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COMRADE WOLF KNOWS WHOM TO EAT

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Title: COMRADE WOLF KNOWS WHOM TO EAT LANGUAGE POLICY AND NEGOTIATED BOUNDARIES IN REGIONAL RUSSIA
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Getz, Michael
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2013
Publication Date: 2013

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Subjects / Keywords: Language Policy
Regionalism
Russian
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

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Abstract: The dissolution of the USSR created an institutional vacuum in which the Russian Federation was formed. During this process, the ethnically defined republics of the nascent federation lobbied for greater sovereignty, partially on the basis of their national distinctness from the Russian ethnicity. Ethnic elites and political entrepreneurs advocated cultural revival movements as a means of assuring the protection of national identities from the forces of cultural assimilation prevalent in a modernizing society. One element of these efforts is the development of national languages, which can be promoted by implementing language policies that address the use of native languages in education, politics, mass media, and other public domains. This study takes a comparative approach to examine different strategies the ethnic republics of Russia have used to establish language revival movements and to elaborate on the relationship between language and the politicization of ethnicity in center-periphery relations. Findings indicate that different republican approaches to language policy implementation can be categorized based on levels of multiculturalism, and that national identity ideologies condition federal response to these measures.
Statement of Responsibility: by Michael Getz
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2013
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

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Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2013 G3
System ID: NCFE004765:00001

Permanent Link: http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu/NCFE004765/00001

Material Information

Title: COMRADE WOLF KNOWS WHOM TO EAT LANGUAGE POLICY AND NEGOTIATED BOUNDARIES IN REGIONAL RUSSIA
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Getz, Michael
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2013
Publication Date: 2013

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Language Policy
Regionalism
Russian
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: The dissolution of the USSR created an institutional vacuum in which the Russian Federation was formed. During this process, the ethnically defined republics of the nascent federation lobbied for greater sovereignty, partially on the basis of their national distinctness from the Russian ethnicity. Ethnic elites and political entrepreneurs advocated cultural revival movements as a means of assuring the protection of national identities from the forces of cultural assimilation prevalent in a modernizing society. One element of these efforts is the development of national languages, which can be promoted by implementing language policies that address the use of native languages in education, politics, mass media, and other public domains. This study takes a comparative approach to examine different strategies the ethnic republics of Russia have used to establish language revival movements and to elaborate on the relationship between language and the politicization of ethnicity in center-periphery relations. Findings indicate that different republican approaches to language policy implementation can be categorized based on levels of multiculturalism, and that national identity ideologies condition federal response to these measures.
Statement of Responsibility: by Michael Getz
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2013
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida Libraries, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Hicks, Barbara

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2013 G3
System ID: NCFE004765:00001


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COMRADE WOLF KNOWS WHOM TO EAT: LANGUAGE POLICY AND NEGOTIATED BOUNDARIES IN REGIONAL RUSSIA By MICHAEL PARKER GETZ A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida May, 2013

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ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements................................... ................................................... ........................iv Maps and Figures................................... ................................................... ..........................v Glossary of Russian Terms and Abbreviations........ ................................................... ........vi Abstract........................................... ................................................... ................................vii Introduction....................................... ................................................... ................................1 Chapter 1 Regionalism, Language, and the Center.. ................................................... .....7 Regionalism in the Russian Federal System......... ................................................... 8 Regionalist Modes of Resistance................... ................................................... .....15 Language Rights in Theory and Practice............ ..................................................1 9 Conclusion......................................... ................................................... .................24 Chapter 2 – Tatarstan and Bashkortostan: Volga Dist rict, We Can!................................25 Case Study: Tatarstan............................ ................................................... ............26 Case Study: Bashkortostan......................... ................................................... ........37 Conclusion: Imagined Immunities................... ................................................... ...47 Chapter 3 – Sakha and Karelia: Modern Frontiers.... ................................................... ...52 Case Study: Sakha................................. ................................................... .............53 Case Study: Karelia................................ ................................................... ............66 Conclusion: The North is a Delicate Matter........ ..................................................7 4 Chapter 4 – Conclusion: A Discussion of Position an d Momentum.................................76 Temporal Position and National Relativity......... ..................................................7 7 Recentralization and Assimilation................. ................................................... .....83 Bibliography....................................... ................................................... ............................87

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iii Acknowledgements Professor HicksSongs will be sung of your indomit able patience. And Professor Schatz, to the immutable “why,” n r.

