Striking the State Apparatus through Indigenous Mobilization

Permanent Link:

Material Information

Title: Striking the State Apparatus through Indigenous Mobilization A Comparative Analysis of Central Andean Movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Jones, Serena Simone
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2009
Publication Date: 2009


Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: This thesis is a comparative study of the central Andean indigenous movements' rise as dynamic collective actors at the turn of the 21st century. To understand variances in these movements and how they emerged, a most similar systems design study was conducted. Under this method some historical and cultural factors were held constant while four independent factors were observed: the degree of openness in a political system, the presence of influential allies, framing of the movements' demands, and a movements' organizational structure. My findings revealed that these factors accounted for Ecuador's and Bolivia's indigenous movements' rise as collective actors able to represent their bases as well as their leadership in advancing the grievances of the broader civil societies in which they are situated. For Peru's indigenous movement, these same factors account for its rise as a dynamic actor, but they also explain the lesser degree of influence that it has had in the political sphere. This difference is attributed to a more closed political system that ultimately undermined the organizational maturation and unity of Peru's indigenous groups, influenced its frames towards a targeted indigenous population, and left the movement with little connection to the broader society.
Statement of Responsibility: by Serena Simone Jones
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2009
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2009 J7
System ID: NCFE004124:00001

Permanent Link:

Material Information

Title: Striking the State Apparatus through Indigenous Mobilization A Comparative Analysis of Central Andean Movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Jones, Serena Simone
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2009
Publication Date: 2009


Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation


Abstract: This thesis is a comparative study of the central Andean indigenous movements' rise as dynamic collective actors at the turn of the 21st century. To understand variances in these movements and how they emerged, a most similar systems design study was conducted. Under this method some historical and cultural factors were held constant while four independent factors were observed: the degree of openness in a political system, the presence of influential allies, framing of the movements' demands, and a movements' organizational structure. My findings revealed that these factors accounted for Ecuador's and Bolivia's indigenous movements' rise as collective actors able to represent their bases as well as their leadership in advancing the grievances of the broader civil societies in which they are situated. For Peru's indigenous movement, these same factors account for its rise as a dynamic actor, but they also explain the lesser degree of influence that it has had in the political sphere. This difference is attributed to a more closed political system that ultimately undermined the organizational maturation and unity of Peru's indigenous groups, influenced its frames towards a targeted indigenous population, and left the movement with little connection to the broader society.
Statement of Responsibility: by Serena Simone Jones
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2009
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2009 J7
System ID: NCFE004124:00001

This item is only available as the following downloads:

Full Text


STRIKING THE STATE APPARATUS THROUGH INDIGENOUS MOBILIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL ANDEAN MOVEMENTS IN ECUADOR, BOLIVIA, AND PERU BY SERENA SIMONE JONES A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree in Bachelor of Art Under the sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida April, 2009


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My deepest and utmost gratitude is extende d to God. Without His love and constant encouragement, I would not have been able to complete my thesis. Throughout this year, as well as my college career at New College, an academic and social network of friends and professors were lovingly placed in my path to help and encourage me to continue the pursuit of my B.A. and the completion of my undergraduate thesis. With His love and this network I leave New College a stronger and confident woman. My sincerest gratitude is extended to Professor Hicks whose patience and mentorship helped guide me through the thesis process. I am forever indebted to her for she spent many late nights helping me revise my thesis, providing insightful feedback, and encouraging me to continue my research. In the end, her love for academia and her encouragement as an advisor has pushed me to desire more from myself in both academic and social circles. My sincerest gratitude is also extended to Jan Wheeler whose love for writing and push for excellence not only improved my writing cap abilities, but also helped me discover a newfound confidence in myse lf and in my thesis. Finally, my appreciation goes to my famil y, colleagues at New College, and my best friends Ambar Velazquez and Lensa Kwadjo (the white binder thesis brigade). Your love support, and prayers helped me continue writing despite many nights of tears and frustration. And, as the last bit of ink dries, I know that I am more than ready to close the last chapter of my undergrad college career at New College of Florida. ii


CONTENTS Acknowledgements ii List of Contents iii List of Figures and Tables v Acronyms vi Abstract ix Introduction 1 Research Design 2 Structure of The Thesis 3 Chapter 1: Literature and Theory Review 6 Social Movement Literature and Theories 6 Political Opportunity Structure 6 Framing Processes 10 Mobilizing Structures 15 Perspectives on Indigenous Movements 17 External Factors 17 Internal Factors 21 Conclusions 24 Chapter 2: A Comparative Historical Account of the Central Andean State Political History and the Ri se of their Indigenous Movements 27 From Pre-Colonialism to State Form ation (early 1500s to early 1900s) 28 The Conquest and Fall of the Inca Empire 28 The Birth and Fall of the Viceroyalty of Peru 29 The Formation of the New Andean Republics and Political Instability 30 The Rise of the Corporatist Ci tizenship Regime Model and the Continuation of Political Instability (1820s to 1950s) 32 Ecuador (1860-1950) 33 Bolivia (1889-1953) 34 Peru (1903-1929) 36 The Last Stretch of Military Intervention 37 Ecuador (1960-1979) 38 Bolivia (1964-1968) 39 Peru (1968-1980) 42 Re-democratization and the Rise of th e Neoliberal Citizenship Regime 44 Ecuador (1979-2000) 45 iii


Bolivia (1982-2003) 49 Peru (1980-2002) 52 The Historical Development of the Central Andean Indigenous Movements 57 Ecuadors Indigenous Movement 59 The Andean indigenous movement 60 The indigenous movement in the Amazon 61 The Indigenous Movement in Bolivia 64 The indigenous movement in the Andes 65 The indigenous movement in the Amazon 68 Perus Indigenous Movement 70 The indigenous movement in the Andes 70 The indigenous movement in the Amazon 71 Conclusions 73 Chapter 3: Comparative Anal ysis of Case Studies 76 The Political Opportunity Structure 81 Ecuador 82 Bolivia 85 Peru 87 Framing 90 Ecuador 92 Bolivia 93 Peru 95 Mobilizing Structures 97 Ecuador 99 Bolivia 100 Peru 104 Conclusions 107 Chapter 4: Conclusion 111 Appendix : 116 Figure A: Geographical Map of Ecuador 116 Figure B: Geographical Map of Bolivia 117 Figure C: Geographical Map of Peru Figure D: Key to Map of Indigenous Organization in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru 119 Figure E: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Ecuador 120 Figure F: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Bolivia 121 Figure G: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Peru 122 References 123 iv


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS AND TABLES Table 3.1: Factors Shaping Indigenous Mobilization in the Three Cases 110 Figure A: Geographical Map of Ecuador 116 Figure B: Geographical Map of Bolivia 117 Figure C: Geographical Map of Peru 118 Figure D: Key to Map of Indigenous Organizations in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru 119 Figure E: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Ecuador 120 Figure F: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Bolivia 121 Figure G: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Peru 122 v


ACRONYMS AIDESEP Asociacin Inter-tnica para el Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana (Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Jungle) APCOB Apoyo Para las Comunidades Indgena del Oriente Boliviano (Assistance for the Indigenous Communities of Eastern Bolivia) APRA Aliazana Popular Revolucionara Americano (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) CEDOC Confederacin Ecuador ian de Obreras Catlica (The Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers) CIDOB Confederacin Indgena del Oriente y Amazon a de Bolivia (Indigenous Confederat ion of Eastern Bolivia) COB Central Obrero Boliviana (Bolivian Workers Center) CONACNIE Consejo Nacional Coordinador de los Indgenas del Ecuador (National Coordinating Council of the Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) CONAICE Coordinadora Nacional de los Indgenas de la Costa del Ecuador (National Coordinator of the I ndigenous of the Ecuadorian Coast) CONAIE Confederacin de Naci onalidades Indgenas del Ecuador (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador) CONAPA Comisi n Nacional de Pueblos Andinos, Amaz nicos y Afroperuanos (The National Commission of Indigenous Amazonian, and Afroperuvian Peoples) CONAP (Confederacin de Nacion alidades Amaznicas del Per (Confederation of Amazoni an Nationalities of Peru) CONFENIAE Confederacin de Naciona lidades Indgenas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon) vi


CSUTCB Confederacin Sindica l nica de Trabajadores Unitary Syndical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia) CTE Confederacin Trabajadores del Ecuador (Workers Confederation of Ecuador ECUARUNARI Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui (The Awakening of the Ecuadorian Indian) FEI Federacin Ecuatoriana de Indios (The Ecuadorian Federation of Indians) FEDECOR Federacin Departamental Cochabamba de Organizaciones de Regantes (Cochabamba Department Federation of Irrigators Organizations) FEINE Federacin Ecuatori ana de Indgenas Evanglicos (The Ecuadorian Federation of Indigenous Evangelists) FENOC Federacin Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (The National Federati on of Peasant Organizations) FOIN Federacin de Organi zaciones Indgenas de Napo (The Federation of Indige nous Organizations of Napo) IMF International Monetary Fund INRA Ley de Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (Law of National Inst itutional Agrarian Reform) MAS Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards Socialism) MIP Movimiento Indgena Pacahkuti (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) MIAP Movimiento Indgena de la Amazonia Peruana (Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon) MNR Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (Nacional Revolutionary Movement) MUPP-NP Movimiento de Unidad Plurinac ional Pachakutik-Nuevo Pa s (Pachakutik Movement of Pl urinational Unity-New Country) NEP La Nueva Political Economica vii


(The New Economic Policy) NSM New Social Movement Theory ngos non-governmental organizations LPP Ley de Participaci n Popular (Law of Popular Participation) OPIP La Organizacin de Pueblos Indgenas de Pastaza (Organization of Indigenous Peoples of Pastaza) PIR Partido de Iz quierda Revolutionaries (Leftist Revolutionary Party) PLR Partido Liberal Radical (Radical Liberal Party) POS Political Opportunity Structure SEMAPA Servicio Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado (Municipal Service of Portable Water and Sewers) SMOs Social Movement Organizations viii


ix STRIKING THE STATE APPARATUS TH ROUGH INDIGNEOUS MOBILIZATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CENTRAL ANDEAN MOVEMENTS IN ECUADOR, BOLIVI A, AND PERU Serena Jones New College of Florida, 2009 ABSTRACT This thesis is a comparative study of the central Andean indigenous movements rise as dynamic collective actors at the turn of the 21st century. To understand variances in these movements and how they emerged, a most similar systems design study was conducted. Under this method some historical and cultural f actors were held constant while four independent factors were obser ved: the degree of openness in a political system, the presence of influential allies, framing of the movements demands, and a movements organizational structure. My findings revealed that these fact ors accounted for Ecuadors and Bolivias indigenous movements rise as collective actors able to repres ent their bases as well as their leadership in advancing the grie vances of the broader civil societies in which they are situated. For Perus indigenous movement, th ese same factors account for its rise as a dynamic actor, but they also explain the lesser degree of influence that it has had in the political sphere. This difference is attributed to a more closed political system that ultimately undermined the organizational ma turation and unity of Perus indigenous groups, influenced its frames towards a targeted indigenous popul ation, and left the movement with little connec tion to the broader society. Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Science


INTRODUCTION In 2009, the Bolivian constitutional referendum dramatically changed the political landscape. The draft of a ne w constitution recognized indi genous rights and widened their inclusion into the Bo livian state. Rising political incorporation of indigenous peoples has also occurred in Ecuador and Peru as they, too, have institutionaliz ed laws recognizing various indigenous rights. This increase in the inclusion of indigenous peoples interests and demands into the political affairs of the state has been the result of pressure exerted from below. Within the la st two decades, the central Andean region has experienced a wave of powerful indigenous mo bilizations that have, at various times, struck down the power of the state apparatu s and captured internat ional attention. Since their emergence in the 20th century; these movements have opened political space for their indigenous constituents and established themselves as dynamic actors in civil society as they have struggl ed to institutionalize indigenous rights. Their ascent as powerful collective actors has been a rema rkable feat given a shared history of colonialism, marginaliza tion and political exclusion. To understand how these movements have risen and to uncover what f actors have led to thei r ability to achieve their goals, I conducted a comparative anal ysis of the central Andean indigenous movements at the turn of the 21st century through a lens of social movement theory. In the end, my study finds that four factors co mmonly identified by the social movement literature both explain the rise of these movements and account for the differences seen among them in their ascent to dynamic actors of contention: the de gree of openness in a 1


political system the presence of influentia l allies, framing of the demands of the movement, and the organizational structure of the movement. Research Design This thesis presents a focused comparison of the indigenous movements in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. To understand the variations in how these movements rose and became dynamic collective actors, a most similar systems design study will be conducted. This design is appropriate for this st udy as it allows us to hold constant some variables (in this case common historical and cultural features ) in order to focus on a few factors that differ among similar systems and that might account for observed political outcomes. In this study the independent variab les of interest consist of the previously mentioned four factors highlighted in theo rizing about social movements, while the dependent variable is the outcome of each m obilization. In the past, scholarly research that has analyzed the rise of Latin Am erican indigenous movements has focused on variables such as the political associational space, transco mmunity networks, shifts in political systems, geography, and demographi cs. Many of those studies were conducted for the first wave of indigenous movements in the early twentieth century, and the most important factors they identify are captured well by the social movement literatures current focus on political opportunity st ructure and movement organization. The variables I chose for this st udy are conducive both to the stud y of indigenous movements in the late twentieth century and to unders tanding them in comparison to other social movements. 2


Although a larger set of cases might ha ve provided more generalizable results, these three cases were specifically chosen b ecause a similar historical trajectory and geographical proximity presents itself as a good background for a comparative analysis of the divergent history of thei r indigenous movements. In addition, the Andean region is home to roughly 90 percent of Latin Americas estimated 35 to 40 million indigenous peoples. Bolivia has the largest proportion of indigenous population (60-70 percent), while Ecuador (30-38 percent) and Peru (38-40 percent) follow Bolivia at the top of the list of highest percentage of indigenous populations in La tin America (Yashar 2005, 20). Because of their importance to understandi ng the opportunities and ways to integrate indigenous peoples into political systems, thes e three countries could also be considered critical cases. Structure of the Thesis Chapter one discusses the ke y theoretical concepts of social movement theory that will be used in the comparative analysis in chapter three. The political opportunity structure, framing processes, and mobilizing structures are three constructs of social movement theory that explain the differences similarities, and outcomes of the empirical data. In addition, this chap ter reviews various scholars perspective on indigenous movements. Because indigenous movements embrace a wide range of themes and are affected by many political and economic factors, the topics will be divided into external and internal factors in relati on to the indigenous movements. This categorization provides a better focus of various themes relating to indigenous movements such as the quality of democracy, political representation, a nd issues of self-determination. 3


Chapter two presents a comparative histor ical account of the development of the central Andean indigenous movements in rela tion to the historical political development of these states. This historical background is necessary because it sets up a comparative framework for examining how the rise and di vergent paths of the indigenous movements correlate with the political trajectories of the central Andean states. Several features should be taken note of when reading this ch apter: the constant feature of political instability due to frequent regime change s; the indigenous popul ations history of marginalization, exclusion, and unequal incorpor ation into the central Andean states; and the role of the political and econom ic transformations of the late 20th century in providing both opportunities and provocations for mobilizing. Chapter three provides the core argument of my thesis. A comp arative analysis of the three movements reveals that all four f actors were instrumental to their rise as dynamic actors. Interestingly, these same factors accounted for the differences in movement strength and reach into the political system. In contrast to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia have had high levels of movement strength and unity and used those factors to assume a surprising leadership role in civil society to advance indi genous rights, as well as some of the demands of other groups particularly the poor. Perus indigenous movement, on the other hand, ha s historically been weaker and lacking organizational unity. Thus we see a lesser degree of influen ce in the political sphere that is, weaker indigenous incorporation into the stat e and influence in civil society. Overall, this study adds to the rising literature on indi genous movements and social movement theory. For the field of so cial movement theory, a comparative study of Latin American indigenous movements adds to the body of literature examining factors 4


that have enabled m arginalized groups of society to establish themselves as powerful actors in the political sphere. For the indigenous movement literature, this study collects and integrates empirical information on thes e movement and their organizations, and it provides a comparative contextual approach to analyzing indigenous movements. In addition, even though this thesis primarily fo cuses on what factors led to the rise of indigenous movements as dynamic actors and wh at they achieved, the subject of how to include the interests and assure the au tonomy of indigenous peoples touches upon broader literatures. For instance, topics in the democratization literature such as democratic citizenship and civil society ar e areas that indigen ous movement scholars appear to be influencing with their resear ch. Scholars have noticed that indigenous movements have provided different visions of citizenship and di fferent visions of the role of the state. Several states have granted new forms of individual and colle ctive rights, while constitutional reforms recognize the mu lticultural and pluricu ltural populations of states rich in indigenous communities. In s hort, though the democratization literature is not addressed directly in this thesis, the findings of this study are relevant to further research in these areas, as well as to theorizing about social movements. 5


CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE AND THEORY REVIEW This chapter provides an overview of so cial movement and indigenous movement literature in order to understa nd how social movement theory can be used to explain the rise and development of Latin American indigenous movements. From the social movement literature, the review focuses on the effects and interplay among three social movement elements: the politic al opportunity structure (POS ), framing processes, and mobilizing structures. These elements explai n how and when social movements mobilize, organize, and build their ideo logical viewpoints in response to their nations political system or political environment. The Indige nous movement literatu re discusses various themes that have risen from the presence a nd interplay between external and internal factors that affect Latin American in digenous populations and their movements These themes include the role that social moveme nts play in the democr atization processes, citizenship rights, the definiti on of nation, the dominance of neoliberalism and its effects on the general population, and the importance of co llective identity in social movements. Social Movement Literature and Theories Political Opportunity Structure Political opportunity struct ure (POS) analysis explains that a movements rise, development, and fate is directly affected by changing factors within a political systems 6


environm ent that constrain or advance a m ovements opportunities for political activity (McAdam and Snow 1997, 34). Tarrow categori zes the factors centr al to structuring political opportunity as: (1) a political systems degree of openness, (2) sh ifts in the traditional alignment of power, (3) the pres ence of allies, and (4) divisions among the ruling elite (1998, 76-84). A political systems degree of openness can encourage or discourage collective action. Eisinger argues that in the presence of partial political access social movements will most likely use the opportuni ties that are available to them to mobilize and to address their grievances (1973, 15). Ferree and Hesss research of the 1970s wave of feminism in the United States adds strength to his ar gument as it demonstrates how feminist organizations began lobbying for equality and womens rights after the American political system partially opened itself to the subject of womens issues (2000, 133). In addition, McAdams research on the Ameri can civil rights movement and partial openness of the American political system i ndicated how the Suprem e Courts decision concerning Brown v. Board of Education encouraged mobilization and opened avenues for civil rights activists to further their stan ce against segregation and towards equality of both white and black Americans (1982, 50-89). Tarrows research for the second factor, sh ifts in the traditi onal alignments of power, pointed out that where the balance of power falls, whether it be to the current traditional actors in power or new actors, di rectly affects how mu ch political opportunity will or will not be availabl e for a social movement (Tarrow 1998, 76-84). For instance, during the 1930s and 1960s, structural changes in the American electoral system opened political space for previously excluded groups of society. These groups came from the 7


unem ployed sectors of society, the organize d labor unions, and the African American communities. They saw the opening of political space resulting form shifts in power as a political opportunity to mobili ze for representation and press their grievances (Piven and Cloward 1992, 55). Also, regime changes can shift the trad itional alignment of power, which then closes or opens political opportunities available to a so cial movement. When Chile transitioned from authoritarian rule to demo cratic rule, Chilean feminists took advantage of the new political opport unities to mobilize differently under democracy than authoritarianism (Franschet 2004, 2). Under the authoritarian state, political parties viewed womens rights as insignificant, resu lting in the feminist movement using an ineffective autonomous and apolitical m obilization strategy. When the state redemocratized and womens issues came to the forefront of politics, the formerly apathetic political parties allied with Chilean feminist activists. This new alliance increased the feminists power and mobilization efforts to re dress their grievances. Franschet notes that effectiveness of a mobiliza tion strategy depends on the right timing of political opportunity available in an opened or closed political system (2004, 10). Alliances with influential allies are th e third element on Tarrows list and are viewed as powerful points of leverages for social movements to challenge the political system (Tarrow 1998, 76-84). Jenkins and Perrow found the presence of allies to be a crucial factor for facilitating and constraining the mobilization efforts of American farm workers during the 1940s and the 1960s (1977, 37). Their research discovered that, despite having the same grievances, res ources, and goals, the outcomes of the two movements differentiated due to the presence and aid of allies. The first movement 8


struggled to achieve their goa ls because of a lack of s upport from political allies and unfavorable governmental policies. In cont rast, the second movement was successful because it operated in a political environmen t where liberal representatives in the U.S. department of Agriculture as their allies support ed their cause. In the end, the support from the allies helped the farm workers to receive new union c ontracts (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, 39-40). Brockett also discovered that allies played a directly influential role in the success and failure of several Central American peasant movements (1991, 256). These religious allies trained and educated peasant organizations in their mobilization efforts against the dominant political structure of the state in El Salvador and Nicaragua (Brockett 1991, 258). In the end, the exam ples provided by Jenkins and Perrow and Brockett illustrate how allies can help shift the balance of power toward the movements and help them gain access to the po litical system (Brockett 1991, 259). Divisions among the ruling elite are Tarrows fourth factor (1998, 76-84). Factions that can arise from elite conflicts can open political opportunity for both movement participants and certain parts of the elite. As allies, elites can use the resources and mobilization strength of movements to re-g ain political power in the state. Movement participants, on the other hand, can use the elites resources to advance and build a stronger support base. Jenkins and Perows study of the 1960s American farm workers points out how elite divisions opened political access for the farm workers. Alliances with one faction allowed those elites and farm workers to gain entrance into the political system (Jenkins and Perrow 1977, 48). 9


