinquish their Polish citizenship when they came to visit Poland. If they refused to do so, they risked being imprisoned in Poland for illegally overstaying abroad and men could potentially be forc ed to undergo mandatory military service (Grny 2010, 5). Under communism, the renunciation of Polish citizenship was justified not in terms of ideology. Policies co ncerning citizenship in Poland were also highly influenced by the political elites. They held high levels of discretionary power regarding Polish nationality at that time, which was particularly evident in how ethnicity was used in administrative decision s. Although absent from the 1962 Act on Polish Citizenship, ethnicity was a factor in decisions regarding Polish citizenship and played a particular role in relation to German and Jewish minorities. Special decrees designed for these two groups in 1956 and 1958 were in force until 1984 (Albiniak and Czajkowska 1996, 326). Republic of Poland necessitated deep economic and political reforms in the country. The 1962 Act on Polish Citi zenship, with some amendments in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, is still the basis of citizenship law in Poland. Nevertheless, some policy changes regarding Polish nationality have been introduced. These changes in
48 policy take advantage of the way provisions of the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality were formulated. Therefore, an approach based on a high level of discretion of public officials in conferring Polish citizenship, as well as an emphasis on certain ethnic criteria, has been conti nued in the Third Republic of Poland. Post transition Citizenship Today, the main body of Polish citizenship law outlined in the Act of 1962 remains mostly intact. Numerous amendments and other legislative and judicial decisions, however, have been made reflecting the changes in circumstance of the Polish state and altering conceptions of citizenship. According to the Act of 1962, there are three means of becoming a naturalized Polish citizen: conferment, acknowledgement, and marriage procedures. Polis h citizenship may also be acquired by means of repatriation. The conferment procedure (Article 8) is the most discretionary path of granting Polish citizenship. It grants the President virtually unrestricted power to confer and refuse Polish citizenship. An individual may be granted t may also make the acquisition of Polish citizenship conditional on the renunciation of foreign citizenship of an applicant. The acknowledgement procedure (Article 9) grants a stateless person, or a person whose citizenship is unknown, Polish citizenship after the individual obtains a permanent residence permit and has lived in Poland for at least five years. The marriage procedure (Article 10) states that an individual married to a Polish citizen may apply for and obtain Polish citizenship after living in Poland on the basis of a permanent residence
49 permit for at least 6 months or remaining married for at least 3 years and 6 months (Grny 2005, 3). As for the loss of citizenship, Polish citizenship cannot be withdrawn involuntarily. A Polish citizen can lose his or her citizenship if he or she renounces it, and the loss is conditional upon the consent of the President of Poland (Article 13; Grny 2010, 13). In 1997 1998 an amendment was passed to the 1962 Act on Polish Nationality making it impossible to deprive an individual of Polish citizenship unless he or she expressed the desire to renounce it. A permanent residence permit was added to the five year residence requirement for obtaining citizenship. Changes were also made to the procedure of acquiri ng citizenship by marriage. Previously, Polish citizenship was only open to foreign women married to Poles, but the amendment allowed for foreign men to acquire Polish citizenship by marrying a Polish woman (Grny 2010, 6). Another significant change to P olish citizenship policy involved the decision to end participation in conventions with other former communist countries concerning the prevention of dual citizenship. These conventions had affected the naturalization process by creating inequality among applicants for Polish nationality. Under these conventions most former Soviet Bloc citizens were not allowed to retain their previous citizenship upon naturalization in Poland, while other applications were subject to the discretionary decision by the Poli sh President (Grny 2010, 6). Another factor affecting the number of individuals granted Polish citizenship is the high level of discretion the President has over the naturalization process. The Ordinance of the President of the Republic of Poland, ena cted in 2000, sought to regulate,
50 at least partially, presidential discretion in decisions regarding the acquisition and loss of Polish citizenship. It outlines specific documents and forms necessary to process citizenship applications successfully. While little changed in terms of formal procedure, ability to grant citizenship at will (Grny 2010, 7). The Repatriation Act was also implemented in 2000, leading to th e removal of provisions concerning repatriation from the 1962 Act on Polish Citizenship. The Repatriation Act stipulates that repatriates are entitled to Polish citizenship without any restriction, becoming Polish citizens upon crossing the Polish border. A candidate, however, must satisfy three conditions to qualify for repatriation: declare Polish nts of Polish ethnicity or hold Polish citizenship (Grny 2007, 1). This procedure further reinforces the claim that the right to Polish citizenship based on ethnicity. Three drafts of a new act on Polish citizenship have been discussed in the Polish Pa rliament. While a general consensus appeared to have been met on the most basic principles, new legislation has not been passed. The most recent draft, like the previous three Acts on Polish Citizenship, maintains a jus sanguine interpretation of citizen ship. The draft also introduces a special procedure for individuals wishing to restore previously lost Polish citizenship. The proposed procedure applies to those who had lost Polish citizenship on the basis of previous Acts on Polish Citizenship (1920, 1 951, and 1962) and had not relinquished their citizenship entirely voluntarily. To be entitled to use this
51 procedure, applicants would not have to live permanently in Poland. Rather, they must prove that they have had Polish citizenship in the past. This new draft of an act on Polish citizenship extended a list of requirements knowledge o in Poland, absence of a criminal record and behavior not violating loyalty towards the Polish state. It was a proposal aiming at setting more precise and less discretional crite ria According to the proposed draft, the President may give Polish citizenship to foreigners who may not have possessed Polish citizenship in the past, but who performed military service or served in certain Polish underground organizations during World War II (Article 17 .1.1; 17.1.2; 17.2; Liebich 2009 13). The bill also provides for restitution of citizenship for some individuals who left Poland between September 1939 and June 1989. These individuals were forced to renounce their citizenship under threat of "repressions and chicaneries," in order to leave the state (Article 28.1.1.b; Liebich 2009 13). The reinstatement of citizenship is not, however, available to individuals who left Poland and voluntarily declared another citizenship. The proposed bill also offers restitution of citizenship to individuals who lost it by enlisting in the Armed Forces of Great Britain, the USA or France after May 1945. Polish accession to the European Union sparked another interesting point of analysis in regards to citizenship and naturalization laws. The topic of immigration to
52 border, but it did not affect the discourse on Polish c itizenship. Accession into the European Union also had an effect on the interest in Polish citizenship among members of the diaspora. The number of applications for the recognition of Polish citizenship submitted to Polish consulates abroad increased subst antially following the accession process. This recognition of citizenship pertained to individuals entitled to Polish citizenship (usually the decedents of Polish immigrants), but who had not formally registered as citizens. In 2000, 765 applications were registered, whereas in 2004 there were 3,807 (Grny 2010, 8). The jus s anguinis principle governing the acquisition of Polish citizenship implies that emigrants who have at least one parent who is a Polish national acquire Polish citizenship at birth. Al though the numbers of Polish citizens living abroad and possessing Polish and foreign citizenship at the same time are unknown, it can be expected that they constitute a reasonable share of numerous Polish diaspora. That being said, the EU accession had a relatively minor impact on citizenship and naturalization policies in Poland. Conclusions The collapse of communism and founding of the Third Republic of Poland in 1989 triggered deep economic and political reforms in the country. In addition, changes i n the citizenship law were already considered necessary at the beginning of 1990s, when new problems requiring solutions on the ground of Polish citizenship legislation appeared. Restoring Polish citizenship to people who lost it during the communist perio d and the repatriation of Poles from territories of the former Soviet Union were the main priorities of citizenship policy initiatives. Also, changes in immigration patterns created a
53 need for more elaborate regulations regarding naturalization in Poland. However, no new legislation on Polish citizenship has been introduced. The most striking characteristic of citizenship laws in Poland since the collapse of communism is their preoccupation with redressing past wrongs. Amendments to the Act of 1962 have emphasized compensation and restitution for individuals denied certain rights in the recent communist past, as well as earlier periods. The Repatriation Act of 2000 is a prime example of an attempt at addressing problems of the past. The law is aimed at compensating or providing restitution to those families who were deported in 1939 1940 from Soviet occupied Eastern Poland, as well as earlier exiles and deportees; members of the Polish minority in the USSR transferred in the Stalinist era to areas far fr om the Polish border; and Polish nationalists and revolutionaries exiled by past repressive regimes. This kind of legislation has been enacted as an attempt to account for damages of the past through the conferral of citizenship. Hungary Like Poland, Hu ngary shares a history marred by shifts in its geographic borders and large numbers of its population. These changes are reflected in the evolution of undergone four ma jor reforms since 1879. These reforms have reflected historical changes in the region and a succession of different political regimes. The original Act on Hungarian Nationality, its subsequent amendments, and other relevant legislation (most notably the recent Hungarian Status Law) provide a means of analyzing the Hungarian national identity and its further conceptions of citizenship. Hungarian citizenship policy
54 follows the jus s anguinis principle and maintains a conception of citizenship similar to Pol and in its ethnic preferences. Hungarian citizenship laws weigh heavily on the idea of an ethnic kin state and address many concerns with the Hungarian diaspora. Changing borders and mass population movements in Hungary over the past century have contrib uted to domestic and international political debates over unification of the Hungarian kin state and the meaning of Hungarian citizenship. Pre transition Citizenship The first Act on Hungarian Nationality was passed in 1879. Since then, citizenship and notable contribution was the establishment of the jus s anguinis principle in Hungarian citizenship law, which has guided policy up to the present. This Act remained the primary source of authority concerning citizenship until 1948. Modern regulation concerning Hungarian citizenship, as in much of the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, was formed out of complications brought on by World War II. Events before World War II, however, wer e also crucial in shaping the direction of Hungarian citizenship law. Most ethnic Hungarians were, until 1918, citizens of the Hapsburg Empire. The Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy ruled according to a nationalistic policy towards its very ethnicall y heterogeneous citizens. In the 19 th up, meant to systematically saturate the government bureaucracy with ethnic Hungarians and promote cultural assimilation of all minorities (Stewart 2009, 3). Ratified in 1920, the T reaty of Trianon legitimated territorial changes initiated by Romania, Serbia, and the Czech Republic (the new states of South Eastern Europe) and carried out in late 1918 and early 1919 at the expense of the former Hungarian state. As a
55 result of Trianon, three war population and two thirds of its territory were ceded to neighboring states (Stewart 2009, 5). The overwhelming majority (about 70%) of the population thus shifted were in fact non Hungarians, but the remaining 30% repres ented some 1.7 million Hungarians in Transylvania, nearly half a million in Vojvodina, and over a million in Slovakia and trans Carpathian Ruthenia, over three million people in total (Stewart 2009, 5). In Romania in particular, the Hungarian minority was subject to intensive nationalizing policies, involving language restrictions. These restrictions transformed into outright repression in the 1930s with the rise of the Iron Guard (Livezeanu 1995). In World War II, the re division of the Trianon states by Hitler and his allies triggered further conflict in the region regarding shifting borders and populations. It led to a series of conflicts and population transfers, initiated by the Hungarians at the beginning and then by their victims at the end of the w ar. At the outset of the war, Romanian territories in the interwar period with the Vienna Awards. The territorial awards were reversed at the end of the war, and Hungary gave b ack the gained territories. The end of the war also led to the eviction of some 200,000 ethnic Germans from Hungary, as well as the loss of some 73,000 Slovaks as part of an "exchange of population"; and, the number of individuals having left Hungary in t he three years following the end of the war is estimated to have exceeded 100,000 ( Juhsz 2003) At the same time, 113,000 ethnic Hungarians were resettled in Hungary from Czechoslovakia, 125,000 from Transylvania, 45,500 from Yugoslavia, and 25,000 from t he Soviet Union ( Juhsz 2003)
56 The Armistice Agreement ratified in Moscow in 1945 voided changes in citizenship resulting from any territorial modifications to the Hungarian state between 1939 and 1945 (Kovcs and Tth 2010, 3). Millions of former Hungar ian citizens located within the jurisdiction of neighboring states lost their Hungarian citizenship. The Peace Agreement fixed the borders of the Hungarian state as they had existed on the last day before the war began (Kovcs and Tth 2010, 3). Between 1 945 and 1948 temporary regulations on citizenship were put in place that considered all individuals living in Hungary in 1945 to be citizens, except for those holding the citizenship of another state. Individuals who had not returned to Hungary at the end of the war were deprived of their citizenship and, between 1946 and 1948, their property was confiscated (Kovcs and Tth 2010, 3). In 1946 a reform of the legal status and civil rights of children born out of wedlock was enacted providing them with equal status, but it was the new Act on Hungarian Nationality of 1948 that specifically addressed the creation of a legal framework for the acquisition of citizenship through changes in family and personal status. The Act provided for the equal treatment of chi ldren born out of wedlock and stipulated that all Hungarian citizens living abroad should be registered. The Act also recognized the pending Hungarian citizenship of undocumented individuals who had been residing in Hungary for a given number of years The third Act on Nationality adopted in 1957 incorporated elements of the New York Convention on the Nationality of Married Women of 1957, and sought to recognize the rights of spouses (Kovcs and Tth 2010, 3). The executive rules of the Act were not publis hed and were implemented by a confidential order. Following the 1956 revolution
57 and the mass emigration it triggered, a broad amnesty was proclaimed for returnees and a registry of nationals permanently abroad was established (Law Decree No. 11 of 1955, No 7 of 1956, No. 11 of 1956; Ministerial Decree of the Interior 2 of 11 January1956; Kovcs and Tth 2010, 3). Beginning in 1969 there was a gradual shift in the focus of Hungarian official policy towards Hungarians abroad, especially those in Romania. In 1969 a working group that cultural relations must be built up with Hungarians living in the neighboring Kovacs et al., Report 144). In the press more arti cles began to appear on Post transition Citizenship Following the collapse of communism, H ungarian policy towards citizenship border populations. After 1989 and the Hungarian turn to democracy, the new constitution regulated citizenship and prohibited its arbitrary deprivation (Kovcs and Tth 2010, 3 ). At the same time, the citizenship of expatriate nationals who had been deprived of their citizenship arbitrarily was restored upon request. The fourth Act on Nationality, passed in 1993, made preconditions for naturalization more restrictive, but to c ompensate, preferences were given to individuals based on ethnic and family ties. Between 1989 and 1993 Hungary terminated bilateral agreements with former socialist states that excluded dual citizenship. Recent developments in Hungarian citizenship are accession efforts to the EU and by political debates on the status of ethnic Hungarians
58 three times, due to the ratification of the European Conventio n on Nationality (1997) and the UN Convention on Stateless Persons (1954). Eligibility for preferential naturalization was extended to EU citizens and a super preference was adopted in favor of ethnic Hungarians in the shadow of the upcoming Schengen restr ictions (Tth 2003). Current debates concerning citizenship in Hungary are overwhelmingly concerned with legislation referred to as the Hungarian Status Law. The Hungarian Status Law tates vis vis the Hungarian state, and provides a series of concessions to these people when visiting Hungary as well as subsidies or financial supports in their own countries. In exchange for such concessions from the would rians beyond the borders have to do little more than establish their credentials as ethnic Hungarians and then commit themselves to remaining as residents of their birth state. This law, therefore, tries to establish a legal relationship between the home s tate and Hungarians abroad and The explicit aim of the Law is to promote the well being and general happiness of those Hungarians who find themselves born outside of what is co nceived as the mother country and to ensure their ability to stay there. One condition of receiving the certificate of nationality is that the individual is not applying for settlement in Hungary. The Status Law defines a number of goals (especially in th e preamble and Article 3) which can be summarized in terms of political, economic, and cultural objectives. Culturally, the aim is to preserve the national identity of Hungarians beyond the borders; economically, the aim is to improve the living standards of these same persons; and
59 benefits to people outside the Hungarian border that are identical to those of Hungarian citizens (Article 4). In many cultural areas, such as receipt of national honors and prizes, beneficiaries are to be treated like any Hungarian citizen. Notably also, beneficiaries would be able to receive a work permit for three months each year and when employed, they would pay national insurance and pension contributions and later receive payments in line with these contributions. Not available to Hungarian citizens in general, a number of other concessions, such as subsidized travel, are also included. The law identifies beneficiaries of the legislation through possession of an identification card, a Hungarian Certificate. According to the Law these are to be issued ation which has been issued by a recommending organization representing the Hungarian national community in the neighboring country concerned and being recognized by the Government of the Republic wart 2009, 15). Such a provision reinforces the idea of an ethnically oriented national community. Not just anyone may apply for the Certificate. An individual must have clear ties to the state, and those ties must be validated by a recognized organizat ion. The Status Law raises questions regarding the legal and political principles that deviates from modern norms of statehood of absolute territorial sovereignty, s ingular national identities, and an exclusive citizenship as the only possible legal and political relationship between states and individuals. The Hungarian case is evidence that, even in
60 contemporary Europe, the concepts and practices of citizenship, so vereignty, territoriality, and identity are by no means concrete. European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) accepted a report in late October 2001 w hich represents the first step towards the development of international norms governing kin state policy towards ethnic minorities abroad (Fowler 2001, 181). The Venice Commission adopted a detailed report on the preferential treatment of national minorit ies by their kin state. In this report, the importance of bilateral treaties was stressed and certain aspects of these treaties, their content and implementation were emphasized. The report found that the responsibility for minority protection is primari ly the responsibility of home States, and also that unilateral measures of granting kin fostering cultural links between minorities and their kin states in order to preserve the mi the European Union, including the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Council of Europe, have also been asked to examine the Hungarian law (Fowler 2001, 181) While the Hungarian kin state policy remains controversial, it also highlights that international political or academic debate, and on an ad hoc basis. The investig ations of the Hungarian law by institutions in the European Union, however, are likely to raise international awareness of the external minority issue, encourage its consideration as part
61 of the ongoing European debate on changing notions of sovereignty, c itizenship and identity, and perhaps prompt the development of an EU position on the question. Conclusions The preference for the naturalization of ethnic Hungarians is the result of a troubled history of a nation split among various states and as a tool for preserving cultural identity in the twentieth century. The principle of ethnicity has been observed directly in nationality legislation and migration law through regulations for visa, residence and e to the perception of a integration of migrants, migration law, naturalization, and citizenship are rarely publicly authorities may refuse an application for naturalization with no explanation, and there is no legal remedy against a negative decision. Members of the European Union were extended preferential treatment in granting citizenship by legislation passed in 2003 partly because of the supposed ethnic proximity of applicants in adjacent states. Provisions supportive of family unity in nationality law are widely accepted and so are the discretionary powers in naturalization proceedings that determine who is to be a llow ed to join this rather homogeneous society Following the revolution of 1989, the relationship between Hungary and the Hungarians living in the neighboring countries entered a new phase. During the communist period citizenship policy focused o n internal matters of the state. Until the mid 1980s, Hungary did not show serious official interest in Hungarians living in other states. In the late 1980s, the problem of Hungarians living abroad, especially in
62 Transylvania, was brought to the center of attention. After the breakdown of the communist regimes and the transition to democracy, the situation changed even more radically. Finally, concern for Hungarians living abroad materialized in legislation and governmental politics. The status law framed in 2001 (amended in 2003) and the referendum on dual citizenship for Hungarians living in neighboring states are primarily an expression of the domestic debates in Hungary as to what constitutes the nation in Hungary. In short, the collapse of communism a llowed for the expansion of conceptions of citizenship outside traditional boundaries. Romania Modern Romania was established in 1859. The nation experienced major shifts in state building in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century, determ ined by conditions of the Congress of Paris (1856), the Congress of Berlin (1879), and the Versailles Peace Treaties (1919 1920) ( Iordachi 2010, 2) These treaties were each part of successive geo political reorganizations of Southeast Europe by larger Eu ropean powers. Developments in Romanian citizenship over time have tended to correspond to major stages in the process of building the state. The events of both World Wars, the rise of communism, and decline of communism, have marked significant points i n the creation of modern Romanian citizenship law. As in Poland and Hungary, Romanian citizenship follows an ethnically based conception. Citizenship in Romania over the past hundred years has felt the impact of significant border changes, as well as ext ensive population shifts. As a result, a significant portion of post transition citizenship policy has dealt with populations outside traditionally recognized boundaries, raising further
63 questions about the nature of statehood. Post transition citizenshi p policy in Romania has also sought the restitution of citizenship and repatriation of individuals harmed since the end of World War II. Again, much like Poland and Hungary, Romania has spent a large portion of its resources concerning citizenship and nat uralization policy on the return to pre communist conditions. Pre transition Citizenship The legal foundation of modern Romanian citizenship was established in the 1865 Civil Code, based on the jus s anguinis principle of ascribing citizenship at birth, and a selective policy of n a turalization favoring individuals born and raised in the country. The constitution adopted in 1866 introduced Christian religion and Romanian ethnicity as criteria for naturalization, both absent in the Civil Code. Until 1879, Jews were excluded from Romanian citizenship and deprived of substantial civil, social and political rights because of their religion. In 1879, under pressure from the international community, Jews were granted access to naturalization; however, the proce ss was lengthy and highly bureaucratic, leading to a small number of naturalizations before World War I. Also during this time, the Romanian state pursued an active policy of granting ethnic Romanians from neighboring countries privileged access to citize nship by the decisions of parliament. Ethnic Romanians wishing to immigrate were allowed to bypass the complicated naturalization stage, did not have to live in the country for the standard ten year period, and could prove their ethnicity through witness accounts or certificates of ethnicity issued by Romanian communities abroad (Iordachi 2010, 2). This practice was justified by the fluid ethnic boundaries of the Romanian nation state and a willingness to incorporate Romanians from Austria Hungary, Russia and the Balkans.
