Women, Peace and (In)security? Rape, Armed Conflict and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325

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WOMEN, PEACE AND (IN)SECURITY? RAPE, ARMED CONFLICT AND UNITE D NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325: A CROSS-COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BY TIERNEY ELISON A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida April, 2009

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This thesis is dedicated to every female st udent in every classroom who ever felt like she had something to say, but could not find the words. To the power of your voice!

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project, and more generally, college, would not have been possible without the unconditional support of a few individuals... I would like to thank my mother, for always saying I love you, whether we were coming or going, as far back as I can remember. To my father, for teaching me the art of dispassionate debate. I would not be the disheveled, bleeding-heart, atheist, Obam a-loving, European beer-drinking, would-be feminist I am if it werent for your pers istent moral and ideological opposition to everything I stand for. To Wheent, for being so wheent. Wheent, wheent-wheent, wheent, wheent, wheent, Wheentwheentwheentwheentwheent. I wheent you. To Dr. Barbara Hicks, for sponsoring this thesis. Thank you for your time, kindness, and incomparable dedication that encouraged me to both think critically and take pride in my work. I cannot emphasize enough how this proc ess has built my confidence and helped me to develop a voice of my own, academic and otherwise. And many special thanks to Caroline Reed Marci Ferraz Ribeiro Jack Hodnett Gus Elison Melissa Jacobowitz Alex English Justin Boner Samantha Samson Katie Harte Boelang Lerato Moleah Alba Jaramillo Ben Brown Elsebeth Gylling-Srensen

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Amy Melvin Lee Kessell Jonas Ecke Ingrid Braithwaite bell hooks Bitch Magazine Jolie Holland Cat Power Mirah Bon Iver Nescafe The stand-offish barista at Sarasota Olive Oil Company The good people at the Bahi Hut of Sarasota, Florida ihasahotdog.com gofugyourself.com and Phil, of Whole Foods notoriety.

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WOMEN, PEACE AND (IN)SECURITY? RAPE, ARMED CONFLICT AND UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUN CIL RESOLUTION 1325: A CROSSCOMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Tierney Elison New College of Florida, 2008 ABSTRACT Sexual and gender-based violence has been used as a systematic weapon of war, political violence terror, and even genocide across geography and time. Yet, only recently have rape and other fo rms of sexual violence been addressed as deliberate strategies of war and repre ssion in international humanitarian and human rights law. United Nations Secu rity Council Resolution 1325, passed in 2000, was hailed as a watershed achievement in the incorporation of gender analysis into the emergent human security paradigm. This thesis examines the resolutions ability to redress the gender-s pecific insecurities of women and girls in armed conflict, particularly mass ra pe and sexual violence, by conducting a comparative qualitative analysis of its implementation by UN peacekeeping missions across four cases of armed conf lict where sexual violence was used as a weapon of armed conflict Liberia, Ti mor-Leste, Haiti, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although widespread ra pe persists in these countries, Resolution 1325 led to important domestic reforms in each country, some more

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substantial than others. Intervening va riables that might determine Resolution 1325s ability to redress sexual violence appe ar to be levels of security, conflict type, and the moment during the peace process at which Resolution 1325 is introduced. The drafting of Resolution 1325 by a transnational feminist NGO, its adoption by the United Nations Secur ity Council, and its subsequent implementation in these states can be unde rstood as an instance of norm diffusion from the international to state leve l. This pattern of norm diffusion has implications both for international po licies addressing sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict and, more genera lly, for international legal and security dialogue. Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Sciences

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CONT ENTS ACRONYMS...ii GLOSSARY.iv Chapter ONE INTRODUCTION.................................................................................1 Topic of Study...........8 Case Selection, Methods, Structure of Study...10 Structure of Thesis...12 TWO SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND WAR FROM 1945 TO 2000, AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY.. International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in a Gendered Cont ext: Distinctions, Contributions and Core Concepts...16 The Role of Women-led Activism and the NGO WG Group on Women and Armed Conflict in the Push for Resolution1325 Resolution 1325: Overview.............36 THREE CASE STUDIES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 1325..39 Introduction.............................................................................39 Presentation of Cases..41 Haiti.....41 Timor-Leste.56 Democratic Republic of Congo...66 Liberia.79 Conclusion..95 FOUR ANALYSIS FIVE CONCLUSION.115 REFERENCES.120 APPENDIX A UNIVE RSE OF CASES...131 APPENDIX B SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325.132 APPENDIX C SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1820.....136 i

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ACR ONYMS AFL Armed Forces of Liberia AFDL Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberacion du Congo-Zaire ATU Anti-Terrorism Unit (Liberia) CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women CIVPOL United Nations Civilian Police CNDP Congress for the Defense of the People (Congo) CPA Central Peace Agreement (Liberia) DDR Disarmament, Demobilization/Dismantlement and Reintegration/Reinsertion DDRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration DDRRR Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, Repatriation and Reintegration DRC Democratic Republic of Congo DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations FALINTIL Armed Forces of Nationa l Liberation of East Timor F-FDLT FALINTIL-Armed Forces of Timor-Leste FADH Armed Forces of Haiti FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo FGM Female Genital Mutilation FRAPH Front for the Progress and Advancement of Haiti FREITLIN The Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste GAU Gender Affairs Unit (UNTAET) HIV/AIDS Human Immunode ficiency Virus/Acquire Immunodeficiency Syndrome HNP Haitian National Police ICC International Criminal Court ICD Inter-Congolese Dialogue ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia IHL International humanitarian law IHRL International human rights law IR International relations LNP Liberian National Police LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission to Haiti MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia MONUC United Nations Organization Miss ion to the Democratic Republic of Congo NGO Non-governmental organization NGO WG UN Working NGO Working Gr oup on Women, Peace and Security OGA Office of Gender Affairs (MONUC, UNMIL) OPE Office for the Promotion of Equality (Timor-Leste) ii

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PNC Congolese National Police PNTL National Police of Timor-Leste SEA Sexual Exploitation and Abuse SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence SSR Security Sector Reform STIs Sexually Transmitted Infections UN United Nations UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women UNAMET United Nations Mission to East Timor UNFPA United Nations Population Fund UNMIL United Nations Integrated Mission to Liberia UNTAET United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor VPU Vulnerable Persons Unit (Timor-Leste) WILPF Womens International League for Peace and Freedom iii

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GLOSSARY Gender. The term gender is used to refer to the socially constructed differences and roles ascribed to biologically female and male individuals (Mazurana and Carlson 2004). Other facets of identity such as class, race, ethnicity or religion shape these differences and roles, but gender itself doe s determine to a great extent what is considered appropriate behavior of indivi duals within a given society (Mazurana and Carlson 2004). Gender Hierarchy/Patriarchy. Accordingly, gender can be understood as a process of relations between individuals based on pow er differentials, one that is premised on the predominance of masculine actors and the subordination of feminine actors within a society (Cockburn 2007). This gender hier archy, referred to as patriarchy, manifests itself at multiple levels in a given society, and can be found in gender-discriminatory wage differentials between men and women or laws pertaining to sexual and genderbased violence. While the term gender should not be conflated with women, understanding gender as a relation of power between masculine and feminine actors provides a lens for analysis of how violen ce against women operates during times of peace and war. ( Systematic and Widespread) Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). Sexual and Gender-Based Violence is used to mean any act of violence against an individual that arises from the inequitabl e power differentials between masculine and feminine actors within a society. Technical ly, sexual violence should fall under the term gender-based violence, but I use SG BV to highlight gender-based violences frequent manifestation through rape, sexual abuse and sexual exploitation (Ward and Marsh 2006). Because SGBV can be underst ood as arising from socially constructed and not biologically determined relations both men and boys are susceptible to SGBV. However, given the near-universal political, social, economic and cultural subordination of women, SGBV is most frequently seen being enacted against women and girls. Additionally, when SGBV is enac ted against men and boys, particularly in the context of armed conflict, it is done with the intent to degrade, humiliate and feminize the victim (Skjelsbaek 2001). Sys tematic SGBV denotes the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence as a w eapon of war, political violence or terror; the perpetrators are typically members of armed fighting factions (or the security sector, depending on conflict type); often, direct orders or a co mplicit toleration of SGBV as a weapon of war is present within the chain of command in armed factions (stoprapenow.org 2008). Widespread and Opportunistic SGBV is used to mean the occurrence of mass rape and sexual violence during or after periods of armed conflict, wherein members of armed groups, the s ecurity sector, or large numbers of individuals commit SGBV in th e security vacuum during and after conflict; this might be better understood as the entrenchment of a culture of ma ss rape that often accompanies the presence of systematic SGBV during armed conflict (UNIFEM 2008). iv

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Armed Conflict. The ter m armed conflict is used to mean either interstate armed fighting between two or more nations, or intrastate warfare between national governments and armed rebel factions or among the latter (ICRC 2004). Using armed conflict, broadens the scope of in ternational humanitarian and international human rights law to include armed hostilities that are not officially declared wars. Each of the four case studies examined in this study may be considered periods of armed conflict that were not officially declared wars, or even recognized intrastate wars at multiple intervals throughout the duration of the conflict. Broadening the scope of armed conflict to include periods of armed fighting dur ing violent political repression or the dissolution of state capaci ty is also appropriate to understanding how insecurity functions at individual and so cietal levels in the absence of external military threats to a state; particularly when examining systematic and widespread SGBV. Gender-mainstreaming. Gender-mainstreaming is a general approach to policy design and implementation that ensures th at the gendered impacts of policies and programs on men and women will be taken into account, making gender equality an integral goal of any policy formulation. This approach has been adopted by a number of international institutions, such as the UN and World Bank, NGOs and national governments. Security Sector Reform (SSR). Security Sector Reform is a broad term used to describe the all-encompassing transformation of state security a pparatuses that is usually applied in the post-c onflict context. Generally, it entails the restructuring of militaries, police forces, the judiciary, legal codes, national constitutions, and even domestic legislatures and civilian bureaucracies where appropriate (Bastick 2008). The ultimate goal of SSR is to strengthen a states capacity to holistically respond to both external and internal threats to secu rity and stability in ways that promote democratic transparency and good governan ce (Bastick 2008). Recognizing multiple potential sources of insecuri ty, ranging from economic co llapse to the mass influx of displaced populations to intern al rebel factions, SSR is an appropriate conceptual tool for building state capacity in countries suffering from endemic underdevelopment and recurrent armed conflict (Bastick 2008). For this reason, it is an especially useful tool of post-conflict reconstruction in states wh ere legacies of SGBV enacted by security sector agents (such as the police or military) threaten human security past the official end of a period of armed conflict. Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs (DDR) are three-part programs for combatants who have participated in an ar med conflict that are typically designed and implemented at the end of an armed c onflict. The sponsors of the program may include the United Nations, national governments, donor governments, or nongovernmental aid agencies. The first phase disarmament, involves the voluntary or involuntary confiscation of weapons from former combatants and the provision of a livelihoods package, which may include m onthly stipends for a period of time v

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vi following the end of armed conflict, food, housing, and skill-set training. The second phase, demobilization, involves the official disbandment of armed factions or the suspension of a military from a mobilized state (Mazurana and Carlson 2004). The third phase, reintegration, includes the return and resocial ization of former combatants into their communities of origin (or new communities, depending on the outcome of a conflict) and to civilian life. Reintegrat ion may include the prolonged provision of a food, housing, a stipend, psyc hosocial counseling and job placement services (Mazurana a nd Carlson 2004).

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Chapter One Introduction It is now more dangerous to be a woman than to be a soldier in modern conflict. Major General Patrick Cammaert, Force Commander for the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2008. Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)1 during times of war, political instability, and repression stretches far back into time a nd spans across civilizations (Brownmiller 1975). During the wars of the former Yugoslavia, it is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 women were systematica lly raped as part of the Serbian-led ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims and Croa ts; many of these women were held for months in rape camps, impregnated, and forced to carry their pre gnancies to term as part of Serbias campaign to create a G reater Serbia (Stiglmayer 1996). In Rwanda, between 250,000 and 500,000 women are estimated to have been raped during the Hutuled genocide of Rwandan Tutsis and modera te Hutu in 1994, many of those women were subsequently killed or forced to marry their attackers (Moser 2001). The recurrent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo ha s witnessed the use of systematic rape on a massive scale. While numerical estimates are hard to come by, it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of women have been rape d or sexually assaulte d since the onset of the Congolese conflict in 1997; a human rights organization estimated that in the two 1 See glossary for definitions of several central terms in this study. 1

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eastern provinces of North and South Kivu alone, over 30,000 wom en were raped in the single year of 2007 (UNSC 2008e). The emergence of systematic rape and sexual violence are not confined to contemporary conflicts, either. Cases of mass rape as weapon of war or political terro r are documented as far back as the German occupation of Western Europe during World War II, under th e Pinochet regime in Chile, and during the Pakistani invasion of Bangladesh in the ear ly 1970s (Brownmiller 1975; Enloe 2000). Due to its frequent occurrence during periods of armed conflict and residual occurrence in post-conflict environments, sy stematic and widespread SGBV is often understood as an inevitable byproduct of war. It is assumed that because rape, sexual abuse, and gender-based violence occur in times of peace, they would naturally occur more frequently and brutally in the power v acuum created by periods of insecurity and political upheaval. However, an ever-growing body of international legal scholarship, human security literature, and feminist theory holds that SGBV is a potent tool of armed conflict, when used as a systematically to te rrorize, displace, repress or dominate civilian populations. Theories about th e utility of systematic SG BV across conflict types are varied and often context-bound. They include positing rape in war as a function of patriarchal misogyny unbound by social cons traints (Brownmiller 1975); explaining sexual violence as an act drawing on socially constructed gender roles that masculinizes and reifies the (military) dominance of the perpetrator and subordinates the feminized victim (Skjelsbaek 2001); posi ting that women, often the be arers of culture within a society, may be raped by armed groups as collective punishment or a threat against the communities they wish to dominate, repress, or displace (Seiffert 1994); and identifying rape and sexual abuse as a means to torture or punish female political dissidents under 2

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authoritarian regim es, acts us ed to both terrorize and dehuman ize the victim and relegate them to oppressive gender roles upon whic h militarized authoritarianism is often dependent (Enloe 2000). There is a wealth of theoretical and ethnographic works dealing with mass rape and other forms of SGBV in armed conflict, but a paucity of quantitative empirical analyses that explore the links between m ilitarization, insecurity, and armed conflict and sexual and gender-based violence against women (Hudson et al. 2009). Due in part to the inherent difficulties associated with furnishing quantitative empirical data on rape in war, many of the aforementioned works are prev ented from making contributions to mainstream international rela tions (IR) theories on peace and security (Hudson et al. 2009). However, given the heightened attention this topic has garnered in feminist IR scholarship, international law, and transnational activism over the last 20 years, new data are beginning to emerge and measurements that can be used to explore the nexus between violence against women and insecurity. One such quantitative empirical an alysis performed in 2009 by scholars associated with the WomanStats database, test ed the hypotheses that i) levels of womens physical security would correspond to levels of state security and ii) that levels of the physical security of women are better indicator s for state security than levels of wealth, the presence of democratic institutions, or prevalence of Islamic civilization (Hudson et al. 2009). The results confirmed what long had been suspected by femi nist activists and scholars: the chi-square analysis for the first hypothesis yielded a highly significant correlation between the level of physical security for women in a society and the level of security of that state, and the bivariat e and multivariate analyses for the second 3

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hypothesis also indicated that the physical security of wom e n had the highest predicative power relative to three other variables against which it was tested for levels of state security (Hudson et al 2009)2. These results warrant furthe r empirical an d theoretical inquiry into the gendered dynamics of state security. One such avenue for research is policy analysis that might measure the extent to which standing international and statelevel policies reflect gender-cons cious notions of security. Despite the protracted hist ory of SGBV as a tool of war, genocide, and political repression, nuanced understandings of how sexual violence operates in wartime and postconflict contexts have only started to inform international humanita rian and human rights law since the early 1990s. This conceptual shift marked a distinct departure from previous decades of international law that either elided or ignored the role that systematic SGBV plays in armed conflict, and it gained momentum after accounts of mass, systematic, genocidal rape and forced impregnation enacted by Serbian military and paramilitary against Bosnian Muslim and Croa t women illustrated the utility of SGBV in the context of armed conflict (Erturk 2008). Si nce this turning point in the early 1990s, monumental strides have been made in international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), and security sector policy incorporating a gendered understanding of crim es of SGBV, during both peri ods of private peacetime 2 This study does not claim a causal relationship between the physical security of women and the security of the stat e. The authors recognize the limitations of the empirical analysis performed, noting that causality is impossible determine due to the fact that [the authors] scaling of the physical se curity of women, being new, has not been applied longitudinally. Without temporal va riance, no conventiona l statistical causal analysis is possibleIn a sense what [the au thors] are probing for is whether the degree of mitigation of the primal templates of viol ent patriarchy (measured as a variation in the prevalence and level of violence against wo men) is reflected in mitigation of state insecurity and violence. The gr eater the mitigation of the firs t, the greater we should find the mitigation of the second to be (Hudson et al. 2009:36-37). 4

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and public wartim e. Achievements of the last 20 years include the adoption of the Declaration on the Eradicati on of Violence Against Women (1993), the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), ad-hoc rulings concerning rape and sexual violence in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Crimin al Court (1998), the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 13 25 (2000), and most recently, adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008). Comprising the body of international law dealing directly with sexual violence in arme d conflict and post-conflict operations, these documents represent substantial progress in how crimes of sexual violence are defined and codified in international law, compar ed to the four preceding decades since the signing of the UN Charter in 1945. United Nations Security Council Resolu tion 1325 adopted in October of 2000, entitled Women, Peace, and Security is the fi rst official act of the UN Security Council to recognize the differential impact that pe riods of armed conflict have on women and girls and to provide a guiding pr otocol to member states to address this issue. The three main objectives of the resolution focus on the need to increase gender-specific protections to women and girl s during armed conflict, the need to increase levels of female representation at all national and regi onal decision-making leve ls in the political sphere, and the need to gender-mainstream all peacekeeping and security sector operations through the Department of Peacek eeping Operations (DPKO) and national governments. Resolution 1325 was neither the produc t of a consensual demand by UN member states to address a newly emerging problem nor was the impetus for its adoption and 5

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im plementation internally driven by organs w ithin the UN system. The resolution was, in fact, the brainchild of transnational, women-organized civil society activism the NGO Working Group (NGO WG) on Women, Peace, a nd Security (Cockburn 2007). The first Security Council resolution to be drafted by civil society memb ers, and certainly the first drafted almost completely by women, Resolution 1325 encapsulates a decade of developments in international humanitarian and human rights law pertaining to SGBV in armed conflict as well as extensive scholarsh ip and activism concerning systematic rape and sexual abuse of women and girls, am ong other gender-specific impacts of armed conflict. Some scholars argue that Resolution 1325s adoption and implementation since 2000 has been piecemeal at best, lacking in coor dination and oversight, and at worst, is a glaring example of institutional cooptation by the UN Security Council of radical feminist anti-militarist activism (Shepherd 2005) In particular, the resolutions language has been criticized for painting women as forl orn rape victims or starry-eyed pacifists, depictions that belie the very active role s that women often play in war-making and during periods of militarization (Shepherd 2005; Cockburn 2007). Furthermore, some feminist scholars have critiqued the resoluti ons (and the Security C ouncils) total elision of the way that highly rigidified gender roles, particularly militarized masculinities, perpetuate the war machine itself ( Coc kburn 2007; Whitworth 2007). However, I argue that even if Resolution 1325 is constrained by the gender bias of its institutional underpinnings, it has been successful in initia ting new dialogues on security within the UN Security Council and the states subject to its implementation. Additionally, it has 6

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been successful in revealing the need to a ddress system atic SGBV in armed conflict and prescribing a guiding set of protoc ol to mitigate this phenomenon. Keeping this in mind, we might take th e resolutions adoption as a sign that the Security Council is moving beyond conventional, gender-blind, state-centric notions of security to a more holistic human security paradigm, one that is reflective of the quotidian insecurities faced by marginalized gro ups within a state, even in the absence of an ostensible military threat or uncontest ed state sovereignty (Blanchard 2003; Truong, Wieringa, and Chhachhi 2006). One such example would be the systematic and widespread rape and sexual abuse of women, that linger we ll into post-conflict periods without state-sanctioned redress. Secondarily, we might also take Re solution 1325s adoption and subsequent implementation as a challenge to those convent ional accounts of IR theory that dictate that norm change, if it occurs at all, is the pr oduct of state-directed demand and action (Finnemore 1996). If Resolution 1325 is a watershed achieveme nt in entrenching gender equality at the international level, as is touted by a number of feminist scholars and activists (Cockburn 2007; Huds on et al. 2009), we might then ask how it translates to a local, ground level, particularly in reconf iguring the structure of states emerging from armed conflict where systematic SGBV have figured prominently as weapons of war or political violence. At the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agencys (SIDA) Conference on Gender Based Violence in 2008, Yakin Erturk, the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, advocated the use of cross-comparative analysis for policy prescriptions aimed at addressing SGBV in armed conflict, 7

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Intervention strategies need to be guided by a careful assessm ent of the dynamics of each conflict situation and the distinct experience of different groups and backed by political determination and sufficient resources. Comparative analysis of conflict a nd post-conflict situations can also reveal insight into what works and what does not. (Erturk 2008: 6) In using Resolution 1325 and the UN Security Council, an international institution, as a starting point for policy analysis, we might trace the resolutions implementation to the state level in countries mired in or emer ging from periods of armed conflict where systematic SGBV was commonly used as a w eapon of war, terror, or political violence. In doing so, we can judge the extent to wh ich international norms, defined by Martha Finnemore as a shared set of beliefs about what is appropriate behavior held by a community of actors (1996), are or are not being disseminated to and internalized by local actors. The underlying norms of Resolution 1325 prom ote the entrenchment of gender equality in political spheres of decision-making, mandate the gendermainstreaming of peacekeeping operations and, most importantly, prohibit the systematic use of SGBV in armed conflict and its residual widespread occurrence after conflict is officially over. The extent to wh ich Resolution 1325 has been able to address systematic SGBV in states emerging from armed conflict would be indicative of whether its underlying norms are in fact being internal ized by these states. It could be argued that the high rates of SGBV f ound across all cases in the wake of Resolution 1325s implementation suggest simple norm impositio n by the international community, where the reforms being enacted within state stru ctures have no beari ng on their endogenization by individual actors or partie s to armed conflict on the ground. However, I argue that these reforms put in place an institutional framework that will guide the long-term internalization of these norms. 8

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Topic of Study In this thesis, I examine the implemen tation of Resolution 1325 across four cases of armed conflict where systematic sexual and gender-based violence were used as weapons of war, terror, or pol itical repression. Social constr uctivist theoretical analysis argues that norm change can in fact occur at an international level and have a discernible impact on the configuration, preferences and behavior of states-as-agents enmeshed in a structural, normative framework (Finnemore 19 96). Employing these tenets, I posit that if Resolution 1325 is one example an internat ional normative shift adopted by the UN Security Council (the most powerful orga n in the UN system), we will see the endogenization of this shift in countries where Resolution 1325 has been directly implemented through UN Peacekeeping Missi ons. I perform a qualitative crosscomparative analysis to examine periods of armed conflict in each of the four cases where systematic SGBV figured prom inently and trace Resolution 1325s implementation after the arrival of a UN p eacekeeping mission and (ostensible) cessation of latent hostilities. The four cases selected include th e 24-year Indonesian occupation of Timor-Leste where East Timorese women were systematically rape d and sexually abused by Indonesian military and militia, particularly in the months surrounding Timor-Lestes 1999 referendum for independence; the 1991 to 1994 military coup in Haiti, where women suspected of political dissidence or t hose associated with popular organizations were systematically raped by the Haitian arm y, militia and military attaches, as well as the reemergence of this trend following the 2004 ousting of President Aristide; the systematic rape (and sometimes forced abducti on) of women by the Liberian military and armed rebel factions during the 14 year-long civil war from 1989 to 2003; and the 9