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iv Maps and Figures Russia’s Ethnic Republics ......................... ................................................... .....................vii Map 2.1: The Republic of Tatarstan ................ ................................................... ..............28 Map 2.2: The Republic of Bashkortostan ............ ................................................... ..........39 Map 3.1: The Republic of Sakha .................... ................................................... ................56 Map 3.2: The Republic of Karelia .................. ................................................... ...............68 Figure 2.1: Demographic Composition of Tatarstan .. ................................................... ..27 Figure 2.2: Demographic Composition of Bashkortosta n ................................................3 7 Figure 2.3: Shifts in Bashkir and Tatar Ethnic Distribution in the Baltachevsky District ................................................... ..41 Figure 2.4: Distribution of Native Language Learner s, Tatarstan ..................................48 Figure 2.5: Distribution of Native Language Learner s, Bashkortostan ...........................49 Figure 3.1: Demographic Composition of Sakha (Yakut ia) .............................................54 Figure 3.2: Demographic Composition of Karelia .... ................................................... ....67 Figure 4.1: Political Dynamics of Language Policy ................................................... ....84

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v Glossary of Russian Terms and Abbreviations Glasnost’Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of political openness an d transparency KorenizatsiiaSoviet nationality policy first introduced in the 1 920s, intended to increase ethnic representation in local government and in th e communist administrative structure. Alrosathe Almazy Rossii-Sakha mining company ASSRAutonomous Soviet Socialist Republic ANRBAcademy of Sciences of the Republic of Bashkortosta n CDLCultural divisions of labor ECHREuropean Court of Human Rights FCNMFramework Convention for the Protection of Nationa l Minorities IYaLILanguage, Literature, and Art Institute of Tatarst an PACECouncil of Europe Parliamentary Assembly UNESCOUnited Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultura l Organization

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vi COMRADE WOLF KNOWS WHOM TO EAT: LANGUAGE POLICY AND NEGOTIATED BOUNDARIES IN REGIONAL RUSSIA MICHAEL PARKER GETZ New College of Florida, 2013 ABSTRACT The dissolution of the USSR created an institution al vacuum in which the Russian Federation was formed. During this process, the eth nically defined republics of the nascent federation lobbied for greater sovereignty, partially on the basis of their national distinctness from the Russian ethnicity. Ethnic eli tes and political entrepreneurs advocated cultural revival movements as a means of assuring the protection of national identities from the forces of cultural assimilation prevalent in a modernizing society. One element of these efforts is the development of nati onal languages, which can be promoted by implementing language policies that address the use of native languages in education, politics, mass media, and other public domains. Thi s study takes a comparative approach to examine different strategies the ethnic republic s of Russia have used to establish language revival movements and to elaborate on the relationship between language and the politicization of ethnicity in center-periphery relations. Findings indicate that different republican approaches to language policy implementation can be categorized based on levels of multiculturalism, and that natio nal identity ideologies condition federal response to these measures. Barbara Hicks Social Sciences