Movements can also expand opportunities for themselves and others. These new opportunities can arise out of a change in the direction or structure of a movements strategies and tactics. When political actors are caught o ff guard by the new strategies and tactics, movement participants can use that time frame to escalate their levels of collective action and reach more participants from society un-mobilized sectors of society (McAdam 1983, 59). McAdams study of the civil rights movements use of non-violent tactics, like the sit-ins used at restau rants and commercial businesses, caught the authorities off guard and gave the movement more time and a new way to strengthen its support base (1983, 59). Framing Processes Scholars also study framing processes to understand how meaning is shaped and used by social movement participants to mobilize potential supporters (McAdam and Snow 1996, 232). Zald defines frames as speci fic metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to rende r or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action, (1996, 262). As mechanisms, frames help individuals identify, channel, and create solutions for addr essing their grievances. The literature provided on indigenous movements discusses the different ways in which frames help social movements address their grievances. Using the American civil rights movement as an example, Noonan demonstrates how this movement was able to increase recr uitments because of the participants ability to effectively tie their grievances to a wider cultural frame that reso nated with the larger American population (1995, 254). Civil right s movement participants framed their grievances of lacking basic citizenship right s to the American cultural belief that the 10


constitutional phrase and the concept of liberty and just ice f or all, (1995, 254) were rights that should be guaranteed to all Amer ican citizens. The success of the civil rights movement was largely due to the ability of the movement to relate to the social movements grievances to the larger cultural frame of citizenship rights and thereby bring in bystanders and expand moveme nt participants (Noonan 1995, 254). The use of the civil rights theme is an example of frame alignment processes. Frame alignments are strategic mechanisms th at help to interpret a social movements grievances as movement participants try to connect their interests and grievances to potential supporters. Scholars have identifie d four basic frame alignment processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow and Benford 2000, 2). Frame bridging concerns a movements abil ity to connect different frames that are ideologically similar but are unconnected conc erning a particular issue. Bridging allows the movement to mobilize individuals in so ciety who share similar grievances. Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford explain how frame bridging through direct mail contributed to the quick e xpansion of the Christian Right (1997, 236-238). They argue that the Christian Rights use of direct mail and extensive media campaigns tied unmobilized religious conservatives to their cause. The movements ability to bridge potential conservative members to their movement helped keep the conservative movement alive (1997, 238). Frame amplification refers to a movements ability to use already existing frames to provide further clarification of their own frames concerning a certain problem. Noonas previous example of the civil rights movement drawing on the broader 11


Am erican cultural frame of citizenship rights is a good illustration of this particular frame. Frame extension refers to a social move ments frame expansion of its frame to include more issues and concerns that might appear attractive to potential participants. The Austin Peace and Justice Coalition (A PJC) provides a good example of how a movement is able to get other segments of society involved they framed their cause of nuclear disarmament and ending military intervention to the interests and issues of minority groups. As a consequence, they adde d the promotion of social justice by ending all forms of discrimination. Scholars studying this movement stated that it was too early to see whether this frame extension has in creased movement part icipants, but it still provided a good picture of a m ovement expanding its original frame to garner a broader support base (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1997, 242). Frame transformation occurs when a move ment changes its original frames of understanding and meaning to generate new fram es so that it can get more participants (Snow and Benford 2000, 238-248). A change in the original meaning of a movements frames redefines the mobilizing strategies and events that are already considered to be meaningful in a different way so that they wi ll be viewed by movement members as new. In addition to framing issues, recent literature has moved toward understanding the connections among three or more movement s, framing, and collec tive identity. Hunt states that framing processes not only connect grievances and ideologies together, but they also re-enforce and invent new collec tive identities to unify potential supporters, members, and other social movements (1994, 185 ). Tarrow takes collective identity and framing a step further by asking how newly c onstructed identities and previously existing 12


identities can hinder and encourage move ments. To answer that question he looks at four different areas where identity can affect a so cial movement and its surrounding culture: (1) the effect of inherited id entities, (2) the creation of ne w identities to gain solidarity, (3) the importance of communities, (4) the ab ility to frame identities to mobilize (1998, 119). An example of individuals using an i nherited form of collective identity for mobilization comes from Noona ns research examining the Chilean womens movement under the authoritarian rule of Pinochet (1995, 257-268). Unde r his regime many Chilean womens loved ones disappeared, causing women to publicize these repressions and press the state for answers. What Noonan finds partic ularly interesting about this movement is that the Chilean women framed their grie vances through the same cultural frame of identity that the state advo cated; the maternal role. To the state, the feminists mobilization efforts of publicly pressing the state for answers were viewed as nonthreatening and to an extent invisible becau se the womens demands were geared toward finding family members so that they could carry out their maternal role in Chilean society (Noonan 1995, 256-261). Here, their collective id entity as mothers and wives enabled women to become the only voice of contes tation against Pinoch ets regime (Noonan 1995, 260-262). Although collective identity can have a unifying effect on a movement and propel its mobilization tactics, it can also have th e opposite effect. In his research on collective identity and environmental movements, Saunders states that a str ong collective identity that benefits a smaller orga nization might not be benefici al for the broader social movement. Using three environmental organizations Environmental Direct Action Group 13


Friends of the Earth, and Chiswick Wildli fe Group as case studies, he found that unification in sm aller groups can be divisive for larger social movement because it can create a we vs. them position thus, leading to divisions and weaker mobilization efforts (Saunders 2008, 1-6). Ferree and Hesss study of the American womens movement adds to Saunders finding (2000, 31-95). They found that feminists struggled to create a collective identity among women of different social classes and ethnic backgrounds because the interests and concerns of minority women varied si gnificantly from how the broader womens movement framed its issues and grievance. Fo r instance, the question of framing equality drew different levels of s upport from women and men for feminist organizations. For some, equality was a problem of women who we re of a certain race or class gaining the same rights as their male peers, while, fo r others, it was an is sue of creating equal opportunities for all men and women (2000, 31). The question of how to frame equality was an important matter, because their choice of frames could in either the unification or hostile division of its members across differe nt racial, social, a nd gender lines. For example, for women of color, placing gender id entification above racial issues led to the creation of separate minority feminist organizations. To overcome hostile divisions, the grievances and concerns of the minority fe minist groups were included (Ferree and Hess 2000, 31-95). When it comes to the organizational st ructures and strategies that social movements use, the political opportunity structure and framing processes have a significant effect on how social movements choose to build or change their mobilizing structures. Mobilizing structures include both formal and informal networks, 14


organizations and tactical repe rtoires, that social m ovements use to involve themselves in collective action (McCarthy 1996, 141). Formal movement-mobilizing structures range from social movement organizations, churches, and unions to protest committees. Informal movement-mobilizing structures include activist networks, neighborhood networks, and to wo rkplace connections. Franschets research of the Chilean wo mens movement provides insight into how changes in the political opportunity structur e affect a movements frames, mobilization tactics and strategies (2004, 1-20). She argued that because the political system changed from an authoritarian state to a democrat ic state, the opening of political access for women resulted in them changing the frames th ey used to channel their grievances as well as the mobilization strategies used to challenge the state. Under authoritarianism, feminists used an apolitical gendered frame to channel their grievances because the political parties were class based and view ed womens issues as insignificant. The political parties apathy caused the feminists to take an autonomous mobilization stance against the state. However, when Chile underwent re-democratization many of the emerging pro-democracy political parties we re concerned with womens issues. The feminist movement politicized its gender fr ame and changed its mobilization strategy to be more militant with the help of its po litical party allies (Franschet 2004, 1-10). Mobilizing Structures Mobilizing structures are fundamentally th e building blocks of social movements. Ranging in variety and construction, the info rmal side of mobilizing structures can include a variety of informal networks am ong activists, movement communities. Formal mobilizing organizations include social movement organizations (SMOs), supportive 15


organizations, m ovement associations, a nd parties and interest groups. SMOS are distinctively different than th e other formal organizations in the sense that they mobilize with a political goal in mind and that they m obilize movement participants for collective action. Supportive organizations by contrast, ar e indirectly involved in the collection action process of the movement and are char acterized as service organizations like churches, and educational in stitutions. Movement associa tions as well participated indirectly and are characterized as self-hel p organizations. While Parties and interest groups pursue political goals they do not depend on their constituents for direct participation (Kriesi 1996, 152-153). The structure of SMOs can range from formal and centralized to informal and decentralized structures. Formalized SMOS are known for having centralized structures that have structurized procedures that allow them to perform vari ous tasks in a routine manner regardless of changes in leadership. Ma ny of these formalized SMOs have been able to maintain their orga nizations longer than in-for malized organizations. This stabilization, has not only helped sustain m ovements, but also greatly influenced the strategic and tactical choices of SMOS. Besides collective action, formalized SMOs engage in institutionalized tactics such as the electoral process to further the grievances and demands of their constituents. In addition, the strategic nature of their tactics help SMOs expands their organizations and achieves organizational maintenance. In contrast to formalized SMOs, inform alized SMOs are decentralized in their structure. Informal SMOs have few es tablished procedures, loose membership requirements, and a minimum division of labor. Because of their informality, informalized SMOs have a harder time e xpanding their organizations and sustaining 16


social m ovements. In addition, the organizatio nal structure is adjusted frequently while the major strategies and tactics of informal SMOs are predominantly classified with disruptive direct-action tact ics (Lofland 1996, 160-162) In th e end, the combination of these three elements of social movement theory can help applicable explaining the emergence and development of Latin American indigenous movements. Perspectives on Indigenous Movements Scholars of Latin American indigenous movement literature have examined various external and internal f actors that have affected the rise and development of these movements. External factors include actors and factors that exist outside of movements like different regime types and elites. Inte rnal factors a movements organizational structure, participants, goals, and mob ilization tactics. The POS, framing, and mobilization strategies can explain how the co mbination of internal and external factors can affect the development and direction of indigenous movements. For instance, Collins argues that when both type of factors are present an indigeno us movement is most likely to occur (Collins 2000, 43). On a broader sc ale examining these factors provides insight into how indigenous movements struggle to obtain self-determination, citizenship rights, socioeconomic rights, political representation, an d policies that reflect rather than destroy their indigenous communities. External Factors As external factors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can aid or hinder the development and mobilization efforts of Latin American indigenous movements. Brysks research of environmental NGOs and indigenous movements has shown that 17


whether NGOs are helpf ul depends on where their particular interest li es in relation to the indigenous movement (2000, 228). When the e nvironmental NGOs particular interests aligned with the indigenous movements desire to obtain selfdetermination and autonomy they were viewed as allies. However, when the interests of environmental NGOs align with the government rather than the indigenous movement, they indigenous communities viewed them as a hindrance agai nst their mobilization efforts (Brysk 2000, 228). External NGOs have also proven to be a powerful tool for indigenous movements as they are able to open new political opportu nities because of their access to resources and the weight of internationa l power they hold in relation to other ex ternal actors. For example, Brysks analysis of indigenous movements, development projects, and NGOs showed that NGOs can be used as a powerful leverage against the state and development agencies to push for improved treatment of indigenous territory and populations ( 2000, 264-267). Her study of the 1980s Brazilian Gran de Carajas steel project revealed the power of the European NGOs Amnesty Intern ational and the Friends of the Earth. When these NGOs received numerous complain ts from indigenous populations about environmental damage, their displacement, and the noncompliance of development agencies, they then placed international pressure on the World Bank and the Brazilian state to improve those problems and streng then the native rights clause in the conditionality agreements of the development agencies (Brysk 2000, 264-267). Other external actors like the church a nd the state have also provided aid to indigenous movements. Albs research on the church and indigenous movements has demonstrated that across Latin America a lot of aid has come from religious leaders of 18


the Catholic Church. In Ec uador, Bishop Leonidas Proao of Riobam ba, helped organize and mobilize indigenous communities (2004, 29). The Catholic Church has had such a strong imprint on indigenous communities that indigenous movements have taken certain aspects from religion to frame their identity and ideologies. For example, the Zapatista movement in Chiapas, Mexico used the biblical belief that all men are created equal in Gods eyes as the basis for their domina nt ideological frame to increase their mobilization efforts for an improved socioeconomic status (Seigenga 2004, 237). Changes in citizenship regimes, from cor poratist to neoliberalism, were analyzed by Yashar as an important external factor that widened political opportunities and opened political space for indigenous actors to m obilize (2004, 63-7). Yashar found citizenship regimes to be of one of three factors shifti ng that explained the em ergence of indigenous movements in the central Andean and Meso american regions (2004, 63-7). Her research discovered that under the corporatist state m odels, Latin American countries experienced a great increase in social, (and some) po litical and civil ri ghts. For indigenous populations, corporatist reform policies uni ntentionally created spaces for indigenous autonomy. Land reforms that granted commun ity-based programs often encouraged the growth of indigenous political spaces and cult ures as the indigenous people were able to carve out new spaces for institutionalization indigenous community practices at the local level. During the 1980s, citizenship regime types across Latin American countries shifted from corporatism to neoliberalism. The introduction of neoliberal citizenship models opened and closed political opportuni ties and political space for many indigenous actors. The neoliberal policies encouraged pluralist forms of civil and political rights 19


while reducing m inisterial budgets social services, and econo mic programs that protected the protection of peasant lands. Here, Yash ar argues that the rise of indigenous movements under neoliberal state models was not necessarily the re sult of neoliberal policies, but merely the react ion to the neoliberal policie s that challenge to the indigenous populations autonomy and self-det ermination established under corporatism (Yashar 2005, 55-66). As a resu lt, indigenous mobilization f ought against the restrictive neoliberal policies and revitalized an ethnic identity lost under coporatism. Stavenhagen sees other external factor s accounting for the ri se of indigenous movements. The failure of the 1950s and 1960s economic development models was one of these factors. Economic development mode ls of that era promised to improve the living standards and incomes of marginalized sectors of Latin American society. Under these models, indigenous populations moved to the modern sector, but the main economic benefits of the economic growth we re still enjoyed by a small group of elites. In response to their economic status, many i ndigenous intellectuals searched for other development alternatives at the grass roots leve l through mobilization and alliances with NGOs to improve the status of indigenous populations (Stavenhagen, 14). Democratization is another external fact or that Latin American countries and indigenous movements encounter ed during the 1980s. This ex ternal factor created new pathways for indigenous movements to grow and mobilize because it opened new spaces for channeling grievances as states were more willing to hear the concerns of the marginalized and expand citizenship rights. Van Cotts analysis of the Andes institutional reforms during democratization demonstrated how political space was opened for indigenous actors to become incorporated into the weak political party system (2000, 2420


45). The firs t institutional reform, decentrali zation, allowed weak parties to compete at the more inexpensive local level than national contests allowed. The second reform lowered party registration, which opened the doors for indigenous parties in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to compet e against national and municipal parties (Van Cott 2000, 24-45). Yet even though democratization wide ned the indigenous peoples access to political rights, many Latin American states had weak democratic institutions with a strong foothold still in clie ntelism and authoritarianism Scholars of indigenous movements have noted that weak political re presentation, coupled with weak democratic institutions yielded a cris is of governability as civ il societys quickly became disillusioned and disenchanted with democracy. (Mainwaring) Throughout Latin America this type of crisis has provided an opening for social movements to become the channels and space for grievances and contes tation. In many countries like Ecuador and Bolivia, indigenous organizations became central political acto rs that provided channels for some groups in civil societys grievances to be expressed and push new actors in the arena of democracy (Drake and Hershberg 2006 1719). In serving as the channels of representation and grievances, social move ments do have an opportunity to deepen democracy through the inclusion of margina lized sectors of society, but the unstable nature of social movements leaves them una ble to fully represent constituents (2006, 1719). Internal Factors For indigenous movements a common inte rnal factor that many scholars have examined is indigenous mobilization for c ontrol over natural resources and against 21


neoliberal p olicies. Dangle analyzes indigenous mobilizations against the privatization of natural resources locat ed in heavy populated indigenous areas (2007, 1). His study of the Water Wars of Cochabamba, Bolivia, demons trated that the indigenous movements success in stopping Bolivias water privatiza tion against a multinational corporation can be attributed to the strong network linka ges among a large indigenous population and other marginalized sectors of civil societ y (Dangle 2007, 3-20). Zamoscs research on the Ecuadorian indigenous movement CONAI E found neoliberal reforms to be the fundamental issues of this movement. For C ONAIE, effective mobilization for territorial rights and against economic neoliberal polic ies attracted the support of the military against the corrupt state (Zamosc 2006, 134-142). Identity is another internal factor relevant to the devel opment of f social movements in general. Some scholars of Latin American indigenous movement literature have examined the role of identity either from a class-based or ethnicbased perspective, while other scholars have taken a synthetic approach by examining ethnicity and class. Studying these identity approaches provides in sight into how the indigenous movements frame their identity to their grievances. The dominant theories that scholars have applied to their research range from Marxism and New Social Movement theory (NSM) to resource-mobilization theory. From a class-based perspective, Petras and Veltmeyer have examined indigenous mobilizations through the lens of Marx ism (2001 and 2005). Using various Latin American peasant mobilizations as case stud ies, they argue that indigenous grievances are rooted in their ties to economic produc tion. For example, in the Chiapas rebellion, peasants, identify themselves and their mob ilization efforts as class struggles against 22


capitalist exploitation in econom ic production (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001, 120-112). Although the majority of peasant movements members is indigenous they do not classify their grievances under an et hnic identity framework but, rather under a class-based framework. Mallon who examines indigenous mobilizati ons from an ethnic perspective mainly uses the NSM to explain indigenous mobilizations in Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia (1992, 140). She argues that ethnicity had a signi ficant effect on how indigenous movement mobilized against counter movements (1992, 40). For instance, Bolivias 1970s Katarismo movement was able to effectively mob ilize and acquire more participants like students, urban intellectuals, and middle class workers because they framed their issues around the Aymara culture and traditions. (Mallon 1992, 38). From an ethnic perspective, Deborah Yash ars comparative research of Bolivian, Ecuadorian, and Peruvian indigenous mobili zations have looked at how political opportunity shapes the rise of indigenous-based movements. She argued that changing citizenship regimes politicized ethnic cleavag es in Latin America by challenging the local autonomy that indigenous communities ha d previously carved out, (2005, 29). Mobilization among these groups occurred when there were strong pre-existing community networks and openness in the pol itical associational space (Yashar 2005, 30). Otero on the other hand, argues that when analyzing indigenous mobilizations solely from a Marxist viewpoint that emphasizes class as the determining factor of social struggles or from a viewpoint that only empha sizes ethnic identity hurts the work of the researcher. Using his case studies of Me xico and Ecuador, he contends that the indigenous struggle for autonomy, self governance and the control over natural resources 23


is inseparable from the identity aspect of the movement. He suggests a synthetic approach to indigenous movement cases where class and identity are core components of the analysis of indigenous movements. To anal yze these comparatively, he created a new theory called the political-class formation of Indian peasants. This theory combines culture, state intervention, and leadership types to explain the links between class structural processes and political outcomes in a systematic manner (Ortero and Jugentiz 2002, 1-3). Research on contemporary indi genous movements has noted that some indigenous movements and their indigenous parties have framed their identity from an ethnic and class standing point For instance, examinations of Ecuadorian and Mexican mobilizations reveal that some of the indige nous organizations have begun to frame their identity around both ethnic and class ba sed rhetorics (Zamosc 2006, 134 and Dietz 2006, 33). Conclusion Elements of social movement theory like the POS, framing, and mobilization strategies can explain the rise and development of Latin American indigenous movements. How much opportunity is availabl e for a movement to engage in political activity is directly contingent upon changing factors w ithin a political system. These changing factors range from the political systems degree of openness, changes in the balance of power, the presence of allies and th e effects of divisions within the ruling elite (Tarrow 1998, 76-84). Within the indigenous literature Van Cott, Drake and Hershett point out how a change in regime from au thoritarianism to democracy opened the political space available for ci vil society, but because a legacy of authoritarianism still 24


existed, the opportunity for civil society to m obilize, particularly the indigenous populations, was shut down (2000, 24-45; 2006, 17-19). However, even with very limited political opportunity, some indigenous movements still created their own opportunities to mobilize against the state. Some of these opportunities were in the form of ethnic political parties that we re in the representative intere sts. As useful as the POS is, structural factors alone can not account for a movements development. By combining the elements of framing, and mobilization strate gies to the POS, scholars will be able to better understand deeper issues of the movement itself as well as what accounts for variations across movements. Framing offers a different way of understanding how movement rises and develops by explaining how meaning is understood by the movement participants and potential members (McAdam and Snow 1996, 232-262). Indigenous movement scholars who have analyzed how movements use identity to frame the ideological basis of their movement or to gain more members debated the centrality of class or ethnic identity in mobilization. Mobilizing stra tegies, on the other hand, expl ain the tactics movements use and the organizational structur e of various movements. Both Lucero and Maria noted that the differences made in the structural makeup of indigenous organizations. These organizations range from ethnic unions and federations to radical indigenous groups (2006, 44). The indigenous movement literatu re provides new insight into the broader context of the roles that social movements can play in democratization process of a state, citizenship rights, resource and neoliberal po licies and reforms, and in the importance of allying with other polit ical actors like ngos. In the end, I intend to use the POS, framing, 25


and m obilizing structures to explain the diffe rences and similarities that occur among the Andean indigenous movements in Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia. 26


CHAPTER 2: A COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CENTRAL ANDEAN STATES POLITICLA HISTORY AND THE RISE OF THEIR INDIGENOUS MOVEMENTS Since the arrival of its first inhabitants, Latin Americas history has experienced a cyclical nature of conquer and conquest that has produced a r ecurring theme of crisis in its state to society relations. This chapter accounts for this them e through an in-depth historical comparison of the central Andean states in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru. In addition, from pre-colonialism to democratiz ation, the political hist ory of these central Andean states is documented to explain how political instability, fragile governments, and a history of exclusion am ong their indigenous populations, have led to tense state to indigenous relations, and the rise of indigenous moveme nts in those states. Three main periods shaped the central A ndean states history. The first period is the Spanish Crowns conquest and colonization of the Inca Empire and the early stages of state formation. After independence, the ri se of Corporatism was characterized by extensive regime changes, characterized by pol itical instability, and redefined state to society relations. In the early 1980s, re-d emocratization changed the way indigenous groups were integrated into the state, wh ich also affected th eir potential livelihood. Toward the end of the second period, indigenous organizations arose in response to the 27


im plementation of the corporatist regimes and the neoliberal citizenship regimes of the current period. From Pre-Colonialism to State Formation (early 1500s to early 1900s) The Conquest and Fall of the Inca Empire Before it was conquered by the Spaniards in the early 1500s, the Inca Empire was a highly stratified ancient civ ilization that spanned more than 300,000 square miles along the Andean corridor of Ecuador, Bolivia, Per u, central Chile, Argentina, and Colombia (Werlich 1978, 28). With its vast empire, the Incas, much like their predecessors, conquered many indigenous tribes until their fa teful fall during the sixteenth century. For the three million indigenous tribes conquered, life under Inca rule was rigidly stratified, both in its politics and social hierarchical class structure (Werlich 1978, 34). At the helm of the empire sat the Inca emperor, and beneath him existed a small aristocracy that wielded an iron fist ove r access to the political and so cioeconomic benefits of the empire. As the empire expanded and the aris tocracy became richer, the conquered tribes became poorer and angrier over their misfortuna te circumstances. Angered by their lack of access to the empire and daily resources, th e disgruntled natives rebelled against Inca rule in the fourteenth century (Werlich 1978, 37). This rebellion coincided with the Spaniard s arrival in Northern Peru, in 1532. At this time discord within the empire had esca lated to surmounting levels as the lower class natives fought for greater inclusion and cont rol over resources. Conquistador Francisco Pizarro took advantage of the Incas intern al strife and cunningly, allied with the indigenous tribes to divi de and conquer the Inca Empire (Werlich 1978, 37). 28