64 The onset of World War I brought significant changes to the Romanian population and its views on citizenship. First, interwar Romania almost doubled in size and population by incorporating territories previously part of Russia and Aust ria Hungary. Although dominated by Romanians, the new state also included a high ratio of ethnic and religious minorities: 28.1 per cent of the total population in 1930, including Hungarians (7.9 per cent), Germans (4.1 per cent), Jews (4.0 per cent), Rut henians (3.2 per cent), Russians (2.3 per cent), Bulgarians (2.0 per cent), Gypsies (1.5 per cent), Turks (0.9 per cent) and Tartars (0.1 per cent) (Institutul Central de Statistic 1940, 44 45; Iordachi 2010, 3). Second, the events of the war generated an unprecedented liberalization of access to citizenship. Under international pressure, Romania took steps towards the civil and political emancipation of its Jewish population. Adopted in February 1924, the new law on citizenship granted citizenship to all l egal inhabitants of the state and the annexed territories. It also preserved the main features of Romanian citizenship doctrine by stipulating three main ways of acquiring citizenship: by descent, according to the principle of jus s anguinis ; by marrying a Romanian man; and by naturalization, after having fulfilled a residence requirement of ten years following a declaration of intent to naturalize. Foreigners born and raised in Romania were exempt from the mandatory residential stage, provided they requeste d naturalization upon becoming an adult. Third, the liberalization of access to citizenship was accompanied by major social and political reorganizations of the country. Comprehensive reforms such as universal male suffrage (1918), massive land redistribut ion (1921), and a new liberal Constitution (1923) remodeled the country into a multi party parliamentary monarchy. While the new regime continued to suffer major regional and socio political cleavages,
65 interwar Romania held free parliamentary elections up until 1937. Unfortunately, the Citizenship in Romania experienced significant changes just prior to and during the Second World War. Under pressure of right wing organizations and the authoritarian political leadership, the multiparty parliamentary regime collapsed in 1938, replaced by a (short lived) royal dictatorship (1938 1940). The new political changes were also reflected in a new law on citizenship, adopted in 1939. The law did not alter the main principles of granting citizenship, but introduced numerous changes in the procedure of naturalization, placed under the control of the Ministry of Justice. The most important change was that naturalized citizens were granted full po litical rights only six years after 1952, when it was amended and then abolished by the new communist regime. The political ascent of the extreme right led to the massive denaturalization of Romanian Jews, the revocation of their political and civil rights, and their partial deportation and extermination during the regime of Ion Antonescu (1940 1944). During the Second World War, Romania suffered major territoria l losses. In 1940, Romania was forced to cede Northwestern Transylvania to Hungary and Southern Dubruja to Bulgaria. Romania also lost provinces to the USSR. In 1944, a coalition of communists and democratic parties removed Antonescu from power, reinstate d the 1923 Constitution, abolished all anti Semitic discriminatory laws, and restored citizenship to all denaturalized inhabitants (Iordachi 2010, 3). Romania also joined the anti fascist military coalition and restored its control over Northwestern Transy lvania. However, the
66 Soviets retook geographic territories and intervened in the political process by installing the Communist Party in power and initiating the forceful Sovietization of Romania. The communist regime implemented radical changes to Roman political system, regulating every sphere of activity. As a legal boundary defining membership in the political community, citizenship legislation was an essential dimension of the communist political transformation and was therefore subjec t to many revisions reflecting the shifts of the political regime. The communist regime redefined the conditions of acquisition and loss of citizenship. Decree no. 33/1952 abolished all existing laws on citizenship (Article 10) and set new rules for the a cquisition of Romanian citizenship, defining the legal boundaries of the nation (Iordachi 2010, 4). Romanian citizenship was granted at birth to children of at least one Romanian parent. This transmission could not result in dual citizenship, however. Ch ildren of mixed marriages had to eventually choose between the citizenship of the mother or the father. The decree ended the traditional policy of naturalization of individuals born in the country and the privileged naturalization of ethnic Romanians livin g abroad. Decisions on the naturalizations, as well as on the renunciation or withdrawal of citizenship, were made by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, established in 1947 (Iordachi 2010, 4). After 1958, Romania turned toward nationalist ideol ogy. The new nationalist orientation of the regime was reflected in the definition given to the legal principle governing the ascription of citizenship at birth. Adopted in 1971, the new Law on Romanian citizenship reconfirmed the principle of jus s anguin is as the foundation of a homogeneous national community and gave it nationalist connotations. The new
67 definition of citizenship linked the application of the jus s anguinis principle to birth on In addition to ascription through jus s anguinis at birth, Romanian citizenship could also be acquired by naturalization, by adoption, and by repatriation. Naturalization was granted at adulthood by the Council of State (a leading or gan of the republic created request; (b) were born abroad but had lived uninterruptedly in Romania for at least five years; (c) were married to a Romanian citizen and ha d lived in the country for at least state and the Romanian people; be eighteen years of age or above; undertake socially useful work or prove sufficient material means of subsistence; and renounce their foreign citizenship or any commitment of loyalty to a foreign power and swear allegiance to The Romanian state reserved the right to by crossing the border clandestinely or, after relocating their home abroad, assumed a foreign citizenship, worked against t he interests of the country or enrolled in a foreign exclusively by the executive power. Only Ceausescu, as the president of the Council of State (from December 1967 to December 1989), could grant or withdraw Romanian citizenship.
68 Post transition Citizenship The 1989 collapse of the communist regime and the gradual democratization of the political system had a powerful impact on Romanian citizenship legislation, resu lting in the redefinition of the legal criteria of membership in the national community. Without significant dissident movements during the communist period on which to build the process of democratization, postcommunist Romania modeled its legal and polit ical systems on the interwar political regime: the restitution of urban and land property, the by its pre communist tradition (Iordachi 2010, 6). Yet, in many ways, the communist legacy deeply affected the society and could not be disregarded as a mere detour in the Citizenship legislation is a relevant example in this respect. Enacted in March 1991, the new Law on Romanian Citizenship was mod eled on the 1939 Law, enacted by the communist r e gime in 1952; yet it also preserved many provisions of the 1971 Law. The 1991 Law specified four main ways of acquiring citizenship by different categories of inhabitants: (1) ascription at birth, through t ransmission jus s anguinis to descendants of cit i repatriation of former citizens; and ( 4) upon request, naturalization of aliens born in Rom a nia or who have lived there for a certain period of time. Although the naturalization requir e ments have been amended several times since 1991, the procedure of naturalization, which is patterned on the 1939 Law, has remained the same. Romanian citizenship legislation underwent substantial amendments and modifications in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2008, due to the process of European integration
69 and the intensification of immigration and emigration. As a rea ction to growing migration ties, coupled with EU pressure to exert strict control over external acquisitions of Romanian citizenship, requirements for naturalization have been tightened. The mandatory residence period for the naturalization of foreigners was increased from five to seven years in 1999, and to eight years in 2003 (however, the term is reduced to five years for foreigners married to Romanian citizens) (Iordachi 2010, 8). A 1999 ile a 2003 amendment requires foreigners applying for naturalization effectively to relocate to Romania, spend at least six months per year in the country and pay taxes there. In 1999, the residency requirement was reduced to half of the period for regula r naturalization for invested more than $500,000 in Romania (increased to $5 million in 2008, but decreased to $1 million in 2009) (Iordachi 2010, 8). Since 2008, refuge es and citizens of EU member states may also take advantage of reduced residency requirements. Along with the longer residency requirement, the 1999 amendment introduced additional conditions for naturalization, such as sufficient knowledge of the Romania n language, Romanian culture and civilization, the Constitution and, since 2003, the national anthem. Applicants for naturalization also need to sign a declaration of loyalty to the Romanian state. Loss of citizenship according to the 1991 Law may occur a s a result of unilateral withdrawal by the state; through voluntary individual renunciation by citizens; or in other special cases, such as the adoption of children by foreign citizens. Romania has become a major source of migration within the European U nion. Taking advantage of the freedom of movement, an estimated 2 2.5 million Romanian
70 citizens currently live and work abroad either temporarily or permanently (Iordachi 2010, 8). The most recent stipulations on the loss of Romanian citizenship express t he with reducing the number of external renunciations of citizenship. For these reasons, in 2003, the Romanian state waived its right to unilaterally withdraw the citiz enship of natural citizens who had obtained it at birth. In addition, in 2007, the procedure for the individual renunciation of citizenship became more complex, costly, and bureaucratic. These stipulations, combined with the fact that the principle of jus s anguinis operates so that Romanian citizenship can be passed on indefinitely to subsequent generations born abroad, even in cases of acquisition of a new citizenship, as long as parents do not renounce their citizenship of origin, account for the fact tha t the number of individual renunciations or losses of Romanian citizenship has been rather small varying from 12,594 persons in 1999 to 10,938 persons in 2005 (National Institute of Statistics 2006, 81 83). These findings represent a negligible portion of the massive number of Romanian citizens living abroad on a temporary or even permanent basis. The most debated provision of the postcommunist citizenship legislation was the right to restitution of state citizenship to former citizens. A traditional feat ure of the Romanian modern legal system, the right to renaturalization survived in various forms under the communist regime as well. Although the Socialist Republic conceived of itself as a new state and granted citizenship to all inhabitants living in the country, it also on new political bases.
71 With the collapse of the communist regime, the repatriation of previously persecuted individuals and the restitution of ci tizenship to former citizens were the major concerns of the new revolutionary power, which was eager to resume ties with the Romanian diaspora and kin minorities abroad. On December 31, 1989, the National Salvation Front guaranteed the right of repatriatio n to all Romanian citizens residing abroad. In addition to the repatriation of Romanian citizens in exile, the decree also facilitated the reacquisition of citizenship by former Romanian citizens living abroad, by request, through the act of repatriation. Unlike the 1971 Law, the new decree did not require former citizens renaturalized in Romania to give up their foreign citizenship, opening the gate to dual citizenship. In May 1990, a new decree passed by the provisional government enlarged the rights to reacquisition of citizenship by former citizens. While the 1989 Decree made renaturalization conditional on repatriation, the 1990 Decree granted former citizens the cit doing so, the Decree explicitly allowed certain categories of citizens to hold dual The provisions on repatriation and reacquisition of citizenship were reconfirmed and enlarged by the 1991 Law on Citizenship. The law stipulated three methods for the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship: a) repatriation; b) renaturalization by request living in the lost territories of interwar Greater Romania. First, the law guaranteed former
72 Romanian citizenship can reacquire it through repatriation, if he or she expresses a Decree, the 1991 Law allowed reacquisition of citizenship by former Romanian citizens even without repat have lost their Romanian citizenship for different reasons citizenship by request even if they retain their foreign citizenship and their home abroad (Article 37; Io rdachi 2010, 10). Third, and most importantly, the 1991 Law introduced a gra against their will or for reasons beyond their control According to the new law, the right to reacquisition of citizenship was not restricted only to those who had emigrated due to political persecution or were stripped of citizenship by the communist regime; it was also granted to all former citizens and their descendants regardless of when or under what conditions they had lost Romanian citizenship. Although not specifically mentioned in the text of the law, the main beneficiaries of the policy of restoration of citizenship have been the inhabitants of the former Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova and of the provinces of Northern Bukovina and Southe rn Bessarabia in the Ukraine (Iordachi 2010, 10). Following the Soviet wartime occupation, the inhabitants of these provinces were forcefully stripped of their Romanian citizenship; the 1991 Law enabled them to retrieve that legal status. In a departure f rom the established legal tradition of the country that had prohibited dual citizenship, the law allowed renaturalized former Romanian citizens to retain their
73 foreign citizenship as well as their home abroad. In doing so, the law created a category of non resident dual citizens living in neighboring countries. Compared to regular naturalizations, the restitution of citizenship was subject to a simpler procedure: renaturalization requests could be sent by mail or by third party intermediaries to Romanian e mbassies or consulates abroad. Applicants were exempt from consular taxes and the major conditions of naturalization required of regular aliens. Moreover, the process of renaturalization did not require an official interview and the personal presence of th e claimant in Bucharest, as the oath of loyalty could be taken at former citizen living abroad to reacquire Romanian citizenship without ever travelling to the country. Overall, the legislation on the reacquisition of Romanian citizenship was highly expansive and also legally ambiguous. It combined the right to renaturalization of expatriates and their repatriation with the principle of restoration of citizenship to for mer citizens and their descendants living in former historical provinces of interwar Romania, including their right to hold dual citizenship. According to legislators, the motivations behind these provisions were democratic, as they were meant to redress communist injustice by allowing anticommunist political dissidents or expatriates to reacquire, upon request, their lost rights (Iordachi 2010, 11). Adopted in anticipation of the imminent dismemberment of the USSR, the March 1991 Law was also triggered b y implicit nationalist motivations, which aimed to undo the effects of the Soviet occupation of certain territories and to reconstruct the interwar
74 national community. Seen from a historical perspective, the law completed the process of restoration of the citizenship to its status in interwar Romania. Included in the debate over restitution citizenship is the controversial right of a discussion made relevant in connection with campaigns by political fo rces in Hungary for their access to Hungarian citizenship. Romanian authorities criticized the stipulations of the 2001 Hungarian Status Law pertaining to Romanian citizens of Hungarian origin, agreeing to its implementation only after Hungary granted acc ess to its labor market to all Romanian citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity. With the liberalization of the status of dual citizens in Romania in 2003, on the one hand, and the failure of the 2004 national referendum in Hungary over granting dual cit izenship to ethnic Hungarians living abroad, on the other, the debates over the issue calmed. It is important to note that, while rejecting the right to right for Moldova n citizens seeking Romanian citizenship. This contradiction can be explained by the fact that Romania acted simultaneously as a nationalizing state in regard to the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and as an external homeland in relation to ethnic Romani ans in Bessarabia and Bukovina (Brubaker 1996; Iordachi 2004, 32). The 1991 Constitution restricted the political rights of dual citizens, only granting only and exclusively Romanian and whose Gradually, the substantial increase in the number of dual citizens led to a normalization of their status. In 2003, as part of numerous amendments to the Constitution, the restrictions on the polit ical participation of dual citizens were lifted. Currently, the only
75 condition of eligibility to public office, including the parliament and the presidency, is Romanian citizenship and residency in the country. Conclusions The fall of communism and subse quent democratic transition process in Romania has triggered numerous domestic and international political debates relating to citizenship and naturalization policy. Far from concentrating on legal technicalities, these debates are linked to major politica l issues such as the communist legacy, the ethnic cultural boundaries of the nation, issues of state sovereignty and territoriality, diplomatic relations with neighboring countries, and the compatibility of this policy with the European standard on citizen ship laws and minority protection. political position and its territorial disputes with the Soviet Union during the Second World War, combines elements characteristic of policies in othe r Central and Eastern European citizenship policy is the restoration of citizenship. These restorations are meant to undo the effects of the territorial changes that took pla ce during and after the Second World War, an issue that garnered little attention during the period of Soviet domination. Romania granted the right to renaturalization to all former citizens and their descendants, irrespective of their ethnic origin, thei r form of denaturalization, and the period of their attachment to the Romanian state. In doing so, Romanian legislation went beyond regular laws on repatriation, like the kind postcommunist Poland passed in relation to former citizens of Polish ethnic ori gin deported to the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War. It also went beyond forms of privileged naturalization of kin
76 Hungarian ethnic origin relocating to th e kin state. Due to the legacy of territorial conflicts and competing projects of nation building and state building in postcommunist inter state tensions, reflecting the complicated nature of these processes. Shifting borders and Shifting Populations: Ethnic Citizenship and Kin state Responsibility In Poland, Hungary, and Romania modern policies on citizenship have been shaped by a turbulent history of shifting b orders and population disputes. The shifts in borders and populations occurred along with the great social and political processes and events that transformed the region. Throughout their history the politic al maps of these countries were repeatedly redra wn. As the multinational empires that encompassed the region in the nineteenth century withdrew or disappeared, new states emerged, modeled on the modern nation state. Their borders were revised several times, almost always leading to migrations of certain populations. Nationalism and national (or religious) chauvinism led to tendencies to eliminate the minorities. Several bloody armed conflicts, especially World War I and II and the revolution and civil war in Russia, led to significant border shifts and generated mass exoduses. The emergence and expansion of totalitarian regimes, specifically Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia, also had a great impact on the scope of population movements,. In these countries, recent revisions in citizenship law have s erved as a way of 1989 political
77 and social reorganization. The dismantling of the communist system and demands for political rights and civil liberties have influenced a radical reor ganization of citizenship doctrine. Poland, Hungary, and Romania have all revised their nationality laws since the collapse of communism, in order to reflect the new political transformation and to address the territorial or population changes that took pl ace during and after World War II. New citizenship laws in these states encompassed an important national dimension: after decades of political isolation from diaspora and prohibition of dual citizenship, most of these states have resumed policies of prefe rence toward their co ethnics abroad. While the process of democratization occurred alongside some of these changes in citizenship policy, it may not be the only driving force behind the reforms. In the context of Poland, Hungary, and Romania, democrati zation appears to have simply naturalization policies for these states with legacies of shifting borders and shifting populations have, for the most part, maintained t raditional ethnic conceptions. The preference for ethnic conceptions of citizenship is apparent in current debates over the granting of dual citizenship, relations with ethnic kin minorities, and policies of citizenship restoration. Common features of Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian citizenship laws include preferential naturalization for former citizens, or members of ethnic kin groups, who status for those who l eft or were forced to leave the country during the Nazi and communist periods.
78 There has been a revival of policies of national integration between home countries and external kin minorities. These policies have varied according to their specific demogra phic and geopolitical context. Policies range from those of cultural assistance to innovative forms of economic or political protection, such as granting access to various citizenship entitlements to compact kin populations abroad. Such policies have bee n part of broader attempts at reconstructing past national communities. The span and content of these policies have been very diverse. The most commonly accepted policy toward minorities abroad is that of maintaining cultural ties between the home country and external minorities. For example, Article 6 of the 2004, 124). In addition these states grant political and diplomatic protection to kin minorities abroad. Poland, Hungary and Romania all supplement this policy with a privileged access to citizenship of co ethnics living abroad. Comprehensive programs granting collective or i ndividual citizenship rights to various kin populations living abroad appear in these three countries. These rights range from programs of repatriation of co ethnics or former citizens, as in the case of Poland, granting of special status to co ethnics as Status Law, regimes of dual citizenship for former citizens, as in the case of Romania, or, in certain conditions, for co ethnics living abroad, as again in the case of Poland. Regarding their content, the scopes of these national programs also differ. Some are directed at former citizens, irrespective of their nationality, as in Romania. Others look at compact ethnic minorities living in neighboring border areas, such as in Hungary.
79 Hungary and Romania have exerc ised broad efforts to extend rights of citizenship to their extensive kin communities abroad, in order to foster cultural identity and strengthen ties with these communities. While such policies were not considered problematic by countries with relatively small populations of ethnic Hungarians and Romanians, they posed serious problems for neighboring countries with large minority populations, as these groups would have obtained significant rights that their fellow aw, which aimed to extend a form of citizenship, with the concomitant rights, to Hungarians outside its borders in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine triggered highly negative responses for what was seen as nty and internal affairs, and the proposed law was soon modified significantly. M eanwhile, Romania, while protesting these Hungarian moves, extended citizenship to former citizens of Romania living in Moldova. This gave some citizens of Moldova, a non E. U. member, privileged access to the European Union once Romania gained membership, which in turn ruffled feathers in both Moldova and Brussels. The Romanian Hungarian postcommunist debate over dual citizenship was linked to a wider ideological controversy between the two countries over contrasting but also overlapping definitions of the nation. These debates originated in the separation of the populations of the two countries following the collapse of Austria Hungary after World War I, and led to numerous diplomatic and territorial conflicts. During the communist period, Hungary abandoned the idea of recovering lost territories but focused instead on the issue of kin minority protection, utilizing an ethnic definition of the nation. While Hungary followed a policy of treating its kin minorities abroad as an integral part of the
80 Hungarian nation and made a pretence of monitoring their treatment in neighboring countries, Romania followed with a statist definition of the nation according to which all inhabitan ts of the country were equal Romanian citizens and full members of the socialist nation, ethnic Hungarians included. Since the collapse of communism Romania has rejected such statist interpretations of citizenship and revisited more ethnic ones.
81 Chapter 3 Statehood Restored: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania Citizenship is a sensitive issue in the Baltic States which, after Soviet occupation, restored their independence in 1991. The Soviet Union had occupied Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu ania beginning in 1940. During the following decades, millions of Russians, as well as Ukrainians and Byelorussians, were encouraged to settle in Latvia and Estonia (less so in Lithuania). As some of the most developed of the Soviet Republics, the Baltic States provided economic opportunities and incentives for migration. The migration was also encouraged by a so ideals throughout the states and pressed the use of Russian as an officia l language. As a result, large Russian speaking, stateless minorities are still present. After independence, the new citizenship laws of these three states reflected this legacy with an emphasis, although to varying degrees, on jus s anguinis as the basis for acquiring citizenship. Lithuania, the least affected by Soviet immigration policy, showed the most inclusive tendencies, and Latvia had the most exclusive attitude toward ethnic Russians. Since restoring their own independent status, the Baltic States have struggled to balance a need to reconstitute their national identity ethnically with a commitment to democratic values, especially with respect to the rights of minorities.