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vii

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1 Introduction The Russian Federation was born into an institution al vacuum. Tasked with the creation of a democratic system, the Yeltsin govern ment began establishing a form of federalism that would appease the myriad interests of a multicultural state. The shell of the Soviet Union informed structural decisions, suc h as the reliance on the ethnic boundaries of the Russian Soviet Federative Sociali st Republic (RSFSR) in defining administrative territories. Having emerged from an era of cultural repression, ethnic groups throughout Russia formed revival movements t o reassert the validity and distinctness of their traditional identities. These cultural movements were tied to and oftentimes a direct result of regional political mo vements relying on ethnic mobilization as a bid for greater sovereignty in the federal sys tem. Cultural capital became an instrument of leverage for the ethnically defined r egions, and was thus cultivated further both for autonomy claims and to justify the careers of ethnic elites. This is not to suggest that the efforts of these el ites were unwarranted. While the official nationality policies of the Soviet Union w ere never explicitly destructive, the de facto practices of Soviet officials discouraged and ofte n punished expressions of national identities. Early Soviet ideology focused on the de velopment and categorization of ethnic identities as a negation of the cultural imperialis m experienced under Tsarist Russia. Stalin’s 1913 definition of a nation as “an histori cally constituted, stable community of

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2 people, formed on the basis of a common language, t erritory, economic life, and psychological make-up, manifested in a common cultu re” suggests a certain legitimacy for the social unit, and the institutionalization o f ethnicity between 1917 and the late 1920s supported this notion (Stalin 1952, 307). Off icial language planning was established to formalize and standardize regional d ialects, and in 1923 korenizatsiia (nativization) was implemented to improve ethnic re presentation in regional administrations. These measures were taken to promo te the integration of autochthonous societies into the Soviet structure, bolstering the claims of internationalism while assuaging minority-group fears that the Bolsheviks were but another iteration of Russian chauvinism. Stalin confirmed the basis of these fears in the 19 30s and 1940s by reversing his response to the nationality question. Mass deportat ions of minority groups, purges of ethnic politicians from regional administrations, a nd aggressive promotion of cultural Russification became the norm. Officially recognize d ethnic categories were consolidated, forcing numerically small minorities to merge with dominant local ethnicities, which blurred cultural boundaries and caused ethnic identities to lose distinction and value (Simonsen 1999, 1075). Nation al languages were modified to parallel the structure of Russian, a process that u ndermined the traditional authenticity of the languages and facilitated Russocentric educatio n (Triandafyllidou 1998, 597). Although the post-Stalin thaw extended to nationali ty policy, which became more lenient and reconstructive under Khrushchev, much of the cu ltural damage was irreversible. Some nations had already become extinct, others cho se not to reassociate their group identity with the tragedies of a recent past (Trian dafyllidou 1998, 598).

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3 The period of glasnost’ Gorbachev’s policy of political openness, brought ethnic grievances to the fore. In 1988 Estonia became the first Soviet Republic to declare sovereignty over its territory, which inspired fort y other Soviet units to follow suit in the course of the next three years. The “Parade of Sove reignties” occasionally escalated to declarations of full independence, contributing dir ectly to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics of Russia participated in the Parade, and, being ethnically defined, were host to cultura l movements whose constituency and leadership carried over into the formation of the R ussian Federation. These movements sought to negotiate a political environment in whic h their national identities were free from the prejudice of cultural hegemony and their e conomic interests were recognized, by establishing distinct cultural boundaries that d emarcated their claims of legitimacy. Language is often the primary defining element of a nation, and many cultural movements focused on establishing the institutional capacity necessary to support regional languages in a globalizing society. A lega l basis for the defense of linguistic rights is required to ensure that language maintena nce is provided for in the public sphere. Article 26 of the 1993 constitution states: 1. Everyone shall have the right to determine and i ndicate his nationality. No one may be forced to determine and indicate his or her nationality. 2. Everyone shall have the right to use his or her native language, to a free choice of the language of communication, upbringing education and creative work. (Constitution of the Russian Federat ion 1993) Specific language policies have been developed in e ach ethnic republic to promote the revival of languages that faced discrimination in t he Soviet era. As regionalist movements gained momentum throughout the 1990s, som e language revival efforts flourished, with native language education, cultura l development programs, and

