African Renaissance? The Emerging Security Structure of the African Union

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Title: African Renaissance? The Emerging Security Structure of the African Union
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Kwadjo, Lensa
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2010
Publication Date: 2010


Subjects / Keywords: Africa
African Union
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theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
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Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: The African Union, through its embrace of the �Responsibility to Protect� doctrine, has embarked on an ambitious peace and security agenda that allows it to intervene in crises that involve genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. However, the institution�s lack of adequate financial and logistical capacity has made external donors necessary partners in the new emerging security structure of the African Union. By comparing how the African Union and its external donors have decided on, and implemented peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia, this thesis seeks to gauge the progress the institution has made towards building a security structure capable of addressing the intertwined collective security and development challenges facing the continent. This study shows that the convergence of interests among member states of the African Union and between the African Union and its external donors are crucial factors in determining the success of the organization�s efforts at conflict resolution. However, this analysis also shows that the lack of corresponding conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction policies affect the African Union�s ability to tackle the conflict and underdevelopment troubles the continent faces.
Statement of Responsibility: by Lensa Kwadjo
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2010
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

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Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
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Classification: local - S.T. 2010 K98
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Permanent Link:

Material Information

Title: African Renaissance? The Emerging Security Structure of the African Union
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Kwadjo, Lensa
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2010
Publication Date: 2010


Subjects / Keywords: Africa
African Union
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: The African Union, through its embrace of the �Responsibility to Protect� doctrine, has embarked on an ambitious peace and security agenda that allows it to intervene in crises that involve genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. However, the institution�s lack of adequate financial and logistical capacity has made external donors necessary partners in the new emerging security structure of the African Union. By comparing how the African Union and its external donors have decided on, and implemented peacekeeping missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia, this thesis seeks to gauge the progress the institution has made towards building a security structure capable of addressing the intertwined collective security and development challenges facing the continent. This study shows that the convergence of interests among member states of the African Union and between the African Union and its external donors are crucial factors in determining the success of the organization�s efforts at conflict resolution. However, this analysis also shows that the lack of corresponding conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction policies affect the African Union�s ability to tackle the conflict and underdevelopment troubles the continent faces.
Statement of Responsibility: by Lensa Kwadjo
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2010
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2010 K98
System ID: NCFE004283:00001

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AFRICAN RENAISSANCE? THE EMERGING SECURITY STRUCTURE OF THEAFRICAN UNION BY LENSA KWADJO A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida In partial fulfillment of the requirement for a deg ree in Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida May, 2009


Acknowledgements I would like to acknowledge the support of my famil y, especially my dad, John Kwadjo, for his intellectual support; my mum, Sara Kwadjo, for her emotional and dietary support; my brother, Neto, for indulging me when I needed someone to take my anger out on. I would also like to thank my New College family of friends who made these past four years worth it. I would like to give a “shout out” to Serena Jones, for being a great roommate and a greater friend, who tolerated my lou dness and my mood-swings, and above all who shared my disdain for certain aspects of school life. To Ambar Velazquez, for entertaining me for four years, I couldn’t have gone through this year without her. To Emily Goldenberg, for just being herself and always making me laugh at myself. I would also like to acknowledge April Barnwell for her spi ritual guidance and her rock-solid friendship. Finally, thanks to Anita and Monica Tam bay for being the coolest cats on campus and being wonderful friends. I would like to give a very important acknowledgeme nt to Dr. Barbara Hicks, without whom I would not have survived New College. I owe a debt to her tireless belief in my ability and her willingness to fight for me w hen I couldn’t fight for myself. She is truly a blessing.




LIST OF TABLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS Figure 3.1: Structure of the Peace and Security Cou ncil of the AU………………….70


ABBREVIATIONS AAP Africa Action Plan AAPOC All-African Peoples Organization Conference ACOTA African Contingency Operations Training and Assista nce ACPP Africa Conflict Prevention Pool AMIB African Union Mission in Burundi AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia APF African Peace Facility ARS Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia ASF African Standby Force AU African Union CADSP Common Africa Defense and Security Policy CAR Central African Republic CEWS Continental Early Warning System CNDD-FDD National Council for the Defense of Democracy-Force s for the Defense of Democracy CNL National Liberation Council CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement CSSDCA Conference on Peace, Security, Stability, Developme nt, and Cooperation DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration DDRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Rec onstruction DFID Department for International Development DPA Darfur Peace Agreement DRC Democratic Republic of Congo


ECA Economic Commission for Africa ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EDF European Development Fund ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union FAL Final Act of Lagos FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office FDI Foreign Direct Investment G8 Group of 8 GNA Government of National Unity GPOI Global Peace Operations Initiative ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty IDP Internally Displaced Person IGAD Inter-Governmental Development Authority ISI Important Substitution Industrialization LPA Lagos Plan of Action MOD Ministry of Defense NDA National Democratic Alliance NEPAD New Economic Partnership for African Development NIF National Islamic Front OAU Organization of African Unity ONUB UN-AU Operation in Burundi PAFMECSA Pan African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa Palipehutu-FNL National Liberation Forces PDF People’s Defense Force POW Panel of the Wise


PSA Peace and Security Agenda PSC Peace and Security Council RECAMP Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities RECs Regional Economic Communities SADC Southern African Development Community SDF Sudanese Defense Forces SLA Sudan Liberation Army SNM Somali National Movement SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army SRRC Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council SSR Security Sector Reform TFG Transitional Federal Government TFI Transitional Federal Institutions TFP Transitional Federal Parliament TNA Transitional National Assembly TNG Transitional National Government UAS Union of African States UNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Da rfur UNDP United Nations Development Program UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan UNOSOM United Nations Operation in Somalia


African Renaissance? The Emerging Security Structur e of the African Union Lensa Kwadjo New College of Florida, 2009 ABSTRACT The African Union, through its embrace of the ‘Resp onsibility to Protect’ doctrine, has embarked on an ambitious peace and se curity agenda that allows it to intervene in crises that involve genocide, crimes a gainst humanity, or war crimes. However, the institution’s lack of adequate financi al and logistical capacity has made external donors necessary partners in the new emerg ing security structure of the African Union. By comparing how the African Union and its e xternal donors have decided on, and implemented peacekeeping missions in Burundi, S udan, and Somalia, this thesis seeks to gauge the progress the institution has mad e towards building a security structure capable of addressing the intertwined collective se curity and development challenges facing the continent. This study shows that the con vergence of interests among member states of the African Union and between the African Union and its external donors are crucial factors in determining the success of the o rganization’s efforts at conflict resolution. However, this analysis also shows that the lack of corresponding conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction policie s affect the African Union’s ability to tackle the conflict and underdevelopment troubles t he continent faces. Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Sciences


1 Introduction African Renaissance? The Emerging Security Structure of the African Unio n Conflict in Africa has taken various forms. Pre-col onial Africa was submerged in territorial conflicts for access to la nd and resources. Colonial Africa was struck by inter-ethnic and class rivalries, whi ch laid the groundwork for the major intra-state and inter-state conflicts of the post-colonial period. The underlying source of conflict has been the competition for sca rce resources among economic, political, and social classes. The inherent weaknes s and incompetence of most modern African states, coupled with an unequal glob al political and economic paradigm, have contributed substantially to rising underdevelopment and conflict on the continent. The quest for a unified, secure and developed Afri ca has continued for much of the twentieth century. The promising expectation s for development through continental unification, which began as a necessary instrument for the liberation of Africa from colonialism, fizzled out with the disap pointments of the early pioneers of Africa’s independence movements in the 1960s and 19 70s. Nationalism and statecentric development agendas gave way to open market neo-liberal programs in the 1980s. Finally, the difficulties of economic and po litical restructuring during the postCold War period, coupled with the rise and intensif ication of corruption and interethnic conflict, soon halted the limited economic, political, and social gains of the immediate post-independence period.


2 Early African leaders saw increased political and e conomic integration as the only path towards sustained peace and prosperity. T he creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was a watershed moment in the continent’s history, because it institutionalized the principles of Afri can integration for common economic and security interests. However, the natio nalist fervor of the time and the insistence on the protection of state sovereignty, coupled with the OAU’s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states, prevented the implementation of concrete integrationist policies, particularly common security mechanisms. The weakness of this institution and th e changing global environment led to the OAU’s demise and eventual replacement wi th a new and more agile mechanism for continental integration—the African U nion (AU). Two decades ago, during a seminal moment in South A frica’s constitutional development, the Deputy President of the African Na tional Congress, Thabo Mbeki, coined the phrase ‘African Renaissance’ to describe a new era in African internal reforms and development, and Africa’s external geos trategic importance. This new era would encompass significant reforms in national governments and institutions including democratic governance, economic growth an d development, and an ‘African solutions to African problems’ approach to security and conflict-related crisis on the continent. Today, the African Union i s looked to as the institutional embodiment of these goals. In place of the ideological polarization that cat egorized the agendas of African countries during most of the twentieth cent ury, African countries in the new millennium have attempted to build institutions—wit hin the framework of the AU—


3 to assure unity and meet common development and sec urity goals. The AU’s adoption of the concept of ‘Responsibility to Prote ct’ and the policy of nonindifference embedded in its Constitution mark a sh arp break with its predecessor. These changes have allowed the AU to engage in mili tary and diplomatic interventions where acts of genocide, crimes agains t humanity, and war crimes occur. The gap between the AU’s ambition of African solut ions to African problems and its financial, logistical, and political capaci ty has been a major problem for the institution. The changing global environment, where complex security threats are globalized, has increased Africa’s geostrategic imp ortance to the rest of the world, particularly countries that are external donors to the African Union. This interest by the international community has created a confluenc e of interest between external donors, who provide necessary technical support, an d internal actors, who contain the threats to the international community. This conflu ence of interests is currently shaping the trajectory of the emerging security str ucture of the AU. Thus, the emerging security structure of the AU seeks to crea te a partnership between member states and external donors. However, a closer look at the evolving security str ucture of the AU will show that rather than a confluence of interests between AU member states and external donors, there is an increasing divergence of intere sts among actors. This thesis argues that the lack of coordination among member states o f the AU and its external donors due to diverging interests threatens to impede the ability of the AU to address immediate security crises effectively and, in doing so, has the potential to prevent the organization from achieving its common security and development goals.


4 Purpose and Methodology of Case Studies This study examines how the interests of AU member states and external donors affect AU peacekeeping mandates and their im plementation. It also addresses the implications that these peacekeeping experience s may have for the emergence of an African peace and security structure that is cap able of achieving the intertwined security and development goals of the AU. In order to analyze the ability of AU member states and external donors to coordinate effectively to achieve peacekeeping goal s, I will compare the AU’s experience in peacekeeping in three countries—Burun di, Sudan, and Somalia. These countries by no means constitute the full range of cases where the AU has intervened to stem conflict and promote development. The AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) has garnered praise for its efforts in negoti ating, through non-military pressure, for general elections in Togo following the instabi lity in the country on the heels of the death of its dictator; for its successful press ure to allow elections in Mauritania following a coup in 2006; and for its successful pe acekeeping mission in the Comoros in 2007, which contained a secessionist movement th at was threatening security in the country. However, the African Union Mission in Buru ndi (AMIB), the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the African Union Miss ion in Somalia (AMISOM) are more representative of AU initiatives to address th e types of complicated intra-state and regional conflicts African states tend to incur These conflicts involve regional security complexes that threaten cross-border expan sion of conflict and thus warrant African Union attention. They are also cases that t est some of the new responsibilities of the AU. The Constitutive Act of the African Unio n authorizes the organization to


5 intervene in crises that involve genocide, crimes a gainst humanity, and war crimes. The cases of Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia allow us t o examine the willingness and capacity of the AU to tackle these challenges, as w ell as the means by which its institutions attempt to mobilize the political, fin ancial, and military resources necessary to do so. In order to assess the forces that promote or inhi bit the effectiveness of the AU’s peacekeeping operations, I introduce each conf lict and its context, trace the process by which the AU decided to intervene, exami ne the formulation of the peacekeeping mandate, and review how the AU garnere d the resources necessary to put the mission on the ground. Then I investigate w hether or not the peacekeeping mission was able to fulfill its mandate. Because ex ternal support is critical to the AU’s security endeavors, these case studies focus o n the levels of coordination both among AU member states and between the AU and exter nal donors. Such an approach allows me to determine the role these stak eholders have played in the success or failure of the three peacekeeping missio ns. The conduct and outcomes of the peacekeeping proces ses are important for shaping the direction, procedures, and legitimacy o f the emerging security structure of the AU. These cases thus allow us to reflect on the progress the AU has been able to make toward building the institutions that will help it achieve its goals of addressing the nexus of conflict and underdevelopme nt. While it is too early to determine the eventual success of this endeavor to build comprehensive security, we can look at what post-conflict reconstruction and c onflict prevention measures, if any, have been undertaken in these three countries. To t his end, I will also consider the


6 nascent initiatives of the New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) to promote capacity-building in African pos t-conflict reconstruction and peace-building responses to conflict. Although it is difficult to determine objectively t he political interests of institutions and make conclusive judgments about th eir effect on policy, I will base my findings on reports from think tanks, reports an d documents of stakeholders themselves, reports from the AU, and academic studi es. Organization of Study Chapter one first addresses the theoretical underpi nnings of regional security and its role within the wider framework of internat ional security. It then examines the nexus between development and security within the H uman Security framework, and looks at how this framework has influenced regional security strategies for dealing with the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts. Chapter two reviews the historical development of A frican efforts to integrate and create an organization that would promote Afric an interests and unity. After discussing the development of Pan-Africanism in the late 19th century and its contribution to creating the Organization of Africa n Unity in 1963, I focus on the successes and failures of the OAU. In chronicling t he global and regional paradigm shifts that facilitated the dissolution of the OAU and the creation of the African Union in 2002, this chapter asks how the security goals o f the AU differ from its predecessor and looks at how mandates of the AU—particularly th e ‘right to intervene’—have significantly altered the security capacity of the regional organization. To answer this


7 last question I address the security implications o f the idea of an ‘African Renaissance’ and its mantra of ‘African Solutions t o African Problems’, which were conceptualized amid the democratic reforms on the c ontinent in the late 20th century. Chapter three examines the purpose and structure of the African Union. I look first at the institutionalization of the ‘right to intervene’ policy, which evolved from the Responsibility to Protect principle developed a t the broader international level. Next, the chapter reviews the security structure of the African Union, considering the structure of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC ) and its various mechanisms; the Common Defense and Security Policy (CDSP) of th e AU; the role of the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPA D)—the development mechanism of the AU—and how it coordinates policies with the PSC; and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and their role in security. Finally, the chapter turns to the role of external donors in fil ling the gap between the AU’s ambitious security agenda and its poor capacity to handle the complex crises on continent and to the question of how these external donors and their interests may be shaping the emerging security structure of the AU. Chapter four assesses the application of the AU’s p eace and security strategy through comparing and contrasting three of its peac ekeeping missions. The African Union’s missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia wil l be used to examine whether or not the various interests of AU member states in th e region of the conflict and of international donors to the AU security structure c onverge or diverge, and whether those interests affect the outcome of peacekeeping mandates. This chapter concludes with the argument that in the case of Burundi’s AUmandated peacekeeping mission,


8 a convergence of interests among both regional and international interests helped the AU to achieve its mandates, while the missions in S udan and Somalia have failed to fulfill AU peacekeeping mandates due to capacity co nstraints and the divergence of interests among regional actors and international d onors. Chapter five summarizes the challenges facing the e merging security structure of the AU and the organization’s ability to meet th e needs highlighted by the Human Security paradigm. Meeting these needs will require strengthening the AU’s capacity to prevent and resolve conflict and to develop effe ctive post-conflict reconstruction strategies through NEPAD.


9 Chapter I Regional Security within the Context of Development The definition of security has changed over time. S ince the creation of the Westphalian state system, the dominant view in inte rnational politics and conflict analysis has been in terms of the security of the s tate from rival states. However, in the post WWII era and following the fall of the Sov iet Union, a rapid rise in intrastate conflicts has dwarfed the instances of classi c inter-state conflict. Intra-state conflicts, in turn, are creating spillover effects, that contribute to regional conflicts. Globalization and the rise of complex emergencies t hat affect global stability are contributing to collective security crises, in whic h institutions like the UN have been looked upon for solutions. The trend in global secu rity management has been moving towards regional structures for addressing regional conflicts as a way reducing the dependence on the UN, which has had to deal with bo th political and resource constraints in responding to crises. The first part of this chapter focuses on the role that regional security institutions play in managin g and resolving conflict. The next part of the chapter deals with the developing nexus between security and development, and its role in preventing conflict. T he third part of this chapter addresses the unique ways in which the development of the African state has shaped African conflicts.


10 Conflict in the African Context The classical definition of the state emphasizes it s “territoriality, its monopoly of the means of physical violence, and its legitima cy.”1 Without these necessary safeguards, which are institutionalized in legal fr ameworks and forms of government, there would be anarchy. However, Africa does not co nform to this classical Westphalian nation-state system. The Weberian conce pt of efficient, hierarchical, and personally detached bureaucracy does not define the African state: The formal division between a person and his office between politics and economics, seldom exists. And if it does exist, it might not be respected. In all practical respects these spheres are woven together into different forms of relationships between equal s or between patrons and clients. This creates a form of social order and organization, for sure, but a kind of order that fo llows a very different logic from the classical models of the state.2 An essential factor in the analysis of the African state is its historical development, which is based on the artificially constructed boun daries established by Europe during the Scramble for Africa. The colonial administrativ e state influenced the modern governance structure of African governments, settin g a base that contributed to the weak capacity and legitimacy of African states. Thi s lack of capacity exacerbated the incompetence of many post-independence leaders, lea ving the state unable to function efficiently and respond to the current challenges f acing the people of Africa. Many current African conflicts are rooted in the es tablishment of borders by European powers in the 19th century. Arbitrary borders had an adverse effect o n the make-up of colonially administered satellite states The preferential treatment that 1 Karin Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008): 24 2 Ibid, 24


11 colonial administrators used to pit ethnic and trib al groups against each other transferred over to the post-independence era. The inheritance of both the territorial borders and the power distribution policies of colo nialism significantly affected the underlying instability, mutual distrust, and inequa lity that have underscored conflict on the continent. Conflict in Africa is essentially fought within sta tes but has the potential to spill over, causing region-wide instability: “since the end of the Cold War conflicts have taken on sub-regional dimensions creating conf lict systems among a grouping of states.”3 The classic example is the 1996 war in the Democra tic Republic of Congo (DRC) which started as a civil war, but due to poli tical and economic interests and ethnic cleavages, involved regional actors such as Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Angola, Chad, and Namibia. The conflict in the DRC spilled over to neighboring Rwanda and Uganda, while the conflict in those coun tries also spilled back into the DRC, thereby causing a regional complex. Regional a ctors like Namibia, Angola, Zimbabwe and Chad had economic and political intere sts in supporting various actors in the civil war, but also had interests in curbing the spiraling conflict. Regional Security and Conflict Management Regionalization, whether economic or security-orien ted, begins through the process of integration. Following World War II, the ories of economic and security integration began to flourish. Anarchy in the globa l system was viewed as the source of global instability and balance of power politics Europe, in particular, sought 3 Tim Murithi, “ Institutionalizing Pan-Africanism: Transforming African Union Values and Principles in to Policy and Practice,” ISS Occasional Paper 143 (June 2007): 41


12 solutions to problems of repeated conflict on the c ontinent, and this search led to integration. The process of integration is incremen tal. Regional integration and security is: an enhanced network of transactions between policym akers; the creation of strong economic ties; spillover from de nse economic cooperation to security cooperation; or a shift tow ard a more collective sense of interests. It is the experience of economi c regional integration that leads to these and other processes, not simply the signing of an agreement.4 The current view is that the integration of product ive capabilities from different countries “has the potential to influence security relations in the developing world by acting as a force that propels the consolidation of integration.”5 Brooks uses the example of Mercosur, whose policy of competition fo r FDI by member countries not only helped countries develop, but also made Argent ina and Brazil—highly competitive security industries that rivaled each o ther during the 1970s—“move beyond their long history of security rivalry and e stablish a stable and peaceful relationship.”6 The most notable fruit of decades of theorizing and policy development has been the creation of the European Union. The compet ing tenets of integration theory are neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Int egration, in this context, refers to the process whereby problems within states that dev elop into external dilemmas force the consolidation of power into a supranational ent ity that has the ability to resolve the mutual predicaments of regional states. Neo-fun ctionalists argue that the spillover effects of creating functional institutions provide the political interests within states 4 Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Cooperations, Glo balization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005): 12 9 5 Ibid, 159 6 Ibid 158


13 enough impetus to advance the pooling of state reso urces and the dissolution of a sizeable level of state sovereignty. Instrumental i n this approach are transnational actors such as multinational corporations, labor un ions, and other interest groups, that cross national boundaries in order to maximize thei r potential. These social interests that shape demand for increased transnationalism in fluence political behavior and the creation of supranational entities to shape and coo rdinate interactions across borders. Neo-functionalists base their theory of integration on the following assumptions: certain types of societies are predisposed to tenet s of democracy including adherence to free market principles, since “in these societie s, class conflicts were to be muted, ethnic rivalries less intense, and warfare an obsol escent institution.”7 While neofunctionalists argue that supranational institution s are major actors in international relations, intergovernmentalists build on the reali sts’ emphasis on the state’s continuing role as a major actor in formulating reg ional and international policy. The intergovernmentalist view is that regional institut ions or supranational institutions are mechanisms through which states push for their own national interests. Following the Cold War, regional clusters of states were “expected to push the development of regionalism, providing order and sta bility in the regions.”8 Integration leads to regionalization. Two of the most important theories in the discourse of regionalism are captured by the debate between inte rdependence, or multilateralist theorists, and regionalist theorists. Regionalism “ can be defined as a political ideology about how the world should be organized, n amely as a loose structure of 7 Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse-Kappen, Thomas Riss e, Beth Simmons, Handbook of International Relations (SAGE, 2002): 485. 8 Raimo Vayrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New” International Studies Review 5, no. 1 (Mar. 2003): 28.


14 world regions.”9 Economic integration serves as the first step in c reating regions; the evolving nature of political integration could be h alted if economic integration falters. Conflict has the effect of interfering with and con straining the integration process: “politically divided regions will enjoy fewer econo mic relations among themselves. A changed security situation thus has important impli cations for the process of integration.”10 Therefore, economic integration is inherently tied to political integration: “the invisible hand of economic intere sts has so far been less influential than the more visible hand of power concerns.”11 There is a difference between regions that are integrated due to physical proximi ty, and those that are more functional, or are based on economic or cultural in terests: Physical regions refer to territorial, military, an d economic spaces controlled primarily by states, but functional regi ons are defined by non-territorial factors such as culture and the mar ket that are often the purview of non-state actors. For instance, an ethni c group may want to create a cultural region and use it agentively [ sic ] to promote an independent political community. In the global syst em, economic regions are constructed by transnational capitalist processes, environmental regions by the interplay between huma n actions and the biosphere, and cultural regions by identity communi ties.12 International relations theory sees physical integr ation as being a mitigating factor in controlling anarchy in the global system. Functiona l regionalism, on the contrary, does not work on the assumption of global anarchy. Rather, the economy, the environment, and culture drive integration. Vayryne n argues that the inutility of global institutions like the UN to the needs of dev eloping countries has necessitated 9 Bjorn Hettne, “European Integration and World Deve lopment,” European Journal of Development Research 2, no. 2 (1990): 186. 10 Ibid, 187 11Ibid, 187 12Vayrynen, “Regionalism: Old and New,” 27


15 the proliferation of regional institutions to take center stage in international relations.13 Globalization has also intensified and complicated interactions between actors at the national and regional level. “The formation of regi ons takes place at the interface between global economic and technological forces an d national realities.”14 Regional integration becomes a collective defense mechanism to pool together scarce resources for mutual development of countries in the increasi ngly complicated world of international finance. Therefore, economic integrat ion is at the heart of regional integration. According to Buzan and Waever, there are three theo retical frameworks for understanding international security in the post-Co ld War era—the Neorealist, Globalist, and Regionalist approach.15 Neorealists focus on the role of the state and the distribution of economic, political and securit y power within the international system in a post-bipolar world. The globalist appro ach shifts attention away from states as the primary international actors, and foc uses on globalization and transnational interactions across borders among non -state and state actors as a way of understanding international security in a multi-pol ar world. According to Lake and Morgan, a region “refers to a set of countries link ed by geography and one or more common traits, such as development, culture, or pol itical institutions.”16 The aforementioned definition reflects an understandin g of resources of regions as physical, not purely functional. The Regionalist ap proach to understanding 13 Ibid, 32 14 Ibid, 32 15 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security (Cambridge University Press, 2003): 16-14 16 David Lake and Patrick Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (Penn State Press, 1997): 11


16 international security involves the security ramifi cations of the political interdependence of states in a particular region. The focus of this thesis will be the role of regio nal security in the management of intra-state and interstate conflicts. During the Cold War, local conflicts among political actors were seen within the wider superpo wer contest, as local actors appealed for assistance from those powers. The need by superpowers to influence local actors for their own strategic interests “exp anded conflicts, as well, driving the superpowers (and their key allies) to provide ever greater resources to opposing clients.”17 Although superpowers expanded some conflicts, they simultaneously mitigated other conflicts. Superpowers were “concer ned that open dispute would create opportunities for the other to intervene in its politically sensitive backyard.”18 Thus, with respect to the spillover effects of regi onal conflicts, the Cold War both contained and exacerbated tensions within and betwe en states. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a sig nificant rise in intra-state conflicts in the form of violent civil conflict, wh ich has the potential of destabilizing regions due to spillover effects across borders. Ho wever, these conflicts do not take on the global significance that they did in the bip olar world. “[W]ith the end of the Cold War, regional conflicts are more likely to sta y regional, responding to their individual circumstances and developments.”19 These unique regional challenges, have spurred the interest in the development of reg ional institutions and arrangements to address regional security challenges. 17 Ibid, 4 18 Ibid, 4 19 Ibid, 6


17 While the UN remains the premier international orga nization that addresses collective security challenges, Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows regional organizations to address regional situations before referring the crisis to the UN for consideration.20 With respect to intervention in disputes that have regional costs, Article 53 of the Charter, allows the UN to use reg ional institutions.21 However, these same regional institutions must acquire UN Security Council authorization to undertake interventions. Since the end of the twent ieth century, global-level multilateral institutions like the UN have been see n as inadequate in dealing with the ever-changing threats of the times. So, there has b een renewed effort to increase the rule and effectiveness of regional institutions. Re gions, like Africa, must deal with regional security complexes, where ethnic or social groups can cause destabilization across borders. These regional security complexes a re comprised of: A set of states continually affected by one or more security externalities that emanate from a distinct geograph ic area. In such a complex, the members are so interrelated in terms o f their security that actions by any member, and significant security-rel ated development inside any other, have a major impact on the others .22 Dealing with such interwoven security dilemmas requ ires a high level of capacity for conflict management. Conflict management involves three factors: prevent ion of conflicts, peacekeeping to resolve conflicts, and post-conflic t reconstruction to transition out of conflict. Conflict prevention refers to thwarting s ecurity crises before they begin. Once a conflict begins, a peace process ensues to a chieve a ceasefire. After hostilities are formally halted, a peacekeeping mission can foc us on the stabilization and 20 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 52 21 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Article 53 22 David Lake and Patrick Morgan, Regional Orders 12


18 containment of the conflict. Post-conflict reconstr uction follows the peacekeeping process, as plans are made for transitional electio ns and a pathway is initiated towards economic, political and social development. For Die hl and Lepgold, conflict management at the regional level depends on “the ex tent to which regional security problems create ongoing negative externalities with which regional actors believe they need to deal, and the degree to which formal a nd informal institutions exist that actors believe can be legitimately and effectively used to deal with regional conflict issues.”23 The globalist approach to conflict management, part icularly through the UN, has given way to more regional approaches. The end of the Cold War and the failures of global institutions like the UN to address risin g conflict and instability in countries like Rwanda propelled this gradual shift in emphasi s from global to regional approaches. Regionalists typically approach conflic t management through “a regional alliance, socioeconomic institution, or a multipurp ose organization.”24 Such an approach to conflict management is beneficial becau se regional organizations are able to tailor responses to crises based on the particul ar regional contexts, while the globalist approach to conflict management prefer ad herence to the adoption of universal norms and institutions. 23 Paul F. Diehl and Joseph Lepgold, Regional Conflic t Management (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 20 03): 11 24 Ibid, 12


19 Human Security and the Security-Development Nexus “Humanity will not enjoy security without developme nt, it will not enjoy development without security, and [it] will not enj oy either without respect for human rights.” UN Report 25 The concept of human security was framed following the Cold War and the ideological divide between state-based development and market-based development that politically polarized the discussion of develo pment. The idea was built around the United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) ref raming of development as freedom from fear and want. According to King and Murray, Human security had four essential characteristics: it is universal, its components are interdependent, it is best ensured t hrough prevention, and it is people-centered. The report also proposed that threats to human security could be grouped in seven categories : economic, food, health, environment, personal, community, and polit ical.26 The linkages between development and security are m ultidimensional. However, fundamental to preventing conflict and pro moting development is addressing the root causes of conflict. The challen ge to the interrelationship between development and security is how to fill the vacuum left after conflict in order to avoid a return to violence. The UN currently describes ‘t hreats to security’ in the 21st century as “not just international war and conflict but terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, organized crime and civil violence. Th ey also include poverty, deadly infectious diseases and environmental degradation.”27 The result of this ground25"In Larger Freedom': Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for all." UN Chronicle 42 no.1 (2005): 5. 26 Gary King and Christopher J. L. Murray, “Rethinkin g Human Security,” Political Science Quarterly 116, no. (2001): 5. 27 “In Larger Freedom,” 2.