82 Upon restoring independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania claimed that Sovi et occupation was illegal and that they had never been part of the USSR. This claim was based on the principle of state continuity, referring to the continuity or identity of states as legal entities under international law (Ziemele 2005, 118). The claim w as supported by states that never recognized the occupation and annexation of the Baltics ( 1 ). The principle of state continuity has also been reflected in citizenship policies, specifically in Estonia and Latvia, where only those who were Estonian or Latvian citizens before the Soviet occupations and their descendants could restore their citizenship, leaving Soviet era immigrants in a category of undetermined citizenship. Most of the states that emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union adopted citizenship policies under which all permanent residents were granted citizenship wit hout naturalization. In Lithuania, individuals who could trace their own or their parents' those who migrated during the Soviet period were placed in separate categor ies. Soviet era migrants were not excluded from citizenship, but rather required to apply for citizenship without a formal naturalization process. In Estonia and Latvia, however, individuals who arrived during the Soviet period mostly Russian speaking and ethnically Russian were excluded from a simple registration process. They were required to naturalize in the case of Estonia, and barred completely from citizenship in the case of Latvia until a citizenship law was finally passed in 1994. Even then, the naturalization process was complicated and adhered to strict limits. Estonian and Latvian laws were sharply criticized by international organizations on the grounds of human rights. In the anticipation of EU integration, these
83 recommendations were h eeded in the revised legislation of the Baltics. Russia has also attempted to influence the citizenship policies in the Baltics, as a majority of individuals with undefined citizenship in the region resettled from other former regions of the USSR. Citi zenship as Soviet Republics Following a brief period of independence between World War I and World War II Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940. The region was occupied by Germany for a time during World War II, and later retaken by the Soviets. Following their annexation to the Soviet Union, the Baltic States spent fifty years as de facto constituent parts of the USSR. Upon annexation, the Soviets g to fully integrate the Baltic States into the USSR. During this period, Soviet policy involved the movement of ethnic Russians into the Baltic States, while deporting tens of thousands of Baltic citizens, and in turn fundamentally altering the ethnic co mposition of the region (Fehervary 1993, 399). Russian language was forcibly incorporated into public life, and history books were rewritten embellishing Russia's past relations with the Baltic States (Elson 1997, 323). Systematic and long term discrimina tion against primarily ethnic Latvians and Estonians in employment, housing, and social benefits resulted in a lower standard of living for native populations than for immigrants in these states (Fehervary 1993, 399; Misiunas 003; Liubiniene 2003). Lithuania did not encounter similar patterns of immigration, and attracted a relatively smaller ethnic Russian population.
84 On September 7, 1940, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passed an uisition of Citizenship for the Citizens of the Soviet the Soviet Socialist Republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia shall be citizens of the USSR from the day aft er these republics are admitt Citizenship policy in the USSR followed a procedure more in line with the legal principle of jus s oli than many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe today Citizenship law in the individual Soviet republics m irrored the format and requirements of the main Soviet citizenship law. In the tradition of jus sangunis citizenship, any child born to Soviet citizens was automatically a Soviet citizen. However, if a foreign citizen expressed an interest in the acquisi tion of Soviet citizenship, there were no universal residency, language, history, constitutional, or other requirements outlined for naturalization ( Makaryan 2006, 4 ). All that was required from a foreign citizen was an application and a renunciation of t Makaryan 2006, 4 ). Soviet citizenship policy did not recognize dual citizenship. A foreigner, wishing to acquire Soviet citizenship, was required to specify the republic they were to reside in, and if the application was a ccepted, assumed citizenship of the Soviet Union (Makaryan 2006, 4 ). The Baltic States retained their status as Soviet republics until, under the leadership of Gorbachev and the USSR policy of glasnost national awareness and a desire for independence began to surface publicly. After years of Soviet oppression, citizens of the Baltic States felt "that their national existence was at stake" (Elson 1997, 324). The Baltic States made calls for independence as it became clear that Communism
85 was falling i n Eastern Europe. The publication of the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact in 1988 strengthened the cause, as even the USSR was forced to recognize that the Baltic States had been forced into the Soviet Union (Elson 1997, 324). Bolstered by international support, the Baltic States held a referendum to decide the question of independence, and the population voted overwhelmingly for independence and freedom from Soviet control. In 1991, the USSR attempted to quiet nationalist movements, initiating "a violent crackdo wn" in Latvia and Lithuania (Elson 1997, 324). However, under increasing pressure from the international community, Gorbachev agreed to grant the republics independence. On September 6, 1991, Gorbachev and the leaders of the Union of Sovereign States for mally recognized the independence of the Baltic States. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were granted membership in the United Nations on September 17, 1991 (Elson 1997, 324). Estonia Since the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and its restoration o f individual statehood, issues of citizenship have been a central focus in the Baltic State of Estonia. Citizenship policies were a means to define or redefine the relationship between the individual and the community after decades of communist rule, and changing sentiments over the national identity were reflected in new citizenship and naturalization laws. New laws established relatively strict naturalization procedures for people who moved to the region after it was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. These new procedures were seen as important to safeguard the homeland and culture for the indigenous people of the country (Smith et al. 1994).
86 Throughout the Soviet period, Estonia had been exposed to a massive influx of immigrants, mostly Russians, wh o came to work in administration, industry, and the military. Such demographic changes led to ethnic Estonians becoming minorities across much of the state. Recent citizenship policies have reflected a fear of demographic extinction and a perceived need to protect the nation from further demographic shifts. With Soviet dissolution and Baltic independence, citizenship was granted only to those who had been or were descended from citizens of the interwar republics. Thousands of Soviet era migrants became stateless. citizenship laws, especially since admittance into the European Union depended on such nce and democratic transition process. Pre transition Citizenship The Republic of Estonia was established in 1918. In 1940, it was annexed, under threat of military force, to the Soviet Union as the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the citizens of the Republic of Estonia were incorporated into the Soviet citizenship regime. Estonian citizenship was replaced with Soviet citizenship. Between 1941 and 1944, Estonia was occupied by Nazi Germany. In 1944, with the restoration of the Soviet r egime, USSR citizenship was again imposed upon the people of Estonia, replacing the significance of Estonian citizenship. After its incorporation into the USSR, Estonia experienced the full force of Soviet economic and ethnic policies. The Soviet Union s ought to merge the different ethnic nations and groups living in the country into a new civic identity, the Soviet people.
87 While the Soviet authorities claimed that such an identity was emerging, the official registration of different ethnic identities was not abandoned. The Soviet authorities did positions in respective administrative unit s, which, in turn, started to promote local interests (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 2). Estonians, threatened by growing immigration from other parts of the USSR, began introducing measures during the pre Gorbachev era to bring this process under control. I n the early 1980s, Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, began limiting the number of workers that industries and other enterprises were allowed to bring to Estonia, charging them considerable fees for every worker who eventually settled in Tallinn (Jrve and P oleshchuk 2010, 2). A more systemic foundation of later immigration policy was laid in 1990, when the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR established the National Migration Board of the Estonian SSR, the predecessor of the Citizenship and Migration Board. This agency maintained state control of migration and issued residence and work permits. The Supreme Soviet adopted the Immigration Law of the Estonian SSR, which took effect on July 1, 1990. This law established the requirement that any individual who w anted to settle in Estonia must apply for a residence permit. The first permits were issued in January 1991. The debate on citizenship began in Estonia at the end of the 1980s, when the national independence movement started to take shape. In 1989, the ca mpaign of registering the citizens of the pre war Republic of Estonia and their descendants was
88 during the perestroika era to promote the idea of the legal continuity of p re war Estonia. The campaign was primarily led by nationalist leaning groups, and helped to introduce the exclusive approach towards Estonian citizenship adopted later. The leadership pointed to drastic changes in the ethnic composition of the population of Estonia due to a considerable increase in Russian speaking migrants from other regions of the USSR after the Second World War. These settlers had pushed the portion of non Estonians in the population from around 10 per cent in 1940 to 38.5 per cent in 1 989 (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 3). On November 6, 1991 the Estonian Supreme Soviet decided that citizenship would be extended only to the citizens of the pre war Estonia and their descendants, regardless of their ethnic identification. Those Estonians who settled in Estonia after 1940 and their descendants could not acquire Estonian citizenship by simple declaration, but had to take the path of naturalization. At the same time, pre 1940 nationals and their descendants of non Estonian ethnic origin could acquire Estonian citizenship by declaration. The final resolution followed in 1992 with the re enactment of the 1938 Citizenship Act, which remained in effect until 1995. As an immediate consequence of this Act, the majority of non Estonians as well as a small number of Estonians were not Constitution in 1992 and in the first parliamentary elections after independence later the nsidered the great number of non Estonians as a threat to the nation (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 3). The interests of the Estonian ethnic nation, as then understood, were given priority over full democratic
89 participation. According to Pettai and Hallik, i n regards to the adoption of the decision on citizenship, [s]overeignty and independence in the interests of protecting the Estonian nation were still the name of the game. However, it was now framed (at least rhetorically) in legalistic juridical terms t hat seemed to remove the actual nationalist sting from the process. It was not an ethnic struggle for political dominance; it was the resolution of an international legal issue, in which one state had been illegally occupied by another in 1940, and that st ate now had a right to restore its sovereignty. What is more, for average Estonians the idea of recreating a citizenry had great appeal, since it was an opportunity to repudiate publicly the legitimacy of the Soviet Union as well as gain a psychological bo ost of confidence as a free nation (Pettai & Hallik 2002, 510 511) In Estonia these exclusionary policies enjoyed relatively wide support as a reaction to the changes in the ethnic composition of the population. A survey of public opinion in the Baltic States in 1993 showed that the principle of limiting citizenship to descendants of the pre 1940 citizens was supported by 44 per cent of Estonian, 52 per cent of Latvian and 12 per cent of Lithuanian respondents (Rose and Maley 1994, 31 34). These differ ences among the Baltic respondents correlated clearly with the demographics of the respective countries: the larger the share of non titular groups in a given state, the stronger the reluctance to let them participate in the political process. Importantly the exclusion of the majority of non Estonians from the formation of state institutions and from the process of adopting crucial legal documents, including the Constitution, enabled Estonians to establish themselves in all major government positions, avo iding power sharing with minorities. At the referendum on independence in Estonia in March 1991 there were 1,144,309 individuals with the right to vote. During the referendum on the Estonian Constitution in the summer 1992, after the adoption of the first Citizenship Act, the reported number of eligible voters was 689,319, or only about 60 per cent of the 1991 figure. Consequently, 454,990 adults had been disenfranchised
90 (Semjonov 2000, 15). Following such actions, the Parliament elected in 1992 was 100 per cent ethnic Estonian (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 4). The restoration of pre 1940 citizenship caused mass statelessness of non Estonians, which harmed relations among different ethnic communities inside Estonia, caused tensions in relations with Russia (t he majority of non citizens were Russians), and inspired recommendations and criticism from prominent international and regional organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co operation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. According to the data of the Population Registry, in 1992 only 68 per cent of the population were actual citizens of Estonia (MFA 2009). As of 2 June 2009, non citizens still made up 16 per cent of the total population: 7.6 per cent we largest group of foreign citizens in Estonia continues to be citizens of the Russian Federation, who are mostly for mer Soviet citizens who adopted Russian citizenship after 1991 while remaining resident in Estonia (MFA 2009). Post transition Citizenship On February 26, 1992, the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Estonia reinstated the Citizenship Act of 1938 as the r uling policy on citizenship. The main features of this citizenship regulation were the jus s anguinis principle and the reluctance to grant dual citizenship (exceptions were later made for citizens by birth). Every person who possessed or whose parents poss essed Estonian citizenship before June 16, 1940 the Soviet annexation of Estonia had a legal claim to Estonian citizenship. About 80,000 non Estonians thereby acquired Estonian citizenship (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 4).
91 Russians and others who came t o Estonia after June 16, 1940, almost one third of the entire population in 1992, were automatically excluded from Estonian citizenship (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 4). These individuals were mostly migrant workers and specialists who were seen by many Esto nians as colonial settlers with no right to automatic acquisition of Estonian citizenship. The only way for them to acquire it was through naturalization. As a precondition for naturalization, the applicant had to have his or her permanent place of residen ce in the Estonian territory for at least two years before and one year after the application date and had to prove knowledge of the Estonian language. The earliest date for establishing the permanent place of residence was set at March 30, 1990. The requi red time period was counted only from that day onwards, so that March 30, 1993 was the earliest date when one could acquire Estonian citizenship by naturalization. The special law to clarify naturalization language requirements entered into force as late a s February 1993. Thus, a large part of the population, especially Russians, did not have the right to vote or the right to run for office in the parliamentary election of September 1992 and were excluded from political participation, giving rise to further tensions in a situation that was already strained. Non political parties was banned by the 1992 Constitution (Article 48). These tensions were somewhat eased by the right of non citizens to vote in local elections. After some chan ges to the 1992 Citizenship Act, a new Citizenship Act came into effect on April 1, 1995. The new Act integrated all regulations on citizenship and introduced some new conditions for naturalization, including residency requirements and a test on the knowle dge of the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act. The naturalization requirements introduced by the 1995 law, especially the written and oral
92 parts of the language test, including an essay and conversation portion, were claimed to be more difficult to complete than previous ones (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 5). The Act also included an ethnicity based privilege, stating ethnic Estonians were not required to take the language test (Article 7). As a result of the stricter naturalization requirements, t he rate of citizenship acquisition dropped sharply (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 5). The initial exclusion of citizenship for Soviet era settlers was justified as serving the interests of the Estonian ethnic nation and its culture. According to a statem ent by a former Estonian minister, the ultimate hope for the future of the non a third or so will become Estonian citizens, a third may remain here with Russian tical leadership had not anticipated the formation of a persistent group of residents with undefined citizenship. The results of the population censuses of 1989 and 2000 showed that 29 per cent of the non Estonians of 1989 had become Estonian citizens by 2 000 and 14 per cent had obtained Russian citizenship, while the total number of non Estonians had decreased from 602,381 to 439,833, or by 27 per cent between the two censuses (SOE 2001, 13 14). In 2000, 173,539 non Estonians, or 39 per cent of their numb er, were Estonian citizens, 86,067 non Estonians, or 20 per cent, were Russian citizens, and 170,349 non Estonians, or 39 per cent, were stateless residents (SOE 2001, 13 14). Estonia was regularly encouraged by international actors to speed up naturaliza tion to reduce the proportion of non citizens in the population, especially during issues with international partners and even had to make changes to its Citizenship Act to
93 naturalization. Several international and regional organizations, foreign embassies in Estonia, and international NGOs participated in the debate. In 1997, internationa l actors persuaded the Estonian authorities to launch a policy of integration for non Estonians. The Bureau of the Minister of Population Affairs and a special foundation for the integration of non Estonians were established; they started to work out and i mplement integration programs and action plans to resolve the problem of statelessness. In 2000, the government of Estonia adopted the state program Integration in Estonian Society 2000 2007, and in April 2008, the government adopted the second state prog ram, Estonian Integration Strategy 2008 2013. Between 1992 and June 2009, a total of 150,143 people acquired Estonian citizenship through the naturalization process (MFA 2009). The total percentage of non citizens in the registered population was reduced to 16 per cent (MFA 2009). In 2008, the percentage of non Estonians in the whole population was 31 per cent (SOE 2009). In other words, about half of all the minority population lack citizenship. Estonian policy on citizenship has remained conservative si nce the restoration of independence, without major domestic debates after the Citizenship Act of 1992 was adopted. Instead, the mainstream political parties have regularly declared that, regardless of election results, the Citizenship Act and the correspon ding policies will not be changed (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 13). In the late 1990s to early 2000s the liberalization of naturalization requirements for some groups (such as the disabled, older people, and stateless children) was primarily the result of pressure from the international community (Poleshchuk 2001), mostly the OSCE and Council of Europe, whose recommendations were openly or covertly supported by the European Commission. According to Dimitry
94 the first time the naturalization policies of the candidate countries were influenced by the pre accession pressure of the EU, The EU and other international actors issued far fewer recomm endations on how Estonia should develop its citizenship policy once accession was secured. Russia, however, has not dropped the problem of statelessness in Estonia from its political agenda. According to the study Integration Monitoring 2008 while 65 pe r cent of ethnic speaking respondents regarded it as ince the adoption of Estonian citizenship policy in 1992, the approaches of Estonians and Russian speakers to the issue of citizenship have been almost completely opposed to each other, illustrating some of the most important components of the ongoing dome stic debates on citizenship. In 2000 and 2008 only a third of ethnic Estonians believed that ethnic minorities are loyal to the Estonian state and supportive of its development; surprisingly, some 80 per cent of minority members themselves were of the sam e opinion (Kruusvall 2008, 82). population, including naturalized citizens. There were proposals to liberalize access to Estonian citizenship, to scrutinize the procedure, or even to introduce a specific quasi citizenship status to meet the interests of Soviet era settlers (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 14).
95 The Estonian government also attempted to simplify the procedures for revoking Estonian citizenship. On June 15, 2009 t he parliament voted to amend the Citizenship Act in order to deprive naturalized Estonian citizens of their citizenship in cases where the individuals have been convicted for intentional offences against the state, even if those offences do not necessarily pose a threat to the security and stability of the state (Jrve and Poleshchuk 2010, 13). However, these amendments were rejected by the President of the Republic of Estonia for not being in line with the Constitution. Conclusions After the Second World War, under the Soviet regime, people from different regions of the USSR settled in Estonia. By 1991, when Estonia regained its independence, ethnic non Estonians made up a significant portion of the population. d this a threat to their ethnic nation and decided to restore the pre war Estonian state. This decision determined the nature of Estonian citizenship policy. In 1992, the 1938 Citizenship Act was re adopted, which stripped many Soviet era settlers of their rights by granting automatic citizenship almost exclusively to those who were citizens in 1940 before the Soviet takeover and their and other Russian speaking minori of other countries, including the Russian Federation, or leave Estonia altogether. In practice, all of these options have been used by the stateless individuals since 1992.
96 In 1995, Estonia adopted a new Citizenship Act which established more demanding r equirements for naturalization. Nevertheless, Estonia had to discuss its citizenship issues with international partners (including the EU) and even make changes obligations and to promote naturalization. played a smaller role in influencing domestic debate on citizenship issues. Since then, this debate has been shaped more than ever before by int ernal disputes. The majority of Russian speakers still heavily criticize the naturalization policy as overly restrictive and a violation of human rights, while ethnic Estonians hold that the national citizenship politics are normal and adequate to interna tional standards. Latvia Latvia has also struggled with issues of citizenship following its postcommunist independence. Like Estonia and Lithuania, Latvia endured decades of Soviet domination; however, Latvians were the most affected by Russian migrati on during the Soviet period. The current Latvian citizenship policy is based on the concept of state continuity. The rights attached to citizenship in the restored state were granted to individuals who were citizens at the time of the occupation of Latvia in 1940 and their descendants. This policy created a large group of stateless people, who settled in Latvia during occupation, and raised a number of questions regarding citizenship that have garnered much international attention.
97 Following the restorati on of statehood, Latvia adopted the most exclusionary policies of naturalization in the Baltic region. Its law, signed in August 1994, set up a complicated set of requirements for individuals who cannot trace their citizenship to before the Soviet annexati on. Applicants for Latvian citizenship are subject to, among other things, strict language requirements, an affirmation of allegiance to the state, and tests of Latvian history. The establishment of a new citizenship policy took longer in Latvia than in th e other two Baltic States only a few hundred noncitizens had been elections were held and in doing so disenfranchised a substantial portion of the population (Chinn a nd Truex 1996, 137). Latvia, under international pressure from various Western countries as well as international organizations, most notably Council of Europe, EU, and NATO, eventually liberalized its citizenship policies. In order to protect certain r ights of the Soviet era settlers and adhere to international law and human rights agreements, Latvia created a specific legal category of people referred to as noncitizens. This category has become the main focus of international debates on Latvian nationa lity policies. Initially, this status was seen as temporary because it was assumed that noncitizens would naturalize or eventually apply for citizenship in another state are still a considerable number of noncitizens who are unwilling to naturalize due to a variety of internal and external factors. Pre transition Citizenship Latvia was first declared an independent state in November 1918. The Law on
98 passed shortly after in 1919. Independence was short lived, however, and Latvia was forced to give up its sovereignty in the conflict of World War II. Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to a secret protocol to the 1939 Molotov Ribbentrop Pact, which provided the USSR with control of the Baltic States. During the occupation, Latvian citizens also became citizens of the USSR by way of automatic There were different views regarding the status of Baltic citizens after the Second World War. In a number of lawsuits initiated by Baltic residents concerning their nationality, courts in other states still consi dered them Baltic citizens (H o ugh 1985). The varying treatment of Baltic nationals by other states continued until 1991 when the Baltic States regained independence. Latvia, along with Lithuania and Estonia, made the argument that the automatic impositio n of Soviet nationality and citizenship on the population of the Baltic States as a consequence of their occupation in 1940 was illegal under international law as long as the Baltic States were presumed to exist (Kalvaitis 1998, 231; Ziemele 2001, 233). U pon independence, Latvians recovered their rights and obligations tied to their Latvian nationality, but non Latvian Soviet era migrants who arrived in Latvia as a result of its foreign occupation were subject to the naturalization procedure according to r elevant legal provisions. During the Soviet era, large Russian speaking communities arrived from across the USSR. The Soviet central authorities encouraged large scale immigration of the labor force to meet the local demands of Soviet industrialization a nd ethnic politics ( home of the headquarters of the Soviet army for the Baltic region.