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4 administrative use of native languages becoming mor e standard. Under Yeltsin’s banner of self-determination, the federal government allow ed the ethnic republics of Russia to grow increasingly autonomous of the center, interve ning only in extreme cases such as the War in Chechnya. Having inherited both a federal system in which reg ional laws were often in direct violation of the federal constitution, and an econo my reeling from a botched privatization process followed by a fiscal crisis, Putin set abou t reasserting federal authority in an attempt to stabilize center-periphery relations. In spite of such measures as the 1999 Law on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which addresses the minority rights in local offi cial spheres, and the inclusion of Russia in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in 1996, the process of establishing a unitary stat e has greatly restricted the ability of cultural revival movements to function, causing linguistic decline to accelerate. And yet, ethnic groups have failed to mobilize in r esponse to worsening conditions for minority rights on the same scale as witnessed in t he early 1990s. This study examines how different approaches to lan guage policy taken by regionalist movements in the 1990s have affected th e viability of national language revival efforts throughout the Putin-era recentrali zation process. Much of the literature on language revival is constructed as single-case long itudinal studies, emphasizing ethnographic content and specific attempts to impro ve language vitality. Furthermore, studies of regionalism often regard language only a s a factor for mobilization, highlighting the political construction of ethnic i dentities. These approaches tend to focus on either the gravity of language death or the subj ectivity of identity construction, but rarely both. Using a comparative approach, this stu dy attempts to distinguish various

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5 political paths taken by regional elites and minori ty groups in the pursuit of selfpreservation via language, and to identify patterns of causality that condition the republics’ linguistic situation. The consequences o f these political trajectories are becoming more significant as Russia approaches a li nguistic crisis resulting from already extant changes in federal policy, the potential res tructuring of the ethnofederalist system, and a renewed emphasis on national unity based on R ussian language and culture. Case studies were selected based on ethnic demograp hics, levels of ethnic-based mobilization in the early 1990s, and levels of regi onal wealth. The republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are economically developed, predo minantly Muslim, and have experienced cohesive and vibrant regionalist moveme nts. High levels of industrialization and unified cultural movements would seemingly prov ide a strong foundation for regional autonomy, though these features also make these regions a high priority for a wary federal government’s ‘standardization’ plan, e specially due to the secessionist history of Tatarstan. The Tatar nation constitutes the majority of its republic’s population, which attributes a cultural authority to Tatar poli tical elites, while Bashkir elites must compete with the cultural interests of Russians and Tatars, who comprise significant populations in the region. The Republic of Sakha holds vast mineral resources and one of the world’s largest diamond processing plants, making it a prime target for economic recentralization. The republic has seen some of the most extensive and in clusive cultural revival programs in the Russian regions, attempting to accommodate the massive territory’s vast ethnic diversity. Although these efforts have gained the r ecognition of supranational minority rights organizations, the republic has struggled to support revival programs over time as a

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6 result of federal restructuring of regional finance s. These three republics have relatively high levels of wealth and ethnic mobilization, thus they may offer insight into the bestpossible scenario for minority languages in Russia. The Republic of Karelia, whose minority populations have been outnumbered by ethnic Russians for a century and have never formed a stable cultural revival effort, exemplifies the effects of cultural assimilation on non-dominant nations. Although the Karelian nation spans the Finnish-Russian border, t here has been no significant crossborder coordination to establish a cooperative revi val movement. The experiences of this disappearing nation demonstrate the importance of e ven basic language policy, such as the recognition of minority languages as official s tate languages. Although this study would optimally include all min orities represented in each region, the limitations of available data force con sideration to be focused on the politically and numerically dominant ethnicity of e ach region. As census data can be unreliable due to institutional biases and subjecti vity of categorization, third-party expert data will be included as much as possible. This stu dy addresses the two decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union, focusin g on the shifts of political dynamics resulting from recentralization, and on the contemp orary context for ethnic identity construction. The findings of this study indicate t hat regional approaches to language policy and revival can be generalized into three ca tegories – authoritarian, multicultural, and market – with apparent applicability to other e thnic republics. Although the actions of the federal government have been universally dev astating to the linguistic composition of Russia, these categories also indicate similar r esponses to changes in federal policy.

