Exploring Abram's Animism as an Approach to Environmental Activism

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EXPLORING ABRAMS ANIMISM AS AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM: THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATING TO THE OTHER-THANHUMAN WORLD BY MONTANA J. IKEMIRE A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Humanities New College of Florida In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Aron Edidin Sarasota, Florida April 2009

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To move the world, we mu st first move ourselves. -Socrates ii

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DEDICATION The content and inspiration behind this thesis is dedicated to the mysteries of life that have and will always make the human expe rience magical and full of wonder. This thesis as project and product, however, is entirely dedicated to the sunshine in my life, Robert Woodrow Schmidt. Tha nk you for your help, patience, and love throughout this process. iii

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First, and foremost, I would like to acknowledge the help, support, and allaround wonderfulness, of Professor Aron Edid in. Without his he lp, this project would have never come to fruition. Words cannot express my thanks. Professor Stephen Miles also deserves such thanks fo r his motivating words, creative insights, and inspiring energy. Again, this project as a whole would not have been possible without his wisdom and guidance. I would also like to th ank Professors April Flakne and Meg Lowman for their support and pa tience throughout this process. They helped to make this project rich and interdisciplinary. In addition to these extraordinary New College faculty members, I would like to thank my extraordinary family for being as supportive as possible throughout the years. The thoughts and ideas included here certainly would not have been possible without their influence. In particular, I am eternally indebted to Sandra Moffett, my loving mother, who edited and supported my work throughout this process. Most importantly, however, I would like to thank those who supported me in more personal ways. I owe my sanity and heart entirely to Robert Schmidt without whom these ideas could have never made it on paper. Among the countless others whose support and presence impacted this project, the following absolutely must be named: Sylvia Beato and Gustavo O liveira, two of the most upstanding people one could hope to befriend, and my loving housemates : Dominic Amaral, Steve OBrien, Ellie Wisely, Lauren Shulman, and Derek Segebarth. You have all enriched my life. iv

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EXPLORING ABRAMS ANIMISM AS AN APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM: THE IMPORTANCE OF RELATING TO THE OTHER-THANHUMAN WORLD Montana J. Ikemire New College of Florida, 2009 ABSTRACT In this thesis I explore Davids Abrams Animism as a mode of relating to the other-than-human world, and aim to encour age its use as an environmental activist program. In the first portion, I intr oduce Animism through Abrams personal experience. After providing an experienti al illustration of how one might develop Animism, I broaden the discussion to place Animism in the larger scope of environmental activism. I discuss the D eep Ecology Movement as one contemporary form of environmental activism that emphasi zes individualized approaches within a structured framework. I also apply N aess understanding of deep ecology and longterm activism to Animism. Analyzing the role Animism might play as an activist program, I compare the development and aims of Naess notion of ecosophy to that of Animism. v

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In the second portion of this thesis, I discuss the im portance of subjective, or direct, experience as it applies to Animism. Drawing on Merl eau-Pontys ideas of shared experience (intersubjectivity), per ception, reciprocity, and The Flesh, I explore the inner workings of Animism as a mode of relating to beings outside ones self through subjective experience. In addition to the written text, this th esis included a solo performance of a portion of the Stuart Saunders Smith trans-media composition, Transitions And Leaps (1990). The performance took place in a loca l outdoor space and aimed to engage the direct, sensory experience of both the perf ormer and the audience in a subjective and intersubjective way. In the last sect ion of the text I discuss performance development, performance reflections, and the use of similar process-pieces in environmental education and activism. Abstract Approved By: ________________________________ Aron Edidin Thesis Sponsor Division of Humanities vi

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CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....iv ABSTRACT.v INTRODUCTION...1 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING ANIMISM.....9 Magic: The Perceptual Shift Return to America: The Perceptual Fade..13 Finding Convergence: The Perceptual Reclamation..15 Standing Along the Edge: Beyond the Written Word...16 CHAPTER 2: A PLACE FOR ANIMISM IN ENVIRONMENTAL THOUGHT.. Environmental Activism: Th e Deep Ecology Platform. Ecosophy and The Deep Ecology Platform.... Activist Commitments Emerge from Ecosophies... Ecosophy T. Animism and Ecosophy..29 CHAPTER 3: ANIMISM, MERLE AU-PONTY, AND PHENOMENOLOGY.. Phenomenology..32 Intersubjectivity.34 Synchronizing Modulation.36 Examples of Recipr ocity in Perception..38 Participation, Reciprocity, and The Flesh.. Participation and Reciprocity.43 CHAPTER 4: CONSIDERING THE PROC ESS-PIECE: AN APPLICATION OF ANIMISM THROUGH THE REALIZATION OF A TRANS-MEDIA COMPOSITION.47 The Rejuvenation of Oral Culture..47 Two Alternative Examples My Realization of a Portion of Transitions And Leaps Performance Reflections and Concluding Remarks..53 vii

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Before and After: Audience Reactions.......54 Development: Pieces of My Process..55 Post-Performance Reflections and Future Ideas APPENDIXA.57 APPENDIXB.58 APPENDIXC.59 APPENDIXD.60 APPENDIXE.. BIBLIOGRAPHY.. viii

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ix The outer world of nature is what awakens our inner world in all its capacities for understanding, affection and aesthetic appr eciation. The wind, the rain, the mountains and rivers, the woodlands and me adows and all their inhabitants; we need these perhaps even more for our psyche than for our physical survival. Thomas Berry

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Introduction Today, we spend more time and energy focused on the non-human environment and ways to remedy and preven t its destruction than we ever have. Simultaneously, we spend less time out-of-doors in these non-human environments. Isolating ourselves from the non-human e nvironment in this way not only wreaks havoc on our bodies, it creates distance betw een human beings and that which is other-than-human; i.e. the ve ry habitats, ecosystems, and species we are trying so desperately to save. This sort of human-focused lifestyle does not allow much room to develop a personal sense of the local landscape, let alone ecosystems far away, or the Earths environment as a whole. Mixed with cu rrent doomsday environmental campaigns, this sort of urban isolation can have ne gative impacts on children and adults alike, causing many to avoid both short-term a nd especially long-term environmental activism. The current approaches in schools and po litical arenas focus on fixing rather than preventing. This quick-fix appro ach seems to center on negative motivation tactics, which assume that when children and adults see the horri ble things happening to the natural world, they will be motivated to help change the situation. However, David T. Sobel, an environmental education specialist at Antioch University of New England, says that this type of e xposure often does the exact opposite. In his essay, Beyond Ecophobia: Reclaimi ng the Heart in Nature Education, Sobel calls negative, overwhelmed feelings toward the environment and 1

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environmental activism ecophobia. He de fines ecophobia as a fear of ecological problems and the natural world.1 Sobel suggests that i ndividuals, particularly children, undergo ecophobia when they are introduced to some of the bigger environmental issues such as global warm ing, ozone layer depletion, and rainforest destruction, before they are able to co mprehend and develop a rapport with their own local ecologies. As an example of the consequences a ssociated with negative exposure to the natural world without the balance of positive, local exposure, he references his own seven-year-old daughter and her reaction to the forest fires in California. Upon seeing pictures in the newspaper of burning homes, his daughter became very distraught as she immediately personalized th e disaster and feared the fire would soon threaten her home and her family. Sobel suggests th at for his daughter and many other children her age, far aw ay places do not register as far, but as right around a psychic corner. He claims that images of environmental destruction and harm, such as those of homes burning in the California fires, can have a n ightmarish effect on young children whose sense of time, pl ace, and self are still forming.2 The current approach toward solving e nvironmental degradation is lacking in personal depth and meaning. If an en vironmental movement is going to be successful, it is necessary to include pers onal elements that build the desire to participate in environmental activism and ma ke personal lifestyle changes. Popular forms of environmental activism, as are of ten portrayed in the media and in schools, have skipped the local element, focusing most of their energy on global 1 Sobel [1996], 5. 2 ibid ., 10. 2

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environmental crises. In order to ma ke environmental activism meaningful, participants have to develop a personal rapport with the natural world. This generally begins in their local landscape with a se nse of community and local environmental responsibility. Sobel believes that today children ar e disconnected from the world outside their doors and [instead are] connected with endangered animals and ecosystems around the globe through electronic media.3 To remedy this dis-connect he suggests that communities begin to invest in envir onmental education that encourages deeper ties with the local landscape. First and fo remost, he recommends that educators go outdoors and explore the local e nvironment with their students. He believes it is better for educators to help children gain expos ure to the natural world through first hand experience rather than bombarding them with devastating information and images. It is also important, he says, for educators to do this in a develo pmentally appropriate manner. Over time, with increasing e xposure and positive reinforcement, Sobel postulates that students taught with expe riential methods will build an important sense of rapport with their local surroundings. Furthermore, he suggests that students who have positive outdoor experiences in their communities will be more likely to engage in both local and global environmental activist initiatives. While Sobel focuses on environmental education for children, my goal with this thesis is simply to explore a path th at aims to encourage people of all ages to develop an affinity for the natural world, or ecophilia4 as Sobel calls it. Approaching 3 Sobel [1996] 4. 4 Sobel refers to ecophilia as supporting childre ns biological tendency to bond with the natural world [1996] 6. However, I mean something less sp ecific here, and so have adopted the term for a more general application. 3

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environmental degradation from a broad, worl dwide perspective, ra ther than building up to global issues from the local level can be psychologically disorienting. Tackling many of the environmental concerns facing the planet today in volves contemplating ethical issues that are much more comple x and widespread than local concerns. Attempts to remedy global environmental issu es without first examining local issues are likely to cause individuals stress, as it is difficult to know where to begin. This sort of stress creates negative mental and emotional associations with environmental activism, or ecophobia, which only further builds a sense of crisis mentality on national and global levels. St ress and fear only serve to hu rt any sort of long-term solutions and preventative measures we mi ght take. In order to make substantial changes, we will need to begin by changing the way we think and feel about the nonhuman environment. For instance, it is eas ier to care for a pers on when you can relate to her or him. It is even easier to care for a person when you know her or him well. I believe the same goes for our relationships with non-human beings. The more we can relate with the natural world and the bette r we know it through our experience, the more likely it is that we will want to care for it. Therefore, it is important that we give ourselves the opportunity to engage our senses in the natural world. We often talk about environmental problems as if they are distant and abstract, but they happen in and to real, sensible landscapes where many animals, plants, and oftentimes huma ns live together in a unique balance. Many of the most pressing environmental concerns today stem from a disruption of this balance. However, the problems ar e widespread and solutions must go beyond pointing fingers. In order to make changes, we have to prevent the actions that led us 4