99 While Latvia was not a homogonous state and had been home to multiple minority populations before annexation, the considerable increase in the Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian populations during the period was problematic. In 1935, ethnic Latvians made up 75.5 per cent of the population, Russians 10.6 per cent and Byelorussians 1.4 percent, with t he remainder composed of various groups, most notably Baltic Germans (Fehervary 1993, 403). The changes in demographic composition following annexation were drastic: the Baltic German population was repatriated according to the treaty of September 28, 193 9 with the USSR; more than 67,000 Latvians were deported between 1941 and 1949; and tens of thousands of Latvians were executed or imprisoned (Fehervary 1993, 403). By 1991, when the Republic of Latvia regained its independence, the ethnic Latvians had al most become a minority only 51 per cent of the population, with Russians and other non Latvian nationalities comprising 49 per cent of the population ( demographic change in the population, but they were heightened by the treatment of ethnic Latvians during the period of Soviet occupation. Some of the most controversial aspects of recent pr oposed citizenship legislation concern property and privatization laws, which attempt to redress the social and economic wrongs inflicted upon the ethnic Latvian population. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Latvian independence greatly complicated th e situation of individuals who were living in Latvia and suddenly became citizens of a state that no longer existed. Many Russian military personnel (50,000 80,000 military personnel with more than 22,000 retired Soviet military officers) remained in Latvi a after
100 Post transition Citizenship Upon declaring independence in 1990, the Latvian government had to completely reconstitute the state. The processes through which an independent Latvia was achieved had a direct affect on citizenship policy. Rather than follow a process of state succession Latvia, like Estonia, chose to uphold the principle of state continuity. Latvia asserted that the Soviet occupation over its territory was illegal, and that the pre Soviet Latvian state never actually lost its independence (Kalvaitis 1998, 231; Ziemele 2001, 233). Therefore, citizenship and other laws were carried over and acknowledged as they exi sted before the Soviet occupation. The principle of state continuity was incorporated in the Declaration of Independence adopted by the Supreme Council on May 4, 1990. The Declaration renewed the main articles of the Latvian Constitution and establishe d a transitional period until full independence was possible. During the transition period set out in the Declaration, the political institutions of the Soviet era remained. However, their ability to function was significantly restricted. Their authority was only to preserve continuity of the state until the fifth legitimately elected Parliament, elected by Latvian citizens, could pre 1940 institutions, including t he parliament. The status of Latvian citizens was re established in accordance with the 1919 Law on Citizenship, as amended in 1927. The 1991 Resolution on the Renewal of the ion also supported the 1919 Law. The citizenship policies asserted that Latvian nationality had continued to exist, irrespective of the loss of independence in 1940. The 1940 Decree on
101 the Order in which the Citizens of the Soviet Socialist Republics Lit huania, Latvia, and Estonia are Granted USSR Citizenship was declared null and void. Latvian citizens recovered rights and obligations deriving from their Latvian nationality, but USSR citizens who arrived in Latvia as a result of its foreign occupation w ere not given those same rights and obligations. According to the Resolution on the Renewal of the Republic individuals were recognized as Latvian Nationals. Citizensh who were Latvian nationals on June 17, 1940 and their descendants if they had lived in the country and had registered by July 1, 1992; (2) persons who were Latvian nationals on June 17, 1940 and their descendants if they did not reside in Latvia or were nationals of another state and had submitted an expatriation permit; and (3) persons born and The Republic of Latvia officially regained its independence in 1991. By this point, as mentioned above, native Latvians had almost become a minority, making up around 51 per cent of the population, while the other 49 per cent was compos ed of Russians and other non jus s anguinis resulted in 673,398 people, or 28.2 per cent of total population, left in the legal li mbo without The Law on the Entrance and Residence of Foreigners and Stateless Persons entered into force on July 2, 1992. It determined procedures for applying and receiving residence permits. The formulations of the 1992 Law were initially unclear about the status of long term residents in Latvia, opening ways for arbitrary decisions by the
102 authorities. The status of individuals who entered Latvia between May 4 and July 2, 1992 was even more uncertain. The government had issued instructions in 1990 prohibiting permanent registration of individuals arriving at that time except under certain special circumstances. Practices varied from one administrative district to another. Some followed 1990 instructions; some applied the 1992 Law retroactively (Ziemele 2005, 160 161). International actors pressured Latvia to adopt a new citizenship law which would accommodate the requirements of international law and would lead to more flexible naturalization procedures. Citizenship was a major issue during the parliamentary election campaign in 1993. Proposals ranged from repatriation of all Soviet era settlers to granting citizenship to everyone permanently residing in the territory. Initial proposals were very strict. According to the first model adopted by the Parliament, the first applications for naturalization would have been accepted in 2000 and then only at a rate policy would have resul ted in approximately a thousand new citizens annually. The draft law was heavily criticized by the Western democracies and by international organizations. Citizenship issues were even the reason for postponing Latvian membership to the Council of Europe (O pinion no. 183, 1995). As a result, the President of Latvia refused to sign the adopted law. A new Law on Citizenship was adopted on July 22, 1994. The law, slightly amended in 1995, followed the jus s anguinis principle. In addition, several other groups could qualify for citizenship, including Livs (a historic indigenous group living near the Baltic Sea) residing in Latvia, women who lost citizenship upon marriage, orphans, and
103 individuals who completed education in Latvian ). These new categories slightly broadened the scope of Latvian nationals, especially the category concerning Latvian language education. Former USSR citizens, who may have integrated into Latvian society, could obtain Latvian citizenship irrespective of their place of birth (Ziemele 2001, 235). The right of a child to acquire Latvian citizenship was ensured by providing that if at least one parent is a Latvian citizen the child will acquire Latvian nationality, subject to mutual agreement by the parents. Those who did not belong to the above mentioned groups had to naturalize according to the procedures set out by law and the regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers. Although naturalization requirements were made easier, they were still exclusionary. The law provided for gradual naturalization, the so naturalization. The system stipulated that individuals would be naturalized in stages starting in 1996 and endi ng in 2003 (Kalvaitis 1998, 231). After 2003 all individuals would have the right to apply. This approach was adopted under fear that large numbers of Soviet era settlers would apply for citizenship. The Latvian government was understandably cautious in protecting its status and capacity to preserve independence. Having experienced only a short period of independence in 1920s and 1930s and been subjected to Russification policies, deportations, and sanctions under the Soviet regime, Latvia wanted to make sure that independence was irreversible. The newly naturalized However, the number of applications for naturalization turned out to be much lower than expected. According to data of the Naturalization Board during 1995 1998
104 only 15,853 people applied for naturalization, and the number of successful applicants accounted for through a number of rea knowledge of the Latvian language; unwillingness to enter into obligatory military service; easier access to obtaining a Russian visa for non citizens; number of rights already granted; political mistrust and d isappointment at not having been granted nationality automatically; and identity crisis after the collapse of the USSR. As a reaction to negative perceptions of Soviet immigrants by Latvians, many of them chose either to opt for Russian or other citizensh ip or to apply for the status of non citizen. Soviet era settlers could not be extradited as settlers from an occupying state also could not be classified as stateless because of international obligations to the state continuity and the obligation to avoid statelessness, Latvia introduced the special The Former USSR Citizens Act in Art. 1 states The persons governed by this Act shall be those citizens of the former USSR who reside in the Republic of Latvia as well as who are in temporary absence, and their children, who simultaneous ly comply with the following conditions: 1. on 1 July 1992 they were registered as being resident within the territory of Latvia, regardless of the status of their residence; or their last registered place of residence by 1 July 1992 was in the Republic o f Latvia; or a court has established that before the above mentioned date they had been resident within the territory of Latvia for not less than ten years; 2. they do not hold Latvian citizenship; 3. they are not and have not been nationals of any other state ( 7) Article 1 recognizes non citizens as a special category whose legal status provides them with certain rights; however, they are not considered citizens of Latvia. Legally defined non citizens are issued a special passport. The passport grants them the special
105 status of belonging to the state, and grants the constitutional right to return. The court therefore confirmed that non citizens have a special link with the state which entails mutual rights and obligations. Those are, however, di fferent from the rights of citizens. It can be argued that non citizens possess a kind of functional citizenship. They have some of the rights of citizens, but they cannot be defined as citizens. In Latvia, political opportunities for non citizens are si gnificantly restricted. Non citizens cannot vote. Those without citizenship have been prohibited from holding state office, from serving as judges or barristers, and from taking part in diplomatic and consular service (Barrington 1999, 164). While citizens are protected from extradition, non citizens do not share such protection. In addition, only a citizen has the right to "freely choose his/her residence in any part of Latvia's territory" and to "freely leave Latvia and to freely return to Latvia" (Articl e 6; Barrington 1999, 164). In Latvia, non citizens have been prohibited from owning land and other natural resources, from purchasing housing from the state, and in some cases from purchasing privatized cooperative apartments; they have received fewer pr ivatization vouchers and smaller pensions; and many argue that their housing and social benefits have been reduced due to their "second class status" (Barrington 1999, 164). in ternational standards in the area of citizenship and nationality. These were accompanied by numerous recommendations, in particular concerning access to citizenship for Soviet era settlers. In view of the constant pressure of the UN Commission on Human Rig hts, the Council of Europe, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and, most
106 2000, 340). The amendments were confirmed in a referendum and became effective in No citizenship for children born in Latvia after August 21, 1991 to stateless individuals or non citizens. In order to apply for citizenship in the case of statelessness, a child shoul d be prior to application; (3) fluent in Latvian which is verified by a document from an educational establishment or by the Commission of the Naturalization Board; and (4) over the age of fifteen. Additionally, the applicant should not have a criminal record indicating more than five years of imprisonment A certificate of language proficiency is only necessary for minors who have not been register ed by their parents before the age of fifteen. Moreover, after they have reached the age of eighteen general naturalization requirements apply. In addition to these amendments, the naturalization procedure was further simplified and several groups of indi viduals were exempt from the naturalization process or the naturalization exams. Western countries and international organizations provided considerable assistance to Latvia in an attempt to lower the barriers to citizenship. Special attention was paid to language training. Learning and informational materials were published, projects to facilitate naturalization were initiated, an information center Even after the latest amendme nts and campaigning, the number of non citizens is still quite high. In January 2008 there were about 372,421 non citizens in Latvia (in start of the naturalization process in 1995 and March 2009, only 131,221 people were granted Latvian citizenship, including 13,747 minors; the rest were either repatriated or
107 Various attempts to speed up the na turalization of non citizens have had limited success. Conclusions Among the successor republics of the USSR, Latvia adopted one of the most restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies. Motivated by the fear that their nation was disappearing, Lat via adopted substantially restrictive citizenship policies. Latvian citizenship policy is based on the concept of state continuity and favors ethnically defined citizenship. The rights attached to citizenship were therefore restored to those who were citiz ens at the time of the occupation of Latvia in 1940 and their descendants. The restored state revived pre War World II citizenship laws in order to reestablish the legal organization of the pre Soviet period. As a result, former pre Soviet citizens and th eir descendents were all entitled to citizenship. At the same time, permanent residents who acquired citizenship during the Soviet period were largely denied political rights and privileges. This policy led to the situation that a large group of people who settled in Latvia during occupation remained stateless. Negative attitudes toward dual citizenship also underscore the ethnic character of citizenship policies in Latvia. Even ethnic Latvians living outside the state were allowed to reacquire their orig inal national citizenship, while substantial ethnic minorities permanently residing in Latvian territory were denied such rights. Under external pressure to comply with the international legal framework, especially regarding the reduction of statelessnes s, Latvia introduced the status of non citizen. In order to enjoy full rights, non citizens have to naturalize. Naturalization rates
108 However, recently naturalization has almost stopped. Two ethno centric communities continue to co exist by living separately from each other. The policies advocated by both international organizations and Russia requiring more rights for non citizens have resulted in a lack of motivation and incentives for them to naturalize. Their social and economic situation would not improve with naturalization and their need for information is met by Russian media. Access to political rights has been an insufficient i ncentive in fostering naturalization. The decreasing role of international organizations, including the EU, has also lowered attention to citizenship issues in Latvia. Lithuania In many respects citizenship in Lithuania resembles citizenship in the oth er restored states. Lithuanian citizenship policy and citizenship law recognizes that, even after five decades of Soviet occupation, the Republic of Lithuania continued to exist. The hieved through a separation from the Soviet Union, but rather through the restoration of former governing institutions. While the three restored states adopted similar modes of defining their original body of citizens upon restoring their independence, di fferences emerged regarding their approaches to naturalizing non citizens living in the region at the time of renewed independence. Lithuania was the first of the Baltic States to deal with the question of naturalization for Soviet era migrants and took the most inclusive approach to doing so. Demographics in Lithuania were different than in Estonia and Latvia, where, as of 1989,
109 Russian speakers comprised only 9 percent of Lithuania's population, and most had lived in Lithuania for all or most of their lives (Rose and Maley 1994, 52 53). The Lithuanian Supreme Council adopted its new citizenship law in November 1989, before independence. This law recognized the legal difference between historic citizens and Soviet era migrants by restoring citizenship to interwar citizens and their descendants, while also establishing a naturalization procedure for migrants. Upon state restoration, Lithuania chose the "zero option" for conferring citizenship, by which all permanent residents were granted citizenship wit hout naturalization Unlike its neighbors, Lithuania granted automatic citizenship to all those born in the republic themselves or who had at least one parent or grandparent born there (Chinn and Truex 1996, 135). Others could become citizens by naturali zation or taking an oath of loyalty to the state. Naturalization procedures were inclusive. Individuals living in Lithuania when the citizenship law was adopted could become citizens by making a formal request, swearing loyalty, and giving up any other ci tizenship. Soviet era migrants were not excluded from citizenship, but rather required to simply apply for citizenship through a formal naturalization process less exclusive than that of the other Baltic States. As such, Lithuania avoided tough internati onal scrutiny over its citizenship and nationality policies in comparison to other Baltic states. Pre transition Citizenship After more than a century of incorporation in the Russian Empire, Lithuania emerged as an independent state in 1918. The Act of I ndependence was adopted by the Council of Lithuania on February 16, 1918. The first citizenship legislation, the Provisional Law on Lithuanian Citizenship, was adopted on January 9, 1919 by the
110 Cabinet of Ministers. Although the law was provisional, it en dured subsequent amendments and remained in force for two decades, outlining provisions regarding Lithuanian citizenship. The Provisional Law of 1919 outlived several Lithuanian izenship under this law was recognized for 1) persons, whose parents and grandparents have resided in Lithuania for some time, and who have always resided in Lithuania; 2) children of persons specified under the first item, who, even though they have not always resided in Lithuania, returned to reside there; 3) persons, who had resided in Lithuania for not less than ten years until 1914 and: a) either owned their own real property, or b) had a permanent job; 4) children of a Lithuanian citizen; 5) his wife or widow; 6) children of an unmarried woman, who is a Lithuanian citizen, if they have not been accepted by a foreigner as his children and; 7) foreigners, who are newly accepted as Lithuanian citizen 2010, 4) In addition to domestic legislation on citizenship, Lithuania signed the Declaration on the Protection of Minorities in Lithuania in 1921 as a precondition for admission to the League of Nations. According to the Declaration, all individuals who were born in the territory of Lithuania after the day of signing of the Declaration and who could not prove another citizenship, had to be recognized as Lithuanian citizens ( A new Lithuanian Constitution was adopted in 1938. Compared with the earlier Constitutions, it contained more provisions per taining to citizenship. Under this multiple citizenship and stated that a time, there were explicit provisions in the Constitution regarding the loss of Lithuanian
111 citizenship. Individuals could lose their citizenship if they did not reside in the State of Compared with the 1919 Law the conditions for naturalization under the new Constitution were significantly tightened, specifically for individuals of non Lithuanian ethnicity. For ethnic Lithuanians there was only one condition: permanent residence in Lithuania. There was also a p ossibility for exemption from the conditions. A person could acquire Lithuanian citizenship for merits to Lithuania without fulfilling the residence requirement; however, in those cases the decision had to be taken by the Council of Ministers (K Developments in citizenship policy during the interwar period were also affected Germany, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Lithuania experienced border changes that complicated matters and cre ated tension within the region. In 1939, Lithuania received an ultimatum from Nazi Germany, who had lost their German citizenship became German citizens again on July 30, 1940. The Treaty between the Republic of Lithuania and the German Reich on the Citizenship the Treaty was signed and settled elsewhere in Lithuania, retained their Lithuanian citizenship, but Second World War began, the Soviet Union entered into an agreement with Lithuania transferring occupied Polish territory. On October 10, 1939, the Treaty on the
112 Transferring of Vilnius and Vilnius Region to the Republic of Lithuania and Mutual Assistance between Lithuania and the Soviet Union was signed. Shortly after, in 19 40, the USSR began its occupation of Lithuania. The USSR presented an ultimatum to the Lithuanian government, and all citizens and residents of Lithuania, including the residents of the transferred Polish territory, were forcibly made Soviet citizens. P ost transition Citizenship Lithuania declared its restored independence on March 11, 1990 and reinstated most of the 1938 Constitution. That Constitution was suspended and the Provisional Basic Law was enacted while a new constitution was drafted (Kalvai tis 1998, 243). When completed, the 1992 Constitution was carefully drafted with reference to laws in force before 1940 and with an emphasis on constitutional continuity (Ziemele 2005, 40). Lithuania, however, had enacted a new Citizenship Law in 1989 be fore independence was finalized or a constitution formed. In contrast with the other two Baltic States, Lithuania included a greater number of citizens in the process of state restoration and the adoption of a new Constitution. The development of curr ent Lithuanian citizenship policy can be divided into three main phases. The first phase began with the Law adopted in 1989 which provided a foundation for citizenship policy as the transition progressed and independence was restored. In 1991, the second phase made certain aspects of naturalization stricter and struggled with tensions between adhering to the principle of citizenship continuity and the prohibition of dual citizenship. The third phase was initiated by the 2002 Law on Citizenship. It attempts to coordinate aspects of the 1991 Law and to address the issue of dual citizenship.
113 A law went into effect on November 3, 1989, passed by the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Republic, which stated that all individuals who had been citizens before June 2010, 13). The law also contained provisions broadening the base of initial citizens, including more of the population than the other two Baltic States. All permane nt residents born in Lithuania or individuals who could show that one of their parents or grandparents was born there were also granted automatic citizenship, provided they did not have citizenship from another country (Barrington 1999, 6). The law also s tated that individuals living permanently in Lithuania who did not meet the other criteria could still become automatic citizens by signing, within two years a declaration of loyalty to the Lithuanian constitution and the laws of the Republic as well as a pledge to "respect its state sovereignty and territorial integrity" (Barrington 1999, 6). Therefore, the Lithuanian law was based strongly on the principle of jus s oli Naturalization procedures required a knowledge of the Lithuanian language, a ten yea r permanent residency requirement, a permanent source of income, knowledge of and a promise to obey the Lithuanian constitution, and a loyalty statement similar to automatic citizens, but also stating a respect for Lithuania's "language, culture, customs, and traditions" (Brubaker 1992, 280). While the naturalization demands were extensive, the requirements for automatic citizenship were relatively inclusive. Out of a population of over 3.3 million, only about 350,000 permanent residents did not receive c itizenship before the two year period expired; and few of those who did not acquire citizenship were legally excluded from the opportunity (Ginsburgs 1993, 233; Barrington 1999, 6).