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7 Chapter 1 Regionalism, Language, and the Center Exploiting the opportunities provided by a divided government after the fall of the Soviet Union, regional elites used the political ca pital at their disposal to leverage greater autonomy against the central government. The asymme trical bargaining that resulted was intended to appease certain regions’ demands for gr eater regional autonomy within the ethnofederalist structure of the Russian Federation or demands for secession in extreme cases such as Tatarstan and Chechnya. These regions demonstrated the validity of their claims by withholding federal taxes, tightening con trols on valuable resources, or holding mass demonstrations in protest of the Russian ethni c hegemon, and as tactics employed by titular elites varied, so varied the success the regionalist movements. The work of Goode (2011) and Giuliano (2011) examin es how the mobilization strategies used during the rise of regionalism in t he 1990s have failed to maintain influence over federal and regional actors in a cha nged legal context. Facing a decline in popular support, regional elites have been unable t o resist the recentralizing policies of the Putin administration, and are now subject to gr eater federal oversight and accountability. While the politicization of ethnici ty has previously served to instigate

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8 popular uprisings in many Russian regions, the poli tical context that informs ethnic identity construction has changed significantly und er the Putin regime. This study proposes that the issue of language policy offers a saliency that links all levels of political and popular society, incorporating forces from the supranational to the local level. This sort of prevalence may offer new avenues for region al actors to organize in defense of national languages, as established avenues become i neffectual in shifting contexts. Regionalism in the Russian Federal System The Russian federal system is defined by constituti onal and political asymmetry. The bilateral agreement process under Yeltsin, thro ugh which regions used territorial resources and sometimes cultural capital to vie for higher administrative status and therefore greater autonomy, created a multi-layered federal structure. Russia’s republics, accounting for 21 of the 83 federal subjects, have the greatest administrative capacity of the federal units, including the rights to a region al constitution and legislature. Each republic is intended to represent a titular nationa lity, though this designation does not necessarily indicate the majority ethnicity of each region. The remaining federal subjects are distinguished as oblasts, krais, autonomous obl asts, or autonomous okrugs, along with the federal cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Th e administrative or ethnic characteristics vary with each subunit. This study focuses on the republics, as they function most significantly in the federal system a nd contain inherent ethnic identities (whether they align with the demographic reality or not). The Russian federal structure

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9 thus provides unique opportunities for the politica l mobilization of ethnicity in regionalist movements. Goode offers a broad definition of regionalism as “ some form of compact, territorialized resistance to the central state,” w hich is distinct from nationalism in locus of political identification (2011, 19, 25). With re gionalism, the foundation for communal identity is territorially defined, whereas national ism derives identity from ethnopolitical commonalities. Similar to nationalism, however, reg ionalist motives are provoked by threats or changes made to a region’s administrativ e status or territorial boundaries. Center-Periphery Negotiations Although federalism is commonly applauded as the op timal government structure for appeasing a heterogony of interests among regio nal actors, an inconsistent distribution of rights within the system can promote instability As Watts describes, “[Federalism] preserve[s] regional identities within a united fra mework. [Its] function is not to eliminate conflict, but to manage it in such a way that regio nal differences are accommodated” (quoted in Kempton and Clark 2002, 17). Kempton an d Clark expand on this argument, noting that accommodation in the form of constituti onal asymmetry, which includes the prioritization of ethnic republics, can establish p ositive relations with influential interests groups while protecting minority groups. However, i f political asymmetry – a disparity in cultural, economic, social, or political conditions – is evinced amongst or within regions, the inequality causes tensions to arise (Kempton an d Clark 2002, 26). While the 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates t hat all subjects of the Federation shall have equal relations with the federal government (e ffectively annulling the regionally