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to such extreme imbalance with the natural world in the first place. It is important now that we enrich our own personal relationships with the natural world through our experience and interactions. In this pa per, I hope to provide a resource of encouragement for people to in teract with the places they live, and the places they visit, giving themselves an opportunity to be a more active and c onscientious part of each small world within worlds that they may encounter. The kind of approach to environmenta l activism I am promoting with this thesis must begin with the individual. This emphasis on personal development can be seen in many different environmental movements. The foundation for my overall environmental thinking, however eclectic and interdisciplinary it may be, has stemmed mostly from the Deep Ecology Move ment. My particular proposal will focus on suggestions by David Abram (1957-) to provide an experiential example and template for individualized environmental change. David Abram and the B asis for this Thesis David Abram, a fellow environmental activist and thinker, will play an integral role in this paper, serving not onl y as the main influence, but also as an important personal example. Abram, who ha s also been greatly influenced by Deep Ecology, calls himself an eco-philosopher and cultural ecologist. In his book The Spell of the Sensuous he describes his exploration of the environmental perceptions of traditionally oral-based, indigenous comm unities across the world. Through his exploration, he came to find, lose, and re-dev elop his own environmental perceptions. This process will be depicted in the first chapter of this thesis. 5

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In The Spell of the Sensuous Abram argues in favor of a form of environmentalism based on a mode of relation he comes to call animism. Animism is typically used to convey the belief that natural objects, natural phenomena, and the universe itself possess souls.5 Animistic beliefs of this kind are often seen in hunter-gatherer groups or clans for whom the natural world directly provides food and general subsistence. However, Abra m intends something both more specific and more universal by the term. Abrams animism, or Animism hereafter, is an experiential mode of relation. Unlike the theoretical methods of the Western world, Animism emphasizes ones direct, sensory experience as the medi um through which one can approach and connect to the non-human environment. He asserts that sensory connections with non-humans develop in ways that are not unlike those of indigenous groups that are often called animists. Rather, he claims that such a mode of relation is readily accessible to all human beings through their sensory faculties. Engaging ones sensory perceptions in the natural world facilitates a sense of inter-connectedness with the natural world. He uses the term ani mism to denote this sort of sensible interconnection with the non-hum an worlda sense of connection that has seemingly been lost in much of the modern world. Some might argue that science and labor atory work in biology and the hard sciences can bring people closer to the na tural world than the types of behavior, or sensible interconnections, Abram encourag es in his writings. While he does not deny the importance of this type of scie ntific work, Abram does however deny its ability to replace the human n eed for personal interaction with the natural world. He 5 The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy [2002]. 6

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claims that humans are tuned for relations hip, and argues that relations with that which is other-than-human are particularly crucial to the human sense of reality, humanity and self. In The Spell of the Sensuous Abram passionately relays: Caught up in a mass of abstractions our attention hypnotized by a host of human-made technologi es that only reflect us back to ourselves, it is all too easy for us to forget our ca rnal inherence in a more-than-human matrix of sensations and sensib ilities. Our bodies have formed themselves in delicate reciprocity with the manifold textures, sounds, and shapes of an animate earth our eyes have ev olved in subtle interaction with other eyes, as our ears are attuned by their very structure to the howling of wolves and the honking of geese. To shut ourselves off from these other voices to continue by our lifestyles to condemn these other sensib ilities to the oblivion of extinction, is to rob our own senses of their integrit y, and to rob our minds of their coherence. We are human only in c ontact, and conviviality, with what is not human.6 This thesis is an exploration of the possi bility that humans can re-connect with the natural world using Animism as a mode of relation, and the possibility of its application in the modern world. Synopsis In Chapter 1, I draw on Abrams personal stories to 1) expound on Animism, and 2) provide an example of how one can come to find and develop Animism. This chapter also discusses the ro le language plays in our stat e of sensory dis-connection from the other-than-human world. In Chapter 2, I use The Deep Ecology Movement to situate Animism within a broader scope of environmental activism. I further compare and link the role of ecosophies (highlighting Naess Ecosophy T) in the Deep Ecology Platform to the role of Animism in a potential individual activist program. 6 Abram [1996], 22. 7

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In Chapter 3, I turn to the phenomenological method to describe Animism as a sensorial process. First, I discuss the wa ys in which human beings subjectively and reciprocally relate to other humans. The n, I draw parallels to the ways in which human beings are able to similarly relate to non-humans by engaging their senses. Next, as the discussion of reciprocity hi nges on the participatory nature of human sensory perception and subjective experience, I look at shared experience, or intersubjectivity to support reciprocit y. More specifically, I focus on Maurice Merleau-Pontys (1908-1961) phenomenology a nd his notion of intersubjectivity in order to provide a theoretical model for bot h reciprocity and Abrams animistic mode of relation. Finally, in Chapter 4, I suggest the in tentional use of trans-media processpieces to develop a particip atory activity through which one might Animistically engage the natural world in a way that Ab ram intends. The process-piece realization I have chosen is an interactive compos ition mixed with experimental performance that will emphasize audience participation, sensory engagement, traditional story elements, embodied telling methods, environmental poetry, and space-specific actions. Place plays a particularly important role in the realization of the piece as my goal is to increase both sensory engagement and environmental awareness. Therefore, the performance will be set and performed in the location in which it was developed; audience members will be members of the local community. 8

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Chapter 1 Introducing Animism Magic: The Perceptual Shift For almost all oral cultures, the envel oping and sensuous earth remains the dwelling place of both the living and the dead. The bodywhether human or otherwiseis not yet a mechanical object in such cultures, but is a magical entity7 --David Abram David Abram studied the psychology of perception in college and later successfully used sleight-of-hand magic in ps ychotherapy to shift the perceptions of those classified as resistant to treatment. His success with magic in therapy turned his interests toward the history and relations hip between folk medicine and magic. Eventually, he followed this interest to As ia on a grant that enabled him to interact with traditional magicians, who were also known as medicine people or healers. Expecting to learn about the curative arts from those who identified themselves as healers, Abram was surprised to find that he was instead learning mostly about how to relate with the non-human realm. Finding himself unexpectedly coming to know the true magic of the other-than-human wo rld while traveling in rural villages of Indonesia and Nepal, Abram underwent a comp lete shift in perception that changed the way he thought about and inte racted with non-human beings.8 The shamans Abram encountered while traveling in the Far East for one wonderfully life-altering year were nothing short of what he expected. The medicine people he met were powerful healers and respected members of their communities. 7 Abram [1996], 10. 8 Abram [1996], 4-5. 9

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Yet, from what Abram gathered, these ex traordinary people did not see their main purpose as curing ailments. Instead, they saw themselves as mediators between two worlds: human and Other. In their view, it is in maintaining the balance between the worlds, connecting to each, that the shaman ga ins his curative power. It is their belief that the ability to tune into the greater world, which includes so much more than humankind, allows a shaman to instill ha rmony within the community as well as within its individual members. The medicine persons allegiance is not merely to the human community. Rather, it extends to encompass the web of human and nonhuman relationships, which inform th e well-being of the human community. Up to this point, Abrams long-time interest in magic had much to do with his interest in the human psyche and perception, but had never crossed into the realm of non-human beings. His journey to rural Nepal and Indonesia brought him to a place that turned his cosmological understandings upside down, leading him to accept a magical kingdom of otherness. In The Spell of the Sensuous he recounts several experiences in the development of his eventual profound shift of perception. One such experience happened in Bali when Abram encountered a woman leaving gifts of rice for the household sp irits each morni ng. Applying a Western understanding of spirit9 to the situation, he was surp rised to find that the woman was leaving rice for the many ant colonies in the area. For the woman and her community, the gifts of rice are seen as cr eating a respected barrier between the house and the non-human world. 9 Abram refers to his personal understanding as We stern. In the Western sense, the term spirit connotes supernatural beings without earthly bodiesotherworldly beings. According to Abram, the spirits of the indigenous Indonesian cultures he encountered are primarily those modes of intelligence or awareness that do not possess a human form [1996], 13. 10

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The womans actions, as simple as they may have seemed to her, planted in Abram the first seeds of what would come to be his understanding of Animism. This experience was the first of many that prompt ed Abram to consider the implications of participatory engagement with the natural world. He could see that the woman had made a very conscious decision to make peace instead of war with the ants. And yet, her action of acknowledgment to the tiny, non-human creatures was foreign to him. It seems that in modern Western society, mak ing peace is not the sort of thing that applies, at least in any formal sense, to our dealings with the other-than-human world. Yet, the exchange, or peace making, that Abram had witnessed between the woman and the ants was powerful enough to shift his percepti on of the world, moving him outside of his anthropocentric views toward a more inclusive and encompassing outlook. Another formative experience for Abram occurred elsewhere in Bali while he was exploring a pre-Hindu site in which rooms, courtyards, and passageways were carved into the volcanic rock. He found a seri es of caves hidden in the cliffs that surrounded a lush valley. The caves were difficult to reach, as they had no set path leading to or from them. Abram struggled to make his way to the caves, but finally found himself inside an opening. While in the cave, he became trapped by the torrential Monsoon rains pouring heavily over the entrance and was forced to spend the night inside. Before falling asleep, how ever, the focus of his senses narrowed to the small space surrounding him. To his surprise and delight, he began to notice tiny webs and their creators quietly weaving the un iverse in front of him. In his account10, 10 His account of the cave is filled with colorful descriptors of his experience such as, My senses were all but overcome by the wild beauty of the cascade and by the roar of sound, my body trembling 11