114 With the end of the two year period and independence secured, a new ci tizenship law was put in place. The second Citizenship Law in a restored Lithuania was adopted on December 10, 1991. It more clearly established who was to be considered a Lithuanian national. The new law ended the liberal period, when any resident could apply for nationality after two years of residence, and introduced stricter requirements. It was subsequently amended several times: in 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996 ( The law basically eliminated the possibility of automatic citizenship for current permanent residents. Those who were citizens of Lithuania before 1940 as well as their children and grandchildren were still granted citizenship wi thout naturalization, as long as they had not assumed citizenship in another state. Citizenship in the USSR was an exception. This provision was aimed at individuals who left Lithuania, went abroad, and took citizenship in a new state (Barrington 1999, 6 ). The 1991 Law introduced elements of jus s anguinis citizenship into Lithuanian citizenship and naturalization policy For individuals who had assumed the citizenship of another state, Article 18 of the 1991 law stated that Lithuanian citizenship cou ld be restored to "persons of Lithuanian descent who were citizens of the Lithuanian Republic and who left Lithuania in the period between 15 June 1940 and 11 March 1990 and now live in other states" (Barrington 1999, 6). It was also made easier for child ren of migrants abroad to become Lithuanian citizens. Ethnic Lithuanians who were not citizens could assert their right to citizenship by renouncing "citizenship of another state, and moving to Lithuania for permanent residence, as well as taking the oath to the Republic of Lithuania" (Barrington 1999, 6). This ethnic based right to citizenship had not existed in the 1989 law. The 1991 citizenship law also stipulated that dual
115 citizenship was not allowed and maintained naturalization requirements similar to those in the law passed in 1989. The 1991 Law was heavily amended over the next five years. In 1992, the Lithuanian Supreme Council simplified the procedures for granting citizenship to children and grandchildren of ethnic Lithuanians living outside o f Lithuania. A second set of amendments to the 1991 Law was passed in July 1993 that outlined new guidelines for demonstrating former Lithuanian citizenship and waived requirements prohibiting citizenship of another state when applying for automatic or re stored citizenship ( 2010, 22). In October 1995, several additional amendments were added to the law. The amendments regarded adopted children as natural children in matters of citizenship, modified the rules for naturalization for the elderly and disabled to exclude l anguage tests or exams on the constitution, and allowed children of migrants to claim citizenship as 1995 amendments also highlighted ethnic conceptions of citizenship in Lithuania. A person could claim Lithuanian citizenship if at least one parent or grandparent was ethnically Lithuanian, and if he considers himself Lithuanian as a result (Barrington 1999, 7). The third Law on Citizenship was adopted on September 17, 20 02 and took effect on January 1, 2003. It repealed the 1991 Law and incorporated other related laws into current citizenship policy ( Law concerned the question of Lithuanian migrants holding dual citizenship. The new Law allowed Lithuanians abroad to retain their citizenship and made possible the re instatement of relinquished citizenship. It expanded the category of people who have an
116 inherent right to Lithuanian citizenship up to the fourth generation, and introduced conditions for simplified restoration of citizenship for those who lost their Lithuanian citizenship but maint ain a right to it ( jus s oli acquisition of citizenship for children whose parents lack citizenship and reside permanently in Lithuania, and the conditions for acquiring Lithuanian citizenship were made stricter for spouses (Art. 10; A conditions for acquisition and retention of citizenship, introducing stricter requirements for some. It also brought Lithuanian citizenship law in line with international human rights law and granted more a uthority over issues of citizenship to the Minister of the Conclusions Dual citizenship in Lithuania remains a subject of debate. The holding of multiple citizenships was restricted by the new Constitution, but the presence o f a large group of former citizens living abroad, but reluctant to give up their Lithuanian citizenship, has led to the limited acceptance of dual citizenship. Certain individuals were able to obtain new Lithuanian passports without renouncing the citizen ship of another state acquired after leaving Lithuania. These provisions were later regarded as unconstitutional ( exceptions for dual citizenship, and the issue remains a topic of discussion. Of the three Baltic States, Lithuania developed the most inclusive citizenship policy by far, both in terms of its official provisions, particularly in the area of automatic citizenship, and its effect on the population of the state. Nearly all permanent residents were able to become citizens without residency and language requirements upon the
117 restoration of i ndependence. As a result of the Lithuanian policy, roughly 95% of the adult population of Lithuania in 1994 had acquired Lithuanian citizenship (Barrington 1999, 5). The Lithuanian approach to the issue of citizenship has been considered more liberal than the regulations in other Baltic states partly because it did not apply interwar citizenship laws with the intention of disenfranchising a large portion of its Soviet era, primarily Russian, migrant population (as was the case in Estonia and Latvia). In s harp contrast with Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania has pursued a policy of granting citizenship to practically all permanent residents. Under citizenship law, anyone who resided permanently in the Republic before November 3, 1989 and who had a permanent job or other legal source of income, could become a citizen of Lithuania by simply stating a desire to do so. The Citizenship Law of 1989 provided straightforward criteria for the acquisition of Lithuanian citizenship, and as a result, most residents obtained citizenship immediately following independence. However, the Citizenship Law of 1991, enacted immediately after restoration of independence, introduced stricter requirements for acquiring citizenship. In certain cases, such as the lengthy residence requi rements, Most of the Soviet era settlers in Lithuania acquired citizenship on the basis of the 1989 Law (before independence was even secured), while Latvia and Estonia re esta blished citizenship strictly on the basis pre occupation legislation. Lithuania did not introduce any quota system for naturalization procedures and included residence during the Soviet period as supporting citizenship applications. Naturalization procedu res in Latvia and Estonia only considered residence after the restoration of independence for individuals who settled during the Soviet era. In turn, citizenship and naturalization
118 policies in Lithuania have avoided the criticisms of the international comm unity directed towards Estonia and Latvia in the last decade. It is important to note, however, the contrasting experiences under Soviet domination, which led to strikingly different demographics, and unequal proportions of non indigenous populations pres ent at the time of state restoration. Restored States: Ethnic Preferences and Democratic Obligations Among the Soviet successor republics, the most restrictive and exclusionary citizenship laws were adopted in the Baltic States, specifically in Latvia and Estonia. These states adopted restrictive citizenship policies in reaction to decades of Soviet occupation and demographic encroachment by other members of the USSR. They revived pre War World II citizenship laws in order to restore the legal mechan isms of the pre Soviet period. As a result, individuals holding citizenship before 1940 and their descendents were all entitled to the rights of citizenship. At the same time, permanent residents who acquired citizenship during the Soviet period were part ially accepted as citizens in Lithuania, and largely excluded in Latvia and Estonia. As restored states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania took almost identical approaches to defining citizenship immediately after independence in 1991. Each utilized princip les of state continuity to ground citizenship laws in 1991 on the citizenship laws of before 1940. Those who were citizens before Soviet annexation, and their descend ents, carried their citizenship over to the newly independent states. However, this appro ach to reconfirming citizenship serves certain political purposes as well. The presence of large numbers of immigrants, mostly Russians, who settled in the
119 Baltics during the Soviet years, drastically shaped conceptions of citizenship throughout the trans ition and postcommunist periods. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Baltic independence, significant populations were left in newly independent states. As new policies were adopted granting citizenship primarily to individuals descended from citiz ens of the interwar republics, Soviet era migrants became stateless. Their disenfranchisement was seen as a way of protecting ethnic dominance and undercutting Russian influence in the new states. The postcommunist tensions regarding citizenship were the consequence of substantial changes in demographic composition as a result of the immigration that took place during the period of Soviet occupation and varying views of how these changes should be reflected in legal status and of the balance of individual and state interests. The history of the Baltic region has played an important role in the development of current citizenship and naturalization laws. Citizenship and immigration have been central issues for all three states since their independence move ments. Throughout Soviet occupation of the Baltic States, Estonia and Latvia were subject to a greater volume of immigrants than Lithuania. They also had smaller initial populations. The stark declines in ethnic populations that resulted from Soviet occ up ation led the titular nations of the Baltic States, especially Estonians and Latvians, to feel threatened. Accordingly, once the states declared their independence from the Soviet Union, their newly drafted citizenship laws reflected a kind of protectio nist sentiment. After decades of illegal occupation and Russification policies designed to eliminate any sense of national identity, these states wanted to preserve what they could of their desired national identity. In Estonia and Latvia preserving tha t identity included a rejection of Soviet era
120 settlers as part of the political community. Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws were based on policies of exclusion rather than inclusion. Latvia introduced quotas designed to dissuade immigration, while E stonia's citizenship law was similarly geared. In contrast, Lithuania did not experience a tremendous influx of immigrants during Soviet occupation. Therefore, its citizenship laws were based on a policy of inclusion rather than upon one of exclusion. The Lithuanian law based citizenship conditions on historical and territorial factors, rather than a desire to protect a particularly defined national identity. Immigration to and from these countries before, during, and after the democratic transition proce ss has played a significant role in the formation of current citizenship and naturalization policies. While the three restored states defined their original body of citizens almost identically (those having possessed citizenship before 1940 and their des cendents), they differed in their approaches to naturalizing noncitizens who were residents at the time of renewed independence. Like its neighbors, Estonia restored citizenship to interwar citizens and their descendants. Resolving the status of Soviet er a migrants, however, proved much harder. Faced with an ethnic Russian population that had grown from 23,000 (around 10 per cent) in 1945 to 475,000 (around 40 per cent) in 1992, Estonians passed citizenship legislation designed to protect their political d ominance in the post Soviet era (Chinn and Truex 1996, 136). The key provision in the new Estonian citizenship law, however, was the language requirement. Applicants were required to demonstrate conversational ability in Estonian, requiring knowledge of ab out 1,500 words (Chinn and Truex 1996, 136). The consequences of this process have been exclusionary. It effectively excluded the non Estonian population from participation in
121 the political process that set the initial course of the state. At the time of the 1992 constitutional referendum, there were 660,000 registered voters out of a total population of 1.6 million; only about a sixth of the 600,000 non Estonians living in the republic were eligible to vote (Chinn and Truex 1996, 136). The first democrati cally elected parliament was elected by the same group of interwar citizens and their descendants and its seats were filled entirely by ethnic Estonians. Ethnic Estonians dominated the political process during the critical early period of regained indepen dence and democratic transition. Latvia had the most trouble regarding issues of citizenship, and adopted the most exclusionary process for obtaining it. Its law sets up difficult requirements for those who could not trace their citizenship to the interwa r republic. Latvian born descendants of migrants were allowed access to naturalization much earlier than Soviet era migrants. Applicants from both groups were required to know some Latvian, swear allegiance to Latvia, and understand some Latvian history. Only a few hundred noncitizens had been naturalized under the citizenship law by the time parliamentary elections were held in 1995 (Chinn and Truex 1996, 137). Latvia was affected most by Russian migration in the Soviet era. Even though the proportion o f ethnic Latvians increased slightly after independence, they still made up only 54.2 percent of all residents at the time of the passage of the 1994 citizenship law (Chinn and Truex 1996, 136). In Latvia, political opportunities for non citizens were ev en more restricted than in Estonia. Non citizens cannot vote in Latvia, while Estonia allows their participation in local elections. Those without citizenship have been prohibited from holding state office, from serving as judges or barristers, and from ta king part in diplomatic and consular service (Barrington 1999, 164). While citizens are protected from extradition, non
122 citizens do not share such protection. In addition, only a citizen has the right to "freely choose his/her residence in any part of Latv ia's territory" and to "freely leave Latvia and to freely return to Latvia" (Article 6; Barrington 1999, 164). In Latvia, non citizens have been prohibited from owning land and other natural resources, from purchasing housing from the state, and in some c ases from purchasing privatized cooperative apartments; they have received fewer privatization vouchers and a smaller pensions; and ma n y argue that their housing and social benefits have been reduced due to their "second class status" (Barrington 1999, 164 ). Lithuania was the first of the Baltic States to deal with the question of naturalization for Soviet era migrants, and took it the most inclusive approach. A primary reason for this was demographic: as of 1989, Russian speakers comprised only 9 percent of Lithuania's population, and most had lived in Lithuania for all or most of their lives (Rose and Maley 1994, 53). The Lithuanian Supreme Council adopted its citizenship law in November 1989, before independence. This law recognized the legal differenc e between historic citizens and Soviet era migrants by restoring citizenship to interwar citizens and their descendants while establishing a naturalization procedure for the migrants. Unlike its neighbors, however, Lithuania granted automatic citizenship t o all those born in the republic themselves or who had at least one parent or grandparent born there. Others could become citizens only by naturalization. Naturalization procedures were inclusive. Those living in Lithuania when the citizenship law was adop ted could become citizens by making a formal request, swearing loyalty, and giving up any other citizenship. Originally, individuals were to have two years to decide whether they wanted to be citizens, but this period was later extended.
123 The Estonian and Latvian citizenship policies have drawn widespread criticism. Early in those countries' independence and democratization processes, the international community took issue with citizenship and residency laws for Soviet era settlers. The Russian Federation, Western governments, and international organizations such as the Organization for Secur ity and Cooperation in Europe (O SCE) spent a substantial amount of energy urging Estonia and Latvia to adopt more inclusive policies. Russian officials went so far as t o equate the restrictive citizenship laws with human rights violations against Russian minorities in the Baltics (Chinn and Truex 1996, 133). While the Baltic States have made efforts to adhere to international law and protect the legal and cultural rights of Russian and other minorities, the Estonian and Latvian approaches to citizenship have still left large Russian minority populations without citizenship and outside the states' political communities. Citizenship and naturalization policies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have undergone substantial changes since restoring their independence. The accession of the Baltic States into international organizations, especially the European Union and Council of Europe, depended heavily on certain changes to e xclusionary citizenship practices. Having addressed the most immediate concerns brought up by the international community, citizenship policies in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have demonstrated at least a partial desire to move ahead in embracing more i nclusive, and inherently democratic, conceptions of citizenship.
124 Chapter 4 Post partition States: Czech Republic and Slovakia After the fall of communism, Velvet Revolution, and partition of Czechoslovakia, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia faced issues of defining their respective nation and conceptions of citizenship. National identity was reconstructed through new legislation seeking to come to terms with the communist past and to effectively create two states from one. Each st ate used various historical justifications for movements towards self determination. Czechs and Slovaks, however, faced very different experiences before, during, and after communist rule and held very different opinions as to their historical situations. While the Czechs were exposed to democratic ideals in the first interwar republic, Slovaks were lesser partners in that Republic and then were set up as a puppet state created by the Nazis. The refusal of the Czechoslovak Government to grant Slovakia th e right to self determination or autonomy in a federation for a long period of time fostered tensions between the two regions. A discrepancy in perceptions of the post 1968 era further increased the rift between the two nations. This initial dichotomy and the institutional structure of the post 1968 federation contributed to the later choice of
125 separate, but similar, paths to democratization and formation of citizenship and naturalization policy. Czech Republic The development of modern Czech citizenshi p legislation since the 1989 overthrow of the communist regime and the creation of an independent Czech Republic in 1993 has been primarily concerned with issues stemming from the break up of Czechoslovakia. The 1990 Citizenship Amendment Act allowed f or restitution of citizenship to those who left the c ountry during the communist era. A constitutional ban on the deprivation of citizenship and a controversial 1993 Citizenship Act have also articulated Czech interpretations of citizenship. Following this l egislation, reforms were adopted seeking to lessen the negative impact of overly restrictive legislation for certain individuals related to the break up of Czechoslovakia. Pre transition Citizenship The creation of Czechoslovakia in October 1918 gave ris e to the first model of Czechoslovak citizenship. Former Austro Hungarian citizens, located in regions that became part of the Czechoslovak territory after the break up of the Austro Hungarian Empire, acquired Czechoslovak citizenship. The creation of Cz echoslovakia led to the massive remigration of ethnic Czechs and Slovaks, in particular from Austria (Vaculk 2002; Kristen 1989). Old Austrian laws on citizenship formed the basis for citizenship policy in the new state, including the jus s anguinis princ iple founded in the 1811 Austrian Civil Code and rules pertaining to naturalization ( The 1920
126 Constitution prohibited dual citizenship, and required the renunciation of any previous citizenship. The end of the Second World War and the restoration of Czechoslovakia led to the adoption of laws naming ethnicity as a determining factor in citizenship legislation. New policies were influenced by the voluntary and forced migration of populations before, during and after World War II Under Concerning Czechoslovak Citizenship of Persons of German and Hungarian Ethnicity Czechoslovak citizens of German and Hungarian ethnic origin were deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship. The decree provided a legal bas is for the expulsion of the 99). The citizenship of ethnic Czechs, Slovaks, and members of other Slavonic nations who settled or resettled in Czechoslovakia, however, was encouraged under the Constit utional Act on the Naturalization of Compatriots Returning to the Homeland. In the post war years, more than 200,000 Czechs, Slovaks, and members of other Slavonic nations immigrated to Czechoslovakia, while more than 2,820,000 inhabitants of German ethni city were expelled ( Retroactively, some individuals of German and Hungarian ethnicity made stateless under previous legislation were granted Czechoslovak citizenship in the late 1940s and 1950s ( Complex new citizensh ip legislation was adopted in 1949 after the communists seized power. The revocation of citizenship was used as a penalty for certain political offenses ( The Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Czechoslovak Citizenship replaced the old l egislation, but preserved many of its features, such as the jus s anguinis principle and the refusal to recognize dual citizenship. The law allowed for the
127 deprivation of Czechoslovak citizenship to citizens who lived abroad and had engaged in which might endanger state interests those who had left the territory of requested to do so by the Ministry of the Interior, those who were dual citizens, and those who lived a Citizenship law remained mostly unchanged until the Prague Spring initiated reforms. The Prague Spring of 1968, a movement towards the libe ralization of communist rule, was accompanied by a Slovak national movement. This movement called for the introduction of a federal system within a multiethnic, but united Czechoslovakia. Under the Constitutional Act on the Czechoslovak Federation, as o f January 1, 1969, the unitary Czechoslovak state was transformed into a federal state, composed of the Czech and the Slovak republics. Citizenship policy and legislation was altered with the April 1969 adoption of The Federal Act on the Principles of Ac quisition and Loss of Citizenship, and the following Act of the Czech National Council on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Czech Socialist Republic. The new legislation introduced citizenship designations of both Czech and Slovak, in additio n to the national Czechoslovak citizenship. Under this legislation, Czechoslovak citizens automatically acquired the citizenship of either the Czech or Slovak Republic, based on their place of birth and some suppl ementary criteria. The republic level citi zenship was relatively easy to change, and held little practical significance. After the federalization of Czechoslovakia, citizenship legislation remained virtually unchanged for almost two decades.
128 The fall of the communist regime in November 1989 prom pted new developments in all spheres, including citizenship legislation. The new democratic government sought to remedy injustices caused by the deprivation of citizenship under communist rule. In response to oppressive communist citizenship policies, a co nstitutional provision was and 72, 80 81). The Act on Judicial Rehabilitation abolished sentences for criminal offences wit hdrawing citizenship, and restored the citizenship of individuals who had been convicted under the communist era legislation. At the same time, legislation was adopted which provided for the reacquisition of the Czechoslovak citizenship by emigrants who h ad lost it in the period of communist rule. Post transition Citizenship The collapse of the communist regime and the difficulty of economic transition instigated the resurgence of nationalist feelings and politics in Czechoslovakia, and the rebirth of t he Slovak nationalist movement led to a consensual break up of the federal state. In the autumn of 1992, as the eventual break up of Czechoslovakia was becoming apparent, citizens increasingly took advantage of their freedom to switch between the Czech and the Slovak republic level citizenship under provisions of the existing citizenship legislation. By the end of 1992, some 65,000 Slovak republic level citizens had applied for the Czech republic level citizenship ( On 1 January 1993, the Czech and the Slovak Republics were established as successor states to the former Czechoslovakia. In the Czech Republic, citizenship issues were regulated by the hastily drafted and adopted Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Czech
129 Repub lic. The primary aim of the law was to identify citizens of the new state and to prevent dual Czech and Slovak citizenship. New legislation concerning citizenship fell into two main categories. The first category included a set of temporary provisions th at regulated the initial designation of citizens of the new state. The second category included more permanent rules, regulating the acquisition of Czech citizenship by birth and naturalization, as well as the loss o f Czech citizenship The initial overa ll determination of citizenship was articulated in the Czech Republic as of 31 December 1992, [...] are citizens of the Czech Republic as of 1 2010, 6) Parallel Slovak legislation adopted the same approach regarding the initial determination of citizenship, preventing overwhelming statelessness in the wake of the break up of Czechoslovakia. The new legislation was also supplemented by provisio ns regulating the designation of citizenship and facilitating naturalization for certain Slovak citizens. Obtaining Czech citizenship required two years of permanent residence in the territory of the Czech Republic and renunciation of Slovak citizenship, as well as a clean criminal record ( Members of the Roma minority were disproportionately affected by such provisions. In 1994, a petition was brought to the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the new citizenship le gislation on several points, but the Court rejected the complaint. The law was criticized by Czech human rights activists as well as by the international community and the European Union (Filip 1999, 1). The criticism led to some adjustments and a softeni ng of the 1993 Act in relation to other former Czechoslovak citizens.