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10 reserved powers granted by the 1992 Federation Trea ty), the legitimation of the bilateral treaties provides flexibility to the central govern ment’s dealings with the regions. The bilateral treaties, 46 of which were signed by Yeltsin from 1994-1998, served to establish regions as subjects of the Federation while undermining the federal system itself. As Goode describes, regional leaders were i nclined to negotiate directly with the Kremlin through the treaty process rather than purs ue policy change through regional and federal legislatures, leading to a “fragmentation o f authority” based on a lack of standardized relations (2011, 8). He continues to a rgue that direct gubernatorial elections and a lack of a coherent national party structure e ncouraged a reliance of titular elites on regional identities and anti-center platforms for l ocal support (7-9). The federal structure under the Yeltsin administration provided the insti tutional opportunities that allowed regional elites to exercise de facto autonomy from the central government, with the mor e administratively endowed republics cooperating with the center the least. Upon his ascendancy to executive power in 2000, Put in established seven federal districts overseeing all of the federal units; the district representatives were to be appointed by the President. Executive reach was exp anded again in 2005 when Putin began the push to replace directly elected regional heads with appointed governors. The capacity of regional governors to participate on th e federal level was greatly restricted, and regional governments were forced into congruenc e with the federal constitution (Goode 2011, 12). According to Kempton and Clark’s outline of the necessary conditions for federalism in a multi-ethnic state, these restr ucturing reforms had the potential to destabilize the ethnofederalist system. The outline stipulates that the federal government must “actively support consensual participation,” t hat mechanisms must exist for regional

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11 subjects to participate in federal-level politics, and that a balance of power between the federal government and its components is necessary to prevent either centralization or balkanization (Kempton and Clark 2002, 21-25). Puti n’s recentralization was met with neither a reactionary balkanization, nor an increas e in secessionism. The prevalence of regionalism in political discourse began to decline which Goode attributes to a lack in the federal districts’ actual coercive power (2011, 57-59). He explains that the creation of macro-regions redirected popular antagonism away fr om the center while providing new channels for regional elites to pursue careers in t he federal government (Goode 2011, 59). Goode demonstrates this by outlining the administra tive positions that ex-regional governors have occupied, as compensation for their willingness to cooperate with the federal government’s regime manipulation. Without e xplicitly limiting the capacity of regional governments to rule, the Putin administrat ion effectively dismantled the established formula for regionalism while reasserti ng the primacy of federal law. This reorganization of the power structure was possible with the methods of institutional reform explained by Goode, Kempton, and Clark, whic h in turn managed to restructure the priorities of regional ethnic populations, and with it their identities. The drastic change in the ability and willingness of regional e lites to politicize these identities indicates that regionalist movements are highly con tingent upon the ethnofederalist structure that defines channels of political access and the manner in which regionalist actors perceive the opportunities offered by this s tructure. The interests and opportunities at play must be clarified by addressing individual regionalist movements and the policies that have affected them.

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12 Explaining Regionalist Movements To frame the phenomenon of regionalism, Goode discu sses the merits of perspectives that describe how regionalized ethnic interests and identities are constructed and utilized. The modernist view, related to the ad vent of globalization, describes local identity revival movements as a response to the hom ogeneity that industrialization engenders, while accepting identity as a socially c ontingent construct. Goode notes that this perspective required revision during the era o f decolonization and the fall of communism, as the efficacy of the state as a nation -builder came into question and indigenous interests found legitimate political exp ression through regional elites (2011, 19-20). The instrumentalist perspective seeks to id entify the efficacy of such politicization, emphasizing rational choice and the interests of regional leaders. Regionalist movements came to depend on the success of personal campaigns and the dedication of those campaigns to their ethnic platf orm over time, which suggests that the instrumentalist behavior that once served as a driv ing force for these movements can lead to the decline of regionalism as political entrench ment increases. Higher-level career opportunities begin to estrange political entrepren eurs from their local support bases, and their incentives to seek mass regional support are diminished. The center is provided with the opportunity to engage in collective bargaining to assuage regional grievances and avoid larger concessions (21). Goode argues that in stitutionalism has been the prevailing view regarding regionalism since the fall of the So viet Union, which proposes that stable and definitive regional boundaries, as structured b y institutionalized practices, are central to group identity, and that deviation from these pr actices results in the degradation of identity rather than the institutions (22). The ins titutionalist view will be most useful to