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he illustrates the particulars of the unfoldi ng process as his perceptions shifted and his senses took over. The barrier between his own sense of being and what was before a separate sense of being belonging to th e other-than-human, faded away. In The Spell of the Sensuous Abram goes on to describe this sens e of melding interconnection as a feeling of great peace and wholeness11. And so, it was through the tiny world of insects that Abram began to get a different picture of magic altogether: It was from such small beings that my senses first learned of the countless worlds within worlds that spin in the depths of this world that we commonly inhabit, and from them that I learned my body could, with practice, enter sensorially into these dimensions (19). As a magician, Abram began to see that the skill of fooli ng ones senses was not the essential factor underlying the shamans profic iency. Instead, it seemed that what distinguished the shamans from the re st of society was the ability to shift perception into a more inclusive view. Working with these traditional magicians allowed Abram to view magic in a complete ly new light. Magic is not tricking the senses; rather, it is embracing a nd expanding them. He states: Magic, then, in its perhaps most primordial sense, is the experience of existing in a world made up of multip le intelligences, the intuition that every form one perceivesis an experiencing form, an entity with its own predilections and sensations, albeit sensations that are very different from our own.12 [Emphasis added] Spending the rest of his time in Indonesi a working with shamanic healers to cultivate a kind of awareness he would later come to call Animism, he became adept at tuning into the natural world. Upon his return home to a bustling, human-centered inwardly at the weird sense of be ing sealed into my hiding place My senses were entranced Abram [1996], 17; 19. 11 Abram [1996], 19. 12 Abram [1996], 10. 12

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world, it became difficult for him to mainta in his heightened sensory perception and feeling of connection with the more-than-human13 world. In fact, after his return to the United States, his higher perceptions fell away. Return to America: The Perceptual Fade After nearly a year Abram returned to his home and life in the United States. Excited by his new sensibilities, he wa s shocked at how difficult he found it to practice and retain the sense of inter-connectedness he had worked so diligently to develop. He could no longer engage with the non-human world the way that he had in Indonesia, though not for a lack of trying. His attempt to cha tter with squirrels, stalk with the heron, and so on, became absurd rather than participatory. His sense of connection had somehow slipped away from him. The active engagement he had vividly experienced in Bali mysteriously ebbed into the familiar disconnected observations of his past. The non-human world had fallen out of his immediate surroundings, and once again appeared to be alien, distant, and unreachable. The flight of sparrows and of dragonflies no longer sustained my focus very long, if indeed they gained my attention at all. My skin quit registering the various changes in the breeze, and smells seemed to have faded from the world almost entirely, my nose waking up only once or twice a day, perhaps while cooking, or when taking out the garbage.14 Abram turned again to his own undeniable experience. He compared his sense of the climates in Nepal and Indonesia to that of the United States, wondering if there was something place-specific that enabled the expanded sense of connection he 13 Abram uses this term in The Spell of the Sensuous to refer to the non-human world. I will use this term, as well as other-than-human, and natural world to refer to all things that can be perceived by human beings other than themselves. 14 Abram [1996], 26. 13

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had felt. He noted that in the United Stat es, the air lacked depth and texture, dulling his senses. Surely the air was not the main factor contributing to his stifled senses and inter-worldly separation. He suspect ed it was something more than that. [The air] was not, [in the United St ates], a sensuous mediumthe felt matrix of our breath and the breath of the other animals and plants and soilsbut was merely an absence, an d indeed was constantly referred to in everyday discourse as mere empty space.15 Abram soon realized that he was acclim atizing to his own culture, becoming attuned to the styles of discourse and interaction of his su rroundings. His senses were adjusting just as they had in the cave in Ba li. Unfortunately, it seemed that there was something ingrained in his cu lture that was not conducive to the felt Animism he had experienced in Indonesia and Nepal. He wondered why su ch attentiveness to the more-than-human world was practiced in th e indigenous cultures there as well as many other places, but not in the modern West. Abram, just as many modern Westerners do, had grown up in a society that focused on human activities, ignoring that which is non-human, perceiving it to be background scenery at best. He wondered whether the assumption that non-humans ought to be treated as separate and un important was the product of careful observation and judgment, or an actual perceptual problem in which Americans simply lack the ability to perceive othe r animals and non-human beings in a clear, meaningful way, if at all? Over time, sifting through observations, Abram came to realize that the more he talked about animals, the less he was able to converse with them. The more he read and talked about his disconnected fee ling, the further separated he became, both 15 ibid ., 26. 14

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intellectually and sensorially. Realiz ing the connection between language and sensory absorption, Abram hypothesized that language is a major player, perhaps even a catalyst, in his experience of sensua l disconnection from the greater world of beings. And so, through language Abram found his convergence. Finding Convergence: The Perceptual Reclamation Abram felt he had stumbled upon a key component in his personal mystery. Ways of speaking in the West often de ny the dynamic existence and wonder of all other beings. Moreover, he began to see that the structures of civilization in the West completely bombard and absorb our senses, hiding or masking the natural world outside of human endeavors. The electric li ghts of our cities w ithhold the dark night and its shining stars, the constant buzz of our motors and machinery override the songs of birds and the voice of the wind in the trees, and ind oor climate control devices such as air c onditioners allow us to remain se parate from the seasons and the Earths cyclical changes. It would seem that more often than not, in modern, urban society we encounter the natural world thr ough the lens of civili zation rather than personal experience with non-human beings. Today, the way we learn about the mo re-than-human world is primarily through books, television programs, or ot her sources of technology and media. Rather than encountering a hippopotamus directly and learning about the one-of-akind hippo in our immediate experience, we first learn the defi ning attributes and characteristics of all hippos, as they are defined in a book or article on the World Wide Web. By learning about the hippo in a book, I am unable to feel the mutual 15

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gaze we share. The photograph of th e hippo in the book or video footage on television cannot react to my physical presence and therefore, is less likely to mean something to me. The more we concentrat e on placeless forms of learning about the environment that do not allow us to engage the landscape, the more we rob ourselves of the opportunity to experien ce genuine interaction and reciprocity with the natural world. However, in order to move towards an Animistic mode of relation in the West, we need not revert back to primal diets and survival shelters. While Abram believes we cannot hope to identify the pr ocess that allowed the relinquishing of higher sensory perception from within th e midst of the very civilization it engendered, he thinks there is a way that we can stand along the edge. By this he means not to say that we must separate our selves from society, but simply that we cannot get outside the problem of dis-conne ct with the more-than-human world while remaining unchanged inside the very society and mindset that has been constituted by it. He states: We may make our stand along the edge of that civilization, like a magician [who] lingers half w ithin and half outside of his community, open as well, then, to the shifting voices and flapping forms that crawl and hover beyond th e mirrored walls of the city.16 Standing Along the Edge: Beyond the Written Word What does it mean to linger half with in and half outside? If we are to stand along the edge, we must inevitably undergo a change in lif estyle that would allow us to do so. Abram believes that the most important change is simply bringing awareness to the ways in which language absorbs our senses. However, it is not so 16 Abram [1996], 28. 16

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much spoken language that concerns him. Rather, he claims that it is more specifically the written word that has, especially for Western cultures, not replaced, but displaced our sense of inter-connection by absorbing and thereby dulling our ability to engage the non-human world as a dynamic part of our perception. He defends this notion by reminding us that written letters began as symbolic representations of the actual thing being represented. Th e letters acted as mnemonic devices to help people pass on traditional st ories and other communa l tales, in which tellers would fill in the de tails with their own experience. These symbols soon became solidified forms that began to move away from symbolic representation toward abstraction. Abram believes that wri tten language has helped to separate us from our individual sensuous experience with the world at large, as written words absorb our sensory experience of the things themselves. Rather than attempt to abolish written language and put to waste technological advancements, Abram simply suggests that we bring a kind of awareness to these sensory absorbing processes, and try to find balance in a world that is made up of so much more than human beings and the ab stract ideals we carry with us, a world Abram deems the more-than-human world. Indeed, Abram asserts that we can use language to stand along the edge, to get outside of language. Langua ge being the form of lear ning we know best and use most, it is Abrams hope that we may begin using speech and sound to shift our perceptions by developing heightened sensor y awareness. As a model for activities that encourage the sort of perceptual shift he intends, Abram cites the common tradition of oral stor ytelling in indigenous cultures th at practice Animism as a mode 17

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of relation. He relays that oral storytelling in animistic cultures often involve sensory engagement with the non-human world, as well as direct references to the benefits of maintaining harmonious conduct with it. To incorporate oral storytelling into our lives, Abram suggests that we focus more on telling our own stories, in unwritten form. He also encourages us to connect with our local landscap es and begin to tell the stories of how we live and interact with in them. Ideally, Abram encourages us to interact directly with the non-human world by talking at trees, responding to birds, barking at squirrels, and so on. However, th is is not a necessary part of what he means by standing along the edge. Along with Abram, I am interested in en couraging such a mode of relation. I share the hope that people will be able to shift their perceptions through sensory stimulation and interaction with the natural wo rld such that they will be able to build a personal rapport with many beings, not just humans. 18

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Chapter 2 A Place for Animism in Environmental Thought If we could identify with more than our families and fellow human beings, and extend understanding and relationship to trees and ecosystems, we simply would not want to employ damaging actions and behaviors.17 --Michael E. Zimmerman With this chapter, I intend to articulate where Animism fits into the broader scope of environmental activism. In the introduction I discussed the importance of cultivating an environmental perspective th at begins on the individual level. Deep Ecology is a common resource for this type of thinking in environmental ethics and has informed both Abrams and my thinking. According to its founder, Arne Naess (1912-2009), Deep Ecology is both an ethical approach to environmental thought and the foundation for the activist moveme nt, the Deep Ecology Movement.18 Often the term deep ecology is used to denote both the philosophy and the activist movement, as the two roles are inte r-connected. This dual role makes the Deep Ecology Movement well suited as a model for applying Animism within environmental activism. I will highlight the relation between two especially relevant concepts within the Deep Ecology Movement: th e eight founding princi ples of The Deep Ecology Platform and the concept of ecos ophies (with the exam ple of Naesss own ecosophy, Ecosophy T). The relationship between ecosophies and the eight founding principles helps to illustrate how Animism fits into th e overall environmental movement. Ecosophies of all sorts can be related to the eight founding principles, whic h address large-scale 17 Atkisson [1989]. 18 Drengson and Inoue [1995], xxv. 19

