Material Information |
| Title: |
Power Games A Microeconomic Game Theoretic Approach to Analyzing Presidential Corruption and the Draft towards Neoliberalism in Cost Rican Politics |
| Physical Description: |
Book |
| Language: |
English |
| Creator: |
Neff Fonseca, Reuben Andrew |
| Publisher: |
New College of Florida |
| Place of Publication: |
Sarasota, Fla. |
| Creation Date: |
2006 |
| Publication Date: |
2006 |
Subjects |
| Subjects / Keywords: |
Costa Rica
Power
Schelling, Thomas
Game Theory
Expected Utility Theory |
| Genre: |
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Notes |
| Abstract: |
After years of posing as corruption free, Costa Rica was shaken by scandals coming to light in 2004 concerning briberies accepted by its three most recent ex-presidents. In this thesis, I use a microeconomic game theoretic framework, combined with expected utility theory, to single out the particular incentive structures in Costa Rican politics that led to these developments. I present microeconomic games that describe the presidential power dynamics in Costa Rica during the period from 1898 to 2002 in order to reveal a common trend in Costa Rican politics of presidents undermining the Asamblea Legislativa. I find that presidents consistently power maximize by taking advantage of peripheral political institutions in the country such as the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones or USAID. Given that Costa Rican presidents turn to these bodies as opposed to the customary and public interactions with the legislature, as most non Costa Rican researchers assume, I conclude that the 2004 bribery scandals are a 'natural' evolution of presidential power manipulation. |
| Statement of Responsibility: |
by Reuben Andrew Neff Fonseca |
| Thesis: |
Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2006 |
| Electronic Access: |
RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE |
| Bibliography: |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Source of Description: |
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law. |
| Local: |
Faculty Sponsor: Elliott, Catherine |
Record Information |
| Source Institution: |
New College of Florida |
| Holding Location: |
New College of Florida |
| Rights Management: |
Applicable rights reserved. |
| Classification: |
local - S.T. 2006 N3 |
| System ID: |
NCFE003677:00001 |
|
Material Information |
| Title: |
Power Games A Microeconomic Game Theoretic Approach to Analyzing Presidential Corruption and the Draft towards Neoliberalism in Cost Rican Politics |
| Physical Description: |
Book |
| Language: |
English |
| Creator: |
Neff Fonseca, Reuben Andrew |
| Publisher: |
New College of Florida |
| Place of Publication: |
Sarasota, Fla. |
| Creation Date: |
2006 |
| Publication Date: |
2006 |
Subjects |
| Subjects / Keywords: |
Costa Rica
Power
Schelling, Thomas
Game Theory
Expected Utility Theory |
| Genre: |
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Notes |
| Abstract: |
After years of posing as corruption free, Costa Rica was shaken by scandals coming to light in 2004 concerning briberies accepted by its three most recent ex-presidents. In this thesis, I use a microeconomic game theoretic framework, combined with expected utility theory, to single out the particular incentive structures in Costa Rican politics that led to these developments. I present microeconomic games that describe the presidential power dynamics in Costa Rica during the period from 1898 to 2002 in order to reveal a common trend in Costa Rican politics of presidents undermining the Asamblea Legislativa. I find that presidents consistently power maximize by taking advantage of peripheral political institutions in the country such as the Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones or USAID. Given that Costa Rican presidents turn to these bodies as opposed to the customary and public interactions with the legislature, as most non Costa Rican researchers assume, I conclude that the 2004 bribery scandals are a 'natural' evolution of presidential power manipulation. |
| Statement of Responsibility: |
by Reuben Andrew Neff Fonseca |
| Thesis: |
Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2006 |
| Electronic Access: |
RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE |
| Bibliography: |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Source of Description: |
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law. |
| Local: |
Faculty Sponsor: Elliott, Catherine |
Record Information |
| Source Institution: |
New College of Florida |
| Holding Location: |
New College of Florida |
| Rights Management: |
Applicable rights reserved. |
| Classification: |
local - S.T. 2006 N3 |
| System ID: |
NCFE003677:00001 |
|