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13 this study, as it addresses the structural and poli cy changes between the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, as well as the methods by which et hnic identities are shaped by the institutions through which they are expressed. This study will address the construction of ethnic identity with the poststructural approach, which, as Yashar describes, “allows ethni city to be seen as primary and purposive without arguing that they are primordial or instrumental in nature” (1998, 29). Congruent with Giuliano’s (2006) work, ethnicity wi ll be regarded as contingent upon historical and socioeconomic context, while avoidin g assumptions about the stability or constancy of ethnic identities. In this way the pol iticization of ethnicity can be more fluently identified with the social, political, and economic forces affecting interactions between titular elites, their constituencies, and t he central government. Goode (2011) focuses on the conceptual boundaries t hat factor into the construction of regional identities, identifying th ree dimensions that are subject to reform or manipulation. His primary argument suggests that consistent stability of boundaries allows for the organization of anti-center interest groups and institutions (Goode 2011, 33-34). Juridical boundaries are territorial limits or “lines on a map” (28). These lines are most often defined by federal elites in the interes t of consolidating power in the center, based on resource control or fragmentation of power ful subunits (29). The institutional dimension, which is distinguished by regional const itutions and political structures, is essential in determining the vitality of regionalis t movement. Goode argues that institutional isomorphism between the center and th e regions, achieved by “coercion, mimesis, or professionalization,” increases the cen ter’s ability to interfere in regional issues (31). This indicator is clearly useful in fr aming the effects of Putin’s federal

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14 districts on regional politics and in determining t he significance of constitutional reform in various regions. The cultural dimension of regio nalism is defined by the practices that create identities and invest regions with meaningfu l concepts of membership (31). This study will address cases with juridical boundaries that have remained stable and have avoided major contestation since the initial federa l reforms of the Yeltsin administration, in order to focus on the cultural and institutional dimensions of regionalism, which frame the source, implementation, and effects of language policy. National Identities and Global Context Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2010) present an outline o f the three prevailing ideologies of Russian national identity: Westernist statist, and civilizationist. These ideologies provide useful context for the values th at regionalist movements claim to represent. Regionalism has been condoned as long as the dominant national identity of Russia supports prerogatives that are congruent wit h the interests of regional elites, such as cultural liberalism. Westernists, such as Gorbachev and Yeltsin, are ori ented toward Western values of “democracy, human rights, and a free market,” em phasizing integration with the “Western civilized” community by way of modernizati on and political liberalization (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010, 7). Statists support the idea of Russia as a “strong independent state, emphasizing the state’s ability to govern and preserve the social and political order,” which reads like a synopsis of th e United Russia political platform (7). Statists have a tendency to emphasize external thre ats, as noted by Putin’s development of US-Russian relations under the pretense of the W ar on Terror (8).

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15 The civilizationist ideology posits that Russia is “a civilization in its own right,” though this ideology includes the thought that the Russian ‘civilization’ is situated in opposition to both external cultures and those who encourage inter-civilizational discourse (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2010, 8). This i deology can be applied to centrist, assimilationist thinking that argues for a stronger Russian civilization based on homogeneity, or to cultural integrationist thinking that proposes a stronger civilization results from developing interethnic bonds. Chauvini st politicians such as Zhirinovsky represent the former, while the administration of S akha during the 1990s is exemplary of the latter. The prevailing Russian identity ideologies shifted with the regime change of 2000. Westernism and civilizationism gained support with Yeltsin’s attempt to establish a liberal democracy in the early 1990s, represented w ell by Yeltsin’s iconic challenge for the regions of Russia to “take as much sovereignty as you can swallow.” The incomplete democratic transition and eventually the 1998 finan cial crisis led to the discrediting of liberal democratic ideals and presented Putin with the opportunity to employ statist strongman tactics along with the promise to reclaim Russia for the Russians. Regionalist Modes of Resistance Discussion regarding the nature of the bilateral tr eaties and the strategies utilized by titular elites has led to the development of the ories that explain the success or failure of various modes of political leveraging against th e center. These theories primarily focus on economic development and identity construction a s the main sources of regionalist