20 breaking definition is the concept of Human Securit y and its implementation in the Human Development Goals. Development is both a goal and a process. Insecurit y and political instability threaten both the goal and process of development. At the root of instability and the cause of most conflicts in states, particularly dev eloping countries, are the structural inequalities that exacerbate existing ethnic, relig ious or tribal cleavages, as well as intense class divisions that create dire social and economic disparities and fuel criminal syndicates and rebel movements. Nathan arg ues that the political violence that is the root of civil conflict is “a manifestat ion of structural crisis.”28 Included in this structural predicament is the incapacity of th e state to provide necessary goods to its people, including quality education, healthcare and access to the halls of power to redress their grievances. This lack of access to th e state is due to despotic neopatrimonial and clientelist regimes that cater to t heir preferred interest groups. According to Dokken, “ because it [the state] lacks legitimacy among vast segments of its citizenry and does not serve the collective interests, the weak state is compelled to privatize security. Politics is commercialized b y leaders intervening in markets to accumulate wealth directly, and limiting access to potential rivalries.”29 The lack of state legitimacy creates a vicious cycle of nepotis m that rewards political, economic or social allies while punishing those outside this network; the result is a continuous weakening of the state apparatus and a rise in the desperation and instability in the public. 28 Laurie Nathan, “The Four Horsemen of the Apocalyps e: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa,” Peace and Change 25 no. 2 (2000): 4 29 Karin Dokken, African Security Politics Redefined 34.


21 Following the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet b loc, a ‘new world order’ under neo-liberalism developed and dominated securi ty and development policies throughout the world The new world order saw the extension of a variety of intergovernmental organizations, private actors and regi onal bodies, developing a global network that would help to brin g about a general movement towards a world based around neo-liberal e conomic reforms. In effect neo-liberalism and its key polic ies of free trade, deregulation and privatization became the global cr edo for economic orthodoxy.30 The rapid rise in state failures in much of the dev eloping world created a global crisis of rising poverty, inequality and conflict. The res ult has been humanitarian disasters, increased crime, intensified poverty, and the rise of powerful non-state actors that have fuelled an increasingly dangerous informal eco nomy. Increasingly, the response from the West and neo-liberal institutions like the World Bank that deal with development is to focus attention on corruption and measures to increase transparency in government. At the core of the secu rity-development nexus under the neo-liberal paradigm is the containment of social c risis and the reorganization of the relationship among the free movement of capital, th e capacity of states, and its relationship with its citizens.31 The end of the Second World War ushered in a new pr ospect for attaining sustainable peace through the promotion of developm ent. At the international level, this vision of combining efforts at attaining peace and achieving development was institutionalized in the United Nations. Although t here was an acknowledgement of the interrelationship between the two concepts, the y did not necessarily overlap. The 30 Peter Wilkin, “Global Poverty and Orthodox Securit y,” Third World Quarterly 23, no. 4 (2002): 635 31 Ibid, 637


22 Security Council had the task of negotiating peace; if they failed, the UN’s humanitarian agencies were tasked with assisting th ose affected by conflict. Thus, humanitarian and development agencies were focusing on development in postconflict environments by focusing on poverty allevi ation measures with the hopes that reconstruction assistance would prevent a rela pse back into conflict. Security is essential to attaining the space necess ary for cooperation and development. Regional conflicts, particularly in Af rica, are more likely to spring up from intra-state conflicts. Africa as a whole faces serious consequences as a result of full-blown conflict, because of the fragility of st ates’ infrastructure to begin with. One consequence of conflict is the inability to plan rationally, particularly in a sit uation of prolonged conflict. This difficulty arises because of depende ncy on external sources of funding that may be slow in arriving, fu nds that may be offered for a purpose other that what government wo uld like to fund; because of difficulties in obtaining financial reso urces from the local population, whose ability to earn their livelihood has been severely disrupted; and because of war-related destruction o f infrastructure.32 Another consequence of conflict on development is t he impact that deaths and mass movement of populations, as well as refugee settlem ents, have on primary goods sectors, like the agricultural sector. And the thir d consequence is “the reductions in GDP that derive from direct war damage, loss of inc ome from exports, tourism, and aid, as well as higher costs in such sectors as tra nsportation and energy.”33 One form of intra-state conflict that has very dest ructive consequences for development in Africa is civil war. According to Co llier, “The relationship between civil war and failures in development is strong and goes in both directions: civil war 32 Nicole Ball, “The Effect of Conflict on the Econom ies of Third World Countries,” in Conflict Resolution in Africa ed. Francis M. Deng and William Zartman (Brooking s Institution, 1991): 288 33 Ibid, 288


23 powerfully retards development; and equally, failur es in development substantially increase proneness to civil war.”34 The regularity of civil war on the continent leave s the countries in what Collier calls a “conflict tra p” or situation of constant economic decline due to war. Another major problem posed by civil war in Africa is the high likelihood of a return back to civil conflict. An i mportant reason for fear of a relapse to conflict is that the root causes of these confli cts are structural. According to Collier: the typical civil war in a low-income country lasts for nearly a decade. Overwhelmingly, the casualties from civil war are n on-combatants: deaths from disease soar as a result of forced migr ation and the breakdown of health systems. War digs a deep hole i n the economy from which it takes many years to recover. Indeed, many of the costs of civil war occur after it is over.35 The issue of collective security is brought up when more often than not, the internal conflicts spill over into other countries and soon balloon into a regional crisis. “In the typical civil war more than half of the total econo mic cost is borne by neighboring countries rather than by the country itself. Thus, the costs of civil wars are very largely not borne by those responsible for them: th ey are borne by non-combatants within the country, by future inhabitants, and by n eighbors.” 36 The immediate costs of conflict are obvious. The disrup tion of the normal progression of development is a major problem. People who join the fighting forces, who are killed or flee, can no longer work productively; schools, power stations a nd/or roads that are destroyed reduce the productive capacity of the eco nomy. There are also more complex interactions between events assoc iated directly with war (fighting, movement of people, deaths, phy sical destruction, international embargoes, military expenditures) and developments in 34 Collier, 2 35 David Collier, “Development and Conflict,” Center for the African Economies, Oxford University: 2004, 2 36 Ibid, 2


24 the macro, meso and microeconomy, which mostly lead to adverse changes in individual entitlements, both economic a nd social.37 The ability of a country to trade actively with the rest of the world is also interrupted by conflict since the productive capabilities of in dustry are severely hampered. Stewart’s study of 25 countries between 1960 and 19 95 showed that “[e]xports were invariably negatively affected. This decline result ed from the general fall in production, a shift towards domestic markets, and d isruptions in international markets.”38 Underground economies start to spring up and fill the vacuum left by legitimate industries. Consequently a drastic incre ase in crime related to smuggling and drugs exacerbates an already deplorable situati on. Also, rising inflation adversely affects wages or leads to unemployment. Funding for public services such as healthcare and education is also disrupted due to e ither the dilapidation of the state or its concentration of revenue on military expenditur es. On a practical level, some argue that the current p olicies of post-conflict reconstruction and human security may be counterpro ductive. Stewart argues that these strategies might cause a situation where “the linkage between development and security might democratize security policy, but at the same time it might ‘securitize’ development policy.”39 In such situations, assistance for development prog rams may be attached to security programs, and vice versa, t hereby blurring the lines between military operations and development programs. To conclude, conflict management strategies employe d by regional institutions have come to include development polic ies. The interrelationship 37 Frances Stewart,”Development and Security,” CRISE Workinig Paper 3 (2004): 5 38 Ibid, 6 39European Development Cooperation, “Europe and the S outh: A New Era.” Conference Report (2004):16.


25 between conflict and poverty, or security and devel opment, has borne a new approach to conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruc tion known as Human Security. With the breakdown of the bipolar security system a nd the rise of intrastate and regional conflict, regional institutions are taking a greater role in conflict management and human security initiatives. These tasks, in tur n, put greater strains on regional organization, compelling them to fuller and more co mplex institutionalization.


26 Chapter II Pan-Africanism: The Idea of Continental Unification Pan-Africanism shaped the trajectory of African int egration through the 20th and into the 21st century. Throughout Africa’s tumultuous history of European exploitation and colonization, the singular frame of uniting and strengthening the resolve against oppression and subjugation, helped to shape an Afri can identity. “Pan-Africanism was a movement and ideology, therefore concretized and se nsitized Africans to reject, inter alia, foreign domination, exploitation and racial discrim ination.”1 An idea rooted in anticolonialism and nationalism, Pan-Africanism has, ho wever, been evolving over time based on the changing contexts in Africa. This chan ging context was visible in the transition from one epoch of the institutionalizati on of Pan-Africanism in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to another inst itutionalization in its recreation in the African Union (AU). The Rise of the Pan-Africanist Movement Two phases of the Pan-Africanist Movement contribut ed to its eventual utilization in the de-colonization and nationalist movements th at shaped post-colonial African integration. The first phase of the Pan-African mov ement began in the African Diaspora and was driven by African-American and West Indian intellectuals. Starting in the late 1 Joram Mukama Biswaro, Perspectives on Africa's Integration and Cooperatio n from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (A : Old Wine in a New Bottle? (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Tanzania Pub. House Ltd, 2005): 25.


27 19th century and ending in the mid-1940’s, African inte llectuals took the lead and began the trajectory towards political and social mobiliz ation and towards de-colonization and African unity. The first phase of Pan-Africanism was based on the proposition that there exists a distinct ‘African Personality’ to which all African s belonged irrespective of location, and was popularized in the late 19th century. This intellectual movement began with the Backto-Africa Movement spearheaded by Marcus Garvey and Edward Blyden, among others. The Back-to-Africa Movement sought the reaffirmatio n of the African identity by reclaiming the lost history of past African civiliz ation and reasserting the intellectual equality—if not superiority—of Africans: The goal o f this Movement was to “seek every means to lay a basis for African nationality and co llective achievement; or to claim that it [white supremacy] was wrong and to demonstrate this by searching into the African past for achievements which the biased eye of the white man had overlooked.”2 Although this phase was dominated by non-African intellectuals an d focused on issues of race and identity, it laid the foundation for wider discussi ons about political and economic independence of the African continent. A second per iod of the diaspora influence began during the Great Depression, as the Back-to-Africa Movement was steadily replaced with a more political and ideological vision for the str uggle for African unification and independence. A global economic depression, the aft ermath of one bloody World War and the stirrings of another world war, and the pol itical involvement of a growing class of African intellectuals marked this era. The most im portant voice of Pan-Africanism 2 George Shepperson, “Notes on Negro American Influen ces on the Emergence of African Nationalism, ” The Journal of African History 1, no. 2 (1960) : 301.


28 during this period was W.E.B Dubois. He wrote proli fically about the necessity for African self-determination and hosted annual Pan-Af rican Congresses where diaspora and African intellectuals and activists could meet to discuss African independence. The Congress under the tutelage of Dubois demanded that the “Allied Powers take steps to end the foreign exploitation of the continent, abol ish slavery and discrimination and called upon colonial powers to actively involve Afr icans in the governments of their territories, so that Africa [would] be ruled by the consent of Africans.”3 The second phase of the Pan-African Movement was hi ghlighted by the fifth PanAfrican Congress held in Manchester, England in 194 5. This Congress marked the first time that the Pan-Africanist agenda was organized a nd run exclusively by Africans. African nationalists such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya met and began discussions about planning independen ce movements. Biswaro notes that the Manchester Congress was also where “African pol itical parties fighting for independence were for the first time represented by trade unions and student organizations…”4 Beyond the regional and cultural change that occur red in Manchester with African-American and West Indian intellectuals moving to the background, there was also a sharp ideological shift to the left with radical calls for militant overthrows of the existing colonial regimes. This position differ ed from those taken by Dubois and his predecessors who asked for more incremental changes Over a decade after the Manchester Congress, Ghana became the first colonized country to gain its independence and was immediatel y followed by Guinea. Almost immediately, independence was linked with political unification with other African 3 Biswaro, Perspectives on Africa's Integration and Cooperati on, 27. 4 Ibid., 28


29 countries, as a means expanding decolonization thro ughout the region. This was the case particularly in West Africa, where there were calls for a West African Union. In the Conakry Declaration of 1959 Ghana and Guinea “expre ssed their intention to broaden the basis of their union to make it the nucleus of a wi der ‘Union of Independent States of Africa’ to which Member States would surrender port ions of their national sovereignty in the full interest of African community.”5 As more African states gained independence, Kwame Nkrumah took the opportunity to hold the firs t Pan-African Congress on African soil in 1958, to which newly independent countries of Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, and Morocco were invited. The meeting centered on showi ng support for the Algerian nationalists, who were mired in a brutal fight for independence with France, and resulted in a joint declaration of support. What was importa nt about this event was not just the fact that it was the first Pan-African Congress hos ted in Africa, but also, that it moved the debates about Pan-Africanism from the realm of idea s and the abstract towards the pragmatic politics of unification. This emphasis on political mobilization and support of nationalist movements spurred the creation of the A ll-African Peoples Organization Conference (AAPOC) that same year. The AAPOC “pledg e[d] moral and diplomatic support for all liberation movements and endorsed t he principle of freedom by any means necessary, including armed struggle. It also sensit ized the groups need for a continental union as the goal of national independence.”6 In East, Southern, and Central Africa, there were serious attempts, through the establishment of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), to create networks for collective action against colonialism. The aim of this organiz ation was to create, upon gaining 5 Ibid., 30-32. 6 Ibid., 30-32


30 independence, a federation of states in order to pr omote mutual development. However, these sub-regional instruments were overshadowed by a much larger and more consequential argument about continental unificatio n and the means through which to achieve it. Pan Africanism Institutionalized: Creation of the O rganization of African Union As more African states were gaining independence, t he debate over what form integration would take was steadily heating up. Thi s debate was complex and multifaceted, encouraging ideological rivalries and sub-regional and geopolitical power struggles. All of these differences induced a compr omise that led to the eventual creation of the OAU. As sub-regional organs like AAPOC and PAFMECSA were taking shape, there was also a broader debate brewing over what institu tionalized format Pan-Africanism should take and what its overall goals should be. T his conflict over the direction of African integration split the newly independent sta tes into the ideologically moderate Brazzaville group and the radical Casablanca group. The Brazzaville Group, including Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Benin, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Mauritania, Senegal, and others, m et for a summit in Brazzaville 1960 to iron out a plan for creating their own economic union, not just among themselves but also with the European Economic Community. These co untries were mainly former French colonies that met under the leadership of th e pro-Western Ivorian leader, Felix Houphouet Boigny. There was a deep suspicion, parti cularly among the Anglophone countries, that France was economically controlling its former countries through its


31 continued ties with the Francophone countries.7 Noticeably missing from this group of independent Francophone countries was Guinea, whose leader had severed all ties with its former colonial administrators. The president o f Guinea, Sekou Toure, had built a strong ideological and financial bond with leader o f the Casablanca group, Kwame Nkrumah. Mali had also broken ties with the other F rancophone countries and joined the Casablanca bloc, due to its bitter secession from S enegalese control. The Brazzaville group was eventually replaced with the Monrovia gro up as more Anglophone countries, such as Liberia and Nigeria, joined, while the Casa blanca group expanded its membership to include Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and Libya.8 The Casablanca group argued that the new institutio n should be a political union with shared economic and military instruments, and that liberation should be won at all costs and by any means necessary. The Brazzaville g roup, on the other hand, wanted a more incremental route to integration by beginning with economic integration and a respect for the sovereignty of their newly independ ent states. According to Biswaro, On the question of liberation struggle, and African Unity, the Casablanca Conference took a more radical stance. It committed itself to giving material and financial support to all nationalist m ovements fighting colonialism…While the Brazzaville group was basical ly interested in economic cooperation…9 The Congolese civil war and the ongoing Algerian wa r for independence exacerbated the ideological divisions brewing betwe en radical and moderate states. On the Algerian war for independence, the Monrovia gro up supported the French government’s argument for a referendum and a series of talks to negotiate the terms of withdrawal of French forces. Meanwhile the Casablan ca group, keeping with its hard-line 7Ibid., 35-36 8 Ibid., 36 9 Ibid., 36-37


32 approach, wholeheartedly denounced the French gover nment’s assertion that it had any say in the terms of Algerian independence; instead they supported the Algerian nationalists’ claim for total sovereignty. On the C ongolese issue, while the Brazzaville group supported Pesident Kasavubu in his power stru ggle with Prime Minister Lumumba and demanded non-intervention by any institution in to the internal affairs of the Congo, the Casablanca group supported Lumumba and his call for the intervention of a UNmandated peacekeeping force to end the Western-back ed secessionist movement in the province of Katanga. The competition to attract new ly independent states into their respective spheres was also a factor in the increas ing tension between the two sides. The constant standoffs between the two sides prompted t he proliferation of sub-regional institutions to deal with the tangible problems of development and security that these new states were facing. According to Franke, “One such body that was created in the heat of the rivalry of those days was Nkrumah’s Ghana-Guine a-Mali Union, later to be named the Union of African States (UAS).”10 By 1963, thirty-two countries had gained independen ce. However, the recurring divisions among nationalist leaders and a wider Col d War served as the geopolitical context for their organizational divisions. Politic al and ideological tensions between the newly independent countries hampered efforts for po litical and economic integration of the continent. In an effort to reach a compromise b etween the diverging blocs on the issue of integration, African leaders met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May of 1963. The Addis Ababa Summit was attended by the thirty-two indepen dent African nations and heralded the creation of the Organization of African Unity ( OAU). The success of the compromise 10 Benedikt F. Franke, “Competing Regionalisms in Afri ca and the Continent’s Emerging Security Architectu re” African Studies Quarterly 3, no. 3 (Spring 2007): 5.


33 that created the OAU hinged on several factors: the unanimous attendance by the conflicting sides; the leadership of Ethiopia’s Emp eror, Haile Selassie, who coordinated and tamped down the passions of both sides of the d ebate; and the fact that the Summit “merged the aims of the previous groups, alliances and organizations, eliminating rivals by absorbing their purposes.”11 Thus, objectives and demands of institutions like the UAS or AAPO were absorbed into a new agreement. The creation of the OAU “represented the constraine d victory of the moderates over the radicals in the Pan African Movement. Cons equently, its Charter reflected the urgent desire by the new African leaders to maintai n the conservative political and territorial status-quo which they had inherited fro m their erstwhile colonial masters.”12 The OAU’s inauguration was a major moment in the ev olution of economic, political, and social relations in Africa. With the critical o bjective of integration, the OAU sought “largely to provide the fragile African States emer ging from colonial rule, but confronted with a hostile international political and economic environment, with a sense of collective security in its total sense.”13 Article II of the Constitution of the OAU establish ed a comprehensive list of objectives including, the promotion of solidarity a mong African states by furthering economic and political integration; coordinated eff orts at improving lives of Africans; staunch defense of state sovereignty and independen ce; the eradication of all forms of colonialism on the continent; and the promotion of international cooperation. These goals would be achieved through cooperation on a number o f fronts including political, economic, educational, cultural, health, scientific and security. Underlying these 11 Biswaro, Perspectives on Africa's Integration and Cooperatio n, 41-46. 12 Amadu Sesay. The OAU after Twenty Years (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984): 12. 13 Sesay, The OAU after Twenty Years, 12


34 objectives were basic principles that guided OAU po litical process, including sovereign equality of states; non-interference in domestic af fairs of states; settlement of disputes through negotiation and mediation; denunciation of all forms of political assassinations as well as other covert actions on behalf of member st ates or others; commitment to total liberation from dependency; and support of the poli cy of non-alignment in international affairs.14 The structure of the new institution was headed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, responsible for the discussio n, coordination, and implementation of major AU policies. The Council of Ministers was made up of the foreign ministers of member countries and was tasked with preparing the agendas for the meetings of the Assembly of Heads of State. The General Secretariat was appointed by the Assembly and headed by a Secretary-General; its role was to over see the day-to-day tasks of the organization. Finally, the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration was tasked with providing proper responses to conflicts on the continent. Assessing the Organization of African Unity The problems facing the OAU arose when the organiza tion tried to achieve its goals within the policy of non-interference in the affairs of member states. The effort of African leaders to balance integration, which by ne cessity required sacrifice of some level of sovereignty, with their nationalist ambiti ons was tricky, and ultimately led to the replacement of the OAU with the African Union (AU) in 2002. The OAU successes and failures were shaped more by its place in the larger global political and economic context, than by its ability to craft its own strategic destiny. 14 "Charter of the OAU." Transition 10 (1963): 41


35 In order to gauge how the OAU met its multifaceted challenges, it is necessary to analyze how the institution addressed its immediate objecti ves, including liberation from colonialism, socio-economic development, conflict r esolution, and international cooperation. Finally, it is important to assess how the success or failure of the institution to meet its objectives fits into its larger goal of political and economic integration. Quest for Total Liberation The clearest area where the OAU was able to craft and implement its own policy initiatives was in the area of assisting liberation efforts on the continent. The 6th principle of Article III—stated that the OAU maintained an “a bsolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are s till dependent.”15 Liberation was an important rallying cry for the thirty-two African n ations that had won independence by the time the OAU was created, but there were severa l countries on the continent that had not yet achieved the same goal. Liberation was a ce ntral goal of the OAU because the ultimate objective of continental unification could not be achieved otherwise, and the belief that the security and prosperity of individu al states was intertwined with the collective futures of all African states was the ve ry basis of the OAU mandate. The OAU’s intensive focus on aiding liberation stru ggles was a success. Since the majority of countries that had already gained indep endence did so through negotiations with their colonial heads, the OAU sought to replic ate that tactic in aiding liberation struggles. The OAU Liberation Committee was set up in Tanzania to coordinate aid to liberation groups, as well as lobby the global comm unity on their behalf. According to the New African, 15 Ibid, 41.


36 Individual African states provided rear bases and t raining for guerrillas, notably Tanzania and Zambia. On the diplomatic fron t, in response to Britain's failure to take effective action against the settlers' Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Southern Rhodesia, t he OAU called on all member states to break off diplomatic relations wit h Britain in 1965.16 Members of the Liberation Committee included Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo and E gypt, among others. A Special Fund was set up by member countries to pool resourc es in order to fund the Committee’s activities.17 States bordering countries where liberation moveme nts were active were required to allow free entry-exit capabilities. Alt hough the OAU did not explicitly condone armed liberation struggle, the Liberation C ommittee was responsible for providing military and economic assistance to liber ation struggles in the remaining Portuguese colonial strongholds of Angola, Mozambiq ue, Sao Tome and Principe, and Guinea Bissau and in the apartheid regimes of Zimba bwe, Namibia, and finally South Africa, whose liberation in 1994, ended the mandate of the Liberation Committee. Economic Development and OAU There are two stages of economic development stra tegies, through which to analyze the effectiveness of the OAU’s economic pol icies and programs. The first stage in the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by Important S ubstitution Industrialization (ISI) policies, while the second economic strategy adopte d by the OAU focused on neoliberal economic programs. The global economic context of the bipolar world of the Cold War allowed the OAU to embrace an economic model that was engulfing policy discussions in the Third 16 “The OAU and Liberation (Special Feature) (Organiz ation of African Unity),” New African (July-August 2002): 25. 17 Ibid., 26-27.