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issues that act as a common foundation of ideas for deep environmentalists. Environmental activism stems from this foundation. The relation between ecosophies and the eight principles i ndicates a role for Animism as a potential form of environmental activism that applies to both individuals and the environmental movement as a whole. Placing Animism in the overall scheme of environmental activism, this chapter illustrates the natu re of the kind of transformation emphasized in this thesis. Environmental Activism: The Deep Ecology Platform The pursuit of harmonious interactio n between human beings and non-human beings has been ongoing throughout human hi story. With a current global population of around 6.7 billion and rising, human beings now, more than ever, impact the nonhuman world. If we are to realize harmony between the two worlds, we must become active in our pursuit to mend our relations. Moreover, we need to do so through a truly effective means. Arne Naess, philosopher, mountaine er and founder of the Deep Ecology Movement19, has provided a foundation through which people may orient their environmental activism around a deep and personal relationship with the morethan-human world. Naess encourages the extension of ethical consideration to nonhuman beings, encompassing all the compone nts that make up an ecosystem. The Deep Ecology Movement propounds an environmental manifesto that envisions an activist credo concentrated on the kinds of ethical judgments that support 19 Deep Ecology is a movement inspired by Arne Naess thought-provoking short paper entitled The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements, presented at the Third World Futures conference in Bucharest in 1972, released to the public in 1973. Sessions [2001], 164. 20

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environmentally conscious ideals and the lifestyle changes necessary to put these ideals into action. To illustrate his own fundamental ideals, Naess provides a basic platform for the Deep Ecology Movement. The platform consists of eight founding principles to which one may apply her or his ecol ogical philosophy. The eight principles20 of the platform are as follows: 1. The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: inherent worth; intrinsic value; inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in themselves. 3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening. 5. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 6. Policies must therefore be changed. The changes in policies affect basic economic, technological stru ctures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply different from the present. 7. The ideological change is mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent worth) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. 8. Those who subscribe to the fore going points have an obligation directly or indirectly to particip ate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes. The eight founding principles of the Deep Ecology Platform reveal the movements depth. A deep approach to environmental activism is long-range and aims to work on the root causes of the worlds environmen tal issues. Drengson and Inoue state: [The] mainstream technological approach has to be clearly distinguished from the deep ecology approach, which in contrast examines the roots of our environmental/social problems. The deep 20 Naess [1986], 189. 21

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approach aims to achieve a fundamental ecological transformation of our sociocultural systems, co llective actions, and lifestyles.21 A shallow approach, on the other hand, is myopic and merely aims to treat the symptoms of what Naess and other deep ecology followers identify as a more profound problem. Naess considers the sha llow approach to be centered on human resources, while the deep approach consider s the well-being of the natural world in its own right, apart from human endeavors. In his writings22, Naess compares the deep and shallow positions on several environmenta l issues such as pollution, resources, and population. One shallow approach to the issue of pollution is emissions trading. This government-instated practice se ts a limit on the amount each company is allowed to pollute. However, this practice, in tu rn, encourages companies to buy or trade emission allowances that simply lead to the re-distribution of harmful gases. Rather than just merely regulating the amount of pollutants each company is allowed to emit in order to lower the amount of harmful gase s in the atmosphere in the present time, Deep Ecology calls for actions that will st imulate economic and technological change toward a harmonious co-existen ce with the natural world. For Deep Ecologists, pollution is consider ed a crime against all life, not just an injustice for humanity. Th erefore, the deep approach aims not only to reform the general mindset concerning the other-than-human environment; it intends to stop the practice of polluting all together. Deep ecology supports a willingness to question all public economic and political policies, emphasizing the importance of individual 21 Drengson and Inoue [1995], xix. 22 See Naess [1973]. 22

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questioning rather than simply following societal norms and government mandates23. This process of individual deep questioni ng is embedded in the formation of what Naess refers to as ones ecosophy, or personalized ecological philosophy24. Ecosophy and The Deep Ecology Platform Arriving at ones unique personalized eco logical philosophy is a process that can encompass a lifetime of thought and experience. The lengthy development process can be afforded to Naess emphasis on individual deep questioning, particularly with regards to ones a) relations with the non-human world and b) personal beliefs and values concerning the non-human environment. Naess expects and encourages environmentalists of all bac kgrounds and stages of life to engage in this process. Naess broadly defines ecosophy such that it is accessi ble to all people. Each person may call her/his ecosophy by the title of her/his choosing, as each persons ecosophy will be unique. This indivi dualistic approach is a part of the overall Deep Ecology Movement, preceding The Deep Ecology Platform. In what follows, I will reveal the role ecosophy pl ays in the overall Deep Ecology Movement and environmental activism. To best illustrate this role, Naess provides a visual analysis of The Deep Ecology Movement in a derivational system, which he deems the Apron Diagram (Figure. 1) pictured on the next page. Naess explains that, under lying the eight tenets or priniciples presented in [The Deep Ecology Platform], there are ev en more basic positions and norms which 23 Naess [1986], 192. 24 ibid ., 198-99. 23

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reside in philosophical systems and in various world religions.25 As the Apron Diagram shows, there are streams of derivations that can be said to make up the total views implied in the deep ecology movement. 25 ibid ., 196. 24

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Figure 1. The Apron Diagram26 26 Naess [1986], 197. 25

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These derivations range from the mo st fundamental assumptions found at Level 1 to the most particul ar individual deci sions found at Level 4. The deepest premises of our thinking, where we stop when we dig through our thoughts, belong to Level 1 and are referred to as ultim ate or fundamental premises. Individual supporters of the Deep Ecology Movement may have varying ultimate premises, but all will at least agree on the ei ght founding principles of the platform (Level 2), as the eight points characterize deep ecology as a movement and a school of thought. In spite of their importance, it is not the eight founding princi ples of the Deep Ecology Platform that Naess thinks of as defining the most basic sense of environmental ethics. Rather, he consider s the eight founding principles to be the crystallization of the kinds of ethical commitments one draws out of her or his individual thoughts, experiences, and ideal s, or ecosophies; in short, her or his individual ecosophy. Ecosophies represent the most fundamenta l sense of how one thinks about the environment and environmental activism. An ultimate norm is a representative statement informed by ones ecosophy. For example, some might state, All forms of life have intrinsic value and inherent worth as an ultimate premise. This statement may be reached, however, from different foundations, religious, philosophical, or otherwise. Naess has used Buddhist, Ch ristian, and Philosophical (B, C, and P respectively) as examples in this particul ar representation of the Apron Diagram to demonstrate the versatility of Deep Ecol ogy. Regardless from where or in what manner one derives her/his ecosophy, it is the personal environmental commitment they are making that matters. From such deeply personal commitments comes the 26

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desire to take action, and the will power to make lif estyle changes that support harmonious co-existence with the natural world. Activist Commitments Emerge from Ecosophies According to Naess, a general defini tion of an ecosophy is a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium. He further states, The details of an ecosophy will show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only the facts of pollution, resources, population, etc. but also value priorities27. The Deep Ecology Platform represents eight value prio rities Naess believes ought to be shared by those interested in a personal and effective means of environmental activism. Furthermore, Naess does not intend the Deep Ecology Platform to stand as a form of activism in and of itself; rather, the platfo rm, tailored to each follower and her unique ecosophy, is intended to give rise to activist projects. In order to help readers better unde rstand the process and results of developing an individual ecosophy, Naess provides an example: his own ecosophy, Ecosophy T. Ecosophy T Naess offers his own ecosophy as a model for personal application of the eight principles in the Deep Ecology Platform. He calls his structured ideals Ecosophy T in order to distinguish th em from other possible ecosophies, which could equally support the select principles of the Deep Ecology Platform, and moreover, the same ultimate premises. Here, Naess chooses the T to represent a truly personal symbol of 27 Naess [1973], 8. 27

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naturethe name of his Norwegian mountain hut, Tvergastein. Naess feels a special affinity for the mountain on which Tvergastein is built. For him, the hut is a place of coming together with the mountain and its unique flora and faunaa place of harmonious being. The hut symbolizes the kind of interactive ra pport both Naess and Abram encourage. Ecosophy T, then, acts as an expression of Naesss personal rapport with the mountain and the natural world at large. Furthermore, Naesss Ecosophy T appear s to epitomize this rapport through kinship ties that not only bind Naess to the landscape, but also extend his sense of selfhood to include the landscape. Naesss sense of identification with the mountain on which his hut, Tvergasten, is built goe s beyond the care and compassion one can have for an Other. Naess has created a ra pport with the mountain that allows him to treat it with the kind of care, compassion, and respect he has for himself Naess calls this expansion of self, or extens ion of identity, Self-realization!28 Self-realization! is the only ultimate norm for Naesss ecosophy. The expression is meant, not in any narrow i ndividualistic sense, Naess says. Rather, Self-realization! is meant to signify th e transformation from the narrow egoistic self to a large comprehens ive Self, which embraces all the life forms on the planet.29 Naess bases this notion on the distinction between self and Self in the Eastern traditions of atman.30 Further inspired by the Eastern traditions, Naess hypothesizes that when ones sens e of personal self increases, there is an inescapable identification with other bei ngs. In this way, Naesss Self-realization! is a 28 Naess [1986], 200. 29 ibid. 30 ibid. 28