The Birth and the Fall of the Viceroyalty of Peru Once the Spaniards conq uered the Incas, Spanish America became colonized under the viceroyalty of Peru (Hudson 1993, 20) The viceroyalty, like the Inca Empire, was rigidly stratified with an institutionalized social hierarchy being the determining benchmark for ones political and socioeconomic access to higher levels in the viceroyalty. At the top of th e social ladder stood the vicer oy and royal Spanish officials who governed in the name of the Spanish monarch. Next, came the peninsulares (Spanish born persons residing in th e new world), then the criollos (Spanish American born citizens), and, finally at the bottom rung of the ladder stood the natives (Hudson 1993, 20). Although the Spanish Crown co-opted the r oyal Inca family into Spanish nobility, the majority of the natives were forced into a lifetime of en slavement on Spanish haciendas (plantati ons) (Werlich 1978, 42). Throughout th e colonial era the Spaniards used the haciendas as a tool for political domination and economic exploitation (Postero 2006, 193). Eventually, due to harsh labor condit ions and fatal diseases brought from the Old World, indigenous populations rapidly declined to dwindling numbers by as much as fifty percent since colonizati on began (Alexander 1982, 42). With the rapid decline of the indigenous populations, the Spanish Crown encountered rising political tension between the peninsulares and the criollos (Werlich 1978, 43). As these groups heatedly contested over political and so cioeconomic access, the Spanish Crown underwent dras tic political changes that fueled the fire for colonial independence: 1.) The change in royal power from the decrepit Hapsburg dynasty to the Spanish Bourbons, and 2.) Napoleon Bonapart es coup on the Spanish Empire (Klein 1992, 64). The Spanish Bourbons created the Bourbon reforms that divided the 29


Viceroyalty of Peru into the Viceroyalty of La Plata (Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia) and the Viceroyalty of New Granada (Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador). For the criollos, the reforms significantly decreased their societal status less benefits while for the indigenous people, th e reforms exacerbated their labor conditions (Klein 1992, 64). In 1808, Napoleon Bonaparte usurped the Spanish throne from King Ferdinand VII for his brother Joseph Bonaparte. Taking this as a sign of Sp ains declining power and legitimacy, the criollos intensely resisted colonial rule (Werlich 1978, 58). Fearing a revolution, Spanish officials tr ied to appease the colonies with extended rights under the Bourbon reforms, but much to their dismay, independence was passionately pursued (Werlich 1978, 63). The struggle for independence began in 1808 and lasted until 1825 (Werlich 1978, 58). By 1820, the forces of independence had split under two main armies; that of Simon Bolivar, credited as La tin Americas liberator, in th e north and that of General Jose de San Martin in the south. With the he lp of Bolivar, General Jose de Sucre Alcala freed Ecuador in 1822. In July of 1821, Genera l Jose de San Martin proclaimed Lower Peru (present-day Peru) independent. When Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia) was declared independent in 1825, the doors on th e wars of independence were officially closed (Klein 1992, 98). The Formation of the New Andean Republics and Political Instability Once the colonies were independent, Bolivar desired to unif y the republics under an American Revolutionary-style federati on (Werlich 1978, 89). His dream was met with intense and hostile opposition as the republic s refused to be ruled by foreigners. 30


Consequently, the repub lics immediately dissolved their unions to each other. Ecuador ceded itself from Gran Colombia. Upper Pe ru became independent republic from Lower Peru and was renamed Bolivia in honor of Bolivar (Werlich 1978, 89). The first two decades as newly independent republics, the Central Andean states found themselves in a political vacuum wher e various actors competed for political power. The rivalries between the caudillos a nd the political military leaders led to political destabilization (W erlich 1978, 69). For example, in Ecuador, from 1830 to 1860, those in power often found their attention diverted away from state-building and towards the caudillos rebellions. In Bolivia the firs t three presidents struggled to build a centralized republican state because of the continuous ri se occurrence of coups and countercoups. Peru experienced the same probl ems as frequent changes of power led to political instability and fragmentation of the state (Hudson 1993, 29). Ultimately, for the newly independent repub lics, independence did little to bring political peace or change the deep-seated st ructures of inequality and underdevelopment that manifested during colonial times ( Hudson 1993, 29-30). Rather than expanding rights and opening political acce ss to all Americans, independence resulted in a transfer of power from the privileged peninsulares to a small criollo elite. Even more disheartening, the indigenous peoples were cla ssified as second cla ss citizens with little to no access to the political and socioeconom ic benefits of the state (Yashar 2005, 22). The end of the caudillo era was just the beginning of the Central Andean states historical relationship with political instability. Although th ese states were able to establish a stable two-party rule, the political vacuum that ensued after Bolivars death catalyzed a tumultuous relations hip between the republican stat es and its societies. From 31


the m id 1800s until the 1980s, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, shared a common political history of coups, countercoups, political pa rty fragmentation, extensive government changes, and small periods of stable civilian that were repe atedly interrupted by political actors who constantly vied for power. The Rise of the Corporatis t Citizenship Regime Model and the Continuation of Politic al Instability (1820s to 1950s) The rise of the corporatist citizenship regimes began in the early 1930s and was fully extended well into the late 1970s. For the Central Andean region, as well as much of Latin America, corporatism had significant implications and consequences for those societies (Perreault 2003, 28). Under a corporatist citizen ship regime, states extended social benefits such as food subsidies, education, and health care in exchange for the creation of state regulated or ganizations and political pa rticipation (Perreault 2003, 6). While corporatism expanded state incorporati on for previously excluded groups, it also introduced a new conceptualization of citizen ship that was based on a class based notion of identity as opposed to ethnicity. The id ea of establishing a homogeneous mestizo nation was rooted in economic and cultural modernization ideologies which perceived ethnicity as an obstacle to a states developmental and modernization plans. Consequently, the indigenous populations in Ec uador, Bolivia, and Peru were stripped of their ethnic identity only to be later identif ied as peasants, citizens of the nation with a class-based status as pr oducers (Perreault 2003, 29; Postero 2006, 195). Although some of the indigenous populations maintained some form of their ethnic ity, corporatism and a class-based ideology reigned supreme until milita ry rule fell in the midst of the Central Andeans return to democracy (Perreault 2003, 29). 32


Ecuador (1860-1950) Before the rise of the cor poratist regim e model, Ecua dorian politics, from 1860 to 1980, was characterized by a two party system of Liberals and Conservatives (Hanratty 1991, 20). Under Conservative rule (1860-1895), Pr esident Garcia Moreno progressively developed and integrated Ecuador into th e international econom y. In 1895 the Radical Liberal Party ( Partido Liberal Radical -PLR) seized political power for three stormy decades until 1925. During the first half of Li beral rule, Ecuador was socially developed while democracy was widely neglected (H anratty 1991, 326). During the second half, a plutocracy known as the ring (l a argolla) controlled Ecuadoria n politics. Situated in the banking sector, the ring determined hopeful pr esidential candidates and governmental positions. Near the end of 1925 Liberal rule en ded with a coup that introduced several years of chaos and social reform led by th e League of Young Officers (Hanratty 1991, 326). While political actors vied for power, Ecuadors indigenous population remained excluded from the state and political li fe until the 1930s (Yashar 2005, 88). The 1930s marked a dramatic change for Ecuadorian politics and its indige nous population as the decade saw the rise of the corporatist citizensh ip regimes. Under corporatism, for the first time indigenous populations were incorporat ed into the political and socio-economic affairs of the state. For Ecuadorian politic s, corporatism improved state to society relations, widened political space, and enhan ced modernization. In general, for both the state and its citizens, corporatism would prove to be significantly consequential throughout its four-decade run (Yashar 2005, 88). 33


Ecuadors first foundational corporatist law was the 1937 Ley de Organizacin y Rgimen de las Comunas (Yashar 2005, 89). This law granted the state the right to transform indigenous communities into corporatist rural communities called comunas This law also re-identified the indige nous people on a class basis with a new identification as peasants. The comunas provided room for some autonomy as indigenous leaders were able to preside over loca l affairs. However, overall, the 1937 Ley de Comunas had a weak effect on the indigenous communities. Many indigenous people resisted the peasant identification and main tained their ethnicity and customs. Even though corporatism widened socio-economic ri ghts, at the end of the day indigenous communities were still barred from political access to the state (Yashar 2005, 91). In 1948, for a brief period, Ecuador broke its corporatist ties and established a stable constitutional rule that lasted un til 1960 (Hanratty 1991, 35). President Galo Plaza Lassos regime (1948 to 1960) restored demo cracy to its true fo rm by enforcing the practice of democratic guarantees such as fr eedom of the press and the right to assemble freely (Hanratty 1991, 33). This era of political stability ended shortly after General Jos Mara Velasco Ibarra was re-elected. Velasco Ib arras rule marked the end of democratic practices, the revival of cor poratism and political and economic crisis well into 1972, Ecuadors last stretch of direct military (Hanratty 1991, 36). Bolivia (1889-1953) Much like Ecuador, early Bolivian polit ics was, for a period, dominated by Conservatists, Liberals, and Republican s (Hanratty and Hudson 1993, 18). Under the Conservative rule modernization advanced at the cost of the disp lacement of indigenous communities from their communal lands to the major cities (Hanratty and Hudson 1993, 34


20). Angered about this, the indigenous population aided Liberals in the 1899 coup agains t the Conservative party. For the indi genous communities, this victory was short lived as the Liberal President Jos Manuel Pando refused to return communal lands to the indigenous communities. Liberal rule offi cially ended when the Republican Party ( Partido Republicano ) took power in 1920 (Hudson and Hanratty 1993, 22). After the Republican era ended in 1935, a reformist military regime came to power and transformed Bolivia with socioeconomic reform s (Hudson and Hanratty 1993, 25). The military socialist regimes of both Colonel David Toro Ruilova (1936-1937) and Colonel German Busch Becerra (1937-1939) lacked the general populations support needed for their reforms. Before Toro could implement corporatist reforms, Busch took over and drafted a constitution in 1938 that, for the first time, legally recognized the indigenous populations right to communal lands. Despite havi ng characteristically weak regimes, Toros and Buschs policies contribut ed to the growing left and new political actors like the Leftist Revolutionary Party ( Partido de Izquierda Revolucionaria -PIR) and the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement ( Movimineto Nacionalista Revolucionario MNR) (Klein 1994, 45-55). In Bolivia corporatism was not fully established until the MNR took power in 1953 (Yashar 2005, 154). Ascending to power on th e shoulders of a radically mobilized peasantry from the 1952 revolution, the MN R implemented populist measures to transform Bolivian society into a modernized and corporatist citi zenship regime. This movement changed Bolivian politics from a tw o party system to a one party system that extended citizenship rights and governmental political positions to Indians. The land reforms not only redistributed land away fr om the small landholding elites, but also 35


crea ted space for indigenous people to have some form of political autonomy (Yashar 2005, 157). To represent a modernized and homogenized nation, the MNR first stripped the indigenous population of its ethnicity and re-identified them as peasants (Yashar 2005, 156). The peasants lived under state-spon sored agrarian federations created by the MNR. Often, the indigenous people living in these federations ignored the peasant classification and ruled with a certain degree of political autonomy (Yashar 2005, 158). In short, the Bolivian state wa s unable to control the local Comunas which maintained significant autonomy from the stat e-sponsored corporatis t peasant federation. The indigenous authority structures often maintained and promoted local forms of government. In the end, the MNR transforme d the countryside under the corporatist regeim model but could not successfully control the indigenous communities from gaining political and cultural autonomy (Yashar 2005, 163). Peru (1903-1929) After spending its first years as a re public and descending into economic and political instability, Peru experienced almost two decades of uninte rrupted civilian rule (1895 to 1914) (Hudson 1993, 38). This era, the age of the Aristocratic Republic, began with a coup that replaced dictator Caceres with Colonel Remigo Morales Bermdez in 1890. Morales Bermudez s alliance with the Civilista party, the foreign guano firm of Dreyfus, and the Company of Paris brought political stability, economic growth, and sociopolitical changes to Peru (Hudson 1993, 37). By 1903 the Civilistas became Perus key political party after gaining control of the national electoral proce ss (Hudson 1993, 24). This allowed them to control the presidential seat while le gislating new policies. A c oup in 1914, organized by Colonel 36


Oscar Raimundo Benavides, initiated an alli ance between the military and the oligarchy that lasted until General Juan Velasco Alvarado 1968 revolution. Economic and political turmoil ended Benavides military regime and began President Augusto B. Leguas eleven-year rule (1919-1930) (Hudson 1993, 34). In the beginning of his pr esidency, Legua carried out socioeconomic reforms that increased economic growth, restored the Civilista oligarchy, and established corporatist roots in Peru vian politics (Hudson 1993, 42) Leguas administration instituted ethnic corporatist principles in the 1920 constitution, which reversed many liberal tenants of the 19th century. The constitution created the institutional and legal mechanisms for indigenous communities to gain legal recognition. The indigenous communities newfound right to communal landhol dings changed state-society relations as new political space provided the indigenous population the freedom to maintain their ethnicity (Yashar 2005, 236). However, these advances were short liv ed as Leguas administration took a turn towards a more dictatorial mandate. Leguas new political stance ended corporatism, purged Congress of oppositional actors, and spread terror throughout Peru until the military led by populist General Juan Velasco Alvarado overthrew the Legua administration in 1929 (Hudson 1993, 40). The Last Stretch of Military Intervention Throughout the 1960s and the 1970s reformed populist military officials initiated the last stretch of direct military interv ention that swept across the Central Andean regions of Latin America (Hudson and Ha nratty 1991, 45). By founding a new ideology 37


steeped in progressive developm ent and e qual access to socioeconomic rights, these armed forces re-instituted a deeper foundation of corporatist citizenship regimes. This changed the Central Andean political landscape and provi ded indigenous people with opportunities to carve out more political and socioeconomic autonomy (Yashar 2005, 35). Ecuador (1960-1979) In Ecuador, populist military regimes dominated politics (1963-1966 and 1972-1977) (Yashar 2005, 91). The military advanced land reforms, pursued development, and continued th e corporatist incor poration of indigenous people as peasant citizens while extending civil and socioec onomic rights. During the first military intervention, General Velasco created a land reform that extended civil rights and advanced economic development. The intr oduction of social programs like education provided indigenous communities with socioeconomic access to the state while the introduction of less exploitative farms freed indigenous communities from semi-feudal labor conditions (Yashar 2005, 91-92). The second era of military rule began in 1972 after General Guillermo Rodrguez Lara overthrew General Velascos regime (Hudson 1993, 41). General Rodrguez Laras regime was a long era of direct military ru le that increased development through the implementation of structural and infrastru ctural reforms (Hudson 1993, 41). For example, Rodrguez Laras land reform provided Ec uadors indigenous people with advanced social right (Yashar 2005, 99). Land re-distr ibution secured land tit les, and increased resource access. These changes granted the indigenous communities a significant degree 38


of autonom y, opportunity, and participation th at were previously non-existent (Yashar 2005, 99). However, Rodrguez Laras structural changes only enhanced political and developmental problems (Hudson 1993, 42). Not desiring to see the majority of their land redistributed to the peasants, the traditional landholding elites thwarted Rodrguez Laras reforms with hostile opposition. Consequently, due to intense conf lict, less than one percent of cultivable land was handed over to the peasants near the end of his presidential term (Hudson 1993, 42). In the end, increasing conflict and a di vided military, encouraged a military triumvirate organized as a Supreme Council of Government Commanders to overthrow Rodrguez Laras administration (Hudson 1993, 45) This triumvirate returned Ecuador to democratic and constitutional civilian ru le on August 10, 1980, in hopes of restoring politics and the military (Hudson 1993, 45). To en sure unity and maintain some level of power, the military guided Ecuadors democratic transition by enforcing stipulations that prevented human rights investigations and gave the military the freedom to preside over issues concerning the minister of defense (Hudson 1993, 45). Bolivia (1964-1968) In Bolivia, military intervention was we lcomed by civil soci ety supporters who experienced an incomplete revolutionthe 1952 Nationalist Revol utionary Movement which bankrupted the national economy and er oded the legitimacy of President Victor Paz Estenssoros first two regimes (1952-56, 1960-64, and 1985-89) (Hanratty and Hudson 1993, 44-58). During the early 1960s, the government rebuilt the military in hopes of re-establishing order a nd political peace. Soon after becoming the sole arbiters 39


of Bolivian politics, the arm ed forces le d a coup in 1964 directed by General Ren Barrientos Ortuo and General Alfredo Ovando Candia (Hanratty and Hudson 1993, 4458). The Barrientos government displaced the MNR from political rule and dismantled any socioeconomic programs with corporat ist ties (Yashar 2005, 163). With the MNR dismantled, Barrientos connected the indigenous communities to th e military through the 1964 Military-Peasant Pact ( Pacto Militar Campesino ). This pact challenged the role of the MNR as the primary mediator between th e inidgneous peasants and the state while limiting the indigenous communities autonomy and access to natural resources (Yashar 2005, 163). By destroying the link between the MNR and indigenous people, the military gained strong peasant support (Yashar 2005, 165). However, by the mid-1960s, social unrest escalated as the military redistributed land to agro-businesses, suppressed the left and labor mining sector. These problems enc ouraged General Ovando to overthrow the previous regime (Klein 1992, 110-114). The Revolutionary Nationalist government s of Ovando and Juan Jos Torres Gonzalez attracted the labor sector, peas ants, and students (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 34). When Ovando assumed his presidentia l powers, he dismissed Congress, and appointed an independent cabinet of reformist civilians. Similar to Ecuador, this cabinet viewed social reforms as imperative to Bolivias development (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 34). The reformed officials viewed unde rdevelopment as the direct cause of peasant insurgency (Klein 1992, 116). To decr ease insurgency and in crease development, Ovandos military regime advanced socioeconomic justice throughout Bolivia. Several of these social justice reforms polarized the military between Generals Juan Jos Torres 40


Gonzalez (1970-71) and Ovando. Aft er a fa iled coup, Ovando resigned and General Torres came to power. Torres regime however, only spurred more opposition from all sectors of society as ideological differences di vided and weakened his admi nistration (Klein 1992, 118). To solve the division and provide political sp ace for communication, Torres created an alternative government, the Popular Assembly (Hanratty and Hudson 1993, 168). However, because of Torres weak leadership and the indecisiveness of the Popular Assembly, the military distanced itself from his regime. On August 21, 1971, the militarys widespread support for Colonel H ugo Banzer signaled the end of Torres regime (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 56-79). Banzers regime (1971-78) increased economic growth and returned the repression known from ea rlier regimes (Hanratty and Hudson 1991, 80). In the beginning, the MNR and former presidents Paz Estenssoro and Mario Gutierrez supported Banzer. However, these govern ing alliances dissolved after Banzer orchestrated brutal suppression of the left, labor unions, and universities. As political instability ravaged the country, some military officials tried to overthrow the regime with little success (Hanratty and Hudson 1993, 80). Unab le to control these rising problems, Banzer staged for an auto-golpe (self-made coup) which allowed him to restructure the government and rule without civilian interference (Klein 1992, 130). Banzers new government was re-modeled to keep the s upport of the private s ector, but the state experienced serious problems as the economy s petroleum resources drastically declined (Klein 1992, 170). 41


In 1977, as Banzer faced hostile op position fr om civil society, the military and the United States, democratic presidential elections were forward for 1978 ( Klein 1992, 188). The National Electoral Court annulled the 1978 presidential elections due to fraud allegations administered by General Juan Pereda Asbuns supporters. Despite the annulment, Pereda Asbun usurped Banzers regi me and came in to power in July of 1978. In the end, although Bolivia continued under military rule, the 1978 election marked the beginning of Bolivias transition to democracy (Klein 1992, 189). Peru (1968-1980) For Peru, the last stretch of military intervention occurred after civil society encouraged the military to overthrow Belaunde because of his weak governance skills and failed economic reforms (Hudson 1991, 49). As in Ecuador, the Peruvian military, led by General Velasco Alvarado instituted deep socioeconomic reforms that advanced development and strengthened national security (Hudson 1991, 230). The militarys desire to institute socioeconomic reforms developed from the National Security Doctrine, a new school of thought, which argued that socioeconomic reforms were crucial for development and national security. The Be launde government also promised these reforms but the military blamed the failure of these reforms on democracys flaws and corruption (Hudson 1991, 50). Of all the reforms that Velascos regi me legislated the 1969 Agrarian Reform Law 1969 was the most significant to the indigenous communities (Hudson 1991, 116). This reform increased agri cultural productivity and quelled peasant insurgency against the landholding elites whom the military considered as primarily responsible for Perus 42


underdevelopm ent. As a result, by 1975 half of all arable land wa s transferred into cooperatives to over 350,000 peasants (Hudson 1991, 50). The Velasco government also instituted a 1970 statute on peasant communities (Yashar 2005, 222). This statute redefined indi genous people as peasants and reorganized indigenous communities along coope rative lines. The statute undermined ethnicity in order to modernize indigenous communities with Perus progressively economic development. Thus, similar to Ecuador, a nd Bolivia, Velasco reframed indigenous as peasants to reorganize their relationship to the land and to the state (Yashar 2005, 234). In addition, the state increased ties to the peasantry thr ough the dissolution of organizations that previously had undermine d the legitimacy and political power of the peasantry such as the National Agrarian So ciety (Sociedad Nacional Agraria SNA) and in turn replaced it with th e National Support System of National Mobilization (Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Movilazacion Nacional-SINAMOS) (Yashar 2005, 233). When Velasco fell ill, he was replaced by a more conservative General Francisco Morales Bermudez Cerrutti (1975-1980) (H udson 1991, 51). Morales Bermudez curbed inflation by implementing an economic auster ity policy, but the underlying political and economic problems remained unresolved, giving way to popular protests from the left and the APRA. Those riots demonstrated the weak popularity of the radical military. By 1976 the military fell from power and Peru tran sitioned to democratic rule in 1980 (Burt 2006, 232). 43