37 World. This economic model was known as Import Subs titution Industrialization (ISI). Proponents of the endogenous-led growth policies of ISI argued that because of colonial rule, Africa’s economy was designed primarily for e xtraction of agricultural and mineral resources to be used in the colonial capitals for p roduction. African states were then forced to import these finished goods and “the term s of trade for Africa’s exports were poor. Consequently, there was a trade imbalance hea vily in favor of the developed countries.”18 African countries inherited poor infrastructure fro m the colonial administrations. Many leaders of these newly indepe ndent countries keenly understood the relationship between creating a long-lasting ec onomic development strategy and ensuring political stability for their young nation s. That is why Article II, Section (b) of the Charter stated that the OAU shall “coordinate and intensify their cooperation and effo rts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa” by means of “economic cooperation, including transport and communications.”19 Thus, the OAU charged its Economic and Social Commission with coordinating its efforts at launching common trade areas, economic cooperation zones, transportation and infr astructural plans as well as other measures of development. Simultaneously, as African states were organizing their economic integration policies and infrastructure, t he UN established the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) to assist African intra -cooperation and foster international relations with Africa. Between 1963 and 1973, the O AU’s Commission was ineffectual in its duties due to the state-centric preoccupation o f individual member states. A number of factors contributed to the lack of progress in regi onal integration during this period. According to Sesay, the lack of technical expertise and increased focus on issues of 18 Sesay, The OAU After Twenty Years 63. 19 Charter of the OAU." Transition 10 (1963): 41


38 political instability and conflict were factors tha t impeded the Commission’s work. While the Economic and Social Commission was incapable of dealing with the economic situation of the continent, ECA was better able to provide technical and organizational expertise toward the goal of economic development o n the continent. The goal of increased economic integration took a b ack seat to national development programs until the 1973 oil crisis and the ensuing economic recession forced the OAU members to increase collective effor ts at economic development and integration. The oil crisis instigated by the Arab countries against the West had a strong effect on the development strategies of the develop ing countries, particularly African countries. Although some African countries were pro ducers of oil, the vast majority were importers of oil from the Middle East. The crisis f orced African countries to “adopt stringent measures such as steep price increases, r ationing, and outright prohibition of driving of private cars and selling of petroleum du ring certain days of the week.”20 The oil crises, however, has much deeper macroeconomic cons equences for African nations— and thus the OAU. One consequence was the fall in d emand for African exports in the West due to the inflationary pressures of the econo mic recession in those nations. This downturn in trade was harmful since most African na tions relied heavily on single export commodities as the bedrock of their national income s. Conversely, the debts of African nations rose dramatically as they had to pay higher prices for oil and for other imports necessary for development. The oil crisis also had an effect on the way Africa n countries saw the OAU. The crisis demanded a collective and well planned negot iation regime with the Arab countries to allow access to oil. The OAU set up the Committe e of Seven to determine how best to 20 Sesay, The OAU After Twenty Years, 69


39 deal with the crisis. In 1974 the Committee began m eetings with the Arab states. Although the rejection of their demands by the oilproducing countries initially dampened the belief that the OAU would be an effect ive negotiator on behalf of the continent, the sense that Africa’s bargaining power with the international community could be strengthened with further political and ec onomic integration and unification was revived. The result of the focused attention was t he adoption of the Addis Ababa Declaration in the 1973, which “recommended introve rted, endogenous and selfsupporting growth for the continent.”21 The Addis Ababa Declaration was followed by the Kinshasa Declaration of 1976, which expanded on the principles of the Addis meeting by recommending “free ownership and control of natural resources by ensuring permanent sovereignty of African countries, the establishment of multinational companies, the establishment of the African common market, the Afr ican Energy Commission, and the African Economic Community within a period of 15 to 20 years.”22 In 1979, the Monrovia Declaration encouraged the newly independe nt African nations to create a framework for developing endogenous economic growth The failures of the ISI policies adopted by countri es in the immediate postindependence period and the global financial crisis that engulfed the world economic system during the oil crisis led to an atmosphere o f emergency. “During the 1960-75 period, Africa’s GDP growth rate was 4.5%; its expo rt growth 2.8%, its agricultural growth 1.6%; and its manufacturing growth 6%.”23 21 Rene Kouassi, “The Itinerary of the African Integr ation Process: An overview of the Historical Landma rks,” African Integration Review 1, no. 2 (July 2007): 2-3 22 Charter of the OAU, 2 23 Abdulla Bujira, “ Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Devel opment From the OAU to the AU: From the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) to the New Partnership f or African Development (NEPAD),” DPMF Occasional Paper, No.13 (2004):3.


40 The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) were adopted in 1980 during an extraordinary economic session of Heads of State to deal with the deteriorating economic situation on the continent. The international economic climate had deteriorated massively since the oil crisis of the 1970s. By the 1980s, the OAU was dealing with a deepening continent-wide financial d ebt crisis. The introduction of structural adjustment programs further debilitated African economies; governments cut essential social services in the face of the overpo wering burden of rising national debt and the unequal terms of trade that had confounded effective trade with t he international community. African countries had also been crippled by ongoing corruption, poor governance, human rights abuses, and poor infrastru cture. The endogenous economic policy embedded in the LPA framework sought to: 1) encourage internal economic and technical cooperation with neighboring countries fi rst; 2) work towards eliminating the unequal terms of trade that Africa bore and create a new international trading system based on the comparative advantage of each respecti ve country; 3) strengthen regional institutions to supplement the efforts of the OAU a nd states to pool their resources to compete effectively with developed countries; 4) pr otect the independent policy-making ability of African states to develop their economic policies. In 1991, the Abuja Treaty that established the African Economic Community was signed by 49 member countries of the OAU. The Treaty allotted a period of 30 years t o the goal of a strong and integrated economic union. Economic integration would be focus ed on necessary sectors needed for promoting endogenous growth including infrastructur e development, energy, and education, among others.


41 In spite of the LPA and the Abuja Treaty, global re alities shaped the trajectory of OAU development plans. Africa saw a “sharp decline in its sources of external financing, explained by a slow down or stagnation in the flow of official development assistance, a drop in its share of foreign direct investments and a significant growth of its external debt due mainly to the privatization of international de velopment financing.”24 The World Bank also instituted its Structural Adjustment Prog rams (SAPs), which set off massive privatization schemes for public institutions, exac erbating the problems of underdevelopment and poverty on the continent. Simu ltaneously, rising disease pandemics like AIDS and tuberculosis and endemic dr aught and famines continued the continent’s decline into social instability: “this resulted in growing insecurity in all areas, as well as easy recruitment of the unemployed into armed rebellions and religious fundamentalist groups or still into so-called popul ist patriotic movements.”25 By the 1990s the OAU had accepted neo-liberal econo mic policies in its development programs. The international community w as heavily involved in shaping the internal development policies of individual member states of the OAU through SAP’s and the conditionalities in the distribution of aid and technical assistance. According to Bujira, “the practical power of the WB/IMF and the Donor community (collectively often referred to as the international community) to inte rvene and direct detailed plans, programs and actual decision making of African gove rnments had become established and accepted in government circles.”26 The rest of the decade continued to show the weaknesses of the OAU in terms of economic and deve lopment policy because of the dominance of the Bretton Woods institutions. Also, there were institutional weaknesses 24 Kouassi, The Itinerary of the African Integration Process, 11. 25 Ibid., 2-3 26 Bujira, Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Devel opment 9.


42 within the OAU itself which were a direct result of the lack of resources that individual states could put at the disposal of the organizatio n. Non-Intervention and its Effect on Conflict Prevent ion, Management, and Resolution Conflicts in Africa, following independence, have b een about control of the state apparatus. The African state does not conform to th e tenets of the classical Westphalian state system. The ethnic, tribal, and religious cle avages that predated the onset of colonialism had been exacerbated by European polici es. In the case of Chad, prior to the arrival of the French colonialists, Blacks and Arab s continually clashed over resources: “the arbitrary character of the colonial frontiers established in the late 19th century in many cases exacerbated these tensions or created ne w ones, by lumping together rival groups in single polities and by splitting ethnic g roups between jurisdictions leaving innumerable potential irredenta.”27 In addition, the preferential treatment certain et hnic groups gained from colonial administrators over oth ers fermented further conflict during and after colonialism. These groups benefited from public goods administered by the colonists, such as education. Those who had access to these educational services went on to become the political, economic, military, and so cial elites of the post-colonial period. These intra-ethnic and social relationships fostere d mutual suspicion and resentment that further disintegrated the inherited colonial state following independence. Lack of economic development compounded political fragmenta tion within the African state, although several OAU members held significant depos its of valuable minerals. At the international level, the Cold War was in full swing global institutions were concentrating 27 Neil S. Mcfarlane, “Africa’s Decaying Security System and t he Rise of Intervention” International Security 8, no. 4, (1984): 130


43 on the aftershocks of the 1970s economic crash spur red on by the oil crisis, and the UN was rendered ineffectual by the polarizing nature o f the Cold War. Thus, Africa was left with an increasingly unstable situation of economic political, military and social turbulence, while institutions such as the OAU, wer e not keeping pace with the degenerating crises. The OAU’s ability to deal with conflict within the borders of countries was weaker than its capacity to settle conflicts betwee n states. Conflict management in Africa, as with other aspects of conflict administration an d resolution, must be seen through a prism of its relationship with the UN. The UN was t he main institution for conflict resolution and collective security prior to the cre ation of the OAU. However, following the creation of the OAU, the new norm was deference to this new regional institution to resolve internal conflicts before the involvement o f the UN was required. Members were expected to coordinate and harmonize p olicies so as to achieve political and diplomatic cooperation, as well as co operation for defense and security. These were major goals elucidated in Section 2, Art icle 2 of the OAU Charter. These goals would be achieved through “non-interference i n internal affairs of states; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, c onciliation, or arbitration; and unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of polit ical assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of neighboring States or any other States.”28 The principle of non-interference in internal affai rs embedded in Section 2, Article 3 of the OAU Charter was adopted to prevent interstate conflicts due to the artificial territorial boundaries created by coloni al powers. Global and local factors were 28 Jonathan Rechner, “ From OAU to the AU: A Normativ e Shift with Implications for Peacekeeping and Conf lict Management, or Just a Name Change?” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2006): 3.


44 responsible for the increased level of intervention s between member states of the OAU during the Cold War. These factors included “the tr ansfer of superpower competition in the period of dtente to the periphery of the inter national system, the subsequent deterioration in the relations between East and Wes t, and the growing insecurity of the principal military power in the Sub-Saharan area, S outh Africa.”29Error! Bookmark not defined. A growing trend of African states intervening in t he affairs of neighboring states also triggered regional and international intervent ions. Security problems in Africa that have caused interventions by states include politic al disintegration and unstable fragmentation; domestic conflicts; domestic politic s; preemption against attacks; and increases in military spending. A key factor that caused interventions on the conti nent was political fragmentation in individual member states of the OA U. According to MacFarlane, “the profound causes of communal conflict in Africa lie to some extent in ethnic and religious differences which predate the colonial period.”30 Further, the institutionalization of rivalries among these ethnic groups was evident in the unequal distribution of access to public goods by certain ethnic groups over others—e ducation is a prime example of such public goods. According to McFarlane, groups benefited disproportionately from education and were well placed to occupy positions in the colonial service and, la ter, in the civil services, armies, and political elites of the new states. Thi s inequity created resentments on the part of those left behind, parti cularly when the individuals occupying these new positions distribut ed benefits in such a way as to favor their own kinship groupings and use d their power to exploit other ethnic groups.”31 29 Bujira, Pan-African Political and Economic Visions 3 30 MacFarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of I ntervention 130-132 31 Ibid, 3


45 Examples of regional tensions resulting from intern al political fragmentation include the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, the Chadian ethnic war, and the Nigerian civil war. Political destabilization based on historic ethnic tensions i s influenced by lack of economic opportunity and endemic poverty. During the 1970s a nd 1980s, levels of exports fell and terms of trade deteriorated, particularly in the oi l and gold markets, all leading to serious current account deficits. The entire situation was exacerbated by external indebtedness. Internal food production was not keeping up with po pulation growth, thereby limiting self-sufficiency and increasing dependence on exter nal assistance. According to McFarlane, much of the poor economic record may be explained i n terms of prior underdevelopment with attendant undercapitalization absence of substantial domestic markets, and shortages of tech nically skilled indigenous personnel, the legacies of the pre-colon ial and colonial eras. The inefficiency of many foreign assistance program s—the result of poor planning and coordination, insufficient attention t o characteristics of the local environment and the constraints these impose on the development effort, and bureaucratization—is another important factor. A third is the relatively low level of the flow of private capital to Africa, and the outward flow of African capital to safer havens. A fourth is the crippling effect of OPEC price increases on the region’s oilimporting economies. In addition, the incompetence, irresponsibility, an d acquisitiveness of many of continent’s leading political figures and o f the elites from which they emerge and which they serve cannot be ignored”32. Interventions are also political tactics in the dom estic political process of intervening countries, where states attempt to defl ect attention to the domestic socioeconomic crisis by involvement in external con flicts. One noted example is that of the Libyan president’s invasion of Chad and interfe rence in Nigeria and Senegal as a way of neutralizing rising domestic discontent at the L ibyan states’ own lack of legitimacy. Some states may intervene externally as a preemptiv e action against interference by 32 Ibid, 2-3


46 external actors. Here Ethiopia’s continual invasion of Somalia comes to mind. Regional hegemonic power struggles, corresponding with incre ases in military and economic growth have also fuelled intervention in neighborin g countries’ affairs. A prime example is Morocco’s incursion and subsequent absorption of segments of Western Sahara; meanwhile Algeria—long since Morocco’s chief enemy in the region—has funded rebel groups in the area to counter what they perceived a s Morocco’s hegemonic designs for the region. The main arguments against intervention, and the re ason why the OAU had to be involved in resolving these conflicts in the region are that intervention “both prolongs and intensifies the conflict which provokes it, inc reasing the number of casualties and refugees and the level of physical destruction in t he target environment; that it thereby jeopardizes economic development; that it erodes na tional sovereignty; and that it is politically destabilizing for the target.”33 For countries that were relatively young during the creation of the OAU, sovereignty was guarded ve hemently. This deep-seated fear of intervention, whether by a regional institution lik e the OAU or a foreign aggressor, is based not only on the fear of the further fragmenta tion of artificially constructed territories, but also on the experience of western intervention during the immediate postindependence period. The economic argument against intervention, particularly in civil wars is that “the more intense a civil war is, the greater the disruption of agricultural, commercial, and industrial activity.”34 However, a plausible argument could be made from a strategic standpoint, that overextending a b elligerent that either depletes its 33 MacFarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of I ntervention, 136-145. 34 Bujira, Pan-African Political and Economic Visions of Devel opment 9


47 resources on armaments or increasingly disrupts its centers of economic activity can quicken the pace of ending the conflict. Intervention that does not address the root politic al, economic, and social causes of the conflict will result in a band-aid solution that will only allow a relapse in due time. On the other hand, interventions that are short and directed may go a long way in removing certain spoilers or threats to legitimate regimes in power.35 There are numerous consequences of regional interve ntion. For instance, increased levels of defense spending by neighboring countries increases the likelihood of further destabilization in the region. Thus, “inter vention is a major contributor to what is a region-wide growth trend in size of forces, milit ary expenditure, and arms procurement.”36 The growth in intervention has the unintended cons equence of preventing already scarce resources from going into valuable d evelopment projects. This trend, in turn, affected the OAU by siphoning off funds for c ollective security programs that could have reduced transaction costs for individual state s, while making it that much harder to control the rate and acceleration of intra and inte r-state conflict. Also, the increases in arms purchases from external sources complicated th e efforts of the OAU at resolving conflicts because of the tightrope it had to tread with the superpowers. The OAU’s first case in conflict resolution was the war between Algeria and Morocco in 1963. What was in dispute was control ov er the Sahara area. What concerned the OAU was that “American ties to Morocco, Soviet ties to Algeria, and French economic interests in the Saharan resources might p romote foreign intervention.”37 35 Ibid, 9 36 Mcfarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of I ntervention 130 37 David B. Meyers, “Intraregional Conflict Managemen t by the OAU” International Organization 28 (1974): 354.


48 During this time, ad hoc committees were set up to deal with security crises on the continent. These ad hoc committees served more as a venue for communication and negotiations between belligerents. In the case of t he Algeria-Morocco war, the ad hoc committee resulted in a resolution, In 1968 King Hassan of Morocco personally led his d elegation to the OAU summit meeting held in Algeria. There he held p rivate meetings with Algerian President Boumedienne. In direct nego tiations that followed, the territorial issue was settled with ag reement to maintain the colonial boundaries while a jointly owned company w ould exploit the mineral resources of the area that had been in disp ute.38 The reunification struggle between Somali secession ists and the Ethiopian military was the second big security challenge for the OAU. Again, there were interventions by superpowers, which led to the deep ening of the crisis. In this case, the Americans supported the Ethiopians with arms, while the Soviets and Chinese armed the Somalis. The OAU deferred to the UN to try to resol ve the situation. Talks held at the OAU extraordinary meetings averted full-blown inter state warfare, even though there were military skirmishes among the varying groups. The Assembly addressed lowintensity border conflict between Ghana and Upper V olta in 1963. Upper Volta feared that Ghana’s President Nkrumah was interfering in t he internal affairs of its neighbors. This matter remained unresolved, despite the effort s at negotiation by the OAU, until Nkrumah’s overthrow. Another case of external intervention prompting act ion from the OAU was the Rwanda-Burundi conflict that began in 1964, but rea ched a particularly violent state in the early 1990s. The reason for the OAU’s involveme nt in seeking a resolution to the conflict was that the Tutsi-Hutu conflict signaled the regional complexity of African 38 McFarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of I ntervention 130


49 conflicts. In this case, an intrastate conflict bet ween ethnic Hutu majorities in both Rwanda and Burundi and politically dominant Tutsi m inorities in both countries turned into an interstate conflict as cross-border tension s spiraled into violent conflict. This situation was particularly complicated for the OAU because, although internal conflict had boiled up to involve a neighboring country, the resolution to the conflict required interference in the local politics of both countrie s. The OAU gained momentum in its negotiations with warring actors in both countries. Burundi, following the replacement of its government and the assistance from neighboring Zaire, allowed the OAU to negotiate a settlement that included the disarmament of the T utsi refugees. This resolution allowed relative peaceful relations between the two countri es until internal ethnic conflict in Burundi instigated a refugee crisis in Rwanda. The Burundi government then accused the Rwandans of interfering in the internal affairs of Burundi. Again, the OAU set up an ad hoc committee to address this issue; however as in the previous round of conflict, the change of government in Burundi settled the tension between the two states. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the violent ethnic conflict in Burundi were both seminal moments in global and continental understanding of how to deal with conflict on the continent. The lack of international engagement to address the genocide, as well as minimal and ineffectual attempts by the OAU in nego tiating a settlement to both conflicts, led to change in the way the internation al community viewed its responsibility to protect and caused the OAU to reevaluate its pos ition of non-interference in the affairs of member states. The Uganda-Tanzania conflict was another case where the OAU tried to help contain a potentially regionally destabilizing conf lict. In 1971, the overthrow of the


50 Ugandan President Obote by General Idi Amin and Obo te’s subsequent exile to neighboring Tanzania created tension between the tw o countries. The Tanzanian government rejected the legitimacy of the Amin regi me. The next year, militants sympathetic to Obote invaded Uganda. Uganda retalia ted against Tanzania. As with other conflicts in Africa during this time, external inte rvention was a problem. Israeli mercenaries backed Tanzania, encouraging Arab state s like Libya to support Uganda.39 The OAU, with the assistance of Somalia and its mil itary observer mission protected a truce gained from intensive negotiations between th e sides. In 1973, diplomatic relations were fully restored. In 1972, rising tensions between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon over oil-rich islands of the coast and fears of foreign intervent ions in the dispute were of concern to the OAU. As was the case with previous conflicts, s uperpower and foreign involvement was a major impetus for garnering OAU attention. Ga bon had close ties with France and Rhodesia, while Equatorial Guinea had ties with the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. In this case, the Assembly was able to negot iate a settlement with the creation of a commission to deal with maritime disputes. On occasion, the OAU has not fully adhered to its p olicy of non-interference. The most famous example is the Congo Civil War. In 1964 the threat to regional stability posed by the conflicts among the Katanga secessioni st movement, the UN-US backed government of Tshombe, and the pro-Lumumba groups b acked by Burundi, CongoBrazzaville, the Soviet Union, and China forced the OAU to act. It set up an ad hoc committee to negotiate a settlement. The committee “attempted bold initiatives, hearing representatives of the CNL [National Liberation Cou ncil] and sending a special mission 39 Meyers, Intraregional Conflict Management by the OAU 360-364


51 to Washington to request an end to American militar y assistance.”40 The conflict was so polarizing that most African countries were sharply divided between belligerents in the conflict. Thus the OAU did not achieve a consensus as to the appropriate steps to be taken. According to Meyers, the ineffectiveness of the OAU in dealing with this crisis stained the reputation of the institution.41 This failure led to a change in the outlook of member states when it came to OAU participation in the internal affairs of member states. In Nigeria, the secession of Biafra and the ensuing civil war created a crisis that cost the lives of over two million Nigerians.42 The Soviets and the British supplied the Nigerian government arms, while Biafra received aid from France and China. The Assembly of the OAU supported the Nigerian governme nt and set up a commission to protect the territorial integrity of the Nigerian s tate. Ensuing attempts at negotiations failed because of the support the OAU gave to the N igerian government and its strict anti-secessionist principles. Also, the OAU was ine ffective in sanctioning four member states that bucked the organization and supported B iafra. Eventually, the war ended when the Biafra militants were defeated by the national government. The conflict in Chad in the 1980s sparked the OAU’s first foray into peacekeeping. Libya’s intervention into the interna l conflict among warring factions within Chad prompted the intervention of the OAU. T he involvement of OAU forces in the conflict was predicated on two principles: “(1) the force must be invited by the Chadian government, in accordance with U.N principl es, and (2) the Libyan troops had to 40 Rechner, From OAU to the AU 3 41 Meyers, Intraregional Conflict Management by the OAU 365 42 Ibid.


52 be withdrawn.”43 Based on these principles an OAU force was suppor ted by the 1980 OAU Summit Conference in Nairobi. The first precond ition of awaiting consent from the government of affected states before involving troo ps was based also on the OAU principle of respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of member states. The Chad mission was an abysmal failure for the OAU; th e factions would not come to an agreement and the OAU left without success. The failure of the mission was blamed on multiple c auses, including a mandate that was unclear to the Chadian government (who thought the OAU was assisted in fighting the rebels) and a lack of logistical and financial resources. Of the six countries that pled ged to form peacekeeping units, only three Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire—actua lly did so…The OAU’s failed peacekeeping mission in Chad left the future status of OAU peacekeeping forces in serious doubt.44 The OAU and the Nexus between Development and Secur ity A seminal realization of the interconnection betwee n security and development was embedded in the Kampala Document in 1991. The d ocument argued that problems of instability created by insecurity impaired the abil ity of the continent to develop. The result of the meeting that produced this document w as the launching of the Conference on Peace, Security, Stability, Development, and Cooper ation (CSSDCA). The purpose of this conference was to set the tone for achieving c omprehensive security and development programs to meet the 21st century. The central purpose of this Conference was encoded in Principle V of the Document, which s tated that the CSSDCA would “provide a comprehensive framework for Africa’s sec urity and stability and measures for accelerated continental economic integration for so cioeconomic transformation.”45 The 43 Rechner, From OAU to the AU, 550 44 Ibid, 551 45 “Kampala Document,” African Leadership Forum (1991 ): 5.


53 areas that the new framework would encompass includ ed security, stability, development and cooperation. This Conference and the goals it set for itself cam e amid a changing geopolitical landscape, where the Soviet Union had ceased to be an influential counter to the West. The dissolution of the Soviet Union significantly c hanged the political and economic paradigm around the world and in Africa in particul ar. Human rights and neo-liberalism had become accepted norms of international relation s and had substantially affected how the OAU perceived its role. The security focus of t he CSSDCA framework encompassed all aspects of security, including economic, politi cal, and social or human security. Also, this document, for the first time, included lack of democracy and human rights as factors that contributed to insecurity on the continent. Th e new security framework elucidated five principles: conflict prevention, common securi ty, peaceful resolution of conflicts, continental self-reliance when it came to addressin g conflicts, and popular involvement in national defense policies. By the 1990s, human rights had become a focal poin t in talks about conflict prevention. The OAU “reaffirmed adherence to articl e 13 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights and the Universal Declarat ion on Democracy, and recognized that the principles of good governance, transparenc y and human rights are essential elements for building representative and stable gov ernment and contribute to conflict prevention.”46 In 1993, following the signing of the Cairo Declar ation, the OAU created the Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution Mechanism. Prior to the creation 46 Rachel Murray, “Preventing Conflicts in Africa: Th e Need for a Wider Perspective,” Journal of African Law 45, no. 1 (2001): 15.


54 of the Mechanism, non-intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring countries was a prized and protected principle of the OAU. Thus, the conflict management arena in Africa was dominat ed by foreign, mostly European, concerns, interests and initiative s. For example, the Portuguese facilitated negotiations between Angola' s factions in 1990-92, followed by the UN in 1993-95; the Italians mediate d the end of the Mozambique civil war during 1991-1992; and the US t ook the lead with regard to Ethiopia in 1990-1991 and Somalia in 1992 -1993.47 The creation of the Mechanism was prompted by the i nternal and regional dynamics of African conflicts, Internal conflicts generate massive flows of displa ced people and refugees, encourage the proliferation of arms which continues to fuel conflicts, spur crime and destroy the (economic/investment) credibi lity of the sub-region and eventually that of the entire continent. Becaus e these factors combined to hinder the economic development of individual co untries, of regions, and of the continent, and because internal wars wer e recognized to have external consequences, collective action to manage these conflicts was now judged both appropriate and necessary.48 The mandate of the Mechanism was clear: in situatio ns where conflicts had taken place, the Mechanism would engage in peacemaking an d peace-building activities. Observer missions would be set up to monitor the ev ents. The institutional makeup of the Mechanism was as follows: “the Secretariat of the O AU provides the administrative support…there is also a military arm of the Conflic t Mechanism, the Field Operations Section (FOS), whilst a Peace Fund was set up speci fically to support its activities financially.”49 The Secretariat also created the Conflict Manageme nt Centre (CMC) to 47 Cedric De Coning, The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa,” Monograph No. 10, Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, (April 1997) 48 Kouassi, The Itinerary of the African Integration Process 2-3 49 Murray, Preventing Conflicts in Africa 16.