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system atic and widespread rape of women an d girls since the onset of intrastate and interstate war in the Democrat ic Republic of Congo in 1997 that persists today despite the signing of a peace agreement in 1999, the su ccessful democratic election of a new government in 2005, and the signing of an Ac ts of Engagement Agreement among armed factions in the eastern re gion of the country in 2008. Id entifying locally contingent factors that have contributed to systematic SGBV before and during these periods of armed conflict, I provide a context for gauging the effectiveness of Resolution 1325 as it pertains to systematic SGBV in each case. Case Selection, Methods, and Structure of Study This cross-comparative, small-N study of four cases was designed in order to trace the implementatio n of Resolution 1325 and test the cl aims that the resolution is a vehicle for norm dissemination from an intern ational to state level. Each case was selected on the shared independent variable of systematic SGBV in armed conflict, drawn from a larger universe of cases that can be found in Appendix A on page 131. Additionally, in order to trace the process of the Resolutions direct implementation from the UN Security Council to the ground level via UN Peacekeeping Missions, each selected case hosted a UN peacekeeping mission that was deployed slightly before or after the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000 and subsequently charged with its implementation. Additional crite ria considered were diversity in region, culture, and conflict type in order to te st the claim that dissimilar state actors may exhibit and converge toward similar behavior and prefer ences as a result of internationally held norms. A final consideration was the avai lability of data on Resolution 1325s 10

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im plementation in the universe of cases; since the Resolution wa s only passed in 2000 and lacks any centralized institutional oversight committee within the Security Council, or even in the United Nations system, availabil ity of data is largely contingent on what is reported by relevant UN organizations, such as UNIFEM, or publications from nongovernmental humanitarian organizations involved with overseeing the resolutions implementation. While four Secretary-Genera l reports on the progre ss of the resolution have been submitted to the United Nations Security Council since 2001, for many countries data is hard to come by. Each case study is divided into five co mponent parts in order to approximate symmetrical and readily comparable data, but given the unique history of each country with systematic SGBV in armed conflict and their separate experiences with Resolution 1325s implementation, the structure of each case varies slightly. These five components include i) a cursory overview of structural and cultural violence3 against women prior to conflict, which often facilitat e the development and entren chment of rape cultures, particularly in situations of armed conflict and political upheaval; ii) a brief overview each conflict; iii) modalities of sexual and gender-based violence that emerged during each conflict; iv) the structure of the UN peacekeeping mission deployed, its mandate relative to Resolution 1325, and an overview of the missions gender division; and v) 3 Galtung defines structural violence as a perv asive and insidious system of exploitation based on unequal power rela tions in a society (Hudson et al. 2009). According to Galtung, structural violence has four core manifestations: exploitation based on a division of labor wherein benefits are as ymmetrically distributed; control by the exploiters over the consciousness of the exploited, resulting in the acquiescence of the oppressed; fragmentation, meaning that the e xploited are separated from each other; and marginalization, with the exploiters as a priv ileged class with their own rules and form of interaction (1990 in Hudson et al. 2009: 20) Cultural violence is the day-to-day use of overt or implicit force to obtain ones ends in social relations, a nd is thus considered the bedrock of structural vi olence (Hudson et al. 2009: 21). 11

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m easures undertaken by each mission (often in conjunction with a transitional government or other UN agencies) to im plement Resolution 1325, which generally include constitutional and legal reform, disa rmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs, security sector reform and within-mission gender-mainstreaming. Identifying measures taken under the resoluti on to address the legacy of systematic SGBV, I designate both loci where the resolution did in fact have a discernible impact in addressing SGBV, as well as roadblocks and deficiencies that may have prevented its ability to do so. The structure of this study is limited in scope by only examining countries where UN peacekeeping missions have directly and deliberately implemented Resolution 1325 after its adoption in 2000. In this way, the study does not account for the possible dissemination of the norms underlying Resolu tion 1325 in countries not involved in its active implementation through UN Peacekeeping Missions, nor can it account for the presence of the same norms in countries prio r to the resolutions a doption. Furthermore, conclusions drawn from this study pertain pa rticularly to the resolutions impact in addressing sexual and gender-based violence during and after armed conflict, and this focus limits the studys ability to trace the im pacts of the resolution in other issue areas covered by the resolution, such as political decision-making or peacebuilding activities. Structure of Thesis This thesis is divided into five chapte rs, including this introduction. Chapter Two presents a historical overview of the evolution of international humanitarian and human rights law pertaining to SGBV from the si gning of the UN Charter in 1945 until the 12

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drafting and adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000, as well as a detailed overview of the resolution as it pertains to SG BV. This chapter is intended to provide the reader with the normative foundation on which Resolution 1325 is built, and also to demonstrate how international legal codes defining and crimin alizing SGBV have changed over time to reflect a more nuanced unders tanding of how it operates in periods of armed conflict and political upheaval. Chapter Three includes the presentation of cases and data, the structure of which is described above. Chapte r Four is the comparative analysis of the data presented in the previous chapter, in which I draw my preliminary conclusions, arguing that state-level reforms conforming to the dictates of Resolution 1325 are indicators that the resolution is transm itting norms prohibiting systematic SGBV both during and after periods of armed conflict. I main tain this claim in spite of the fact that high rates of SGBV and domestic violence persisted in each case, arguing that the persistence of sexual violence does not negate the presence of the resolution nor its efficacy. These reforms have contributed to making rape and other forms of systematic and sexual gender-based violence during peri ods of armed conflict and during times of peace intolerable violations of what is consid ered appropriate behavior. Further, they relocate responsibility for redressing these violations to the state. Chapter Five, a conclusion, builds on my claim that Resoluti on 1325 has contributed to the dissemination of norms prohibiting systematic SGBV during and after armed conflic t, by introducing an additional UN Security Council Resolution pa ssed in June of 2008, Resolution 1820. This resolution, also entitled Women, Peace and Security, explicitly re cognizes systematic SGBV as a self-sustaining thre at to international peace and se curity, particularly where it threatens the cessation of latent hostilities and reconciliation. I argue that because 13

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Resolution 1325 im plicitly acknowledges systema tic SGBV as a threat to international peace and security, and prescribes a number of policy measures to be taken by UN member states and peacekeeping missions to ad dress this threat, norms that prohibit its use and occurrence were entrenched at a ground level. The persistence of the phenomenon across countries actively implementing the Resolution since 2000 triggered the recognition of norm transgression by both member states and th e Security Council, and thus resulted in Resolution 1820, which mo re explicitly recogni zes the link between insecurity and systematic SGBV, condemn s its use, and provides sharper policy prescriptions focused on its redress. We mi ght take this as an example of norm clarification (Sandholtz 2008), which would not have occurred without the entrenchment of these norms through Resolution 1325s initial implementation. 14

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Chapter Two Sexual Violence and Wa r from 1945 to 2000, an International Legal History Resolution 1325 calls attention to the vulne rability of women a nd girl civilians to sexual gender-based violence in armed conflic t, pointing to the re sponsibilities of all parties to armed conflict to respect standing international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL) that prohi bit rape and other forms of sexual abuse. Notably, the Resolution does not explicitly menti on systematic violence as a tactic of war or identify it as a threat in and of itself to security. However, implicit in the resolution is the connection between insecurity and sexua l and gender-based violence, because the resolution, in addition to enumerating the numbe r of ways in which gender inequality in political decision-making, peacemaking, and peacebuilding can impede the restoration of peace and security, places systematic SG BV against women and girls along this spectrum. Additionally, the resolution encap sulates and relies upon IHL and IHRL that constitute systematic and sexual gender-based as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and constitutive acts of genocide, all whic h ostensibly threaten peace and security. Resolution 1325 is predicated on a s ubstantial, though evol utionary body of international humanitarian law and internati onal human rights law th at enshrine genderspecific protections and rights to female civi lians and combatants during and after periods of armed conflict. After the entry into for ce of the United Nations Charter in 1945, initial 15

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treaties and conventions regardi ng the status of fem ale civilians and combatants in armed conflict either marginalized sexual violence as an attack on personal honor or dignity (Geneva Conventions 1949) or elided its occurrence altogether. However, as women-led activism and the realities of contemporary armed conflict called on the United Nations for more gender-specific protections for wome n in armed conflict and a reaffirmation of womens human rights, a body of law was gradually amassed between the adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 and Resolution 1325 in 2000. Providing a genealogy of international law, women-organized activism in civil society and the reality of sexual gender-based violence during and after conflict can help us identify norms underlying codification and reveal the catalysts for paradigm shifts within this body of law. This chapter provi des a detailed history of the evolution of international law regarding SG BV and the status female civilians and combatants during armed conflict. A historical analysis of IHL and IHRL from 1945 to 2000 contextualizes the adoption of Resolution 1325. Additionally, I provide an overview of Resolution 1325 and an in-depth analysis of its relationship to the preceding decades of international legal doctrine and women-led activism in civil society. I will demonstrate how this historical trajectory reflects evolving international atti tudes towards sexual violence in IHL and IHRL, and how this trajectory has laid the international legal a nd normative bedrock for the adoption of Resolution 1325. 16

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Internation al Humanitarian Law and In ternational Human Rights Law in a Gendered Context: Distinctions, Co ntributions and Core Concepts Two distinct yet complementary bodies of law address crimes of sexual genderbased violence in armed conflict: internationa l humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). IHL is applicable to situations in which tw o or more states are parties to an armed conflict, and it ceases to be applicable when la tent conflict has ended in an official capacity, such as a ceasefire, peace treaty, or military intervention (Askin 2003). IHRL is universally applicable wit hout exception; all pers ons are entitled to fundamental human rights, such as right to life and dignity of person, by being human. IHL and IHRL are not mutually exclusive: IHRL continues to be fully applicable throughout the course of armed conflict, and is understood as complementary to IHL in this way (UN 2002). International Humanitarian Law (IHL) The foundational instruments of IHL related to rape a nd sexual violence are the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, and its Two Additional Protocol of 1977; case-law rulings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the form er Yugoslavia (ICTY); caselaw rulings of the Internati onal Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR); and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC 1998). IHL a pplies both to declared wars of an international na ture, specified in Common Article 2 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to armed conflicts of an internal na ture, specified in Co mmon Article 3 to the Conventions. The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Two Additional Protocol of 1977 17

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IHL regarding the treatment of female civilians during wartime can be traced as far back as the 1300s, though it was not until the 20th century, following two world wars and the birth of United Nations that IHL made mention of rape and sexual violence (Askin 2003). With the establishment of m ilitary tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo at the end of World War II, it became apparent that sexual violence had figured prominently in both theaters of the war. However, crimes of sexual violence were not prosecuted nor explicitly mentioned in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, despite substantial documentation of wartime and post-war rape by German military (Askin 2003). At the Military Tribunal in Tokyo, gender-based crimes were not mentioned in the Tribunals Charter, but we re prosecuted in conjunction with other war crimes in the trials of Japanese military officials (Askin 2003). Gender-specific provisions for the treatment of women during armed conflict were first seen in the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949). Until this ti me there had been no binding international treaties regarding the treatment ci vilians in armed conflict, much less any that specifically provided for the treatment of female civilia ns (Askin 2003). The four Conventions of 1949 provided the first internationa l legal code to prohibit rape of female civilians and to provide protection for the dignity of pers onhood, Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault (UN 2002). Depending on whether the armed conflict in question is international or internal, Article 27 can be used to prosecute rape as a grave breach ( under Common Article 2) or as a violation of (under Common Artic le 3). In the Fourth Geneva Convention, a 18

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grave breach is a crim inal act that so flagrant ly violates customary humanitarian law that it requires immediate and severe criminal punishment (Askin 2003). Such acts include willful killing, torture or inhumane treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious in jury to body or health, unlawful deportation or unlawful confinement of a protected pers on (Geneva Conventions 1949: Article 146) While rape and other acts of sexual violence are not mentioned as those constituting a grave breach, the acts of torture, inhumane treatment, or willfully causing great suffering or harm to body or health have been broadly interpreted to include SGBV in their scope. However, in order for such acts to be prosecuted as grave breaches under Common Article 2, it must be proven that the conflict in question was international nature and that the protected persons in question were not of the nationality or their violators (Askin 2003). Essentially, in order for rape and other acts of sexual violence to be considered grave breaches of humanitari an law, these acts must occur across enemy lines in interstate warfare, where the aggressor is violating the occupied civilian population. International legal scholars have noted that such a hierarchy of offenses in humanitarian law has contributed to the elis ion of rape and sexual violence as serious crimes in armed conflict. This occurs in tw o ways: through the omission of rape as grave breach or serious violation of IHL, and sec ondarily, through the primacy that is put on violations occurring in an in ternational context over those in internal conflict. McKinnon claims that this interstate/intrastate distinction in law, especially with respect to the status and rights of women, makes it harder to accep t crimes of sexual violence against women in an internal conflict as requi ring international redress: The convergence here between ways of thinking about women and ways of thinking about international law and politics is this: th e more a conflict 19

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can be framed as within a state as a civil war, a domestic, as private the less effective the [human rights model] becomes. The more it looks like the construction of the oppression of women, the less can structurally be done about it. (McKinnon 2006: 190) The Two Additional Geneva Protocols of 1977 explicitly deal with rape and other forms of sexual violence. Protocol I, corresponding to Common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions applies to conflicts of an international nature. Article 76 of Protocol I states: Women shall be the obj ect of special respect and sha ll be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault (Geneva Conventions 1977a). Additional Protocol II, corresponding to Common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, pertains to armed conflicts of an internal nature or conflicts involving non-state actors. Article 4 of Protocol II ad dresses rape by prohibiting [o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution any form of indecent as sault (Geneva Conventions 1977b). The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and Two Additional Protocol Thereto of 1977 prohibit rape and sexual violence as grave breaches of humanitarian or explicitly enumerate them as war crimes or crim es against humanity. However, dynamic interpretations of each document have used thei r language to do so in the case rulings of the ICTY and ICTR: although there was disagreement pr ior to the establishment of the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals as to whether violations of the Geneva Conventions outside the grave breach pr ovisions carry criminal sanctions, the Tribunals have successfully disabuse d assertions that criminal liability for violations rests exclusively with grave breaches.case law confirms that sex crimes are covered by the grave breaches provisions (Askin 2003: 288) Despite the fact that the provisions of Convention and Protocols have been used in certain contexts to adj udicate SGBV as war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 20

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constitutive acts of genocide their language points to an inadequate understanding of sexual violence in arm ed conflict. Article 27 of the Fourth Convention, Article 76 of Protocol I and Article 4 of Protocol II each categorize the act of rape or sexual violence as acts violating a womans honor, digni ty, or respect. While each Article criminalizes SGBV as a viola tion of IHL and IHRL, the language used misconstrues rape and sexual violence as individual acts committed by men that devalue a womans relative social worth by violating chast ity, purity, or consent, rather than as systematized acts intended to destroy the personhood and di gnity of the vict im and surrounding communities. Where rape is treated as a crime against honor, the honor of women is called into question and virginity or chastity is often a precondition. Honor implies the loss of station or re spect; it reinforces the social view, internalized by women, that the ra ped woman is dishonorable. And while the concept of dignity potentially embraces more profound concerns, standing alone it obfuscates the fact th at rape is fundamentally violence against women violence against a womans body, autonomy, integrity, selfhood, security, and self-esteem as well as her standing in the community. This failure to recognize ra pe as violence is critical to the traditionally lesser or ambiguous status of rape in humanitarian law. (Copelon 1994: 201) This antiquated understanding of rape as a crime of transgression or indecency prevents nuanced analysis of how rape might operate as a potent tool of community destruction and demoralization in armed conflict. The Genocide Convention of 1948 The Genocide Convention is relevant to the prosecution of gender-based crimes during armed conflict and repressive political regimes, for its emphasis on group identitybased persecution, and for th e tendency of ethnic and natio nalist conflict to use systematized sexual violence as part of ethnic cleansing campaigns. The Convention 21

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defines genocide as [acts] comm itted with th e intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group (UN 1948), di fferentiating it from crimes against humanity with its empha sis on identity-based persecution. Constitutive acts of genocide listed by the convention include killi ng, causing serious bodily or mental harm, deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing measures intended to prevent births and forcibly transferring children (UN 1948) The Convention has been interprete d in ICTR rulings to include SGBV as a constitutive act. Further, the Convention has also been used to interpret women as a specific group targeted in genocidal campaigns, particular ly where gender is c onflated with other identity labels such as race or ethnicity, In considering whether additional groups meeting this criterion might also be covered, the [ICTR] stated th at the intenti on ofthe Genocide Conventionwas patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group, thereby providing support for the proposition that targeting women, exclusively on the basis of their sex, may fall within the existing definition of genocide (UN 2002:44). International Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by a United Nations Security Council Resolution in response to a UN investigation and report alleging massive humanitarian and human rights abuses during the period of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1 990s. Involving a Serbianled ethnic cleansing campaign directed at Bosnian Muslims within newly autonomous Serbia, as well as Serbian-initiated incursi ons into Croatia and Bo snia-Herzegovina, and Croatian incursions into Bosnia-Herzegovina, the conflict saw extreme violations of IHL 22

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and IHRL, including m ass rape, forced impregnation, forced prostitution and other egregious forms of systematic SGBV. The Security Council empowered the ICTY to adjudicate crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, under th e provisions set forth in Common Article 2 and Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Askin 2003). The tribunals ability to prosecute war crimes under Common Article 2 is directly related to the international nature of the wars of the former Yugos lavia, Serbia being the aggressor and Bosnia-Herzegovina being the occupied te rritory, though most crimes prosecuted as crimes against humanity under the jurisd iction of the Tribuna l were under Common Article 3, where proof of international status for crimes committed was not necessary. Numerous reports, circumstantial and physical evidence, and eyewitness testimony demonstrated for the tribunal that systematic SGBV was used by the Serbian military as a means of terrorizing, suppressing, and dissolving Bosnian-Muslim and Croatian communities. Taking interpretative lib erty with the language of the Geneva Conventions, the ICTY set case-law precedent in the prosecution of gender-based crimes by recognizing sexual violence as torture in th e Celebeci judgment of 1998; judging the rape of a single victim to be a serious viol ation of international humanitarian law in the Furundzija judgment of 1998; developing case-law precedent concerning sexual slavery in the Kunarac et al. judgment of 2001; and j udging rape to be persecution in the context of a joint criminal enterprise in the Kvoeka ruling of 2001 (Askin 2003). Notably, although crimes of genocide and rape were separately prosec uted under the Statute of the ICTY, the ICTY was slow to prosecute rape as a constitutive act of genocide, which some scholars argue was the case (McKinnon 2006). At the time, the ICTY was the only 23

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judicial m echanism available for the interp retation and applicati on of international humanitarian and human rights law, thus it s rulings with regard to SGBV not only contributed to the jus cogens status of these crimes, but al so to a growing consensus on the differential, gendered impact that armed conflict has on women. International Criminal Tr ibunal of the Former Rwanda The Security Council established the Inte rnational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1998 under a similar Security Council i nvestigation and Chapter VII mandate as the ICTY The tribunals major contri bution to the body of existing international humanitarian law is its expande d definition of sexual violence and rape, established in the Akayesu ruling of 1998, The Akayesu Trial Chamber defined ra pe as a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a pers on under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which is broader than rape, is defined as any act of a sexual nature which is co mmitted on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to a physical invasion of the human body and may not include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact. (Askin 2003: 319) The Akaseyu definition of rape is seminal in inte rnational laws evolut ion toward a more nuanced understanding of how systematic SGBV in armed conflict can be used against civilians. The broadness of acts constituting ra pe under the definition denote an implicit recognition of coercion inhere nt in sexual violence enact ed during armed conflict, distinguishable from peacetime definitions of ra pe where lack of consent is essential to its prosecution (McKinnon 2006). In effect, the assumption of non-consent and coercion predating acts of rape and sexual violence in situations where rape and sexual violence occurred at mass levels improves internati onal laws capacity to address SGBV when 24

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enacted during arm ed conflict, and more specifically in the case of the ICTR, as an act of genocide In addition to establishing a comprehe nsive definition of rape and sexual violence during wartime, the Akayesu ruling of the ICTR prosecuted sexual violence and rape as a constitutive act of genocide under th e definition of genocide given in Article 2 of the ICTR Statute (Askin 2003). Rome Statute of the Inte rnational Criminal Court The well-documented use of mass rape as tactics of warfare, repression and ethnic cleansing in interstate and in trastate armed conflict of th e 1990s resulted not only in a collective call from the international community for an international judicial mechanism that could uniformly adjudicate IHL and IHRL The establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 was accomplishe d through the adoption and ratification of the Rome Statute, a treaty that empowers the ICC to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide (ICRC 2004). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is the first international judicial mechanism to explicitly recognize crimes of gender-based sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against humanity subject to cr iminal liability for all states parties to the Statute. Article 7.1(g) of the Statute enumerates crimes against humanity citing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as criminal offenses (ICC 1998). Article 8, enumerating wars crimes, designate s these definitions of sexual violence and gender-based crimes as serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (ICC 25

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1998). Im portantly, the Rome Statute ensures that crimes of SGBV occurring in armed conflicts of an internal nature (gove rned by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions) merit the same judicial redress as grave breach war crimes committed in interstate warfare (ICC 1998). International Human Rights Law (IHRL) Several UN Conventions and Treaties pe rtain to systematic SGBV in armed conflict and the post-conflict se tting. IHRL remains applicable in the absence of latent armed conflict, and is understood as compleme ntary to IHRL in this sense. Human rights law is comprised of a wider, though le ss binding body of treaties and conventions pertaining to the rights and dignity of the human person. Those that immediately pertain to the adjudication of crimes of SGBV violations of wome ns human rights include: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1 977) and its Optional Protocol of 2000; the Torture Convention of 1984; The Conventio n on the Rights of the Child (1989); The Vienna Declaration on Wo mens Human Rights (1993); the General Assembly Declaration on the Eradica tion of Violence Against Women (1993); and the Beijing Declaration and Platfo rm for Action (1995). United Nations Charter With the signing and entry into force of the UN Charter in 1945, signatory parties to the UN became legally obligated to the ge neral principles of non-discrimination on the basis of sex and fundamentally equal human rights of men and women. This is echoed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1946), the Inte rnational Covenant on Civil 26

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and Political Rights (1966), and the Conven tion on the Elim ination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1977). Rhetorically, it establishes parameters for humane treatment of the human person in civ il, political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and deviations are considered violations of in ternational law. The Declaration on the Prot ection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict In this declaration issued by the UN Ge neral Assembly in 1974, the UN officially condemns the indiscriminate use of force ag ainst civilian populations, and recognizes the fact that women and children usually sustain disproportionate levels of trauma and displacement when civilian populations are attacked ( UN 1974). The declaration uses maternalist language to identify the need for di fferential consideration of female civilians during armed conflict and humanitarian cr ises, stressing womens (assumed) natural aptitude for mothering and nurturing future generations (UN 1974). The declaration also does not mention the links that heightened female trauma and suffering have to systems of gender inequality nor does it explicitly address rape, sexu al violence, sexual abuse or sexual exploitation as potential vulnerabilities that female a nd child civilians often endure during periods of armed conflict or em ergency (Askin 2003; MacKinnon 2006). Despite its conceptual and linguistic inade quacies and the limitations of enforcement inherent in its non-binding na ture, the Declaration was demo nstrative of a normative shift occurring in international security sector policy due to the global influence of secondwave feminism. By using gender-specific la nguage and applying gende r analysis to the assessment of armed conflicts impact on civi lian populations, it was significant in its initiation of a normative dialogue concerning the status of women in armed conflict. 27