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process that connects the indi vidual to the larger worl d[it] brings the many into one.31 For environmental activism, the expanded self becomes the foundation from which Naess derives his allegiance to the eight principles. Naess relates to the landscape as if it were a part of him, or one and the same, causing him to do all that he can to protect and care for it. Much like Sobels ideas in the introduction, Naess believes that once a person is able to relate in this kind of pers onalized way with the local landscape, she will be much more inclin ed to extend her sense of self to other natural ecosystems and to the otherthan-human world as a whole. Furthermore, Naesss description of de veloping Self-reali zation! is much like Abrams description of developing an Animistic sense of the more-than-human world. In essence, his Animism is comp arable to Naesss take on ecosophies, both personally and as activist approaches. Give n the similarities, the question stands: Exactly how does Animism relate to Naess notion of ecosophy? Animism and Ecosophy Animism can play the role of an eco sophy. Because an ecosophy is a personal philosophy, one might categorize it as being th eoretical in nature. Animism, as we have characterized it, however, is entirely experiential in nature. Therefore, Animism initially seems an unlikely match to fulf ill the role of ecosophy. However, Naesss Ecosophy T provides a connection, as it is based in Naess experience. As seen in the previous section, the rapport he builds with the mountain, sy mbolized by Tvergastein, is precisely the kind of sensory interacti on Abram encourages with Animism. The 31 Rothenberg [1987], 162. 29

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role Naess Ecosophy T plays for him with in the Deep Ecology Movement can be paralleled to the role Abrams Animism play s for him within environmental activism. Just as an ecosophy gives rise to acti vist commitments, so may Animism. Prior to discussing these sorts of activist commitments, we will elaborate on the way ones senses interact with the othe r-than-human world within our perceptual experience to create a sensib le interconnection with the landscape. Abram states that perceptual experience has its own coherent structure; it seems to embody an openminded logos that we enact from within rath er than the abstract logic we deploy from without.32 The coherent structure of perceptual experience he refers to here can be explored best using the investigativ e methods of Phenomenology, a school of philosophical thought developed in the early 20th Century. In the following chapter, I will fo cus on the phenomenological ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty as they apply to Animism. The chapter will further explore the active unfolding process of perceptual experience that Abram refers to as the ordinary, everyday experience of the world around us.33 Key ideas explored in the chapter include: perception, synchronizing modulation, intersubjectivity, reciprocity, and Merleau-Pontys The Flesh. In order to understand the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, and the concepts he explor es within the tradition, we will briefly examine the history and development of phenomenology as a method and school of thought. 32 Abram [1996], 74. 33 ibid ., 32. 30

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Chapter 3 Animism, Merleau-Ponty, and Phenomenology The relations between things or aspects of things having always our body as their vehicle, the whole of nature is the setting of our own life, or our interlocutor in a sort of dialogue the thing is insepa rable from a person perceiving it.34 --Maurice Merleau-Ponty the ambiguity of experience is already a part of any phenomenon that draws our attention. For whatever we perceive is necessarily entwined with our own subjectivity, already blended with the dynamism of life and sentience.35 --David Abram In the previous chapter we characteri zed Animism as a kind of ecophilosophy, or ecosophy, as one type of basis for a deep ecological activis t approach. Abram emphasizes shifting ones perception through experience as a key component in developing an Animistic mode of relation. What exactly is an Animistic mode of relation and what does it amount to? Chapter 1 sought to introduce Abrams experience of Animism through his perceptual shift, fade, and reclamation. While this introduced the basic ideas and the origins of Animism, we have yet to discuss its inner-workings, or the how of Animism. In order to explicate these inner-wo rkings, Abram cites the philosophy of 20th Century French philosopher, Maurice Merl eau-Ponty, to depict the more intricate details of Animism, analyzing it as a phenomenological process. Therefore, this chapter will discuss Abrams findings with support from Merleau-Ponty and other sources. It will also attempt to activel y illustrate Animism as a phenomenological process using Merleau-Pontys theories and basic examples. 34 Merleau-Ponty [1967], 373. 35 Abram [1996], 35. 31

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Phenomenology In order to understand Merleau-Ponty s ideas on percepti on, interaction, and human experience, we turn to the phenom enological method. Phenomenology is a method developed by Merleau-Pontys predecessor, the German philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) that intends to explore the world of spontaneous, preconceptual experience,36 or direct experience before one can objectively rationalize it. The method itself and can be described very basically as the examination of consciousness, or more litera lly phenomena, or that which appears to consciousness. The given assumption behi nd the method is that whatever we know about the world and objective truth basi cally begins with and is based in consciousness, or subjectivity. To put it another way, phenomenology is the study of the essential structures of experience.37 Experience, which must be based in consciousness, is the key element of Husserl and Merleau-Pontys phenomenology. Husserls development of phenomenology was an attempt to explore what he called the things themselves, or the things we experience before we are able to reflect on them, not as objects of the world, but as objects of subjective experien ce. As Abram puts it, Husserl decided that unlike the mathematic al sciences, phenomenology woul d seek not to explain the world, but to describe as cl osely as possible the way the world makes itself evident to awareness, the way things first arise in our direct, sensorial experience.38 In order to use Husserls methods and explore the th ings themselves, however, one has to reflect on his or her pre-reflective experien ce. Husserls aim was to examine how and 36 Abram [1996], 34. 37 Solomon [2001], 1. 38 Abram [1996], 35. 32

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what we experience before we are able to ta int it with reflective afterthought. In so doing, Husserl believed that one might be ab le to gain pure insi ght into the actual nature of the objects of subjective experien ce by examining this pre-reflective realm. Husserls ideas were often criticized as solipsistic.39 His later writings attempt to reconcile this shortcoming by way of empathy, which became Husserls grounds for intersubjectivity, as a path outsi de of subjective ideal ism. He claim that empathy occurred as the result of two conscious mindsor subjectivitie interrelating, which he called intersubjectivity. Despite his attempts, Husserl never did manage to fully refute solipsistic cl aims against his methods of phenomenology. This had much to do with his choice to locate consciousness in the mind, separate from the body. Husserls deliberate se paration of mind and body seems to trap consciousness in the mind like a bird locked pe rpetually in a cage, no sign of escape. Situating consciousness in the mental domai n only makes it difficult to assert that the nature of reality, and the world as we know it, are constituted by more than our own minds. How, then, can we get outside this trap to account for the inter-relation of multiple subjectivities? ed s Taking up Husserls methodologies and th e problem of subjective experience within a world containing multiple subjectivi ties, Merleau-Ponty offers a solution: relocating consciousness to the unified body, in which mind and body come together to host the subjective self, or consciousness. For Merleau-P onty, the body is not an 39 Solipsism is a theory holding that the self can know nothing but its own modifications and that the self is the only existent thing; in an epistemolo gical sense, it can also be defined as, the extreme form of subjective idealism that denies that the human mind has any valid ground for believing in the existence of anything but itself. Encyclopedia Britannica [2009]. 33

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object of consciousness, rath er it is the preobjective medium of consciousness.40 He goes onto say, Experience is nece ssarily corporeal, and it is in terms of our corporeal inherence in the worl d that we perceive the other's body directly as an experiencing person."41 Locating subjectivity within the unified or lived body, which must encounter, interact with, and adjust to ot her lived bodies, causes intersubjectivity to become less a matter of the mind and more a matter of the senses. Attempting to provide a theoretical f oundation for Animism, in what follows, we will explore the realm of subjective expe rience and our relations with others using Merleau-Pontys phenomenological methods. Intersubjectivity humans are inherently relational beings42 -Will W. Adams Within subjective experience, there are at least two distinct regions of the experiential, or phenomenal field: one of phenomena that unfold entirely for me images [] that arise on this side of my bodyand another region of phenomena that are, evidently, responded to and experienced by other embodied subjects as well as by myself.43 The latter region of phe nomena belongs to more than my subjectivity as it extends to multiple sensing subjects.44 As such, this region may be deemed intersubjective phenomena.45 Abram defines the intersubjective phenomenal field 40 Ostrow [1990], 12. 41 ibid ., 13. 42 Adams [2007]. 43 Abram [1996], 38. 44 ibid 45 ibid 34

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as a collective landscape, constituted by other experiencing subjects as well as by oneself.46 He further describes the in tersubjective fi eld, stating: The mutual inscription of others in my experience, and (as I must assume) of myself in their experien ces, effects the interweaving of our individual phenomenal fields into a single, ever-shifting fabric, a single phenomenal world or reality.47 As James M. Ostrow states, Intersubjectivity is an essential mode of our habitual preparedness for the immediately and immanently felt sense of situations.48 Indeed we are able to experience a subject ivity that is all our own, i.e. daydreaming, but we cannot escape the knowledge that we are born into an experiencing and experienced world. From birth, the world as we experience it consists of more than our subjective experience alerting us to the fact that we are not alone, that there are multiple subjectivities. Furthe rmore, the stable reality we are born into is constituted by the consistent, unavoidable interactions of these multiple subjectivities. Consequently, these subjectivities are not just important for gr oup perceptions on the whole; they are essential to my, or ones, own being. The existence of others is intrinsi c to my own existence because, prior to any conceptual distinction be tween myself and the world or, therefore, between myself and othe rs, I am habitually sensitive to situations that are quali fied by our copresence.49 Abram reinforces this idea stating, T he encounter with other perceivers continually assures me that there is more to anything, or to the world, than I myself can perceive at any moment.50 Shared experience, as such, entails phenomena that unfolds not only for my self and for the ot her subjectivity simultaneously, but unfolds 46 ibid ., 39. 47 ibid ., 39. 48 Ostrow [1990], 13. 49 ibid ., 13-14. 50 Abram [1996], 39. 35

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in such a way because of us. Our engagement with one another and all that surrounds us51 is hence a kind of back-and-forth within a particular time and space. This backand-forth determines and makes up a uni que shared experience that cannot be produced by a single subjectivity, alone. Rath er, this experience may only result from the interactions between and of the two or more subjectiv e bodies that are presently engaged. It is an experien ce that can only be created th rough our mutual interactions, in which our perceptions become intertwined. Perception, Stephen Harding sugges ts, is never a unilateral relation between a pure subject and a pure object, but is rather a reciprocal encounter between divergent aspects of the common flesh of the world.52 As such, when perceiving another, I simultaneously become the percei ver and the perceived, the sensing and the sensed. Furthermore, in perceiving another, I am undergoing their presence. In order to perceive this other, I necessarily inhabit a situati on that is qualified by our copresence.53 Another term for this adjust ment process is synchronizing modulation54. Synchronizing Modulation Synchronizing modulation refers to th e intentional fluctuation one must undergo in order to understand an other. When synchronizing modulation occurs, rather than simply making an inference of anothers thoughts, there is an actual 51 All objects that we may experience can engage our senses and elicit a response. This is explained in greater detail in Merleau-Pontys writings, particularly in The Phenomenology of Perception [1967] and The Visible and the Invisible [1969]. 52 Harding [2006], 48. 53 Ostrow [1990], 13. 54 De Preester [2005], 51. 36