Re-democratization and the rise of the Neoliberal Citizenship Regime Simultaneously during the early 1980s, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru redemocratized and returned to civilian rule. In the establishment of a new citizenship regime, neoliberalism reigned supreme as corporatism slowly eroded, while the 1980s world debt crisis engulfed and crippled many of the worlds economies (Perreault 2003, 9). The return of democratic constitutional rule ignited civi l societys hopes for improved state to society relations, great er political inclusion, and an improved standard of living for all citizens. However, as the neoliberal citizenship regime became the dominant form of governance and as corruption, clientelism, state repression, unequal representation, and partial political inclusion c ontinued, many lost confidence an d faith in their governments and in democracy itself. As a result, especially for the indi genous population, many looked for other extra-institutionalized channels through address their grievances. Under neoliberalism, states dismantl ed populist social programs established during the corporatist regimes, replacing th em with neoliberal markets and political reforms focused on individual citizenship, decen tralization, political rights, and political representation (Postero and Zamosc 2006, 21). For the Central Andean indigenous groups, the transition from corporatism to neoliberalism dramatically altered the way indigenous groups were related to and integrated into the state. Previously, states integrated and related to i ndigenous groups through corporat ist organizations, such as peasant unions and agrarian reforms that re-defined them as peasants Under the neoliberal citizenship regime, political rights were expanded to broader society while decentralization policies spread state power to the local governments. These changes allowed more sectors of society to obtain great er political inclusion and access to political 44


power. In addition, because indi vidual citizenship was a part of neoliberalism states related to indigenous people as citizens rath er than through the class based corporatist identification as peasants (P ostero and Zamosc 2006, 22). However, the positives of neoliberalism ca me at the cost of cutting the indigenous communities social rights and autonomy that had existed under corporatism (Yashar 2005, 236). As states restructured their economies along neoliberal lines reinforced by the International Monetary Funds (IMF) stabi lization policies, indigenous communities saw their resources and economic livelihoods dras tically decrease (Perreault 2003, 21). In response, some indigenous communities took advantage of whatever political space and new rights were available, while others fought back and organized among themselves to defend their autonomy and collective righ ts. The channels that the indigenous communities used to voice their grievances were not the regular institutionalized political party systems. In fact, because the Ecuadorian political parties did not fully represent the interests of the indigenous population, many indigenous communities pushed to establish unofficial institutions of representation, indi genous organizations, to defend, protect and address their rights and grie vances (Yashar 2005, 143). Ecuador (1979-2000) Ecuadors 1979 democratic transition wa s heavily guided by the parting military regime (Zamosc 2007, 12). During this time the neoliberal citizenship regime was established and political space was opened fo r all Ecuadorian citizens. However, because the military single-handedly guided democracy w ithout representation or input from civil society and Ecuadors political parties, the de mocratic institutions that were founded in the early 1980s were ill suited for preventing or solving the political problems that soon 45


followed. Som e of these problems arose out of mounting tension between the executive branch and Congress, regionalism issues, ch ronic party fragmentation, and the rise of personalistic politics that di d not in any shape or form represent the ideals of a democratic state. On the neoliberal front, it appeared that the militarys pursuit of a neoliberal nationalistic agenda improved the living standards of the popular sectors and expanded the economy. Alongside the economic program, Ecuadors democratic transition and the establishment of a neoliberal citizenship regime widened political space for the indigenous population. Under Presid ent Jaime Roldos (1979-1981), Ecuadors first civilian president, the 1979 Constitution eliminated the literacy requirement for voting (that had previously barred many i ndigenous groups), which resulted in the extension of universal suffrage to all Ecuadorians (Zamosc 2007, 12). By the mid-1980s, democracys appeal waned as civil society became highly critical of and disillusioned with the st ate and democracy itself (Yashar 2005, 142). To start, the expansion of polit ical rights came with the drastic reduction of specific socioeconomic arrangements, which greatly challenged the local autonomy that indigenous communities had carved out for themselves under corporatism. As the indigenous people saw their resources and socioeconomic programs destroyed, they found themselves without in stitutionalized channels th rough which to voice their grievances. The political parties, whic h should have provided the channels for representation, had barely changed with the introduction of democracy. These institutionalized channels had never historically repr esented Ecuadors indigenous populations. In fact, many indigenous pe ople had greater success voicing their grievances to the state directly through cor poratist channels during the populist military 46


regim es. Political parties were only interested in the indigenous communities during campaign season, once elected they would continue to ignore the Indians voices. Thus, as before, the indigenous populat ion continued to deem thei r political parties to be untrustworthy and unre liable (Yashar 2005, 142-143). By the 1990s, the downturn of the economy and the weakening of relations between the state and indigenous peoples pr ovided the perfect recipe for indigenous insurgency. During President Sixto Durans (1992-1996) administration the radicalization of neoliberalism catalyzed rising mobilizat ion efforts from the indigenous population (Zamosc 2006, 133). Economically, the IMFs St ructural Adjustment Programs soon lost their credibility when it becam e clear that these policies would not be conducive towards economic growth. Politically, Duran lacked support from his own political party as well as from the military that saw the privatization of state enterprises as their positive legacy. Led by CONAIE, the Confederation of Indi genous Nationalities of Ecuador, Ecuadors national indigenous confederation, the indi genous population alongsid e other sectors of civil society mobilized against Sixto Durans neoliberal policies. The first mobilization protested the liquidation of health services and social security budget cuts, while the second mobilization battled the Law of Agrari an Modernization which sought to break up communal property. The strength wielded by these mobilizations forced Duran to concede to the indigenous movements demands. The success from these mobilizations not only placed CONAIE as a significant pl ayer in the political arena, but also demonstrated the collaborative effort between the indigenous movement, peasant organizations, and unions from the public sector (Zamsoc 2007, 10; Zamosc 2006, 133). 47


However, with the 1996 presid ential election of Abdal Bucaram (1996-1997), indigenous peoples relations with the state worsened as more drastic neoliberal policies were implemented (Zamosc 2006, 133). Bucar ams populist presidency was marred by corruption and clientelism. He initiated harsh neoliberal economic polices that increased the price of gas and reduced the national budget. As corr uption grew, CONAIE altered the intent of its mobilization from changing the neoliberal policies to ousting Bucaram for his corrupt government. After Bucarams administration was overthrown, CONAIE and its allies convened at a constitutional assembly and reformed the constitution. Ecuador re-identified as a pluricultural nati on and the indigenous peoples socio-cultural and political rights were recognized by the state, but also CONAI Es political party, Pachakutik, obtained ten percent of the seat s in congress through th e elections for the assembly (Zamosc 2006, 137). For a while, it appeared as if CONAIEs success improved the plight of Ecuadors indigenous people, but neoliber al policies from the next two presidents, Jamil Mahuad and Luiz Guti rrez, deteriorated state to indi genous relations and lowered living standards made the lifestyle for poor Ecua dorians even further. Mahuad entered his presidency during Ecuadors worst economic crisis (Zamosc 2007, 12). To curb economic decline, Mahuad devalued the nati onal currency and negotiated a deal with the IMF for more loans. The IMF insisted that Ecuador follow its conditions: dollarize the economy to guarantee stabilization; eliminate gas, electricity, and gasoline subsidies to reduce the national deficit; priv atize public enterprises; and not save the failing banks. When Mahuad adhered to these demands, he became caught between three large popular 48


mobilizations led by CONAIE and pressure from the IMF, and he was left with no allies (Zam osc 2006, 141). Nevertheless, Mahuad announced the dollari zation plan. In response, on January 21, 2000, a joint coup initiated by CONAIE a nd the military led by Colonel Lucio Guti rrez overthrew the Mahuad administration (Collins 2000, 1). The civil-military triumvirate that General Carlos Mendoza announced as Ecuadors new government was short lived as the next day Mendoza met with the high military command to turn the government over to constitutional rule under the new President, Gustavo Noboa. Betrayed, Colonel Guiterrez and others were arrested while Mendo za explained that his intent had been show support for the coup in order to stop a bloody movement (Collins 2000, 1). In the end, CONAIE was weakened by its participation in the coup. Later, after being released from prison, Colonel Gutirrez ran for president in 2002 with help from CONAIE and Pachakutik. Identifying himself as a radical populist candidate, Gutirrez denounced the neoliberal model, corrupti on, and promised to alleviate the living standards of the poor. Yet, once in office, Gu tirrez abandoned his political platform and began talks of implementing fu rther austerity measures. Mo bilizations against Colonel Gutirrez in 2004 failed as they lost the support from their Amazonian members and other allies which showed the lack of cohe sion and unity in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement itself (Zamosc 2006, 150). Bolivia (1982-2003) Bolivias democratic transition ushered in a new era of civilian rule and ended an era of military authoritarian rule (Klein 1992, 269). With the presidential elections of 1982, Hernn Siles Zuazo became Bolivias first democratically elected president (198249


1985). In one stroke, the old political system of the 1930s and 1940s replaced the military. On the left stood Siles Zuazo, his progressive party the MNR and his allies consisting of the MIR, new peasant leaders, and the central confederation (COB). In the center stood the traditional MNR while to the ri ght and center were the political parties of 1979 and 1980. With civilian rule restored a nd democracy revived, Bolivias future for political and economic stability appeared bright (Klein 1992, 270). However, by 1983, the Bolivian economy was crippled by declining state revenues and the 1980s world debt crisis (Klein 1992, 272). Siles Zuazo printed more money to curb the economic crisis, but this further exacerbated Bolivias economic woes as the country experienced hyperinflation at nearly 23,000 percent. Because of his inability to control Bolivias dwindling economic climate and his incompetence as a political administrator, Siles Zuazo was for ced to resign by his former allies (Klein 1992, 272). To stabilize the economy Victor Paz Es tenssorro (1985-1989), Bolivias second president, introduced the neoliberal model, the new economic policy, (nueva political economica -NEP). This economic plan implemented fiscal austerity measures that reduced inflation at the cost of pushing the econom y into a recession (Kle in 1992, 276-277). With slow economic growth and increasing social misery, Bolivians demanded greater inclusion in Bolivian politi cs (Van Cott 2000, 134). More precisely, many demanded a new state model that would resolve Bolivias chronic instability and that would provide political inclusion (Postero 2006,198). It was in this context that Presiden t Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (1993-1997) introduced his constitutional re form plan, Plan for All ( El Plan de Todos), to change 50


Bolivia s traditional power structures. This reform pleased the local elites, the business sectors, and the indigenous population because it included their main interests. For the local elites, decentralization of state power to the municipal governments increased their political power to reside over local affa irs. For the business community, the plan modernized the state thr ough neoliberal economic polic ies. For the indigenous population, the plan opened the political spa ce available for organizing (Van Cott 2000, 134135). Finally, on a more general level, the Bolivian state was redefined as multiethnic and pluricultural. Of all the decentralizat ion policies, the Popular Participation Law ( Ley de Participacion Popular-LLP) affected the indigenous population the most. The law extended political participati on, incorporated rural and indi genous populations to political life, and legally recognized indigenous commu nities as full citizens (Domingo 2005, 7). However, when former dictator General Hugo Suarez Banzer won the 1997 presidential elections, the articulation of this policy and other multicultural reforms dramatically changed to favor a more traditional business approach (Postero 2006, 201). Because the Banzer government designated poverty as Bolivias most important fight the discussion of indigenous rights and multiculturalism wa ned. Indigenous people and the poor were lumped together as a new group of the poor who needed to be incorporated into the modern labor force in order to propel Bolivia as a competitive contender in the global market (Postero 2006, 202). This change in articulation of multicu ltural reforms drastically limited their benefits and did not change the traditional economic and political power structures (Postero 2006, 196). For instance, in practice the LLP switched the power struggles to a 51


local level which allowed indi genous participation, but for th e m ajority of the indigenous communities, the new laws only increased the political power of already existing politicians and local elites. Second, politic al participation blatantly ignored ethnic differences. Allowing only one indigenous or ganization to represent all indigenous groups resulted in the interest of an i ndigenous minority not being fully represented. Third, when indigenous communities discovered that rather than being able to make demands about autonomy and cultural rights, th ey were forced to work on other issues while gaining access to limited co-par ticipation funds (Postero 2006, 196-198). By the time S nchez de Lozada was re-elected, so cial unrest escalated as other sectors of society beyond indigenous comm unities were angered by the devastating effects of neoliberal policies (Domi ngo 2005, 12). When water (2000) and gas (2003) were privatized, social unrest erupted as both indigenous and civil society filled the streets and demanded the overturn of these policies and President Sanchez de Lozadas resignation in 2003. This 2003 mobilization was al so the culmination of popular protests that had escalated from 2000 onward with diffe ring issues. Overall, they expressed their disillusionment with the institutions of political representation (political parties) and the increasing neoliberal econo mic model (Domingo 2005, 13). Peru (1980-2002) When Peru re-democratized in 1980, popular belief was widespread that democracy would increase living standards for poor Peruvians and create a new model for state to society relations (Burt 2006, 232). However, the first democratically elected president, Fernando Belande Terry, pursued the same neoliberal policies that were 52


initiated during the last m ilitary regime. With these policies Belandes government institutionalized Perus neoliberal citizenship regime (Yashar 2005, 235). The orthodox economic policies and decentralization policies actually undermined popular living standards. This decl ine occurred in the context of continued state repression, co-optation and cleintelism remaining the principa l means of dealing with civil society (B urt 2006, 233). Rather than extend st ate power to the local level, Belandes decentralization policies only se rved to undermined and control local organizations in the municipalities. For the m unicipalities, their ability to preside over local affairs and have comple te autonomy was cut short as they remained dependent on resources. In many cases the state held pow er at the national level and continued to dominate the behavior of political parties (Burt 2006, 233). For Perus indigenous population, th e transition from corporatism to neoliberalism marked the return of political rights and the extension of universal suffrage to illiterates at the cost of retracting social rights (Yashar 2005, 236). Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, Peruvian administrations reduced social services that dealt with agricultural, health and education progra ms. During Belandes government land reforms seemed to provide peasants with territoria l autonomy, but, in f act, richer peasants capitalized and benefited more from these policies than the poorer peasants (Yashar 2005, 235). In 1985, Alan Garca Perezs populist presid ential campaign instilled hopes in the hearts of many Peruvians who filled the ba llot boxes hoping to see improvements made in political economic and social conditions (Burt 2006, 236). In the beginning, Garca Prez made ambitious efforts to improve Per uvians living standard s by decreasing social 53


program s for the urban and rural poor, to decrease foreign debt payments, and to participating in tripartite ne gotiations among the state, labor sector, and capital sector. However, after two years of exuberant state spending a nd economic growth, Garcias government faced severe hyperinflation and corruption that drastically reduced the incentives for these plans. In addition, Garcia s party APRA used its power as governing party to direct state resources toward cleintelistic networks that bolstered popular support for Garcia. This clientelism not only alienate d the other social groups but also polarized the democratic government widened the gap be tween the state and society. Near the end of Garcias rule, after clientelistic networks faltered and st ate resources dried up, the state had reached a legitimacy crisis as popular support and confidence in Garcias administration and democracy had drastically fallen (Burt 2006, 237). The legitimacy continued well into the 1990s as traditional power structures from the left fell from prominence (Burt 2006, 239). President Alberto Fujimori filled the political vacuum that ensued after the le fts fall when he campaigned on a populist platform. Once in power, Fujimori abandoned his platform and institutionalized an authoritarian government with auster e neoliberal polices (Atwood 2001, 3). Fujimoris administration imposed one of the most far-reaching neoliberal economic programs in Latin America (Burt 2006, 244). During the 1990s, the Fujimori government was a mix of authoritarian allian ces with the military that implemented structural adjustment and economic shock th erapy. For foreign comp anies, privatization of state enterprises was highly beneficial. The reformed 1993 Constitution led to a significant loss for both indigenous and peasan t communities because it allowed the sale of communal lands which left them open a nd vulnerable to state privatization. This 54


m easure counterbalanced others in the refo rmed 1993 Constitution that recognized the Andean and Amazonian communities and langua ges. In response to the measure on communal land, the measure on communal land, Amazonian movement leaders petitioned for Fujimoris neolib eral 1993 Constitution. Also, n ear the end of the 1990s, in response to Fujimoris natura l resource plan, Andean peas ant communities constructed a nationwide anti-mining campaign to contest th e increase in mining in the Andean region (Greene 2006, 9). For the indigenous population, Fujimoris ne oliberal policies d ealt the final blow to any remnants of corporatism. Communal la nds that were previously inalienable were sold with their sale came the elimination of the price support and subsidies to agriculture. Fujimoris neoliberal reforms challenged lo cal autonomy and provided the very motive that catalyzed indigenous organizing in Bolivia and Ecuador: indigenous communities suffered devastating poverty levels. During this time indigenous communities became worse off than non indigenous populations. Alth ough Fujimori created social safety nets and social investment funds, these populis t programs were never institutionalized (Atwood 2001, 2). While Fujimoris regime dealt with hyperinflation, a civil war led by a Maoist group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) forced the government to pay attention to its pressing demands (Atwood 2001, 4). Originated in the early 1980s, the Shining Path emerged as a guerilla group in violent res ponse to the poor living conditions of the Andean peasants. A serious threat to the states viability, Shining Path rallied. Many Peruvians were left terrified and in fear. In response, Fujimori called an autogolpe (selfmade coup). He suspended the 1979 Constitution, dissolved Congress, dismantled the 55


judiciary and installed a new governm ent em ergency and reconstruction where he then ruled by decree on April 5, 2000 (Atwood 2001, 4). The autogolpe re-established order and security, but at th e price of reviving authoritarianism in Peruvian politics after n early 12 years of electoral democracy (Burt 2007, 4). Anti-terrorist legislation allowed the state to incarcerate and persecute anyone suspected of terrorist sympathies or affiliations. Many Peruvians, especially Perus indigenous population, who were activists and locals but were not i nvolved in Shining Paths networks were imprisoned and convict ed. Heavy state repression paralyzed the country in fear and demobilized society. Ev en more, Fujimori systematically dissembled virtually every institution that was a threat to his power (Atwood 2001, 1-4). When Fujimoris government was found co rrupt it was replaced by a consensus government in 2000 (Burt 2007, 245). Once electe d president, Alejandro Toledo (20012006) pledged to cleanse the state of aut horitarian elements left by the Furjimori administration, to clean the government and po lice department of corruption, and to make the judicial process more efficient (Ba rr 2003, 6). Professing a populist and Andean identity that connected his indigenous heritage to the co mmon citizen, Toledo rose to popularity as his decentralization policies, an ti-privatization promises, and promise to establish a state-led indigenous rights framework captured th e hearts of many Peruvians (Barr 2003, 5; Greene 2006, 2). Despite the success of his decentralization policies, Toledos anti-privatization promises ran into serious problems (Barr 2003, 6). In the beginning, because of civil societys growing discontent against neo liberalism, Toledo boldly promised not to privatize on state-owned companies while maintaining investors confidence through 56


foreign investm ent. However, by May 2002, fina ncial problems forced him to reconsider privatization. Unable to walk the tightrope of promising benefits for the poor while increasing international capital for an invest ment friendly climate, Toledo succumbed to a pro-privatization stance. In the end, this decision caused so cial unrest and polarized the Peruvian government (Barr 2003, 6-7). For the indigenous population, Toledos promise of pushing indigenous rights to the forefront of Peruvian politics led to the formation of the National Commission of Indigenous Amazonian, and Afroperuvian Peoples (CONAPA) (Barr 2003, 8). Headed by his wife, Elaine Karp, CONAPA advanced ethnic and indigenous rights while forging an alliance between the Andean and Amaz onian indigenous communities. However, a series of scandals and Karps resignati on left many indigenous organizations like AIDESEP angry. Mismanagement of five million from the World Bank intended for indigenous development from CONAPAs top members, failure to advance indigenous rights, and CONAPAS failure at creating strong channels for representation and consultation (Greene 24; Yashar 2005, 267). As a result, all of Perus major indigenous organizations declared CONAPA has an unreco gnizable entity of indigenous interests and they refused to work with CONAPA in the near future (Greene 2006, 329). The Historical Development of the Central Andean Indigenous Movements Although the second half of th e chapter looks at the rise of indigenous movements in response to the tumultuous history of the cen tral Andean states, indigenous resistance against the state apparatus has been a part of Latin Americas history since the dawn of colonization. The rebellion of Tupac Amaru (1571-1572), the last ruler of the royal Inca 57


fa mily, started the subsequent rise of indi genous movements. His legacy of resistance against colonial rule stands as a symbol to the Andean indigenous people. Because he is considered as the first indigenous leader to rebel seriously against the Spanish, he has become an inspiration for many indigenous organizations and guerrilla groups over the centuries. For instance, the Peruvian communist rebel group Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) and the Uruguayan Marxist rebel group the Tupamaros have directly adopted the indigenous spirit and name of Tupac Amaru to revive the indigenous population fo r mobilization of their land and rights. The subsequent rise of indigenous movements from Tupac Amarus rebellion to the indigenous uprisings at the turn of the 21st century can be explained as a cyclical phenomena coined by the Andean indigenous populations as Pachakutik, which derives from the language of the indigenous populat ion the Quechuas. This word signifies change, rebirth, transformation, and then coming of a new era. In relation to the indigenous movements, Pachakutik is interpreted as the complete inversion of the established order, thereby signifying a new beginning where indigenous movements struggle to topple the old established order and move toward a new order that recognizes the inclusion of indigenous people into society (Kruyt 5-9, 2006) The development of the Central Andean indigenous movements is as much diverse in its organizational origins as it is similar in its demands and power to push the state to acknowledge and address indigenous rights. In general, these movements emerged in direct response to the states encroachment on indigenous communities local and territorial autonomy (Yashar 2005, 283). Th is encroachment a nd mobilization have occurred in the context of shifting citizenship regimes: from that of a corporatist 58


citizensh ip regime to that of a neoliberal ci tizenship regime. Unintentionally, rather than just incorporating the indigenous population into the political system as national peasants, corporatism also provided space for i ndigenous communities to carve out and institutionalize local and terr itorial autonomy in line with their indigenous roots. For Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru the formal aut onomy that was granted to their indigenous populations secured collectiv e land and land credit which not only provided the space that local autonomy was established, but also helped them to defend indigenous established authority sy stems (Yashar 2005, 235). When corporatism was replaced with neoliberalism indigenous communities autonomy was deeply threatened and challe nged (Yashar 2005, 283). In response, many indigenous communities organize d to defend their autonomy. However, where they could draw upon existing social community networks and where political space was available that indigenous communiti es only developed regional and national indigenous organizations. Ecuador and Bolivia have exhi bited the strongest in digenous movements while Peru has had a relatively weaker indigenous movement. In genera l this section aims to discuss the rise of the indigenous movements in the Ce ntral Andes and discuss their mobilization efforts against the state. The Indigenous Movement in Ecuador Ecuadors indigenous movement is the cu lmination of two ethnically diverse and regionally distinct histories: that of the Andean region and that of the Amazonian region (Selverston-Scher 2001, 31). Not only do these regions reflect geographical and ethnic differences, but also the histories of the indigenous movements reflect the differing level of state penetration and incorporation. Since colonial times, the Ecuadorian state has 59