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The Convention on the E limination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) In 1979, the Convention on the Elimina tion of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was adopted by the General Assembly and is considered a marker of achievement in the promotion of womens human rights that came out of the first UN Decade for Women (1975-1984). The c onvention, requires that member states adopt principles of non-discrimination, defi nes discrimination against women as any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irre spective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of huma n rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultur al, civil or any other field. (UN 1979) The Convention requires members of the General Assembly to take specific measures to eradicate sex-based discrimina tion against women in all spheres of public and private activity. While the c onvention itself makes no reference to violence as a form of discrimination against women, it acknowledge s that sex-based discrimination poses an obstacle to international p eace and security and also impedes the full enjoyment of human rights by men and women (UN 1979). Fu rther, the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Agai nst Women, the body responsible for the conventions interpretation, later expanded its definition of discri mination to include violence against women as an explicit form of sex-based discrimination prohibited under the convention (Kaufman and Lindquist 1995). 28

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The UN Dec laration on the Elimi nation of Violence Against Women The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993 and expl icitly condemns SGBV violence against women including rape, sexual battering, and mo lestation. The declaration acknowledges that extreme or extraordinary conditions of humanitarian cris es, such as abject poverty, political instability, natural disaster and ar med conflict make women and female children more susceptible to SGBV, and that vi olence against women is endemic to underdevelopment, and an impediment to th e achievement of sustainable peace and security (UN 1993). Notably, the declarations language cent ers the problem of SGBV against women within the context of the international syst em, attempting to deconstruct the dualistic division between public and private spheres of law that often implicitly absolves states from taking action against it or being held accountable for its occurrence (Peters and Wolper 1995). The declaration includes a provision holding the state responsible for investigating and adjudicati ng instances of violence ag ainst women, regardless of whether these acts are state-sa nctioned or committed by a civilian. This component of soft, non-binding IHRL bolstered a gr owing normative consensus among the international community that violence agai nst women is not a marginal social issue isolated from the realm of governance and stat e accountability, particularly when patterns of systematic gender-based brutality toward women surface during periods of armed conflict. 29

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The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action The Fourth UN Conference on the Status of Women in Beijing in 1995 led to the adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Plat form for Action. The Beijing Declaration and Platform For Action reinforce the UNs comm itment to principles of non-discrimination and equality by acknowledging standing cont ributions that women have made to international peace and development, in addition to identifying barriers that remain to the full enjoyment of human rights in all sphe res of economic, social, and political life by women and girls (UN 1995). The declaration and platform contri bute to the conceptual framework of Resolution 1325 by affirming a human rights-b ased approach to gender equality. They affirm that womens rights are human rights, addressing the contention that the standing body of IHRL is neither gender-s ensitive nor representative of the lived experience of women, specifically with re gard to SGBV, sexu al exploitation, and discrimination (Cockburn 2007). The declaration goes on to address the contributions that women have made to the nuclear disarmam ent and peace movements, advocating for the eradication of public and private barriers to the full visibility of women in governance and the security sector (UN 1995). In addition to ensuring that all women and girls have the right to be free of SGBV, the declarati on demands international recognition of IHRL and IHL, particularly with respect to the n eeds and vulnerabilities of women and girls. 30

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The Role of Women-led Activism and the NGO Working Group on Women and Armed Conflict in the Pu sh for Resolution 1325 The adoption of Resolution 1325 signified a departure for the UN Security Council from previous years of gender-bli nd policies. Here, the Security Council for mally recognized that th e political marginal ization of women, and implicitly, systematic SGBV, pose legitimate impediments to international peace and security. The resolution is part of a broader trend in security dialogue that occurred during the late 1990s; after the dissolution of Co ld War deadlock, issues such as intrastate (often ethnically-fueled) warfare, economic collapse, environmental de gradation, and the reemergence of the human rights agenda shaped the emergence of a new paradigm human security (Blanchard 2003). Human security moves beyond a theoretical framework that takes the cohesi ve state as its primary unit of analysis and instead focuses on the material conditions that shape the securi ty of individual constitu ents within a state. Truong, Wieringa and Chhachhi, building on the work of Amarty a Sen, look to the security of the human body, access to services and livelihoods, and the distribution of political agency within a state as three core components of the human security framework (2006). The human security paradigm was h eavily influenced by feminist security theories at this time, challenging conventi onal accounts of securi ty resting on neatly defined levels of analysis. Both human secur ity and feminist security theories maintain that this approaches elides the gendered underpinnings of the st ate and international system, particularly the lived experiences of feminized insecurity during times of peace and war, i.e. SGBV, the feminization of poverty, and the undercutting of political agency (Blanchard 2003). 31

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Heightened involvement and increased vi sibility of civil society, particularly transnational non-governmental organizations were hallmarks of the emergent human security paradigm (NGOs). Mirroring the recognition of transnational threats to international peace and security, these networks were often able to proffer alternative, rights-based insight and appro aches to such quandaries. For example, women-led NGOs organized a massive, transnational caucus to be present at the UN Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993, declar ing Womens Rights Are Huma n Rights, with the hope that gender-specific provisions for sexua l violence and gender-based discrimination would be mainstreamed into th e human rights agenda, and ul timately be reflected in the Vienna Platform for Action (Friedman 1995). Similar caucuses were organized at the Nairobi Conference for Population in 1994, w ith specific emphasis on the differential impact armed conflict has on female civi lian and combatants, and in the Beijing Conference on Women and Platform for Acti on, where women and armed conflict was highlighted as one of the 12 critical areas of focus (Shepherd 2005). In tandem with scholarship and civil so ciety, the Security Council also began to take note of the need for less rigidified defin itions of security and integrative responses to the multifaceted challenges presented by post-Cold War politics. At the 1992 summit meeting, the first to be held at the level of heads of state and government, the Security Council recognized that non-military sources of instability in the economic social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace a nd security, indicating a significant shift in the Councils agendaframing policy issues as human security issues, blending as it does the ideo logical weight of human rights discourse with the strategic implications of security discourse, allowed for an alternative performance of secu rity by the [UN S ecurity Council]. (Shepherd 2005:10) 32

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Appropriately, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1996 in 1996, which officially sanctioned the m onitoring and advocacy roles of NGOs in UN institutional structures, especially with respect to the Security C ouncil (Shepherd 2005). This new institutional avenue to the most powerful organ of the UN prompted decisive action from women-led civil society organizations seeking redress to the scourge of women in war zones and post-conflict transition, partic ularly to issues such as mass rape and gender-based exclusion from official peacemaking and pos t-conflict reconstruction operations. The Women in Armed Conflict Caucus, a co alition of NGOs led by the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom (W ILPF) that had organized with the intent of reviewing and implementing the Beiji ng Platforms chapter on Women and Armed Conflict, met in 2000 at the Beijing + 5 C onference and drafted an outcome document with specific goals for mainstreaming a women and armed conflict agenda and bringing it to the attention of the Security Council -- [i]t wa s at this meeting that the emphasis of the activists shifted subtly fr om getting armed conflict on to the UN woman agenda to getting women and armed conf lict on to the main agenda (Cockburn 2007:140). The impact of this outcome document was clear on March 8, 2000, the UN International Womens Day, when the then-p resident of the Security Council Anwarul Chodhury of gave a speech on the behalf of the Security Council, in which he emphasized the intersections between gender, peace and security and the need to develop a long-term international secu rity agenda that reflected this awareness (Cockburn 2007). The Caucus saw its chance for action, and quickly developed into the UN NGO WG on Women and Armed Conflict. The NGO WG is centrally coordinated by WILPF, though 33

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the other prim ary organizations working with in the umbrella framework include Amnesty International, International Alert, the Ha gue Appeal for Peace, the Womens Commission for Refugee Women and Children, the Internat ional Peace Research Association and the Womens Caucus for Gender Justice (Coc kburn 2007). Ultimately, the NGO WG wanted a Security Council Resolution condemning ge nder-based discrimination, mass rape and other such obstacles to the full and equal participation of women in all spheres of political decision-making, peacemaking, p eacebuilding, and security dialogue. The NGO WG courted individual member s of the Security Council, as well as other agencies within the UN system, reitera ting the need for the council to officially acknowledge the gender-specific th reats to individual security posed by armed conflict to women and girls, as well as th e ways in which systematic SG BV in war or the exclusion of womens input from peace agreements and peacekeeping missions might impede the restoration of security. One important tene t of the NGO WG agenda in pushing through the Resolutions adoption was an emphasis on the lived experien ces of women across contemporary armed conflicts (Cockburn 2007). Th is was reflected in the Arria Formula meeting, held in the 3 days before the Security Council debate on the resolutions adoption. Here, NGO WG arranged for Security Council members to meet with female representatives from different countries who could provide graphic, detailed accounts of their experiences as women during armed conflict, as marg inalized citizens during peace negotiations, organizers of antiwar camp aigns, and as community members during turbulent transitions from war to peace (Cockburn 2007). Ultimately, Resolution 1325 was adopted on October 31st, 2000. While the NGO WG was optimistic about its success, it was evident that the resolutions full 34

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im plementation would be a laborious process requiring vigorous civil society monitoring, as the resolution lacks any centralized in stitutional oversight committee within the Security Council or UN system (Cockburn 2007; Binder, Lukas and Schweiger 2008). Furthermore, worries about an institutiona l cooptation of feminist rhetoric were somewhat confirmed by the final re-dra fting of the resolution, which does not acknowledge the gendered dynamics of armed conf lict itself, particular ly the role that militarized masculinities have in sustaining and perpetuating cultures of war. Additionally, the anti-militarist stance of the NGO WG was lost in translation: the resolution technically only seeks to improve the status of women and girls in armed conflict, rather than promoting an ex plicitly anti-war agenda (Cockburn 2007). Shepherds analysis highlights how the out come document itself is reflective of the institutional authority retained by the Securi ty Council and the limited scope of influence granted to the NGO WG operati ng within this framework, despite significant differences in institutional power and internal organization between the [UN S ecurity Council and NGO WG], the dominant logics in the discourses of gender, violence and security issuing from these sites is compatibleIt is th ese compatibilities that lead to both the successes and shortcomings of [Resolution]1325 by delimiting the boundaries of possibility of the Re solution and its implementationThe image in which societies torn by conflict are to be rebuilt is decidedly conservative, drawing on concepts of state and sovereignty from the narrative issuing from the UN Security Council, despite the emphasis put on the participation, representation and protection of women. (Shepherd 2005:15) While the language of the Resolution reflect s the institutional limitations and (perhaps) still-entrenched gender-bias of the UN Secur ity Council, Resolution 1325 was indeed a significant step towards broade ning the emergent human secur ity paradigm to include the gender-specific insecurities of women and girl s in armed conflict. Although the level of 35

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legal obligation of UN Security Council resolutions is debatabl e, the Security Council is the m ost powerful organ in the UN System. Article 24.1 of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to enact on be half of UN member states and elevates UN Security Council Resolutions to the status of bi nding international la w (Shepherd 2005). Resolution 1325: Overview The Resolution synthesizes the contribu tions that the aforementioned body of international law and civil society has made to the development of a gendered approach to human security during armed conflict. The th ree main foci of the resolution are: first, the need to increase gender-specific prot ections for women and girls during armed conflict, particularly from sexual and gender-b ased violence; second, the need to increase womens participation at all levels of deci sion-making in national a nd regional legislative bodies, peace agreements, and the design of post-conflict reconstruc tion processes; and third, the need to gender-mainstream all aspects of UN peacekeeping operations (Cockburn 2007). To see the resolution in full, refer to Appendix B on page 132. Although the content of the resolution fo cuses largely on the n eed to increase the number of women in conflictresolution and peacebuilding m easures, a number of policy prescriptions aimed at redressing SGBV during and after armed conflict are made. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 call for more female officers and staff in peacekeeping missions, the provision of gender-sens itivity training to mission pe rsonnel and UN member state military and police, and the establishment of gender divisions within peacekeeping missions to oversee the integration of ge nder analysis in ground operations (UNSC 2000). As later discussed in Chapter Four, th ese measures not only build confidence in 36

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fem ale civilians who associate state agents wi th rape and other forms of abuse, but can also make missions and security sector com ponents better able to respond to systematic SGBV during armed conflict or its widespre ad occurrence in postconflict settings. Paragraphs 8(a) and 12 of the resoluti on deal with the gender-mainstreaming of DDR programs and post-conflict reconstructi on operations, calling for the provision of gender-specific services to women and girl s (UNSC 2000). These could include medical testing for sexually transmitted infections or trauma counseling for survivors of rape and sexual abuse. Contrary to masculinist definitio ns of combatant that have informed past DDR programs only made available to men, wome n and girls frequently play active roles as combatants and as troop support, and ma ny endure repeated rape and sexual abuse by male combatants. Thus, their inclusion into DDR programs is paramount in ensuring the full disarmament and demobilization of a society seeking reconciliation and peace; furthermore, due to the complications that arise from these female combatants enduring years of rape, sexual abuse or forced marri age, many require gender-specific services such as obstetric and gynecological care or counseling. Later discu ssed in Chapter Four, the provision of psychosocial counseling to male ex-combatants who have committed acts of SGBV could also be included in DDR programs. Most relevant to Resolution 1325s capacity to address systematic and widespread SGBV are paragraphs 8(c), 9, 10 and 11, which re fer to rule of law. These paragraphs call on member states and parties to armed conflic t to respect the huma n rights of women and girls in the judiciary, police, electoral and constitutional systems; to respect IHL and IHRL as they pertain to women and girl s during armed conflict and in transitional periods, specifically legal instruments that de signate acts of SGBV as war crimes, crimes 37

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against humanity, and acts of ge nocide; to take special m easures during latent conflict to protect women and girls from rape and se xual abuse by armed forces; and to combat impunity by prosecuting perpetrators of SGBV particularly when they constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or acts of ge nocide after the cessati on of conflict and to exclude such acts from amne sty provisions (UNSC 2000). Resolution 1325 does not make explic it a connection between the physical insecurity of women and that of the state. However, the prior discussion of the resolutions drafting and adopti on suggest that this normative foundation is implicit in the language of the document, as it rests on a body of international law r ecognizing the utility of mass rape and sexual abuse as weapons of war and women-led civil society activism that worked for over a decade to draw attenti on to these abuses. By providing a historical overview of IHL, IHRL and Resolution 1325, I have delineated the international normative foundation from which we can trace th e implementation of the resolution to the state level in order to test its efficacy in addressing systematic and widespread SGBV and gauge the extent to which norm disseminatio n is (or is not) o ccurring. The following chapter presents data on th e aforementioned measures of Resolution 1325 in Haiti, Timor-Leste, Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia. 38

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Chapter Three Case Studies in the Implemen tation of Resolution 1325 Introduction In the following chapter, I examine th e implementation of Resolution 1325 as it pertains to systematic sexual and gender-based violence across four cases of armed conflict. The first case covered is Haiti, beginning with the patterns of systematic sexual and gender-based political violence that emerge d during the three-year military coup lead by General Raoul Cedrs from 1991 to 1994, th rough the present political upheaval and insecurity among former armed forces, militia and armed gangs. Second, I will consider the case of Timor-Leste, and Indonesias 24-yea r occupation of the territory beginning in 1975 and ending violently in 1999 after the Ea st-Timorese voted for independence in a referendum. Here, SGBV was used systemati cally by Indonesian milita ry and militia to cement Indonesian domination over the annexe d territory. Third, I consider the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, beginning with the onset of civil war in 1997 until the present fighting among the C ongolese military and rebel insurgents in the eastern provinces of the country, despit e a January 2008 ceasefire. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are used as systema tic weapons of war on a massive scale in the DRC, and as a result have become socially embedded practices among civilians even where armed conflict no longer threatens civili an security. Lastly, I examine the 14-year civil war in Liberia, with particular attention paid to th e second phase of the war that rekindled in 1997 and ended with the Lusaka Accords in 2003. During this period, SGBV 39

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was used by arm ed forces and rebel insurgents to systematically terrorize and dominate civilian populations, in addition to the for ced abduction and conscription of women girls into armed factions. The universe of cases can be referred to in Appendix A on page 131; this universe of cases is comprised of periods of armed conflicts where SGBV was used as a weapon of war or political violence. The selected cla ss of cases was chosen in order to evaluate the normative and practical imp act that Resolution 1325 has had in redressing systematic SGBV, as well as identifying barriers to its further impl ementation. Each case is an armed conflict where sexual and gender-based were used as systematic weapons of warfare or political violence and was host to a UN peacekeeping mission in the wake of armed conflict slightly before or after the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000. Regional and cultural diversity and availability of data were also c onsiderations in the selection of cases. Qualitative analysis is used in order to illuminate the diversity of each cases experience. Therefore, data presented for each case will not necessa rily be symmetrical, but rather lend itself to a holistic comparis on of each countrys unique history of SGBV in armed conflict and subsequent implemen tation of Resolution 1325. The structure of the comparison is roughly divided into five core parts in order to approximate readily comparable data. These parts include (i) a curs ory overview of the structural and cultural violence against women in each country (in wh ich much nuance is collapsed for the sake of this projects scope); (ii) a general overview of each armed conflic t; (iii) modalities of SGBV that emerged during and after the conf lict; (iv) an review of the UN peacekeeping mission deployed in each country, the breadth of its mandate as it pertains to SGBV and 40

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Resolution 1 325, and the gender division of each mission responsible for the resolutions implementation; and (v) specific measures undertaken by the mission to address SGBV under Resolution 1325, which may include the gender-mainstreaming of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs, legal and constitutional reform, or gendersensitive security sector reform, among other measures. Presentation of Cases Haiti Haitian men and women cohabit a society marked by a rigid, gendered division of labor and social roles (NZengou-Tayo 1998). Haitian women are socialized from an early age to aspire to the roles of primary caregivers and nurturers, often leading to their marginalization from the public and political realms. Perceptions of a womans chastity play an important role in determining a Haiti an womans social curr ency, especially her ability to marry. Due to widespread miscon ceptions about sexual assault that conflate rape with sexual intercourse, a raped wo man, if previously a virgin, is no longer considered chaste, making rape particular ly traumatic and shameful for young Haitian women (NZengou-Tayo 1998:129) Prior to 2005, this gender bias was visibl e in Haitian penal co des pertaining to the crime of rape. Though illegal, the crime of rape in Haiti was widely understood as an assault on a womans morals, implicitly perpet uating the notion that shame lies with the victim. Rape, under the Haitian penal code, is among those crimes considered to be assaults on morals. This classifica tion of rape reflects the perception that the harm inflicted by the assault consists of damage to the victims morals or honor, rather than to her physical integrity and well-being. The 41

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investigation and prosecution of rape thus routinely stress not the physical harm done to the woman, but rather the status of her honor or morals. Consequently, women who allege ra pe must endure public scrutiny of their morality (HRW 1994: 21) In addition to an inadequate legal definition of rape, the judicial process in Haiti requires that a victim provide a rape certificate from a medical center verifying the assault occurred (HRW 1994). The lack of medical fac ilities and services in much of the country (due to recurrent periods of political upheaval) and cost prevent victims from attaining a certificate that they can presen t to police personnel. Furthermore, a civilian lack of trust in the security sector that was fostered dur ing the three-year coup continues to discourage women from reporting their assaults. It is of ten assumed that the police will not take the crime seriously or that the generally inefficacious judicial system will not be able to deter reprisal attacks on the victim (UNIFEM 2009a). These cultural and legal understandings of rape converge to make rape a humiliating experience for Haitian women. If sexual violence can be understood along a spectrum of social, economic and political violence (Moser and Clark 2001), we can assume that cultural and structural violence against women in Haiti contributed to the use of SGBV as a weapon of political violence during the escalation of armed conflict. Systematic and widespread SGBV as politic al violence emerged first during the Cedrs military junta that controlled Haiti from 1991 to 1994, and persists in the current security vacuum engendered by political upheaval after President Jean Bertrand Aristides exile in 2004. 42

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Conflict background Haitis current political, social and econom ic upheaval is not the product of a hot war, per se. Having secured its independen ce over 200 years ago, Haiti was subject to successive authoritarian regimes for most of its lifespan, often bolstered by elitist selfinterest, an overdeveloped military, and willingness of political agents to resort to violence. In February 1991, after 35 years of authoritarian ru le under the Duvalier dictatorship, Jean-Bertrand Ar istide was inaugurated as the first democratically elected president of Haiti, under the Fanmi Lavala s political banner, a populist coalition comprised of rural peasants, the urban poor students, grassroots organizers and academics (Pezullo 2006). In September, th e Armed Forces of Haiti (FADH), enacted a coup, imposed martial law, exiled Aristide and consolidated control over the nation, led by Brigadier General Raoul Cedrs. This thr ee-year coup was characterized by flagrant human rights abuses and extreme political violen ce against civilians, of which systematic SGBV was a common weapon. Following Aristides return to pow er in 1994, relative civil order was reestablished, though marked by a sustained UN presence. As part of Aristides series of reforms to ensure a long-term reconciliation and peace, he disbanded the military in 1994, established a Truth and Justice Commission, and cha nneled energies towards security sector reform (SSR) (Pezullo 2006). During Aristides second term as President, popular discontent began to mount again. Th is opposition is believed to have been partially comprised of former FADH officer s, insurgents part of the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), and military attaches that supported the 1991-1994 coup; these factions were not fully disarmed during Aristides 1994 program. 43

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In February of 2004, Aristide was again ous ted by this popular unrest (U NIFEM 2009a). After the appointment of Supreme Court Ch ief Justice Boniface Alexandre as Interim President, the UN Security Council passe d Resolution 1529 that created the United Nation Stabilization Mission in Haiti, al so known by its French acronym, MINUSTAH in June of 2004 (UNIFEM 2009a). Modalities of sexual and gender-based violence Prior to the Cedrs military regime, sexua l violence had been used extensively as a weapon of political repression and terro r during the Duvalier ist era. Under the Duvaliers, a notorious loyalist militia called th e Ton Ton Macoutes, that swelled to over 300,000 members by the mid 1970s used SGBV as a method of political violence: The Duvalier dictatorship encouraged violence against women and used rape as torture against the wives and daughters of political opponents. This violence was to be overshadowed only by the 1991-4 repression (NZengou-Tayo 1998). The ascendancy of the Cedrs junta sa w a sharp spike in the frequency and intensity of political violence, with sexual and gender-based violen ce being a preferred method of intimidation and torture used ag ainst female political opposition by the FADH, the Haitian National Police (HNP), an arme d paramilitary group called the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRA PH) and armed gangs known loosely as zenglendos thought to be implicitly tolerated by th e military regime in order to bolster civilian discomfort and insecurity (HRW 1994). Beginning with the military coup in 1994, three primary patterns of sexual violence are identifiable. First, ra pe or the threat of rape as political repression towards women publicly affiliat ed with popular organizations, especially grassroots organizations worki ng with human rights and womens rights. 44

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Second SGBV was used as a weap on of te rror and intimidation during military and paramilitary interrogative sweeps of homes believed to be pro-Aristide. The third pattern was the opportunistic rape of unaccompan ied women in pro-Aristide neighborhoods by military attaches (HRW 1994). Haiti is no longer controlled by the stranglehold of a military junta, but these patterns of SGBV c ontinue to shape reality for Haitian women and girls. In each of the scenarios, SGBV was operationali zed along ideological lines and performed in a gender-conscious way. Reports from womens rights gr oups in Haiti reveal that women also are targeted for abuse in ways and for reasons that men are no t. Uniformed military personnel and their civilian allies have threatened and attacked womens organizations for their work in defense of womens rights and have subjected women to sex-specific abuses [emphasis added] ranging from bludgeoning womens breast s to rape. (HRW 1994:2) SGBV exacted by state agents against wome ns rights organizations served a twofold purpose: first, the Cedrs regime launched an active campaign of terror and intimidation against all popular po litical organizations that cha llenged the coups legitimacy or expressed pro-Aristide political beliefs. Womens groups in Haiti were often worked for human rights and social justice, and their disbandment meant less public opposition to the authoritarian junta. In 1994, Human Rights Watch reported that mobilization around womens issues has decreased dramatically, making the documentation of abuses against women doubly difficult (HRW 1994:6). According to Moser and Clark, grassroots organizations, often largely women-organized, ar e generators of horiz ontal social capital during and after conflict (2001) If grassroots organizations are unable to get strong foothold in Haitian society duri ng post-conflict reconstruction, this could further hinder the process of reconciliation and levels of trust in communities that are requisite for human security. 45