55 collect and distribute information about current an d future conflicts, advising the Secretariat about possible strategies for dealing w ith conflicts.50 The second goal of the CCSDCA was ensuring stabilit y on the continent to allow the space necessary for development. The rule of la w, good governance, respect for human rights and freedom, respect for political ins titutions, transparency, and respect for ethnic and religious plurality became embedded norm s for promotion by the OAU. Again, this was a fundamental shift from the Cold W ar era of total non-interference by the institution. The principles of the development focus of the CCSDCA were selfreliance, increased economic integration, diversifi cation of commodity production, civil society engagement in economic decisions, and incre ased leadership of member states in economic decision-making. Rising globalization forc ed the adoption of a third focus— cooperation. Increased cooperation with neighbors w ithin the continent, cooperation with the West, and cooperation with neighbors to the Sou th was of vital importance to the OAU. The Rwandan crisis in the 1990s, not only showed th e weakness of the OAU in dealing with security and humanitarian crises on th e continent, but also shed serious light on the overall weakness of international organizati ons in responding to international crisis. OAU military observers were sent to Rwanda, although the mission was plagued by difficulties in logistical support. Besides its success in some negotiating efforts, the OAU mission was also able to mitigate further damag e by exerting pressure on the UN to respond in-kind by sending a peacekeeping mission k nown as UNAMIR. These 50 Eric Berman, "African Regional Organizations’ Peac e Operations: Developments and Challenges," African Security Review vol. 11, no. 4 (2002): 35.


56 interventions, however, were ineffective in prevent ing the brutal genocide that killed hundreds of thousands. In Burundi and the Comoros, though, the OAU’s small military observer missions met with success. In Burundi “the intervention of t he OAU was thought to have prevented some instances of conflict between warrin g factions, whereas in the Comoros, the forces successfully served in the role of media tor and succeeded in providing humanitarian assistance.”51 In the mid to late 1990s, the ongoing weaknesses in the institutional and financial capabilities of the Mechanism and the CCSDCA led th e OAU to lose its primary role in conflict resolution to sub-regional agencies. Altho ugh the OAU continued to engage in diplomacy and negotiations, the sub-regional organi zations took the bulk of peacekeeping and peace-building initiatives during this period. During this time there were five important sub-regional agencies: the Inter-Governme ntal Development Authority (IGAD) in the East; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West; the Maghreb Union in the North; the Southern Africa n Development Community (SADC) in the South; and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in the Central African sub-region. The most active and by far most successful of these groups was ECOWAS and its military arm ECOMOG. Pool ed from soldiers who were involved in UN peacekeeping missions, ECOMOG was ab le to deploy and resolve successfully the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Le one in the mid 1990s. 51 Rechner, From OAU to the AU, 552.


57 International Cooperation and the OAU Africa’s history with colonialism and the Cold War between the West the Soviet Union set the stage for the OAU’s adamant support o f the policy of non-interference. “[S]uperpower intervention in Africa was … driven b y ideological goals, socioeconomic objectives and geostrategic considerations.”52 Africa’s geostrategic importance to the two superpowers was multi-faceted. Port facilities on the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Indi an Ocean and Atlantic coasts of Africa, plus base and landing rights, wer e obvious needs of the two superpowers with global foreign policy interest s. Access to new markets and raw materials, including arms sales and the rich natural resources of the continent, also figured in the exp ansionist trading plans of the superpowers. Another major interest of the supe rpowers was to win diplomatic support from the new African states for their respective foreign policy objectives, as debated and pursued at the Un ited Nations and in other international fora.53 The most important factor in analyzing whether the OAU developed a cogent foreign policy to deal with the rest of the world i s to determine areas of common interest that the institution could pursue with a collective voice. To achieve its stated goals of cooperation in defense and security policies, the O AU Charter pursued the policy of nonalignment with all international alliances. The OAU was created during the tumultuous years of the Cold War. Between 1947 and 1989, Afric an states could not escape the geopolitics of the Cold War era and thus had to sha pe domestic and foreign policies to reflect the new realities. Following the fall of th e Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, OAU policies again changed with the times The seventh principle of Article III dictated the O AU’s policy vis--vis international engagements by supporting a policy of non-alignment The OAU’s attempt at international 52 Wilbert J. Lemelle, “The OAU and Superpower Interv ention in Africa,” Africa Today 35 (1988): 23-24. 53 McFarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of I ntervention 130.


58 cooperation was evidenced by its participation in t he non-aligned movement bloc at the UN. This position was due to attempts by Western an d Eastern states to use them as proxies in the Cold War. Non-alignment proved probl ematic for the foreign policies of these newly independent countries because, on the o ne hand, they wanted to avoid the Cold War rivalry between the superpowers, and on th e hand, they wanted access to trade and assistance needed for development. The non-alig ned movement was based on neutrality in the foreign affairs of individual cou ntries. Tassin defines the non-aligned movement as “an alliance with the forces of regiona lism, national independence, the struggle for a new economic order, social and econo mic progress, and self-reliance.”54 Nationalism played an important role in framing the discussions of non-alignment and state neutrality in global politics. The “basi c purpose of the policy was to restructure the ex-colonial country's dependent economy, was to promote socio-economic development, and to de-link the country from the co lonial world and the capitalist system.”55 Thus, the non-aligned movement believed that approp riate policy space and independence from the major powers was imperative t o economic, political and social development of former colonies. The major consequen ce of the adoption of nonalignment by countries in the third world, particul arly in Africa, was that it allowed countries to streamline national foreign policies, which in turn, allowed national integration and rebuilding to further intensify. By 1994, the OAU was able to mobilize the internati onal community and the UN to support the independence movements in the remain ing colonial protectorates in Southern Africa, mainly Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Sout h Africa. Zimbabwe gained its 54Kristin Tassin, “LIFT UP YOUR HEAD, MY BROTHER: Nat ionalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement,” Journal of Third World Studies 23, no. 1 (2006): 148 55 Mcfarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of I ntervention, 130


59 independence in 1980, as did Namibia in 1990. South Africa was also able to rid itself of an oppressive apartheid regime with the help of a m ajor divestment campaigns and pressure all over the world. Failures of the OAU and Creation of the African Uni on The overall weakness of OAU institutions limited th e effectiveness of continental conflict resolution programs. Primary to the ineffe ctiveness of the conflict management regime of the OAU was the principle of non-interven tion, which required the institution to seek the consent of the affected member state be fore intervening. However, “peace enforcement involves the use of military force to c ompel warring parties to reach peace settlements and is differentiated from peacekeeping in that permission of the parties or the state is not a prerequisite. Thus, peace enforc ement and humanitarian missions without permission were essentially banned by the O AU Charter.”56 The OAU’s conflict management policies were constricted to preventive diplomacy and intensive political negotiations to stave off further conflict, because they did not have the institutional mechanisms to address conflicts effectively when th ey broke out. Fear of further fragmentation and instability serve d as the basis for the OAU‘s emphasis on the territorial integrity of the border s of member states. The already fragmented territorial boundaries created by former colonial powers were fiercely protected as the final demarcations of state border s. “Due to the multiethnic nature of most African countries, African leaders remain fear ful that changing even one boundary will open a Pandora’s box of ethnically based seces sionist movements and lead to the further balkanization of the African continent into even smaller economic and political 56 Rechner, From OAU to the AU 554.


60 units.”57 The problem with this policy, which handicapped th e ability and credibility of the institution, was the fact that the OAU compromi sed human rights of marginalized people for the sake of territorial integrity and th e often brutal governments that ruled those territories. Decision-making on security matters involved achiev ing a consensus by members. Thus, issues that were controversial enoug h to impinge on member’s assumed territorial prerogatives would not be subject to OA U sanctions. The result was an impotent and unenforceable mandate, which both dele gitimized and weakened the institution in the long-run. Lack of financial and logistical resources severely curtailed the institution’s ability to deal effectively with severe economic an d security problems. Necessary skills such as diplomatic, military, political, or economi c know-how were severely lacking. The lack of resources beyond the limited contributions of the member states also made the institution dependent on state leaders whose influe nce and interest may have been contrary to the needs of the OAU. A defining principle of the OAU was the strong defe rence for the sovereignty of states embedded in its Charter. Article III of the OAU Charter stated that there would be no interference in the internal affairs of member s tates out of “Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its ina lienable right to independent existence” and that conflicts would be solved peacefully “by n egotiation, mediation, conciliation or Arbitration.”58 Successes of the OAU included its efforts to suppor t liberation, which were 57 Peter J. Shraeder. Encyclopedia of African History: Nationalism: Postc olonial Africa, ed. Kevin Shillington (New York: CRC Press, 2005), 1078 58 Sesay, The OAU After Twenty Years, 12


61 clearly delineated in the Charter. The OAU took sig nificant steps towards ensuring security on the continent. It was successful in its goals for a continent free of colonial administration and was also successful in keeping A frica non-nuclear, a goal embraced in the Pelindaba Treaty. The sovereign equality princi ple within the Charter, which in essence legitimated the colonial territorial bounda ries, assured the likelihood of conflicts within rather than between member states. The rigid ity of its adherence to the principle of non-interference severely curtailed the ability of the OAU to manage and resolve conflicts. This problem “meant that a very difficul t conceptual shift was necessary for the OAU to remain a viable institution that was in tune with the changing needs of Africa.”59 Reformers, or those who wanted a more flexible and interventionist policy, would have had amend the Charter substantially and rework the rules. The structure and power distribution within the ins titution was also a problem. In the Assembly Heads of State national interests, mor e often than not, superseded the collective interest of the OAU. Essentially,“the po wer rest[ed] with one group: the Assembly of Heads of State,” and “getting African h eads of state to look beyond their own personal and national interests proved to be di fficult, further frustrating the progress of OAU meetings.”60 The Secretary General was weak and could not take initiative to direct the agenda of the institution. Another insti tutional failure was the lack of enforcement mechanisms to assure compliance to OAU statutes: “the OAU had no mandatory powers, and many of its decisions were es sentially recommendations.”61 With regard to peace and security policies, the OAU did not have a mechanism to force 59 Rechner, From OAU to the AU 557-558. 60 Meyers, Intraregional Conflict Management by the OAU 365 61 Ibid, 365


62 through its decisions. This lack of ability to enfo rce decisions undermined the legitimacy of the institution from within the continent and wi th the international community. An important institutional weakness which led to th e de-legitimization of the OAU in general, and its efforts at conflict managem ent in particular, was the singular role the Assembly of Heads of States played. This body w as made up of the leaders of member states, had expansive powers to choose what areas to focus on, and made the final decision on what overall position the OAU wou ld take. The Council of Foreign Ministers, a separate body responsible for coordina ting the foreign policies and the conflict management policies of member states, had to follow the directives of their respective leaders, who made up the Assembly. The G eneral Secretariat, which was tasked with overseeing the day-to-day management of OAU affairs, was also rendered weak and ineffectual by the Assembly so as to avoid unwanted independent interference into national affairs. The power of the Assembly w as enhanced by the fact that the OAU did not have funding independent of its member stat es. Financial problems linked to the overall economic condition of African countries dur ing this time affected the ability of member states to meet their financial obligations t o the institution. Thus, “the low level of resources available to the organization … also limi ted its ability to become independent of the national leaders.”62 Following the initial successes and eventual failur es of the endogenous-led growth models that swept the third world during the 1960s and 1970s, the debt crisis that crippled the global financial system during the lat e 1970s and 1980s severely curtailed the continent’s ability to support itself. The incu rsion of the Bretton Woods institutions 62 Ibid, 350-360


63 into the economic lives of these countries further debilitated the ability of these countries to ensure economic and political stability. With substantial gains achieved in terms of fulfill ing the goals set out for the OAU, particularly with respect to decolonization, A frican leaders wanted a reformed supranational institution that would learn from the failures of the OAU and provide a more rigorous and effective development and securit y strategy for the continent. In 2000, the Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopt ed in Lome, Togo. The Assembly of Heads of State of Government of the OAU presided ov er this major event, and in May 26, 2001, with the Constitutive Act finally impleme nted and ratified, “the OAU ceased to exist as a legal entity, and the AU emerged in its place.”63 The principles espoused in Article 4 of the Constit utive Act clearly differed from those of the OAU, Whereas the OAU Charter adheres to the principle of the ‘sovereign equality of all Member States,’ the Constitutive Ac t rephrases the principle as respect for the ‘sovereign equality an d interdependence among Member States of the Union’. While the OAU Ch arter speaks of ‘respect for the sovereignty and territorial integr ity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence,’ th e Constitutive Act Speaks only of ‘respect for borders existing on achievemen t of independence.64 The most significant difference between the OAU Cha rter and AU Constitutive Act is with respect to the concept of non-intervention. Wh ile the Charter was rigid in its policy of non-intervention in the affairs of member states the AU allows member states to intervene in cases of genocide, war crimes, and cri mes against humanity.65 The rigidity of the policies of the OAU was amelior ated by the AU’s rejection of illegitimate governments or governments that were b orne through illegitimate means. 63 Rechner, From OAU to the AU 550 64 MacFarlane, Africa’s Decaying Security System and the Rise of Intervention, 564 65 Rechner, From OAU to the AU 551


64 “The interventionist tone of the Constitutive Act g oes even further to provide for the existence of the ‘the right of Member States to Req uest intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security’, it also advoc ates ‘the establishment of a common defense policy for the African Continent.”66 To address the ineffectiveness of the Secretary-General in the OAU, the new Commission, w hich is the decision-making body of the Secretariat, was not restricted by any const itutional limitations. In July 2002, following Article 5, section 2 of the Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created. Made up of fift een members with ten serving two years, with five rotating every three years, this i nstitution works with the Chairperson of Commission. The PSC is “charged with authorizing de ployment and deciding mandate of peace support missions, recommending armed interven tion to the Assembly in grave circumstances, initiating sanctions on governments that take power unconstitutionally, and other related peace and security functions.”67 The PSC, however, does not decide whether or not to intervene; that is left to the Ch airperson of the Commission to send information to the Assembly for final decision. The Chair can also direct diplomatic efforts to help prevent conflicts: “the role of the Chairperson as part of the PSC indicates a broader role for the Commission in the AU and a m ore even distribution of powers than that which existed in the OAU.”68 A major weakness of the OAU was the lack of a stron g enforcement mechanism to force member states’ compliance with policies. H owever, “Article 23 of the Constitutive Act provides for the imposition of san ctions for default in payment of 66 Ibid, 551 67 Ibid, 551 68 Ibid.


65 contributions to the budget of the AU, as well as t he possibility of sanctions for failure to comply with the AU’s decisions and policies.”69 69 Ibid.


Chapter III The Emerging Security Structure of the African Unio n In the last forty years, approximately thirty confl icts have ravaged Africa claiming the lives of more than seven million and displacing at least twenty million people.1 In this context the creation of the African Union in 2002 u shered in a new framework for achieving peace and security on the continent. The creation of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), in place of the failed Mechanism use d by the OAU, represented a significant shift in institutional direction when i t came to addressing the pervasive security crisis on the continent. This new institut ion was buttressed by a new and more comprehensive architecture—the Common Africa Defens e and Security Policy (CADSP). The PSC, Regional Economic Communities (RE Cs), and New African Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) works t ogether with the assistance of the UN, the European Union (EU), and Group of 8 (G8), a nd individual donors such as the US, UK, and France, among others, which constitutes a new approach to addressing common security and development threats in Africa. The Responsibility to Protect The Constitutive Act of the African Union serves as the guiding document through which Pan-African goals for regional integr ation for the 21st century were developed. One can gauge the changes in strategy to wards achieving peace and security Ulrich Golaszinski, “Africa’s Evolving Security Arc hitecture.” FES Briefing Paper (December 2004):1


through a comparison of the AU’s Constitutive Act w ith the OAU Charter. Of singular strategic and political importance to this emerging security framework is the shift in focus from non-interference to the policy of non-in difference. The approach to PanAfrican security and development integration espous ed by the OAU was put into serious question by the conflicts of the late 20th century. The establishment of the African Union signaled a break from the ineffective policies of t he past, and a reorganization of the continent’s efforts to meet new challenges. The int ernational norms underpinning the AU’s new peace and security approach fall within th e ‘Responsibility to Protect’ framework embedded in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) document. This framework lays o ut the conditions under which the AU would be able to intervene in member states. Thi s new framework influenced the Constitutive Act and the Protocol Relating to the E stablishment of the Peace and Security Council, which in turn established the AU security architecture. The principle underlying the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ framework is that t he international community has the right to intervene during humanitarian crisis in or der to protect defenseless people. Although the principle respects the state’s right t o sovereignty, it argues that “when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its populat ion or, indeed, is targeting its own citizens, the responsibility to protect is transfer red to the international community.”2 The international community, for its part, has the resp onsibility to undertake all peaceful measures—such as diplomacy and sanctions—to constra in belligerents in a conflict. However, should these actions fail; military option s for intervention are open. The conditions under which interventions are allowed in clude “large-scale loss of life, actual 2 Kristina Powell. “The African Union’s Emerging Pea ce and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenge s for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect,” The North-South Institute, ISS Monograph Series 119 (May 2005):7-8.


or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of either deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large-scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether ca rried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.”3 The UN, specifically the Security Council, has the authority to determine when such interventions are allowed to pr oceed in which case the belligerents have no authority to disagree. However, in cases wh ere the Security Council fails to act, the regional or sub-regional institution within the area a crisis develops has the right to determine intervention. What is unique about the Re sponsibility to Protect approach is that it goes far beyond just the politically conten tious nature of military intervention and seeks to deal with the root causes of conflict: “it identifies structural issues such as the weakness of the state structures and the inequitabl e distribution of wealth as causes of conflict.”4 In the African context, the Responsibility to Prot ect approach and the deference to regional organizations acknowledged by the UN signa ls a monumental shift in how Africa as a whole deals with security crisis. The m ost pervasive reason for the OAU’s ineffectiveness was its dogmatic protection of stat e sovereignty; this position meant the organization could not legally or institutionally i ntervene where it was needed. As a result, the AU’s security regime was given the foll owing tasks by the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union:promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa; anticipating and preventing conflicts; promoting and implementing pe ace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; coordinating and harm onizing continental efforts in the prevention and combating of internat ional terrorism; developing a common defense that can be operational ized; promoting and encouraging democratic practices, good governance a nd the rule of law, Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Reg ime 7-8 Ibid 7-8


through the protection of human rights and fundamen tal freedoms, the sanctity of human life, and international humanitar ian law.5 Although, the Constitutive Act and the PSC of the A U continue to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of AU member states, ther e is a limit to which the institution accepts the sovereignty of states. This limit is th e inability or unwillingness of member states to provide adequate protections to their cit izens: Article 4 of the Constitutive Act asserts “the right to intervene in a Member State p ursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances: namely war crime s, genocide and crimes against humanity.”6Article 4 (j) of the Constitutive Act also indicate s that “a member state has the right to request intervention from the Union for re storation of peace and security.”7 Contrary to the OAU provision, the AU does not need to acquire the consent of the state in question to intervene. Two-thirds majority is ne eded for approval of intervention, not a consensus. The AU’s right to intervene clause makes the Constitutive Act the first international treaty to identify a right to interve ne in a state of humanitarian crisis other than genocide.8 Structure of the AU’s Peace and Security Architectu re: Internal Actors of the Emerging Security Structure of the AU The AU’s peace and security architecture (Figure 3. 1) is governed by the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC is governed by the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union and the Commissioner for Peace an d Security. The framework through which the AU develops its security architecture is the Common African Defense and Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, Article 4 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4, S ection (h n Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4, S ection (j) Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Re gime, 10-14


Security Policy (CADSP). The institutions that supp ort this framework are the Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force, Special Fund, NEPAD, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) Figure 3.1: Structure of the Peace and Security Cou ncil of the AU9 The institution of the AU tasked with formally draf ting and implementing the new comprehensive approach to security is the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The PSC was created in 2002, to serve as the foremost decis ion-making body of the AU, on matters of security and defense. In 2004, thirty-si x members of the PSC ratified the PSC Protocol. This Protocol laid out the general goal o f the PSC as “a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa.”10 As seen in Figure 3.1, the PSC is supported by the Chairman of the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Earl y Warning System (CEWS), an 9 UN Office of the Special Advisor, The Emerging Rol e of the AU and ECOWAS in Conflict Prevention and P eacebuilding” Background Paper (2007): 1810 Golaszinski, Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture 2-3


African Standby Force (ASF), and a Special Fund. In addition, a Military Staff Committee advises the PSC on issues relating to mil itary affairs. The Executive Council of the AU selects 15 member states representing the five sub-regions of Africa—East, Central, North, South, and West—to three-year terms in the PSC. Ten other member states are selected for two-year terms. The PSC and the Chairman of the Commission have tremendous power, including the powers to enga ge in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions; authorize the mounting and deployment of peace supp ort missions; recommend to the Assembly intervention in a member state in respect of severe circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide a nd crimes against humanity; institute sanctions whenever an unconstit utional change of government takes place in a member state; implement the common defense policy of the AU; follow up the progress to wards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect of t he sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by member s tates; and support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of arm ed conflicts or major natural disasters.11 There are some striking differences between the PSC and its counterpart from the OAU Mechanism. One such difference is in the rotation o f membership in the security structure. While previously in the Mechanism, membe rship was based on alphabetical order, the PSC membership system allows for a vote that must yield a two-thirds majority from secret ballot. This new system has the effect of preventing countries that are not suited to the task of the time from being in a deci sion-making position. Another significant departure from the Mechanism is that [t]he Protocol states 10 substantive criteria that candidate countries have to meet to be eligible for selection. These include re cent contributions to peacekeeping, the capacity to shoulder the responsi bilities entailed in membership of the council, and financial contributi ons to the AU and the 11 Ibid, 2-3


Peace Fund…the 15 member states of the PSC members should show respect for constitutional governance, rule of law and human rights.12 The Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS) is org anized with the Commission and the RECs connected through situation rooms and sharing timely information. CEWS is mandated “to facilitate the an ticipation and prevention of conflicts.”13 The Chairman of the Commission is supposed to use i nformation from CEWS to advise the PSC on emerging threats to conti nental peace and security. The central organ of CEWS is the Situation Room which i s located at the Conflict Management Directorate at the AU. The Situation Roo m is “linked to the observation and monitoring units of sub-regional organizations, suc h as those being established within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the Horn of Afri ca and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).”14 Lessons from the conflict in Rwanda show that gathering accurate and timely information is necess ary for the successful implementation of the comprehensive security program of the AU. Of maximum importance to the functioning of CEWS is its integrated and well coor dinated relationship with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The RECs are responsible for collecting localized data and transmitting it to the Situation Room for further analysis. The Panel of the Wise (POW) works in tandem with th e Commissioner of the AU Secretariat in engaging in preventative diplomacy. The POW is made up of respected African leaders who offer neutrality and credibilit y during important negotiations. They serve as envoys of the AU to trouble spots, in orde r to engage in preventive diplomacy to 12 Golaszinski, Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture, 2-313 Ibid 4-514 Ibid, 4-5


avert further decline into armed conflict. However the “operationalization of the POW…had to be delayed until the end of 2007, mainly due to lack of office space and human and financial resources.”15 The most ambitious and far-reaching goal of the eme rging security structure of the AU is the creation of the African Standby Force (ASF). The UN is the preferred authority to mandate the ASF. However, the PSC has the right to initiate peacekeeping missions under the mandate of Chapter 9 of the UN C harter. The goal of African strategists for the AU is to have fully operational regionally based brigades by 2010. Rapid establishment of these brigades is important because the AU envisions having the capacity to deal with complex emergencies. Each mem ber state would be required to produce 300 to 500 military observers and over 200 hundred police, should a need for their services arise.16 The deployment rate of the ASF should optimally be within 30-90 days. For a situation involving genocide, the force must be activiated within a maximum of 14 daysrThe RECs would serve as a counterpart to the AU for ce. The African Standby Force should ideally draw on the experience and exi sting capabilities of the sub-regional organizations. “These regional brigades will be dep loyed under AU mandates and placed under AU or UN operational control, as applicable.”17 A fully operationalized ASF will have a range of duties, including “observation and monitoring, preventive deployment, peacekeeping and multidimensional peacekeeping, int ervention in grave circumstances like genocide, and engagement in peace-building tas ks, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization.”18 The AU has given the RECs leeway in determining 15Nicoletta Pirozzi, “EU Support to African Security Architecture: Funding and Training Components,” European Union Institute of Security Studies, Occasional Pap er (February 2009): 1316 Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Reg ime, 15-1617 Ibid, 15-1618 Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Reg ime, 15-16.