130 Following the establishment of the independent Czech Republic, both intentional and unintentional consequences of the break up of Czechoslovakia dominated the discussion of citizenship and the formation of citizenship and naturalization policy. In 1998, after a change in government, reform of citizenship legislation was put on the government agenda. This initiative led to significant changes to the 1993 Citizenship Act, and the adoptio n of the 1999 Act on the Citizenship of Some of the Former Czechoslovak Citizens. Changes to the 1993 Act lessened the harsh consequences of the break up of Czechoslovakia for some groups of former Czechoslovak citizens. The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic ruled in May 1997 that an individual does not lose Czech citizenship by applying for citizenship of the Slovak Republic. An estimated 65,000 people had applied for Slovak citizenship, and these individuals became dual citizens following the Major amendments to the 1993 Citizenship Act were implemented by the 1999 Act on Citizenship, which took into former citizens of Czec hoslovakia as of December 31, 1992 to acquire Slovak citizenship without losing their Czech citizenship. The 1999 Act also introduced a simplified procedure for acquisition of Czech citizenship by declaration for former Czechoslovak citizens and their chil dren who had lived continuously in the territory of the Czech Republic since the break up of Czechoslovakia. This amendment provided for the acquisition of Czech citizenship by individuals who for various reasons could not opt or apply for Czech citizensh ip before. A subsequent amendment to the 1993 Citizenship Act adopted in 2003 (Act No. 357/2003 Coll.) introduced further corrective provisions. It
131 gave former Czechoslovak citizens who were granted Slovak citizenship between January 1, 1994 and September 1, 1999 the right to reclaim their lost Czech citizenship by declaration. The amendment also gave the right to acquire the Czech citizenship by declaration to certain groups of Slovak citizens who were minors at the time of the break up of Czechoslovakia. The 1999 Act on the Citizenship of Some of the Former Czechoslovak Citizens reintroduced and broadened the right of reacquisition of Czech citizenship by declaration. It applied to emigrants who had lost Czechoslovak citizenship under communist rule, but for legal or practical reasons had not been able to make use of earlier provisions. As is evident from these provisions citizenship legislation in the Czech Republic has gone through a series of reforms since 1993. Since its adoption, there have been n ine amendments to the 1993 Citizenship Act, and two to the 1999 Act on the Citizenship of Some Former Czechoslovak Citizens. While most alterations in legislation have concerned the situation of former Czechoslovak citizens, there have been other changes, affecting the acquisition of Czech citizenship and the processes of naturalization. Some changes reflected reforms of the administrative structures. Despite extensive amendments, the basic principles governing Czech citizenship have remained stable, namel y the principle of jus s anguinis rather strict naturalization conditions, and extensive administrative discretion in regards to naturalization. There are several ways of acquiring Czech citizenship, including the acquisition of citizenship by former Czec hoslovak citizens and their children by choice or declaration; acquisition of citizenship by birth, adoption, and establishment of paternity; acquisition of citizenship by being found in the territory of the Czech Republic; and,
132 acquisition of Czech citize nship by naturalization ( Under the jus s anguinis principle, a person acquires Czech citizenship at birth if at least one parent is a Czech citizen, regardless of where they were born. jus s oli applies if the parents are stateless and at least one of them is a permanent resident. A natural person found on the territory of the Czech Republic is a Czech citizen unless it is proved that he or she acquired the citizenship of another state at birth. The jus s anguinis principle remains the tr aditional and dominant feature of Czech citizenship legislation whereas the application of jus s oli is extremely limited. The conditions for naturalization are strict. Requirements include permanent residence for at least five years, renunciation of previ ous citizenship, clean criminal record, adherence to immigration law, fulfillment of certain statutory duties (such as paying taxes, health and social insurance) and passing a Czech language test ( 2010, 9) Conditions are unfavorable regarding nat uralization except for foreign nationals with strong family links to Czech citizens. They involve long waiting periods to fulfill residence requirements. Applicants have to relinquish their original citizenship and a number of additional criteria are teste d. There are no specific provisions for automatic acquisition of the Czech citizenship by second and third generation immigrants. Most of the requirements can be waived at the discretion of the Ministry of the Interior if certain conditions are met. The Ministry cannot waive the two requirements pertaining to permanent residence status and clean criminal record. Decisions denying naturalization are open to judicial review but both in theory and practice administrative discretion is applied very broadly i n naturalization cases. On the other hand, the legal status of
133 naturalized citizens is secure as a ban on the deprivation of citizenship is guaranteed under the Constitution. Despite official positions discouraging dual citizenship, Czech legislation is g enerally more tolerant of dual and multiple citizenship than it has been in the past. The developments after 1989 inevitably increased the number of dual citizens. Immediately following the break up of Czechoslovakia the original objective of citizenship and naturalization policy was to prevent dual Czech and Slovak citizenship. The 1993 Citizenship Act adhered strictly to the principle of preventing dual nationality; however, it was not entirely successful. Following the first reforms adopted in October 1993 the legal stance against dual citizenship weakened. As one group was able to obtain dual citizenship, it became more difficult to deny the same benefit to another group. As a result, a specific, preferential regime developed in relation to dual Cz ech and Slovak nationality. Czech and Slovak nationals could choose their citizenship for a period of one year after the break up of Czechoslovakia. This situation was not without complications. It rendered tens of thousands of Roma living in the Czech R epublic stateless due to improper documentation, permanent residence in Slovakia, as many migrated from Slovakia to Czech lands before 1989, lack of information about the procedure and the need to apply, a criminal record, or other reasons. In 1999, after years of continuous pressure from European institutions and non governmental organizations, and following a Czech Supreme Court decision of 1997, which ruled that the Czech citizens who chose Slovak citizenship in 1993 did not lose their Czech citizenship the Czech citizenship laws were amended to allow for reacquisition of the Czech citizenship for certain groups
134 of people within a stipulated period. Further revisions of the Czech law were passed in September 2005 to allow for dual citizenship for Czechs living in Slovakia, who had lost their Czech citizenship by acquiring the Slovak nationality between 1 January 1994 and September 1999. Applications for dual citizenship can be submitted to the Consular Office of the Czech Embassy in Bratislava. The appli cation process takes up to two months. Approximately five thousand people requested dual citizenship in 2005 ( Kus 2010, 15 ). Conclusions The fall of the communist regime in 1989, the break up of Czechoslovakia, and the establishment of an independent Czech state in 1993 brought about marked changes to Czech citizenship policy. The Velvet Revolution resulted in two substantial changes in the sphere of citizenship law: the constitutional ban on deprivation of citizenship against hich regulated restoration of citizenship by persons who lost it under the communist rule. The preferential treatment of former citizens may be understood as a remedy for past injustices. The consensual division of Czechoslovakia caused many problems reg arding citizenship. The new legislation did not generate a mass stateless population; however, the restrictive citizenship legislation initially adopted left a number of former Czechoslovak citizens with the citizenship of a successor state in which they d id not live and to which they were only formally attached. By the introduction of reforms in the period between 1993 and 2003, many of the problems related to the break up of Czechoslovakia have been addressed. Nonetheless, the original intention of legis lators to avoid dual Czech and Slovak citizenship has not been fully achieved. On the contrary, the
135 precarious position of some groups of citizens shows that there are situations in which it is not justified to deny a person the right to dual citizenship. Cases of dual Czech and Slovak citizenship are now numerous. Slovakia The development of Slovak citizenship legislation and practice has been closely connected to that of its immediate neighbors, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Both served as a foundat ion for the Slovak citizenship legislation, and continue to influence the direction of citizenship and naturalization policy. The question of national self determination throughout the twentieth century has played a special role in shaping the theoretical and legal aspects of citizenship in Slovakia. Tensions between Slovakia and Hungary, mostly relating to the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia, have heightened following the introduction of legislation concerning the state language, which limits the u se of minority and other languages for official purposes. Slovak citizenship and naturalization policy is rather progressive and forward looking on paper. Following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, citizenship was granted automatically to those who wer e citizens of the Slovak Republic before December 31, 1992. Slovak citizenship policy is also one of the few in the region to recognize dual citizenship. However, the actual practice of granting citizenship to the new residents of Slovakia is among the m ost restrictive and conservative in Europe. Recently, the conditions for acquisition of citizenship have been made stricter by increasing the residency requirements and through the addition of stringent language requirements.
136 Pre transition Citizenship Czechoslovak citizenship was created with the first Czechoslovak Republic on October 28, 1918. The new state emerged from the dissolution of the Austro Hungarian Empire and from the peace treaties following the First World War. The Czechoslovak Republic consisted of a multitude of ethnic groups who struggled to assert themselves and establish a dominant position in their newly established Republic. National minorities, especially the three million Germans and close to a million Hungarians, formed 44 per cent of the total population ( Kus 2010, 2) The Czechoslovak Government thus enforced an official Czechoslovak nationality rather than separate Czech and Slovak nationalities. Differing practices in granting citizenship and the legal title of residence in the regions existed before 1918, while they were still part of the Austro Hungarian Empire. While the legal recognition of residence in a municipality (domicile) was closely regulated and registered in Austria, it was not in the Hungarian part of the em pire that included Slovakia. Even though domicile was granted to all those born and residing in a n Austrian municipality, the gentry had a right to deny some people domicile even if they were born or had resided in the locality for a long period of time ( Kus 2010, 2) The Roma and Hungarian populations were singled out by succeeding Czechoslovak governments seeking to minimize minority influence and consolidate power. World Wa r. Slovakia became a Nazi puppet state, while the Czech lands were occupied restoration of Czechoslovakia led to the adoption of ad hoc laws that introduced the criterion of eth nicity into citizenship legislation. The new legislation was linked to a
137 massive post Constitutional Decree, Czechoslovak citizens of German and Hungarian ethnic descent were denied Czechos lovak citizenship. They were also excluded from official institutions (Order 99/1945 of the Slovak National Council), as well as from reimbursement for war damages, and suffered other practical consequences including dissolving of German and Hungarian ass ociations and organizations ( Kus 2010, 3) The relocation of ethnic Germans was agreed upon by the Allied Powers at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. Similar policies pertaining to ethnic Hungarians were not, however, formally agreed upon. The alternativ and Hungary. This plan resulted in the expulsion of 89,660 ethnic Hungarians, who were moved into Hungary, in return for receiving 73,273 ethnic Slovaks (Vadkerty 2002, 32). Ethnic Hungarians living in Slovak lands were recruited for work in the then vacant Sudetenland. Age limits imposed by the Decree were also frequently ignored and prope rty left behind was confiscated in direct violation of th e Decree (Kus 2005). These policies were accompanied by a program of re Slovakisation, passed by the Slovak National Council in June 1946. This policy gave ethnic Hungarians an opportunity to based on the premise of previous coercive Magyarisation of Slovaks within the time span of one year. Some 320,000 Hungarians were granted Slovak citizenship on this basis ( Kus 2010, 4) Citizenship was eventually restored to the Germans and Hungarians remaining in Czechoslovakia in 1948 by the newly established communist government; most Hungarians who had been transferred to Sudetenland returned. Many, however, ne ver
138 recovered lost properties. When issued, t substantial impact on Czech an d Slovak social and political development In the postcommunist era especially in connection with possible compensation for those affected and their descendants the impacts of the Decrees were felt even further Some conciliatory steps, however, have be en taken by the Czech and Slovak governments in the past decade ( Kus 2010, 4) The rise of communist rule tamed the systematic discrimination against Hungarians and Germans in Czechoslovakia, but introduced new citizenship laws that were manipulated for other political purposes. During this time, and the dtente period of the 1960s, Slovak leaders and intellectuals articulated a desire for the self determination of the Slovak nation within a federal state arrangement. They did not wish to be Czechoslova k citizens, but Slovak citizens of Czechoslovakia. While the Czechs focused Kus 2010, 6) These differing viewpoints divided the Czechs and Slovaks for the better part of the communist regime. The Soviet leadership took into account Slovak aspirations for federation. While the oppression following the Prague Spring and Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 was significant in both parts of the country, it also brought about the federation of the state. Dissent in Slovakia was in turn less vocal than in the Czech region. The Soviets invested in Slovak industry during the post 1968 era, contributing to different perceptions of the period in b oth parts of the state ( Kus 2010, 6) Such a divide was more clearly defined as the break up of Czechoslovakia neared.
139 Until 1968, when the Czechoslovak Federation was established, Czechoslovakia was a unitary state with a single Czechoslovak citizens hip. The establishment of a federation also resulted in the creation of Czech and Slovak citizenships. The 1968 Constitutional Law on the Czechoslovak Federation considered individual preference when determining the citizenship of the two constituent repub lics. The law contains a provision stating that every citizen of one of the republics is also a citizen of Czechoslovakia (Art. 5; Kus 2010, 6 ). Citizenship was regulated by the 1968 Constitutional Act of the National Council of the Czechoslovak Socialis t Republic on the Principles of Acquisition and Loss of Czech and Slovak Citizenship, followed by the 1968 Act of the Slovak National Council on Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Slovak Socialist Republic. Republic level citizenship was primarily determined by birthplace or by the citizenship of parents, if known. Czech or Slovak citizens could, however, choose a different citizenship until December 31, 1969. The Act did not allow for dual citizenship, and individuals had to choose one or the other Slovak citizenship federation), by marriage, or by grant (after five consecutive years of residence for foreigners and two years for Czech citizens with permanent re ( Kus 2010, 6) Post transition Citizenship In the first years of the Slovak Republic, citizenship was either designated by law, or chosen by residents individually. Citizens of the Slovak Republic before December 31, 1992 autom atically became citizens of the new Slovakia, in accordance with the 1993 Act on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic. Czech citizens could apply for Slovak
140 citizenship until December 31, 1993 through a written request to the District Office in the Slovak Re public or designated offices abroad. This option was open to all citizens of the former Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. Those applying for Slovak citizenship had to provide proof that they were Czechoslovak citizens as of December 31, 1992 and state their place of birth and permanent residence (Art. 7; Kus 2010, 9 ). After the fall of communism, Slovakia experienced turbulent shifts in population, mostly related to the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, but also as a result of its strategic position between Western and Eastern Europe. In the early 1990s, the Slovak Republic lost many of its citizens to the Czech Republic. This trend slowed after 1994 when Slovakia began to experience an increase in population from abroad, parti cularly from the East. Most migration to Slovakia is temporary, with migrants returning after short stays in the country ( Kus 2010, 9 ). The number of individuals who eventually apply for Slovak citizenship, however, changes according to domestic and int ernational events, circumstances, and legislation. In 1993 and 1994, the vast majority of those who acquired Slovak citizenship were Czech nationals. Because of the option of choosing citizenship in 1993, the proportion of Czech nationals among the succe ssful applicants for citizenship was significant. This proportion of Czech applicants gradually declined thereafter, but rose again, specifically after amendments to the citizenship law in 1999, and in the years prior to 2005 when the Czech Republic and Sl ovakia joined the European Union ( Kus 2010, 9 ). Slovak citizenship can currently be acquired by birth, by adoption, or by grant. The laws regulating citizenship are comparatively generous towards individuals with
141 Czech or Slovak roots, allowing for plu ral citizenships and extending considerable citizenship rights to the Slovak expatriates living abroad. Acquisition of citizenship by birth is firmly based on jus s anguinis except in those cases where a child would otherwise become stateless. In current l egislation a child acquires Slovak citizenship only if at least one parent is a citizen of the Slovak Republic or if the child was born in the territory of the Slovak Republic to parents who are stateless or whose citizenship is not transmitted to the chil d. If citizenship cannot be established, a child is considered to be a citizen of the Slovak Republic if he or she was born or was found in the territory of the Slovak Republic and his or her parents are not known. If one of another country and the other is a citizen of the Slovak Republic, then the child is a citizen of the Slovak Republic even if it is later established parent. A c hild can also acquire citizenship when he or she is adopted by a Slovak citizen. In the case of a disagreement between the parents, Slovak citizenship can be determined Citize nship in the Slovak Republic can also be granted upon request to a foreigner. The 1993 Act on Citizenship of the Slovak Republic requires consecutive permanent residence and physical stay in the Slovak territory for at least eight years immediately prior t o submitting an application for citizenship. The law also requires sufficient basic proficiency in the Slovak language. Applicants must also have a clean criminal record, which means that they must not have been prosecuted for an intentional crime during t hose five years before the application, must not be under an administrative expulsion order from the country of residence, or subject to extradition proceedings. The
142 application process may hasten if an applicant is stateless or voluntarily renounces his o r her previous citizenship. Furthermore, citizenship can be granted upon request to those who have entered into marriage with a Slovak citizen after living in the Slovak Republic for a period of five consecutive years, or those who have made special contri butions to the Slovak Republic through their achievements in the field of economy, science, culture or technology ( Kus 2010, 12 ). There are also special provisions for the restoration of citizenship to those who lost it according to previous legislati on. A person whose former Czechoslovak citizenship has expired or who lost their Czechoslovak citizenship due to a long absence or on the basis of citizenship law during the communist regime, may be granted citizenship of the Slovak Republic even if the ab ove mentioned condition of five years consecutive permanent residence has not been met. Former Slovak citizens returning to live in Slovakia have to have permanent residence in the Slovak Republic for three years prior to filing an application for citizens hip. Following independence, many more foreigners looking both for asylum and for citizenship settled in Slovakia. Among those who sought Slovak citizenship were people fleeing from persecution, violence, civil war, or other conditions threatening their lives and security in their home countries. Nearly 46,000 foreigners have applied for asylum in Slovakia since 1992; however, asylum status was granted only to slightly over 600 of them by the end of 2007 (Portal of the Statistical Office of the Slovak Re public). This tendency makes Slovakia a country with one of the lowest rates of refugee recognition in Europe (Kus 2010, 11 ).
143 In 2009 the Slovak Parliament enacted an amendment to the Law on the State Language which has sparked debate related to citizen ship. The language law conflicts with other European standards against the discrimination of language minorities. This Act imposes fines for the incorrect use of Slovak language by institutions, monitored by the Ministry of Culture, and requires that geog raphical signs, plaques and memorials are written in the Slovak language first and only then in a minority language. It introduces a requirement of issuing documentation in minority schools and in health care in the state language. It tightens other requir ements; for example the Post Office, Army, transportation, police forces and fire department are required to use the state language in all official business and more films for children will be dubbed into the Slovak language. In 1997, the Slovak Repub lic passed the Act on Expatriate Slovaks. Previously, protection of Slovak nationals living abroad was guaranteed by a declaration of support Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic, has also been in existence since 1995, focusing on cultural cooperation and support of expatriate Slovak institutions. According to the Act on Expatriate Slovaks, an application for special status may be submitted by former Slovak citizen s or those with direct descen t from a Slovak national. If the applicant cannot provide any documentation certifying his or her ethnic Slovak origin, a letter from an institution representing Slovaks abroad or two witnesses who have the status of expatriate Slovaks may be accepted. The application is submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. If it is successful the Ministry issues an Expatriate Slovak Certificate. The benefits of this status include permission to reside in the ter ritory of the Slovak Republic and the opportunity to apply for permanent residence
144 in Slovakia. It is also possible to apply to any Slovak university or to apply for a job without having permanent residence in Slovakia or employment authorization required by other foreign nationals. Slovak Hungarian relations have been a persistent issue in the development Slovak citizenship policy since the fall of communism. Policies of forceful Magyarisation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the t urbulent dissolution of the empire, which left one third of the ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of the Hungarian state, provided a historical basis for sometimes tense relations. Hungarian rule over Slovak territory in the past has been a rallying po int for Slovak nationalists in the period since independence. The introduction of the Hungarian Status Law in 2001 was met by firm opposition in Slovakia, and rekindled old historical grievances between the two nations. The first version of the Hungari an Status Law provided for financial and other benefits for individuals of Hungarian ethnic origin abroad. After the refusal of the Slovak and Romanian Governments to allow implementation of the Status Law in their m by the Venice Commission, the law was amended in 2003. Institutions that offer education in the Hungarian language or on Hungarian culture were provided stipends, rather than individuals, making financial aid accessible not only to ethnic Hungarians but to anybody who wishes to study Hungarian culture and history. The amended version was approved by a majority of the Hungarian Parliament. Slovak representatives, however, remained opposed to it and sought to prevent the implementation of the Status Law in the territory of the Slovak Republic. The political debate between Slovak and Hungarian leaders was resolved in December 2003 by the
145 Slovak Hungarian Agreement on Support for the National Minorities in the Areas of Culture and Education. The treaty identi fies two specific cultural foundations that are permitted to distribute financial aid to cultural and educational institutions. It establishes a principle of reciprocity, and the distribution of funds is to be subject to annual control by a Slovak Hungari an commission of experts. The Hungarian Status Law inspired changes to Slovak citizenship law. In 2005 the National Council of the Slovak Republic passed an Amendment to the Act on Expatriate Slovaks, establishing the Office for Slovaks Living Abroad, whi ch is funded from the state budget and is responsible for carrying out the official state policy towards Abroad that make the process of claiming benefits related to the status easier. Financial support is tied to the areas of culture, education and research, information, and media. development of Slovak identity, culture, language, or (Kus 2010, 19 ). Conclusions The current legal citizenship policies in Slovakia are a continuation of the policies established according to previous Czechoslovak legal norms. Most provisions concerning the acquisitio n and loss of citizenship have not changed dramatically either with the fall of the communist regime or with the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, save for the special provisions dealing with the citizenship of the Czechs and the Slovaks in the newly created republics and those who have lost citizenship. The Slovak citizenship legislation has been tweaked and updated since, notably by introducing significant amendments to
146 the Act on Citizenship in 2007, an Act on the Slovaks Living Abroad in 2005, and amendmen ts to the Law on Asylum in 2008 that bring it closer to the EU standards. Slovak law has moved towards defining stricter conditions for the acquisition of citizenship by foreign nationals, increasing the required length of permanent residence, and scope o f language requirements including a requirement of basic knowledge of Slovak culture and society. At the same time, conditions for acquisition have been simplified for former nationals who lost their citizenship due to naturalization in another country o r those of Slovak descent wishing to acquire Slovak citizenship. Because it evolved from the same source, the citizenship law closely resembles that of the Czech Republic. The Slovak law however allows for dual citizenship, and loss of citizenship occurs only by application for release from the state bond. Like its neighbors, the Slovak Republic established an Office for the Slovaks Living Abroad on the basis of the Act on the Slovaks Living Abroad, which is similar to the Hungarian Status Law. The Slova k citizenship and naturalization policy has been protective of the Slovak majority in the recent past. Increased tensions between Slovakia and Hungary over the introduction of various laws, as well as over issues related to the Hungarian minority in Slovak ia, have contributed to a decreased tolerance of ethnic diversity in recent legislation. This decrease in tolerance is felt by national minorities, as well as those seeking Slovak citizenship or new citizens of Slovakia, in their contact with state offices use of their language, and the general public atmosphere.