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The junta publicly targe ting women with rape for th eir imputed public political involvement helped to rigidify highly pros cribed gender roles in Haitian society, upon which militarized masculinity is often dependent (Enloe 1989; 2001). Though a Haitian womens movement developed under the thumb of the Duvalier regime and continued to remain active through th e election of Aristide, prevailing notions of traditional Haitian feminine propriety dictate that the public political sphere is re served for men, with domestic and low-end commercial realms reserved for women (NZengou-Tayo 1998). Thus, a woman who injects herself into Hait ian politics and simultaneously speaks out in ideological opposition against a highly militarized government makes a double transgression. In a 2005 interview with Peacewomen, the Senior Gender Adviser of MINUSTAH, Nadine Puechguirbal, cited pers istent insecurity and violence against women in Haiti as two impediments to the effective collaboration of MINUSTAH with civil society organiza tions (Shteir 2004). The second prevailing pattern of SGBV during the Cedrs military regime occurred during military, paramilitary, and att ach force sweeps of households believed to be pro-Lavalas. A common scenario would be the forcible entry of armed forces into homes at night, where they looted goods, violently terrorized fa mily members, and searched for the male head of household for arrest or summary execution (HRW 1994). When armed state agents could not find a ma le head of household during their sweeps, they would often beat and rape female relativ es to further intimidate the male head of household and derail the familys subversive political leanin gs (HRW 1994). If male relatives were present, it was common for attach es or paramilitary forces to rape female family members in front of their male rela tives and children, using the bodies of women 46

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as comm unicative threats to their male counterparts (HRW 1994). At this time, a widespread phenomenon called marronage was occurring, where many Lavalas men left the urban landscape for the count ryside, leaving their homes and families, in order to evade political pers ecution. In effect, marronage created thousands of single female head-of-households, especially in the slums of Port-auPrince, making women more vulnerable to gender-based abuses (HRW 1994). The third pattern included the seemingly opportunistic rape of unaccompanied women in neighborhoods reputed to be pro-La valas by military atta ches. The attaches would often make reference to the woman s political beliefs thr oughout the duration of the assault, pointing to the political and ideo logical nature of the attacks (HRW 1994). In each of the aforementioned scenarios, politic ally motivated sexual assault of women is operationalized as a form of collective repre ssion exacted by aggressors on a community representing polit ical opposition. The patterns of sexual violence that ha d emerged during the coup persisted after Aristides return. The Special Rapporteur on Violence Agains t noted in January of 2000 that, the phenomenon of zenglendos, or thugs, breaking into houses at any time, raping and beating the women, started during the Cedrs regime as a form of political pressure but has now become a common practice of criminal gangs, terrorizing the entire population (UNIFEM 2009a). During the in itial period of viol ence in January 2004, instances of politically motivated and opportunistic rape in creased exponentially, especially against young girls (2009a). A report on human rights abuses occurring between 2003-2004 estimates that 35,000 Haitian females were victim to rape and other forms of SGBV, over half of who were under age 18 (Kolbe and Hutson 2006). The 47

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dem ographics of the perpetrators reflect th e factiousness of Haiti s political landscape: armed anti-government gangs, ex-members of both FADH and FRAPH, the HNP, UN Peacekeeping troops and common criminals ha ve all been implicated in committing SGBV against female civilians. The same report also noted that approximately 14 per cent of crimes of SGBV between the 2003 to 2005 period were committed by HNP officers (Kolbe and Hudson 2006). MINUSTAH MINUSTAHs mandate, initially defined in Resolution 1542 resolution, recalls the UN Security Councils commitment to Resolution 1325 (UNSC 2004). Though no specific mention of systematic SGBV is made in Resolution 1542, it does make cursory reference to the importance of gender-mainstreaming in the missions duties. Among MINUSTAHs responsibilities under its manda te were to help the transitional government design a DDR program, with par ticular attention paid to women and children; to assist the Transitional Gove rnment in preparations for 2005 elections, ensuring that women were accu rately represented at the voting polls; and finally, to promote and enforce human rights law, with particular attention paid to vulnerable groups (i.e. women and children) (UNIFEM 2009a). MINUSTAHs efforts to enforce human rights law and implement UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 can be considered spo tty at best. Since its deployment in 2004, the mission has been accused of not interpre ting their mandate broadly enough to protect Haitian civilians from SGBV. Moreover, there have been credible allegations of peacekeeping troops sexually exploiting and raping female Haitians (Puechguirbal 2007). In November 2007, 108 Sri Lankan blue helmet soldiers were repatriated due to 48

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collective charges of sexual abuse and exploitation (S EA) (Scherr 2008). Currently, Brazilian an d Jordanian peacekeepers, comp rising the majority of MINUSTAH military contingents, have been known to rape and sexually exploit Haitian women with impunity (UNIFEM 2009a). For many Haitians, the legacy of sexual gender-based violence in the security sector and the mistrust that it fostered within civilians has been reinforced by MINUSTAHs alleged multiple sexual abuses Further exacerbating the phenomenon of SGBV and SEA in the mission is MINUSTAH s less-than-equitable gender ratio. With women comprising 1.54 per cent of total milit ary contingents in December of 2008 and 5.54 per cent of the UN civilian police force 22 per cent of internati onal staff and only 11 per cent of local staff, these proportions fa ll short of what is desirable for the full implementation of Resolution 1325 (Shteir 2004; DPKO 2009). In 2004, the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH wa s established simultaneously with the missions deployment to Haiti; it was the fi rst peacekeeping mission to have been initially deployed with a Gender Division in tact from the onset (Shteir 2005). Nadine Puechguirbal, the Senior Gender Advisor to MINUSTAH appointed in 2004, defines the mission of the Gender Unit as 1) promoting the particip ation of women in the electoral and political processes as candidates and votes; 2) working on a strategy to enable women and girls to leave the endless cycle of armed violence in [Haitis] slums; and 3) contributing to a national strategy on eradicating violence against women with the particip ation of both women and men. (Puechguirbal 2007) Pursuant to these goals, the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH is responsible for gendermainstreaming each component of the missions operations in the host country and also for building the capacity of Haitian civil so ciety organizations to become activity involved and respond to these issues (Shteir 2004; Puechguirbal 2007). 49

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Following Resolution 1325s recommendations, the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH incorporates gender-sensitivity training for a ll civilian personnel arriving in Port-auPrince (Shteir 2005). The Gender Unit has been a part of is greatly constrained by budgetary limitations and the pr ecarious security situation outside of and even within certain parts of Port-au-Prince. These constraints mean that it provides only limited gender-sensitivity training to a small porti on of military peacekeeping forces on the ground. Senior Gender Advisor Nadine Puec hguirbal highlights the difficulties of providing gender-sensitivity training in a 2004 interview, saying that Due to a lack of human resources, time and logistics, we are not able to deliver gender training to the military contingents that are deployed throughout the country, outside of Port-au-PrinceAlthough gender training is not the key that solves all problems of misunderstanding gender issues, I strongly believe that it he lps break the ice around a sensitive subject and paves the way for further exchanges and initiatives. (Shteir 2004) The provision of gender-sensitivity training, including providing troops with information about how to protect civilian s from SGBV and deal with these crimes properly, is paramount in enabling the Mission to address its systematic and widespread nature in Haiti. When MINUSTAHs Senior Gender Advisor Nadine Puechguirbal was asked what the current peacekeeping mission is doing to engage local women in peacebuilding efforts, she responded that The Gender Unit is involved in a few projects with womens organizations. The main problem these da ys is the increase in the level of violence that prevents us from implem enting our activities in the field (not to mention the fear, the lack of conf idence of local men and women in the future of their country, and the impact that the current volatile security situation has on their spirits. (Shteir 2004: 2) 50

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Puechguirbals comm ent highlights the critic al nexus between physical security and political participation. Politic al violence, and particularly sexual and gender-based violence hinder the ability of MINUSTAH and civil society organizations to advance the goals of Resolution 1325, which in the long -run may perpetuate a vicious cycle of insecurity and armed conflic t when used as weapons. In keeping with Resolution 1325, the Gender Unit is involved in an interagency initiative called the Inter-Agency Ac tion Plan on Violence Against Women. Here, MINUSTAHs Gender Division work s in tandem with other UN agencies to mainstream gender-sensitivity training in all UN agen cies on-the-ground and incorporate genderspecific needs into the provision and disp ersion of aid and services within the peacekeeping mission (UNIFEM 2009a). In addition, UNIFEM launched a program entitled Supporting Womens Engagement in Peacebuilding and Preventing Sexual Violence in Conflict: Commun ity-Led Approaches in 2007 (UNIFEM 2007a). The twoyear program, its partners including the Gender Unit of MINUSTAH, the Ministry of Womens Condition and Womens Rights a nd Haitian womens organizations, was allocated $ 1 million USD to improve Haitis judicial, social, and educational framework for combating SGBV through local female-led initiatives (UNIFEM 2009a). Focal points of the program include school-based outreac h to educate youth about SGBV, justicesector trainings and the initiation of a comm unity advocacy program for rape victims, a grant program for womens organizations that deal with SGBV and incorporating men and boys into educational programs, social awareness and community outreach (UNIFEM 2009a). To date, this is the most comprehensive program that advances the goals of Resolution 1325, with its emphasis on the nexus between all-inclusive security 51

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and the eradication of SGBV, though its m eager budget may be determinant of its limitations. Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reinsertion Since Aristides return to Haiti in 1994 un til the present, a series of Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reinsertion Programs have been implemented in Haiti, first for exFADH and FRAPH combatants after the military was disbanded in 1994, and more recently in the 2006 for members of the arme d insurgency in 2004 (that includes former members of the aforementioned groups, in addition to armed gangs and former military attaches). Due to the failures of the firs t DDR program, it is estimated that 210,000 small arms and weapons continue to circulate th roughout Haiti, many in the hands of these former combatants (UNIFEM 2009a). In line with its 2004 mandate, MINUSTAH partnered with the Transitiona l Government in 2006 to design a community-based DDR program for armed groups, the results of which are vague due to the Transitional Governments ambiguous commitment to the programs success (UNSC 2006). In recognition of its responsibility under its mandate to include vulnerable groups such as a women and children in DDR, and due to the community-based approach to DDR, MINUSTAH has attempted to include wome n in community dialogues and awarenessraising about the program, noting that their involvement is indispensable to the DDR process (UNIFEM 2009a). However, due to th e unclear progress of the program, and the residual possession of small arms by gangs and former military and paramilitary troops, rates of SGBV remain high, especially wher e dense populations are competing for scarce resources and aid distribution remains a reality (UNIFEM 2009a). 52

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Police r eform The HNP are known throughout Haiti to ha ve been agents of SGBV against female civilians during the 1991 to 1994 coup and during the political upheaval following Aristides 2004 departure (HRW1994; Kolbe and Hutson 2006). As part of MINUSTAHs original mandate, which stipulat es that it is to aid the Transitional Government in restructuring the HNP, includi ng the vetting of former personnel, hiring and training new recruits, and providing gender training as pa rt of this process (UNSC 2004). MINUSTAH and the Transitional Governme nt began restructuring of the HNP in 2006; in line with Resolution 1325s recomme ndations for security sector reform, MINUSTAH continues to mainstream gender issues in the Haitian National Police through the development of educational material for the Police Academy and training jointly w ith the National Police gender focal points. A registration exercise aimed at encouraging women to join the police force resulted in thousands of women applying for some 150 places in the twentieth class; 710 women passed the entrance examination. (UNSC 2008c: para. 31) As of 2008, only five per cent of HNP offi cers are female. This percentage is disappointing, as target goals for female offi cers within the police force should be 30 per cent or more; especially when considering that a plurality of cases of SGBV between the 2003 to 2005 period were committed by HNP officers (Kolbe and Hutson 2006). Womens rights organizations ha ve suggested that the creati on of an all-female police unit to deal with crimes of SGBV would also be helpful in curtailing male chauvinism within the HNP, something that prevents many women from reporting these crimes (Brown 2004). The Secretary General corroborat ed this point in his April 2004 Report to the Security Council, noting that measures to improve the security situation for Haitian women should address [t]he need for female police officers and officers trained in dealing with victims of sexual and domestic violence (UNIFEM 2009a). 53

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Legal reform and judicial impunity The Haitian judicial system has always been crippled by an overdeveloped bureaucracy, corruption and deep-seated patria rchal gender bias. This was particularly true of the judiciary between 1991 and 1994, during the Cedrs coup. During this time judicial redress for victims was not a viable option, as th e judicial system was under complete control of the military. Additionally, there was no law enforcement agency distinct from the Haitian army for victims of politically motivated rape and sexual abuse to report such crimes to. In 1994 Human Right s Watch found that the level of corruption and military mismanagement of the judicial system was so severe that [t]here is no reason for anyone, and especially a victim of rape, particularly if her assailants are the military, paramilitary forces, or anyone else even nebulously associated with th e military, to believe that there is a chance for judicial redress. It just wont happen. Furthermore, the woman would probably be putting her life in danger. (HRW 1994: 18) After the signing of the Governors Is land Accord (effectiv ely ending the junta and putting Aristide back in power) in 1994, the United Nations/Organization of American States (UN/OAS) Civilian Missi on to Haiti arrived to oversee the full implementation of the accord (Pezullo). Upon its arrival to Haiti in January, the UN/OAS mission documented 66 cases of political ra pe during the regime (estimates of undocumented and unreported political rape are much higher), in addition to a number of other flagrant violations of human right s committed by the junta (HRW 1994). Despite these findings, a sweeping amnesty provision was included in the Governors Island Accord to vanquish the FADH, FRAPH, HNP and military atta ches of any responsibility for these acts between 1991 and 1994, includi ng politically motivated acts of SGBV. 54

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This am nesty provision no doubt ha s contributed to the presentday culture of impunity in Haiti and entrenchment of a Haitian rape culture. The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women reports that women who suffered violence during the Cedr s regime (1991-1994) have never received any measure of justice for the crimes committed against them. In fact, many perpetrators continue to mix in the communities with the women they violated. (UNIFEM 2009a) In light of the inadequate legal definiti on of rape in the Haitian Penal code, in 2005 the Haitian governments Council of Mini sters revised the statute to change the crimes status from one that constituted indecent assault to sexual assault. The current statute states that [a]ttempted or actual rape or other sexual assault accompanied by violence, threats, surprise or psychological pr essure against the victim, whether male or female, is punishable by 10 years of hard labour (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2007). Legal reform aside, domestic violence and rape rates remain high. This has been attributed to victims resistance to report crimes, due in part to a lack of confidence in a corrupt judicial system and the ineptitude of the HNP in dealing with victims of SGBV (Brown 2004). Haitian womens groups have suggested that the creation of a special court to try crimes of SGBV, as well as setting up special police units within the HNP, would be proactive steps in comba ting gender bias and impunity (Brown 2004). Conclusion A 2008 Secretary General report submitted to the Security Council that domestic violence was the most common form of violence against women, followed by sexual violence. However, the report noted that pa tterns of sexual violence had shifted since 2004 to 2006, with rates of gang rape having decr eased slightly, possibly attributable to 55

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im proved security, improved access to information for victims and public awareness campaigns (UNSC 2008c). Although the implem entation of Resolution 1325 has resulted in significant reconfigurations of Haitis inst itutional capacity to combat rape and sexual abuse, residually high rates in the country, c oupled with recurrent insecurity imply that the resolutions impact leaves much to be desired. The limitations that constrain Resolution 1325s ability to address SGBV in Haiti include a biased and corrupt judiciary, a legacy of SEA in the HNP and even within MINUSTAH, the continued circulation of small arms making violent ac ts against women more likely, and deeply embedded structural and cultura l violence against women. Timor Leste The newly formed nation of Timor Leste has had comparatively more success with the implementation of Resolution 1325, despite a historical legacy of sexual and gender-based violence that was cemented dur ing Indonesias occupation of the territory lasting from 1975 to 1999 (Abeysekera 2006). Re solution 1325s imprints can be seen with the establishment of UNTAET, the United Nation Transitional Authority for East Timor, the first peacekeeping mission to ha ve a separate Gender Affairs Unit (GAU) (Schroeder, Farr and Schnabel 2005). The GAU f acilitated the estab lishment of Timors first government agency that deals specifica lly with gender-mainstreaming, the Office for the Promotion of Equality, a permanent fixt ure in Timor Lestes elected government since 2002. 56

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Conflict background and modaliti es of sexua l and gender-based violence In November 1975, Portugal granted Timor-L este its independence after centuries of colonial rule. Less than a month later, Indonesia invaded Timor with the intent to annex the territory, and launched a year-long battle against the East Timorese militia, Armed Forces of National Liberation of Ea st Timor (FALINTIL), the armed wing of the pro-liberation group The Revolutionary Front for an Independent Timor-Leste (FREITLIN) (UNIFEM 2009c). In one year, over 100,000 East Timorese died and over 600,000 were displaced from rural communities to Indonesian-military run refugee camps in West Timor, where many were expos ed to sub-standard living conditions and insecurity; women and girls became particul arly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse within these camps (UNIFEM 2009c). The Indonesian military occupation had profoundly gendered impacts for East Timorese civilians and combatants. The armed conflict between Indonesian military forces and pro-integrationist militia and FA LINTIL during the 25-ye ar occupation at one point rendered 45 per cent of East Timorese women widows, creating tens of thousands single-parent households in a country fraught by high levels of unemployment and almost non-existent state capacity and services (2009c). It was not uncommon for East Timorese women to be coerced into sexual slavery; these marriages with Indonesian military officers were arranged in exchange for liv elihood and extra protection (Abeysekera 2006). Women who were involved in the resistance front, either politically in FRETILINs womens party, the Popular Orga nization of Women of Timor, or as mobilized female combatants in FALINTIL, we re especially vulnerable to systematic 57

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SGBV at the hands of Indonesian m ilitary and militia, as were female relatives of known political dissidents (Whittington 2003). More generally, systematic rape, forced marriage, and sexual slavery were used throughout Indonesias occupati on as a method of solidifying Indonesian sovereignty in Timor-L este (Schroeder, Farr and Schnabel 2005). A 1998 Report from the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women details the decades of mass rape endured by East Ti morese women during the occupation: .the Indonesian military and the local militias in East Timor used rape as a method of torture and intimidation against the local population.Several girl s (below 18) and wo men testified about extensive torture, rape and sexua l slavery during 1980, and about the creation of entire communities of widow s. Women spoke of being raped in front of their families and communities. Others referred to the problems they faced with their communities as a consequence of bearing children as a result of rape. (Abeysekera 2006: 11) In 1998 Indonesia brokered an agreement with Portugal, East Timor and the United Nations to allow a referendum where East Timorese could vote for their independence. In 1999, the referendum was held under the auspices of the United Nations Mission to East Timor (UNAMET), and the East Timorese voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence. This vote triggered violent Indonesian backlash: the Indonesian military and pro-integration militia launched Operation Global Clean Sweep that entailed massive strikes on East Timorese villages and cities, decimating institutional capacity. When UNTAET mission arrived in October of 1999, 90 per cent of the countrys infrastructure, in cluding government buildings medical centers, schools and commerce districts had been destroyed (Whittington 2003). Accompanying this upsurge in armed vi olence and destruction was a drastic increase in the systematic use of SGBV by the military against female East Timorese as collective punishment for Timorese resistance: 58

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After 1999, Indonesian military frequently used rape as a form of torture and intimidation against resistance movements. Sexual slavery was also common with soldiers on duty in Timor-Leste reportedly demanding sexual services or a live-in arrangeme nt, threatening to harm a family member if she didnt comply. Relativ es of political opponents were raped by the military as a form of revenge or to force dissidents out of hiding. During the post-referendum rampage, pro-Indonesian militias used gang rape as a tool of war. (UNIFEM 2009c) Statistical data providing the exact number of victims and instances of sexual violence during Indonesian occupati on and months surrounding the 1999 referendum are not available for a number of reasons. First, the destruction of government records occurred during Operation Global Clean Sweep; second, a climate of impunity for sexual violence prevailed during Indonesian rule, discouraging female victims from reporting crimes of sexual assault committed by the Indonesia military, militia or police forces; third, the dictates of patriarchal East Timorese cultu re strongly influenced by the legacy of Portuguese colonization and the Catholic Chur ch, and further entrenched by the presence of a heavily masculinist Indonesian military. Ea ch of these factors made sexual assault a stigmatizing taboo for many East Timorese wo men, preventing them from reporting these crimes (Schroeder, Farr and Schnabel 2005). As internal displacement continues to be a problem for the East Timorese, so does SGBV and SEA within these camps. In 1999, the Indonesian-led violence resulted in over 250,000 East Timorese refugees fleeing to Indonesian military-r un refugees camps. Recurrent reports of sub-par living conditions and a lack of gender-specific protection mechanisms for women and girls led the United Nations High Comm ission for Refugees to establish refugee camps in Timor-Les te (UNIFEM 2009c). According to reports, women in Indonesian-run military camps were often solicited for sex in exchange for food or protection. In 2006 tensions between the national police and national army 59

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created a security vacuum, leading to m assive gang-led violence in and around the Capital of Dili. Over 100,000 civilians were displaced to refugee camps; the UNCHR was forced to pull out of Timor due to budge tary constraints and security concerns, despite reports of sexual abuse and exploitation within camps (UNIFEM 2009c). UNTAET UNTAET would be the first peacekeeping mission charged with implementing Resolution 1325 on the ground (after it was adopted in 2000). Its broad and integrative mandate that called not only for the protection and security of East Timorese civilians, but also for overseeing the peaceful transiti on to elected government institution-building, revitalizing a non-existent economy and upholdi ng a strong commitment to human rights (Whittington 2003). This commitment to human rights outlined in the mandate made strong reference to upholding the terms of the CEDAW, stating that all persons undertaking public duties or holding public office in East Timor shall observe internationally recognized human rights standards[including] the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Di scrimination against Women of 17th, December 1979 (Whittington 2003). The creation of a Gender Affairs Unit (GAU) in 2001 and a broad mandate to oversee Timor through peaceful and all-inclusiv e transition to stable democracy allowed UNTAET to facilitate a number of on-t he-ground initiative s with the aim of mainstreaming gender awareness in all UN gr ound operations, promoting gender-equality in political, social and economic spheres of Timor-Leste, and combating the residual, widespread occurrence of SGBV. The GAU included a senior gender specialist, a program specialist, a legislative and policy analyst, a statistician, a communication and 60

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inf ormation specialist, and a civil society a nd district liaison officer (Whittington 2003). Part of the GAUs internal gender-mainstr eaming policies included bi-monthly genderawareness training for civilian staff member s, with quarterly training provided for civilian police and military contingents (Whittington 2003). Given the lack of sexdisaggregated data on post-conflict Timor-Les te, one of the key functions of the GAU was the collection of data that demonstrated methodological gender-sensitivity, specifically with respect to SGBV (Wh ittington 2003). Ultimately, the GAU enabled the establishment of a permanent institutional fixture in Timor-Lestes first independent government in 2002, the Office for the Prom otion of Equality (OPE) whose four programmatic components include .Gender Mainstreaming, the Promotion of a Culture of Equality, Addressing Gender Based Violence and the Empowerment of Women [emphasis added] (UNIFEM 2009a). The nexus between SGBV and gender-based political marginalization of women in Timor-Leste has lead the GAU, UNIFEM, a host of regional and domestic civil society actors, the East Timorese Ministry of Justi ce and Secretary of State to launch a countrywide program called Supporting Womens Engagement in Peace Building and Preventing Sexual Violence: Community-Led Approaches (UNIFEM 2007b). TimorLestes allocated budget of $519,911 USD will be directed pr imarily towards training women in conflict resolution at the community level in addition to providing funding to grassroots organizations that work to educate East Ti morese about SGBV (UNIFEM 2007b). As part of the program, UNIFEM-funded training will also be provided to police, judicial actors, local authorit ies and village councils about relevant SGBV legislation and 61