how the brigades for the ASF are to be formulated. For example, the East African Brigade was created to be part of the overall ASF f orce. Under normal political circumstances in Africa, such an ambitious goal of creating a standby force capable of rapidly responding to African crises, would be deep ly contentious and bogged down by political setbacks. However, member states of the A U have come to the agreement, through the adoption of the ‘African Solutions to A frican Problems’ concept, that their collective security and thus development depend on an effective stabilizing force. The Peace Fund is a holdover from the Mechanism, an d was set up in 1993 to “provide the necessary financial resources for peac e support activities and other activities related to peace and security. It is to be financed with requisitions from the AU’s regular budget, as well as from voluntary contributions fro m state and non-state sources inside and beyond Africa.”19 Due to the financial weakness of member states, th e EU was asked to set up the Peace Facility (PF), through which fu nds could be allocated to member countries to promote peacekeeping operations. The “ main functions of the PF will be to (i) promote African solutions to African crisis by providing the AU with the financial muscle to back up its political resolve with concre te actions; (ii) encourage African solidarity through financial contributions from all African countries; and (iii) create the necessary conditions for development.”20 The Common Africa Defense and Security Policy In February 2004, the AU adopted the Solemn Declara tion on a Common Africa Defense and Security Policy (CADSP). This policy fr amework tied in development as a 19 Golaszinski, Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture, 5-6. 20 Ibid, 5-6


necessary component of a comprehensive security str ategy for the continent. This comprehensive approach to development and security, as conceptualized by the Human Security paradigm, serves as the overarching policy framework of the PSC and the emerging security structure of the AU. While most AU and NEPAD programs seek to deal with the causes of conflicts, such as underdevelopment and bad governance, the CA DSP seeks to manage conflicts through preventive diplomacy and quick intervention The CADSP is the framework or strategy around which the continent’s emerging secu rity structure is built. This policy deals with complex and changing threats facing the continent: interstate conflicts including situations that thre aten national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as intra-state c onflicts including war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Unset tled post-conflict situation, armaments, diseases and various other cr imes all constitute internal threats under the terms of the Common Afri can Defense and Security Policy.21 The CADSP signifies a common understanding by membe r states about the threats faced by all, and the need for common actio n to deal with these threats. Touray argues that three underlying concepts define the CA DSP: defense, security and common threats, and development. [I]n the context of the African Union, defense is d efined broadly to encompass the traditional use by a state and/or any competent public authority of the legally constituted armed forces t o protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as t he less traditional, nonmilitary modes of protecting people’s, cultural, social and economic rights, values and ways of life.22 Common threats refer to an expanded view of defense and security to included threats that link the needs of member states together. Exte rnal threats that qualify as common 21 Omar Touray, The Common African Defense and Securi ty Policy,” African Affairs 104 no. 417 (2004): 642-64322 Ibid, 648


threats include “external aggression against an Afr ican country and international conflicts and crises with adverse affects on African regional security, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, the adverse effects of globalization, international trade regimes and narcotics.”23 Central to the CASDP’s goals in countering interna l and external threats to collective security is dealing with mutual suspicio n and rivalry among member states and encouraging capacity-building measures needed to ad dress immediate and long-term crises. The Role of the New Economic Partnership for Africa n Development (NEPAD) NEPAD plays an unusual role in the AU’s security st rategy because it is a central institution of the AU, yet more autonomous than oth er branches of the Union. Issues of good governance, institution building, and socio-ec onomic development are of prime importance to the new security framework of the AU. Therefore, NEPAD—whose main purpose is to focus on issues of economic developme nt, good governance, human rights and justice—has also added a peace and security dim ension to its mandate. This role stems from the realization that conflict on the con tinent impedes necessary socioeconomic development, and vice versa. NEPAD is to c omplement the work of the AU in its peacekeeping and political actions by focusing on post-conflict reconstruction efforts through the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction Po licy Framework. The framework seeks to address interdependence between developmen t and security, particularly humanitarian aspects of peace-building and post-con flict reconstruction. The matrix of relationships that this new program should coordina te and streamline includes policies 23 Ibid, 648


from within NEPAD itself, the AU, the Regional Econ omic Communities (RECs), civil society organizations and the private sector, and i nternational organizations and agencies. According to NEPAD, “the continent has for the past 40 years been torn apart by inter-state, intra-state, ethnic, and religious, an d resource conflicts. Approximately 26 armed conflicts have erupted in Africa since the 19 60’s, affecting the lives of 474 million people representing 61% of the population of the co ntinent and claiming over 7 million lives.”24 In addition, conflicts in Africa have consequences that spiral over to all segments of life on the continent. These conflicts have disrupted Africa’s fragile pos t-colonial sociocultural, political and economic systems and destro yed most of its transport and communication infrastructure and heal th and education services. In the process it has damaged the environ ment, which, in turn has contributed to further cycles of resource related c onflicts. The cycle of conflict has severely undermined both African and f oreign investor confidence, further weakened indigenous economic de velopment, and increased dependence on foreign loans and assistanc e.25 Thus, every post-conflict reconstruction program mu st be suited to fit the specific historical context of the conflict. The five dimens ions to post-conflict reconstruction include security; political transition, governance and participation; socio-economic development; human rights, justice and reconciliati on; and coordination, management and resource mobilizations. The creation of the Pos t-Conflict Reconstruction Framework involved consultation with academics, civil society groups, policymakers, development organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and foreign governments. In 2003, NEPAD developed the African Peace and Security Agen da (APSA) which consisted of the following priorities: 24NEPAD, Governance, Peace and Security Program: African Pos t-Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework (2005): 2-5.25 Ibid, 2-3.


developing mechanisms, institution building process es and support instruments for achieving peace and security in Afr ica; improving capacity for, and coordination of, early action for conflict prevention, management, and resolution including the development of peace s upport capabilities; improving early warning capacity in Africa through strategic analysis and support; prioritizing strategic security as follows : promoting an African definition and action on disarmament, rehabilitatio n and reconstruction (DDRR) efforts on post-conflict situations; coordin ating and ensuring effective implementation of African efforts aimed a t preventing and combating terrorism; ensuring efficient and consoli dated action for the prevention, combating and eradicating of the proble m of illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking or small arms and light weapons; improving the security sector and the capacity for good governance as related to peace and security; generating minimum s tandards for application in the exploitation and management of A frica’s resources (including non-renewable resources) in areas affect ed by conflict; assisting in resource mobilization for the African Union Peac e Fund and for regional initiatives aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent.26 The Post-Conflict Reconstruction system works in th ree phases, all of which revolve around security, political, economic, judic ial, and administrative goals. The first phase is the emergency phase, which directly follow s the commencement of a conflict and whose main aim is to offer humanitarian assista nce and secure civilians. Organizations such as the Red Cross and the UN will be involved in providing the necessary humanitarian assistance. The second phase of the post-conflict reconstruction system involves transitioning from one regime to an other. This is where general elections and a new constitution are allowed to begin to help create the legitimate institutions of governance. According to NEPAD, the transitional phase focuses on developing legiti mate and sustainable internal capacity…Programs include efforts at rebui lding the economic infrastructure, short-term job creation through lab or intensive public works, and establishing mechanisms for governance a nd participation. The security sector is likely to be engaged in transfor ming the existing police, defense and other security agencies so that they ca n become representative 26Ibid., 2-3.


of the communities they serve and so that they are oriented to their appropriate roles in the post-conflict environment.27 The third phase is the developmental phase, where t he new regime undergoes further economic, political, and social transformations. Th e peacekeeping and stabilization forces are expected to leave and security responsibilities are left to the new government. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) The RECs were developed as a way of increasing regi onal integration and enhancing economic development. However, as endemic conflicts flourished, so did the need to develop effective and localized responses t o conflict. Thus, “with the exception of the Arab Maghreb Union, all of Africa’s RECs hav e subsequently developed security mechanisms (albeit with varying competencies) to op erate within the context of a broader regional integration agenda.”28 Article 16 of the PSC Protocol and the CADSP “str ess that the regional mechanisms will form the building blocks of the AU’s peace and security architecture, including the ASF. The PSC P rotocol reinforces this relationship by emphasizing the importance of harmonization, coordi nation and cooperation between the AU and the regional mechanisms, and ensuring effect ive partnerships between the regional mechanisms and the PSC.”29 At the heart of the utility of the RECs to the AU’ s peace and security efforts is their proximity to th e conflict zones. The RECs provide the AU with better conflict management options for addr essing conflicts in specific subregions.30 The key challenge to this argument is that RECs ca n actually worsen a conflict if member states are not neutral to the localized c onflict. Additionally, regional hegemons, who provide the largest share of resource s to REC capabilities, may seek to 27Ibid., 8.28 Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Reg ime, 19-2029Ibid 1930 Ibid, 19-20


influence actors on the ground. RECs, like the sta tes that constitute their membership, are constrained by financial and logistical limits that greatly hamper the institutions’ ability to act on crises that develop. The patchy l evels of political and economic development among member states affect the ability of the AU and the RECs to coordinate and harmonize policy initiatives. Thus, “these factors inevitably undermine the consensus required to pursue a collective secur ity mandate and execute effective responses to conflict through regional and continen tal initiatives.”31 The RECs have differing mandates and visions for peace and securi ty. For example, ECOWAS is more interventionist than SADC. A significant problem th at has been brewing concerning RECs is that there is a resistance on the part of m ember states to relinquish some influence at the sub-regional level for a more cont inental approach to conflict management. External Components of the Emerging Security Struct ure of the African Union There is a gap between the AU’s ambition and abilit y to create a self-sustaining peace and security architecture that can act to pre vent, manage, and resolve conflicts. This gap is being filled by an emerging security st ructure made up of various international stakeholders. The annual budget of th e AU is $60 million, which should be contributed by member states; however the inability of member states to fulfill their obligations has resulted in significant arrears. “I n 2005, according to the AU Commission, donors provided around 95 per cent, or US$ 80 million, of the US$ 95 31 Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Re gime, 19


million needed to finance the AU’s programs, which shows that the fund is in fact heavily donor-dependent.”32 These stakeholders—made up of the EU, UN, G8, and i ndividual countries like the US, UK, France, and Germany—have different reas ons for supporting the creation of an independent AU security structure. Although inst itutions like the EU, UN, and the G8 have enough capacity to pool together resources to support the development of the AU’s peace and security mechanism, there are major count ries that have strong bilateral relations with the AU. Countries like France and th e UK also have strong historic links with AU member states. The European Union (EU) Key international actors such as the EU are vital t o the enhancement of African capabilities. One such contribution is the establis hment of the African Peace Facility (APF), which: provides €250 million over three years to support o perations deployed by the AU or undertaken by regional organizations unde r the auspices of the AU and requiring UN mandate. In addition, a portion of these funds (€35 million) have been allocated for capacity building, including helping the AU to develop its security policy, building plannin g capacity in the AU’s Peace and Security Department, and assisting the AU and regional organizations with planning and managing peacekeepi ng operations.33 Due to increased need by the AU in its peacekeeping missions, the APF increased to €440 million in 2007.34 A significant side-effect of the policy by the EU of shifting funds used for development—particularly its European Deve lopment Fund (EDF)—towards this Facility is that supporting the security archi tecture creates a serious draw from 32 Stephen Klingebiel, Tina Marie Blohm, and Rosa Eck le, “Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of th e African Peace and Security Architecture,” German Development Institute 38 (2008): 3233 Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Reg ime 2534 Pirozzi, EU Support to African Security Architecture 26


development. Increased consolidation and integratio n has made the EU one of the most powerful international actors. Growth in wealth has increasingly led it to participate more vigorously in global security decisions. For Europe the acceleration of globalization has increased opportunities as well as risks, particula rly from non-state actors. The heart of Europe’s interest in Africa is embedded within its European Security Strategy (ESS) established in 2003. Critical to its objectives is targeting regional security threats, which “can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure ; it provides opportunities for organized crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand or W MD.”35 To this end, the EU set up the Peace Facility endowed with $250 million in pea cekeeping assistance for operations mandated by the AU. In 2007, this AU-EU relationshi p was bolstered by the Joint AfricaEU Partnership which seeks to develop long-term str ategic partnerships. This move “separated and fragmented financial procedures impl y higher transaction costs and a time-consuming decision-making process, considerabl y jeopardizing the process of interaction between the EU and its African counterp arts.”36 In the area of peace-building and post-conflict rec onstruction, the EU’s Common Defense and Security Policy deals with development policies that are needed to ensure conflict prevention. The EU supports long-term deve lopment programs such as democratization, trade, and arms control, as well a s short-term crisis management programs. Overall, the EU’s support of the emerging security structure of the AU has grown. “ Since 2004, the European Union has given financial support to the AU through its African Peace Facility. Through this €250 milli on ($343 million) mechanism, the EU allocated €200 million ($274 million) for financing African-led peace operations, €35 35 European Council “A Secure Europe in a Better Worl d-European Security Strategy,” Brussels, December ( 2003): 536 Pirozzi, EU Support to African Security Architecture 23


million ($48 million) for AU capacity building, €12 million ($16 million) for contingencies, and €3 million ($4 million) for audi ts and evaluations.”37 The G8 Another international actor necessary for the build ing of this AU security architecture is the G8. The G8 was interested in su pporting the development of a viable peace and security structure for the AU because of the relationship between conflict and underdevelopment: “where conflict is widespread, po verty is exacerbated and sustainable development is impossible. Where poverty increases, the risk of instability and violence grows.”38 To this end the G8 has committed to supporting pea cekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. It has adopted the goals of s upporting the training troops, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and the development of the African Standby Force. In 2002, the G8 adopted the Africa Action Plan (AAP) t o assist NEPAD’s efforts at sustainable development. Since NEPAD includes the a rea of peace and security within its framework for development—particularly the early wa rning, conflict management, prevention, and resolution, aspects of its approach —the G8 was expected to assist in developing these goals. However, the continuing foc us on developing the military capacity of PSC has hindered the development of an indigenous peace-building force that can shoulder the burden of post-conflict reconstruc tion. The G8 sees enhancing security capacity on the continent as part of the overall de velopment package for Africa as is shown by its partnership with NEPAD. In 2005, the A U made several commitments towards peace and security in Africa. Among these w ere the commitment to train 75,000 37 Katherine Andrews, and Victoria K. Holt, “United N ations-African Union Coordination on Peace and Secu rity in Africa” Stimson Center Issue Brief (August 2007): 738 The Data Report 2007, 98


troops by 2010 to allow Africans develop their own capabilities, the support of AMIS, and the provision of technical assistance to the de velopment of the African Standby Force. As part of the G8 commitment to the developm ent of Africa’s emerging peace and security structure, its donors have undertaken step s at training and technical assistance. The US is the largest donor within the G8. Its Afri can Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program (ACOTA) is focused on traini ng 75,000 African peacekeeping troops by 2010. As of 2007, it has spent $75 millio n on this program. The UK has spent $38 million on operational training, which includes planning, preparation, and logistical assistance. It has also spent $28 million for peace keeping training at the Kofi Annan Center, and an additional $5 million on training fa cilities. France is supporting African peacekeeping operations by spending $15.4 million t hrough its RECAMP program. Italy has not spent funds on training but is rather using its own facilities in Italy to train African peacekeepers. Canada has spent $3.9 million on supporting RECs such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and $2.6 million for the Kofi Annan Center. The AU-UN Partnership Acknowledging its limits, the AU has created a fram ework that partners with the UN to deal with ongoing crisis, while continuing to build its own independent capacities. The PSC Protocol envisages a collaborative relation ship between the AU and the UN. According to Article 17 section 1 of the Protocol, “the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter national peace and security.”39 There is 39 Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Reg ime 23-24


a generally unclear relationship between regional i nstruments and the UN. Although the UN Charter clearly states that the UN Security Coun cil has the primary decision-making role when it comes to addressing issues relating to international peace and security, Chapter VIII also gives regional instruments the le gal leeway to engage in actions that resolve regional conflicts. Taking into account the continent’s experience with the ineptitude of the UN during the Rwandan crisis, it has sought to carve out alternatives should the UN suffer bureaucratic or political stal ls again. According to the PSC Protocol, “the UN has primary responsibility for ma intaining international peace, security and stability in Africa, thereby subtly staking its claim to the continent.”40 The UN provides vital assistance to the ongoing developmen t of AU’s peace and security architecture. For instance, the Department of Polit ical Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the UN have been involve d in assisting the ASF. As for the relationship between the PSC and the UN, Chapter 5 and 6 of the UN Charter clearly state that the UN has the right to use regional ins titutions to meet its objective of securing peace. Since the area of international peace falls within the purview of the UN, the AU must seek the approval of the UN Security Council i n areas where the AU is contemplating the use of force. The relationship be tween the AU and UN is more cooperative than confrontational. This partnership is more from necessity than choice, since the AU’s ability to stand on its own in matte rs of security are minimal at best. Individual State Donors and their Strategic Interes ts Africa’s geostrategic importance in international r elations has risen significantly since the Cold War. The changes in international po litics affect how external actors 40 Ibid, 13


interact with the emerging security structure of th e African Union. There is, on the surface, a convergence of interests between the AU and external actors and donors, on the importance of developing a cogent African response mechanism for dealing with security crises. The interests of external actors, particula rly those who finance and support much of the security structure of the AU, have an effect on how the PSC decides priorities and AU policies. For AU members, financing and logistical support fo r peacekeeping missions and reconstruction efforts are necessary for developing indigenous conflict management capacities and for realizing the dreams of an ‘Afri can Renaissance’ in the twenty-first century. For external actors, developing an African security structure allows them to expand their capacities for dealing with threats. T hese complex threats are spurred by destabilizing crises that lead to failed states and thereby serve as breeding grounds for international threats. The principal advantage of i nvesting in local capacities is to limit political damage from intervention in foreign confl icts, such as the fall-out from the debacle in Somalia in 1993. Supporting an African s ecurity structure also insulates external actors from the criticism of lack of actio n, particularly when genocide or other appalling crimes are taking place. Key to understan ding this congruence of interests is globalization and its effects on all corners of the globe. This seeming convergence of interests has not alway s been evident. During the Cold War, Africa was seen as another battleground w here proxy wars between the ideological nemeses could stake claim to geo-strate gic interests. African countries were just coming out of colonialism and were saddled wit h the pressures exerted by both sides. During this time, calls by President Nkrumah for en hanced security and political


integration as key goals for the newly constructed Organization of African Union were ignored. When the end of the Cold War brought the e nd of the slight attention Africa got in international politics, the lack of African secu rity and political integration left states and regions unable to cope with a staggering rise i n civil and ethnic conflict, compounded by debilitating poverty and underdevelopment. The U N, the only bastion for intervention on the continent during the 1980s and 1990s, was cu tting down on its engagement obligations: “factors contributing to this included operational setbacks in Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia between 1993 and 1995, as wel l as financial and political considerations for countries contributing personnel and other resources to these expensive and high-risk missions, often deployed to areas of dubious strategic interest.”41 The importance of Africa’s emerging security struct ure to global security concerns can be seen in the involvement of not only institutions like the EU, G8, UN, but also individual countries in financing and supporti ng the emerging security architecture of the AU. The US, the UK, France and other world p owers have always had interests in Africa. During the Cold War, both the Soviets and t he West sought to increase their spheres of influence around the world by engaging i n proxy conflicts in Africa. The most famous example was the civil war in Congo, where co nflict over resources fueled decades-long civil war. Following the end of the Co ld War, the rise in globalization, and the rise of fragile states, there has been a growin g consensus in the West, particularly donors to the African region, that complex emergenc ies that involve poor governance, economic and social marginalization, political inst ability, violent conflict, the debilitation and de-legitimization of the state, rampant crime, increased drug trafficking, and rise in 41 Alex Ramsbotham, Alhaji S. Bah, and Fanny Calder, “Enhancing African Peace and Security Capacity: A U seful Role for the UK and the G8?” International Affairs 81 2 (2005): 327-330.


health pandemics have rendered borders incapable of containing threats. Thus, there was an increased interest in human security and the foc us on development-centered security, as a way of mitigating trans-border threats. In par ticular, the September 11th attacks in the US seem to have moved Africa into an important geos trategic interest for several donor countries. This convergence of interest towards dev elopment and security in Africa is a welcome improvement. However, as the cases of Burun di, Somalia, and Sudan will show, there are serious problems with the emerging framework of security on the continent, which threatens the promise of creating a sustainable process for dealing with complex emergencies and the basis for strong develo pment on the continent. As the leading institution dealing with keeping int ernational peace and security, the UN has a vital role to play in the emerging AU security framework. The role of the UN within the emerging security framework is more c omplicated than is warranted. Although the institution has provided necessary log istical and financial support in both peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction effor ts during AU mandated interventions, there has been confusion of late about the relation ship between the two institutions. Legally, the AU is supposed to fall under the autho rity of the Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which authorizes the regional institutions to deal with issues of peace and security, provided the UN mandates it. However, the UN is deferring responsibility for intervening in conflicts to the AU. The lack of fin ancial autonomy and the logistical constraints for the AU have impeded its ability to conduct peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures on its own. The result has been a n awkward hybrid mission of AU and UN forces, which has created many problems, includi ng overlapping mandates and bureaucratic hurdles. However, the most significant hurdles are the political constraints


within the UN and the broader international communi ty that have contributed to the ineffectiveness of the UN. Since the mid 1990s, there has been a gradual rise in the number of UN peacekeeping missions, particularly following the s hame of the Rwandan genocide. But there has also been an increased investment in expa nding the capacity of African regional institutions, particularly ECOWAS and SADC, who hav e benefitted from sizeable donor investments over the years. The West has used diffe rent mechanisms to develop African security capacities, including the RECAMP program b y the French, the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) integrating resources from w ithin the British government into a cohesive donor mechanism, and the Global Peace Oper ations Initiative (GPOI) developed by the US to help develop capacity in individual co untries. These ad hoc measures symbolize a lack of strategic planning in how best to tackle security in Africa. The US The US has been involved in a myriad of peacekeepin g and capacity building initiatives in Africa for decades. In 2004, the Glo bal Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) was launched in 2004 to invest $660 million to tra in “75,000 foreign peacekeepers— 40,000 of whom are to be African—and assist the AU and other RO’s [Regional Organizations] with developing their headquarters c apability in arenas of preparation and implementation of peace operations.”42 In situations where the AU cannot undertake contingency planning exercises on its own, the GPOI supports it through providing capacity-support infrastructure and planning for th e smooth transfer of information among African military forces and among stakeholder s within the security structure of 42 Lindsay Scorgie, “Building African Peacekeeping Ca pacity: Donors and African Union’s Emerging Peace a nd Security Architecture,” KAIPTC Paper 16 (April 2007): 16


the AU. Scorgie argues that the US method of fundin g capacity building programs is through in kind contributions, which “enables it to maintain heavy influence over the RO.”43 This self-interested approach to assistance has ma de coordination and harmonization among various stakeholders, particula rly the EU, UK and France, difficult.44 The UK The UK, like the EU and the US, has its own interes t in stability and development in Africa. According to its Department For Internat ional Development, “Many of the problems which affect us, such as war and conflict, international crime, refugees, the trade in illegal drugs and the spread of diseases l ike HIV and AIDS, are caused or made worse by poverty in developing countries. Getting r id of poverty will make for a better world for everybody.”45 The UK has been able to pool resources from its va rious capacity building programs, including its Foreign and Common wealth Office (FCO), the Department for International Development (DFID), an d the Ministry of Defense (MOD), towards the creation of a single streamlined instit ution known as the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP). With an estimated annual en dowment of £60 million, the ACPP supports the G8’s Action Plan as well as the EU. It s goal is to streamline British conflict prevention tools to maximize their effectiveness. T he overall objective of the ACPP is to support the building of African conflict management capacity; assist with conflict prevention, management and post-conflict r econstruction in a number of priority sub-regions and country conflict s; and to support pan43 Scorgie, Building African Peacekeeping Capacity 1644 S. Klingebiel T. Blohm, R. Eckle. K. Grunow, “Do nor Contributions to Strengthening the African Peac e and Security Architecture” DIE Country Working Group Ethiopia/South Africa, In stitute for Security Studies (2006): 1545 “About Us,” Developments Magazine available at t-us (accessed 1 June 2009).


African initiatives for security sector reforms, sm all arms control and to address the economic and financial causes of confli ct.46 Forty-one percent of ACPP funding in the 2006-2007 budget year went to Security Sector Reform (SSR) policies, eleven percent has gone to D DR, while twenty-one percent went to peace operations. Peace-building initiatives rec eived fourteen percent, while only three percent has gone into supporting the peace and secu rity architecture of the African Union itself.47 This distribution shows an emphasis on bilateral s upport for country-specific needs, as opposed to the continent-wide emerging se curity structure of the AU. France France, like the UK, has historic colonial ties wit h Africa. However, unlike Britain, France has had a reputation for overtly fo llowing policies that are interest-based in the post-colonial period. “France has long maint ained a high level of influence over the currency and financial policies of its former colon ies” and “has defense and military cooperation agreements with twenty sub-Saharan stat es. A network of military bases, that allows France to deploy its troops rapidly to all s ub-regions of the continent.”48 Increased pressure from fellow EU members, who want a more Eu ropeanized presence in Africa as opposed to French domination of parts of Africa, ha s led to a scaling back of military and economic operations on the continent. The creation of the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities (RECAMP) with a €90 million budget was to support training for African peace operations. The goal of RECAMP is “to increase peacekeeping potential for—and cooperation with—the African Unio n, using traditional training 46 “The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: An Informati on Document: A Joint UK Government Approach to Prev enting and Reducing Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa,” DFID, Ministry of Defense and Foreign and Commonwealth O ffice (2004): 747 “Africa Conflict Prevention Pool,” DFID Annual Report (2006/07): 6-748 Andreas Mehler, “France in Search of a New Africa Policy” Africa’s Plight 9 (Spring 2008): 28

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measures and joint maneuvers.”49 According to Scorgie, “RECAMP is clearly focused o n the ‘Africanization’ of peacekeeping, and thereby i s geared more towards enhancing the ability of Africans to undertake their own peacekee ping operations, than necessarily promoting effective integration into UN missions.”50 The question of whether or not France subordinates its own significant interests o n the continent for a wider European Africa policy has been a thorny issue among EU memb er states and has had an effect on the ability for stakeholders within the emerging se curity structure to coordinate effectively. Conclusion African countries formed the African Union to incre ase integration and development and, recognizing the interaction of sec urity and development, endowed the organization with a security structure designed to tackle the complex internal and interstate conflicts on the continent. Given the li mited resources and capacities of both African states and the new AU institutions, as well as the authority of the U.N. Security Council with respect to international intervention, external multilateral and individual actors have become a major part of the AU security structure and its initiatives. This arrangement brings needed resources but leaves many stakeholders and serious problems of coordination. 49 Ibid, 3350 Scorgie, Building African Peacekeeping Capacity, 18

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93 Chapter IV African Union Peacekeeping Missions in Burundi, Sud an and Somalia The AU’s ability to undertake successful peacekeepi ng missions depends on the coordination between AU member states and external donors. A comparative analysis of AU missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia sheds li ght on whether or not the AU is able to implement its security goals successfully t hrough peacekeeping, and how it is able to coordinate actions effectively within a security structure that involves converging and diverging interests. Burundi Since its independence in 1962, Burundi has undergo ne several ethnic upheavals that have devastated the country’s social, economic and political fabric. The direct and indirect consequences of the protracted conflict be tween the Hutus and the Tutsis serve to illustrate the relationship between conflict and un derdevelopment. Prior to colonialism, ethnic conflict was managed t hrough the centralized control of chiefs. According to Abrams, “A client-patron s ystem ordered relations throughout much of society, provided another avenue of social mobility and promoted social cohesion.”1 While not perfect, this social organization was ab le to keep the ethnic and social conflicts under control until three importan t factors—colonialism, modernization, 1 James S. Abrams, “Burundi: Anatomy of an Ethnic Co nflict,” Survival Vol. 37, Issue 1, (1995): 146

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94 and interstate ethnic tensions with Rwanda— further exacerbated the existing cleavages in Burundian society. The Germans were the first Europeans to explore Bur undi extensively in the 19th century. After successive attempts at pacification, they were successful at establishing a system of indirect rule in the country. The German administration did not change the existing structure of Burundian society. However, t he establishment of Belgian rule in 1918 did significantly change social dynamics. Belg ian rule and the fact that the Belgians controlled both Rwanda and Burundi under the same a dministrative system would have long-term implications for Rwanda-Burundi relations and ethnic tensions in the region between Hutus and Tutsis: Operating under the mistaken assumption that the Tu tsi domination of the political system was as strong in Burundi as it was in Rwanda, Belgium gave greater power and educational opportunities to the Ganwa and the Tutsi. Belgian attempts to rationalize the traditional adm inistrative system further contributed to the consolidation of Tutsi d ominance.2 In the 1950s, following Belgium’s unceremonious dep arture from the continent amid rising criticism, even from fellow European im perialists, about its inhumane treatment of Congo’s inhabitants, Burundi was put u nder UN Trusteeship. However, colonialism had already drastically changed the soc ial, cultural, political, and economic fabric of the continent. Christianity had replaced traditional religions and culture, the cultural dimensions of subsistence farming had been replaced by increased modernization and factories. There was also a rise in western-tra ined intellectuals and proponents of western ideas of democracy, commerce, and education The result was positive in the sense that Burundi was rapidly modernizing; however the rise of the state-patronage 2 Ibid., 146