activ ely incorporated and controlled the A ndean indigenous communities, while ignoring Amazonian region until the second half the twentieth century (Yashar 2005, 86-87). The Indigenous Movement in the Andes The first two Andean indigenous organi zations, the Ecuador ian Federation of Indians ( Federaci n Ecuatoriana de Indios or FEI) and the National Federation of Peasant Organizations ( Federacion Nacional de Or ganizaciones Campesinas or FENOC) emerged as pressure groups against the 1964 and 1973 land reforms (Yashar 2005, 100). In 1944, the Ecuadorian Comm unist Party founded FEI. FEIs ideology promoted indigenous concerns and professe d the class struggles of the p easants. With the sole goal of allying with the Workers Confederation of Ecuador ( La Confederaci n de Trabajadores del Ecuador or CTE), FEI only mobilized Indians around class-based issues. Although FEIs class-based demands ap peared one-sided, its alliance with CTE was a great accomplishment as CTE helped form transcommunity networks among isolated indigenous populations and encourag ed cooperatives. For the local indigenous people, FEI brought land rights issues to th e forefront of Ecuadorian politics and even though their struggles were framed around classbased issues, they of ten understood them as an ethnic issue (Yashar 2005, 102). By 1960, FEIs declined as the predomin ant indigenous organization, supplanted by the rise of FENOC. With its institu tional roots steeped in the Ecuadorian Confederation of Catholic Workers ( Confederacion Ecuadorian de Obreras Catolica or CEDOC), FENOCs mobilizations efforts were seen as an actor against the class based indigenous organizations. For the most part, the Catholic church helped to create social networks among indigenous communities for FENOC. FENOC maintained its 60


evangelical and organizational strength throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Rural workers were organ ized into rural unions and used an aggressive mobilization approach against land reforms. However, by the 1980s, FENOC lost its organizational strength as socialism gained prominence (Yashar 2005, 102). In 1972, the Andes witnessed the rise of its first regional organization, Ecuador ( Runacunapac Ricchharimui or ECUARUNARI) (Yashar 2005, 107). Supported by the Catholic Church and President Rodri guez Laras administration (1972-1976), ECUARNUARI, in the beginning, espoused a cl ass-based ideology that focused on land struggles (Zamosc 1994, 48). As ECUARUNAR I grew, it eventually developed a dual class and ethnic ideology. On the nationa l level, ECUARUNARI focused on class-based issues while on the local level it forged alli ances with lowland indigenous organizations (Yashar 2005, 107). However, as Ecuador transitioned from a corporatist state to a ne oliberal state, the dual ethnic and class ideology changed. S eeing their local autonomy challenged by the state, indigenous communities pressured ECUARUNARI to strengthen community networks and make indigenous issues its focus. As a resu lt, in 1985, ECUARUNARI explicitly espoused an ethnic ideology (Yashar 2005, 109). The Indigenous Movement in the Amazon The lack of state penetration in the Am azonian throughout the first half of the twentieth century gave indigenous commun ities the opportunity to maintain their territorial autonomy (Yashar 2005, 108). Unfortunately, this au tonomy was partial, as the state did relinquish control of the Amazon re gion to churches in the 1960s. The churches establishment of schools, communities, and heal th facilities were used as mechanisms of 61


control am ong the indigenous population. Ironi cally, these establishments actually provided necessary resources that indigenous communities would later use to build their own indigenous organizations. The presence of the church also provided indigenous communities with social capital to build and use their Spanish speaking skills in order to communicate with the state and other indigenous communities (Yashar 2005, 110). The first indigenous organization to emerge around an ethnic identity in Ecuadors Amazonian region was th e Federation of Shuar Centers (La Federaci n de Centros Shuar) (Selverston-Scher 2001, 33). Located in the southern Amazon, the Shuar were independent of the state until 1894 when Salesian missionaries arrived. The federation succeeded as it secured indigenous territory, preserved Shuar culture, and developed bilingual educati on and health programs. The success and organizational strategies of the Shuar were so successful that this federati on served as a political model for other organizations through the country (Selverston-Scher 2001, 33). An increase in cultural and land th reats throughout the 1970s catalyzed indigenous organizations (Yashar 2005, 130). Two of the next significant indigenous organizations were the Organization of Indigenous peoples of Pastaza ( La Organizaci n de Pueblos Ind genas de Pastaza OPIP), the Federation of Indigenous Organizations of Napo ( La Federaci n de Organizaciones Indigenas de Napo-FOIN). Not only did the OPIP and FOIN mobilize to defend resources ri ghts, they also collaborated to form the regional Amazon indigenous federation in th e 1980s, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon ( La Confederacion de Nacionalidades Ind genas de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana -CONFENIAE) (Selverston-Scher 2001, 34). 62


Located near the Am azon frontier to wn of Puyo, CONFENIAE is a well structured organization that represents mostly Shuar, Wuicua, and other smaller indigenous people of the Amazon (SelverstonScher 2001, 34). This organization has an ethnic identity and has brought im portant indigenous issues to the forefront of Ecuadorian politics, such as land, resources, and devel opment issues. COFENIAE has also presented a political agenda by forming alliances with politicians, human rights and environmental activists (Selverston-Shcer 2001, 35). In the late 1970s and the early 1980s the indigenous activists from ECUARUNARI and CONFENAIE discussed the formation of a national federation as a better way to mobilize against the state (Y ashar 2005, 130). For the first six years this national federation was named the Coordina ting Council of Indige nous Nationalities ( La Consejo de Coordinaci n de las Nacionalidades Ind genas CONACNIE). Later, it was renamed the National Indigenous Confederation of Ecuador ( La Confederaci n de Nacionalidades Ind genas del Ecuador CONAIE). In the beginning, this national indigenous movement struggled to unify di fferent indigenous communities along identity and resource issues. Indigenous communities with differing views debated which issues should be at the forefront of CONAIEs demands. In the end, the indigenous leaders and the networks that were left in place by th e unions, churches, and NGOs helped to merge the differences among the indigenous commun ities because they and CONAIE provided the framework for forging a transco mmunity identity (Yashar 2005, 132). Throughout the 1990s, CONAIE solidified its prominence as a national actor as it mobilized to demand indigenous righ ts (Yashar 2005, 144). In 1990, CONAIE coordinated its first mobilization. Organizing against President Rodrigo Borjas economic 63


reform s that increased its cost of living, lowered peasant prices, and ignored finding a resolution to land conf licts, CONAIEs mobilization efforts paralyzed the country. Borja complied with CONAIEs demands as he pr ovided indigenous communities with land titles (Zamosc 2006, 134). Beyond winning territoria l rights, the mobilization in and of itself provided CONAIE with a platform to artic ulate its agenda in th ree categories: .) ethnicity the right to be recognized as a multiethnic population with equal rights, 2.) citizenship equal rights to serv ices; and 3.) class-rights as peasants to land, fair prices, and so forth, (Yashar 2005, 145). CONAIEs m obilization efforts raised an indigenous consciousness that forced the st ate to rethink land and ethnic relations in different ways. As Ecuador transformed to a neoliberal citizenship regime, CONAIE assumed a leadership role in civil society and espoused an anti-neoliberal stance in defense of different forms of local autonomy (Yashar 2005, 144). The Indigenous Movement in Bolivia When compared to Ecuador, the indigenous movement in Bolivia is much more fragmented. There is not a national Bolivian i ndigenous organization that represents all of the indigenous tribes in the Andes and Amazon as there is in Ecuador This is interesting, given the fact that Bolivia ha s the largest indigenous populati on in Latin America. In fact, for Bolivia, indigenous organizations emerge d in the Andes, the Valley, and then the Amazon. Nevertheless, the conditions that fac ilitated the rise of Bolivias indigenous movement parallel Ecuador in provide mo tive, opportunity, and capacity (Yashar 2005, 152). First, for both regions, Bolivias indigenous movement initially organized to defend indigenous peoples autonomy from stat e policies that rose and fell with the 64


changing citizenship regim es (Yashar 2005, 153). Second, different levels of state penetration affected the differences of or ganizational structures in the Andes and Amazon. For instance, state re treat in the Andes challe nged the local autonomy indigenous communities had under the corporatist state, while state penetration in the Amazon challenged the indigenous territorial au tonomy that they had in the absence of state penetration before the 1980s. Third, th e capacity to organize did not occur where political opportunity and transcommunity networks were available (Yashar 2005, 153). The Indigenous Movement in the Andes The indigenous movement in the Andes arose out of defense for local autonomy that was quickly challenged by state authoriti es as the corporatist citizenship regime eroded during the implementation of the 1960s Military-Peasant Pact (Yashar 2005, 189). Organizing first emerged in La Paz, where i ndigenous authority structures survived state penetration. The Kataristas, a group of Aymaras, mobilized against the class identification of peasants and proclaimed the importance of re-establishing their indigenous culture and identit y. By capitalizing on their tr anscommunity networks and using an ethnic rhetoric to mobilize other In dians, the Kataristas became Bolivias main peasant federation during the 1970s and early 19 80s. In turn, their su ccess was attributed not only to their strength in mobilizing numbers, but also because of their ability to influence and compel the state to address the saliency of ethnicity and indigenous issues (Yashar 2005, 189). As part of their goal to transform the peasant movement, the Kataristas renamed the main peasant federation as the United C onfederation of Peasan t Workers of Bolivia ( La Confederacin Sindical nica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia CSUTCB) 65


(Yashar 2005, 176). Originally, the state cr eated governm ent-controlled unions in the 1970s and later organized them into the main peasant federation (CSUTCB) in 1979 (Andolina, Radcliffe, and La urie 2005, 683). After the Kataristas renamed the main peasant federation, it forged an anti-col onial ideology with CSUTCB and tied ethniccultural concerns to a class-base d peasant identity (Hahn 1996, 96). In 1979, CSUTCB severed its governmental ties and mobilized against the IMFs economic policies for freezing prices on agricultural goods. Although CSUTCBs demands were not ethnic in origin, it made significant waves in achieving material demands and regaining access to resources that were previously denied to many indigenous people (Yashar 2005, 178). As CS UTCB grew in strength, it did call for specifically ethnic demands such as the dema nd for calling Bolivia a plurinational state and also publicized ethnic identities in polic y debates. Soon after CSUTCB took the place of the Kataristas and espoused a stro nger ethnic rhetoric (Yashar 2005, 181). The movements that emerged after the Kata ristas used the Kataristas success as a model to propel their own movements (Yashar 2005, 182). The second generation movements emerged in the 1980s during the rise of the neoliberal citizenship regime. These movements like the cocaleros (coca growers) drew upon pre-existing networks, political space, and an indigenous mobilizi ng rhetoric to push the state to address indigenous demands during th e rise of corporatism (Yashar 2005, 182). The cocaleros emerged in the valleys, defending indigenous rights to coca production and its importance to indigenous culture and tradition (Yashar 2005, 184). The indigenous communities that compromise of the cocaleros however, were not initially producers of cocoa. During the 1980s, after the insta llment of the NEP, the state 66


closed production for all inefficient m ining en terprises. As a result tin mining, which had the largest percentage of workers from the indigenous communities, was forced to dismiss more than 23,000 laborers. Many indi genous families lost their income forcing the ex-miners and other peasants to migrate to the Chapare region to cultivate coca, a crop that was high on demand and that yiel ded high prices (Yashar 2005, 185). When the United States pressured Bolivia to er adicate all coca production, the indigenous communities of the Chapare region fought back in the 1991 cocalero movement (Yashar 2005, 183). Affiliated with CSUTCB, they argu ed for the legalization of coca production and consumption. For the cocaleros, coca is a sacred leaf used for consumption and indigenous rituals. In response to th e states coca erad ication plan, the cocaleros have organized numerous blockades and protests to defend their right to grow coca (Dangl 2007, 42). Since their emergence, the cocaleros have gained considerable attention concerning their claim to cultural rights and autonomy (Yashar 2005, 184). They have also made significant political waves by fiel ding political candidates for elections. In 1995, they elected forty-seven mayors and gain ed greater access to the Ministry of Agriculture than any other peasant uni on (Yashar 2005, 182-187). Sensing the need for legal protection, the cocaleros created the political party the Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo -MAS). This party has refo rmed eradication policies and used the coca leaf as a symbol of Andean struggle and Andean traditions (Dangle 2007, 48-49). In short, the second generation of indi genous movements emerged not necessarily to defend local autonomy but cultural rights. Th ey also used a rhetoric of ethnic identity 67


as a key component of their political struggle. These m ove ments later established key positions within the CSUTCB greatly influe ncing more of the CSUTCB adopted an ethnic agenda that would be key as the country entered the millennium (Yashar 2005, 187). The Indigenous Movement in the Amazon The indigenous movement in Bolivias Amazon region emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s, more than a decade late r than the Bolivian Andean indigenous movements (Yashar 2005, 190). As in Ecuador, the Bolivian state did not penetrate the Amazon until the second half of the twentie th century. Consequently, the Amazonian indigenous communities thrived, as they were able to institutionalize their autonomy centered on political and cultura l indigenous issues. However, when new state laws like Ley Forestal, Ley Fauna y Vida Silvestre and the Ley Mineral granted developers the right to exploit the Amaz ons natural resources in the 1970s, Amazon indigenous communities responded with the formation of indigenous organizations that organized primarily along ethnic lines. The Amazon indi genous organizations ability to organize, negotiate territorial autonomy, and participate actively in constitutional reforms led to their greater success in th e Andean indigenous organi zations (Yashar 2005, 190-191). Although other Amazonian indigenous organizations exist, the Indigenous Confederation of Bolivias Orient e, Chaco and Amazonian region ( La Confederaci n de Ind genas del Orient, Chaco y Amazonia de Bolivia or CIDOB) is the most prominent indigenous organization of the Amazon (Yashar 2005, 198). CIDOB was founded in the lowlands of Santa Cruz in 1982 and repres ents the entire Am azon, including other localized Amazonian indigenous organiza tions. To communicate and unify across 68


inte rethnic lines, CIDOB used the intra-orga nizational and internat ional resources from the NGO. Help for the Indigenous Peasant of the Bolivian Orient ( Apoyo para el Campesi n-Ind gena del Oriente Boliviano or APCOB). APCOB helped build CIDOB into a strong regional movement by creat ing intra-ethnic li nks across indigenous communities to increase dialogue that addr essed gender, culture, sociopolitical organizational, and territorial demands (Yashar 2005, 198-203). During the administration of Presiden t Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozado and Vice President Victor Hugo Cardenas, the re lationship between the Amazon indigenous communities and the Bolivian state significantly changed with the implementation of multicultural reforms. The multicultural reforms such as the Law of Popular Participation and other constitutional reforms addressed some of the indigenous communities demands to institutionalize inclusion and autonomy, and to recognize Bolivias multiethnic and pluralistic society. Howeve r, the indigenous communities view these reforms as not yet fully realized by the st ate and civil society (Yashar 2005, 216). In 1990, CIDOB mobilized with CSUTCB to force the state to grant the Amazonian Indians greater authority and access over their socioeconomic resources (Yashar 2005, 216). Reaching up to 30,000 particip ants, this mobilization pressured the state to consider the demands of the Amazon indigenous communities. Although the movement ended in discord, th e states legislation of the Ley de Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (LEY INRA) included many of CIDOBs original ideas for an indigenous law such as the indigenous peopl es communal land rights to their original land, the right to use natural resources on i ndigenous property, and the right to title old and new land. In the end, CIDOBs successf ul mobilization towards acquiring greater 69


political inclusion and territo rial autonom y from the st ate solidified the indigenous organization as a powerful contender in soci al movement circles and policy debates (Yashar 2005, 218). The Indigenous Movement in Peru The development of Perus indigenous m ovement parallels those in Bolivia and Ecuador in the sense that the lack of state penetration during corporatism resulted in a higher level of organizing among the Am azonian indigenous communities than the Andean Indians. However, the presence of a civil war with the authoritarian state and Shining Path, that raged throughout the And ean region nearly dest royed any political space available to mobilize for the Andean indigenous communities. The state neglected the Amazon Indians late until the 1980s. Due to less penetration from the state and the civil war, NGOs and the church were able to build the transcommunity networks and infrastructure needed to organize. The Indigenous Movement in the Andes Unlike in Ecuador and Bolivia, Perus corpor atist citizenship regime left a legacy of weak transcommunity networks (Yas har 2005, 246). The uneven distribution of General Velascos land reforms created tensions that weakened a desire to promote and defend community rights between those who we re affiliated with the cooperatives and those were the beneficiaries. In addition, when the state trie d to organize the indigenous communities into cooperatives, the indigenous population saw this as unwanted state intervention (Yashar 2005, 246). 70


When Peru re-dem ocratized and the cor poratist citizenship regime fell, the Andean indigenous communities political sp ace to mobilize and their transcommunity networks of organization were closed off due to an onset of a civil war and heavy state penetration (Yashar 2005, 246). The civil wa r was initiated by the Shining Path ( Sendero Luminoso ) in 1980s. This guerilla movement emerged as a military communist organization desired to implement a new so cial democracy in Peru. To do so, they launched a violent war against the state and any alternative form of organization, which led to the destruction of inde pendent networks and associa tions. Even though the Shining Path has been portrayed as an ethnic m ovement, their demands themselves were not ethnic. In addition, they sought to destroy any potential fo r organizing along ethnic lines. This strategy, in turn, led to the destruction of comm unication links among different indigenous groups and to the destruction of indigenous communal systems (Yashar 2005, 247). The state responded with heavy military repression of anyone who seemed to by sympathetic or affiliated with the Shining Path. This civil war left a fearful legacy of repression and death if an indigenous pers on publicly selfidentified as Indian. In addition, the legacy of Shining Paths organi zational strategy, weak ened political space availability to mobilize, and led to the destruction of long-la sting transcommunity networks (Yashar 2005, 249). The Indigenous Movement in the Amazon Due to weak penetration by the state and the Shining Path, the indigenous movement in the Amazonian region has been much more active than their Andean counterparts (Yashar 2005, 255). More than 85 percent of Amazon Indians are affiliated 71


with indigenous organizations and about half of them or ganized along ethnic lines. Amazonian indigenous organizations have emer ged in response to the colonization and development programs that have threatened th e material and political autonomy of those communities. The Amazon indigenous movement has also been able to develop in large part, to the fact that the Shining Path stayed in the highland Andean region of Peru. This geographical isolation from the civil war not only allowed indigenous communities the opportunity to increase their au tonomy, but also opened spa ce for external actors and NGOs to provide resources and organizati onal capacity for th e development of Amazonian indigenous organizations (Yashar 2005, 256). One of the most prominent ethnic indi genous organizations is the Interethnic Association for the Developmen t of the Peruvian Jungle ( Asociaci n Intertnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana or AIDESEP) (Greene 2006, 341). Founded in 1980, AIDESEP represents the interests of different indigenous tribes and mobilizes primarily to defend their lands, territory, natural resources, and right to self-determination. Of these demands, cultural autonomy and territorial rights are the most important cause that AIDESEP pursues in the face of development projects and state reforms that challenge the Amazon Indians territorial, politi cal, economic, and cultural autonomy. When AIDESEP encountered financial concerns and institutional problems encountered in 1997, divided AIDESEP into two indigenous organizations: AIDESEP and the Confederation of Peruvi an Nationalities of the Amazon ( La Confedracin del Nacionalidades Amaznicas Per or CONAP) (Yashar 2005, 265). CONAP represents and fights for similar issues to those addre ssed by AIDESEP does, such as advancing and defending Amazon indigenous rights in the Amazon. By the mid 1990s CONAP had left 72


an im pressive mark on state and indigenous people as it defended the environment and brought environmental indigenous agendas to the forefront of the global community. Specifically, CONAP worked to bring r ecognition and obtain compensation for the indigenous communities knowledge of biodive rsity. This achievement has come in a where the Peruvian state has begun applyi ng neoliberal market principles to environmental indigenous concerns (Greene 2006, 342). In addition, CONAP has defended indigenous cultures, and opposed governmental constitutional reforms that threatened the indigenous te rritorial autonomy of indigenous peoples (Yashar 2005, 266). The existence of both CONAP and AIDE SEP has spurred numerous debates concerning which organization legitimately represents Peru s indigenous population of the Amazon (Greene 2006, 343). Nevertheless, in spite of sour relations, AIDESEP and CONAP have changed relations between the state and indigenous peoples through their mobilization efforts (Yashar 2006, 267). Both organizations have forced the state to recognize and address indigenous rights. For instance, during Fujimoris administration, the government bowed to signing compacts that acknowledged, even if they have not always been acted upon, collectiv e indigenous rights and politi cal inclusion. For the most part, in fact, AIDESEP and CONAP have b een the two main federations they have presented issues to the Special Program for Native Communities in the government. Essentially, these two organizations have b ecome the main un-institutionalized channels that the indigenous communities use to voi ce their grievances (Yashar 2005, 267). Conclusion In short, since colonization, political inst ability and partial political inclusion has significantly characterized the central Andean states of Latin America. This instability 73


and partial inclusion have greatly contributed to the crisis of state to society relations in the central Andes. W eak and unresponsive governing institutions and representative institutions have, in turn, led to the systemic political exclus ion of lower classes while an elite privileged class has freely enjoyed the political and socioeconomic benefits of the state. When corporatism was es tablished in the 1930s, state to society relations appeared to normalize as the indigenous populations and other marginali zed sectors of society were granted more socioeconomic rights and citi zenship rights. However, the systemic exclusion that the former elites and domineering military felt propelled them to take power and erode all corporat ist ties and unveil the predomin ance of a new citizenship regime-neoliberalism. The establishment of the neoliberal citi zenship regime and the central Andean states return to democratization brought promises of enhanced political rights and political incorporation for all members of civil society yet at the drastic cost of socioeconomic rights. Changing citizenship regimes and the individualistic tenets of neoliberalism challenged the political a nd cultural autonomy that many indigenous communities carved for themselves under co rporatism. In response, indigenous organizations were formed to address the gr ievances of the indigenous communities. In addition, disillusioned with democracy and persistence of clientelism and exclusion in representative institutions of political partie s, civil society has turned towards social movements in this case the indigenous organizations. In the end, this chapter has provided a comparative historical background of the central And ean states and the rise of their indigenous organizations. With this history, one can und erstand the background 74


politica l context that led the in digenous organizations to assume a leadership role in civil society. 75