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change in my existence as the result of the others provocation55. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of speech: Just as the sense-giving intention which has set in motion the other persons speech is not an explicit thought, but a certain lack which is asking to be made good, so my taking up of his intention is not a process of thinking on my part, but a synchronizing change of my own existence, a transformation of my being.56 It is through this transformation of being that I am able to perceive anothers body, and thus, another being in the world. Merl eau-Ponty further desc ribes the sensation through gesture stating: The communication or comprehens ion of gestures comes about through the reciprocity of my intenti ons and the gestures of others, of my gestures and intentions discerni ble in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other persons inte ntion inhabited my body and mine his. The gesture, which I witness, outlines an intentional object. This object is genuinely present and fu lly comprehended when my powers of my body adjust themselv es to it and overlap it.57 The comprehension of gesture that Me rleau-Ponty refers to in the above quotation is the synchronizing modulation, or intentional flux, one goes through in order to adapt to and comprehend the gesture of another. To illustrate, let us take the examples of interact ing with 1) another human bei ng, 2) both a domesticated and a non-domesticated animal, and 3) an inanimate being. These examples will attempt to illustrate the silent conversation,58 or the result of synchronized modulation, that occurs between our sensuous bodies and th e sensuous world in ways that often go unnoticed. The roots of this process run d eeper than verbal awareness and sometimes independently of it. Merleau-Ponty calls this deeper realm that lays beneath our 55 ibid 56 Merleau-Ponty in Preester [2005], 52. 57 Merleau-Ponty in Preester [2005], 52. 58 Abram [1996], 49. 37

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conscious awareness the life-world.59 Abram defines Merleau -pontys life-world as the world of our immediately lived experience, as we live it, prior to all our thoughts about it.60 In what follows I will highlight the presence of this life-world and a few ways in which the adjustment process of synchronized modulation can unfold as reciprocity within ones perception. Examples of Reciprocity in Perception Example 1: My friend and I are putting a jigsaw puzzle together. As I search for and put the pieces into place, I am aw are of my friends presence, whether I actively recognize it or not. I also have a latent awaren ess that my presence and actions are a part of her pe rception. Completely satura ted in the activity, we both take on the role of collaborating puzzle-doers Without thinking a bout it, we pick up pieces and place them in response to the ot hers actions, gestures, and intentions. Thus, the experience I have putting the puzzle together with my friend is constituted by the experience of taking pa rt in a mutual project with her. Just as it might go in a conversation, without consciously thinking a bout it, I fill in the pieces of the puzzle, where she has not and vice versa. If I were doing the puzzle alone, my experience would be completely different, as it would remain solely my experience. I would have no one to perceive or to perceive me. To be more literal, there would be no co-pre sence with which to engage in synchronized modulation. When doing the jigsaw puzzle with another 59 A concept introduced by Edmund Husserl that refers to the "world of immediate experience." The lifeworld, or Lebenswelt, is an important idea in the field of phenomenology, and thus, has been explored by many phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty. 60 Abram [1996], 40. 38

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person, however, our co-presence creates, in my experience a unique inter-mingling of our subjectivities that is neither co mpletely mine nor completely hers. Precognitively, our bodies create an inte r-subjective rhythm that unfolds as our process, our puzzle, and our interaction take place in a way that cannot be replicated. In short, the way I experience this activity is influenced by the presence of the other as another perceptive being. In this case, my friends very presence in the room and as part of this activity changes my sense of being as (I can only assume) mine changes hers. Our copresence, as such, causes us to alter ou r intentions, thoughts, and gestures. The puzzle is our means of common understanding, but th e ways in which we interact and relate to one another taking part in the activity as a joint effort are far more subtle and complex. To re-iterate, this process involves a sense of adjustment and commingling of intention and gesture, or synchronizing modulation that can happen in a number of situations when two or more people are interacting or even present in the same space. However, synchronizing modulation can al so happen in response to non-human beings, as illustrated in the next two examples. Example 2a. I walk into the kitche n and notice my pet cat looking at something in the corner. I look in the direction of her gaze and see nothing. She seems very intent on whatever it is she s ees, however; and so, I take another look. This time I see a cockroach at the base of the wall. I see what the cat is looking at; the shared perception is part of my sense of the situation. By jo ining my pet cat in the activity of looking at the obj ect that possesses her gaze, my body is sharing a mutual experience with her body that shapes my experience of the object. This sort of shared 39

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experience can also occur with a non-domesticated animal. To illustrate, I will provide a parallel example. Example 2b. I am on a hike and round a bend to meet a wolf. I stop walking and try to stay as quiet as I can so th at I do not disturb her and possibly endanger myself. At first she does not see me. I see her looking intently over toward some low brush, and I follow her gaze. At first I do not see what she sees. Upon a second look, however, I see a wiggling ball of white and grayand then another. I soon realize that the wolf is a mother with two pups pl aying in the brush. The mother turns, and instantly spots me. Our eyes lock and I can see her seeing me I immediately understand the intentions behind her gaze a nd begin to back away slowly while employing an old backcountry trick I once heardI sing to her calmly. I watch her watching me as I back out of sight; sh e does not come after me. The information exchanged in my interaction with the wolf is similar to my shared interaction with the cat. Had I not followed the mother wolfs gaze, I would not have seen the pups and realized the enti rety of the situation. When she turned, I could see her seeing me and we shared the gaze. Without words, through synchronizing modulation, we shared both he r call of alarm, and my non-threatening response. Plants can also e licit this sort of in fluenced response, as the next example will show. Example 3. Plants can be interactiv e to our senses and influence our experience as well. Most plants do not move or react in ways that are obvious or perceivable to humans. There are, howeve r, plants that do. These plants, often known as sensitive plants, are able to react to touch and sunlight in ways that are 40

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obvious and perceptible to most human be ings. One kind of sensitive plant, Mimosa Pudica61, is able to grow in the sub-tropics of the United States. At night the leaves rapidly close using what has been termed nyctinastic movement. When touched, or warmed, however, the plant moves using se ismonastic movement. This type of movement is a reaction to stimuli, the re sult of interaction with another. Let us say that I am standing on the edge of a field where there are sensitive plants, unbeknownst to me. I observe the plants leaves acti vely close in the wake of a rat that has just traipsed over them on its way through the field. The curious movement of the plant entices me to try for myself. I touch the leaves of several of these sensitive plants and watch them close (using seismonastic movement) because of my touch I can see what the plant is responding to and feel the plants response. This interaction with th e plant elicits a response of wonder from me and significantly alters my sensorial experience because I can see the plant respond in reaction to my touch. This confirms my ability to a ffect the plant. I could not create the plants reaction, nor could it have closed because of my touch without my having touched it. Thus, the exchange is unique to our interaction, creating a form of reciprocity within my perception. The situational unfolding process being described in the above examples constitutes a unique experience of a two-wa y flow between self (subject) and other (subject and object within my perception). As the next section will show, this unfolding process is in congruence with Abrams application of Merleau-Pontys intersubjectivity and notions of perception, and reciprocity. 61Encyclopedia Britannica [2009]. 41

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Participation, Reciprocity, and The Flesh Our bodies are made of the same flesh as the world and the world shares in the flesh of our bodies.62 --Andy Fisher In contrast to the previous, more speci fic examples that involve relating to another person, an animal, or a plant, we will now discuss an aspect of MerleauPontys intersubjectiv e realm that suggests a more universal connection to the sensible world. In both, The Phenomenology of Perception, and his unfinished final work, The Visible and the Invisible63, Merleau-Ponty refers to a universal property of phenomenal experience and exis tence stating that it belongs neither to the subject nor world exclusively.64 He deems this property the fl esh and insists that it is the seat of all human relation to the world.65 The flesh, however, is not possessed by an individual, but belongs to the whole of the Earth. When Merleau-Ponty discusses the ontology of the flesh he implies a primordial interconnect edness that is not matter, is not mind, is not substance;66 rather, it is the coiling over of the visible upon the visible.67 The flesh is something that connects the human body as an exemplar sensible68 to all things, and in turn, co nnects all things to the human body through the concept of reversib ility. Merleau-Pontys revers ibility is an ontological 62 Fisher [2002], 133. 63 Given that Merleau-Ponty never completed this work, leaving much room for speculation. This has led many philosophers to discredit its contents. Yet, many philosophers find much to be gained from the ideas it puts forth. The section entitled The IntertwiningThe Chiasm has been particularly noted and will account for the materi al used here. [1968], 130-156. 64 Leder [1990], 210. 65 ibid ., 209. 66 Merleau-Ponty [1968], 139. 67 Merleau-Ponty [1967], 140. 68 ibid ., 135. 42

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concept that can be defined as a 'lateral, pre-analytic partic ipation' of embodied subjectivity within its world."69 The body as an exemplar sensible, as it were, has the ability to be both the perceiver and the perceived, the subject and the object 70 in tactile reversibility. Merleau-Ponty uses the example of ones ha nd touching the other, allowing one to be both subject and object. However, he relays there is a diverge nce that never quite enables the toucher to simultaneously be th e touched and vice versa. Merleau-Ponty calls it an anonymity innate to myself.71 The body, then, must be chiasmatic in order to be a perceiver/perc eived. Drew Leder notes that the chiasmatic relations and intertwinings that Merleau-Ponty uses to characterize the universal flesh are similar to the ways in which our ability to experience the three-dimensionality of visual space depends upon the optic chiasm blending fibers from both eyes [] the world leaps out of a chiasm between s ubject and object, my vision and that of others, perception, and language.72 Participation and Reciprocity To the sensing body all phenomena are anima te, actively soliciti ng the participation of our senses, or else withdrawing from our focus and repelling our involvement.73 --Stephen Harding Merleau-Pontys universal and pre-cognitive sense of the world fits nicely with Animism. In The Spell of the Sensuous, Abram emphasizes the perceptual 69 Davis [1991 ] 32. 70 Leder [1990], 210. 71 Merleau-Ponty [1969], 133. 72 Leder [1990], 210. 73 Harding [2006], 49. 43