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the responsibility of these governm ent actors to swiftly a nd seriously respond to charges of SGBV. In conjunction with GAUs efforts to gender-mainstream UNTAET operations, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) provided intensive gendersensitivity training to its military continge nts. The DPKO demonstrated concern for the possible sexual exploitation and abuse of East Timorese civilians by taking gendersensitive measures in logist ical operations on the ground; one such measure was the inclusion of metal detectors at civilian ch eckpoints to prevent physical contact between blue helmet soldiers and East Timorese women (UNIFEM 2009c). Police reform After the transitional authoritys arrival to East Timor in October of 1999, it was apparent that mass SGBV would not be expell ed with the exit of Indonesian military and militia, but that it had become a socialized form of violence in the post-conflict environment as well. In 2000 it was reported that over 30 per cent of East Timorese women experienced some form of domestic violence (UNIFEM 2009c). In 1998, the UN Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Radhika Coomaraswamy suggested in a report that East Timorese society had internalized a culture of violence against women as a result of 24 years of mass rape and sexual abuse during the Indonesi an occupation. This was corroborated by a 2001 policy paper fr om a legislation team commissioned by UNTAET that assessed the social underpinnings of widespread SGBV in Timor-Leste. In response, UNTAETs civilia n police division established a Vulnerable Persons Unit (VPU) in 2000 that deals with cases of sexual and gender-based violen ce and abuse, with particular concern for the differential n eeds of women and children (UNIFEM 2009c). 62

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Fem ale officers were heavily recruited for this post in order to bol ster perceptions of equitable representation and foster trust in vict ims of assault. The initiatives results were startling: Reported cases victims included children and the mentally ill as well as women increased threefold in year after the creation of the VPU, and in December 2001 a record 40 percent of all reported cr imes involved offenses against women [emphasis added] (Whittington 2003: 1286). In addition, the GAU launched an aggressive hiring campaign for the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL) to encourage female recruits; currently, over 15 percent of PNTL officers are female (UNSC 2008g). Legal reform and the judiciary At this time, the GAU was simultaneously developing a working relationship with a host of womens rights NGOs around Timor Lest e, primarily the umbrella organization called REDE Feto (Portuguese for network) that works to adva nce civil and political liberties for women (Abeysekera 2006). Th is relationship between UNTAET and East Timorese womens NGOs led to further strides in Resolution 1325s implementation. After the second East Timorese Womens Congress in 2002, a Womens Charter of Rights was drafted to be included in the new Constitution, which now notably includes language that enshrines gender equality as a fundamental objective of the state (Whittington 2003). In 2003, following Timor-Lestes ratification of the CEDAW, a cooperative effort between the GAU, OPE, UN IFEM and civil society members resulted in draft legislation for a bill providing the most comprehensive definition of sexual and gender-based violence in Timor-L estes history (Abeysekera 2006). 63

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A 2004 Report by the Judicial System M onitoring Program detailed the barriers within the judiciary that prevent women from receiving adequate redress for crimes of domestic violence. At this time over half of all criminal hearings in the East Timorese justice system were crimes of SGBV, though on average only 16 per cent of these hearings proceeded to trial (UNIFEM 2009c). Th ree factors contributing to this culture of impunity are a prevalence of gender bias w ithin the PNTL, who have a reputation for selectively documenting reported SGBV that only cause serious in jury; second, many traditional justice mechanisms are used in ru ral East Timor in place of those under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Prosecutor of Timor-Les te, which often do not prove victim-friendly (UNSC 2008g); fi nally, gender-discriminatory at titudes remain prevalent among key justice actors within th e judicial system (UNIFEM 2007b). In 2000 UNTAET established a Serious Crimes Unit to try war crimes, crimes against humanity and individual crimes of rape, torture and murder committed during the violence that erupted in the months lead ing up to and after the referendum in 1999. The unit continues to function as a branch of The United Nations Integrated Mission (UNMIT) in Timor-Leste, though it remains unde r the jurisdiction of the Timor-Lestes independent judicial system. To date, one cas e of SGBV has been tried in the SCU and successfully convicted a former pro-Indonesi a militia leader of rape during the 1999 violence; he was sentenced to 4 ye ars imprisonment (UNIFEM 2009c). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration After the referendum for independen ce was scheduled in 1999, FALINTIL contingents were taken to a cantonment center to await a DDR program, pending the results of the referendum. After inde pendence, UNTAET stalled the design and 64

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im plementation of a DDR program due to the un clear future of Timors security sector. The Transitional Authority in Timor was uns ure of whether the young nation would need a military, given the absence of external m ilitary threats and its desire to avoid the potentially damaging impact of remilitarizing society. Ultimately, the Transitional authority opted to create a small army, FA LINTILForcas Defesa Timor Lorosae (FFDLT) using 650 former FALINTIL members as its core ( UNIFEM 2009c). A UNTAET-sponsored DDR program was designed for the remaining 1,300 FALINTIL combatants. The DDR program di d not include any component of genderanalysis, and consequently, only male ex-combatants qualified for the program, despite the fact that all-female squads had fought during the FALINTIL re sistance (Schroeder, Farr and Schnabel 2005). The failure of the DDR program to address the issue of armed female ex-combatants, negating their experien ces as active participants in the liberation front during post-conflict r econstruction constitutes one of the weakest points of Resolution 1325s implementation in Timor-Les te. Public recognition of the active roles that women play during armed conflict is essen tial for post-conflict reconstruction if it is to build an inclusive peace founded on the premise that all members of a society are affected by armed conflict (Puechguirbal 2003). Conclusion Resolution 1325s Implementation in Timo r-Leste has been successful to date. While residual sexual and gender-based violen ce and gender-based discrimination persist in both the private and public spheres, the UN and successive elected governments of Timor-Leste have reformed key components of Timor-Lestes budding security sector to be more gender-sensitive. UNTAET-sponsored re forms within the judicial sector, aimed 65

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at ending impunity for perpetrators of SGBV and rooting out gende r-b ias in judicial proceedings have contributed to a stronger in stitutional framework for victims. The UN and East Timorese government partnerships with civil society actors such as REDE Feto have resulted in the creation of a space for political acti on and negotiation for women in Timor-Leste, yielding a constitutional comm itment to gender egalitarianism and the production of victim-empowering domestic violence legislation. The Democratic Republic of Congo The civil wars of the Democratic Re public of Congo (DRC) have engendered some of the most widespread and system atic patterns of sexual violence of any contemporary armed conflict. Due to the sheer size of the country, the protracted nature of the conflict and the sham ing stigmatization suffered by victims of sexual violence, precise data that convey its magnitude ar e not available; however, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimated in 2008 that at least 1,100 cases of rape are reported every month in the DRC (2008. These figures are not necessarily representative of even a fraction of all crimes committed; for example in April of 2008, over 7,000 women reported being raped in North and South Kivu, but this figure is estimated to be about 10 per cent of actual rape rates (UNSC 2008e). The breakdown in security that began in 1994 with the arrival of Hutu refugees fleeing post-genocide Rwanda and peaking in the outbreak of civil war by 1998, saw a sharp increase in the frequency and bruta lity in cases of sexual violence (Pratt and Werchick 2004). It soon become apparent that rape and other forms of SGBV were being used as a systematic weapon by all parties of the conflict, that at one point involved over nine African nations fighting on DRC soil, in addition to numerous loosely-defined rebel 66

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groups. The arrival of the United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in 1999, that now numbers over 17,000 (making it the largest United Nations peacekeeping mission in the world) has helped to reestablish security in most of the DRC, though armed conflict between various rebel factions and the Armed Forces of the Defense of the C ongo (FARDC) continues to embroil the eastern Congolese provinces of North and South Ki vu in a precarious s ecurity situation. An Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) wa s established in the MONUC mission in 2004, making it a priority to implement Re solution 1325 in UN field operations, the Congolese transitional government, and through out Congolese society, with the specific aim to eradicate systematic and widespread SGBV. Though there has been some measurable success with the implementation Resolution 1325, SGBV continues to plague the eastern DCR on a massive s cale. In regions of the count ry that can be considered post-conflict, the legacy of systematic rape in armed c onflict has embedded itself at a community level, and in regions of the country still subject to armed conflict (despite a January 2008 ceasefire agreement) in the eastern Congo, SGBV is still us ed as a tactic of terror, displacement, and ethnically-motivat ed violence by the FARDC and rebel groups such as Congolese Rally for Democracy -Goma, Congolese Rally for DemocracyKisangani-Liberation Movement and th e Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Amnesty International 2008a). Prior to the onset of civil war in the DRC, deeply entrenched gender inequality was a hallmark of Congolese social and poli tical institutions. The Congolese Family Code cemented the predominance of a male head of household and his wifes socioeconomic dependence upon him: Even before the war in Congo, women and girls were 67

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second class citizens. The law as well as so cial norm s defined the role of women and girls as subordinate to menWomen and gi rls are also subordinate by custom and practice. A womens status de pends on being married and gi rls tend to marry at a young age. (HRW 2002:20) Accordingly, many women rely on marriag e as a source of survival, with few economic opportunities for generating self-suffici ent income made available to them. As in many patriarchal societies, marriage or the potential of marriage is easily compromised by a womens questionable chastity or fidelity, which often occu rs with the social stigma that rape brings: Women and girls who are raped suffer significant loss of social status(HRW 2002:20). Before and during civil war, Congolese women in the eastern provinces were routinely excluded from local policy-making governing bodies, further contributing to their marginalization from the public sphere (Puechguirbal 2003b) The long-term impact that over 10 year s of civil wars has had on Congolese women has been marked: approximately 60 to 80 per cent of all Congolese women in the Kivus are single female heads of househol ds (Puechguirbal 2003b). Though solidarity across gendered lines in armed groups is not prevalent on any large scale as was the case of liberation front of Timor-Leste, approxima tely 15 to 20 percent of women served as combatants, soldier support, domestic worker s, or sexual slaves for armed combatants during the first period of civil war from 1998 to 2002 (Puechguibal 2003b). Conflict background After the Hutu-led genocide of Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front forced the exile of a over a million Rwandan Hutus, to the eastern border of the DRC (then-Zaire). In 1996, Rwanda and Uganda mobilized to 68

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invade th e DRC, claiming that former-Interahamwe (those responsible for the Rwandan genocide) posed a threat to regional securit y. A loose alliance of Congolese coalition of rebel factions, the Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberacion du Congo-Zaire (AFDL) led by general Laurent Kabila, and backed by Rwandan and Ugandan government troops advanced into the DRC in 1996 (HRW 2002). By 1997, Kabila deposed Zaires Presiden t Mobutu Sese Seko and renamed Zaire the Democratic Republic of Congo. By 1998, Kabila no longer desired the foreign backing of Rwanda and Uganda, and ordered their troops to wit hdraw, spurring their further incursion into the eastern Congo. In 1999, a ceasefire among the parties to armed conflict was signed in Lusaka, Zambia a nd the MONUC was deployed to oversee the provisions of the Lusaka accord, which in cluded the disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, rehabilitation a nd reintegration (DDRRR) of armed groups, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) among armed factions(HRW 2002). In 2002, the ICD concluded in Sun C ity, South Africa, with the brokering of a power-sharing arrangement for a transitional government including President Joseph Kabila, Laurent Kabilas son who succeeded th e presidency after his assassination in 2001, the AFDL, the rebel group the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo and civil society groups. Despite the successful adoption of a new constitution in 2005 and relatively peaceful presidential and parliamentary el ections in 2006, violence resurged in the Eastern provinces in 2007 between disside nt General Laurent Nkundas paramilitary group Congress for the Defense of the Pe ople (CNDP) and FARDC forces (Amnesty International 2008a). An Act of Engagement agreement was signed in January 2008 69

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am ong the FARDC (Armed Forces of the De mocratic Republic of Congo), CNDP, and the Rwandan-proxy rebel group, the Democratic Front for the Liberati on of Rwanda, that Nkunda claims the FARDC implicitly tolerates and supports (Amn esty International 2008a). The Act of Engagement served as a temporary ceasefire among all armed factions operating in the Eastern DRC, binding the parties to armed conflict to respect standing international humanitarian and human rights law, esp ecially as it pertains to civilians. Since its adoption, t he act of Engagement, the ceas e-fire has been broken on hundreds of occasions, thousands of women and girls have been raped (Amnesty International 2008a: 4). Modalities of sexual and gender-based violence Though a documented history of rape exis ts in pre-war Zaire, it primarily occurred at an individual crim inal level, and in many cases where it occurred, charges of SGBV were often resolved th rough traditional jus tice mechanisms that might include the perpetrator paying reparations to the victims family or marrying the victim (HRW 2002; Pratt and Werchick 2004). An increase in the number of reported rape s and their levels of brutality was noted as early as 1994, with th e influx of Hutu refugees and militia from neighboring Rwanda. By 1996, the patterns of rape witnessed during the tensions leading culminating in civil war were discernibly si milar to those seen during the genocide in Rwanda (Pratt and Werchick 2004). Initially, the violence was attributed to former Interahamwe militia from Rwanda, operating fi rst within the AFDL and later as the Rwandan proxy paramilitary group Rally for Congolese Democracy Pratt and Werchick 2004). However, given the complex and shifti ng nature of militar y, paramilitary and militia alliances that characterize the fighting in the Eastern Congo, it is apparent that all 70

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parties to th e conflict, even the FARDC, ha ve used rape as a systematic strategy for terrorizing and dominating civilian communities. Soldiers and combatants raped and otherwise abused women and girls as part of their effort to win and ma intain control over civilians and the territory they inhabited. They attacked women and girls as representatives of their communities, intending thr ough their injury and humiliation to terrorize the women themselves a nd many others. (HRW 2002:23) Rape typically occurs as pa rt of village-wide raids, in conjunction with the indiscriminate use of force or summary executio n of civilians and pill aging and looting of homes. Abduction and forced sexual slaver y in military camps is also common among paramilitary groups and militia; women are of ten cornered in their homes or while performing agricultural work a nd led to secluded camps where they may be held or a series of days, weeks, or months as domes tic workers or sexual slaves (HRW 2002; Pratt and Werchick 2004; Amnesty International 2008). Additionally, sexual violence may be used to displace entire populations in order to gain access to resources, such as mineral wealth, food, or agricultural implem ents (Pratt and Werchick 2004:8). In addition to military and paramilitary groups, MONUC has registered a rising number of crimes of SGBV committed by po lice personnel, who are rarely brought to justice due to the incapacitated judiciary (UNSC 2008f). The Congolese National Police (PNC) is described as severely understaffed, underpaid, a nd ill-equipped; many officers are ex-combatants hastily integrated into the force with inade quate preparation and training (Bennet 2007). Demonstrating the social ly learned nature of sexual violence, civilians also use sexual violence against on e another as a punitive measure or as an opportunistic violent act tolerated by a societ y riddled with impunity: The use of sexual violence as a tool of domination and punishme nt has spread to the community level as well. .The use of sexual violence has prolif erated to the point that even the most 71

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seem ingly minor of transgressions or old pers onal scores are now d ealt with through the use of rape and violence (Pratt and Werchick 2004:10). MONUC The United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo [MONUC] was deployed in Oc tober 1999 to oversee the implementation of the Lusaka Accords. Military contingents within the mission, initiall y authorized at 5,537 have currently swelled to over 17,000, making MONUC the largest peacekeeping mission in the world. Its Chapter VII Mandate has been revised and augmented substantially since 1999, congruent with the ebb a nd flow of violence in the DRC. The Mandate not only charges the mission with the protection of C ongolese civilians using all means necessary, but also with rebuilding democratic politic al institutions, catalyzing security sector reform, and jumpstarting the war-torn economy of the DRC. MONUCs current mandate (defined in 37 separate UN Security Council Resolutions) has often been described as a patchwork of wide-ranging and sometimes competing political, military, and humanitarian objectives (Bennet 2007:5). MONUCs mandate makes gender-specific provisions for the protection of women and girls in armed conflict, and has been hailed as the strongest mandate with regards to civilian protection to date. Ho wever, the mandates sometimes competing objectives have hindered military contingents from pursuing a humanitarian interpretation of their Chapter VII Mandate: MONUC has sometimes been accused of behaving more like a Chapter VI observer mission, using force only in self-defence and doing little to physically protect civilians. I dont th ink theyre allowe d to open fire, claims a Congolese NGO worker in Goma. They did nothing to stop women getting raped in Bukavu and Ruthsurereasons for such inaction are numerous and often include a lack of resource and capacity, as well as 72

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the prioritization of m ore political aspects of the mandate over protection objectives. (Bennet 2007:10) Although reports of inaction on MONUCs behalf persist, especially in some regions of the Kivu provinces, MONUC has been credited w ith the reestablishment of security in much of the DRC, as well as for supplanti ng the security vacuum that is exacerbated by severely unprofessional and ill-trained FARDC forces, who have demonstrated a discouraging inability to protect civilian s from human rights abuses (Bennet 2007). In 2004, an Office of Gender Affairs (OGA) was established in MONUC in order to address the starkly gendered impact th at civil war has wrought on women. The OGA defined its core mission as working to ensure that gender is mainstreamed within design, implementation, promotion and monito ring of the missions policies and programmes and advise the mission on strategies to facilitate the involvement of local women, groups and networks in the peace process including reconstruction, reconcilia tion and rehabilitation and other processes leading to sustainable peace. (Puechguirbal 2003a: 23) Employing this two-pronged strategy, the OGA provides gender-awarene ss training to all military observers, civilian personnel, and UN civilian police officers (CIVPOL), in addition to the Congolese national police and military contingents when possible Externally, the OGA has focused on streng thening the capacity of womens rights organizations working with victims of sexual violence as well as those advocating for the increased participation and representation of women at a political level. In line with Resolution 1325, the OGA, partnering with UNIFEM, helped coordinate a womens caucus of 74 women from various womens ri ghts NGOs to be present at the 2002 ICD, providing leadership training to delegates in advance (Smythe 2003). However, the 74 delegates who attended the ICD were repr esentatives of organizations in and around Kinshasa. At that time, the rebel group Ra lly for Congolese Democracy-Goma controlled 73

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the eastern Kivu provinces, and using intim idation tactics to target womens rights organizations, they prevented delega tes of one NGO from attending the ICD (Puechguirbal 2003b). Though Resolution 1325 calls for gender-mainstreaming at all operational levels of peacekeeping missions, MONUCs military contingents and CIVPOL force are hindered by a disproportionate gender ratio; as of February 20 09, only 1.55 per cent of MONUC military contingents are female, followed by only 5.34 per cent of CIVPOL officers (DPKO 2009). The OGA has only been able to provide gender-sensitivity training to MONUC military con tingents sporadicall y, in light of the sheer number of troops on the ground in the DRC and logistic al complications associated with the countrys size. In 2003, Senior Gender Advi sor to the OGA Amy Smythe remarked that the conduct of military contingents and CIVPOL personne l is paramount to Resolution 1325s implementation and the missions overall impact on the DRCs transition to peace. Alluding to allegations of sexual a buse and exploitation by military contingents within the mission: The need to systemati cally train the contingents continues to be crucial because the military and CIVPOL live and work nearest to the communities in the conflict areas. Their behavior is theref ore not only used to judge MONUC in many instances but becomes the yardstick emulated by the population and government (Smythe 2003:2). In 2007, the UN Security Council requeste d MONUC to develop a national action plan for combating mass SGBV. In 2008, a Senior Adviser and Coordinator on Sexual Violence were appointed to the mission. To da te, a number of factor s have inhibited the development of a viable national strategy for eradicating SGBV, the most prominent 74

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being the co ntinual lack of s ecurity in the eastern provinces and inefficacious judicial system. However, a nation-wide public sexual violence awareness campaign was launched in March 2008 as part of the Joi nt Initiative framework between MONUC and the OGA, the Congolese National Ministry of Gender, Family and Children, UNFPA, and locally based civil society organizations. The campaign was designed to address the socially embedded attitudes towards sexual violence in the DRC, as well as to emphasize the need to end impunity for civilian, state agent, and rebel perpet rators alike (UNFPA 2008). Nation-wide baseline data that systematically assess the scale of sexual and gender-based violence and va riables related to its occurrence do not exist (Amnesty International 2008a); this is turn has prompted the Senior Adviser of Sexual Violence and MONUC to direct their energies towards da ta-gathering to prepare for the development of a national action plan to combat sexual vi olence. The action plan was to begin initial phases of implementation by the end of 2008 (UNSC 2008b). Legal reform and the judiciary The legal and judicial framework for addressing SGBV, at least on a rhetorical level, has improved since the implementation of Article 51 of the new Congolese Constitution, adopted in 2005. The article requests the government to attend to the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women and ensu re that their rights are respected and promoted. The article further requests the government to take appropriate measures to ensure th at women become involved in the economic, social and cultural fields are represented within national, provincial and local institutions. Finally article 51 calls on the government to take all necessary measures to fight against all forms of violence targeting women in both the public and private spheres [emphasis added]. (Puechguirbal 2003a: 25) 75

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Additionally, legal reform s were made to the Congolese military code in 2002 and civilian code in 2006 concerning rape and other forms of SGBV. As of 2002, the Congolese military code recognizes rape and other forms of sexual violence such as sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization... as crimes against humanity when part of a system atic attack against ci vilian populations, in line with the language of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Amnesty International 2004: 13). The 2006 reform to the civilian penal code make s rape and other forms of sexual violence a serious infringement; raises the agent of consent from 14 to 18 years of age; criminalizes sex with a minor; prohibits diplomatic immunity; raises the minimum sentence for rape from 10 to 20 years; and mandates accelerated judicial proceedings and increased protections for victims (Amnesty International 2008a; Koumbo 2008). However, both article 51 of the Constitution an d the rape statutes have translated poorly in practice. The Congolese judicial system, part icularly in the eastern region, is hampered by a number of structural variab les endemic to conflict and po st-conflict situations, such as a lack of government funding, persistent in security, poorly traine d judicial actors, a lack of concern or sensitivity to cases of SGBV, and a male-dominated judiciary that does not making prosecution of SGBV crimes a priority (HRW 2005). Consequently, many victims of sexual violence feel either ju stice is not possible due to the inefficacy of the judicial system, nor its pursuit desirable given the lack of protections accorded to victims who decide to step forward. Adding to the victims perceptions of impunity and injustice are the logistical difficulties associated with prosecuting soldiers and rebel combatants: prosecuting soldiers and other combatants implicated for crimes in Congo is extremely difficult. These di fficulties are multiplied in cases 76

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involving sexual violence. Commandi ng officers often arranged for com batants accused of sexual violence to be quickly transferred elsewhere, making prosecution far more difficult and often impossible. (HRW 2005:41) Recognizing that this culture of im punity presents a major obstacle to the eradication of SGBV, MONUC ha s taken a number of strides to strengthen the judicial recourse for victims of sexual violence, wh ich included the establishment of legal aid clinics for victims of SGBV in five provin ces and the creation of a national standard medical rape certificate (UNS C 2008b). Given the number of human rights violations, including SGBV, that are attributed to agen ts of the state, MONUC has directed its attention to rooting out corrupt ion and gender bias within the judiciary that prevents the prosecution of FARDC soldiers and Congolese national police, partic ularly those high ranking officials accused, Impunity for sexual violence is unde rlined by continued reports of local authorities either facilitating non-judicial agreements between victims and perpetrators, or direc tly protecting perpetrators from prosecutionMONUC continues its wo rk with judicial and political authorities to remove obstacles to prosecuting high-level FARDC officers accused of sexual and gender-based violence related offences. The Mission has designed a road map to be presented to the Ministry of Justice, proposing concrete, short-te rm measures to progress eradicating the culture of impunity. (UNSC 2008b: para. 66) Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration and Security Sector Reform DDR programs to date have been disappoi nting, both in terms of their overall success and in incorporating gende r analysis into their design. After a failed attempt at national DDR in 1996, piecemeal programs were implemented in 2002 and 2003, that did not involve the OGAs recommendations to include (female) dependents, particularly those of foreign ex-combatants who were summarily demobilized and repatriated to Uganda and Rwanda (Smythe 2003; Puec hguirbal 2003a). MONUC, international 77