CHAPTER 3: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES At the turn of the twenty-first century, the central Andean states experienced an unprecedented wave of indigenous movements that not only overthrew the executive branch, but also forced their governments to listen to and redress the grievances of broader civil society. As their powerful m obilizations paralyzed and shocked their countries to a sense of wonderment, some of the indigenous movements became the only actors with the political capacity to represen t the indigenous populati ons and the rest of civil society. Considering y ears of exclusion, discriminati on, and marginalization, it is remarkable how these indigenous movements have risen as dynamic collective actors. To analyze how these movements rose and to a sses their effectiveness in incorporating indigenous issues, the four factors highlighted in chapter one will be examined in each case: (1) the degree of openness in a political system, (2) the presence of influential allies, (3) framing of demands and identity, and (4) the organizational structure of a movement. To analyze these factors significance social movement theories emphasizing three different explanatory arguments will be used: the political opportunity structure, framing, and mobilizing structures. The concept of the opportunity structure will be used to analyze whether the degree of openness in the central And ean states political systems and the presence of allies provided oppor tunities for the indigenous movements to 76


mobilize. Fram ing will help to explain how the indigenous movements demands played a role in turning them into powerful actors. A study of mobilizing structures examines whether the organizational make-up has influenc ed how the movements have been able to become dynamic collective actors. Before di ving into a comparative analysis, a brief overview of the central Andean indigenous movements is necessary. In Ecuador, the national indigenous conf ederation, CONAIE, positioned itself as a dynamic collective actor from the 1990s to the beginning of the twenty -first century. Its most significant mobilizations occurred during the Mahaud administration (1998-2000). Beginning in 1998 and ending with the overt hrow of Mahuad in 2000, CONAIE engaged in three indigenous mobilizations that protes ted against the states neoliberal reforms. CONAIEs mobilizations occurred in the context of Ecuadors worst economic recession since the 1930s. The economy contracted by seven percent, unemployment skyrocketed, banks plunged into an economic crisis as the Ecuadorian people lost faith in the national banking system, and Ecuador struggled to repa y its external debt (Postero 2006, 138). To curb this crisis, Mahuad implemented auster e economic measures and negotiated with the IMF for economic stabilization plans. The IMFs insistence on eliminating subsidies and privatizing state enterprise s caused uproar among the popular sectors. Consequently, Mahuad faced three large mobilizations led by CONAIE that pressured him to adhere to their demands and change the economic policies back to their original intent. In addition to alienating him from civil society, the auster e neoliberal reforms also left the president without allies as the IMFs policies also alienated banke rs and large businesses who happened to be his biggest supporters. Mahua d made one last attempt to revive the Ecuadorian economy by announcing the implemen tation of the IMFs dollarization plan 77


(pegging the Ecuadorian currency to the Am erican dollar). But, before the plan took off, CONAIE and mid-level army officers st aged a coup that ove rthrew Mahuad and instituted a military government. Surprisingl y, the next day, this new administration was quickly dismantled as high military officials returned the Ecuadorian government to civilian constitutional rule (Postero 2006, 139). Bolivias indigenous movement, particul arly the Amazonian regional federations of CSUTCB, CIDOB, and the cocaleros became dynamic actors of contention in the early millennium. Most notably, the mobilizatio ns that protested the privatization policies of water (2000) and gas (2003) solidified the indigenous movement as the vanguard for ethnic and popular demands. They were able to take advantage of their political opportunities, extend their indigenous frame to include a broader platform of ethnic and class-based demands while promoting a co llective identity that was wrapped in indigenous culture, and they organized massive multi-class mobilizations that pressed for land reforms and protested privatization policies (Yashar 2006, 207). Before these policies were implemented, Bolivia, much lik e Ecuador, faced an economic recession as it entered its second roun d of neoliberal reforms. In the mid to late 1990s, the Banzer regime adopted the World Banks market-bas ed practices in water management. This market competition, in turn, led the governme nt to grant concessions to a US-based company, Betchel, who privatized water serv ices, which raised drinking water taxes 200 percent in Cochabamba, Bolivia Outraged by the situati on, indigenous peasants and indigenous organizations mobilized to ove rturn the privatization policies and push Betchels company out of Bolivia. After decl aring a ninety-day state of emergency, on April 9, 2000, the government ended Betchel s control, revised the water law, and 78


allowed water services to be controlled by SEMAPA, a Bolivian water m anagement company (Perreault 2006, 9). Peace, however, did not last long as the privatization of Bolivian natural gas reserves resulted in a massive multi-class, in digenous-led mobilization that paralyzed the country and ended in the overthrow of two successive presidents, S nchez de Lozada and Mesa. For the movements participants, the issue at hand here was a simple attack on Bolivian patrimony. In a country harboring a d eep resentment against Chile for stealing its water front, the governments announcem ent to privatize a nd export natural gas reserves through a Chilean port to the US outraged many Bolivians. In addition, the majority of the financial profits from the ga s export benefited transnational firms like BP, Amoco, and Repsol YPF, while the state recei ved little in royalties After Sanchez de Lozada was overthrown and Mesa stepped in, Boliv ians were still unsatisfied with the gas policies and mobilized to overt hrow Mesa and overturn th e gas privatization policies (Perrault 2006, 29). Perus indigenous movement, unlike those in Bolivia and Ecuador, has had less success in incorporating indigenous interests in to the state and has experienced a weaker indigenous movement. In addition, the Peruvi an movement did not include the civil societys grievances in its mobilization efforts. Yet, with the mobilization efforts of the past year (2008), it has consolidated itsel f as a prominent political actor for the indigenous population of Peru. Since the regional Amazonian federations have emerged, they have established themselves as leading actors in the i ndigenous population. Pa rticularly, AIDESEP solidified its leadership role in the indigenous community when it successfully led a 79


m assive indigenous mobilization in August 2008 primarily against Law #840 (the Law of the Jungle). This law, and law 1015 and la w 1073 were just three of 100 legislative decrees that President Alan Garcia institutiona lized in line with neoliberal reforms to advance Perus development and modernizatio n plans. In essence, these laws granted greater concessions to lumber companie s for buying uncultivated lands of communal territories located and held by indigenous and farming commun ities in the forest (Selva) and the mountainous region (Sierra) (R nique 2009, 6) Because these laws undermined collective property for Andean and Amazonian communities while allowing foreign investors to take a greater role in the privatization of the states natural resources, Peru experien ced a great outcry from civil society (R nique 2009, 6), and a national agrarian strike in July 2008 against Garcias legislative decrees and the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement. Led by La Confederaci n General de los Trabajadores del Per (the General Confederation of Workers of Peru) the strike included teachers, businessmen, peasants, indigenous people, the Confederation of Peasant Communities, the National Agrarian Confederation and AIDESEP. Although the mobilization failed to overturn the legislativ e decrees or the free trade agreement, it did encourage AIDESEP to lead an indigenous m ovement against three legislative decrees that challenged the indigenous communities territorial rights and autonomy for inclusion in the developmental plans of the state (P eruvian Times 2008b). With more than 10,000 indigenous protestors armed with spears and bows, this movement paralyzed the country and forced President Garcia to call a state of emergency as protests blocked roads and took control over gas fields and oil pipelines Forced to address the demands of the indigenous movement, Congress met with indi genous representatives, which led to the 80


repeal of Laws 1015 and 1073 against Garcia s w ill (BBC 2008). In the end, even though Perus indigenous movement is seen as being weak overall, AI DESEPs mobilization efforts dealt a significant blow to Garcia s neoliberal policies and solidified the organization as a powerful and important actor in the political arena for Perus indigenous population. The Political Opportunity Structure As previously noted, the political opportuni ty structure is a co nstruct of social movement theory that explains a social m ovements emergence in relation to changing factors in a states political environment. Some of these factors, such as a political systems degree of openness and the presence of influential allies, can be perceived by movements as elements of opportunity for co llective action. For the first factor, greater degrees of protest have been noted to emerge out of political systems that exhibit a mix of open and closed factors of inclusion and access of civil society (Tarrow 1998, 77). In addition, movements can expand the political opportunities availabl e through their own mobilizational efforts (Tarrow 1996, 58). The pr esence of influential allies can also increase a movements opportunity for mobilization success and encourage movements to partake in collective action. This is because al lies often act as a resource external to the movement by providing more participants for mobilization strength and providing external resources. For Bolivia, Ecuador, and Pe ru, an analysis of these factors through the lens of the political opportunity structure explains how the central Andean indigenous movements were able to assume a leadership role in civil society and perceived new elements of opportunity for mobilization. 81


Ecuador Prior to the late 1990s and the early 2 000 mobilizations, the degree of openness in Ecuadors political system was relatively small. Even though democracy had granted greater political space to organize and enha nced political rights, political inclusion, especially in the decision making process, was not fully granted (Yashar 2005, 143). This resulted in a mixed political system with bot h open and closed opportunities. In response to a partially opened political system, CO NAIE mobilized against President Bucaram (1996 to 1997) and widened the political opportunities available for the incorporation of the indigenous population. As a result, the stat e was forced to widen the political system through a constituent assembly initiated by CONAIE and its allies. During this constituent assembly constitutional reforms we re implemented so as to extend collective political rights for Ecuadors indigenous population (Perreault 2003, 71). In addition, Ecuador was identified as a pluricultural and multiethnic state with greater customary laws recognizing communal territorial rights for the indigenous population, as well as allowing indigenous delegates to participate for the first time directly in state discussions on citizenship, legalizing forms of democr acy, and removing institutional barriers to political participation (Van Cott 2006, 167-168). These change s, in turn, widened the political systems degree of openness for Ecuadors indigenous population. However, Ecuadors political system returned to a mixed political system with open and closed opportunities as the Ma huad administration (1999-2000) implemented austere neoliberal measures. The states st ruggle to push the econom y out of a recession resulted in the implementation of strict neoliberal policies that drastically reduced the livelihood of many social sectors. With the help of his political party, the Social Christian 82


Party, Mahaud followed through new austerity measures that concentrated on improving a series of economic reforms that also pleased the constituents of the Social Christian Party such as the interests of exporters a nd bankers (Zamosc 2006, 138). As the state and political parties redirected their focus, civil society found itself without strong representative institutions that were willing to listen to and address their grievances. This lack of political inclusion pushed both the indigenous population and other parts of civil society towards non-institutionalized means of representation and channeling their grievances. Also, the decline of the left, which had begun its descent in the 1980s and continued throughout the 1990s, opened political space for a new actor to take its place. This decline occurred around the same time that CONAIE had matured as an indigenous organization and established itself as a dynami c collective actor in its past mobilization actions. This change prompted leftist intelle ctuals, party professiona ls, and popular leftist movement activists to join CONAIE and its indigenous party (Van Cott 2005, 114-115). Consequently, CONAIE quickly assumed a leader ship role in civil society as it perceived the lefts decline, civil societys lack of political inclusion and the drastic socioeconomic effects of the neoliberal reforms as an opportunity for collective action. After CONAIE led three different m obilizations (1998 to 1999), Ecuadors political system was widened as Mahauds administration was forced to address the movements demands. For instance, from 1998 to 1999, demands were made to restore subsides to electricity, fuels, gas and to create a permanent forum for discussion and negotiation of adjustment measures. The dema nds met after these mobilizations increased the opportunity of the indigenous population and various sect ors from civil society to engage in the political decisi on-making process of the state. Yet, it was not until Mahuad 83


announced the dollarization plan that the in digenous m ovements political opportunity took on a new form as the military and CONAIE allied against President Mahuad and the dollarization plan (Zamosc 2006, 139). Befo re the coup, during the first three mobilizations, the presence of allies incr eased CONAIEs mobilizat ional strength. The participants of the 1998 to 1999 mobilizati ons included CONAIE, Indian and peasant organizations, trade union federations, and later associations of small and middle entrepreneurs. In each wave of mobilization, these alliance s helped CONAIE to push for measures that helped restore subsides to electricity, lift restric tions on small savings accounts, and meet demands agreed to in previous negotiations. The militarys alliance with CONAI E was a temporary relationship of convenience for both actors as it widened the political opportunities for collective action (Walsh 2001, 24). Strategically for the indi genous movement, the military provided the support of Ecuadors national security forces which allowed the indigenous movement to peacefully take over the legislative palace a nd to occupy other state institutions without the interference of armed forces. For the military, CONAIE provided the bulk of movement participants, which increased th e mobilizational capacit y. In the end, although the coup was successful, victory lasted for one day as high level officers quickly returned the government to vice president Noboa and dismantled the new military and civilian led regime. Here, CONAIEs choice of the milita ry as allies increased its political opportunities for mobilization success. However, this alliance can be perceived as a tactical error that hurt CONAIEs image b ecause the mobilization involved undemocratic practices of inducing change into th e political system (Walsh 2001, 25). 84


Bolivia Bolivias political system, much like Ecuadors, was relatively closed until the state instituted constitutional reforms during Sanchez de Lozadas regime. Many of these reforms were multicultural reforms such as the Law of Popular Participation and the economic privatization under the Law of Capitalization as part of neoliberal reforms. These laws significantly widened the politic al opportunities available for political inclusion and incorporation of the countrys indigenous population (Perreault 2008, 6). Political decentralization laws and the mu lticultural reforms provided indigenous and rural peoples with new opportunities for sociocultural organizing and political participation, and the presence of indigenous pe ople and peasants was increased in formal politics. By 1994, Bolivia was identified as a multiethnic and pluricultural state with customary laws recognizing collective territ orial rights and extendi ng bilingual education to its indigenous population. However, even though these new rights opened Bolivias political system, access and inclusion in the constitutional reform process was very limited. Both the indigenous population and other groups in ci vil society encountered barrie rs to equal representation and inclusion in the political system (Van Cott 2006, 168). The decline of the left also opened space for a new actor to take the leading role in wavi ng the banner against neoliberal policies. As neoliberal reforms re directed the states interests towards pleasing international financial institutions and big businesses, civil society and the indigenous population turned to Bolivias indigenous moveme nt to address their grievances about the neoliberal reforms (Postero 2006, 145). As a result, by the early millennium, Bolivias political system exhibited a mix of open and closed opportunities with discriminating access to inclusion in politics. 85


For Bolivias indigenous movement, the la ck of representative political parties willing to act on behalf of civil societys inte rest helped it assume a leadership position. Yet, it was not until the government enacted th e water privatization law and then later the gas privatization occurred without the consent of civil societ y that the political system significantly contracted. As in Ecuador, the states systematic exclusion of civil society from the political decision-making process of the state was perceived by Bolivias indigenous movement as an opportun ity to mobilize (Postero 2006, 145). The presence of allies played a signifi cant role in advancing the demands of the movement and opening the political opportuni ties available for mobilization. Throughout the water war (2000) a strong co alition of allies pressured the state to overturn the water laws and reinstitute SEMAPA, a Bolivian company, to preside over the distribution of water. Although this water war began in 1999, tensions came to a significant clash in April of 2000. Organizations like CSUTCB, the Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de la Vida (Coordinating Committee to Defend Water and Life), and Federaci n Departamental Cochabamba de Organizaciones de Regantes (Cochabamba Department Federation of Irrigators Organizations or FEDE COR) allied to organize road blocks and marches against Law 2029 and the foreign company Aguas del Tunari In addition, thousands of Cochabambinos (indigenous people, peasants, other water committees and heavy transport workers unions and delegations) filled the street protesting against the Coordiandora and the Civic Committees proposals which stated that Augas del Tunari 24 hours to leave the city. The protestors proc laimed that there is nothing to negotiate and demanded the reinstate of SEMAPA as the primary water company (Assies 2003, 2829). 86


The gas war was also initiated by Bolivias indigenous movement, la Central Obrero Bolivian (the Bolivian Workers Cent er or COB), trade unions, la Coordiandora that participated in the wate r war, students and peasants. Th ese groups worked together to pressure the state to reform the gas laws and force President Sanchez de Lozada from office. COB, the national trade union confeder ation, called a general strike was called to protest the governments economic policies and demand that natural gas resources be used to develop Bolivias own industries and hydrocarbon sector. Miners and teachers were the first to go on strike, then studen ts and indigenous peasants from the Yungas valley marched and blocked highways into the capital. In Cochabamba, trade union demonstrators and the Coordinadora from the water war joined in filling the streets proclaiming, El gas es nuestro! (The gas is ours!). In res ponse to the pressure exerted by the movement, the state used violence on th e movement participan ts. The deaths of eighty civilians encouraged in tellectuals and the middle cl ass to stage hunger strikes while calling an end to the violence and S nchez de Lozadas resignation. Even S nchez de Lozadas own allies deserted him, citing th e mounting death toll and pressure from the movement as their primary reason (Postero 2005, 75). In the end, th e presence of allies widened the movements political opportuni ty through their additional strength and the force they exerted in their mobilizational efforts. Peru Prior to the 2008 indigenous movement, the degree of openness in Perus political system was smaller than in its Andean neighbors. Access and inclusion was granted during the 1980s as Peru slowly transitioned to democracy. In Peru, as in the other two countries, the lefts decline in the 1990s opened space for a new political actor, yet for 87


Perus indigenous m ovement nor any other polit ical organization neither was able to take the leftist place as Fujimori closed down all forms of political associational space for oppositional politics. At the same time, due to a lack of organizationa l maturity and small substantive achievements gained in past mobiliz ations, the left viewed Perus indigenous movement as a weak actor. In addition, in cont rast to the left in Ecuador and Bolivia, the left in Peru was more class-oriented in its ideology and it did not view ethnicity as important to include in its political cause. Thus, Perus indigenous movement was not provided the opportunity to become a dynami c actor like the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia (Van Cott 2005, 165-169). The rise of Fujimori and the Shining Pa th during the early 1 990s greatly reduced the political space for indigenous and civil soci ety actors who either appeared to have supported the terrorist organization or opposed the governance and policies of Fujimoris administration. Indigenous organizations faced a serious setback during the constitutional reform process as Fujimori rejected i ndigenous rights and predominantly guided the direction of the constitution. As a result, the 1993 Peruvian constitution weakened the inclusion of indigenous population by removi ng the official status of the Quechua language; the constitution also weakened collective land rights by allowing the sale and break up of communal lands, and by limiting the number of seats available for indigenous representatives. When Toledo took office in 2001, the political system opened as his administration focused on incorporating indi genous demands; however, many indigenous organizations were still barred from full incl usion as many of thei r proposals for changes in the state were ignored (Van Cott 2006, 171). 88


During Garcias administration, the degree of openness in Perus political system contracted as more than 100 laws regarding the control of the land titling process, logging, natural resources and agricultural polic y were passed without the consultation of Perus indigenous communities. The exclusion of Peruvian Indians from the political decision making around these laws significantly contributed to the contraction of the indigenous peoples access and in clusion in the states politi cal system (Peruvian Times 2008a) Like Ecuadors and Bolivias systems, Pe rus political system had laws that granted the indigenous people with territorial rights, such as the states ratification of the International and Labor Orga nizations Convention 169 on th e Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples and La Communidad Nativa which granted collective land titles and the need for legal incorporation of landholde rs. When Garcia ignored these laws and implemented his developmental legislative decree s, he not only elicited uproar from both civil society and the indigenous population, but also created a mixed political system with closed and open opportunities for inclusion. AIDESEP and other groups in society sa w this as an opportunity to mobilize as allies against Garcias laws. However, during and after the national agrarian strike, Perus indigenous movement did rise as dynamic co llective actors. For the most part, AIDESEP and its indigenous constituents played a small role in the strike wherein they chose to join the ranks of civil society in hopes of specifically fighting for the repeal of laws #840, #1015, and #1073 rather than for the overall overt urn of the free trade agreement and all of the 100 legislative decrees (R nique 2000, 5). Other allies also only represented a fraction of society leading to the failure of th e movement. In contrast to Bolivia and Peru, the presence of allies, although helpful in increasing the movements mobilizational 89


strength, did not do m uch in opening the political system for increased access or mobilizaitonal success du ring this period. However, the failure of that multi-class mobilization prompted AIDESEP and its indigenous constituents to mobilize for th e laws specifically affecting indigenous territories and indigenous rights a month later. This choice in mobilizing and demanding increased access for indigenous people into the political decision making process of the state is what distinguishes the Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movements from Perus indigenous movement. In addition, inte rnational ngos and left-wing activists, as well as agents of presidents Hugo Ch vez and Evo Morales, became indirect allies, of AIDESEPs mobilization efforts. The intern ational attention drawn from these allies placed more pressure on the Peruvian state to open dialogue with AIDESEP representatives (R nique 2009, 7). Thus, even though Peru s political system presented itself with similar conditions as in Bolivia and Ecuador of containing open and closed opportunities for inclusion and mobilization, AI DESEP did not assume a leadership role in civil society. In large part, this was the result of AIDESEP choosing to frame its demands solely around an ethnic agenda that promoted resolutions and increased access into the Peruvian polity specifically for Perus indigenous population. Framing Although the political opportuni ty structure (POS) offers insight as to when states become vulnerable for mobilization and when opportunities are or ar e not available for the political use of a social movement, POS does have its limitations (McAdam and Snow 1996, 254). First, because traditional poli tical opportunity models have been based 90

PAGE 100

on W estern democracies, they are often biased in favor of explai ning opportunities for the kinds of mobilizations normally found in t hose countries. In contra st, social movements in Latin America are more often based on cris es of consumption such as lack of food, health, and other basic resources. Second, political opportunitie s, as Tarrow notes, can be a subjective matter which means that actors must first be able to s ee opportunities before taking advantage of them (1994, 24). Without this subjective component, the issue of human agency is strangely absent. Neverthele ss, the political opportunity structure is still a significant factor towards explaining th e rise of indigenous movements and their assuming a leadership role in Latin America. By analyzing movements through a frame analysis, one would be able to understand how a movements beliefs, values, identity, and choice increase movement participants and aid a movements success beyond the structural component of the political opportunity structure (McAdam and Snow 1996, 254). Frame alignment brings together social movement organizations with external actors (McAdam and Snow 1996, 238). A frame, in and of itself, is a mechanism through which individuals may understand what happe ns around them, identify the sources of their problems, and devise ways for addr essing their grievances (McAdam and Snow 1996, 254). Four frame alignment processes el ements (frame bridging, frame extension, frame transformation, frame amplification), fr ame bridging and frame extension will be used to explain how the central Andean indigenous movements framed their demands and understood the source of their problem and whet her that led to their powerful rise as powerful actors Basically, frame bridging i nvolves the linkage of a social movement organization with an un-mobilized pool of civil society who share common grievances 91

PAGE 101

but lack an organizational base for expressing their grievanc es and in terests. For this, collective action from the external actors view point occurs because of similar grievances held with the social movement or ganization (McAdam and Snow 1996, 238). Ecuador In the case of Ecuadors indigenous m ovement, CONAIE has established itself as a powerful actor because it has successfully fr amed its demands with in a broader context of civil societys plight (Postero 2005, 8). In the 1990s, CONAIE linked anti-peasant policies in its indigenous demands with ci vil societys demands which denounced the states neoliberal model. This strategy not onl y resonated with the in terest and frames of other agrarian organizations, but also facilitated increased support for CONAIEs mobilization efforts against the state. Du ring the second half of the 1990s, CONAIE extended its indigenous frame to include sent iments and demands from a more general class-based viewpoint. This move attracted unions and urban sectors towards CONAIEs national slogan of anti neoliberalism. Runni ng on a broader frame that incorporated the interests of other civil society members, spec ifically an anti-neoliberal stance, catapulted CONAIE as the only political actor available with the mobilization and representational strength to lead civil soci ety in the fight against neoliberalism (Postero 2006, 144). Taking on a broader frame was also appa rent in the three mobilizations that occurred in the late 1990s. A strikingly comm on aspect across these mobilizations is the lack of demands regarding specific indige nous issues demanded. This absence is interesting given the fact that CONAIE called for the mobilizations, gathered the most participants for the protests, and directly conducted negotiations with the government. Nevertheless, indigenous issues were not le ft unaddressed. In f act, during negotiations, 92