147 Post part ition States: Ethnic Boundaries and Self determination The evolution of policies relating to the definition, granting, and withdrawal of citizenship in the Czech Republic and Slovakia were closely tied to turbulent events on the international and regional political scene. The ideals and practices of citizenship were marked by struggles for national self determination, as well as power struggles between neighboring states. The developm ent of individual Cze ch and Slovak citizenship policies began in the period before 1948. The Slovaks had not achieved a truly independent statehood and were not content in a centralized Czechoslovak state after the Second World War. The rise of communist rule tamed the systematic discrimination against Hungarians and Germans in Czechoslovakia, but introduced new citizenship laws that were manipulated for other political purposes. During this time, and the dtente period of the 1960s, Slovak leaders and in tellectuals articulated a desire for the self determination of the Slovak nation within a federal state arrangement. While the Czech state focused on market liberalization and democratization of the regime, Slo vakia then Kus 2010, 6) These differing viewpoints divided the Czechs and Slovaks for the better part of the communist regime. The Soviet leadership took into account Slovak aspirations for federation. Citizenship law in Czechoslovakia remaine d mostly unchanged until the Prague Spring initiated reforms. The Prague Spring was accompanied by a Slovak national movement. This movement called for the introduction of a federal system within a multiethnic, but centralized, Czechoslovakia. Citizenshi p policies within the common state of Czechs and Slovaks were influenced in 1968 by the federation of
148 Czechoslovakia, and then again after 1989, when the Velvet Divorce led to the separation of the two nations. Citizenship policies in the Czech Republic a nd Slovakia experienced frequent changes in prior to 1989 inconsistencies in the first years of the postcommunist regime s as well new challenges resul ting from independence in 1993. Czech and Slovak citizenship policies were strongly shaped by internatio nal influences, especially by pressures from the European Union and binding treaties with the Council of Europe. In Slovakia they also reacted to the historically and emotionally charged political debates on the status of Hungarians living abroad and the possibility of their acquiring dual citizenship in Hungary. The collapse of the communist regime instigated the resurgence of nationalist feelings and politics in Czechoslovakia, and the rebirth of the Slovak nationalist movement led to a consensual brea k up of the federal state. N ew citizenship legislation did not generate a mass stateless population; however, the restrictive citizenship legislation initially adopted left a number of former Czechoslovak citizens with the citizenship of a successor state in which they did not live and to which they were only formally attached. By the introduction of reforms in the period between 1993 and 2003, many of the problems related to the break up of Czechoslovakia had been addressed. The new democratic governmen t s in the Czech Republic and Slovakia sought to remedy injustices caused by the deprivation of citizenship under communist rule. The Velvet Revolution resulted in two substantial changes in the sphere of citizenship law: the constitutional ban on deprivat which regulated restoration of citizenship by persons who lost it under the communist
149 rule. The preferential treatment of former citizens may be understood as a remedy for past injustices. In the Czech Rep ublic, citizenship issues were regulated by the hastily drafted and adopted Act on the Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship of the Czech Republic. The primary aim of the law was to identify citizens of the new state and to prevent dual Czech and Slovak cit izenship. The development of Slovak citizenship legislation has been influenced strongly by policies in Hungary and the Czech Republic. Both served as a foundation for the Slovak citizenship legislation, and continue to influence the direction of citizens hip and naturalization policy. The question of national self determination throughout the twentieth century has played a special role in shaping the theoretical and legal aspects of citizenship in Slovakia. Tensions between Slovakia and Hungary, mostly r elating to the ethnic Hungarian minority in Slovakia, have heightened following the introduction of legislation concerning the state language, which limits the use of minority and other languages for official purposes. After the fall of communism Velvet Revolution and partition of Czechoslovakia, both the Czech Republic and Slovak ia faced issues of defining their respective nation and conceptions of citizenship. National identity was reconstructed through new legislation seeking to come to terms with t he communist past and to effectively create two states from one. Each state used various historical justification s for movements towards self determination. Czechs and Slovaks, however, faced very different experiences before, during, and after communist rule and held very different opinions as to their historical situations While the Czechs were exposed to democratic ideals in the first interwar republic, Slovak s were not and instead existed as a pu ppet state created by the Nazis.
150 T he refusal of the C zechoslovak Government to grant Slovakia the right to self determination or autonomy in a federation for a long period of time fostered tensions between the two regions. A discrepancy in perceptions of the post 1968 era further increased the rift between t he two nations. This initial dichotomy contributed to the later choice of separate but similar, paths to democratization and formation of citizenship and naturalization policy.
151 Chapter 5 Citizenship in Postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe: Analysis and Conclusion C itizenshi p policies in the eight cases studied here confirm that citizenship is a multifaceted concept and an intricate political and legal means of defining political communities. This project was inten ded to analyze the configuration and evolution of particular citizensh ip policies over the course of the democratic transition process of eight postcommunist states. Complex political transformations in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe posed new q uestions concerning state building. The process of democratization provided a platform from which entire states were rebuilt and redefined. Citizenship policies have played an important role in establishing the boundaries of the new and liberated states, a key element in that process being the designation of membership in the political community. In order to gauge the overall trend of patterns and transformations in citizenship policies in postcommunist Central and Easte rn Europe, this project provide d a comprehensive analysis of citizenship laws and other relevant policies before, during, and after the transition to democracy. The main objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between democratization and altering conceptions of citizens hip. Has the democratic transition led to more liberal, open, ethnic, or restrictive policies?
152 The collapse of communism generated a huge movement for state and national reconstruction throughout all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. In the c ontext of complex institutional and economic transformations, new citizenship rules have been established to demarcate the political boundaries of the reconstituted states. One of the main chara cteristics of the region is that specific historical conditio ns, related to the overlap of multiple imperial regimes and the process of state establishment, generated a map of complex ethno national political communities (Drumbrava 2007, 13). Central and Eastern Europe, with its history of fluid borders, large mino rity communities, and ethnic conflict, has experienced citizenship policies since 1989 based heavily on ethnicity and aimed at restoring former (pre World War II) national communities, strengthening ties of kinship, and redressing past injustices, includin g the wrongful deprivation of citizenship during both the Nazi and Soviet periods. The reorganization of citizenship rules in postcommunist Eastern Europe has followed a general pattern promoting interests of the titular nation (and ethnically defined kin groups across borders) and the exclusion of various other groups. Common features of all the r former citizens, usually members of ethnic kin groups, who repatriate, as well as various fo rms of expedited citizenship or special status for those who left or were forced to leave the country during the Nazi and communist periods. This project began with an overview of citizenship and democratization theory and situated the analysis in a norma tive and historical context. After examining the concept of citizenship and underlining the importance of citizenship in democratization and national determination, this study systematically present ed data on citizenship
153 regulations of eight Central and Ea stern European countries. Countries were analyzed diachronically pre transition and post transition and also compared with each other in the two different periods. The following provides a summary of the findings and interpretations as to the relation ship between a transitioning postcommunist region and its conceptions of citizenship. Jus Soli Jus Sanguinis and Naturalization States have the power to decide who their citizens are. Citizenship status is most commonly granted by birth in a territo ry ( jus s oli ), descent ( jus s anguinis ), a combination of the two, or naturalization. Other roads to citizenship include marriage, adoption, or in special cases such as secession, succession, or repatriation, the option of citizenship designation may be de Processes of naturalization provide the greatest variation among the eight postcommunist states examined. Some countries may require a minimum period of residence and proof of loyalty or integration, while others m ay require long residence, substantial proof of cultural integration, criminal, political and moral records, renunciation of other citizenship, evidence of legal income, and even medical records. Citizenship Acquisition Most of the postcommunist states examined in this study altered their citizenship policies shortly after the collapse of communism, with the exception Poland, which kept in place its citizenship law of 1962. Both jus s oli and jus s anguinis principles have been recognized. All eight coun tries provided for citizenship to individuals born in the
154 of the countries allowed for unconditional citizenship for those with direct lineage from citizens, regar dless of their place of birth, while Latvia and Lithuania introduced parental consent as a condition. All the countries granted exceptional jus s oli citizenship for children to unknown parents found in the territory, but citizenship was not available for stateless children in each case. Hungary and Lithuania specified that parents should be permanent residents. Despite the adoption of new regulations, few changes have been effected with reference to the acquisition of citizenship through birth right sinc e the transition. The most important changes have been made by the Latvian and Estonian laws that provided for special naturalization procedure for the stateless children born after the moments of proclaiming of state independence. Table 5. 1 Citizenshi p at Birth State Descendents Non descendents Born in State Born out of State Born in State Poland Automatic Automatic Exceptional for stateless and children of unknown origin Hungary Automatic Automatic Exceptional for stateless and children of unknow n origin Romania Automatic Automatic Exceptional for children of unknown origin Estonia Automatic Automatic Exceptional for stateless minors and children of unknown origin Latvia Automatic Conditional Exceptional for stateless minors and children of un known origin Lithuania Automatic Conditional Exceptional for stateless minors and children of unknown origin Czech R Automatic Automatic Exceptional for stateless and children of unknown origin Slovakia Automatic Automatic Exceptional for stateless and children of unknown origin
155 Loss of Citizenship All eight countries examined in this study allow citizens to renounce their citizenship and require the submission of proof of possessing or acquiring other citizenship. However, the renunciation is uncondit ional only for three cases the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland while the other states impose additional conditions. There are no examples of discrimination between natural and naturalized citizens and facilitations for reacquisition of citizenship are typically available. A number of citizenship laws in postcommunist Cen tral and Eastern Europe provide for involuntary loss of citizenship on different grounds, including the acquisition of other citizenship, severe crimes against the state, service in a foreign army or office, or permanent residence abroad All eight countries have taken into account international norms for avoiding statelessness and ensuring non discrimination across different categories of citizens. Table 5. 2 Loss of Citizenship St ate Voluntary Loss Involuntary Loss Possibility of Reacquisition Poland Unconditional NA Not Specified Hungary Unconditional NA Conditional upon request Romania Conditional Conditional Not Specified Estonia Conditional Conditional Not Specified Latvia Conditional Conditional Not Specified Lithuania Conditional Conditional Conditional upon request Czech R Unconditional Conditional Not Specified Slovakia Conditional NA Conditional upon request
156 Naturalization Apart from acquiring citizenship throug h birth, naturalization provides another route for individuals to become citizens of a state. Citizenship acquired through naturalization depends on procedural arrangements and is subject to a certain degree of administrative discretion. The rules of natu raliza tion provide the widest range of policies in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. Policies range from those with minimal requirements, as in Poland, to those with numerous conditions and constraints, as in the Baltic States. A usual requiremen t for naturalization is a minimum period of residence within the territory of the state, either as simple resident or as permanent resident. Another common prerequisite for naturalization is the knowledge of the official language of the state (or at leas t one of the official languages), proved through formal or informal evaluation. The majority of the countries in this study required proof of social and cultural integration. In some of the cases, the knowledge of the Constitution or the history of the cou ntry is also included among the requirements. Table 5. 3 Naturalization Requirements Residence Language Constitution/ Criminal Dual Oath State Requirement Requirement Society Req. Record Citizenship Poland 4 5 years None None Not Considered Prohibit ed No Hungary 6 9 years Informal Eval. Test Considered Allowed Yes Romania 6 9 years Informal Eval. Informal Eval. Considered Allowed Yes Estonia 4 5 years Test Test Considered Prohibited Yes Latvia 4 5 years Test Test Considered Conditional Yes Lithu ania 10+ years Test Test Considered Prohibited Yes Czech R 4 5 years Informal Eval. None Considered Prohibited Yes Slovakia 4 5 years Informal Eval. None Considered Conditional No
157 Citizenship, Nationality, and Ethnicity Distinctions between civic and ethnic conceptions of citizenship, as well as between citizenship founded upon jus s oli and jus s anguinis have also greatly influenced the development of citizenship in these eight countries. While citizenship generally refers to membership in a politica l community and affords qualifying individuals certain exclusive rights and duties, nationality refers to membership i n a specific form of ethnic or cultural community the nation that may or may not be organized as a nation state. For example, question s of nationality in Central and Eastern Europe throughout the nineteenth century, culminating with the First World War, referred to the fight of successful states, the terms Ethnicity is one of the ingredients of nationality and may be thought of as a common descent or origin of a particular group. Relevant to this study is the fact that ethnicity does matter for citizen ship purposes and that states often offer automatic or privileged citizenship for individuals that share the same ethnicity. Following World War I, the Allied and Associated Powers outlined rules for acquisition of citizenship in the successor states base d on territorial criteria. Anyone with continuous residency or the right to domicile within a state was entitled to that citiz enship. The post wa r peace treaties also made concessions to the principle of ethnicity, at least as an alternative criterion for the determination of citizenship. The treaties allowed for a right of citizenship option. In the case of the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, individuals could determine their citizenship not only on the basis of
158 habitual residence but also by virtue of their place of birth, on condition that their parents were permanent residents in that place at the time of their birth (Lieblich 2009, 5). Under communist rule, the societies of Central and Eastern Europe enjoyed limited independence. They were subj ect to the political, cultural, and economic rule of the authoritarian communist regime In some cases, citizens of these states utilized nationalist or ethnic sentiment to spur agitation against communist rule and make the case for independence and democ racy. Early civic minded nationalist movements (to an extent, the Hungarian Revolution, Prague Spring, and Solidarity Crisis, for example) were the bedrock of the pro democracy moment s in the region. Such movements during the communist era were the drivin g force behind Poland becoming the first country in the region to move in a democratic direction, and it later enabled the regime ch anges that followed in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Bunce 2006, 610 ). For the countries of Central and Ea stern Europe, t he revolutions of 1989 signaled the end o f an era of Soviet domination and communist authoritarian systems that had helped to define the region for the bette r part of the twentieth century. The revolutions marked the beginning of an irrevoc ably different geopolitical landscape across Central and Eastern Europe and an attempt to redefine the region as entirely more open, liberal and democratic. An essential part of that redefinition process is the specification of who exactly is entitled to participate in the new, more open, liberal, and democratic political community. While democracy brought broad rights and privileges to those designated as citizens, policy makers and political elites often focused citizenship policies on preserving old t itular nations and ethnic groups. These new political communities provided a platform for ethnically conceived national groups which viewed
159 democratization as an opportunity to achieve or consolidate national sovereignty (Csergo 2008, 87). Ethnically de fined citizenship was a central part of the postcommunist transitions of Central and Eastern Europe. The extent to which ethnic conceptions of citizenship were utilized in forming citizenship and naturalization policy varied from state to state depending on a number of internal and external factors. A discernable pattern has emerged among the transitioning countries of Central and Eastern Europe in regards to the exploitation of ethnic ties as a policy making tool. The postcommunist regimes needed a way to legitimize their authority and the new political and economic policies of the transition period. Playing to an ethnic audience recovering from half a century of communist repression, policy makers were able to enact legislation intended to reestablish or preserve ethnic ties. Since 1918, the prevailing conceptions of citizenship have used ethnic criteria as a main factor in defining those entitled to citizenship. These ethnic criteria do not necessarily appear explicitly in citizenship laws themselve s, though they are no doubt present. Formally, the governing principles of citizenship laws are made without reference to ethnicity, the Baltic States being a main exception Underlying conceptions of citizenship can be found, notably in supplementary do cuments that attempt to establish quasi citizenship or a special connection with co nationals abroad. Hungary and Romania have enacted particularly broad based efforts to extend rights of citizenship to their extensive kin communities abroad, in order t o foster cultural identity and strengthen ties with these communities. While transnational grants of status were not considered problematic by countries with relatively small populations of ethnic
160 Hungarians and Romanians, they posed serious problems for neighboring countries with large minority populations, as these groups would have obtained significant rights that of citizenship, with the concomitant rights, to Hunga rians outside its borders in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine, triggered highly negative responses for what was seen as modified significantly. Romania, while protesting Hungarian policies, also extended citizenship to former citizens of Romania living in Moldova. This gave some citizens of Moldova, a non EU member, privileged access to the European Union once Romania gained membership. Poland attempted to prom ulgate similar legislation aimed at a broad diaspora, but the initiative was not enacted. Slovakia, however, has successfully adopted its 1997 Law on Expatriate Slovaks. Those who qualify are afforded special benefits regarding work and residence status, as well as certain social security contributions, and elderly expatriates receive travel subsidies within Slovakia. The Baltic States articulated the most extreme ethnic preferences in postcommunist citizenship policy. Following the resettlement of large numbers of ethnic Russians during the Soviet period, the proportional share of native ethnic populations was greatly reduced. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these states developed strongly nationalistic citizenship policies aimed at restoring th e primary position of their native, ethnically defined, populations. Thus, they denied automatic citizenship in their newly independent polities to ethnic Russians living within their borders, stripping them of their rights to participate as equal citizens They then made it particularly difficult through
161 language and residency requirements, among other things for migrants to acquire citizenship, leaving many stateless. The attempt to create continuity with prewar national constructs essentially erased 40 years of history, which also meant erasing parts of a shared civic experience. While the Baltic States were decoupling from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia was engaged in its own peaceful dissolution. This process presented problems of state breaku p, with the addition of strongly nationalist overtones. In Czechoslovakia, citizens had been expected to register in one of the two halves of the country and to change their registration when they moved. Many neglected to do so, and internal movement was c ommon. Suddenly, for example, Slovaks in the Czech Republic, and vice versa, found themselves stateless. For most, resolving the issue was relatively uncomplicated, as applying for citizenship was simplified and dual citizenship in both republics permitted But Roma, for example, who often lacked documents or had criminal records preventing them from naturalizing, remained (and in some cases remain) without citizenship. Reinforcing Statehood, Plural Citizenship, and Statelessness None of the eight postc ommunist countries examined in this study with the exception of Romania, existed as a modern nation state before the First World War. Poland and Hungary have long been acknowledged as historic states, albeit with periods of domination by other empires, w hile Romania has been a state since 1888. Claims of state continuity aside, the Baltic States actually spent more time as Soviet republics than as independent, sovereign entities, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia have only
162 become states in the last two decades (Slovakia experiencing a brief period of statehood during the Second World War). The tenuous nature of statehood in Central and Eastern Europe over the past century has contributed to the more recent attempts to firmly establish and define indiv idual states. Included in those attempts is the reluctance or refusal to recognize multiple or plural citizenship. With the exception of Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, the rest of the states in this study hold reservations concerning plural citizenship. Migrants wishing to maintain or reestablish formal ties with their country of origin, without giving up membership in their country of adoption, have objected to those reservations. A certain amount of incoherence exists in policies governing plural citiz enship. For example, an Estonian citizen may not be a citizen of another country; any Estonian citizen who holds another citizenship by birth must renounce either that citizenship or Estonian citizenship. The same law, however, states that no person may be deprived of Estonian citizenship acquired by birth. In Poland, similar regulations state that an individual who is a Polish citizen under Polish law cannot be recognized at the same time as a citizen of another state. This provision was interpreted restri ctively in the communist period, but is now interpreted more liberally (Liebich 2009, 4). Similarly, plural citizenship was prohibited in Czechoslovakia after 1949, while current policies in ons from the requirement to renounce one's [previous] nationality" upon naturalization (Barsova 2010, 6). Throughout this postcommunist region, there is a pattern of formal rejection of the principle of plural citizenship, though with varying degrees of se verity and consistency.
163 Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia, the three states that recognize rights to multiple citizenship, may do so as a reflection of their historical experience. These three countries authorize plural citizenship with few reservations. Th ey show particular concern for their diasporas and have experienced either a sudden change of borders (Hungary and Romania) or status (Slovakia), leaving a number of their nationals outside the state. There has also been, since the revolutions of 1989, a trend toward relaxation of rules against plural citizenship. Advanced freedom of movement and an increased interest in the protection of human rights, especially concerning non discrimination and gender equality, have increased tolerance of plural citiz enship. Greater tolerance of plural citizenship may also be the result of a Europeanization of the region. The most recent European Convention on Nationality (1997) encourages plural citizenship. As a consequence of the fall of communism, many of these countries have reconnected with their historical migr communities. The move in the direction of recognizing plural citizenship has not led to sweeping changes in citizenship laws, however. States have elimin ated communist era bilateral conventions proh ibiting dual citizenship. According to Andre Liebich, such actions should be seen as a rejection of a communist heritage rather than endorsement of plural citizenship (2009, 5). Only Lithuania has speci fically removed the clause in Article 1 of its 1991 a nd 1997 citizenship laws that stated, "A citizen of the Republic of Lithuania may not at the same time be citizen [sic] of another state, except in cases provided for in this law." In the case of Latvia, restrictions on plural citizenship now apply only to those who choose to naturalize into the citizenship of the country concerned.