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interrelations of humans and non-humans through reci procal engagement, or reciprocity. As mentioned earlier in the chap ter, for Abram, reciprocity is the silent conversation between thingsthe ongoing interchange between my body and the entities that surround it.74 It is this ongoing interc hange that situates Animism with Merleau-Pontys universal flesh. Indee d, Abram references the flesh in order to reveal the nature of human perception as deeply embedded in the natural world. He calls this sensorial embeddedness participati on. Abrams concepts both reciprocity and participation, situate the body in a dyna mic and responsive world much like that of Merleau-Pontys universal flesh. Our bodi es are only able to participate in the world and reciprocate with other beings b ecause they are both perceiver/perceived, sensing/sensible in a sensib le world. Abram states: We can perceive things at all only because we ourselves are entirely a part of the sensible world that we perceive! We might as well say that we are organs of this world, flesh of its flesh, and that the world is perceiving itself through us.75 Both body and world constitute one anothe r through a reciprocal unfolding, or the sort of dynamic back-and-forth shown in earlier examples. Carl Olson states that for Merleau-Ponty: the human body and the perceived world form a single system of intentional relations; they are correlations, which implies that to experience the body is to perceive the world and vice versa. Since the body is the medium of things, its pr esence to the world enables things to exist. Thus the body and world are an inseparable, internal relation.76 74 Abram [1996], 52. 75 ibid ., 68. 76 Olson [1986], 4. 44

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Hence, the flesh is the intertwini ng of the sensate and the sensible.77 Establishing that the body is able to participate in the se nsible world, and thus relate to it as such, Abram makes the connecti on between Animism and the flesh using Merleau-Pontys concept of reversibility. Abram uses the example of a person walking through a forest, observing the green leaves of the trees and vines, smelling the crisp, cool air, when, rather suddenl y, she/he undergoes a perceptual shift in which she/he senses themselves being watched by the foresta visual reversibility.78 This sensation may be disturbi ng at first, but if one spends quite some time there, perhaps even dwelling there, Abram insists that her perceptions may shift once again, creating a welcoming sense of belonging. It is through the reversib ility of the flesh that Abram believes we may most successfully shift our perceptions to encompass the wider world of all beings. In the Western world, we have become accustomed to engaging our senses in ways that separate us from the dynamism of the natural world. Abram suggests we take a step back and consciously engage our efforts in activities that explore the natural world and our place in it as both sens ate and sensible beings. To reach this end he proffers a revival of oral storytel ling in the tradition of indigenous cultures who regularly engage their lo cal landscapes through story and song. He suggests that we begin by acknowledging the local la ndscape by telling stories about our experiences there. When we begin to tell stories, ou r imagination begins to flow out through our eyes and our ears to inha bit the breathing earth once again. 77 Flynn [2008]. 78 Abram [1996], 68. 45

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For we are born of this animate earth, and our sensitive flesh is simply our part of the dreaming body of the world.79 Telling our own stories and experiences in the location in which they occur helps us to invoke an embodied connection to the places in which our bodies reside. Our local landscapes are the very places that enable our bodies to participate in the flux of synchronized modulation. Telling our own stories about our places invites others to develop reciprocal interactions with that pa rticular place and the general landscapethe flesh of which we are all part and participant. In the next chapter I will briefly discuss Abrams suggestion of oral storytelling as well as other possible app lications for developing Animism. I will then describe my own suggested applicationthe realizati on of a trans-media process-piece. 79 Abram [2007]. 46

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Chapter 4 Considering the Process-Piece: An Application of Animism through the Realization of a Trans-media Composition The Rejuvenation of Oral Culture David Abram discusses the potential for tr aditional oral stories to awaken our senses to the sort of recipr ocity that makes itself availa ble to us in our surroundings on a daily basis. He maintains that indigenous cultures worldwide, for which oral storytelling is an important part of life, sh are a relationship with the landscape that the Western world has displaced with written words. Indeed, when we consult indige nous, oral peoples from around the world, we commonly discover that for them there is no phenomenon -no stone, no mountain, no human artifact -that is definitively inert or inanimate. Each thing has its ow n spontaneity, its own interior animation, its own life!80 It is Abrams hope that we can begin te lling our own stories, set in our local landscapes, so that we may once again deve lop an Animistic rapport with the morethan-human world. While he does not ask us to throw out our computers, televisions, and cell-phones, Abram does encourage the r ejuvenation of oral culture within our homes, families, and communities. Accord ing to Abram, the verbal recognition of our physical connections to the more-thanhuman world is necessary to regain our sensory connection with the wider world of beings. He states: When stories are no longer being to ld in the woods or along the banks of rivers -when the land is no longer being honored, ALOUD!, as an animate, expressive power then the human senses lose their attunement to the surrounding terrain.81 80 Abram [2007]. 81 ibid 47

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For many early oral cultures, stories and song were so interwoven into the local landscape that they were nearly one and the same. Without ritual stories, geographical locations did not exist in any recognizable formlandforms lost all meaning and the landscape became incoherent and disorienting.82 Storied place was of the utmost importance to these cultures. It is almost as if these oral groups needed to become acquainted with the land through sens ory experience in order to relate to it, just as one might feel when meeting a stranger. While place does not play such an activ e role in the modern Western world, developing a relationship with a place over time can still have a tremendous impact on an individual. When one frequently engages her/his senses in the local environment, there is an important sense of belonging that often occursa kinship, of sorts. While Abram focuses on the tradition of oral storytelling to engender feelings of kinship, I aim to explore the use of othe r performative vehicles to re-connect our sensing bodies to the sensible body of the world. Two Alternative Examples There are several activities that could be used to Animistically engage ones senses in the natural world. Stephen Hard ing provides simple exercises that entail relating to the natural world through experience, visualiza tion, imagination, and basic experiments. For example, in the exercise Active Looking,83 the participant is instructed to pick up a stone and study it for 30 seconds to a minute. Then they are to close their eyes and visualize the colors, textures, and other various parts of the 82 Abram [1996], 269. 83 Harding [2006], 36. 48

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stones surface for around a minute, upon which they let the image go. Then, the participant is to look at the stone again as a whole without focusing on the details. As before, they are to do this for about 30 s econds to a minute, visualize the stone as a whole, and then let the image go. Harding s uggests the participant repeat this process for 15 minutes and then enter into a state of reflection about the different ways of looking.84 Using music as her primary medium, Pa uline Oliveros also provides several participatory exercises in her composition, Sonic Meditations 85 that encourage participants to engage their surroundings. While not all of these exercises specify the surroundings, they can be adapted in ways th at facilitate buildi ng a rapport with the local landscape. One exercise, Envir onmental Dialogue for the New Hampshire Festival Orchestra, was written, however, for a specific environment. The composition instructs: On Lake Winnepausaukee at sunup or sundown, players of the orchestra are dispersed heterogeneously in small groups in small boats all over the lake. Players begin by observing your own breathing. As you become aware of sounds in the environment, gradually begin to reinforce the pitch of the sound source or its resonance. If you become louder than the source, diminuendo until you can hear it again. If the source disappears listen quietly fo r another. If the source is intermittent your pitch reinforcem ent may be continuous until the source stops. Aural awareness of th e source is necessary at all times even though your reinforcement may be momentarily louder. Reinforcement is distinctly different than imitation. Only strengthen or sustain pitch. Allow the boats to drift unless guidance past obstacles or away from shore becomes necessary.86 Oliveros composition here aims to creat e a change in awareness toward the surrounding landscape and the par ticipants relation with it, sonically and otherwise. 84 ibid 85 Oliveros [1974]. 86 ibid 49

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Much like Oliveroscomposition above, I aim to use the trans-media process-piece, Transitions And Leaps ,87 to engender a change in awareness toward the local landscape in which I will perform my real ization. While Oliveros and Hardings examples provide ways in which one can re ciprocally engage th e other-than-human environment, they avoid the medium of language. Abram suggests the rejuvenation of oral storytelling because he believes that language can play a powerful role in the development of Animism. I suggest the real ization of a processpiece that in part explores the use of language as a medium for reciprocity, as well. My Realization of a Portion of Transitions And Leaps Stuart Saunders Smith refers to Transitions And Leaps88 as a trans-media collective compositional system, that is typically meant to be for two or more people, performing any actions.89 I will, however, be adapting a portion of the piece as a solo realization.90 The portions I will be realizing are 1I (Section I, Page 1) and 3I (Section I, Page 3), which are included in th e appendix. TAL, as a process-piece, provides the composer/performer91 with a structure of three subsystems: the Transitions sub-system, the Leaps sub-system, and the And sub-system. Smith explains: Two of these sub-systems ( Transitions Leaps ) consists of various event-constructs for transformi ng one category of phenomena to 87 Smith [1990]in Welsh [1995]. 88 TAL hereafter 89 ibid 90 Note: while I do my best to stay true to the composition as Smith intends it, some elements of procedure and imitation will be accou nted for using different methods. 91 Smith uses the term composer here to designate anyone who designs phenomenon in order to create expressive forms [1990]. 50

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another category of phenomena. The And sub-system re-integrates and trades some of the results of the former two sub-systems.92 While composing solutions to the even t-constructs, the composer/performer uses three types of thinking as equally as possible: Fast thinking, Slow thinking, and Taste thinking.93 Fast thinking can be associated with the bodyit is instinctual, active, and spontaneous. Smith compares it to sprinting. Slow thinking can be associated with the mindit is logically-bas ed and deliberate. Smith says that it is good for long distances and the development of Fast thinking. Taste thinking can be associated with the sensesit is fluid, i ndividual, and organic. Smith says that it can literally be used to check if an idea is sensuously compelling. Smiths general directions give the composer/performer the freedom to choose which route, or order, they want to use to perform their event-constructs. However, Smith specifies that, the entire composed re alizations of all event-constructs must be performed. While the composition leaves room for the composer/performer to create and choose the ways in which she rea lizes the event-construc ts, the structure of the composition resembles a piece of music. Smith includes a time range for the duration of the entire composition (c. 20 minutes to 1 hour) and each box (1-60 seconds). Each box also contains a symbol that indicates a modifier. For example, the symbol Z indicates a repeating patte rn. Smith has struct ured the composition such that one category transforms into the ne xt category. He uses specific notation to indicate when the transition into the next category must be complete. He also 92 ibid 93 emphasis added 51