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donors, and the Congolese governm ent develo ped a reinvigorated SSR program in 2008 that includes a comprehensive DDR program for approximately 131,400 combatants to occur simultaneously with the reintegration of some former combatants into the existing FARDC. These target numbers are expected to decrease substantially due to a strict oneperson-one-weapon policy that will determine eligibility criterion for ex-combatants, working to the detriment of female and child dependents (Bennet 2007). In addition to the internal limitations of the current DDR programs design, the UN Secretary-General has noted that its feas ibility in eastern DRC is still questionable given the lack of security (UNSC 2008b) The lack of a multifaceted DDR and SSR program in the east becomes particularly problematic for combating SGBV and other human rights abuses, given the current figures that suggest that one-t hird of all cases of rape in eastern DRC are committed by FARDC, PNC, armed rebel factions, or militia (UNSC 2008b). Both the FARDC and PNC ar e notoriously understaffed, ill-trained, underpaid, in addition to a having history of enacting human rights abuses against female civilians both systematically during figh ting and opportunistically during periods of ceasefire. In light of this, MONUCs manda te was extended in late 2008 to oversee the vetting and integration of FARDC members in the eastern provinces, with a particular eye towards preventing SGBV (UNSC 2008b). Currently, no gender-disaggregated data is available for the FARDC or the PNC. Ho wever, because women make up less than 15 per cent of ex-combatants from rebel groups and militia who are being reintegrated into the FARDC and PNC, it is unlikely that the number of female officers is high. Furthermore, there are reports that of the few women serving in the PNC in the eastern 78

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Congo, m any face gender-based discrimination and sexual abuse on a regular basis; many at the hands of senior commanders (UNSC 2008b). Conclusion Large gaps exist between the institut ional impact of Resolution 1325 and its impact on the ground in the DRC. We do in fact see significant reforms in civilian and military legal codes regarding rape and sexual abuse, and sustained efforts by the OGA and MONUC to provide gender-sensitivity training to peacekeeping personnel and the Congolese security sector. However, disillusi oning statistics and reports of SGBV not only as a scourge of war, but as a widesp read practice among civilians persist. This suggests that a more systematic strategy is needed to address the complex nature and multiple forms of sexual violence in the Congo. Undoubtedly, the intr actable nature of rape in the eastern Congo spurred the 2008 adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1820, which formally recognizes rape as a tactic of war and a stand-alone threat to international peace and security. Liberia Liberias civil war can be separated into two phases: the firs t occurring between 1989 and 1996, ending with the Abuja Agreement, and the second between 1997 and 2003, ending with the Accra Accords. During the first phase of the war, the National Patriotic Front for Liberia, headed by Genera l Charles Taylor, launched an incursion into Liberia and overthrew the Doe government A protracted civil war ensued involving the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), Taylors N PFL, the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia, the Liberian 79

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Peace Council, and the Lofa Defens e Force (A mnesty International 2008). The conflict was fraught with flagrant human rights abuses and war crimes, part icularly those that targeted civilians. All parties to the conflict committed widespread and systematic unlawful killings along ethnic lines, includi ng rape, torture, ill-treatment, conscription, hostage-taking killings of humanitarian workers and the enlistment and use, during hostilities, of child soldiers unde r the age of 15. (Amnesty International 2008b: 8) Although the 1996 Abuja Peace Agreement pr ovided for democratic elections and a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program under Charles Taylors government, the fruits of the accord were ultimately unsuccessful. A botched DDR program that left thousands of comb atants armed, mounting discontent among the Liberian people with the Taylor admini stration and an overly powerful and abusive military and national police force. This eventua lly led to the onset of armed conflict again in 1997, this time involving Taylors army, th e AFL, and armed rebel groups Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LUR D) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) (HRW 2003). A ceasefire agreement was reached in 2003 among the Taylor Governments AFL, LURD, and MODEL, with peace talk s scheduled for the following August in Accra, Ghana (Amnesty International 2008b). Although civil society groups were formally excluded from the Accra peace talk s, a number of womens organizations gathered at the Golden Tulip Hotel in Accra on August 15, 2003 to develop an action plan to incorporate the concerns of Li berian women, and more generally, gendersensitive provisions in the peace agreement. The Golden Tulip Declaration was produced as a result of this meeting in which, 80

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Recalling [United Nations Security Council Resolution] 1325, the group decided on several resolu tions including increasing the representation of women in the peace process, peacekeeping and DDR, and lobbying the parties to include a 50% quota for women in the transitional government. (UNIFEM 2009b) Three days later, on August 18th 2003, official peace negotiations produced the Central Peace Agreement (CPA), or the Accr a Accords. The CPA called for the cessation of armed hostilities between the AFL, LU RD and MODEL (Aisha 2005). Additionally, the CPA required the two-year National Transi tional Government of Liberia to design and implement a nation-wide Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) program for all indi viduals who served in armed groups, with particular attention paid to women and ch ildren who comprised a substantial number of fighting forces and troop support in rebel groups (Aisha 2005). Additionally, the CPA allotted two years to the transitional government to prepare for democratic presidential and parliamentary elections th at were scheduled for 2005. Modalities of sexual and gender-based violence Comprehensive data on the magnitude of SGBV in Liberias civil war does not exist, given the breakdown in state cap acity during this 15-year period. However, Amnesty International estimates that two-thirds of all Liberians were subjected to some form of SGBV during the civil war (2008b). Tw o dominant modalities of sexual violence against women and girls emerged during both phases of the war: mass rape and sexual violence enacted against civilians during terri torial incursions by armed factions; and the forced abduction, conscription, and sexual slav ery of women and girls into armed groups such as LURD and MODEL (HRW 2003). 81

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While sexual violence was sometimes ope rationalized along ethnic lines against civilians by armed rebel factions and government forces, it was largely used a strategy to terrorize, demoralize an d dominate civilian populations during territorial incursions: Rape and other forms of sexual violence have been reported in virtually all areas of Liberia, by all the warring part ies and have clearly been used to humiliate, intimidate and dominate civilians and as a means of penalizing civilians perceived to be sympathetic to the opposition. Every time an area changes hands, or fighters embark on a looting spree, rape has become the near-inevitable. (HRW 2003:11) Additionally, even though rape and sexual vi olence were often associated with armed rebel factions such as LURD and MODEL (i n the second phase of the war), Liberian security sector agents, such as the AFL a nd the Taylor governments paramilitary AntiTerrorist Unit (ATU), and the Special Operat ions Division were often liable to commit acts of SGBV during fighting and opportunist ically against women and girls at border checkpoints or during patrols (HRW 2003). The forced and coerced conscription of women and girls with rebel groups was a hallmark of the Liberian civil war. It is es timated that in the second phase of the civil war, women associated with fighting forces (WAFFs) and girls associated with fighting forces (GAFFs) comprised between 30 to 40 per cent of total comb atants, or between 25,000 to 30,000 individuals (Amnesty Inte rnational 2008b). Many WAFFs and GAFFs were abducted, or resorting taking up arms with an armed group in order to secure a livelihood and ensure a minimum level of prot ection from other fighting factions. Some women served as commanders or combatants, others as porters, spies, cooks, domestic servants, or sex slaves (Amnesty Inte rnational 2008b). A ma jority of WAFFS and GAFFS reported having undergone some form of sexual abuse or exploitation while serving, which had wide-ranging consequences for women in post-conflict Liberia 82

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The raping of women and girls resu lted in many unwanted pregnancies, while the rate of teenage pregnanc y increased significantly with a high incidence of HIV/AIDS. As a result a nd in combination with other factors, post-disaster psychiatric disorder is particularly high among Liberian refugee women and female abductees... (Aisha 2005:150) According to one source, 70 per cent of women who participated in the 2004 DDRR were mothers, while the number of women who te sted positive for STIs (Sexually Transmitted Infections) was reported to be as high as 83 per cent (Amnesty International 2008b). Liberian women and girls involvement in armed groups as either combatants or troop support demonstrates that females can become active agents of violence during periods of armed conflict, rather than passive recipients or victims. However, one report suggests that the gendered divi sion of labor within fighting forces, as well as the sexual politics governing relations be tween combatants may have reinforced pre-war gender roles that painted females as socially subordi nate, with men reserving the right to demand sexual relations at any time (Amnesty Inte rnational 2008b). Additiona lly, after the war, many women met with ridicule a nd disbelief from their male compatriots when they tried to participate in the national DDRR program that was designed to serve all excombatants, including WAFFs, and GAFFs (Amnesty International 2008b). This disjuncture highlights the tran sformative power that periods of armed conflict can have for gender roles, especially when women find themselves taking on new roles that breach peacetime gender norms such as passivity or domesticity. However, just as armed conflict can dissolve social institutions and open new discursive spaces for the renegotiation of gender roles a return to peace may signify a return to pre-war gender norms (Abeysekera 2006). Anothe r potent example of change dur ing conflict in Liberia is that female genital mutilation (FGM), whic h became common in West Africa during the 19th and 20th centuries, but fell out of practice after the onset of civil war subsequent 83

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dissolution of social instituti ons. However, both after the ces sation of arm ed conflict in 1997 and now well into the post-conflict peri od in 2009, instances of FGM are resurging to pre-war rates (UNIFEM 2009b). SGBV committed against IDPs and refug ees was also frequent during the war, particularly during the final months in 2003. The ceasefire signed in June of 2003 could not derail the resurgen ce of violence that summer, when LURD forces launched an offensive into the capital city of Monrovi a (HRW 2003). At this time, a number of refugee camps were located around the outskirts of Monrovia, that housed tens of thousands internally displaced persons (IDPs), and some housing refugees from neighboring Sierra Leone. During the LURD offensive against government forces, both LURD and the ATU systematically and opportu nistically raped female residents of Monrovia, particularly those living in re fugee and IDP camps (HRW 2003). Women in refugee and IDP camps in Sierra Leone and Cote dIvoire also reported being raped by AFL forces during this period. Throughout th e duration of the war, this wave of systematic SGBV was used against women a nd girls primarily suspected of collaboration with opposition forces. The Accra Accords in August of 2003 and subsequent deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in Se ptember of the same year have quelled insecurity considerably, a nd since then the transitional government was able to successfully hold fair and democratic elec tions in 2005, because of which Ellen JohnsonSirleaf was elected President of Liberia. Liberia is well into post-conflict reconstruction, with the cessation of latent hostilities be tween armed factions in 2003, and a relatively successful DDRR program completed by the end of 2004. However, rates of reported 84

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rape cases in Liberia rem ain high, even when compared to rates during armed conflict. In 2006, a government survey on rape and sexua l violence interviewed 1,600 Liberian women in ten different counties, and 92 pe r cent of those survey ed reported having experienced some form of sexual violen ce between the period of 2005 to 2006 (IRIN News 2006). In 2009, a rights group contracted by the government to gather comprehensive statistical data on SGBV reported that every month at least 100 people in Liberia seek medical treatment as a result of rape or sexual ab use (IRIN News 2009). Sexual Abuse and Exploitation (SEA) has also become normalized in postconflict Liberia. Even though the country is pl agued by high rates of rape, it also reports high levels of SEA against women and girls in disadvantaged positions. For example, in some regions of the country fourth-fifths of school girls reported having had sexual relations with a teacher in order to circumve nt tuition payments or in order get passing grades (Momodu 2007b). SGBV and SEA have been dubbed the new war in Liberia, and as one Amnesty International report point s out, these phenomena find their roots in the 15 years of civil war that burned this bra nd of violence into the collective memory of many Liberians (2008b). The social ramifications from years of mass rape and abuse are marked. Rape during the war and rape during peace are both believed to have contributed to the growing HIV/AIDS transmission rates in Liberia. It is currently estimated that the overall STI rate within the population is between 75-80 per cent, and the United Nations Development Program reports that the prevalence of HIV/AIDS has increased dramatically in Liberia over the last decad e as a rape is used as a tactic of war (UNIFEM 2009b). Additionally, post-war social indicato rs for women in Liberia are abysmal; the 85

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dissolution of the countrys infr astructure and halted provision of social services such as education an d healthcare have rendered approximately two-thirds of all women illiterate, and many lacking marketable skills (UNIFEM 2009b). Opportunities to generate income and legal provisions that entr ench womens right to propert y and inheritance are also scarce. Many women are now dependent on marriage as livelihood, w ith girls in their early teens being forced by their parents to marry, or worse, turn to prostitution. Those girls forced to become single heads-of-house holds for siblings, war orphans, or their own children, are inherently more vulnerable to economic and sexual e xploitation and abuse (Aisha 2005). Despite the legacy of rape in Libe ria, it remains a taboo subject for many Liberians, particularly women, and particul arly those women who served in fighting forces. Many women who do admit to having been raped face shame from their families and communities, especially if they conceive d a child out of wedlock as a product of the violence. Additionally, many women wish to a void the suspicion of their peers that may stigmatize them as potential carriers of HIV/AIDS, which can be damning in small communities or for women hoping to marry in the future. Currently, the Liberian government makes it a priority to combat the transmission of HI V/AIDS by providing free counseling services a nd post-exposure prophylaxis4 treatment at over 20 clinics in the country. However, a 2008 government repor t notes that fear of stigmatization prevents many rape victims and potential carri ers of HIV/AIDS from seeking treatment and stepping forward (IRIN News 2009). 4 A treatment given to rape victims to prevent the transmission of HIV. 86

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UNMIL In Septem ber of 2003, Resolution 1509 was adopted by the UN Security Council, creating UNMIL, a 15,000 troop-strong Chapter VII integrative peacekeeping mission. SCR 1509 defined the missions manda te broadly, including security sector reform, constitutional reform, electoral reform, the promotion and protection of human rights and economic restructuring as missi on goals (UNIFEM 2009b). With a special eye turned towards the legacy of rape during war, Resolution 1509 reaffirmed the central role that Resolution 1325 would play in the ge nder-mainstreaming of all UNMIL ground operations and the reconfigurati on of the Liberian state: Resolution 1509 also underlines the im portance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflic t peace building, and recalled the need to address violence against wome n and girls as a to ll of warfare. UNMILs mandate already included a gender perspective in accordance with Security [Council] Resolution 1325. The First progress report of the UN Secretary-General on the UN missi on in Liberia in September 2003 also stressed the importanc e of addressing the ge nder specific needs of female ex-combatants as well as wives and widows of former combatants, as well as the importance of prev enting sexual violence. (UNIFEM 2009b) One of the strengths of UNMILs original ma ndate is its direct referral to the role that Resolution 1325 should play in the missions operations, the importance of addressing the differential need s of women and girls and the need to combat SGBV and SEA in order to attain long-term, sustaina ble peace. In 2004, the Office of the Gender Adviser (OGA) was established within the mission. The OGAs mandate in UNMIL is defined as ensur[ing] that the [Resol ution 1325] and the DPKO gender policy are implemented and gender mainstreamed through the mission in the broadest sense (UNMIL 2009). Since its inception the OGA has focused on a range of tasks aimed at gender-mainstreaming the internal operations of the mission as well assisting the Liberian 87

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governm ent. These tasks include the provision uniform gender-sensitivity training to all peacekeeping personnel, including military contingents, CIVPOL officers, and UN civilian staff; HIV/AIDS awar eness training for all civili an personnel of the mission; advocating on behalf of women and girls du ring the design and implementation of the DDRR program; developing a strong working re lationship with womens organizations in the civil society sector and increasing thes e groups visibility and influence in the peacebuilding process; and ensuring that women and girls human rights are entrenched in the national constitution, electoral syst em, police, and judiciary (UNMIL 2009). Currently, the OGA and the Ministry of Gende r and Development of the Government of Liberia are working to implement a Joint Program to Prevent and Respond to Sexual Gender-Based Violence for the period 2008-2012, with the goal of reducing SGBV by 30 per cent by 2011 (based on rates of repor ted incidences) (IRIN News 2009). The OGA has also adopted the Secretary-Gene rals Bulletin on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence and Sexual and Explo itation and Abuse, which provides clear guidelines on codes of conduct and disciplinary action to be taken in the case of sexual abuse or misconduct of UN peacekeeping personnel or staff. The OGAs extensive gendersensitivity training and strict zero-tolerance policies for SGBV and SEA within the mission have made it relatively successful in quelling instances of abuse and exploitation (Aisha 2005). As of February 2009, 2.45 per cent of all UNMIL military officers are female officers (the highest percentage of all cases in this study). While low, the disproportionate gender balance is not unique to the Liberian mission and continues to be a critical area of concern for all UN missions worldwide. However, in January 2007, UNMIL received the 88

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first ever all-fe male police contingent from India. The contingent, dubbed the 5th UNMIL Formed Police Unit (FPU) is comprised of 103 female police officers trained to serve in ground operations, with 22 male officers serv ing as logistical and technical support (Washington 2007). Overall, UNMIL boasts one of the highest percentages of female CIVPOL officers in the world, currently at approximately 16 per cent (DPKO 2009). It is hoped that increasing the visibility of women within UNMIL will encourage more Liberian women to join the Liberian Nati onal Police (LNP) and AFL. Additionally, OGA staff, advocates in civil society, and Liberian government officials have stated that a heightened female presence within the secur ity sector will make victims of SGBV and SEA feel more confident in st epping forward to report thes e crimes and seek judicial redress (Washington 2007). Disarmament, Demobilization, Re habilitation and Reintegration In December 2003, a nation-wide DDRR program was launched by UNMIL and the Liberian transitional government to demobilize approximately 38,000 combatants who had fought in the second phase of the civil war (Amnesty In ternational 2008b). In keeping with the CPA, Resolution 1509 and Resolution 1325, the DDRR program was designed to meet the needs of WAFF s, GAFFs and dependents. The OGA was instrumental in broadening the definition of combatant to encompass those activities performed by women and girls within fighting factions by expanding the term female ex-combatants to women associated with fighting forces (WAFFs) and girls associated with fighting forces (GAFFs), resulting in the inclusion of approximately 22,000 females in the DDRR program (Amnesty International 2008). 89

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Recognizing that WAFFs and GAFFs faced more barriers to participating in the DDRR process, such as relationships with abusive and exploitative male commanders and pervasive misinformati on about DDRR eligibility cr iteria, the OGA launched a national awareness campaign for the DDRR program in January 2004. The awareness campaign targeted women and girls by making information on eligibility criteria readily available, as well as by trying to dispel the stigmatization that prevented many young women from participating. In accordan ce with Resolution 1509 Resolution 1325, cantonment and demobilization camps were designed with gender-sensitive needs in mind. Camps were gender-seg regated, and gender-specific medical services and STI testing were provided to ex-combatants (Amnesty International 2008b). Additionally, rape counseling services were made availa ble to WAFFs and GAFFs during cantonment, but critics maintain that this brief phase in the DDRR process was not a sufficient period of time for victims to feel comfortable conf iding in counselors (Amnesty International 2008b). As part of the Rehabilitation and Reintegration phases of the DDRR program, skill-set training programs were promised to WAFFs and GAFFs. In practice, many of the programs designed to cater to demobilized females were clustered around large cities, remaining inaccessible to women living in rural areas (UNIFEM 2009b). Although 70 per cent of women who registered with the DD RR program had children (many a product of their time spent with armed groups), they were not provided with free or subsidized child care so that they could participate in skill -set and vocational training. Furthermore, the piecemeal programs that were provided to WAFFs and GAFFs were weakened by budgetary constraints and poor design; many programs simply did not start, ended 90

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halfway through, had instructors who dropped out or charged costly tuition (Am nesty International 2008b). It is estimated that th e majority of the 22,000 who were disarmed and demobilized did not complete the reha bilitation and reintegr ation phases for the aforementioned reasons, which could have severe ramifications for the individual security of these women, who might resort to prostitution or petty crime for survival (Amnesty International 2008b). One of the weakest points of gender-mainstreaming in the DDRR program was the lack of psychosocial couns eling to male ex-combatants, particularly regarding attitudes towards women, SGBV and SEA. Given the protracted period of time that many male combatants spent in armed factions, and the extent to which the violent behavior of these combatants became socially ingrained, the Liberian governments Ministry of Gender and Development, the OGA, and the civil society identify these individuals as likely perpetrators of rape: High incidences of rape and other forms of sexual violence in homes, schools and communities is, at least in part, due to the failure of the DDRR programme to provide adequa te psycho-social counseling to former combatantsThe issue of rape is a serious one. There is a whole generation of men who have repeat edly raped women and in [the experience of one rape counselor] th ese are the ones who will easily rape again (Amnesty Inte rnational 2008b: 44) The inability of the DDRR program to ade quately address these factors may be one contributor of the current ra pe culture in Liberia. Legal reform Before 2005, the Liberian civilian penal c ode provided no clear definition of rape or sexual assault, only criminalized gang-ra pe, and was classified a bailable offense. 91

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(Aisha 2005). In 2000, The A ssociation of Fem ale Lawyer s of Liberia (AFELL) was empowered by the Ministry of Justice of the Taylor government to prosecute crimes of SGBV, though its capacity to investigat e and prosecute crimes was undercut by budgetary limitations. After the establishmen t of the transitional government, the AFELL association drafted and lobbied for the adoption of a new rape law for the Liberian penal code. That law was eventually adopted in 2005, and [t]he current anti-rape legislation, wh ich came into for ce after President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf wa s sworn into office, is much tougher and more comprehensive than the pr evious law. It broadens the scope of rape to cover penetration with any foreign obj ect, and not just the male sex organ. It also addresses the as pects of rape of boys a nd assault of children under the age of 18. Under the new legislation, bail will not be granted for accused rapists and punishment is seve n to life imprisonment. (Ballada 2006: 8) Following the adoption of the new legisla tion, the OGA initiated an awareness campaign throughout Liberia to make women aw are of the rape laws reform. Despite the laws adoption, fewer crimes have been prosecuted than would be expected, due in part to the crippled judicial system in Liberia, weakened by a lack of infrastructure (numerous courthouses around th e country were destroyed during the civil war), the understaffing of skilled legal actors and limited financial resources (Ballada 2007). The general weakness of the judicial system is exacerbated by many officials inexperience with and insensitivity towards handling crimes of SGBV, preventing many women from seeing charges of rape or sexual violence through to prosecution. With an aim towards strengthening judicial in frastructure, UNMIL renovated thirteen courthouses, eight police stati ons and five correctional facilities in 2006, in addition to training hundreds of new legal and judicial staff. Meanwhile, AFELL lobbied for a Special Court for Crimes of Sexual Violence to fast-track prosecutions and increase 92

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victim s confidence in the legal system. Th e Special Court began processing cases in 2009 (UNIFEM 2009b). Police reform As part of UNMILs mandate, the missi on began the process of reforming the Liberian National Police (LNP) in 2004. Initiall y, all members of the LNP at that time were required to register with UNMIL a nd subsequently vetted for future service (UNIFEM 2009b). Some 900 core members of the police force were retained, and UNMIL launched an aggressive hiring campaign that specifically targeted female recruits with the goal of achieving at least 20 per cent female officer s in the long-term. By 2007, only six per cent of 2,336 newly trained recruits were female. That year, UNMIL partnered with the Ministry of Gender a nd Development to provide an educational program that would allow female applicants to the Police Academy to meet the minimum educational criteria for eligibility (Momodu 2007a). Attempts to equalize the gender ratio of the police force has been a significant step for the LNP, not only in terms of incr easing Liberian womens confidence in the security sector, but also in extending oppor tunities to many young women deprived of access to education and skill-set training during the civil war. Additionally, the OGA provides training to the LNP on womens legal rights and be st practices in handling crimes of SGBV and orchestrated the de velopment of specialized units in police departments that separately handle reports of SGBV (Ballada 2007). 93