PAGE 102

dem ands that related to indigenous issues were indirectly addressed, such as the governments willingness to provide an invest ment fund for Indian areas, increase the budget for Indian agencies within the stat e, and increase radio access for indigenous organizations (Postero 2006, 146). In the end, CONAIEs decision to fram e its mobilizations around civil societys struggles and problems was very effective. Its framing strategy was effective because it was able to achieve indigenous goals al ongside popular demands without having to organize more protests. CONAIEs achieveme nts obtained for both the popular sectors of society and the indigenous masses may not have been possible if CONAIE had chosen to frame its mobilization issues solely around cultural demands. A synthesis of both an ethnic agenda and a class agenda against the ne oliberal policies of th e state significantly aided CONAIEs role to assuming a leadership role in civil soci ety (Postero 2006, 147). Bolivia Similar Ecuadors indigenous movement Bolivias indigenous movement (2000 and 2003), rose to a dynamic level because it successfully framed a nationalistic collective identity that he ld underlying sentiments of both ethnic and class-based demands that appealed to many Bolivian citizen s. This strategy, in turn, garnered the widespread support of sympathi zers and increased the numbers of movement participants (Postero 2005, 42). Although the water a nd gas mobilizations are recognized as indigenous movements, in contrast to Ec uador, these movements did not have one leading indigenous organization th at guided and framed the movement. Yet, this is not to say that Bolivias indigenous organizations which lack a unifying national indigenous confederation, and its broader indigenous c onstituents did play a key role in the 93

PAGE 103

move ments themselves. In fact, many of th e protestors involved beyond the miners, the coca farmers, and other Bolivian citizens, were indigenous or affiliated with an indigenous organization such as the cocaleros, CSUTCB, and CIDOB. Throughout the water war this nationa list collective identity was apparent everywhere as participants were encouraged to view the privatization policies of water as an assault on their national patrimony. Civ il society was challenged to adhere to its Bolivian identity and join the ranks of mobili zed Indians in the fight for Bolivian control over water companies. Throughout the prot est movement leaders enhanced this nationalistic frame by using Bolivian nationa l symbols and languages to mobilize the more sectors of civil society. Protest signs, for example, in fact stated, Water is not for sale! and The water belongs to the people of Cocachamba (Gray 2000 and Olivera 2004). Although a national identity frame was used, ethnicity was at the heart of the mobilization as indigenous symbols and the Andean flag, whiphala, appeared flying next to the Bolivian flag. In addition, from an indigenous viewpoint, many believed that privatizing water violated the traditional indi genous way of life with respect to water. Similarly, during the gas war (2003 a nd 2005), movement leaders focused on framing a national collective identity that vi ewed privatization as an assault on Bolivian patrimony that would only exacerbate social costs for the Bolivian poor if gas was privatized. Protestors used ethnic metaphors a nd references as signs of strength of the Andean warrior people throughout demonstra tions and marches. Yet, even though the majority of protesters were Indians, thei r demands were not explicitly framed as indigenous or framed for i ndigenous rights. Instead, overall demands were made on behalf of all Bolivian people. Besides gas, the majority of demands objected to the 94

PAGE 104

harsh national security laws, low basic wages, the free trad e agreement and clarity in the coca eradication laws. Similar to the water wars, for both of these mobilizations there appears to be a fluid movement between ethnicity and class that reflects the fact that the majority of Bolivians are both poor and i ndigenous (Postero 2005, 84). Both of these mobilizations reflect examples of frame br idging and frame extension wherein ethnic and class based demands within thes e mobilizations were extended to broader civil society to create a nationalistic identity that united both civil society actors and the indigenous population (Postero 2005, 84) Peru Similar to Ecuador and Bolivias in digenous movement, AIDESEP framed its demands using an ethnic and class rhetoric. However, the Peruvian indigenous movement different from its Andean neighbors in the se nse that its ethnic and class rhetoric was specifically geared at repealing the legi slative decrees that would have drastic socioeconomics effects on the indigenous community as opposed to extending their framing demands to address the socioeconomic effects felt by broader society. This framing strategy was also apparent during the national agrarian strike that occurred one month before the indigenous movement. Th ere, AIDESEPs participation focused on mobilizing for the repeal of laws harm ing the indigenous communities despite the broader movements demands for repeal of the free trade agreement and improved socioeconomic status for all (Peruvian Times 2008a). Framing its demands solely towards indigenous people was the determining the factor for why the indigenous movement did not assume a leadership role in civil society. Neverthe less, it did help the 95

PAGE 105

move ment assume a leadership role as a prominent actor for the Peruvian indigenous community. Throughout the August mobilizations, AIDESEP rallied Perus indigenous population under a broad indige nous ethnic identity that fram ed its demands along ethnic and class lines. AIDESEP strate gically used the August mobilizations as a moment in Perus political history to espouse an 11-point platform that not only resisted Garcias development decrees, but also declared the underlying goal of the protest, to be the liberation of indigenous territories and independence from the Peruvian state (R nique 2009, 4). Beyond defending indigenous territorial integrity and autonomy, AIDESEP also explicitly called for the state to fund sustainable development projects in the rainforest, follow through with the creati on of a program for protecting indigenous peoples in voluntary isolati on, and the creation of a congr essional commission to oversee the implementation of the UN Declarati on of Rights of Indigenous Peoples (R nique 2009, 3). Interestingly, as AIDESEP continued to frame its demand within the framework for the socioeconomic improvements of and for Perus indigenous population, the governments offensive actually garnered more indirect support from civil society and international attention. Drawing on anti-communi st repertoires of oligarchic and Cold War ideologies, government officials like Vi ctor Castaneda, poli ce chief of Amazonas Region, stated that the underlying cause of th e mobilizations was to defend the interests of narcotraffickers. Prime Minister Eduardo de l Castillo in turn de nounced the uprising as part of a broader plot led by the Nationalist Party former pr esidential candidate Ollanta Humala to overthrow the government (R nique 2009, 3). In the end, even though 96

PAGE 106

AIDESEPs fra me did not help it nor was it intended to help achieve a leadership role in civil society, it did help consolidate the indigenous population as a dominant force in civil society. Mobilizing Structures Next to the POS and framing, mobilizing structures present another explanatory factor for how the central Andean indige nous movements were able to assume a leadership role in civil society. By examin ing the indigenous moveme nts structures we will be able to see how they influenced a m ovements choice of strategies and tactics for collective action. In the end, we will also be able to determin e how the structure led to a leadership status in civil society. As Kriesi noted, mobilizing structures are comprised of social movement organizations (SMOs), kinship and friendshi p networks, informal networks, movement communities, as well as other formal organi zations which contribute to a movements cause without directly being involved in th e mobilization process for collective action (1996, 152). Besides SMOs, four other types of formal mobilizing structures exist including supportive organizati ons, movement associations, and parties and interest groups. Service organizations, such as the medi a, churches, restaura nts, and educational institutions can also be s upportive organizations. For the mo st part, these organizations work on behalf of the social movement a nd sympathize with pa rticipants, yet are indirectly involved in a movements mobiliz ation efforts. Movement associations are self-help organizations that ar e indirectly involved in a m ovement and exist solely to cater to the needs of the me mbers affiliated with the movement. Finally, parties and interest groups may contribute directly or indirectly to a movement. However, they 97

PAGE 107

prim arily pursue political goals while rely ing on the direct par ticipation of their constituent base (Kriesi 1996, 153). SMOs differ from the other types of formal organizations by two criteria in that they mobilize their constituents for collective action, and they do so with a political goal to achieve a collective good (Kreisi 1996, 152). In addition, SMOs range from formal and centralized organizations to informal and decentralized organizations. Formalized and centralized SMOs are characterized by estab lished bureaucratic procedures for decision making, explicit criteria for membership, a nd rules for governing subunits. In contrast, informal SMOs have few established procedures, loose membership requirements and a decision making process that occurs infr equently. Also, for informal SMOs the organizational structure frequently ch anges, assignments among personnel and procedures are developed daily to meet th e immediate needs of the organization. The structure of an SMO affects how long an SMO lasts as well as the major strategies and tactics chosen for mobilization (Lof land 1996, 160-161). Unlike informal SMOs, formalized SMOs have more stable organiza tions and tend to engage in institutionalized tactics such as the electoral process. Al so, formalized SMOs are more likely than informal SMOs to engage in activities that help to achieve organizational maintenance and expansion. Analyzing the organizational st ructure of the central the central Andean indigenous movements, allows us to see how the mobilizing structures of those movements played a significant role in helping them rise to power and incorporate indigenous interests (Lofland 1996, 160-161). 98

PAGE 108

Ecuador Even though other indigenous organizatio ns exist in Ecuador, CONAIE has been recognized for its hegemonic position as the leading representative for all Ecuadorian Indians. For the most part the centralized st ructure of this indigenous organization and its mobilizing tactics of institutional and collec tive action have not only provided CONAIE with an insurmountable amount of power and po litical capital, but ha ve also helped it achieved a powerful status as an actor for collective acti on. Structurally, as a social movement organization, CONAIE is highly centralized with a representative body comprised of Ecuadors three main regiona l Ecuadorian confederations; CONFENIAE, ECUARUNARI, and CONAICE (C ONAIE 1998). At the top of this representative body sits the president, vice president, and then several other representatives who comprise the governing council of democratic ally elected leader s. These representatives meet once every year to outline solutions to proble ms affecting the indigenous community. The formalized structure of CONAIE has not only been appealing to civil society but has also enabled it to establish itself as a vanguard fo r all of Ecuadorian Indi ans (Selverston-Sher 1994, 139). Because CONAIE holds itself as a highly centralized and formalized organization, its internal struct ure has also directly determined what tactics and strategies are best for collective action. For instance, C ONAIE has used institutional initiatives in addition to collective action which have allowe d its activists to file lawsuits and mount aggressive lobbying campaigns (Zamosc 2006, 146) Many of these tactics have led to the establishment of indigenous devel opment programs funded by the state or international organizations. In addition, CONAIE has also expanded democratic participation and representation through the creation of its own political party 99

PAGE 109

Movimiento de Unidad Plur inacional Pachakutik-Nuevo Pa s (Pachakutik). Like CONAIE, Pachkutik promotes an ethnic and class fra me that has attracted indigenous and non-indigenous constituents. The rise of this political party also attracted many leftists who were facing the harsh reality of a broken leftist group that too had been decimated by neoliberal economic policies and internal disun ity. As a result, many leftists either joined or allied with Pachakutik. Ultimately, the support of Pachkutik and CONAIEs mobilizational affairs have led to securi ng Indian rights in the 1998 constitution and obtaining representation in the legislature and local political offices (Birnir and Van Cott 2007, 109). During the late 1990s and into 2000 in its mobilization and coup, CONAIE combined institutional tactics with collective action. This combination was especially evident during the first three mobilizati ons (1998-1999) where direct government negotiations were undertaken to address indi genous needs after collective action forced the state to interact with CONAIE and its allies. In the end, CONAIEs centralized structure and its combination of institutional initiatives and collective action have helped it assume a leadership role in civil society (Zamosc 2006, 149 from David versus Goliath). Bolivia Bolivias indigenous movement, on the other hand, is decentralized and lacks a unifying national indigenous organization. Instead, the three dominant indigenous organizations (CSUTCB, CIDOB, and the cocaleros ) that comprise Bolivias indigenous movement are regionally and ethnically separa ted by distinct geographical and ecological zones. Despite decentralization, Bolivias i ndigenous movements mobilizing structures 100

PAGE 110

have helped it assum e a leadership role in civil society during the gas and water wars. As with CONAIE, the centralized structures of these SMOs have had a profound impact on the choices of tactics a combination of institutional and extra-institutional. CSUTCBs organizational st ructure was originally modeled on western political organizations. This indigenous organization is centralized. At the top, the national level, sits CSUTCB, the confederation. Underneath, at the regional or depa rtmental level sits twenty-six regional federations comprised of more than 200 organized and active centers at the sub-regional or provincial level. And, fi nally, at the local level or community level sits a network of unions (Han 1996, 100). Nati onal congresses are held every two years, bringing union delegates together from Boliv ias seven regions. There, the delegates address the peasants major socioeconomic grie vances with the state and the market (Van Cott 93). Through this pyramid shape, CSUTCB imposes a more top down approach of control on the indigenous populat ion and has used a combin ation of collective action tactics and institutional initiatives (Han 1996, 100). For instance, during the water wars, CSUTCB joined the efforts of other key indigenous particip ants and under the direction of leader Felipe Quispe called a national mobilization that blocked many roads. In addition, when the Banzer regime finally decided to engage in negotiations with movement participants, CSUTCB played a sign ificant role in drafting the demands. For instance, the government was asked to revise the water laws, to e the distribution of natural resources, biodiv ersity and the use of the land, and to reform the INRA land labor rights (Khol & Farthing 2007, 266-267). In the end, the mobilizing structures and the collective action and in stitutional tactics helped CSUTCB to push Bolivias indigenous movement to a leadership level in civil society. 101

PAGE 111

The lowland indigenous orga nization CIDOB, as well, ha s a centralized structure and represents thirty-four i ndigenous tribes. CIDOB is char acterized as an umbrella organization that not only represents Boliv ias lowland indigenous population, but also has served to strengthen smaller indigenous organizations such as CPIB, CIRABO, and CPESC. Similar to CONAIE, CIDOBs mobilizi ng structure has influenced its strategies of action and tactics. For instance, since its emergence, CIDOB has used institutional and extra-institutional means to press for indi genous demands. CIDOBs official principles state its desire to extend and maintain horizontal democracy and democratic representation. This vision has led to past mobilizations where CIDOB has established profound relations with state institutions and non-governmental organizations at the national and the international level and w ith public or private organizations for development and cooperation. It has also esta blished its voice for lowland and broader civil society through its mobiliza tions efforts during the water wars. What is important to note here is that even though CIDOB did not directly take part in the water and gas mobilizations, it did contribute gr eatly to the restructuring of those rights in the aftermath of those wars. For instance, in 2005, after the gas war, CIDOB alongside other indigenous organizations and poli tical parties participated in a constituent assembly to improve water rights and improve the political and social status of indigenous people and civil society at large. In the proposal, CI DOB asked for the government to adopt a democratic, participatory, and representative community that advances Bolivian policy to increase decision making efforts for the peas ants and indigenous people (CIDOB 2008). The cocaleros is another centralized indige nous organization. Originally comprised of six major cocalero unions, the cocaleros is a network of unions organized 102

PAGE 112

under an umbrella of thirty sub-federations which, in turn are organized into five federations. Since its emergence, this group ha s established itself as a dom inant force within the indigenous communities of the co ca growers as well as gained sympathetic support from human rights organi zations, anthropologist, journali sts, and social sectors in Cochabambas elite-based civic committees They used direct action tactics and institutional initiatives. For instance, in 1992, they took control of CSUTCB and sought efforts to create an independent political party to comple ment massive mobilization and resistance to the eradication of coca (Van Cott 2003, 762). Dominating the CSUTCB helped them add their issues to meeti ng agendas. Peasant leaders had become increasingly dissatisfied with previous al liances between the movement and traditional political parties. In addition, to these institutional tactics, the cocaleros engaged in collective action during the water wars when they aided other social movement participants, especially in the El Chapar e region, by adding the revision of the Law of Water to their list of demands. Un der the guidance of Morales, the cocaleros supported the water coordinating committee by helping to block roads in Cochabamba (Khol & Farthing 2007, 266-267). Throughout the water and gas mobilizations Bolivias indigenous movement used a combination of oppositional mobilizational tac tics. It was not until after the water war and during the 2002 elections that the indigenous organizations were able to engage fully in the electoral process. Evo Morales, leader of the cocaleros, created the indigenous political party MAS ( Movimiento al Socialismo or Movement Toward Socialism). Felipe Quispe, leader of CSUTCB created MIP (Movimiento Indigena Pachakuti or Pachakuti Indigenous Movement). MAS and MIP ran oppos ite each other in the 2002 elections and 103

PAGE 113

lost to Sanchez de Lozada. Although they lost, MAS and MIP obtai ned a strong foothold in congress by winning 27 percent of congressi onal seats for indigenous delegates. L ong after Sanchez de Lozada was el ected and the gas war erupted that Bolivias indigenous movement used their political parties to take a leading role during the second phase of the gas wars (Van Cott 2003, 753). By 2005, after Sanchez de Lozadas resignati on, civil society rose in anger against the successor government of Carlos Mesa. Th ey believed that Mesa was dishonoring the rights of the people and that the natural ga s reserves were once again being looted by foreign interests. This suspicion encouraged collective action yet ag ain in May and June 2005 by the same movements that drove Sanc hez de Lozada from office. During this time, the Bolivian indigenous movement initia ted the call for mobiliz ation with Morales and MAS taking a prominent leadership positi on. The coalition of new social movements and labor unions pushed even harder with them at the helm. Morales and the other movement participants demanded Mesas resi gnation and improved le gislation for natural gas reserves. Bolivians also called for a c onstitutional assembly because they viewed Mesa as a traditionalist politician who w ould betray the indigenous people and other mobilized popular sectors. Furthermore, they demanded a new constitution to restructure the state to be more responsive to popular interests and improve national elections. As a result, a new government was formed after elect ion in which Morales was elected with an outright majority (Vanden 2007, 24) Peru Peru, much like Bolivia lacks a single national indigenous movement. This case has not only been extensively studied by scholar s, but has also led to the conclusion that 104

PAGE 114

the Peruvian indigenous move ment is either non-existent or rela tively weak. Although weaker in comparison to its Andean neighbor s, Perus indigenous movement has made significant strides in establishing itself as a dominant force in Peruvian politics. Based primarily on its mobilizing structures, it has a ssumed a leadership role specifically for the indigenous population more than for broader civil society. Even though this status can largely be attributed to framing, the mob ilizing structures of Perus indigenous movements also help to explain why it did not assume a leadership status for civil society. Perus indigenous movement is more active in the Amazon than in the Andes, largely because the civil war resulted in the murder of many Peruvians, particularly the indigenous population in the highlands. AIDESEP and CONAP are the two most prominent indigenous organizations in Perus Amazonian region. Structurally, even though the overall movement is decentralized as in Bolivia, the indigenous organizations themselves are centralized. Both AIDESEP and CONAP represent smaller indigenous groups in a highly centralized and forma lized organization. Because CONAP is a formalized organization its strategies and tactics have leaned more towards an institutional strategy. In a sense, CONAP re flects a new relationship between indigenous activists and both state and non-government al supporters. Unlike AIDESEP, however, CONAPs heavy dependence on the support of development organizations has opened debate concerning whether CONAP really re presents the interest s of its indigenous constituents (Elena Garcia 2006, 167). Neverthe less, CONAP has establ ished itself as an important actor for Perus Amazon indigenous population. Its instit utional initiatives have raised awareness of and an industry for indigenous medicine. 105

PAGE 115

AIDESEP, on the other hand, is a centrali zed organization that prides itself on its autonomy from the state and any religious or political affiliation. Comprised of 57 federations and indigenous te rritorial organizations, AIDESE P is characterized as an umbrella organization consists of six indigenous organizations spread throughout Perus northern, center, and southern regions. Because of its large structure, AIDESEP has used a combination of both institutional and collec tive action to push exclusively for the rights of Perus Amazonian indigenous population. This was particularly evident during the 2008 indigenous mobilizations (AIDESEP 2009). Throughout this mobilization, AIDESEP and its constituents strategically us ed collective action tactics and institutional initiatives to force the go vernment to overturn legislative decrees #1015, # 1073, and #840. Strategically, AIDESEP first employed the use of collective act ion to paralyze the state and draw national and in ternational attention to President Garcias legislative decrees. On the first day of mobilizat ions, hundreds of Matsiguengas closed down navigation in the Urubamba River; then n earby, another group occupied two pumping stations, heliports, and instal lations of Pluspetrol, the corporation operating the Camisea gas deposit. Further north, more than 5000 Awa jun occupied and clos ed the hydroelectric plant of El Muyo while thousands rallied in the nearby provincial capital of Bagua. AIDESEP vowed to maintain the blocka des and occupations until the government established direct dialogue (R nique 2009, 4). When dialogue was permitted, the government ceded to AIDESEPs demands and repealed the three legislative decrees. Beyond stirring direct negotiations with the government, Perus indigenous movement has yet to produce a viable ethni c party like its Andean neighbors. Although AIDESEP took steps of formulating the first ethnic party in 1996, Indigenous movement 106

PAGE 116

of the Peruvian Am azon (Movimiento Indgena de la Amazonia Peruana or MIAP), it has only experienced limited and local success due to lack of resources for registration and campaigning, as well as persistent fraud by loca l election officials loya l to other parties. The main obstacle to ethnic party formation has been the lack of unity and organizational maturity of indigenous social movement organizations. The problems between AIDESEP and CONAP have been quite challenging to their involvement in electoral politics. National political alliances have tended to lead to severe conflicts within the organizations, as members have allegiance to different parities. Anthropologists have noted that forming an ethnic party is a low pr iority for the Perus indigenous movement because the indigenous organizations themselves play the role of parties by representing their interests as a lobby rather than as elected officials. Ul timately, however, both AIDESEP and CONAP have not assumed a leadership role in civil society because their mobilizing structures specifically promote a nd defend indigenous rights as opposed to the broader interests of civil so ciety (Van Cott 2006, 165). Conclusion If we consider these four major characte ristics of social movements over our three cases, many similar patterns and a few di fferences emerge (see table 3.1). Four determining factors help Ecuador and Boliv ias indigenous movement rise as dynamic actors of collective action and on a second note assume a lead ership role in civil society: (1) a partially opened political system character istic of a declined leftist party and weak representative institutions (2) the presence of influential allies, (3) the successful use of extending and bridging demands with an ethnic and class-based rhetor ic that sought to 107

PAGE 117

build a national collec tive identity against neoliberal reform s, and (4) indigenous mobilizing structures that are comprised of centralized SMOs that use collective action tactics alongside institutional initiatives For Ecuadors and Bolivias movements, democratization brought institutional changes th at greatly opened the political system for inclusion for the indigenous populations and for civil society. However, because full political inclusion was not fully granted the degree of opening in those political systems contracted to reveal a partially opened polit ical system. In addition, the political decline of the left and the history of weak and fr agmented party systems opened space on the left of the political spectrum for Ecuadors and Bolivias indigenous movements to assume a leadership role as dynamic actors of represen tation and collective action. The presence of influential allies also incr eased the movements politic al opportunities to assume a leadership level in civil soci ety by exerting more pressure on the state to adhere to the movements demands. For the next two fact ors, Ecuadors and Bolivias indigenous movements successfully framed the grievances of their indigenous constitutes and civil society in an ethnic and class-based frame wrapped in a nati onalistic collective identity against neoliberal reforms. In addition, the organizational matu rity and unity reflected in their indigenous organizations helped th em achieve substantive goals in their mobilizations, which in turn, strengthened their position in institutional polities. Perus indigenous movement, predominantly AIDESEP on the other hand, did not assume a leadership role in civil society in the 2008 movement, yet it did establish itself as a powerful actor for Perus Amazon indigeno us community. The same four factors that applied to the leadership as cent of Ecuadors and Bolivias indigenous movement applied to Perus indigenous movements lack of l eadership ascent. Perus indigenous movement 108

PAGE 118

109 also faced a partially opened poli tical system that was characteri stic of an absentee leftist party and weak representative institution th at barred most of ci vil society from full political inclusion existed. Yet, both the left and civil society view ed Perus indigenous movement as too weak in organizational matu rity and unity to take advantage of the political opportunity to replace the left as a dynamic actor against the states neoliberal reforms. The presence of allies added m obilization strength to the indigenous movements. In addition, Perus indigenous movement framed its demands within an ethnic and class based rhetoric that spoke specifically to the socioeconomic status of the indigenous communities. Unlike those in Ecua dor and Bolivia, this movement did not extend nor bridge its ethnic and class based frames under a Peruvian nationalistic collective identity that put civil societys de mands and grievances at the forefront of the movement. Instead, Perus indigenous moveme nt extended its frame towards an ethnic indigenous collective identity. And, in the end, even though Perus indigenous organizations were centralized in structure, the lack of organizational unity among indigenous organizations and small success in collective action and th e electoral process deemed left Perus indigenous movement too we ak to assume a leadership role in civil society.