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95 system amplified ethnic tensions. According to Abra ms, colonialism’s influence in modernizing Burundi resulted in “an intensification of ethnic identification and the creation of separate elites, of which two (the Ganw a and Tutsi) dominated the political and economic system, and the third (the Hutu) was s maller, significantly underrepresented in positions of power and increasi ngly resentful of the dominance of the other two groups.”3 Burundi’s Civil War Although post-independence Burundi did not exhibit high levels of inter-ethnic conflict, intra-ethnic political tensions did affec t the country’s transition to selfgovernment. The triggering factor for the ethnic co nflict that has plagued Burundi for generations was the Hutu uprising and eventual poli tical control by Hutus in neighboring Rwanda in 1964. Thousands of Rwandan Tutsis were sl aughtered in this power struggle. Massive numbers of Rwandan Tutsis also sought refug e with their kinsmen in Burundi. This migration of Rwandan Tutsis created a dicey po litical, social, and economic crisis for Burundi. Hutus in Burundi were encouraged by th e turn of events in Rwanda, while Burundian Tutsis feared the same fate as their coun terparts in Rwanda. Tutsis have been a dominant minority in the politi cal structure of Burundi for decades. In 1965, Hutu elements within the military attempted to overthrow the Tutsi government in a coup. This coup attempt was met wit h swift action by the government through the purging of Hutus from the military and government. Hutus continued to protest their oppression at the hands of the Tutsi minority. The Tutsi government also protested the routine use of threats of attempted c oups by Hutu rebels as a means 3 Ibid., 146

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96 suppressing dissent from ethnic rivals. In 1972, B urundi endured one of its most brutal civil wars. Elements in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Tanzania supplied logistical support to Hutu rebels. The insecure Tut si government decided to eliminate its Hutu opponents, as well those Tutsis who were not c ooperative, resulting in 250,000 dead and 150,000 displaced Burundians. The demoralized H utus retreated until 1988 when Hutus brutally attacked hundreds of Tutsis. However the response by the Tutsicontrolled military was not proportional: at least 15,000 Hutus were killed, while hundreds of thousands of others were driven into Rw anda. These actions by the Tutsi government were basically attempts at ethnic cleans ing.4 The election of a Hutu president in Burundi in 199 3 increased hopes that the cycle of ethnic violence had come to an end. However, a f ew months following the election of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu president in Burun di, he was killed in a coup by Tutsi elements in the Burundian military. The result of t his coup was “a frenzy of brutal violence between Hutu and Tutsi throughout the coun try that took up to an estimated 200,000 lives and drove an estimated 1-1.5m from th eir home.”5 The cycle of ethnic violence was finally broken in 2000 with the signing of the Arusha Agreement by 17 political parties, the gover nment, and the parliament. The problem was that the main rebel groups refused to s ign the agreement. These Hutu rebel groups—CNDD-FDD and Palipehutu-FNL—threatened to in vade the capital if they were not included into the transitional government. Afte r intensive negotiations, one of the holdouts, CNDD-FDD, signed a ceasefire and joined t he transitional government. 4 Ibid., 148. 5 Ibid., 148

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97 African Union Mission in Burundi While Burundi was undergoing its transitional phase the CNDD-FDD and the Palipehutu-FNL were still launching attacks on Tuts i targets. The continuous tensions, despite the ceasefire, threatened to derail the sig nificant gains made between government forces and the other political actors involved in t he conflict. Thus, in 2004, a Heads of State and Government meeting at the AU agreed to es tablish an African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). This mission was comprised of over 3,300 South African, Ethiopian, and Mozambican troops. The AU member state that pro vided the most contributions was South Africa. While the mission of AMIB was to prot ect cantonment areas and provide technical assistance to the DDR process, the centra l mandate of AMIB was to create conditions on the ground conducive for the UN Secur ity Council to send in troops. AMIB had mixed results. The mission was unable to enforce the ceasefire agreement, since fighting continued between the Bur undian army and the rebels. Its second most important task, DDR, also was also unsu ccessful. However, AMIB was successful in protecting parts of the country and r epelling some rebel groups, which allowed it to fulfill its central mandate—stabiliza tion of the country to allow UN peacekeepers to intervene. Capacity and financial c onstraints of the AU security structure impeded its ability to fulfill all of its mandates. The first difficulty for AMIB was its capacity. The AU had problems in deploying its troo ps immediately because it “had decided that the troop contributing countries were to be self-sustained for the first two months of deployment.”6 This created a predicament for countries that want ed to 6 Emma Svensson, “The African Mission in Burundi: Le ssons Learned from the African Union’s First Operat ion,” FOI (2008): 13.

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98 contribute to AMIB but had their own economic const raints with which to contend. The second problem AMIB faced was lack of adequate fina ncing. The UN Security Council continually rebuffed the large amounts requested by AMIB. The AU wanted over $100 million to cover the cost of the mandate. To financ e the mission, the AU set up a trust fund to pool resources from the various stakeholder s in the emerging security structure. However, out of the amount of money pledged by the international community, AMIB was able to gain only $50 million for its mission. AMIB was left to rely on South Africa to supply significant troops and logistical support to the Burundi mission because it was one of the few AU member states with the capacity t o contribute. Much needed external assistance was delivered by the US, the UK, and the EU. Although the EU gave the most—€25 million—it was still not sufficient for th e mandate AMIB was given. Even though the AU mission in Burundi faced signifi cant challenges, it was still able to stabilize parts of the country it was deplo yed to and prepare the ground for a joint UN-AU Operation in Burundi (ONUB) in May 2004, whos e mission was to reinforce and expand stabilization efforts in the country. This s uccess can be attributed primarily to two factors: the coordination between AU member states in achieving the Arusha Peace Agreement, and the coordination between external do nors and the AU in enforcing its peacekeeping mandates. AU member states coordinated efforts to achieve the Arusha Agreement, which was necessary for disarming belligerents in the con flict. Tanzania and South Africa played important roles in negotiating a peaceful se ttlement of the conflict. Both countries had significant economic interest in the stability of the country: “fear that existing traders would lose business to new players. For instance, T anzania and Kenya lost transport

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99 business to Zambia and South Africa as Burundian bu sinessmen searched for alternate routes to transport and receive goods.”7 Prior to the intervention of AU forces in 2004, President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Mandela of South Africa managed to achieve the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreeme nt. This agreement allowed the smaller or splintered Hutu rebel groups to either d emobilize or incorporate into the government, with the exception of the two groups—th e CNDD and Palipehutu—who refused to take part in these negotiations. Followi ng the sudden death of Nyerere, Mandela was successful in getting concessions from smaller rebel groups, including Tutsi rebels, allowing them to sign the Arusha Agreement. Thus, the Arusha Agreement was necessary in creating the conditions on the ground for AU peacekeepers to achieve their mandate of stabilizing the country to allow UN inte rvention. While the AU member states took care of the pre-AMI B negotiations that created the conditions for AU intervention, the external do nors to the AU also did their part to address this crisis by providing logistical and fin ancial assistance to AMIB forces. The international community had several reasons for ass isting the AU. One significant reason was due to the intense criticism against UN Securit y Council members for not intervening in the genocide in Rwanda, and the UN’s intention not to allow indifference to genocide again. Another reason was that the UN h ad one of its largest peace operations in the DRC, where external donors also had troops i nvolved in peacekeeping missions. External donors saw Burundi in the regional context of the wider Great Lakes Region, 7 Kadenya Bertha Amisi, Development and Peace Making in Africa: Negotiating Peace in a Neo-Liberal World Paper presented at Codestria Eleventh General Assembly, M aputo, Mozambique, (2005): 7

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100 encompassing Eastern and Central Africa. In effect, the conflict in Burundi was seen as inseparable from the wider regional conflict: Since 1960 there have been 11 outright wars in the DRC, five in Burundi and two in Rwanda, not forgetting the constant lowintensity warfare. An estimated four million people have lost their lives as a direct result of these conflicts and a further four million have bee n forcibly displaced.8 External actors contributed to the relative success of the AU peacekeeping mandate through financial, capacity-building, and d evelopment assistance. The EU gave €3.5 million in grants to support the capacity of c ivil society actors. China, flexing its own political status, pledged 30 million to suppor t capacity-building initiatives in healthcare and education.9 Belgium also agreed on a €60 million development pa ckage. The African Development Bank, as a representative f or continental Africa’s assistance, pledged $10.8 million to support economic reform pr ograms. France signed a €47 million development aid package to be used for five years t o address deficiencies in education, democratic governance and political development, an d the resettlement of refugees and IDP’s.10 The G8’s role in assisting the AU’s efforts in Buru ndi was carried out mainly through NEPAD and its Joint Action Plan. As part of the G8 Joint Action plan, Canada provided C$4 million in capacity-building aid to th e AU and gave an additional C$4 million towards the AU’s efforts in Burundi. France ’s influence through the G8 is through its Renforcement des Capacits Africaines de Maintien d e la Paix (RECAMP) Program, which is tasked with increasing African ca pacity through training, seminars and 8 Daley, Patricia, "Challenges to Peace: Conflict Re solution in the Great Lakes Region of Africa," Third World Quarterly 27, no.2 (2003): 303. 9 UN Security Council S/2006/994 Ninth Report of the Secretary General on United Nat ions Operation in Burundi (18 December, 2006): 11 10 Ibid.,11

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101 logistical support. France assisted the AMIB missio n by sending support personnel to assist the Ethiopian brigades. The UK, through its ACPP program, provided £3.7 million to “facilitate the deployment of a 217-strong conti ngent of Mozambican troops as part of AMIB force. The Africa Conflict Prevention pool (AC PP) also provided a further £2 million contribution to the African Union AMIB Trus t Fund.”11 To conclude, the combination of intensive and succe ssful negotiations by AU member states, which resulted in the Arusha Agreeme nts, and the coordinated financial and logistical support by external donors helped th e AU peacekeeping forces to succeed in its central mandate—the stabilization of the cou ntry to allow UN deployment of forces. Sudan Unlike the Burundi case, the AU mission in Sudan (A MIS) was not successful in fulfilling its mandates. At issue, is not only the lack of financial and logistical support and planning, but also the diverging strategic inte rests of external donors, as well as of AU member states. As one of Africa’s largest countries, Sudan has a r acially, religiously, and culturally diverse population, that has been in con stant conflict for decades. According to the International Crisis Group, “Sudan is divided a long lines of religion (70 per cent Muslim, 25 per cent animist, 5 per cent Christ ian), ethnicity (African, Arab origin), tribe and economic activity (nomadic and sedentary) .”12 Also, vast deposits of minerals and oil, administered by incompetent institutions, and a weak civil society have exacerbated the tensions among groups in the countr y. 11 DFID, “The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool,” 10 12 International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Sud an,” September 2008

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102 Prior to its independence, Sudan was co-administere d by Egypt and Britain. As Britain began to control the terrain more, hostilit ies developed between northern Arab Muslims and those in the South who were of African descent and of Christian or animist beliefs. The British colonial administration left S udan with power centralized with the Muslim Arabs in the north, which effectively margin alized groups in the south and led to rising conflict among the Darfurians in the west an d among tribes in the east. Endemic poverty, discrimination in civil service employment and lack of basic services contributed to the alienation of those outside the Arab dominated Khartoum, and further fragmented Sudanese society. The Khartoum governmen t was further strengthened by the discovery of oil deposits in 1978. For close to fifty years, Sudan has been plagued by two intermittent conflicts that have debilitated the country. The first is the twen ty-one year civil war between the northern Arab Muslims and Christian or Animist grou ps in the south of the country. The second dimension of the conflict involves the fight among government forces, paramilitary entities, and rebel groups in Darfur. The North-South Conflict The polarization between the north and the south wa s further stressed by the imposition of nationwide sharia law by the Khartoum government. The Sudanese Liberation Army (SPLA) was created as an opposition rebel group in the South to fight the Khartoum government’s abuse of power. In 1983 t he north-south conflict reignited after an eleven-year truce that began with the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement. Renewed fighting began between the SPLA and the Sudanese De fense Forces (SDF). The main goal of the SPLA and other smaller Southern groups was the autonomy of the South from

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103 Northern dominance. Their main argument was that li nguistic, political, social, and cultural differences between the two territories we re too vast to be reconciled under one centralized government.13 However the continued intra and inter-factional di sputes among rebel groups hampered achieving a unified fro nt against the North. Increased economic stagflation, famine, and drought added to the chaos and disorder that fuelled one of Africa’s deadliest civil wars. In 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF), headed by General Omar al Bashir, led a coup against the prev ious Mahdi regime. He succeeded in fully implementing sharia law and went on to lead t he (SDF) and the People’s Defense Force (PDF). Bashir further exasperated tensions by banning political parties and other civil society organizations and creating state poli ce organs to enforce sharia law. In 1991, following the ouster of the SPLA’s most im portant backer—Ethiopian president Mengistu—the liberation groups fractured. Also, the increased links between the Khartoum government and terrorist leaders such as Osama Bin Laden led to increased international isolation, particularly following the bombings of US targets in Kenya and Tanzania, which led to a US cruise missile attack o n selected targets within the country in 1998.14 In 1995, the SPLA tried to quell fractionalization within the opposition by joining forces with allies in northern and southern parts o f the country. The result was the creation of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) whose duty was to counter the Bashir regime. However, protracted internal fightin g severely weakened their organized front against Khartoum, allowing the north to conso lidate more power. Thus, the establishment of Islamic law, along with the strugg le for political power and access to oil 13 Korwa G. Adar, “A State Under Siege: The Internati onalization of the Sudanese Civil War,” African Security Review Vol. 7, no. 1 (1998). 14 International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Sud an,” September 2008.

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104 revenue, contributed to a twenty-one year protracte d conflict which left two million people dead and four million displaced. The Peace Process The ‘eleven year truce’ that followed the civil war between north and south was due to the willingness of actors to comply with the 1972 Addis Ababa ceasefire agreement. The main actors that facilitated the tru ce were the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the US. Member s of IGAD, a regional economic community that deals with security in Eastern Afric a, were at the forefront of negotiations with parties to the Sudanese civil war IGAD member states involved in the peace process were also Sudan’s immediate neighbors and therefore had a significant stake in containing and resolving the civil war. IG AD member states that conducted intense negotiations with the warring parties inclu ded Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. However, the involvement of neighboring cou ntries in the negotiations presented its own set of problems for the smoothnes s of the negotiations, which ranged from their own bilateral interests in Sudan to avoi ding a perception that they were intruding on the sovereignty of Sudan. “[O]ne of th e major constraints … is their own bilateral conflicts with Sudan. The front-line stat es are also cautious not to overemphasize the issue of self-determination and a utonomy, given the potential internal implications in their own countries.”15 A coalition of IGAD’s allies, known as IGAD’s Friends, from Britain, Canada, and other Western co untries joined forces to contribute aid for Sudan’s significant humanitarian needs. However these negotiations did little to constrain the belligerents. 15 Adar, “A State Under Siege: The Internationalizati on of the Sudanese Civil War,” 1998.

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105 The Machakos Protocol of 2002 between the UN, IGAD, and IGAD’s Friends was responsible for, setting forth the principles of governance, the tra nsitional process and the structures of government, as well as on the right t o self-determination for the people of South Sudan, and on state and religio n. They agreed to continue talks on the outstanding issues of power s haring, wealth sharing, human rights and a ceasefire.16 The talks culminated in the signing of the Comprehe nsive Peace Agreement (CPA) in July 2005, which ended the North-South conflict. Th e CPA agreement between the SPLA and the Khartoum government set the agenda for elec tions to establish a unity government by 2009. A new Government of National Un ity (GNA) ratified a new constitution in 2006. There was a tenuous peace for most of 2007; however, tensions rose sharply over the fighting between Arab militias and SPLA member in the oil-rich area of Abyei.17 In 2008, there were attempts at neutralizing the es calation of conflict in this area. The negotiations that culminated in the CPA, also a ttempted to address the rising tensions between the government and rebels in easte rn Sudan. In 2006, the government and eastern rebels signed the Eastern Sudan Peace A greement. The GNA also made attempts at including easterners into government po sts as a way of stifling fears. United Nations Mission in Sudan In 2005, UN Resolution 1590 was activated to help a ddress the tenuous situation between SPLA and government forces. This UN resolut ion allowed for the creation of a 5,000-strong UN-mandated peacekeeping mission. The United Nations Mission in Sudan 16 The UN’s Mission in the Sudan, [Online version], 2 007, und.html [accessed at 20 May 2009] 17 International Crisis Group, “Conflict History: Sud an,” September 2008

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106 (UNMIS) was tasked with monitoring the implementati on of the CPA agreement. The specific tasks for the UNMIS mission were the follo wing: (a) to support implementation of the CPA signed by the parties; (b) to facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and in ternally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; (c) to assist the parties in the mine action sector; (d) to contribute towards internatio nal efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordi nate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with p articular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced pe rsons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS' cap abilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencie s, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations.18 UNMIS constituted over 8,000 military troops, over 600 military operators, and over 800 police and civilian personnel. Progress in achievin g the CPA was dependent on the strength and unity of the GNA; however, the death o f the SPLA leader John Garang was a major setback to the stability of the unity gover nment. Without the moderation of Garang, both the Bashir government and the new SPLA leadership became more uncompromising. Thus, the work of UNMIS was adverse ly affected by the inability of both sides to fulfill the requirements the CPA agre ements, particularly on issues of power-sharing and wealth disbursement. In 2006, th e mandate of UNMIS was expanded to include the protection of civilians under threat of immediate violence in the conflict in Darfur. The peacekeeping force was expanded to inc lude approximately 17,000 military personnel and 3,000 police personnel.19 Although the UNMIS mandate was supposed to expire in September 2006, the deteriorating situati on in Darfur led the UN to extend its mandate through 2011. The peacekeeping force has al so been charged with coordinating 18 The UN’s Mission in the Sudan, [Online version], 2 007, available at und.html [accessed at 20 May 2009] 19 Ibid.

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107 peace-building initiatives among agencies within th e UN system. UNMIS has also been in charge of DDR programs in the country. Crises in Darfur The second dimension of the conflict in Sudan is th e crisis in Darfur. Despite the CPA, tensions between government forces and SPLA re bels continued with surprise attacks on government military installations. Begin ning in 2003, the Khartoum government started responding by arming Arab militi as known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed were composed of criminals, Arab national ists, and members of the PDF. Their involvement in the conflict led to “killings, abductions, forced expulsions, systemic sexual violence, and deliberate destruction of crop s, livestock and important cultural and religious sites.”20 The Khartoum government’s efforts to contain the re volts by southern rebels were met with resistance by its neighbor Cha d. Chad was concerned about the spillover effects of cross-border migration of arou nd 30,000 individuals and over a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP)—many of whom crossed into Chad. However, several refugees from conflict zones in ot her parts of the country settled in refugee camps in Darfur. Constant attacks by the Ja njaweed, coupled with a serious humanitarian crisis, made Darfur a focal point of c oncern for international aid agencies and the UN. According to UNMIS, “the number of esti mated deaths had risen to 70,000 …the overall number of people requiring relief had increased by at least 10% (to around 2 million)…”21 International debate concerning the humanitarian cr isis occurring in Darfur centered around the potential for interventi on. Questions ranged from whether or 20 Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, “The Respons ibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur,” Security Dialogue 37, no. 27(2005): 30. 21 Ibid., 31.

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108 not to designate the crisis a genocide and the poli tical ramifications of such a decision, and whether intervention jeopardized the tenuous No rth-South peace agreement. A clear example was the Navaisha talks, a crucial part of t he peace process to resolve ongoing fighting between the southern rebels and northern f ighters. “[T]he talks…, drawing to a conclusion at Naivasha, stood on the brink of succe ss and failure throughout the first year of the Darfur emergency.”22 The concurrent conflicts affected the attitudes of countries in the region and the international community. The Khartoum government fe ared that a counterinsurgency group in the north, made up of political opponents and elements within the Khartoum government, would seize the Darfur conflict as a ba sis for launching a coup. This perceived threat meant that government interest in implementing Naivasha did indeed wobble. It also allowed government ideologues to ar gue for extreme measures in Darfur and for the ensuing military campaign to ‘annihilat e’ the insurgency announced by President Bashir.”23 The international community, for its part, feared that the ouster of Bashir would jeopardize the entire peace process an d lead to a more fragmented approach rather than a comprehensive peace process. Many in the international community favored sequencing the peace process by dealing with the No rth-South conflict as the first priority, then the Darfur crisis. This approach res ulted in the slow international response to the crisis in Darfur. The politics of this debate centered on the consequ ences of designating the crisis in Darfur as genocide. Such a decision would mean i nternational humanitarian 22 Slim, Hugo, “Dithering over Darfur? A Preliminary Review of the International Response,” International Affairs 80, no. 5(2004)): 822 23 Ibid.

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109 intervention under the Responsibility to Protect do ctrine. The controversy over Darfur and the question of intervention was particularly t ense in light of the international community’s lack of involvement in Rwanda. Internat ional organizations like Amnesty International and International Crisis Group, as we ll as officials like the US Secretary of State Powell, concluded that the Khartoum’s governm ent actions in Darfur were indeed genocide. However, the response to this widespread acknowledgement was a focus on achieving a political resolution to the crisis thro ugh arms embargos and humanitarian aid, rather than through force. Since 2008, the fighting has intensified with increased government bombardment of western Sudan rebel stron gholds, where aid workers were also killed. The Abyei region of Sudan, the site of large deposits of oil, has been increasingly inflamed with tensions. In March 2008 Arab militias fought with SPLA rebels, thereby severely jeopardizing the CPA agree ment.24 Later that year, the hijacking of Ukrainian tankers on the Somali coast “sparked f ears of an arms race between the North and former rebels in the South.”25 African Union Involvement in Darfur and Sub-regiona l Concerns While UNMIS was charged with enforcing the CPA betw een the north and south, there was no enforcement mechanism to deal with the deteriorating situation in Darfur. The Khartoum government rejected any involvement by the UN in its affairs, arguing that an intervention by the UN was tantamount to a re-co lonization of the nation.26 The UN was not willing to deploy a humanitarian mission to Darfur due to “opposition by Khartoum and by a number of other African leaders, as well as divisions within the 24 BBC World News, Chronology of Key Events: Timeline Sudan, [online version], 4 March 2009. Available a t [ accessed 20 May 2009]. 25 Ibid. 26 Murithi, Tim, “ The African Unions Role in Peace O perations,” African Security Review 17, no. 1, (2008): 77

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110 Security Council.”27 The UN had cited Article 41 of the UN Charter to p lace the responsibility to protect the people of Darfur on t he Khartoum government.28 In July of 2004, however, the Security Council authorized Reso lution 1556, which “among other things imposed an arms embargo on the region, suppo rted the deployment of the AU Protection Force and gave the Sudanese government 3 0 days to disarm the janjaweed or face sanctions.”29 Meanwhile, in early 2004, the AU started stepping u p its efforts towards seeking a resolution to the Darfur crisis. Its efforts in lea ding negotiations between rebels and the government led to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreem ent. This agreement called for the creation of a Ceasefire Commission made up of media tors from Chad and other international actors. These observers were sent to monitor the ceasefire. In May of 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was set up with 360 military observers and military support. The mandat e of AMIS allowed for a one-year deployment, with the following mandate under the Hu manitarian Ceasefire Agreement: To monitor and observe compliance with the Humanita rian Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the process of confidence b uilding; to contribute to a secure environment for the delivery of humanitari an relief; monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs ; monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all parties; monit or and verify hostile militia activities against the population; monitor and veri fy efforts of the Government of the Sudan (GoS) to disarm Government controlled militias; investigate and report about allegations of violations of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement; protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the GoS; protec t both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat, and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities; provide visible mili tary presence by patrolling 27 Powell, “Delivering on the Responsibility to Prote ct,” 3 28 Ibid., 3 29 Williams and Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Prote ct and the Crisis in Darfur,” 32.

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111 and by the establishment of temporary outposts in o rder to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile a cts against the population.30 “AMIS personnel were not permitted to intervene bet ween the parties on the ground, and were only able to fire in self-defense if directly threatened.”31 An additional 3,000 troops were sent in to protect civilians who were threaten ed in their immediate jurisdiction. In 2006, the AU was able to get certain factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). The new mission, known as AMIS II grew to 7,000 and its mandate was to: Monitor and verify activities of all parties and th e security situation in and around areas where a secure environment has been es tablished; monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs; monitor and verify the cessation of hostilities by all parties; monito r and verify hostile militia activities against the population; monitor and veri fy attempts of the GOS to disarm government controlled militias; investiga te and report all allegations of violations of the CFA; protect AMIS personnel, equipment and installations; protect Observer patrols on vehi cle and helicopter borne deployment as required; be prepared to protect civi lian under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity; Be prepared to pr otect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threa t and immediate vicinity; provide visible Military presence by patr olling and by the establishment of temporary outpost in order to dete r uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the pop ulation; provide road security patrols along major lines of communication ; carry out preventive deployments as necessary to reduce the incidence of inter party and inter tribal attacks.32 AMIS II was severely constrained by the lack of tec hnical and financial capacity of African member states and their inability to send a dditional troops. However, “in late 2006, the UN began providing a light support packag e to AMIS consisting of about 200 30African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), “AMIS Mandat e under the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement [HCFA] ,” AMIS, [a ccessed May 30, 2009]. 31African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), “Background and Chronology,” African Union Mission in Sudan, [accessed Ma y 30, 2009] 32 African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), “AMIS Manda te under the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement [HCFA ],” AMIS, [a ccessed May 30, 2009].

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112 personnel, and 36 armed personnel carriers and othe r equipment.”33 In 2007, in an effort to assist the severely under-resourced and under-st affed AMIS force, the UN Security Council created the combined AU-UN hybrid force for Darfur known as UNAMID. This force included over 19,000 military personnel on to p of the already existing AMIS observer force.34 Assessment of AMIS and the Emerging Security Struct ure of the AU AMIS failed at completing its central goal—to monit or and verify the disarmament of militias in Darfur. AU member states and external donors did not coordinate their actions to get factions of the SPL A to agree to the DPA agreements. Both the lack of coordination among member states and th e lack of coordination between external donors and the AU contributed to the inabi lity of AMIS to enforce its mandate. Reasons for the lack of coordination among AU membe r states included the diverging interests among members of the AU and the interfere nce of AU member states in the conflict. The reason for the lack of coordination b etween external donors and the AU was due to bilateral interests of external donors in Su dan. The first reason for the lack of coordination amon g AU member states was because of the diverging interests within the AU an d their interference in the conflict: “When its [the AU’s] Peace and Security Council met in March, it rejected a recommendation that the force be scaled up to more than 12,000 soldiers, and instead focused on winning a peace deal in talks being held in Nigeria.”35 Primarily Arab member 33 Alhaji M.S. Bah and Ian Johnstone, “Peacekeeping i n Sudan: The Dynamics of Protection, Partnerships a nd Inclusive Politics,” Occasional Paper on Global Peace Operations (May 2007): 3. 34 Murithi, “The African Unions Role in Peace Operati ons,” 78. 35 Lydia, Polgreen Joel Brinkley contributed reportin g from Washington for this article, “Obstacles Test African Force in Grim Darfur," New York Times (2006): 1.