164 Along with questions of multiple citizenship, statelessness the existence of individuals who do not hold any citizenship has emerged as an important problem related to cit izenship regulations in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. There are certain causes of statelessness, including voluntary renunciation (without naturalization in other country), deprivation, birth to stateless parents or parents that cannot legally transmit their citizenship, complicated administrative procedures, and historical events such as conflict, state dissolution, or border changes. After 1989 a number of people in the region were rendered statelessness due to the adoption of exclusionary cit izenship rules, as in Estonia and Latvia, or the reconfigurati on of states, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Avoiding statelessness is a matter of sustained international concern and many states have introduced special provisions into their domestic laws in order to address the problem. Statelessness has been used as a measure of compliance and change in countries like Estonia and Latvia by international organizations such as OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Union. External Influences and Europeanization Citizenship policies in the period following the collapse of communism were influenced by domestic, as well as external factors. Another important element explaining certain changes in citizenship policies is the Europeanization pro cess may stand for different things. Specifically, it refers to the processes through which the European Union influences member states in terms of law and policy (Feathers tone
165 2003). In a general sense, Europeanization m a y refer to the relative homogenization of laws, practices, and identities of the European countries. There is no comprehensive European policy on citizenship. The formal establishment of citizenship of the European Union in 1991 was not intended to replace, but to be additional and to complement, national citizenship (De Groot 2004). Some have argued that the Europeanization process has influenced national policies either by pushing towards increased coordi nation among the member states or by direct regularization through specific EU acts, rules of residence for third country nationals, and common immigration policy (Rostek 2006). While the European Union did not create a comprehensive policy on citizenshi p, it did create a common framework for immigration and border control and regularized the status of third country nationals. Related European standards in the areas of fundamental rights and non discrimination, freedom of movement, and the obligation of s olidarity among member states may align certain aspects of domestic citizenship policies. Policy compliance in areas such as immigration, asylum and border control are the most significant aspects of a possible Europeanization of citizenship in the new member states, since access to citizenship is the result of acceptance in the territory and the registration of residence (Drumbrava 2007, 66). All eight countries examined in this project are members of the European Union, having fully completed prepara tions for accession. Citizenship regulations were not explicitly involved in the accession process. Interest in the area was shown, however, in the cases of the Baltic States where the missioner on National Minorities, the Council of Europe) in their pressures to solve the problem of
166 stateless populations. The Council of Europe and the Venice Commission were also important in shaping the debate over the Hungarian Status Law. The great v ariety of the laws concerning citizenship in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe and their uneven transformation seem to prove that citizenship regulations in the region, while perhaps influenced in certain cases, are not directly shaped by Europeaniz ation. Redressing Past Wrongs A major recurring trend in the eight countries examined in this study is that citizenship laws and related provisions have been formulated and implemented with the intention of redressing past wrongs. Issues of restitutio n are particularly strong with respect to the recent communist past, though t hey also extend to earlier periods. The Polish Repatriation Act mentioned in Chapter One is a prime example of an attempt at such historical redress. The Act recognizes that the to allow the repatriation of Poles who had remained in the East due to deportations, exile and other ethnically motivated forms of persecution" (Article 4; Liebich 2009, 12). Repatriates enjoy significant benefits and acquire Polish citizenship on the day they cross the Polish border, their costs of resettlement underwritten by the Polish state. Repatriates must have at least one parent or grandparent or two great grandparents who held Polish citizenship or who cultivated "Pol ish traditions and customs" (Article 5). The law also covers individuals and their descendants who emigrated willingly to some of the peripheries of the Russian Empire or of the USSR; for example, as employees in Siberian development projects or in the mi litary or civil service of the Russian or Soviet state.
167 The primary targets of the law, however, are families who were deported in 1939 1940 from Soviet occupied Eastern Poland during World War II, as well as earlier exiles and deportees; those who left u nder communist persecution; members of the Polish minority in the USSR transferred in the Stalinist era to areas far from the Polish border; Polish nationalists and revolutionaries exiled under the tsar ( Grny 2010). While few individuals took advantage o f the benefits of the Act, it made a strong statement as to the symbolic significance of the conferral of citizenship as a means to right the wrongs of previous decades. T he re establishment of the Baltic States is itself seen as a redress for historical w rongs. Citiz enship laws in these sta tes serve the purpose of correcting past injustices largely by legally abolishing the time period during which injustice was perpetrated. The Estonian Parliament voted to reenact the Citizenship Act of 1938 and made cle ar that only individuals who were Estonian citizens before the Soviet occupation, or who had direct Estonian ancestry, qualified for citizenship upon state restoration. This qualification deprived a number of resident non or facilitated naturalization. Like certain other countries, Estonia specifically states that it will not grant or restore citizenship to those who have acted against the interests of the state. The Estonian law also denies citizenship to individuals and spouses of individuals who entered Estonia "in conjunction with the assignment of military personnel into active service, the reserve forces or retirement" (Article 21.6). In this case, historical injustices may be righted not only by conferring citizensh ip, but also by denying it. Latvia's 1994 Citizenship Law also identifies citizens as those who were citizens on June 17, 1940 and their descendants, unless they had become citizens of another state
168 after May 4, 1990 (Article 2.1). Naturalization by Latvi ans abroad during the period of occupation is thus distinguished from naturalization since the reestablishment of independence. Restrictions on who can obtain Latvian citizenship are more severe in some respects than those in Estonia. Citizenship is not g ranted to individuals whom courts have identified as propagating racist or totalitarian ideas, as well as those who, after 13 January 1991, acted against the Republic of Latvia through participation in the Communist Party or front organizations. In Latvia retired Soviet military and police personn el are also refused citizenship as well as former employees and even informants of the Soviet security services. Lithuania adopted the most liberal policies of naturalization among the Baltic States All persons who had been resident for at least ten years in the Soviet Republic of Lithuania before November 1989 could opt for citizenship within two years. Nevertheless, even the most recent 2002 Lithuanian citizenship law defines the first category of citizens res ident in Lithuania as those who held citizenship before June 1940 and their descendants. The aim of historical redress is articulated in Article 14.2, granting easier conditions of naturalization to deportees or political prisoners who married Lithuanian citizens, as well as to their children born in exile. The Czech Republic also adopted restitution laws intended to underscore and correct the injustices of the communist era. The Czech law benefits all individuals and their descendants who lost their Cz echoslovak citizenship during the communist period for whatever reason, including by virtue of the prohibition on plural citizenship in Czechoslovakia or through naturalization in a state that prohibited dual citizenship. Restitution of citizenship may be seen as a nod offered to all Czechs, whatever the
169 circumstances of their loss of citizenship. Dual citizenship was addressed in the 1997 Citizenship Law, allowing dual Czech and Slovak citizenship as an exception to a general prohibition. Conclusions This project was undertaken with the intent of contributing to the comparative study of citizenship policies in the context of democratization. It is primarily focused on a specific area of regulations concerning the acquisition and loss of citizenship in eight postcommunist countries located in Central and Eastern Europe. Many studies in the field of citizenship have been focused on the West, with a distinct lack of interest in other notable regions. In the recent past, citizenship policies have been ref ormed in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These eight cases Poland, Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia emphasize the role of particular domestic and contextual factors in determining the configu ration and change of citizenship policies. The process of national consolidation and state building, external influences and Europeanization, and a preoccupation with the past have each to some extent influenced postcommunist conceptions of citizenship and the dynamics of citizenship policy. In the postcommunist region of Central and Eastern Europe, variation in the context of the democratic transition process was expected to generate different ideas of citizenship. The eight case studies carried out in this project demonstrate that citizenship policies across Central and Eastern Europe were divergent before, during, and after the democratic transition process. However, when measuring the character of change over
170 the course of that transition, citizensh ip regulations in the region have not been substantially altered. Limited changes were related to a relative general opening of the regulations regarding acquisition of citizenship at birth (the integration of stateless persons in Estonia and Latvia, for example) and loss of citizenship, and a relative restricting of the regulations regarding naturalization. Citizenship policies did not necessarily become less open because they were restrictive in the first place. Ethnicity has maintained a privileged st atus throughout the development of these policies. In the majority of the cases examined, formal provisions have been adopted in order to reintegrate different groups of individuals especially those of the titular ethnicity, left outside the boundaries o f the political community for varying reasons before, during, and after the transitions to democracy. Different paths of national consolidation and democratization have led to the development of different conceptions of citizenship. This study designated three separate categories of state status as possible indicators of patterns in citizenship policy. Countries were classified as either states with shifting borders and shifting populations, restored states, or post partition states States with shiftin g borders and shifting populations (Poland, Hungary, and Romania) followed a broad historical pattern in which border changes led to population movement; the migration of substantial populations tended to lead to feelings of nationalism; and nationalist se ntiments aided the formulation of citizenship policies that favored particular ethnic groups and titular nations The restored states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) enjoyed brief periods of independence; they experienced major demographic shifts as a re sult of the Soviet occupation; and like the previous group, eventually felt the effects of nationalism and ethnically focused
171 citizenship policies. The post partition states (the Czech Republic and Slovakia) experienced periods of occupation and repressio n during World War II; established nationalist movements early on; faced issues concerning population movement; and addressed cross border kin state ethnic groups. The broad scope of the three categories and diverse nature of the region, however, indicat e that citizenship policies in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe do not fit neatly into any one of these groups. Each and every state examined in this study encountered border and population shifts at one point or another in the last century The restoration or partition of a state necessarily involves border delineation and a reconfiguring of populations. If the principle of state continuity is set aside, the restored states are also the product of the break up of the USSR and could be considere d post partition states as well. While the three categories outlined in this study provided a useful organizational tool, their relevance to the overall analysis of citizenship and democratization proved less informative than anticipated. The overall e ffect of the democratic transition process in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe appears to be just one of a number of other possible contributing factors in the formulation and implementation of citizenship policies. The fact that so many of the po stcommunist reforms to citizenship legislation addressed issues and circumstances in place long before the democratic transition makes it difficult to isolate democratization as a significant driving force behind altering conceptions of citizenship. A s imple description of citizenship regulations over a given period of time does not fully capture the scope, or further understanding, of the substance of citizenship policies. The administrative and political discretion involved in the application of the
172 ru les may lead to different outcomes than those intended in the text of the laws (Dumbrava 2007, 69). Additional research assessing the condition of citizenship policies and the complicated procedures through which they are shaped and carried out may further (and more comprehensively) examine the complex relationship between citizenship and democratization. Each of the reoccurring trends observed in this study the process of national consolidation and state building, ethnically focused policies, external i nfluences and Europeanization, and a preoccupation with the past pose interesting questions as to the nature of citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe. What rights and privileges did citizens acquire throughout the varying stages of national consolid ation? Is there a correlation between the formulation of ethnically focused citizenship policies and a resurgence of nationalist movements in the region? Could the Europeanization of citizenship policies (if it is happening at all) point to an emerging gl obal conception of citizenship? What affect has repatriation and the restitution of citizenship had on the demographics of the region and vice versa ? Are any of the findings in this study comparable to research in other parts of the world? The idea o f citizenship as conceived by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe was presented at the beginning of this study as a n articulation of how these countries wish to define themselves. The legislation and policies examined in the previous chapters poin t to a conception of citizenship that is deeply rooted in the past. Historical grievances and ethnic ties have dominated much of the recent debates concerning citizenship. There are also obvious indications, however, that the countries of Central and Eas tern Eur ope are moving forward, transitioning through the democratization process, and entering into a new international community.
173 Bibliography Albiniak, M. and A. Czajkowska. 1996. Statutes on Polish nationality 1919 1995. Dom Organizatora. A ndrews, Geoff. 1991. Citizenship. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Ara Minority in From Migrants to Citizens 253 301. Edited by Alexander T. Aleinikoff, and Douglas Klusmeyer. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Andrea. 2010. Country Report: Czech Republi c Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Supranational Theoretical Inquiries in Law 8(2): 452 88. What's the Matter with Liberal ism? Berkeley: University of California Press. Beiner, Ronald. 1995. Theorizing Citizenship. Albany: State University of New York Press. Annual Review of Politic al Science : 455 76. Citizenship. Edited by G. Andrews 151 163. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Blumer, M. and A.M. Rees. 1996. Citizenship Today: The Contemporary Relevance of T. H. Marshall. Lond on: UCL Press. Boussard, Caroline. 2002. and Empirical Development and Democracy: What have we learned and how? Edited by Ole Elgstrom and Goran Hyden. London: Routledge. Brubaker, R. 1992. Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States International Migration Review 26(2): 269 291.
174 Brubaker R. 1989. Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship Europe and North America. Lanham:University Press of America. Brubaker, R. 1996. National ism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bunce, Valerie. 2006. Global patterns and postcommunist dynamics. Orbis 50, (4) : 601 20. elite transformation and democratic Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe Edited by J Higley, R Gunther. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press. Belonging: The Meaning and Future of Canadian Citizenship Edited by Wi lliam Kaplan. Montreal: McGill Queen's Press. Czech citizenship. Prague: Linde. Journal of D e mocracy 7( 1 ): 133 147. Evaluation of World Politics 47(1): 135 170. Trade Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards 195 227 Edited b y Henry E. Brady and David Collier. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Csergo Zsuzsa. Wolchik and Curry. 2008. Central and East European Politics: from Communism to Democ racy Rowman & Littlefield. De Groot, Gerard Rene. ECJL 8(3). Dahl, R.A. 1989. Democracy and its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press. Dahl, R.A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and opposition New Haven: Yale University Press. Di Palma, G. 1990. To craft democracies: An essay on democratic transitions. Berkeley: University of California Press.
175 Dumbrava, Costica. 2007. Citizenship Policies in Eastern Europe: Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship in Sixt een Postcommunist Countries. Masters Thesis Submitted to Central European University Nationalism Studies Program. Budapest, Hungary. I ndiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 5(1): 317 340. The politics of Europeanization 3 26 Edited by Featherstone K. and Radaelli C. M. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fehervary Citizenship, Statelessness and Human Rights: Recent Developments International Journal of Refugee Law 5(3). Prvn ro zhledy 5: 1 3. Fuzzy Citizenship: The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection. No. 4: 177 238. Fullerton, M., E. Sik and J. Tth. 1997. From Improvisati on toward Awareness? Contemporary Migration Politics in Hungary. Yearbook of the Research Group on International Migration Budapest: Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The Hungarian Legislati on on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries. The Hungarian Status Law: Nation Building and/or Minority Protection Edited by Kntor, Majtnyi, Ieda, Vizi, and Halsz 396 410. Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University. Galston, William. 1991. Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Duties in the Liberal State Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gans Morse, Jordan. 2004. Searching for Transitologists: Contemporary Theories of Post Communist Transitions and the Myth Post Soviet Affairs 20 (4): 320 349. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 115 44. George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences Cambridge: MIT Press.
176 From the 1990 Law on Citizenship of the USSR to the Citizenship Laws of the Successor Republics (Part II) Review for Central and Eastern European Law 1:1 5 5. Glendon, Mary Ann. 1991. Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse New York: Free Press. Grny, Agata. 2010. Country Report: Poland Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Heater, Derek. 1990. Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World His tory, Politics, and Education. London: Longman. New York Law School Journal of International and Compar ative Law 6(2):391 447. Huntington, S.P. 1991. The third wave: Democratization in the late twentieth century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Institutul Central de Statistic. 1940. The Statistical Yearbook of Romania, 1939 and 1940. Bucharest: Im primeria National. Minorities in East Central Europe: A Comparison between Hungary, Romania, and the Republic of The Hungarian Status Law Syndrome: A Nation Building and/or Mino rity Protection 239 269. Edited by Z. Kntor, B. Majtnyi, O. Ieda, B. Vizi and I. Halsz. Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, Hokkaido University. Iordachi, Constantin. 2010. Country Report: Hungary Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Jrve Priit and Poleshchuk Vadim. 2010. Country Report: Estonia Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Information Source Country Report. Online http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=181 Accessed Nov. 2010. Boston University International Law Journal 1 6: 231 271. Comparative Politics 23: 1 21. Keane, J. 1988 Civil society and the State London: Verso.
177 Klusmeyer, Douglas B. 1996. Between Consent and Descent: Conceptions of Democratic Citizenship Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Kochenov, D. 2006. Internal External Paradox and Mutually Exclusive Pre accession Standards Paper changing Ideas on Europe 2006: Visions of Europe: Key Problems, Conference, Limerick, Ireland (31 August 2 September 2006). s: spaces of citizenship in Political Geography 14(2): 121 137. Czech Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 16(3): 63 84. Kovcs, Maria and Tth, Judit. 2010. Country Report: Hungary Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Czechs Abroad 4: 77 87. Kristeva, Julia. 1 993. Nations without Nationalism New York: Columbia University Press. Country Report: Latvia Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Report of the Estonian society i ntegration monitoring 2008. Tallinn: MEIS. Kukathas, Chandran. 1993. Multicultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity. Edited by Chandran Kukathas. St. Leonard's: Centre for Independent Studies. Country Report: Lith uania Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Kus Dagmar. 2010. Country Report: Slovakia Florence: EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Ethics 104(2): 352 381.
178 Layton Henry, Z. The Frontiers of Ctizenship. Edited by U.Vogel and M. Moran. London: Macmillan. the New EU Citizenship Policies in the New Europe. Edited by Rainer Baub ck, Bernhard Perchinig, and Wiebke Sievers. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Lieven, A. 1993. The Baltic Revolution. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. The Washington Quarterly 13: 143 164. Linz, J.J. and A. Stepan. 1996. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post Communist Europe Baltimore, MD: Johns Hop kins Univ. Press. American Sociological Review 59: 1 22. Lipset, S.M. and R. Bendix. 1959. Social Mobility in Industrial Societies. Berkley: University of California Press. Liubinie Political Representation and Participation in Transitional Democracies: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania Stockholm, Sweeden: Sodertorn Academic Studies. Livezean u, Irina. 1995. Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, nation building, and ethnic struggle 1918 1930. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. ethnic boundaries and the issue of citizenship in Polish soc Ethnicity, nation and culture: Central and East European perspectives 149 164. Edited by B. Balla & A. Sterbling. Hamburg: Kramer. Macedo, Stephen. 1990. Liberal Virtues: Citizenship, Virtue, and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press. M Sociological Methods and Research 28: 387 424. Union Republics: Conforming the World Culture or Following National Center for the Study of Democracy. University of California, Irvine. Marshall, T. H. 1965. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. New York: Anchor.
179 M FA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 2009. Citizenship (as of 8 June 2009 ). www.vm.ee (10.06.2009). Misiunas, R. and Taagepera, R. 1993. The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940 1990 Berkley: University of California Press. Moore, Barrington, Jr. 19 66. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Mouffe, Chantal. 1995. "Citizenship." In The Encyclopedia of Democracy 217 221 Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset. Volume 1. Wa shington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. Question of Causal The American Political Science Review 88(3): 635 652. des of transition and democratization: South America Comparative Politics 29: 343 362. Latvian Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions 119 130. National Institute of Statistics. 2006; 2007. Romanian Statistical Yearbook Bucharest: National Institute of Statistics. Report of the Es tonian society integration monitoring 2008 Tallinn: MEIS. The History of the Baltic States Westport CT: Greenwood Press. Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about u ncertain democracies. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Journal of Democracy 7: 34 51. Oldfield, Adrian. 1990a. Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World London: Ro utledge. Political Quarterly 61: 177 87.
180 Dependency and Cooptation in Post Nations and Nationalities 4(8). Minorities and Law in the Czech Republic 31 Scheu. Prague: Auditorium. Queen's Quarterly 99: 33 55. Poleshchuk, V. 2001. Advise not welcomed. Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner to Estonia and Latvia and the Response Kieler Schriften zur Friedenswissenschaft, Bd. 9, Mnster: Lit Verlag. World Politics 49(2): 155 183. Roche, M. 1992. Rethinking Citizenship: Welfare, Ideology and Change in Modern Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Rose, Rich ard and William Maley. 1994. "Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study." Glasgow, Centre for the Study of Public Policy. European Integration online Papers vol. 10. Rueschemeyer, D., E. Huber and J. Stephens. 1992. Capitalist development and democracy New York: Cambridge University Press. Rustow, Dankwart A. 1970. Comparative Politics 2 (3): 337 363. Sa ndbrook, R. 2000. Closing the circle. Democratization and development in Africa London: Zed. Journal of Democracy 5: 57 74. xpulsion o f German Populations National Identities 8(4): 367 382. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1954. History of Economic Analysis. London: Allen and Unwin.
181 ation. Political and Legal COPRI Working Paper 8. 2001 Vilnius: Teisins informacijos centras. Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community. Edited by Chantal Mouffe, 211 24. London: Routledge. The Baltic States: The Nat ional Self Determination of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Palgrave Macmillan. Smith, Rogers M. 1997. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in US History. New Haven: Yale University Press. Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective 441 458. Edited by K.T. Leicht and J.C. Jenkins. Handbooks of Sociology and Social Research: Springer Media. Contemporary Politics 3(2): 171 188. Statistical Office of Estonia (SOE) 2001. 2000 Population and Housing Census, 2 Tallinn: Statistical Office of Estonia. aw: A new European form of Transnational gy, University College London: Gower St, London. Stola, D. 2000. Anti Zionist campaign in Poland in 1967 1968 Warsaw: ISP PAN. Taylor, Charles. 1992. Multicult uralism and the Politics of Recognition Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Annual Review of Political Science 2: 369 404. New Left Review 103: 3 41. Tichenor, Daniel J. 2002. Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
182 Tismaneanu, Vladimir. 2010. "Citizenship Restored." Journal of Democracy 21/1: 128 135. Responding to Human Rights Violations Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Refugees and Migrants: Hungary at a Crossroads. Yearbook of the Research Group on International Migration 57 68. Edited by M. Fullerton, E. Sik & J. Tth. Budapest: Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. minorities to the Kin s tate in the Extended Schengen European Journal of Migration and Law 5: 201 227. Regio 8: 21 39. Turner, B.S. and P. Hamilton. 1994. Citizenship: Critical Concepts Vol. 2. Lo ndon, Routledge. Vaculk, J. 2002. Czechs abroad: emigration and return Brno: Masarykova univerzita. Vadkerty, K. 2002. and Reslovakisation. Bratislava: Kalligram. Vanhanen, T. 1997. Pro spects of democracy. A study of 172 countries. London: Routledge. Vanhanen, T. 1990. The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147 states, 1980 1988. New York: Crane Russak. Perspectives on Canadian Federalism Edited by R. D. Olling and M. Westmacott. Scarborough: Prentice Hall. Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship and Community. Edited by Chantal Mouffe, 211 24. London: Routledge. Political Innovation and Conceptual Change Edited by T. Ball and J. Farr. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolchik, Sharon and J. L. Curry. 2008. Central and East Europ ean Politics: from Communism to Democracy Rowman & Littlefield. Ethics 99: 250 74.
183 In The Baltic States at Historical Crossroads 224 248. Edited by T. Jundzis. Riga: Academy of Sciences of Latvia. Ziemele, I. 2005. State Continuity and Nationality: The Baltic States and Russia. Past, Present and Future as Defined by International Law Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. Zolberg, A. R. 2006. A nation by design: Immigration policy in the fashioning of America New York: Russell Sage Foundation.