PAGE 119

Table 3.1 Factors Shaping Indigenous Mobilization in the Three Cases Ecuador Bolivia Peru Political Opportunity Structure Openness : Partial opened with constitutional laws recognizing indigenous rights, yet barred from full political decision making process Allies : CONAIE, peasant organizations, trade union federations, transport coops (buses, taxis, trucks) (mobilizations 1998 to 1999) and mid-level military officers (2000 mobilization) and CONAIE Openness : Multicultural and decentralized laws (LPP and INRA) opened access for incorporation into the state, yet indigenous population still barred from decision making process Allies : CSUTCB, cocaleros, Coordinadora de Defensa del Agua y de La Vida, FEDECOR (2000 water war), and COB, Coordinadora, students, peasants, MAS, CSUTCB, and cocaleros (2003 and 2005 gas war) Openness : Fujimoris administration deeply hindered indigenous incorporation and organizational growth during and even after his regime. Openness occurred after ratification the ILO Convention 169, yet the indigenous population was still barred from the political decision making process when Garc a approved the developmental decrees. Allies : AIDESEP, indigenous communities, indirect allies NGOs Framing Framed demands with an ethnic and class-based demands that extended towards popular resistance against Mahauds neoliberal reforms. Framed demands with an ethnic and class based rhetoric that encouraged a nationalistic collective identity Framed demands within an ethnic and class-based demands within an indigenous collective identity Organizational Structure Centralized structure and unified under one indigenous confederation CONAIE and an ethnic political party Pachakutik Also engages in more institutional tactics Overall decentralized indigenous movement, yet has centralized indigenous organizations that have an ethnic political party MAS. This movement as well engages in institutional tactics Overall decentralized indigenous movement and lacks organizational maturity, yet the organizations themselves are centralized. 110

PAGE 120

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION This thesis has provided a comparative hist orical analysis of the central Andean indigenous movements development in relatio n to the political development of those states. The case studies of th e central Andean indigenous mo vements revealed that four explanatory factors commonly cited in the so cial movement literature significantly affected their rise as effective coll ective actors at the turn of the 21st century: (1) the degree of openness in a political system, (2) the presence of influential allies, (3) framing demands within an ethnic and class based rhet oric, and (4) the organi zational structure of the movement. In addition, my findings reveal that the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia used favorable combinations of these same factors to assume a leadership role in civil society as a way to incorporate and advance the interest s of their indigenous populations. Although these indigenous movements shar e similarities in their mobilization efforts, the differences exhibited across th ese movements can be attributed to the divergent historical trajectory that the central Andean stat es experienced after the 1970s. The rise of the central Andean indigenous m ovements has often been attributed to the shift in citizenship regimes fr om corporatism to neoliberal ism. The political opportunity structures for mobilization in Bolivia and Ecuador did expand during the neoliberal citizenship regime. The lefts decline in the 1980s and throughout the 1990s opened space for a new actor to take charge, while a history of weak and fragmented party 111

PAGE 121

system s left the indigenous population and diffe rent groups in civil society disenchanted with the political party system. In additi on, even though re-democra tization opened more channels for incorporation of the indige nous population, the lack of full political inclusion into the decision ma king process of the state create d a partially opened political system that elicited collectiv e action from the indigenous movements and some sectors of civil society. Democratization in both states established the neoliberal citizenship regime and introduced decentralized laws. Howeve r, Ecuadors and Bolivias indigenous movements rise as dynamic actors and leading roles in civil society would not have been possible if they had lacked or ganizational maturity or if the framing of their demands had not extended or bridged their demands to the broader frame of civil societys plight under neoliberal reforms. For Perus indigenous movement, re-dem ocratization might also have opened more institutional channels fo r incorporation of the indi genous population. Yet, a civil war and the political ascent of Fujimori s authoritarian regime stopped this from happening. The closed political space during the civil war delayed the development of Perus indigenous movement and the rise of organizational matu rity even after a constitutional government was restored in 2000. This lack of organizational maturity and unity among Perus indigenous organizations led the political left to discredit the movement as a more general collective actor ab le to speak in the na me of civil society. Yet, a relatively weak position relative to ot her actors in civil society did not hinder Perus indigenous movement from consolidating itself as a leader among Perus indigenous population. AIDESEPs mobilization efforts not only succeeded in repealing the legislative decrees of #1015, #1073, and # 850 but also made significant strides 112

PAGE 122

toward the incorporation of indigenous peopl e into the decision m aking process of the state. Framing its demands within an ethnic a nd class-based rhetoric helped the Peruvian movement to garner more support from indigenous constituents, even though nonindigenous members of the lower classes did no t identify with the movement. In the end, although Perus movement is weaker, ma rred by a political history wrought with authoritarianism and closed political space for organizing, the indigenous organizations have established themselves as dynamic actor s able to pursue indigenous interests in Peruvian politics. In addition, the history of the political opportunity structure has significantly shaped the potential to form effective organi zations, which in turn, have allowed them to successfully bridge frames of demands effectively vehicle for advance the interests of the indigenous population and broader civil society. Organizational maturity and unity, as seen in Ecuador and Bolivias indigenous m ovement, helped the indigenous movements to lead successful mobilizati ons that put indigenous demands on the map of the political agenda. In these two cases, democratization a nd decentralized laws were institutionalized as a response to the demands and pressure from broader civil society and from the indigenous movement. Partic ularly, in Ecuador, the pol itical opportunity structure widened for incorporation of the indigenous population after CONAIE mobilized against the Bucaram regime (1996-1997). Constitutional reforms implemented after this movement greatly opened the political sy stem to indigenous participation and incorporation. In addition, the organizational maturity of these movements influenced the movements strategy to lean towards engaging in more institutional tactics, such as the electoral process and the creati on of their own political parties Even though all these 113

PAGE 123

move ments exhibited similar conditions such as a partially opened political system, influential allies, a declining left, and fragmented party syst em, the unity exhibited in the organization of their indigenous movements helped established those movements as viable collective actors able to mobilize the indigenous community and other groups in civil society. In contrast to Peru, Ecuadors and Bo livias indigenous movements chose not to limit framing their demands to the sphere of indigenous rights and instead extended their frames toward a broader popular resistance against neoliberalism. That they were able to bridge these frames might be explained by the fact that many indigenous movements are not purely ethnic phenomena, but rather a combination of ethnic and class-based movements. For the most part, both Ecua dorian and Bolivian i ndigenous communities social position in the state has a class characte r that also identifies them as peasants. The blend of ethnic and class components are a f undamental element in the definition of the struggles fought for in their movements (Otero 1999, 143; Postero 2006, 148). CONAIE, from its birth, has combined demands characteristic of the peas antry and indigenous communities. Since 1988, CONAIEs demands have included improvements in the socioeconomic situation of Indian communities, protection of their lands, support to small agriculture, and other types of social as sistance in tandem with the demands related to indigenous cultural autonomy and the legal status of the indigenous population. These demands have resulted in mobilizations for increased representation within state institutions, official recognition of native languages, territorial autonomy, recognition of CONAIE as the representative of all I ndian groups (CONAIE 1988). In addition, the fusion of ethnic and class elements has been reflected in the political platform and 114

PAGE 124

115 organizational structure of CONAIE, which has combined a trade union structure at the national and provincial levels with community organization at the grass roots. These elements have been noted in Bolivias indigenous organizations as well. CSUTCB, CIDOB, and the cocaleros have combined ethnic and class components in their organizational structures and their platforms. Both the organizational structure and the mandates of CIDOB and CS UTCB reflect a combination of ethnic and class characteristics. In addition, the political party MAS, which grew out of the cocaleros also used an ethnic and class-based frame to garner more support for its political campaign and against S nchez de Lozada (Postero 2006, 24). In the end, the rise of the central Andean indigenous movements at the turn of the 21st century can be attributed to the interplay of a political systems degree of openness, the presence of influential allies, framing demands within an ethni c and class rhetoric, and the organizational structur e of a movement. Of the thr ee central Andean indigenous movements, Ecuador and Bolivia have used these factors, partic ularly framing and organizational structures, as a means to incorporate the interest s of their indigenous constituents while fighting for popular dema nds. Taking on popular demands helped the indigenous movements in Ecuador and Bolivia a ssume a leadership role in civil society. Yet, for Peru, AIDESEPs decision to use an ethnic and class-based frame targeted only towards the indigenous community and its lack of organizational unity hindered it from assuming a leadership role in civil society. Nevertheless, overall, these mobilizations have increased the inclusion of their indi genous communities into the political decision making of state affairs.

PAGE 125

APPENDIX: Figure A: Geographic al Map of Ecuador 116

PAGE 126

Figure B: Geographic al Map of Bolivia Figure C: Geographic al Map of Peru 117

PAGE 127

118Figure C: Geographic al Map of Peru

PAGE 128

Figure D: Key to Map of Indigenous Organizations in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru 119

PAGE 129

Figure E: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Ecuador 120

PAGE 130

Figure F: Map of Indigenous Organizations in Bolivia 121

PAGE 131

Figure G: Map of Indigeno us Organizations in Peru 122

PAGE 132

REFERENCES AIDESEP. Organization, history, docu ments, territories, and programs. http://www (accessed September 12, 2008). Alexander, Robert Jackson. 1982. Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of its Politics. New York, NY: Praeger. Andolina, Robert, Sarah Radcliffe, and Ni na Laurie. 2005. Development and Culture: Transnational Identity Making In Bolivia. Political Geography 24, no. 6 (August): 678-702 Assies, Willem. 2004. Bolivia: A Gasified Democracy. Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 76 (April): 25-43. -----. 2003. David versus Goliath in Cochabam ba: Water Rights, Neoliberalism, and the Revival of Social Protest in Bolivia. Latin American Perspectives 30, no. 3 (May): 14-36. Atwood, Roger. 2001. Democratic Dictators: Authoritarian Politics in Peru from Legu a to Fujimori. SAIS Review 21, no. 2 (Summer): 155-76. Barr, Robert R. 2005. Bolivia: Another Uncompleted Revolution. Latin American Politics and Society 47, no. 3 (Fall): 69-90. -----. 2003. The Persisitence of Neopopulism in Peru. From Fujimori to Toledo. Third World Quarterly 24, no. 6 (December): 1161-78. BBC. 2008. Peru throws out Amazon land laws. British Broadcasting Corporation August 23. i/world/americas/7578040.stm (accessed September 25, 2008). Brockett, Charles D. 1991. The Structure of Political Opportu nities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America. Comparative Politics 23, no. 3 (April) 253-274. Brysk, Allison. 2000. From Tribal Village to Glo bal Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Burt, Jo-Marie. 2006. Contesting the Terrain of Politics: State-Society Relations in Urban Peru, 1950-2000. In State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives on Andean Crisis, eds. Paul W. Drake and Eric Hershberg, 220-256. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh. 123

PAGE 133

CIDOB. Center for international re lations and developm ent studies. /en/ (accessed September 25, 2008). Collins, Jennifer N. 2000. Military-indige nous coup aborted by military high command. Global Policy Forum. ons/sovereign/dollar/2000/ 0122ecuador.htm (accessed September 4, 2008). CONAIE. The confederation of nationalities of Ecuador: In formation, news, indigenous culture. (accessed September 12, 2008). Cotler, Julio. 1986. Military Interventions and Tr ansfer of Power to Civilians in Peru. In Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America eds. Guillermo ODonnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 148-172. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University. Cuffe, Sandra. 2008. Peru indigenous occupa tions end with victory in Congress. The Dominion. August 23. http://www.dominionpaper. ca/weblogs/sandra/2001 (accessed September 23, 2008). Dangl, Benjamin. 2007. The Price of Fire: Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia. Oakland, California : AK. Drake, Paul W., and Eric Hershberg. 2006. Introduction. In State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspectives on Andean Crises eds. Paul W. Drake and Eric Hershberg, 1-40. Pittsburgh, PA: Univ ersity of Pittsburgh. Eisinger, Peter K. 1973. The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities. American Political Science Review 67, no. 1 (March):11-28 Ferree, Myra Marx, and Beth B. Hess. 2000. Controversy and Coalition: The New Feminist Movement across Three Decades of Change. 3rd ed. New York, NY: Routledge. Franschet, Susan. 2003. State Feminism and Womens Movements: The Impact of Chiles Servicio Nacional de la Mujer on Womens Activism. Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1: 9-40. Garc a, Mar a Elena, and Jos Antonio Lucero. 2006. Un Pa s Sin Indgenas? Rethinking Indigenous Politics in Peru. In The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America, eds. Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, 158-188. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic. Gray, Kevin. 2000. Bolivian upheaval underscore s dissent over free market policies. Associated Press. April 19. 124

PAGE 134

Greene, Shane. 2006. Getting ov er the Andes: The Geo-Eco-Politics of Indigenous Movements in Perus Twenty-First Century Inca Empire. Journal of Latin American Studies 38, no. 2 (May): 327-354. Hahn, Dwight R. 1996. The Use and Abuse of Ethnicity: The Case of the Bolivian CSUTCB. Latin American Perspectives 23, no. 2 (Spring): 91-106. Hudson, Rex A., ed. 1991. Peru: A Country Study Lanham, MD: Bernan Jenkins, Craig J., and Charles Perrow. 1997. Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements, 1946-1972. In Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, eds. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, 37-51. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury. Klein, Herbert S. 1992. Bolivia: The Evolution of A Multi-Ethnic Society. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Oxford University. Kohl, Benjamin, and Linda Farthing. 2006. Impasse in Bolivia: Neoliberal Hegemony and Popular Resistance. New York, NY: Zed. Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. The Organizational St ructure of New Social Movements in a Political Context. In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Stru ctures, and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 152-184. New York, NY: Cambridge University. Kruyt, Suzanne. 2006. Between "Pachakuti" and "A nother world is possible" : global and local inte ractions in social movement frames in Bolivia. Masters thesis, VU Universiteit Amsterdam. Lewis, Tom. 2004. The Gas War in Bolivia. International Socialist Review 36 (July): 3454. Lofland, John. 1996. Social Movement Organizations: Guide to Research on Insurgent Realities Piscataway, NJ: Aldine Transaction. Lucero, Jos Antonio. 2001. Crisis and Contention in Ecuador. Journal of Democracy 12, no. 2 (April): 59-73. Mallon, Florencia E. 1992. Indian Communities, Political Cultures, and the State in Latin America, 1780-1990. Journal of Latin American Studies 24: 35-53. McAdam, Doug, and David A Snow. 1997. Conditions of Conduciveness: Political Opportunities. In Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics eds. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, 34-35. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury. 125

PAGE 135

-----. 1996. Introduction: Opportunities, Mobili zing Structures, and Fram ing Processes -Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements. In Comparative Perspectiv es on Social Movements eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, 1-20. Cambridge: Cambridge University. -----. 1982. Political Process and the Developm ent of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. McCarthy, John D. 1996. Constraints and O pportunities in Adopting, Adapting ,and Inventing. In Social Movements: Readings on Th eir Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, eds. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, 141-151. Los Angeles, CA: Roxbury. Noonan, Rita K. 1995. Women Against the State: Political Opportunities and Collective Action Frames in Chiles Transition to Democracy. Sociological Forum 10, no. 1 (March):1573-7861. Olivera, Oscar. 2004. Cochabamba! Water War in Bolivia Cambridge, MA: South End. Otero, Gerardo. 2003. The Indian Question in La tin America: Class, State, and Ethnic Identity Construction. Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (February): 248-266. -----, and Heidi A. Jugenitz. 2003. Challeng ing National Borders from Within: The Political-Class Formation of Indige nous Peasants in Latin America. Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 40, no. 5 (December): 503-24. Perreault, Thomas. 2003. Changing Places: Transn ational Networks, Ethnic Politics, and Community Development in the Ecuadorian Amazon. Political Geography 22, no. 1 (January): 61-88. -----. 2006. From the Guerra Del Agua to th e Guerra Del Gas: Resource Governance, Neoliberalism, and Popular Protest in Bolivia. Antipode 38, no. 1 (January): 15072. -----. 2008. Natural Gas, Indigenous Mobilization and the Bolivian State. Identities and Conflict and Cohesion Programme Paper. UN Research Institute for Social Development. July 12. Peruvian Times. 2008a. 216 Arrested during Per uvian national atrike; mostly business as usual in Capital, Lima. Peruvian Times. July 9. ed-during-peruvian-national-strikemostly-business-as-usual-in-capital-lima (accessed September 25, 2009). 126

PAGE 136

Peruvian Tim es. 2008b. President Garcia D eclares 30-Day State of Emergency to quell indigenous protests in Amazon. Peruvian Times. -garcia-declares-30 -day-state-ofemergency-to-quell-indigenous-protests-in-amazon (accessed September 25, 2009). Petras, James, and Henry Veltmeyer. 2001. Are Latin American Peasant Movements Still a Force for Change? Some New Paradigms Revisited. Journal of Peasant Studies 28, no. 2 (January): 83-118. Pilar, Domingo. Democracy and New Social Forces in Bolivia. Social Forces 83, no. 4 (June): 1727-1744. Piven, Frances Fox, and Richard A. Cloward. 1979. Poor Peoples Movements New York: Vintage. Postero, Nancy Grey. 2006. Articulation and Fragmentation: Indigenous Politics in Bolivia. In The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America, eds. Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, 189-216. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic. -----. 2005. Indigenous Responses to Neoliberal ism: A Look at the Bolivian Uprising of 2003. Political and Legal Anthropology Review 28, no. 1 (January): 73-92. R nique, Gerardo. 2009. Against the Law of th e Jungle: Perus Amazonian Uprising. North American Congress on Latin America Report 42, no. 1 (January): 5-8. Saunders, C.E. 2008. Double-Edged Swords? Colle ctive Identity and Solidarity in the Environment Movement. British Journal of Sociology 9, no. 2 (May) 227-253. Selverston-Scher, Melina. 2001. Ethnopolitics in Ecuador: Indigenous Rights and the Strengthening of Democracy. Miami, FL: University of Miami. Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford Jr., St even K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1997. Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation. In Social Movements: Readings on Their Emergence, Mobilization, and Dynamics, eds. Doug McAdam and David A. Snow, 235251. Los Angeles, CA. -----, and Robert D. Benford. 2000. Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. Annual Review Sociology 26 (August): 611-639 Stavenhagen, Rodolfo. 1996. Ethnic Conflicts and the Union State. New York: NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Steigenga, Timothy J., and Edward L. Clearly. 2004. Resurgent Voices in Latin America. Newark, NJ : Rutgers University. 127

PAGE 137

Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University. -----. 1996. States and Opportunitie s: The Political Structure of Social Movements. In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, 42-61. New Yo rk, NY: Cambridge University. Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2003. Andean Indigenous Movements and Constitutional Transformation: Venezuela in Perspective. Latin American Perspectives 30, no. 1 (January): 46-69. -----. 2003. From Exclusion to Incl usion: Bolivias 2002 Elections. Journal of Latin American Studies 35, no. 1: 751-775. -----. 2005. From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Ev olution of Ethnic Politics. New York, NY: Cambridge University. -----. 2006. Turning Crisis into Opportunity: Achievements of Excluded Groups in the Andes. In State and Society in Conflict: Co mparative Perspectives on Andean Crisis, eds. Paul W. Drake and Eric Hershberg, 157-188. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh. -----. 2008. Radical Democracy in the Andes. New York, NY: Cambridge University. Vanden, Harry E. 2007. Social Movements, Hegemony, and New Forms of Resistance. Latin American Perspectives 34, no. 2 (Fall): 17-30. Walsh, Catherine E. 2001. The Ecuadorian Po litical Irruption: Uprisings, Coups, Rebellions, and Democracy. Nepantla 2, no. 1 (Winter): 173-205. Werlich, David P. 1978. Peru: A Short History. London: Southern Illinois University. Yashar, Deborah J. 1998. Contesting Citizenship: Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. Comparative Politics 31, no. 1 (October): 23-42. -----. 2005. Contesting Citizenship in Latin America: The Rise of Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge. New York, NY: Cambridge University. -----. 1999. Democracy, Indigenous Movement s, and the Postliberal Challenge. World Politics 52, no. 1 (October): 76-104. Zald, Mayer N. 1996. Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing. In Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Po litical Opportunities, Mobilizing 128

PAGE 138

129 Structures, and Cultural Framings, eds. Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, 261-274. New York, NY: Cambridge University. Zamosc, Leon. 1994. Agrarian Protest and the Indian Movement in the Ecuadorian Highlands. Latin American Research Review 29, no. 3 (Fall): 37-68. -----. 2006. The Ecuadorian Movement: From Polit ics of Influence to Politics of Power. In The Struggle for Indigenous Rights in Latin America, eds. Nancy Grey Postero and Leon Zamosc, 131-157. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic. -----. 2007. The Indian Movement and Political Democracy in Ecuador. Latin American Politics and Society 49, no. 3 (May): 1-35.