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113 states of the AU such as Libya and Egypt provided s upport to the Khartoum government during PSC deliberations, emboldening Khartoum’s de mands for a weakened AMIS mandate. “Realizing the need for a modicum of Khart oum’s co-operation in order to deploy successfully in the country, the PSC backed away from its campaign for a strong mandate. It instead settled for a smaller force wit h no civilian protection capacity. A triumphant regime in Khartoum welcomed a feebler AM IS II.”36 In some cases, AU member states fueled the continuation of rebel and militia activities in Sudan. While South Africa played a critical role in AMIB by supp lying a large number of troops and other resources to the effort, it has played a cons picuously muted role in AMIS, while Nigeria has played a more significant role in AMIS. This is because of their diverging interests in Sudan. Nigeria, an oil producing count ry has contributed three infantry battalions of the overall force, while South Africa contributed just one. “South Africa has not responded with the same alacrity and fervor to the demand for troops in Darfur as it has in the Great Lakes region [in order]…not to ant agonize Sudan where its companies are trying to make inroads.”37 Of critical importance to the situation in Darfur is Sudan’s neighbor Chad, which happens to be a member of the PSC. Chad’s involvement in Sudan has been a key factor in expanding the crisis in Da rfur, particularly in light of the 200,000 refugees from Darfur who have sought refuge in its country.38 The involvement of Khartoum-backed rebels in the attempted coup agains t the Chadian government also increased the tensions between the two countries. T he massive influx of refugees and IDP’s from southern and eastern Sudan has created i nternal social instability in Chad, 36 Kagwanja, Peter and Patrick Mutahi. “Protection o f Civilians in African Peace Missions: The Case of the AU Mission in Sudan, Darfur” Institute for Security Studies Paper 139, (May 2007): 6 37 Ibid., 9 38 Nick Grono, “Briefing—Darfur: The International C ommunity’s Failure to Protect,” African Affairs 105, No. 421(2006): 4

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114 which has also heightened political tension between the Chadian government and the Khartoum government, with each accusing the other o f supporting coup attempts. [D]espite a May 2007 peace agreement signed by the two countries in Saudi Arabia and another agreement signed in Dakar, Senegal in March 2008, the accusations continue. Chad alleges that S udan backed the February 2008 assault on N’Djamena and the June adv ance in the east. Reports suggest the one of the Darfur rebel groups may have provided support to the Chadian army during the attack. Suda n has in turn accused Chad of backing Sudanese rebels involved in a May 2 008 attack on Omdurman, a suburb of the Sudanese capital.39 To its east and south, Sudan shares a border with E thiopia, which has also been involved in Sudan’s civil war. Since the 1980s, the Ethiopians have supported the SPLA through military and logistical supplies as a way o f getting revenge against the Khartoum government’s support for Eritrean secessionists. “[ T]he Addis Ababa government was also troubled by the massive camps of Eritrean refu gees in Sudan, which served as sanctuary, rear bases, and channels for the transmi ttal of military, food, and medical supplies for Eritrean fighting forces in Ethiopia.”40 Although most Sudan-Ethiopia tensions have waned due to the CPA agreement and Et hiopia’s preoccupation with Somalia, there have been ongoing skirmishes, such a s the 2006 attack by the Ethiopian military on an apparent secessionist hideout in sou thern Sudan.41 The Central African Republic (CAR) also has an interest in Sudan. CAR b orders Sudan to the southwest and its porous borders have attracted many refugees fro m Sudan. Its own weak central government has also been battling internal rebels w ithin its borders. The situation in the 39Ploch, Lauren. Instability in Chad CRS Report for Congress. Washington, DC: U.S. Lib rary of Congress, Congressional Research Service, (10 September 2008) : 3 40Yehudit Ronen, “Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudan ese Civil War: Was it as Significant as Khartoum Cl aimed?” Northeast African Studies 9, no. 1(2002): 106 41 “Sudan Says Ethiopia attacked military base”. Reut ers 8 July, 2008

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115 country has been unstable due to the influx 150,000 IDP’s from neighboring countries,42 while a significant number of CAR refugees have als o been fleeing to neighboring Chad. CAR has accused the Khartoum government of supporti ng rebels with military assistance. [O]n its northeast border with Sudan, Chadian rebel s supported by the Sudanese government have built a base… to bolster t heir bid to overthrow Chad’s President, Idriss Dby. Now the Central Afri can Republic government says these foreign fighters have teamed up with local rebels to overthrow it as well, making it increasingly hard t o separate one conflict in the region from another.43 The second reason why AMIS was unsuccessful was the lack of coordination between external donors and the AU. External donors did pro vide logistical and financial support for the AMIS mission. The UK was an important playe r in helping to coordinate donor community support for AMIS. In addition to its fund ing of UNDP efforts at capacity building, it also provided £52 million in bilateral assistance to the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool (ACPP) to help the poor and displac ed in Darfur.44 According to the DFID, “the ACPP agreed to meet some of the start-up costs with a contribution of £2 million for the observer mission…the ACPP facilitat ed the UK’s timely response to the AU appeal…”45 The ACPP has helped IGAD with its ceasefire monitor ing efforts, and UNICEF with its DDR efforts for child soldiers. Dar fur was NATO’s first foray into African peacekeeping. It was tasked with assisting AMIS by providing airlift capability for troop deployments, as well as training for mili tary personnel. Other EU and G8 countries also were involved in supporting the AMIS mission. Norway provided support 42 Stephanie Hanson, Backgrounder: Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic, Council on Foreign Relations. January 2, 2007. 43 Lydia Polgreen, “On the Run as War Crosses Another Line in Africa,” New York Times (December 2006):1 44 Stephen Klingebiel, Tina Marie Blohm, and Rosa Eck le, “Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of th e African Peace and Security Architecture,” German Development Institute 38 (2008):94 45 DFID, “The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool,” 10

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116 through the construction of police stations and IDP camps in Darfur. Germany provided $4 million46 to airlift for Gambian troops deployed by AMIS.47 Japan supported the mission by providing “civilian components of AMIS w orth $5 million.”48 Sweden provided over $2 million in financial aid to the mi ssion. The US has been a major supporter of AMIS through “in-kind donations [which value at] almost $400 million.”49 Also, “The U.S. government, via private contractors provided about $280 million from June 2004 through September 2006 to build and maint ain 32 camps for AMIS forces in Darfur.”50 France’s critical historical and military relations hip with Sudan’s neighbors, Chad and Central African Republic, pushed the EU to be involved in efforts to stabilize the border regions with those two countries. “Franc e is highly motivated in resolving the crisis in Sudan because it feels that the Darfur cr isis may spill into Southern Sudan, a territory in which the French conglomerate Total ha s huge oil concessions and drilling operations.”51 The fact that EUFOR’s peacekeepers are primarily f rom France emphasizes France’s interest in keeping Chad stable. Although there has been positive assistance from ex ternal donors, strong bilateral interests of external donors in Sudan and its neigh bors have undermined AMIS’ mission. The bilateral interests of donors like the US and t he interference of external interests like China and Russia, who are not stakeholders in the A U’s security structure but have the capacity to affect the belligerents in Sudan’s conf lict, have played complicating roles. 46 The Data Report 119 47 Stephen Klingebiel, Tina Marie Blohm, and Rosa Eck le, “Donor Contributions to the Strengthening of th e African Peace and Security Architecture,” 90 48 Ibid., 91 49 Ibid., 95 50 General Accounting Office (GAO), “Darfur Crisis: P rogress in Aid and Peace Monitoring by Ongoing Viol ence and Operational Challenges,” GAO-07-9 (November 2006): 2 51 Timothy Othieno and Nhamo Samasuwo. “A Critical An alysis of Africa’s Experiments with Hybrid Missions and Security Collaboration” African Security Review 16, no. 3(2007): 36

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117 The US policy in Sudan since the end of the Cold Wa r has centered on fears of the Khartoum’s government support of terrorist grou ps. These fears were amplified when the Bashir government hosted Osama Bin Laden in the 1990s. Following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, the US developed a close intelli gence-sharing relationship with the Sudanese government. “[I]n 2005, it [the US governm ent] flew Salah Gosh, the Sudanese chief of intelligence and one of the architects of the Darfur atrocities, out to Virginia on a private plane for meetings with the CIA.”52 In 2007, the Bush administration imposed new sanctions against the Bashir government, thereb y putting it back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism. “The sanctions blocked asset s of Sudanese citizens implicated in Darfur violence, and also sanctioned additional com panies owned or controlled by the Government of Sudan.”53 President Bashir responded by withholding oil reve nue payments to the southern Sudan government, which we re required by the ceasefire agreement and thereby posed major problems for the entire peace process. While the bilateral interests of countries like the US, that are major stakeholders in the AU’s security structure, are an important fa ctor to take into account when analyzing the AMIS mission, the role of China and R ussia in the conflict cannot be ignored. China’s involvement in Sudan has been its most far-reaching on the continent, combining its efforts at providing “a prototype of China’s willingness to offer a broadbased relationship—money, technology, infrastructur e, and political protection from international (Western) pressures on human rights54On Darfur, the Chinese have emphasized diplomacy over sanctions, opposing the I nternational Criminal Court ruling 52Nick Grono, “Briefing—Darfur: The International Co mmunity’s Failure to Protect,”628 53 U.S. Department of State, “Sudan,” Background Notes March, 2009, 24.htm [accessed May 31, 2009] 54 Anyu, Ndumbe and Ifedi Afam. “China’s Ventures in Africa: Patterns, Prospects, and Implications for A frica’s Development” Mediterranean Quarterly Vol. 19, no. 4, (2008 ): 99

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118 against Sudan’s President and the intervention by t he UN peacekeepers in the country. China’s tacit economic and political support of the government of Sudan has undermined the ability of AMIS to control the government-spons ored militias in Darfur. Like China, Russia has developed strong bilateral relations wit h Sudan. The Russians have also opposed sanctions against Sudan. During UN debates over Resolution1556, wording that would have imposed significant sanctions against th e Khartoum government was rejected by these two permanent members of the Security Coun cil, due to their own economic and military interests in the country. In 2005, while A MIS was heavily out-matched by the Janjaweed, which hampered its ability to protect re fugees in Darfur, Russia was selling Sudan arms worth more the $34 million.55 Russia’s interest in supporting the Khartoum government, despite international pressure, may be due to its significant oil investments in the country. An example of Russia’s investments include the $200 million exploration deal between Slaveneft oil company and Sudapet Comp any, owned by the government of Sudan, that allows for the exploration of oil in th e country’s eastern front. Thus, the inability of the AU peacekeeping force to get the factions of the SPLA to agree to negotiations to form a unity government in order to enforce the DPA agreements was due to the lack of coordination amon g neighboring AU member states with their own interests in Sudan and the lack of c oordination between the AU and external donors like the US, which had its own nati onal interests to address. There was also interference from external actors like Russia and China who assisted the Khartoum government in circumventing its obligations under t he DPA. 55 Paul Reynolds, “Pressure Builds over Sudan Embargo ,” BBC News, 8 May 2007,, [acc essed 30 May 2009].

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119 Somalia Unlike in Burundi, the AU mission in Somalia (AMIS OM) has not been able to complete any of its mandates. The ongoing the situa tion on the ground has depreciated significantly since it intervened; and there is gro wing evidence of diverging interests among stakeholders within the emerging security str ucture of the AU. History of Conflict Conflicts in Africa are borne out of the instabilit y caused by political and economic marginalization. However, corresponding so cial cleavages exacerbate structural economic and political differences. Buru ndi’s civil war was based on interethnic conflict, while Sudan’s civil war was based on interethnic and inter-religious conflict. The social cleavage that has spurred conf lict in Somalia has a complex inter-clan rivalry that has fueled decades of fighting. Accord ing to the World Bank, “clannism and clan cleavages are a source of conflict—used to div ide Somalis, fuel endemic clashes over resources and power, used to mobilize militia, and make broad-based reconciliation very difficult.”56 Somalis share a language and the Islamic faith. Th e key divisions in Somali society lie along clan and sub-clan. This cl an-based identity politics, coupled with poor governance and mismanagement, as well as an un helpful international community, has fueled decades of conflict that have resulted i n the failure of Somalia’s state. Ogaden War with Ethiopia and its Repercussions for the Somali State (1978-1991) The United Republic of Somalia was formed in 1960 w hen the terriroties of Somalia controlled by Britain and Italy were united under one independent government. 56 World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics ,( Washington, January 2005): 10

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120 Somalia’s first president, Abdullah OsmanDaar was s ucceeded—through democratic elections—in 1967 by Rashid Ali Shermarke. However, the pervasiveness of corruption and clan-based patronage and favoritism increased p ublic dissatisfaction with civilian rule.57 The spell of successive elections was interrupted i n 1969 by the overthrow of the Shermarke government through a military coup led by Mohammed Siad Barre. Between 1978 and 1991, the combination of drought a nd famine conditions, corrupt and polarizing leadership from the Barre go vernment, increased tensions with neighboring Ethiopia over the Ogaden regions, and C old War international contexts intensified instability in the country, which event ually led to a collapse of the Somali state. The Barre regime adopted socialism and natio nalized economic activity in the country. At the height of the Cold War, Barre signi ficantly boosted the Somali army and exercised brutal control of the political, economic and social life of the country: “the leadership skillfully manipulated and politicized c lan identity over two decades of divideand-rule politics, leaving a legacy of deep clan di visions and grievances.”58 The pervasive corruption and oppression of the state increased th e desperation of marginalized groups. The deep-seated suspicion among various groups incr eased the polarization of Somalia’s clan-based society. These events, along with a declining economy and a directionless dictatorship favoring Barre’s clan, resulted in dis content with the government. In 1978 a number of officers attempted a coup d’tat, but failed. As a response the regime used excessive for ce against the clan to which most of the officers belonged, resulting in a rise of clan-based opposition groups. Various militias began to form, thus beginning of a long-drawn civil war.59 57 Ibid., 10 58 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges FOI, (October 2008): 1559 Ibid.,15

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121 In 1978, the thirteen-year Ogaden War began between Somali-backed insurgents and Ethiopian forces. The war was spurred on by the intervention of Somali forces into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia to support the uprisi ng of ethnic Somalis against Ethiopian forces. The Cold War played a key role in Somalia’s instability because competition between the West and the Soviet Union “allowed the Barre regime to attract large quantities of military and economic aid. When the w ar ended, the level of expenditure, especially to maintain the bloated bureaucracy, was not sustainable and precipitated the fall of the regime.”60 The result of the Ogaden war was not only the loss of over twenty thousand lives, but also the political destabilizat ion of Somalia that led to its eventual collapse. The loss of this war spurred a deteriorat ing political situation in Somalia where rebel groups, united along clan identities, organiz ed their efforts to demand autonomy and to oppose the Barre regime. During the 1980s and 1990s, a civil war broke out b etween the Somali government and the Somali National Movement (SNM) o ver control of the northwestern part of the country. The SNM was formed out of the Isaaq clan and was driven to armed rebellion by the Barre government’s military contro l of the northwest: “Isaaq grievances deepened over the course of the 1980s, when the Bar re regime placed the northwest under military control and used the military admini stration to crack down on the Isaaq and dispossess them of their businesses.”61 This conflict and the atrocities committed by the Somali government led to the eventual secession of the northwest as Somaliland in 1991. As the Cold War drew to a close, and Somalia’ s geostrategic importance waned, 60 Ibid., 15 61 World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics ,( Washington, January 2005): 11

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122 the Barre government lost the ample arms and assist ance it had received during its battles with Ethiopia. The result of this was the collapse and ouster of the Barre regime in 1991. Somalia’s Failed State and UN Intervention (1991-pr esent) The ouster of the central government and the fracti onalization of Somali society led to a breakdown in law and order and an increase in levels of crime and anarchy in the country. Intra-clan fighting in the southern part o f the country and conflict over legitimate political power quickly spiraled into “predatory lo oting, banditry, and occupation of valuable real estate by conquering clan militias. Y oung gunmen fought principally to secure war booty, and were under only the loosest c ontrol of militia commanders.”62 In this environment, warlords built themselves a power base by providing much needed security enclaves for destitute citizens left to fe nd for themselves. Towards the northeast and northwest of the country, where Somaliland had declared itself autonomous, clan elders were better able to control the flow of viol ence and provide some semblance of security and government. The need to protect humanitarian relief operations in Somalia brought on by severe famine, prompted the international community to sanction the US-led United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) of over 30,00 0 troops in 1993. However, an expanded mandate increased the force’s duties to “a ssist Somalis in promoting national reconciliation, rebuilding the central government, and reviving the economy.”63 In the same year, the Addis Ababa Declaration was signed b etween various clan factions. However, several militias and warlords, whose inter ests were directly threatened by the 62 Ibid., 12 63 Ibid., 12

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123 imposition of a transitional government coalition, did not agree to the peace deal. In June of that year, 24 UNOSOM peacekeepers were killed an d a few months later 18 American troops were killed in the now infamous ‘Black Hawk Down’ attacks in Mogadishu. This attack had a devastating impact on the overall peac ekeeping mission in Somalia and led to the evacuation of UN forces from the country in 1995. ”[P]ictures of the US soldiers being dragged around Mogadishu was [sic] broadcaste d over the world and this subsequently led to a US withdrawal from Somalia.”64 While it was active in the country, UNOSOM had a la sting impact, including cultivating a small civil society in the country. A lso the peace-building efforts of UNOSOM provided the basis for a non war-related eco nomy. “Merchants who in 1991– 92 had profiteered from diverted food aid and looti ng now made small fortunes in quasilegitimate business ventures, from procurement and construction to remittances and import-export commerce. Their shifting interests he lped to contain armed conflict and lawlessness in the post intervention period.”65 Following the UNOSOM disaster, while Somalia was left in relative anarchy without a cohe sive national government, a UN Political Office was set up in Kenya in 1995 to pus h for political reconciliation. Fighting intensified throughout the late 1990s and 2000, wit h Somalia still not having a government and with clashes moving from large-scale intensive fighting, to smaller intraclan skirmishes over plots of land and territory. L aw and order was deliberated through the Sharia Islamic courts. 64 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 18 65 World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics ,( Washington, January 2005): 13

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124 Peace Process The 2000 Arta Peace Conference, hosted by IGAD in D jibouti, led to the creation of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and a Transitional National Assembly (TNA) to consolidate a functioning national governm ent in Mogadishu. Various warlords and clan factions that opposed the TNG’s Mogadishubased power threatened the threeyear mandate of these institutions. The main opposi tion to the TNG at this time was the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC ). Following the termination of the TNG mandate, further peace conferences led to the c reation of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFI), the Transitional Federal Govern ment (TFG) and the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP). The five-year mandate of these institutions was to set conditions for general elections to be held in 2009 The proliferation of arms and increased violence af fected governability in the country; therefore in 2002 IGAD instituted the Keny a Peace Process to promote peace and reconciliation among the various factions and w arlords. The mediators involved in the peace process were the Kenyans, IGAD, the UN, a nd the EU Commission. Unfortunately this peace process was unsuccessful u ntil pressure from Ethiopia, a patron of the SRRC, pushed the creation of the TFP. Howeve r, the unintended consequence of the adoption of the consociational parliamentary mo del was that the SRRC gained significant power in the parliament. “ [T]he leadership and sub-clans most closely identified with the old TNG were conspicuously marg inalized in the new government. What was intended to be a government of national un ity was, yet again, a government based on one of the country’s two main coalitions a t the expense of its rival.”66 The 66Menkhaus, "The Crisis in Somalia: Tragedy in Five A cts," 361

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125 winner of the elections was Abdullahi Yusef, the pr esident of the erstwhile autonomous Puntland and a staunch ally of the Ethiopian govern ment. He, in turn, selected another close Ethiopian ally as prime minister. Of course, Somalis questioned the legitimacy of having strong Ethiopian-backed leaders as heads of the government. This suspicion also affected the legitimacy of IGAD negotiators, since “they had convened and empowered warlords in the talks.”67 Thus, the TFG already faced credibility problems i n the very warlord-ridden political environment it sought to c ontrol. The TFG was based in Nairobi since anti-Ethiopian warlords deeply distrustful of the TFG government controlled Mogadishu. The government was later able to move to the small Somali town of Baidoa. While the process of forming a government was under way, the Mogadishu-based Union of Islamic Courts (UIC)—a group formed during the anarchy following the collapse of the Somali state—emerged as a relativel y organized alternative to the TFG: The courts system had existed since the collapse of the Somali state as a governance experiment in a government vacuum. Durin g the past decade, apart from running the courts, the Sharia courts ha d also built a school and health system. This meant that they had provided th e basics of a social security network, thus making it easier for the UIC to gain support from the local population.68 By 2004, the TFG was hampered by lack of resources and institutional capacity to govern the country. Also, the UIC become a major political opponent to the TFG, “establishing itself as the new reality that controlled Mogadishu and increasing its sphere of influence …thus effectively besieging the TFG in the small en clave of Baidoa.”69 While the TFG was wrestling with clan-based loyalties in its atte mpts at forming a federal system of 67 Ibid., 361 68 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges, 18 69 African Union Mission in Somalia, “Background and Political Developments,” AMISOM, _Background.htm [accessed May 31 2009]

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126 government under the Transitional Federal Charter, the UIC was a strict enforcer of sharia law. In 2006, the UIC expanded its oppositio n to the TFG by encouraging a military campaign to gain total control of Mogadish u and its surrounding areas. Negotiations were held that year under the leadersh ip of Arab countries to establish a deal between the TFG and UIC. However, the Islamic Court s were successful in taking control of much of Somalia. With US support, Ethiop ia intervened to assist the beleaguered TFG forces. Ethiopian forces were able to push UIC forces well back from Mogadishu. The Ethiopians feared inciting further i nsurgents by their occupation and therefore agreed to pullout on condition that a mul tinational force was deployed to protect the TFG.70 The humanitarian crisis that resulted from the fig hting between TFG and UIC saw over 320,000 Somalis fleeing their home s, hundreds of deaths within days of fighting in Mogadishu, and a severe piracy probl em that threatens food aid supplies.71 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) In December 2006, UN Resolution 1725 authorized the AU and IGAD to create a six-month protection mission in the country: “as th e international community called on Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from Somalia it als o recognized the fact that Somalia will relapse into anarchy without a strong force replaci ng the Ethiopians to assist the TFG to consolidate its position.”72 Thus, in January 2007, the PSC mandated the AU Com mission to create the African Union Mission in Somalia, whi ch incorporated elements of IGAD. 70Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 19 71 BBC World News, Timeline Somalia: Chronology of Ke y Events, [online version], 15 May 2009. Available at 1072611.stm [accessed 20 May 2009]72 African Union Mission in Somalia, “Background and Political Developments,” AMISOM, _Background.htm [accessed May 31 2009]

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127 The AMISOM mandate is to …provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towar ds the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-t erm stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.73 Its objectives are: to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders, to provide … protection to the TFIs a nd their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their func tions, to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabili zation Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective reestablishment and trai ning of all inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the program s already being implemented by some of Somalia’s bilateral and mult ilateral partners, to provide … technical and other support to the disarm ament and stabilization efforts, to monitor, in areas of depl oyment of its forces, the security situation, to facilitate, as may be requir ed and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of IDPs, and to prote ct its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense.74 Considering the rapidly deteriorating security situ ation in the country and the consensus so far that AMISOM has been a disaster, t here have been some relative successes in terms of its most basic task: protecti ng humanitarian convoys and patrolling areas in Mogadishu. For example, “the Ugandan batta lions based at Mogadishu airport have from the start of the mission conducted securi ty tasks in and around the airfield and begun patrolling activities in other parts of Mogad ishu with the arrival of needed equipment.”75 Unfortunately, the rules of engagement of the miss ion do not allow for the protection of civilians, a problem that has hurt it s credibility since the intensity of the crisis resulted in a significant humanitarian crisi s. 73 African Union Mission in Somalia, “AMISOM Mandate, ” AMISOM, _Mandat.htm [accessed May 31 2009] 74 Ibid., 75 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 31

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128 Numerous challenges have contributed to the mission ’s overall failure thus far. In terms of funding, there has been a noticeable gap b etween donor pledges of $622 million and the $32 million contributed as of January 2008. This is particularly troubling since the AU has declared that it requires an annual supp ort of $538.3 million for military components; $57 million for police; $66 million for civil operations; $155 million for mission management and support operations.76 Another problem involves the shortage of troops. AMISOM mandated the deployment of 8000 troo ps. Uganda provided 1600 troops, Burundi gave over 1500 troops, Nigeria gave 850, and Ghana gave 350.77 This obviously falls short of the 8000 troops mandated f or the AMISOM mission. The reason for the shortage of troops is that countries that h ad pledged troops like Burundi and Uganda were constrained by financial and logistical problems. Hull also credits a less than ideal situation on the ground with attacks aga inst AMISOM troops killing peacekeepers.78 In 2008, two more Ugandan peacekeepers were killed in roadside bombings in Mogadishu.79 2009 was AMISOM’s deadliest year, with eleven peacekeepers from Burundi killed in explosions on a University compound.80 Although, financial support has been far short of what is nee ded, AU management of the limited resources it has received has not been efficient. T he lack of adequate staff at the AU to monitor where and how funds are used, and the fact that “the AU has often struggles to account for donations given as it simply does not h ave the capacity to provide for detailed 76 African Union Mission in Somalia, “AMISOM Financia l Support,” AMISOM, _Financial.htm [accessed May 30 2009] 77 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 27 78 BBC News, “AU Peacekeepers Killed in Somalia,” 16 May 2007, .stm [accessed 30 May 2009] 79 BBC News, “AU Peacekeeper Killed in Somalia,” 15 S eptember 2008, [acce ssed 30 May 2009] 80 AllAfricaNews, “Somalia:11 African Union Peacekeep ers Killed” 22 February 2009, [acc essed 30 May 2009]