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indicates the relative space/time between th e execution of one box to another using various symbols.94 For the And sub-system Smith uses a different set of symbols that generally indicate ways in which the composer/performer borrows- trades actions, sounds, etc. from other composer/performers.95 My approach to this aspect of the score is to imitate aspects of my surroundings in th e performance space, engaging both the landscape and the audience. This interpretation of TAL encourages reciprocity between human and other-than-human. It also invites others to reciprocally engage the surroundings. Using recipr ocity was also an important part of the development process in my realization because it enc ouraged me to develop a rapport with the specific performance space/ landscape. When used deliberately for the purpose of environmental education, realizing a process-piece like TAL can promote an Animistic mode of relating to the otherthan-human environment that can be used to encourage children and adults alike to develop their own activist programs and to make long-term environmental commitments. In TAL, the easiest way to promote environmental activism is to choose categories that pertain to the natural world. For this reason, I have made a more deliberate effort in choosing my categories than perhaps Smith intends. However, for my purposes, choosing categories that pr omote ecophilia richens the performance and its aim to encourage sensory particip ation and sensorial engagement with the specific natural site. For my realization of TAL I have chosen to use 6 categories, 94 See AppendixC for Smiths Event-Construct Schematic Section. 95 Smith [1990] in Welsh [1995]. 52

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rather than 8, and they are as follows: A. embodied text; B. eco-poetry; C. embodied gesture; D. sensory action/re action; W. Air or Breath; a nd, Z. story-inspired action. These categories are meant to be vague and ar e worked out in more specific ways in each event-construct. For example, in the first event-construct my category A is inspired by Oliveros Sonic Meditation V, entitled Native.96 Each time I come across category A in a new event-construct, I perform a specifically chosen form of embodied text, using verbal passages from Oliveros Sonic Meditations (1971). The same practice applies to each category with in each event-construct. The chosen category action or idea is then modified through the event-c onstruct in various ways that include repetition, timing constraints and pauses, ener gy levels, and the duration of actions. There are also modifiers that instruct the performer to modify the character of the action or idea so that it is bigger, louder, more, or higher; smaller, softer, less, or lower. To get a better idea of how I have done this in my realization, I have included a copy of the way I work through the score.97 In the next section, I include my re flections on the performance piece and include discussion of how my realization of TAL helped me to not only connect with the landscape, but the particular audience th at participated in the actual performance. Performance Reflections and Concluding Remarks I performed my realization of pages one and three from Section I in Stuart Saunders Smiths Transitions And Leaps (1990) on the morning of April 16th, 2009. 96 Oliveros [1974]. 97 See AppendixE. 53

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The audience included four professors a nd three students, and one person from the public. All of the audience members were familiar with the Florida landscape; however, most had not had much experience with the particular space in which the performance took place. The space I chose wa s a small section of bamboo trees next to New Colleges Cook Hall. This space in cluded an open area in the center of the trees, which acted as the performance area fo r both myself (the performer/composer), and the audience. I chose the bamboo patch for its sonic attributes and its somewhat isolated, but open sense of enclosure. Before and After: Audience Reactions Before the performance, I included very little in the way of explan atory or descriptive remarks about the content of the perform ance, leaving the audience members unsure and without expectations or c onnotations to associate with it. Most members of this particular audience did, however, happen to have some prior informal knowledge about the structure of the performance via talking with me or reading the text of the thesis. Judging by the comments and questi ons at the end of th e performance, this ambiguity about the content and moreover, expected conduct, had a substantial impact on their experience of the performance. I had intended to use this ambiguity to elicit a fresh sensory experience. An aspect I had not accounted for, however, was the sense of minor anxiet y and confusion that occurred for the audience members when I performed certain actions coordina ted with command statementsa category I called embodied text. The audience members were left unsure whether or not they ought to obey my commands and participate with me. In the future, this 54

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aspect might be re-considered or used mo re deliberately, as it is not clear if the ambiguity was beneficial in working toward the goal of the performance. Either way it added to the experience of the perf ormance, and elicited a sensory reaction. Development: Pieces of My Process The process of developing the piece did, in fact, allow me to engage the space using my senses, which in turn allowed me to become familiar and comfortable with the particular more-than-human spacethe bamb oo patch. One of the professors in the audience remarked that they were able to hear and see a Downy woodpecker drilling on the side of a bamboo shaft, an action sh e had previously not known the particular species would do. The actions that I chose to use within my realization of the piece were inspired by the space through similar sens ory experiences. For example, there is a section of the performance in which I chose to recite a po rtion of an Emily Dickinson poem and coordinate my actions with a portion of the space. In the development of this portion of the performance, I encountered an ant crawling through the dead bamboo leaves in the ground cover and decided upon actions that might indicate that experience. I also wa s inspired to use the ant in several other categories. Post-Performance Reflections and Future Ideas During the performance there were several unnatural sounds that entered the sonic space. When mixed with my emphasis on the natural surroundings and sounds, these noises were perceived in a different light. The audience members suggested 55

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that the sounds of planes and construction became an important pa rt of the experience for them. These noises took on meaning with regard to their relationship with the natural setting. This sense of meaning impacted individua ls in different ways, but overall seemed to bring an awareness of both the extreme contrast and the potential for harmonious co-existence between the human and other-than-human worlds. This unintended aspect of the performance has particularly led me to consider the possibilities of using a spectrum of sounds, actions, and ideas associated with both human endeavors and other-than-human endeavors to create a mixed experience that exploits and blends the associ ations to promote a sense of harmonious co-existence. This type of performance, as I state previously in the text, could ideally be used to promote a sense of ecophilia in the community if used in environmental education programs. Children, in particul ar, might respond well to process activities that they either: a) do themselves, b) participate in, c) observe, or d) do some combination of a, b, and c. If this project were to be continued, I would likely perform this piece for younger school student s or explore another realization of TAL that included active hands-on participation with the students in a local outdoor setting. 56

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AppendixA The first page of the score th at I use in my performance: Taken from John P. Welshs The Music of Stuart Saunders Smith [1995], 129. 57

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AppendixB The second page of the score I use in my performance: Taken from John P. Welshs The Music of Stuart Saunders Smith [1995], 131. 58

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AppendixC An Event-Construct Schematic for Transitions Sub-System, Leaps Sub-System, and And Sub-System: Taken from John P. Welshs The Music of Stuart Saunders Smith [1995], 118. 59

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AppendixD Definitions of Transitions Sub-System and Leaps Sub-System: Taken from John P. Welshs The Music of Stuart Saunders Smith [1995], 121. 60

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AppendixE My Working Score: 61

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Abram, D. [1996]. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a Morethan-Human World. New York: Vintage Books. ----[2007]. Storytelling and Wonder. Retrieved February 18, 2009, from http://www.wildethics.org/essay s/storytelling_and_wonder.html Adams, Will W. [2007]. The Primacy of Interrelati ng: Practicing Ecological Psychology with Buber, L evinas, and Merleau-Ponty. In The Journal of Phenomenological Psychology. Bril l Academic Publishers, Inc. Atkisson, A. [1989]. Introduction to Deep Ecology. Retrieved October 12, 2008, from http://www.context.org/ICLIB/IC22/Zimmrman.htm Davis, D. H. [1991]. Reversible Subjectivity: The Problem of Transcendence and Language In M. C. Dillon (Ed.), Merleau-Ponty Vivant (pp. 31). Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. De Preester, H. [2005]. Two Phenomenological Logics and the Mirror Neurons Theory. In H. De Preester, & V. Knockaert (Eds.), Body Image and Body Schema (pp. 45-64). Amsterdam: John Be njamins Publishing Company. Drengson, A., & Inoue, Y. [1995]. Introduction. In A. Drengson, & Y. Inoue (Eds.), The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology (pp. xvii). Berkeley, California: North Atlantic Books. Encyclopedia Britannica Online. [2009]. Solipsism 2008, from http://www.britannica.com/EBch ecked/topic/553426/solipsism Fisher, A. [2002]. Radical Ecopsychology Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. Flynn, B. [Fall 2008]. Maurice Merlea u-Ponty. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Harding, S. [2006]. Animate Earth: Science, Intuition, and Gaia White River Junction, Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing Company. Hirsch, J., E. D., Kett, J. F., & Trefil, J. [2002]. The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy (Completely Revised and Updated, Third Edition ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. 62

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63 Merleau-Ponty, M. [1967]. In Honderich T. (Ed.), Phenomenology of Perception [Phenomenologie De La Pe rception] (C. Smith Trans.). (Fourth ed.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd. Merleau-Ponty, M., Lefort, C., & Lingis, A. [1968]. The Visible and the Invisible (A. Lingis Trans.). Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press. Naess, A. [1973]. The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement: A Summary In A. Drengson, & Y. Inoue (Eds.), The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology (pp. 3). Berkeley, California : North Atlantic Books. Oliveros, P. [1974]. Sonic Meditations. Smith Publications. Ostrow, J. M. [1990]. Social Sensitivity: A Study of Habit and Experience New York: State University Press. Sobel, D. [1996]. Beyond Ecophobia: Reclaiming the Heart in Nature Education (1st ed.). Barrington, MA: The Orion So ciety and The Myrin Institute. Solomon, R. C. [2001]. Introduc tion. In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), Phenomenology and Existentialism (Second edition ed., ) Rowman & L ittlefield Publishers, Inc. Welsh, J. P. [1995]. Trans-media systems. The Music of Stuart Saunders Smith (pp. 116-138). New York: Excelsior Mu sic Publishing Company. Welton, D. [1999]. Flesh and Blood: A Proposed Suppl ement to Merleau-Ponty. In D. Welton (Ed.), The Body (pp. 200-210). Malden, Massachussetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.