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Military reform Refor m of the AFL began in 2003, concurrent with the DDRR program. Though UNMILs mandate commits the mission to SSR, it deferred responsibility for military reform to the U.S. Military and Dyncorp, a pr ivate military corporation, who have been in the process of restructuring the AFL since 2003. The Liberian government has set the same target of 20 per cent female representation for the new military. Projected numbers for Liberias military are pegged at 2,000 pe rsonnel, with 1,131 having thus far been recruited and trained (Barber 2008). Statistical data rega rding the gender balance is unavailable due to the military reforms distance from the UNMIL, as well as its current restructuring. It is clear, however, that the role envisioned for the Liberian military is one that includes a strong commitment to deve lopment and post-conf lict reconstruction, ostensibly to dispel the nations memory of past abuses. In a February 2008 speech, President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf expressed Libe rias humanitarian vision for the AFL: We look forward to an AFL that ha s civil-orientati on in training and preparedness, soldiers that are trai ned and oriented towards civil and clinical skills to our various comm unities; soldiers that are able to organize themselves and engage in agricultural production to be able to fee themselves; soldiers that are development-oriented as well as technically trained to carry out their constitutional mandate. (Liberian Ministry of National Defense 2008) Since her election, Sirleaf has shown a strong and vocal commitment to the eradication of sexual and gender-based violence and to the heightened representation of women in the political sphere of Liberia. Johnson-Sirleafs inaugural address to Liberia in January of 2006 articulated the connection between the political marginaliza tion of women in 94

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Liberia and their pas t history of sexual vi ctimization, and committed her administration to transforming the future for Liberi an women (Ward and Marsh 2006). Conclusion UNMIL has met comparatively more success in implementing Resolution 1325 and combating high rates of SGBV through peacekeeping mission ac tivities. Facing the inevitable challenges that are presented by high rates of sexual violence and more generally, gender-based discrimination in a war torn society, it is evident that the Liberian government and the OGA must mainta in an aggressive and proactive stance on promoting womens rights, especially in term s of the judiciary and in the provision of social services to survivors of rape and sexual abuse. Thus far, the OGA has acted as a major catalyst allowing both the Liberian gov ernment and womens civil society groups to benefit from the transformative power that the immediate post-conf lict period can have for gender relations. Conclusion Liberia and Timor-Leste have had rela tively more success with Resolution 1325, but this may be due to the fact that both countries were relatively stable by the time of its implementation. DRC and Haiti have had a great deal of difficulty with adhering to its tenets, but the intractability of both conflicts and recurrent periods of insecurity also prevent its full-fledged implementation, al ong with a number of other post-conflict reconstruction processes. However, across all cases the adoptions of policies pursuant to Resolution 1325 converge. In each case, we see that measures to implement the resolution, ranging from the provision of gender-sensitivity training to peacekeeping 95

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personnel to the reform of rape statutes, were undertaken to some degree. In the following chapter, I draw a systematic comparis on of this data, in or der to trace points of convergence among cases that would suggest norm endogenization is occurring at local levels. I also identify points of divergence among cases, that might explain these varying levels of success and the exogenous factors th at determine the differential adoption of norms and policies. 96

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Chapter Four Analysis Resolution 1325 was not the product of UN member states seeking a solution to a newly emerging problem, nor was it the result of a normative shift occurring from within the UN system. Rather, the resolution bu ilt on a decade of rapid developments in international humanitarian and human right s law concerning SGBV in armed conflict by providing protocol to UN member states pursuant to these developments. The resolution was also the first UN Security Council resolutio n to be drafted by civil society members, growing out of a previous decade of feminist activism drawing attention to the gendered impact of armed conflict on women and experien tial contributions they can make to more holistic notions of peace and security. Keep ing this in mind, we might first take the Security Councils adoption of the resoluti on as a substantive sh ift in broadening the notion of human security to include the physical security of women and girls during post-conflict reconstruction, and second, as a challenge to conventional accounts of international relations that see norm change, if it occurs at all, as the product of statedirected demand and action (Finnemore 1996). If Resolution 1325 is a wat ershed achievement in en trenching norms of gender equality at the level of international instituti ons, we might then ask how it translates at an agent level, particularly in reconfiguring the states emerging from armed conflict where 97

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SGBV was a pervasive weapon of war or political violence. Taking the Security Council as a third-party arbiter of Resolution 1325 between transnational activist groups who lobbied for its adoption and m ember states s ubject to its implementation, we can view the Security Council and, more specifically, UN p eacekeeping operations as teachers of Resolution 1325 to member states (Finnemore 1996). The cases examined in Chapter Three demonstrate that international norms condemning and prohibiting sexual and gender-b ased violence in armed conflict, and more broadly, those that promote gender e quality within state structures are being transmitted to and internalized at local leve ls by the countries in question, albeit in varying degrees and with differing results. I s ubstantiate these claims with a systematic comparison of the most salient data garner ed from the case studies, referring to the language of Resolution 1325 and incorporating tenets of feminist security theory and social constructivism to strengthen my an alysis. Key reforms linked to Resolution 1325 were introduced in all of these cases, including the broadening of peacekeeping mission mandates; the presence of gender offices within missions; legal and judicial reforms; security sector reform; and disarmament, a nd demobilization and re integration programs. Even though all countries exhi bited similar behavior insofa r as adopting and adhering to tenets of Resolution 1325, the extent to which the resolution was adopted and its effectiveness varied by country. Generally, Liberia and Timor-Leste appeared to have had more success with the implementation of Resolution 1325 as it pertains to SGBV, while the DRC and Haiti have had comparatively less. Comparison of the cases suggests that a few intervening factors may have influenc ed these outcomes; in particular, levels of 98

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security in a country, co nflict type, and the moment in the peace process at which Resolution 1325 is introduced may be correlated to its success. Each peacekeeping mission recalled Resolution 1325 in its mandate. UNMIL (Liberia) and UNTAET (Timor-Leste) had stro nger initial mandates with reference to Security Council Resolution 1325; MONUC (DRC) language began to reflect the need to address SGBV with Resolution 1325 and 1820 after its initial deployment in 1999; MINUSTAH (Haiti) made minimal reference to the resolution in its initial mandate, mostly concerning the need to gender-mai nstream DDR operations and enforce the human rights of women and children. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of the resolution, each peacekeeping mission included a gender unit to gender-mainstream operations of the peacekeeping mission and transitional government of the host country (UNSC 2000). Although paragraph 4 calls fo r the heightened representation of women in mission ground operations, each mission suffers from di sproportionate gender ratios in military contingents and civilian police forces. Although disparate gende r ratios are characteristic of all peacekeeping missions worldwide, they are perhaps more symptomatic of the inequitable gender ratios within the militaries of troop-contributing countries than they are of reception to gender-balanced forces in recipient countries. The gender divisions in each country provi ded gender-sensitivity training to all mission civilian, military and police personnel, although to varying degrees. Material barriers, such inadequate f unding, restrictions on availabl e resources, and gender bias within missions can limit the scope of influe nce that gender offices have (Shteir 2004). Moreover, in two of the four cases Haiti and the DRC sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) in the missions themselves have posed significant problems for the credibility and 99

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legitim acy of the missions mandate to im plement Resolution 1325. Charges of SEA in MINUSTAH have been recurrent since the missions deployment in 2004, and similar charges have been brought against MONU C peacekeepers since its 1999 deployment. UNMILs relative success with quelling instan ces of SEA in Liberia might be explained by the enforcement of the UN Secretary Gene rals bulletin on Se xual Exploitation and Abuse and strict zero-toler ance policy. In Timor-Leste, structural mechanisms were implemented to prevent SEA, such as meta l detectors installed at UNTAET checkpoints. Peacekeeping missions are one of the primary vehicles for the implementation of Resolution 1325, so an ethical commitment to the eradication of SG BV, particularly in contexts where it has figured prominently as a systematic weapon of war or political violence may be paramount to a missions ab ility to address rape and sexual violence effectively in host populations. In each case, rape laws have been reformed in the wake of a peacekeeping missions arrival and Resolution 1325s implem entation, in line with paragraph 11 of the resolution (UNSC 2000). Only tw o of the cases, Liberia and Timor-Leste, have thus far established special courts to try crimes of SGBV, t hough the 2006 Congolese law does provide for expedited trial proceedings. Across each country, the reform of rape statutes in civilian and military codes is characterized by a move from laws that reflect patriarchal attitudes towards women and sexual assault to laws that conceive of SGBV as violation of a fundamental human right; one such exam ple is the shift in the language of the Haitian penal code from defining rape as a crime of indecent assault to one of sexual assault. Notably, these domestic legal reforms mirror the discursive shift in international humanitarian and human rights law concer ning rape and sexual violence, upon which 100

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Resolution 1 325 is predicated, offering evid ence of international norm transmittance to the local level. According to Binder, Lukas and Schweiger, two meas ures are crucial to the success of Resolution 1325 s ability to address SGBV: as a first step, gender violence needs to be criminalized, and, as a second step, its prosecution must be ensured by adequate procedural norms as well as by gender-sensitive policies of justice institutions (2008: 32). The reform or creation of laws regarding SGBV in military and civilian legal codes is significan t because this language can be used to combat impunity, which is cited as a residual problem across each case. Impunity for these crimes is an oft-cited barrier to the full implementation of Resolution 1325 and the eradication of SGBV and SEA in each country, particularly in the DRC, Haiti, and, to a lesser extent, Liberia. A nu mber of material fa ctors contribute to cultures of impunity. Those most frequently cited across cases are diminished judicial infrastructure and a lack of funding to recons truct buildings, hire ne w staff, and retrain judicial actors, as is the case in the DRC, Haiti, and Liberia. S econd, notorious gender bias in the judiciary and police force partic ularly visible in Haiti, the DRC, and TimorLeste can prevent proper judicial redress for charges of rape and sexual violence. This bias also diminishes victim confidence in th e legal system and may prevent victims from stepping forward altogether. Third, cultures of shame and silence are social and cultural impediments to ending impunity across a ll cases; survivors of SGBV often face stigmatization due to widely held beliefs about feminine chastity and fidelity or more practical concerns such as the fear of contracting HIV/AIDS. While these considerations are not be yond the scope of the resolutions reach, they require strong, proactive responses from peacekeeping missions and states, including 101

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a willingness to engage with local populations on the to pic of sexual and gender-based violence and im punity. In Liberia, Timo r-Leste and the DRC, national awareness campaigns on rape and sexual abuse have b een pioneered by the gender divisions of peacekeeping missions and the appropriate government ministries. Additionally, a number of UN interagency initiatives that include the cooperation of the gender divisions of peacekeeping missions have been undertaken in Timor-Leste, Liberia, and Haiti to train judicial actors in ge nder-sensitivity. These programs fall under the umbrella of UNIFEMs interagency initiative Supporting Womens Engagement in Peace-Building and Preventing Sexual Violence in Conf lict: Community-Led Approaches (UNIFEM 2007a; 2007b). In compliance with paragraphs 1 and 10 of Resolution 1325 pertaining to increased female representation in the secur ity sector and special protections against SGBV for women and girls by pa rties to armed conflict, each country has been engaged in some measure of security sector reform since the arrival of a UN peacekeeping mission (UNSC 2000). Traditionally, gender-mainstr eaming of SSR involves the implementation of gender quotas in the police force and military, and sometimes quotas for elected positions within the legislature or judiciary, though both Liberia and Timor-Leste ultimately did not adopt electoral and legislat ure gender quotas for women. Part of SSR is the vetting of prior members of security forces for past service, partic ularly in situations where security sector agents were known to have raped or sexually abused women during armed conflicts, such as happened with HNP in Haiti and the ATU in Liberia under Charles Taylors government. Vetting of security sector forces was performed in Liberia for the LNP and AFL; in Haiti for the HNP; and in Timor-Leste during the restructuring 102

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of the F-FDTL. In the DRC, the failures of the fragmented integration and vetting of the FARDC and PNC have been noted as contri buting to the high rates of human rights abuses by state agents. Although each country falls short of targ et gender quotas for police forces, ideally ranging from 20 to 30 per cent based on recommendations by the UN Secretary General and those set by the countries themselves, e fforts have been undertaken in Liberia, Timor-Leste and Haiti to increase female repr esentation in the police force, and, in the case of Liberia, in the milit ary. The Democratic Republic of Congo is anomalous to this trend, which may be attributed to the past failu res of SSR programs, in particular the poor integration of the FARDC and incomplete vetting and re-training of the PNC. Currently, no data on the gender ratio of the PNC is ava ilable; this could be due in part to the marginal role that the PNC plays in securi ty sector operations of the DRC. The data presented in Chapter Three demonstrate th at the PNC are unders taffed, underpaid, illequipped to combat rampant crime, and not orious for misdirecting the minimal power they are accorded to enacting human rights abus es, including rape a nd sexual violence. In all four countries, gender-s ensitivity training of nati onal police forces has been provided by the gender divisions of the p eacekeeping missions, in varying degrees and with different outcomes. In Liberia, a target gender quota of 20 per cent female officers is part of the militarys ongoing restructuring, though no data is available to mark progress toward this goal. In Timor-Leste, the demobilization of approximately 1,300 FALINTIL combatants and subsequent restructuring of the F-FDTL di d not appear to incl ude any target gender quotas. However, FALINTIL forces did not ha ve a history of exacting systematic rape 103

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against East Tim orese women, so this may explain no explicitly recognized need to include gender quotas in FALINTILs re structuring. Haitis army, the FADH, was summarily disbanded in 1994 after Aristide s return, and no plans are in place to reconstitute a Haitian militar y, though the issue of armed ex-combatants responsible for SGBV remains a security threat. As descri bed in Chapter Three, the Congos FARDC restructuring has entailed the hasty integration of former fighting factions. As systematic SGBV in the eastern Congo reaches epic pr oportions, MONUCs mandate was extended by UN Security Council Resolution 1856 in December of 2008 to empower MONUC military contingents to oversee gender training for the integrated forces of the FARDC in the eastern region, within an emphasis on the prevention of sexual and gender-based violence (UNSC 2008a). However, no measures to increase the presence of female officers are discernible from available data. Certain strands of feminist security theory hold that women make inherently better security sector agents and attribute this claim to a universally shar ed, inherently feminine tendency towards empathy a nd nonaggression (Manchanda 2001; Blanchard 2003). While these claims may strategically promote the increased representation of women in the security sector, they ultimate ly promulgate a self-limiting discourse that continues to conflate women with pacifi sm, passivity, and nurturance -the same discursive constructs that have led to thei r marginalization from the high politics of peacemaking and security (Manchanda 2001). Rather than justify th e participation of women in the security sector with claims th at rely on conventional gendered stereotypes, it may be more useful to appr oach this issue from the recognition that the marginalization of a part of society can cond ition the way they respond to conflict. Gender roles give way 104

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to different possibilities for security for me n and women in armed conflict, particularly where the male portion of the population retains a monopoly on the use of force and women remain relatively vulnerable in this respect (Hudson et al. 2009). Womens shared history of marginalizat ion from spheres of power and the use of force may have in turn conditioned them to be more ready to compro mise, less likely to reso rt violence, and to eschew oppressive or abusive behaviors (Man chanda 2001). An applied example of this concept can be seen in UNMILs 2006 deploym ent of the all-female formed police unit (FPU) from India; the aforementioned jus tifications were evoked for the units deployment. To date, the FPU in Liberia has been hailed as a success, not only in terms of increasing the representation of female CIVPOL officers to 15 per cent (the highest amongst all cases), but also in terms of build ing Liberians confid ence in UNMIL and the security sector. This partic ular achievement should stand as an exemplar to other peacekeeping missions, particularly those in th e DRC and Haiti, who have yet to recruit female military contingents and CIVPOL officers en masse. Paragraphs 8.a and 13 of Resolution 1325 call for special consideration of the needs of women and girls in the design and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) progr ams, to varying degrees depending on the nature of the program (i.e. whether or not the programs include some measure of rehabilitation or repatriati on as well). The norms underlying these recommendations hold that sustainable peace cannot be built in a soci ety that continues to devalue or altogether ignore the experiences of ha lf of the population during pe riods of armed conflict and political upheaval. The tendency of past DDR programs to define combatant by criteria typically associated with male actors, su ch as the possession and use of small arms, 105

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ignores the active contributi ons that m any women have demonstrably made to warmaking as spies, porters, domestic servants, slaves, or even combatants in many cases (such as the all-female units within FALINTIL forces or in Liberian LURD forces). In the same way that gender-based discrimi nation functions to delegitimize women as security sector agents and polit ical actors, discursive construc ts that negate the active and aggressive roles of women in war also precl ude the active contributions they can making during peacemaking and postconflict reconstruction. Furthermore, if DDR programs do not take into account the material, medical and psychosocial needs of female ex-combatant s and dependents (such as the wives and children of Ugandan insurgents in the D RC), this could culminate in a potentially explosive situation for security within the host country, especially if these individuals remain armed and without livelihoods. Those female ex-combatants and dependents who are not outfitted with a provision of upstar t capital or skill-set training, many of whom tend to be illiterate or low-skilled (such as female ex-combatants in Liberia), may turn to self-endangering professions like prostitution in order to support themselves or their families, exposing themselves further to SGBV and potential STI contraction. The need to gender-mainstream DDR programs extends to gender-specific medical services and psychosocial support that shoul d ideally be provided from the initial period of cantonment through rehabilitation, rein tegration, reinsertion and/or repatriation. This aspect of DDR is of special importance to addressi ng systematic SGBV and SEA during and after armed conflict. Liberia is the only country of the four cases whose UNMIL-sponsored DDRR program has provided comprehensive medical treatment and psychosocial counseling services to WA FFs and GAFFs during cantonment, which 106

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included ST I testing and rape trauma couns eling. However, this treatment was only provided during the brief period of cantonment, an insufficient amount of time to address complex and enduring complications of STIs and rape trauma. The DRC, Haiti and Timor-Leste have provided no such treatment for females associated with fighting forces either due to their complete exclusion from DDR programs, as in Timor-Leste, or due to the overall incompleteness of the DDR program itself, as in Haiti and the DRC. Persistently high rates of rape and se xual abuse across each case highlight the need for DDR programs to provide male co mbatants with adequate psychosocial counseling with respect to SG BV. If ex-combatants partic ipating in DDR programs are those who have perpetrated acts of systematic rape against the civilian communities into which they will eventually be reintegrated, it is likely that, without the appropriate psychiatric treatment and deprogramming, many of these individuals will retain violent attitudes towards women and gi rls. Recalling the comments of one Liberian government official in a 2008 Amnest y International report, [h]igh incidences of rape and other forms of sexual violence in homes, schools and communities is, at least in part, due to the failure of the DDRR programme to provide adequa te psycho-social counseling to former combatantsThere is a w hole generation of men who have repeatedly raped women and in my experience these are the ones who will easily rape gain. In the past women w ould never tell and only address it if someone else finds out. But as long as women are silent about it the rates will remain high. (Amnesty International 2008b: 43) Similar problems exist within FARDC forces in the eastern region of the DRC. Attributable to the hasty integration of former rebel factions into the FARDC as part of the power-sharing agreement of the transitional government si gned in 2002, many of these forces retain loyalties to former co mmanders, were not vetted for prior abuses in their former factions and did not receive adequate gender-sensitivity training upon their 107

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integ ration into the Congolese army. In Haiti, we saw that the patterns of SGBV that have emerged after the 2004 ousting of Aristide a nd ensuing political uph eaval resemble the politically motivated rape and sexual abuse of female civilians by FADH, FRAPH, military attaches and armed gangs during the Cedrs junta. That these individuals were responsible for acts of indivi dual and gang rape that were perpetrated after 2004 suggests the failures of the Aristidesupported 1994 disarmament, dismantlement and reinsertion program for FADH members. Although no reports substantia te the use of systematic SGBV against East Timorese civilians by th e FALINTIL front, we can recall that in1998 the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Wo men noted that a culture of violence against women was internalized by East Timorese men over the course of 24 years of mass rape by Indonesian forces. The failure of the East Timorese DDR program to include any shred of gender-mainstreaming mean s that these combatants most likely did not receive psychosocial counseling or services regarding SGBV. Hudson et al. posit that a culture of viol ence against women begins with domestic violence witnessed by family members in th e household, and is rein forced at individual and collective social levels. Without appropriate restraints or punishme nt for this kind of behavior, this brand of violence is effectiv ely depersonalized which makes it easier for men to continue to perpetrate gender-based violence against women beyond the private domestic sphere -i.e., during military offensives, police patrols of cities, or armed incursions into civilian terri tory (2009). Illuminating the interconnectedness of socially learned, private violence against women and mass rape that surfaces at an intersocietal or intrastate level, they go on to say that [s]ocietal expectati ons of violence at every level of analysis will almost certainly be higher if men who are dominant in political power 108

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in virtually ever hum an society have received many rewards from committing high frequencies of aggressive acts towa rd women (Hudson et al. 2009: 27). Thus, the ineffectiveness of DDR programs to address ex-combatants use of systematic SGBV during armed conflict may engender a vicious cycle of insecurity for women, where men are socialized to rape and abuse women during armed conflict, diffuse their unadulterated violent behavior towards women in post-confli ct societies, effectively cement a rape culture and making it more like ly that SGBV will emerge in subsequent periods of conflict or emergency. Structural and cultural violence agai nst women were noted to be prevalent problems across each of the four cases both befo re and after conflict. In terms of gauging Resolution 1325s impact, these factors are far more difficult to assess. A general consensus among some scholars an d humanitarian workers is th at structural and cultural violence against women undergird cultures of rape and sexual abuse, making the jump from private, implicit violence to public, ac tive violence more like ly during periods of armed conflict (Blanchard 2003; Hudson et al 2009). In each case before the onset of armed conflict, we see societies heavily steepe d in patriarchal values particularly those that relegate women to the domestic realm a nd undercut their ability to participate in formal political and economic spheres. Mo st notably in Liberia, Haiti and the DRC, victims of rape often faced shame and stigma tization after the trauma, specifically with regards to chastity and ability to marry; the pre-war legal co des of these countries reflect these sexist misconceptions as discussed earli er. In Timor-Leste and Haiti, legacies of domestic violence against women both predated (in the case of Haiti) and were cemented by (in the case of Timor-Leste) systematic rape during armed conflict. Resolution 1325 109

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identifies th e need to increase the represen tation of women at all levels of political decision-making, peacemaking, and security di alogue within member state structures. Calls to end mass rape in armed conflict a nd respect standing international humanitarian and human rights law with respect to women and girls in armed conflict are included in the same resolution, effectively establishi ng the interconnectivity of structural and cultural violence against women and its more flagrant manifestations as systematic SGBV in armed conflict or widespread SGBV during post-conf lict reconstruction. The conceptual linkage here is critical to the resolutions ability to address the taproot of systematic and widespread SG BV during armed conflict and in ostensible times of peace. By recognizing the need to trea t women as legitimate political actors in peacemaking and security dialogue, the reso lution implicitly problematizes a statecentric notion of security that, defined by the absence of an external or internal military threat, is conflated with the term peace (Blanchard 2003). Looking to the male genderskew of state structures, such as the milita ry, police force, and legislature that are responsible for producing s ecurity dialogue, Resolution 1325 acknowledges how this dialogue not only elides, but priv atizes female experiences of insecurity such as sexual and gender-based violence and effectively re legates them to the private sphere as disjointed afterthoughts to the interna tional politics of war and peacemaking. Levels of insecurity duri ng the time of the resolution s implementation seem to be correlated to the success in addressing SGBV. In the DRC and Haiti, where Resolution 1325s implementation has been less successful than in Liberia and Timor-Leste, high rates of SGBV are coupled with persistent insecurity. In both c ountries, armed fighting continues: in Haiti, gang violence and political instability threaten the security situation 110