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129 description of its expenditures…which risks promoti ng corruption and straining other AU assets.”81 Like AMIB, AMISOM was supposed to serve as a stabil izing force to allow space for a peace process to occur, which would allow for the eventual deployment of UN troops. However, the deteriorating situation on the ground has prevented that from happening. Thus, the PSC has had to extend the mand ate of AMISOM until June of 2009 to protect humanitarian convoys moving through the country. Although the AU Commission had been calling for a UN peacekeeping f orce in the country, the UN Security General argued that the conditions did not allow for UN intervention: “UN deployment was not a viable option during the preva iling circumstances since such a force could only be deployed in support of a politi cal process, not a substitute for one.”82 Thus, the failure of the AU member states to sustai n a peace process, coupled with the ineffectiveness of AMISOM troops to create stabilit y on the ground, created an environment where the UN could not risk interventio n. In June 2008, an accord between the TFG and the All iance for Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) was signed, paving the way for a ceas efire and the deployment of an international stabilization force. However, the agr eement failed. There are two reasons why the peace process has so far failed to help pro vide the stabilization necessary for the AU to have accomplished its peacekeeping mission. T he first reason is the lack of coordination among member states of the AU, and the second reason is the lack of coordination between external donors and the AU. 81Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 43 82Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 32

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130 Diverging interests among AU member states have pre vented the realization of a credible peace process. Following the end of the Co ld War and the collapse of the Somali state, regional actors were worried that instabilit y would spread into their countries. Of particular concern are the cross-border clan allian ces that have developed as a result of the chaos and anarchy following the collapse of the Somali state in the 1980s. These cross-border alliances have increased attempts at i nterference by neighboring states, in particular Ethiopia and Kenya. Ethiopia has been the most active actor in the regi on. Ethnic and religious dimensions form the basis for Ethiopia’s interferen ce in the inter-clan politics in Somalia. The Ogaden war exemplified the ongoing tensions bet ween the Mogadishu-backed secessionist movement in Ethiopia and Ethiopian gov ernment. Religion also plays an integral role in Ethiopia’s relationship with its n eighbors because of its fear of threats from Islamic jihadists in the region. While Ethiopi a has had confrontations with parts of the country, particularly areas in the South and Mo gadishu, it has increased its influence with the two autonomous regions of Somalia—Puntland and Somaliland. According to the World Bank, Ethiopia’s policy of maintaining re lations with these regions was to ensure “that both a potentially expansionist pan-So mali nationalism and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism are kept at bay.”83 Its relationship with the South of the country, however, has been decidedly more confrontational. E thiopia is the chief regional benefactor of the TFG, which they supported under t he belief “that a weak and dependent government would prevent Somalia from once again cl aiming the Ogaden region.”84 83 World Bank, Conflict in Somalia: Drivers and Dynamics, 38 84Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges, 21

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131 Ethiopia’s military support for the TFG ended due t o its own political and economic constraints, as well as the intervention of AMISOM. Since the Cold War, Kenya has been involved in Soma lia’s attempts at a peace process through IGAD. This is because, like Ethiopi a, Kenya also fears the rise in radical Islam in the region. This is of particular concern following the US embassy bombing in Nairobi in 1998, which killed over 200 and wounded over 4000.85 The Kenyans have also feared that refugees from Somalia could destabilize and threaten their own country. This fear explains Kenya’s neutrality in the 2006 confli ct between the TFG and Islamic Courts, despite its involvement in creating the TFG Lack of coordination between external donors and th e AU also has affected the ability of AMISOM to succeed in its mandates. Since the onset of AMISOM’s mission in Somalia, external donors have contributed some reso urces to the campaign. The UN has contributed civil and military experts to assist th e AU troops. Japan has also contributed to AMISOM peace operations. Sweden has contributed medical and accommodation supplies, including $1.5 million86 in support of AMISOM. Italy, in 2009, contributed six million euros to support institutional development and the peace process in Somalia.87 The UK has provided support for reconnaissance miss ions and has pledged £8.5 million and support for the AMISOM Support Management Plann ing Unit. Through, its ACPP program and in partnership with an NGO called the W ar-Torn Societies Project, the UK has “supported grass-roots dialogue and reconciliat ion, in support of the wider overall 85 BBC News, “Somalia’s Threat to Kenya’s Peace,” 7 A ugust, 2008, 046.stm [accessed 1 June 2009] 86 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 43 87 Government of Italy, “Minister Frattini meets his Somali counterpart, Mohammed Abdulladi Omaar,” Reli efweb April 6, 2009, db900sid/MUMA-7QX37R?OpenDocument [accessed 1 June 2009]

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132 IGAD led peace process, which focused exclusively o n warlords and key power brokers with limited grassroots engagement.”88 In 2009, China donated $300,000 to the ongoing AMISOM peace operations.89 The Arab League contributed to AMISOM Operations. Finally, while NATO has pledged to provide strategi c airlift to AMISOM operations when needed, the EU has pledged €5 million to the c reation of an AMISOM Support Management Planning Unit90 and the AMISOM strategic airlift operations. The EU has donated €15 million towards assisting the UNDP with its humanitarian projects in the country. It has also donated an additional €20 mill ion to the African Peace Facility to assist AMISOM with capacity-building projects.91 In 2008, the EU supported the EU NAVFOR naval operations on the coast of Somalia to tackle the emerging piracy problems facing international ships. The EU is also involved in diplomatic efforts to support a viable peace process in the country, incl uding supporting the creation of the TFP and efforts at political inclusiveness. In term s of development assistance the EU has pledged over 200 million Euros in support through t he European Development Fund. According to Reliefweb, “the main areas of developm ent cooperation are governance, education, the productive sectors and rural develop ment.”92 They have also contributed over €40 million towards humanitarian relief aid to those in need in Somalia. Within the EU, however, diverging bilateral interes ts are affecting the cohesiveness of its Somali strategy. In particular France has significant strategic 88 DFID, Reducing Conflict in Africa: Progress and Challeng es, ACPP Performance Report, 2001-05, DFID (September 2006): 43 89 African Union, “China donates the sum of US $300.0 00 to assist the African Union in the Somali peace process,” Reliefweb, 28 August 2007. Available at: http://www [accessed 1 June 2009] 90 Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplif ying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges 30 91 European Union. “Factsheet: EU Engagement in Somal ia” Reliefweb, 28 August 2007, R49LY?OpenDocument [accessed 31 March 2009] 92 Ibid.

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133 relationships with countries in the region. This ha s affected its ability to coordinate its actions effectively with both the EU and AMISOM. Al though France has provided training support to the AMISOM personnel, its strat egic interest in the Horn of Africa has been a source of increasing tensions with the US. T he point of contention between the two countries has been the stability of one of Fran ces’ most important satellite states— Djibouti. Being a former colony and a staunch ally of French military operations in the region, Djibouti’s stability is of prime importance to France. However, increased US interest in countering terrorism in the region led to the establishment of the Joint Taskforce Horn of Africa military base in Djibouti. This has weakened France’s influence in the country and has threatened its sph ere of influence in the region. “French diplomatic and military operations in Djibouti, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden have or are in danger of becoming seriously compromised and weakened, to the detriment of French policy in Africa and the Middle East.”93 French fears are rooted in Djibouti’s geostrategic importance in providing access to the Indian and Pacific Ocean and to its dependent states including French Polynesia and New Caledonia. Djibouti also allows the French military to base any operations in East Afri ca, the Middle East and East Asia. “[T]his French basing platform represents the third largest French force deployed outside of metropolitan France…and monies paid by the Minis try of Defense to Djibouti represent over 60 percent of the Djiboutian budget and nearly 25 percent of its GDP.”94 With increased US involvement in the region due to Somalia’s alleged links to terrorism, the Djibouti government has sought to benefit by in creasing demands and levies from the 93 Liebi, Vernie, “Military Policy to Revise the Fren ch Military Presence in the Horn of Africa,” Comparative Strategy 27, no. 1, (2008): 79 94Ibid., 80

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134 French government. In 2003, France acquiesced and d oubled its stationing fees to the Djibouti government. Also, the US has been the prim ary beneficiary of increased Djibouti nationalism, which has been growing for de cades due to France’s colonial history with the country. Following the rise in terrorist activity by Islamic fundamentalists during the 1990s and following the September 11th attacks, the US argued that “Al Qaeda remnants fleeing Afghanistan would seek and find refuge in f ailed or failing states in sub-Saharan Africa and reconstitute their operational base…”95 Thus, since the ‘Black Hawk Down’ debacle during the US military’s first foray into S omalia in 1993, Washington has preferred to support the efforts of regional neighb ors to contain the instability in Somalia. Both Kenya and Ethiopia have become important ideol ogical and strategic partners in its efforts at preventing Somalia from becoming a base for terrorists. The US has supported the TFG and assisted Ethiopia’s military in its 200 6 incursion into Mogadishu against the Islam Courts. Since the creation of AMISOM, the US has provided logistical assistance and support for the Strategic Planning and Manageme nt Unit, training, and airlift support for troops. Thus, despite increased US attention to the region, the focus on counterterrorism and increased monetary and logistical sup port of the Ethiopian government serve to undermine AMISOM’s efforts at stabilizing the country and the AU’s efforts at negotiating a peace deal with all parties. Also, th ere is a perception that Kenya, and in particular Ethiopia are not neutral negotiators in the peace process due to their close ties with elements of rebel groups, as opposed to assist ing single-minded focus on counterterrorism. 95 Jonathan Stevenson, “Risks and Opportunities in So malia,” Survival 49, no. 2 (2007): 8

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135 Conclusion These case studies demonstrate the converging and diverging roles played by various actors within the emerging security structu re of the AU, and how they affected the outcome of specific goals of the institution. S pecifically, each case study shows the role regional interests, the PSC, and external dono rs played in shaping AU peacekeeping missions. The implementation of AU peacekeeping man dates poses consequences for the ability of the AU to develop its peace and security structure. Given the relative youth of the new institution and the fact that the security structure is still evolving, it is important to assess how these external donors and AU members coordinate their actions and their implications for the development of an effective Af rican peace and security structure. Burundi has faced forty years of political instabil ity and two decades of prolonged violent and intense civil conflict that has involve d neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda. The result of this constant violence is a c ountry that is one of the poorest in the world. However, the actions of AMIS helped break Bu rundi’s cycle of violence, which has resulted in two consecutive elections and a pat hway towards development. The reason why AMIB succeeded in fulfilling its mandate of creating stable conditions on the ground to enable UN intervention was the effective coordination among AU member states and between the AU and its external donors: [B]ased on enlightened self-interest, pressure from the AU and its membership, and particularly South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda, encouraged Burundian actors to stay the course. Pre ssure and donor support from the EU and its member states, from Can ada and from the US also played a critical role.96 96 Stephen Jackson, “the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB) – Political and Strategic Lessons Le arned,” DPKO Peacekeeping Best Practice, Conflict Prevention Pool Forum (July 2006): 3

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136 The combination of these actors, international nongovernmental organizations, and civil society groups working in tandem helped to break th e violent cycle of conflict that had gripped Burundi for decades. Thus, the emerging sec urity structure of the AU, with its different interests and actors, was able to work re latively well together to stabilize the situation for BINUB to implement post-conflict reco nstruction measures. Sudan, on the other hand was a failed mission for t he AU because it was not able to fulfill its mandate by enforcing the DPA agreeme nt and disarming militias. Unlike AMIB, where the Arusha Agreement was successfully n egotiated, AMIS was unable to enforce the DPA agreements by getting the factions of the SPLA to agree to negotiations in order to form a unity government. This failure w as due to the lack of coordination among AU member states that had vested interests wi thin Sudan and the region, as well as the lack of coordination between external donors and the AU. Unlike AMIB where regional actors cooperated on important peacekeepin g decisions, the AMIS mission was hampered by the lack of coordination between Nigeri a and South Africa. This competition between the two major regional powers h ampered the timely deployment of troops. In addition, neighboring AU member states w ere involved in the internal conflict in Sudan. Chad’s fear of the escalating refugee cri sis, coupled with its suspicion of the Khartoum governments interference in Chad’s own int ernal political crisis, increased tensions between the two governments and hindered n ecessary curbs to the violence in Darfur. Sudan’s neighbor Ethiopia also posed a prob lem to the AU’s ability to broker a peace deal due to its monetary and logistical suppo rt for the SPLA. The weakness of the government of the Central African Republic, and the instability of its porous borders contributed to the ongoing fighting in the country. There were also significant differences

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137 among external donors who had diverging interests i n Sudan. Bilateral interests of countries like the US and France, which revolved ar ound issues of counter-terrorism and geostrategic concerns, distracted and interfered wi th the efforts at negotiation and peacekeeping of AMIS. External interests like China and Russia interfered in the internal dynamics of Sudan, which also had an adverse impact on the AMIS mission. Like AMIB and AMIS before it, AMISOM has taken on a major burden by intervening in a crisis which much of the internati onal community did not have the political will to engage. Also, like its predecesso rs, AMISOM was left with inadequate financial and logistical support, not to mention th e inability of member states themselves to send enough troops or handle resources efficient ly. As does AMIS, AMISOM faces an AU emerging security structure that should marshal the full resources of its stakeholders into supporting it, but lacks cohesiveness. At the heart of this lack of comprehensiveness are the diverging interests of regional and interna tional actors. Recently, the Commissioner of the PSC laid the blame squarely on the UN for not sending in UN peacekeepers to quell the violence.97 The problem is that the increased involvement of t he US with its ally Ethiopia in counterterrorism measu res has the negative effect of inflaming actors within the country and regionally and thus preventing a comprehensive peace process. Also, the fears of countries like Fr ance of losing strategic access to military routes in the region, as well as its compe tition with the US for influence, have clouded the ability of countries in the region and in the international community to tackle this crisis. 97 Peter Hienlein, “African Union Urges Major Interna tional Endeavor in Somalia,” VOA 13 May 2008, -05-13voa48.cfm?CFID=215149785&CFTOKEN=91536598&jsessioni d=003067a567fedc2d3c0c641f705050755d19 [accessed 1 June 2009]

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138 Chapter V Implications of Emerging Security Structure of the African Union for Long-term Development on the Continent Importance of the Emerging Security Structure of th e African Union The peace and security architecture of the AU has d eveloped significant continental and international importance. While the UN has been the primary instrument for ensuring international peace and security for d ecades through its peacekeeping and peace-building operations, it has been overloaded b y the demand for its resources. Moreover, the lack of international intervention du ring the genocide in Rwanda and the US’s botched engagement in Somalia during the 1990s illustrated the political liability that comes with international intervention. The nee d for conflict resolution mechanisms to deal with the proliferation of intra-state confl icts in Africa forced the AU to pursue the creation of its own institutions for addressing eme rgencies on the continent. Second, the structural transformation of the OAU’s Mechanism fo r Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution into the Peace and Security Council has fundamentally changed the ability of the AU to deal with conflict. Instrument al to this change was the ideological transition from non-intervention and the primacy of state sovereignty towards the policy of non-indifference embedded within the ‘Responsibi lity to Protect’ framework. The PSC was created to offer an African solution to the end emic crisis of conflict on the continent, and to provide the stability necessary for badly ne eded development. Increased liberalization among member states has spurred a qu est for an ‘African Renaissance’,

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139 where governance reform and economic growth have be come essential predicates for development polices. To this effect, NEPAD was crea ted to complement the important conflict resolution policies of the PSC by addressi ng endemic poverty, poor governance, and corruption. Policies to address these problems are seen as necessary to preventing future conflicts. The end of the Cold War, the rise of complex emergencies, and the transnational nature of threats brought on by insta bility to the global system have moved global actors towards supporting multiple mechanism s for providing peace operations around the world. The changes to the AU’s security structure should make the AU a viable contributor to these operations Problems with the Emerging Security Structure The components of this emerging security architectu re provide the financial, strategic, logistical, and political support the AU needs to carry out its conflict management operations. The internal components of t he peace and security structure of the AU—the PSC, NEPAD, and the RECs—are trying to b uild the self sufficiency the AU needs to achieve the so-called African Renaissan ce its members have hoped for. However, as the AU missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia show, the AU has significant financial and strategic deficits that p revent its autonomy. The AU-mandated missions illustrate problems within the structure o f the AU itself. While AMIB showed how successful a coordinated approach to AU strateg y can be, AMIS and AMISOM show how financial, logistical, and political const raints impede the ability of those missions to fulfill their mandates. External donors are filling the gap between the AU’s ambition and its capacity. In all three missions, t he UN has provided the technical assistance and support that the AU missions needed, and, in the cases of AMIB and

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140 AMIS, this support led to joint missions. The G8 co untries, through their Africa Action Plan have provided training and financial assistanc e for AU peacekeeping troops. The EU has also provided technical and logistical assistan ce, as well as peacekeepers in support of AU forces. NATO also provided limited airlift su pport to AMIS and AMISOM. Individual countries, particularly economic and pol itical powers like the US, UK, and France, have contributed the largest share of suppo rt for AU missions. Other G8 countries like Germany, Canada, and Japan have also provided technical assistance and support to AU missions. Finally, all external donor s have contributed humanitarian assistance to countries that underwent or continue to undergo crisis. Despite the efforts of these external donors, there remain diverging strat egic interests between donors and AU member states, which harm the ability of actors to coordinate efforts at dealing with conflict. AMIS and AMISOM show that. In terms of th e fulfillment of mission mandates, AMIB produced mixed results, while AMIS and AMISOM produced and continue to produce comparatively poor results. AMIB was more s uccessful in achieving central tenets of its mission mandate by coordinating effec tively with AU member states in the region and with external donors. In AMIS and AMISOM on the other hand, diverging interests of regional actors and external donors de bilitated the AU’s ability to coordinate effective responses to the conflicts. There are significant problems within the AU that s hould not be ignored. While this new emerging security structure of the AU mark s a strong improvement from its predecessor, the OAU, several challenges diminish i ts efficacy. Some of these problems are constraints internal to the structure of the AU itself, while other problems are external in nature. First, the AU needed the consent of the Khartoum government to intervene in

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141 Sudan. Although the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doc trine in the Constitutional Act allowed the PSC to mandate interventions in cases o f genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, influential member states such as E gypt were against the implementation of a stronger mandate than what was sanctioned by t he Sudanese government. Second, the debate over whether or not Sudan should have as sumed its scheduled presidency of the PSC in 2005 put into focus the potential of the AU losing legitimacy like its predecessor the OAU. Similarly, the Protocol of the Peace and Security Council requires its members to support good governance practices.1 There are a significant number of African countries with governance problem, their co ntributions to AU mandated missions poses a potential crisis of legitimacy for the orga nization. However, exclusion of member states due to issues of governance also has the pot ential to limit much needed contributions to the fledging organizations. Dependence on regional hegemonic powers like Nigeri a (AMIS) and South Africa (AMIB) can also be problematic. The AU relies on re gional powers not only for budget fulfillments, since the contributions from smaller countries are insufficient, but also for their leadership in peace processes as well. Accord ing to Klingebiel, “it is South Africa, Nigeria and Libya that play crucial roles in politi cal mediation, peacekeeping and the allocation of financial resources.”2 However, because the relationship among ordinary member countries and the presence or absence of lea ding powers in regional organizations play a large part in determining the ability of the regions to react to or prevent conflict situations,3 countries, like Ethiopia in the case of AMISOM, th at have the 1 S. Klingebiel, T. Blohm, R. Eckle, and K. Grunow, Donor Contributions to Strengthening the African Pe ace and Security Architecture: Final Report of the DIE Coun try Working Group Ethiopia/South Africa (Institute for Security Studies, 2006), 30-31 2Ibid, 41 3Ibid, 38

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142 capacity to intervene also have the potential to af fect the outcomes of missions negatively, because they have political interests i n the countries in conflict. RECs also have been affected by the political tensi ons among regional powers. With the case of Somalia, Within IGAD there is no clear leader, although Ethi opia has tried to assume that position by contributing troops to AU p eace support operations and paying $100,000 in voluntary contrib utions into the AU’s program budget, making it one of three countries to do so, the other being South Africa and Nigeria…The tensions between Sudan and Somalia have similarly hampered decision-making at regional leve l. Kenya has attempted to take on a coordinated role, since it i s active in the process between Sudan and Somalia.4 Institutional problems, such as hold-ups in the dis tribution of funds, have weakened the effectiveness of AU. According to the EU, “the reasons for budgetary under-performance are both structural and manageria l, in particular, concern [over] procurement procedures, strategic planning and repo rting cycles.”5 The AU lacks infrastructure capacity for deployments, communicat ion, and intelligence-gathering needed for a coordinated intervention. This require s, particularly in the case of AMISOM and AMIS, the airlift support of international inst itutions like NATO. Finally, the AU has not fully operationalized significant mechanisms of its peace and security structure, including the Early Warning System and its post-con flict reconstruction apparatus. The external component of the emerging structure of the AU is based on a partnership between the AU and its international do nors. However, the diverging interests of external donors have the effect of impeding cohe sive need-based strategies for the development of the security structure of the Africa n Union. 4Ibid, 39 5Nicoletta Pirozzi, “EU Support to African Security Architecture: Funding and Training Components,” Occasional Paper (European Union Institute of Security Studies Feb ruary 2009), 16.

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143 Lack of coordination because of diverging interests among donors has led to “the slow rate of troop mobilization and deployment of m issions. External pressures for the deployment of AMISOM and the extension and upgradin g of the initial six month observer mandate of AMIS did not take into account the actual capabilities of the AU.”6 Unlike the coordinated ACPP funding mechanism used by the UK, the complicated layers of EU policy programs for the AU—including t he APF, the European Development Fund, and the European Neighborhood Pol icy Instrument—have led to a somewhat fragmented approach to supporting AU opera tions.7 This internal fragmentation and lack of coordination within the E U mechanisms for dealing with AU policy, amplified by the strong bilateral relations between individual EU member states and the AU, jeopardizes a cohesive approach to assi sting the peace and security structure of the AU. Unlike AMIB, AMIS and AMISOM showed that the diverg ence of interests among external donors affected the ability of the A U peace and security structure to accomplish necessary political settlements by putti ng pressure on national and regional actors involved. Competing external interests also engender the wider question of what circumstances compel the military intervention of i nternational actors. This central problem has handicapped the efficacy of the UN due to the political machinations of the UN Security Council, and it has ultimately led to t he building of viable regional security institutions. However, “the willingness of external actors to intervene militarily (above all, with combat missions) in extreme situations (t hat do not affect their own interests) is 6 Pirozzi, 15. 7 Ibid., 23.

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144 likely to remain low.”8 The creation of the African Standby Force is seen as the solution to the unreliability in the UN; however, its capaci ty is not likely to be sufficient for some time. Funding for military operations is higher than for civilian operations. Many of the conflicts Africa faces, as exemplified by Sudan and Somalia, are complex intra-state and inter-state conflicts. This means that there must b e a strong emphasis on political resolution to complement the peacekeeping and peace -building. A significant amount of donor support goes to developing the military and c ivilian components of the peace and security structure as opposed to the conflict preve ntion and post-conflict reconstruction mechanisms of the framework. Within the PSC, the in stitution responsible for coordinating post-conflict reconstruction policy wi th NEPAD and other institutions, there has been no focus on developing effective coordinat ing instruments.9 Also, there is a broader problem in the coordination between the Pea ce Operations section of the PSC and the Political Affairs Department of the PSC, wh ich is in charge of conducting postconflict reconstruction work. The overall impact of the dependence on external do nors on the emerging peace and security structure of the AU is on African owne rship. The point of the pan-African ideal of the African Renaissance was that there wou ld be an ‘African solutions to African problems’ approach to regional security governance. However, some argue that external support for African ownership only occurs when “(1) they do not have immediate interest in it; (2) they [external donors] do have an immedi ate interest but do not want to engage 8 Klingebiel, Blohm, Eckle, and Grunow, Donor Contributions to Strengthening the African Pe ace and Security Architecture 10. 9 Ibid, 31.

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145 directly or alone; or (3) it requires a long-term a nd sustained approach to which they are unwilling to commit.”10 Impact of the Emerging Security Structure on Long-t erm Development The Common Africa Defense and Security Policy, whic h forms the foundation of the emerging security structure of the AU, has emph asized the interdependence of security and development and the concept of human s ecurity. However, this crucial aspect of conflict prevention seems to be missing f rom the AU-mandated missions. At the heart of the AU’s attempts to assure comprehens ive human security is NEPAD. Its aim is to deal with the short-term Post-Conflict Re construction and Development Framework (PCRD): “It is not intended to be stringe ntly prescriptive but rather to be a comprehensive guide on the basis of which appropria te strategies, policies and activities can be developed and implemented for each unique si tuation.”11 The aim of this framework is to provide guidelines and policy strat egies for the AU, civil society, external donors (both institutions and bilateral do nors), and other organizations. The vision of the AU is that the PCRD “a) consolidates peace and prevents a relapse of violence; b) helps address the root causes of confl ict; c) encourages and fast-tracks planning and implementation of reconstruction activ ities; and d) enhances complementarities and coordination between and amon g diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes.”12 Within this framework there is the emergency phase that deals with humanitarian assistance; the second phase is the tr ansition phase following a ceasefire that allows peace-building measures to begin throug h transitional elections; the final 10 Franke and Esmenjaud, 149 11 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 16 12 UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 17

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146 phase is the development phase which deals with lon g-term political, economic and social changes. In AMIB’s case, the AU was able to fulfill its mand ate enough to allow UN troops to assure that the second phase of transitio nal elections occurred successfully. NEPAD’s PCRD instrument was not fully operational a t that point so the UN, along with the World Bank and IMF, took control of coordinatin g the entire peacemaking and subsequent peace-building phase. However, AMIS was unsuccessful in its mandate and required a quick AU-UN hybrid force to stabilize th e situation in Darfur. The tenuous North-South peace agreement allowed for a brief sha red government between elements of the SLA and the Khartoum government. However, ongoi ng tensions, exacerbated by the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, have made implementa tion of peace-building policies difficult. Humanitarian assistance continues to be provided under the leadership of the UN agencies and external donors. AMISOM’s mission c ontinues to be at the humanitarian assistance phase. Conflict prevention has become central to avoiding a relapse in cases where there has been conflict. One criticism that has been moun ted against external donors with respect to their impact on the comprehensive securi ty and development approach to dealing with conflict is the fear of the securitiza tion of development assistance: “Many countries fear that money which could have been use d for their socio-economic development is being redirected to conflicts in oth er countries, thus constraining their opportunities for development and leaving them more prone to future conflict.”13 Another fear is that the influence of strategic interests o f various external stakeholders in the 13 Klingebiel S, T. Blohm, R. Eckle. K. Grunow, Donor Contributions to Strengthening the African Pe ace and Security Architecture 55.

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147 emerging security structure negatively impacts the coordination and harmonization of not only peace negotiations but also support for the pe ace operations themselves. Due to the fact that NEPAD’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Fram ework is still in its conceptual stage, there is a growing need to identify what pol icies can aid the rebuilding of conflict areas, so as to prevent them from relapsing into th e cycle of violence and instability that has characterized modern Africa’s history.

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