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and arm ed fighting between rebel factions in the eastern Congo has repeatedly violated the Act of Engagement signed in January of 2008. Conversely, Liberia and Timor-Leste seem to have had relatively higher rates of success with implementing Resolution 1325, but also began implementing the resolution in transitional periods that could be considered solidly post-conflict. Even though high rates of rape and domestic violence plague both countries, systema tic and widespread SGBV no longer occur in the context of armed conflict. The cases were chosen for variability in conflict type and this variable seems to have some bearing on the eff ectiveness of Resolution 1325. As noted in Chapter Three, Haitis current situation is not the product of organized intrastate fighting among clearly defined factions, but is the pr oduct of gang warfare, political instability, the circulation of small arms through the country, and the fa ilures of the 1994 DDR program to fully demobilize FADH and FRAPH insurgents. Consequently, there is no formal peace agreement guiding MINUSTAH and national rec onciliation, effectively blurring the lines between conflict and peace. Resolution 1325 s protocol, which conforms to more conventional cycles of warfare, has been difficult to implement where recurrent and factious fighting color Haitis political lands cape. The recurrent fighting in the eastern Congo may be attributable to the complex and protracted nature of the war itself, making certain measures of Resolution 1325 difficult to implement (particularly DDR programs, SSR and prosecuting perpetrators of SGBV). Liberia and Timor-Leste both well past armed conflict wherein systematic SGBV wa s perpetrated seem to have had more success with Resolution 1325. In the case of Liberia, th e Central Peace Agreement guided the purposes of UNMIL as well as pr oviding a point of unity and reconciliation 111

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for the country. Liberia was successfully able to transition to dem ocratic government in 2005, and has since experienced relative peace (despite high rates of SGBV). TimorLestes transition to peace wa s also one to independence, after the end of Indonesian occupation and subsequent exit of their military and militia, who were the primary perpetrators of SGBV against East-Timorese women during the occupation and violence surrounding the referendum. For this reas on, UNTAETs mandate and Resolution 1325 met few obstacles in the way of insecurity or resistance from the East-Timorese, who were unified by national self -determination after the 1999 referendum. It seems that the moment at which Resolution 1325 is introduced during post-conf lict reconstruction matters, with countries that have more de finitive and unified peace agreements being more able to adhere to the resolutions dictates. We might conclude that Resolution 1325 has resulted in significant reforms in each state regarding sexual and gender-based violence. The most substantial reforms noted across all or almost all cases are legal and constitutional reforms that enshrine gender equality at national levels and that criminalize rape and other forms of sexual violence in accordance with international lega l standards; the creation of special courts to prosecute civilian and military crimes of SGBV and the establishment of special units in police departments and peacekeeping mission to report such crimes; the introduction of target gender quotas for police and military re structuring with aim towards preventing SGBV at the hands of state agents; the provision of gende r-training to both domestic security sector components and peacekeeping mission personnel, particularly military and CIVPOL contingents; the in corporation of a gender perspective into at least DDR programs, in light of systematic SGBV used during armed conflict; and a responsive, 112

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streng thened zero-tolerance policy on SG BV and SEA within peacekeeping missions. However, there remain roadblocks to Reso lution 1325s ability to address wartime and peacetime rape. These limitations are largely exogenous due to the contextual factors in each of the four cases. Those most frequently noted impediments to Resolution 1325 and the cessation of widespread SGBV were j udicial impunity, with a host of mitigating factors that prevent the apprehension a nd prosecution of both military and civilian perpetrators; either incomplete or defici ent DDR programs and SSR; in-mission SEA and SGBV; persistent insecurity in the case of Haiti and the DRC; and the complex, selfsustaining nature of rape cultures and cultural violence against women. Variance in the extent of Resoluti on 1325s implementation, with Liberia and Timor-Leste being the more successful and Haiti and the DRC being less so, does not negate the presence of the resolution or the norms that underscore it. Even though high rates of SGBV persist across all cases (systematic rape in the DRC and Haiti, widespread rape in Liberia, widespread domestic violence in Timor-Leste), significant reconfigurations in each st ate have resulted from Resolu tion 1325, specifically with regards to SGBV. These reconfigurations re flect how insecurity is both gendered and personal for individuals in armed conflict, a nd further, relocate the responsibility to attend to these insecurities to the state level. Although larg e gaps exist between nominal laws and protocol addressing SGBV and how it is handled at the ground level, new institutional frameworks exist where there previously were non e. While it is arguable that the resolutions institutionalization is indicative of norm imposition versus norm adoption, the resulting reforms concerning SGBV are requisite changes in state infrastructure if long-term norm change is to occur among citizens within a state. 113

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114 The exogenous limitations to the resolution discussed above have more to do with the nature of each particular conflic t, rather than an inherent de ficiency or altogether absence of norms underscoring it. In cases where intrac tability and persistent fighting remain, the scope of influence that this resolution has is inherently limited by the material and logistical implications of sustained ins ecurity. However, these limitations are only determinate of the extent to which the resolution is effective in addressing systematic and widespread SGBV, but do not nega te its presence altogether.

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Chapter Five Conclusion The extent to which the normative shift in international security discourse has been internalized by Haiti, th e DRC, Liberia, and Timor-Les te varies by each countrys unique experience and negotiation of Reso lution 1325s implementation. However, as Martha Finnemore notes, [n]orms of international society may create similar structures and push both people and states toward si milar behavior, but the body of international norms is not completely congruent. Certainly, it is not congruent enough to produce homogeneity or equifinality. Tensions and contradictions among the norms leave room for different solutions and different arrangements, each of which makes legitimacy claims based on the same norms. The compromises arrived at may be contingent on local circumstances and personalities and are likely to reflect the local norms and customs with which intern ational norms have had to compromiseThe particular form of any state is a result of both international and local factorsThes e local variations are not simply oddities of interest only to area specia lists. Some contingent, local results may become internationalized and institutionalized as part of the global normative structure in important ways thus influencing the content of international normative structure at a later time. (Finnemore 1996: 136) Returning to my original claim, we can ta ke Resolution 1325 as a normative shift at the international level that has been endogenized by the states examined in this thesis, notwithstanding local variations in the outcome of its implementation. The creation of new institutional mechanisms in each state, such as special courts for cases of rape and sexual violence in Liberia or the introduction target gender quotas for police forces in Haiti, is in fact indicative of the transmittance of these norms to the state level. Varying 115

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configurations of the resolutions im plemen tation do not negate the existence of the norms in question, but rather, are demonstrative of how loca lly contingent variables can undercut or catalyze the process of norm a doption. The differing levels of success with Resolution 1325 in Liberia, Timor-Leste, Haiti and the DRC reveal both what has worked and what challenges remain to combating systematic and widespread SGBV during and after armed conflict. These insights provide avenues for contesta tion and renegotiation that can result in the clarification of preexis ting norms and the prescription of new, wellinformed policies pursuant to the spir it of these norms (Sandholtz 2008). The adoption of Resolution 1820 in June of 2008 illustrates how this process of norm transmittance from the international to state level can clarify a preexisting norm with local, experiential contributions, that in turn produce sharper policy prescriptions at the international level. Resolution 1820 bu ilds on and expands the normative foundation laid by Resolution 1325, noting how SGBV in armed conflict and post-conflict settings can exacerbate hostilities and impede reconciliation. The resolution also puts sexual violence into a broader context of gender inequality and structural violence against women and recognizes that SGBV can functi on in and of itself to marginalize women further from political decision-making and non-governmental activism. This explicit link between the physical security of women and international peace and security is a vital articulation that was only implicit in Reso lution 1325. Emphasizing this crucial nexus, Resolution 1820 calls for a strengthened, more comprehensive strategy to combat systematic SGBV during and after armed conflict, holding both the UN and member states accountable. 116

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During the day-long, ministerial-level m eeting held by the Security Council on the day of Resolution 1820s adoption, UN of ficials, heads-of-state, and military personnel spoke at length about the persistence of SGBV and the threat it poses to peace, reconciliation and human securit y, citing examples of persiste nt systematic SGBV in the DRC and residually high rates of rape in Liberia (UNSC 2008e). Notably, Resolution 1325 was routinely cited as having laid a crucial foundation of gende r equality in peace and security dialogue, but that in spite of this step systematic SGBV continues to be used in armed conflict and to plague post-conflict societies. In this way, the catalyst for the adoption of Resolution 1820 was the recogni tion of norm transgression (enduring rape and sexual violence) in states where Resolution 1325 had been implemented since 2000. The preamble of Resolution 1820 pointedly acknowledges a preexisting norm that is currently being violated: Reiterating deep concern that, despite [the Security Councils] repeated condemnation of violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict, including sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, and despite its calls addressed to all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of such acts with immediate effect, such acts continue to occur and in some situations have become systematic and widespread, reaching appalling levels of brutality [emphasis added] (UNSC 2008d) By focusing more explicitly on the need for a stronger, comprehensive strategy to combat SGBV as a stand-alone threat to security, Reso lution 1820 addresses some of the weaker points of Resolution 1325s la nguage and implementation noted in Chapter Four. Resoundingly, one of 1820s primary emph ases is the need for a strengthened response to judicial impunity on the part of member state governments and peacekeeping mission personnel in host countries. Paragra ph 4 of the resolution reiterates the responsibility of parties to armed conflict and member states to respect standing 117

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international hum anitarian and human rights law, and holds member states accountable for prosecuting perpetrators for crimes of SGBV, in addition to requiring that these crimes be excluded from amnesty provisions whenever possible. As noted in Chapter Four, judicial impunity has proved to be a significant hurdle for Resolution 1325; Resolution 1820 more explicitly calls upon stat es to prosecute those responsible in accordance with obligations under international law. Further, Paragraph 3 of Resolution 1820 addresses issues associated with fighting forces, calling upon all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to prevent SGBV th rough the provision of gendersensitivity training, enforcemen t of military disciplinary code s, systematic vetting of members for past abuses pert aining to SGBV and SEA, a nd debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, among other steps (UNSC 200 8d: para. 3). Paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 focus on the legacy of SEA within missions, aski ng both the DPKO and UN member states to provide comprehensive, heightened pre-de ployment and in-theater gender-sensitivity training to all civilian, military and police pe rsonnel, with a special emphasis on the strict zero-tolerance SEA policy of the Secretary Gene ral. Other paragraphs reiterate the need to consider SGBV during the planning and de sign of DDR programs, to increase donor funding and support to the judicial and public health sectors with the purpose of servicing rape survivors, and also measures to incl ude local women and wome ns organizations in peacebuilding and reconciliati on activities. For the full text of the resolution, see Appendix C on page 137. The key here is that Resolution 1820, with sharper and stronger policy prescriptions than its predecessor, would not have been possible without the foundation laid by Resolution 1325. Resolution 1820s adop tion not only strengthens my original 118

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claim that norms which condemn SGBV may be present even wher e it continues to occur, but also that international legal codes and institutions can be constitutive of state behavior and preferences, a nd visa-versa. First we see wo men-organized activism that catalyzed the drafting and adoption of Resolu tion 1325, a resolution that grew out of the recognition of how conventional understandings of warfare ne gate the lived experiences of millions of women, many of whom endure egregious forms of SGBV both during and after armed conflict. By adopting Resoluti on 1325, the Security Council prescribed policies pursuant to norms promoting gender equality and condemning systematic and widespread SGBV in war to member stat es, particularly those emerging from armed conflict and subject to UN peacekeeping missi ons. In turn, peacekeeping missions either met success or disappointment when implementi ng key reforms as part of the resolutions implementation. Resolution 1325, by emphasizing the gendered, differential impact that armed conflict has on women and girls, called attention to patterns and behaviors that prevent women from emerging as political subj ects in a society, of which systematic and widespread SGBV is one. In this sense, Re solution 1325 functioned as a critical tool for better understanding how war is played out, and consequently, how peace should be made. During its implementation, peacekeeping missions and member states were able both to entrench these norm through institutional reforms in state structures and to identify loci were these norms continue to be transgressed. These agent-level transgressions in turn heightened inte rnational awareness about systematic and widespread SGBV posing a threat to internat ional security, both in exacerbating armed conflict and by plaguing wome n and girls societies emerging from war. In turn, Resolution 1820 was adopted by the Security C ouncil, re-prescribing policies in light of 119

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the barriers encountered to eradicating SGBV on the ground. Tracing this process illum inates how international normative structur es and the agents enmeshed within them are mutually constitutive of one a nother (Finnemore 1996; Sandholtz 2008). Resolution 1820 is another step towards developing a more systematic, coordinated strategy to combat SGBV in the spirit of standing international humanitarian and human rights law. Although at the time of writing, no systematic data or reports exist assessing its impact, and the Secretary-Ge neral is due to submit the first report on Resolution 1820s progress in June of 2009 (UNSC 2008d: para.15). The language of the document reflects an awareness of the obstacl es encountered in the eight years since Resolution 1325s adoption. Among the more general recommendations coming from the June 2008 Security Council meeting was the proposal to create institutional oversight committees within the Securi ty Council to consolidate in formation on the progress of both resolutions. These committees would ha ve national focal points (key liaisons reporting to the Security Counc il subcommittees) in countries of critical concern such as the cases in this comparative study to identi fy locally contingent obstacles and best practices (UNSC 2008e). Some scholars have argued that Resolution 1325, and now 1820, could be used to lobby for a referral of the Security Council to the ICC when states fail to address cases of massive sexual violence (Binder, Lukas and Schweiger 2008: 33). To date, neither resolution ha s been invoked to this end, but recent investigations of the International Criminal Court in the DRC and the Central African Republic concerning violations of the Rome Statute suggest that both resolutions do provide an institutional framework for doing so. Another indication of progress since Resolution 1820s adoption is MONUCs hiring of a Special Adviser on Sexual and 120

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Gender-Based Violence, to assist the C ongolese governm ent and MONUC in developing a nation-wide strategy to combat sexual violen ce and begin systematic data collection. Resolution 1325 represents a turning point for the incorporation of gender analysis in international security dialogue. By officially re cognizing gender inequality and its most brutal manifestations during periods of armed conflict, the UN Security Council simultaneously adopted a new paradigm for thinking about security: namely, that there is none for a society in which one-ha lf of the population c ontinues to suffer the scourges of war, even after the peace agr eements have been signed. However, more rigorous and systematic examination of both Resolution 1325 and Resolution 1820s implementation at the ground level is needed, particularly in countries beleaguered by unremitting rape cultures and pervasive gender ine quality at every level of analysis. This thesis offers one such point of departure, resting heavily on the e xperiences of past and current UN peacekeeping missions, with the hope that the lived suffering of East Timorese, Congolese, Haitian and Liberian women might contribute to the worldwide eradication of sexual and gender-based violence in the future. 121

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131APPENDIX A UNIVERSE OF CASES Characteristics/ Conflicts Conflict Type? Systematic/Widespread SGBV? Peacekeeping Mission postConflict? Time Frame? Former Yugoslavia Ethnic Yes Yes Early 1990s Rwanda Ethnic Yes No 1994 Democratic Republic of Congo Ethnic/Resource/Civil War Yes Yes 1997Present Darfur Ethnic/Civil War Yes Yes 2000 Present Somalia Civil War Yes No 1991 Present Liberia Resource/Civil War Yes Yes 1989 2003 Sierra Leone Resource/Civil War Yes Yes 1989 2003 Cote dIvoire Civil War Yes Yes 19902004 Timor-Leste Foreign Occupation/War of Liberation Yes Yes 19742000 Haiti Junta/Political Upheaval Yes Yes 1991Present Guatemala Ethnic/Civil War Yes Yes 19601996

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United NationsS/RES/1325 (2000) Distr.: General 31 October 2000 00-72018 (E) ````````` The Security Council, Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and recalling also the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Womens Rights and International Peace (International Womens Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816), Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict, Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and recognizing the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation, Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution, Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

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Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls, Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard noting the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693), Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations, Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security, Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, 1. Urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict; 2. Encourages the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decisionmaking levels in conflict resolution and peace processes; 3. Urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard calls on Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster; 4. Further urges the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel; 5. Expresses its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component; 6. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, invites Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and further requests the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training; 7. Urges Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Childrens Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

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8. Calls on all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including inter alia: (a)The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction; (b)Measures that support local womens peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements; (c)Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary; 9. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; 10. Calls on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict; 11. Emphasizes the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard stresses the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions; 12. Calls upon all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000; 13. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants; 14. Reaffirms its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions; 15. Expresses its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international womens groups; 16. Invites the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and further invites him to

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submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations; 17. Requests the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls; 18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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United Nations S/RES/1820 (2008) Distr.: General 19 June 2008 08-39144 (E) *0839144* The Security Council, Reaffirming its commitment to the continuing and full implementation of resolution 1325 (2000), 1612 (2005) and 1674 (2006) and recalling the Statements of its president of 31 October 2001 (Security Council/PRST/2001/31), 31 October 2002 (Security Council/PRST/2002/32), 28 October 2004 (Security Council/PRST/2004/40), 27 October 2005 (Security Council/PRST/2005/52), 8 November 2006 (Security Council/PRST/2006/42), 7 March 2007 (Security Council/PRST/2007/5), and 24 October 2007 (Security Council/PRST/2007/40); Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Reaffirming also the resolve expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document to eliminate all forms of violence against women and girls, including by ending impunity and by ensuring the protecti on of civilians, in particular women and girls, during and after armed conflicts, in accordance with the obligations States have undertaken under international huma nitarian law and international human rights law; Recalling the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations Ge neral Assembly entitled Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-first Century (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning sexual violence and women in situations of armed conflict; Reaffirming also the obligations of States Parties to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Optional Protocol thereto, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocols thereto, and urging states that have not yet done so to consider ratifying or acceding to them, Noting that civilians account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict; that women and girls are particularly targeted by the use of sexual violence, including as a tactic of wa r to humiliate, dominate, instil fear in, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group;

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08-39144 and that sexual violence perpetrated in this manner may in some instancespersist after the cessation of hostilities; Recalling its condemnation in the strongest terms ofall sexual and other forms of violence committed against civilians in armed conflict, in particular women and children; Reiterating deep concern that, despite its repeated condemnation of violence against women and children in situations of armed conflict, including sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, a nd despite its calls addressed to all parties to armed conflict for the cessation of such acts with immediate effect, such acts continue to occur, and in some situations have become systematic and widespread, reaching appalling levels ofbrutality, Recalling the inclusion of a range of sexual violence offences in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the statutes of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals, Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prev ention and resolution, Deeply concerned also about the persistent obstacles and challenges to womens participation and full involvement in the prevention and resolution of conflicts as a result of violence, intimidation and discrimination, which erode womens capacity and legitimacy to participate in post-conflict public life, and acknowledging the negative impact this has on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including po st-conflict peacebuilding, Recognizing that States bear primary responsibility to respect and ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals within their territory as provided for by relevant international law, Reaffirming that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure th e protection of affected civilians, Welcoming the ongoing coordination of efforts within the United Nations system, marked by the inter-agency initia tive United Nations Action against Sexual Violence in Conflict, to create awareness about sexual violence in armed conflicts and post-conflict situations and, ultimately, to put an end to it, 1. Stresses that sexual violence, when used or commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and security, affirms in this regard that effective steps to prevent and respond to such acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, and expresses its readiness, when considering situations on the agenda of the Council, to, where necessary, adopt appropriate steps to address widespread or systematic sexual violence; 2. Demands the immediate and complete cessation by all parties to armed conflict of all acts of sexual violence against civilians with immediate effect;

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08-39144 3. Demands that all parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians, including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence, which could include, inter alia, enforcing appropriate military disciplinary measures and upholding the principle of command responsibility, training troops on the categorical prohibition of all forms of sexual violence against civilians, debunking myths that fuel sexual violence, ve tting armed and security forces to take into account past actions of rape and other forms of sexual violence,and evacuation of women and children under imminent threat of sexual violence to safety; and requests the Secretary-General, where appropria te, to encourage dialogue to address this issuein the context of broader discussi ons of conflict resolution between appropriate UN officials and the parties to the conflict, taking into account, inter alia, the views expressed by women of affected local communities; 4. Notes that rape and other forms of se xual violence can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a c onstitutive act with re spect to genocide, stresses the need for the exclusion of sexual violence crimes from amnesty provisions in the context of conflict resolution processes, and calls upon Member States to comply with their obligations for prosecuting persons responsible for such acts, to ensure that all victims of sexual violence, particularly women and girls, have equal protection under the law a nd equal access to justice, and stresses the importance of ending impunity for such acts as part of a comprehensive approach to seeking sustainable peace, justice, truth, and national reconciliation; 5. Affirms its intention, when establishing and renewing state-specific sanctions regimes, to take into consideration the appropr iateness of targeted and graduated measures against parties to situ ations of armed conflict who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women and girls in situations of armed conflict; 6. Requests the Secretary-General, in c onsultation with the Security Council, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and its Working Group and relevant States, as appropriate, to develop and implement appropriate training programs for all peacekeeping and humanitarianpersonnel deployed by the United Nations in the context of missions as mandated by the Councilto help them better prevent, recognize and respond to sexual violence and other forms of violence against civilians; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to continue and strengthen efforts to implement the policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse in United Nations peacekeeping operations; and urges troop and police contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including pre-deployment and in-theater awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel; 8. Encourages troop and police contributing countries, in consultation with the Secretary-General, to consider steps they could take to heighten awareness and the responsiveness of their personnel participating in UN peacekeeping operations to protect civilians, including women and children, and prevent sexual violence against women and girls in conflict and post-conflict situations, including wherever possible the deployment of a higher percentage of women peacekeepers or police; 9. Requests the Secretary-General to develop effective guidelines and strategies to enhance the ability of relevant UN peacekeeping operations, consistent

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08-39144 with their mandates, to protect civilians including women and girls, from all forms of sexual violence and to systematically in clude in his written reports to the Council on conflict situations his observations concerning the protection of women and girls and recommendations in this regard; 10. Requests the Secretary-General and relevant United Nations agencies, inter alia, through consultation with women and women-led organizations as appropriate,to develop effective mechanisms for providing protection from violence, including in particular sexual violence, to women and girls in and around UN managed refugee and inte rnally displaced persons camps, as well as in all disarmament, demobilizationand reintegration processes, and in justice andsecurity sector reform efforts assisted by the United Nations; 11. Stresses the important role the Peacebuilding Commission can play by including in its advice and recommendations for post-conflict peacebuilding strategies, where appropriate, ways to ad dress sexual violence committed during and in the aftermath of armed conflict, and in ensuring consultation and effective representation of womens civil society in its country-specific configurations, as part of its wider approach to gender issues; 12. Urges the Secretary-General and his Special Envoys to invite women to participate in discussions pertinent to th e prevention and resolution of conflict, the maintenance of peace and security, and post-conflict peacebuilding, and encourages all parties to such talks to facilitate th e equal and full participation of women at decision-making levels; 13. Urges all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to sup port the development an d strengthening of the capacities of national ins titutions, in particular of judicial and health systems, and of local civil society networks in order to provide sustainable assistance to victims of sexual violence in armed conflict and post-conflict situations; 14. Urges appropriate regional and sub-regional bodies in particular to consider developing and implementing polic ies, activities, and advocacy for the benefit of women and girls affected by sexual violence in armed conflict; 15. Also requests the Secretary-General to s ubmit a report to the Council by 30 June 2009 on the implementation of this resolution in the context of situations which are on the agenda of the Council, utilizing information from available United Nations sources, including country team s, peacekeeping operations, and other United Nations personnel, which would include, inter alia, information on situations of armed conflict in which sexual violence has been widely or systematically employed against civilians; analysis of the prevalence and trends of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict; proposals for strategies to minimize the susceptibility of women and girls to such violence; benchmarks for measuring progress in preventing and addressing sexual violence; appropriate input from United Nations implementing partners in the field; information on his plans for facilitating the collection of timely, objectiv e, accurate, and reliable information on the use of sexual violence in situations of armed conflict, including through improved coordination of UN activities on the ground and at Headquarters; and information on actions taken by parties to armed conflict to implement their responsibilities as described in this resolution, in particular by immediately and

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08-39144 completely ceasing all acts of sexual violence and in taking appropriate measures to protect women and girls from all forms of sexual violence; 16. Decides to remain actively se ized of the matter.