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16 influence, though the significance of these two fac tors and the degree to which they relate to each other is variable. The boundaries that Good e (2011) has defined are useful in the evaluation of these factors, as the juridical, inst itutional, and cultural dimensions can capably accommodate the political implications of p opular mobilization, elite bargaining, and the interests of the federal government. The Wealth Hypothesis The vivacity of regionalist movements in economical ly well-endowed republics such as Tatarstan and Sakha has led some scholars t o attribute the probability that a regionalist movement will arise and succeed to the region’s level of economic development. As Giuliano (2006) and Bahry (2002) ar gue, higher levels of wealth and development would lead to a more pronounced state o f ethnic economic inequality. Their arguments focus largely on the cultural divisions o f labor (CDL), which describes the distribution of employment and income among cultura l groups, and their effects on popular perceptions. Bahry’s (2002) analysis of regional economic transi tions in the early 1990s indicates that there is a strong tie between econom ic endowment and strength of regional nationalist movements. She argues that regions with more resources available were more capable of allocating benefits locally and thus cou ld appease demands made by nondominant minorities (Bahry 2002, 673). Her analysis addresses the shift from established CDLs of the Soviet era towards more ethnically repr esentative CDLs, and the attempts of regional elites to facilitate this shift without pr ovoking intervention from the center by specifically disadvantaging ethnic Russians. Bahry demonstrates that Tatarstan was

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17 capable of avoiding federal intervention by expandi ng public sector jobs tailored towards indigenous workers, while softening the economic tr ansition by providing agricultural subsidies and broad social safety nets (675-677). S he notes the difficulty in garnering individual support for the pursuit of greater regio nal sovereignty, which can assure only collective benefits and faces high costs to the ave rage individual, though a noticeable improvement in the CDL can counter these discouragi ng factors (675). Bahry describes language policy as a successful measure both in pro viding greater employment opportunities for indigenous citizens in the admini strative and education sectors, as well as in combatting an unequal CDL. As the cultural division of labor begins to favor a group that is not the regionally dominant minority, elites are provided with opportu nities for mobilization. If the economic opportunities for the citizens of a region can be framed as dependent upon ethnicity, there is likely to be popular support in favor of granting greater economic privilege to regional minorities, which is a favora ble condition for the careers of titular elites. Consistent with Yashar’s poststructural con cept of ethnicity, Guiliano argues that ethnic groups are neither strictly defined nor immu table, as group interests are subject to change as a part of the political process (2011, 24). Emphasizing the importance of perception when assessing the ability of elites to mobilize a population, Giuliano shows that regions whose titular populations enjoyed sign ificant improvements in economic mobility as a result of the Soviet korenizatisiia (affirmative action) policies were nonetheless able to inspire regionalist movements b y portraying the economic status of the titulars as subordinate to that of ethnic Russi ans (2011, 4). The actual economic situation within regions is separate from the cause s of mobilization, as political

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18 entrepreneurship is necessary to link the two throu gh the manipulation of popular perception. Giuliano (2011) indicates as well that the regional ist movements that focused on economic disparities were able to gain significantl y more popular support than regionalist movements that focused on culture and language issu es. Nonetheless, language policy clearly plays a role in the maintenance of regional ist efforts, as policy is derived from both political and economic grievances, and focuses around the establishment of equity in the community. As language is often the primary dis tinguishing element of an ethnicity, it also serves as the basis for the construction of ethnic identity in a political context. Popular Mobilization Economic explanations for popular mobilization in R ussia rely on a historical institutionalist approach to regionalism, which wou ld suggest that regionalist movements are products of the individual situations that emer ged from the Soviet era. This approach implies that certain combinations of institutional remnants, such as civil organizations, resources, and territorial identities, would result in regional mobilization. Goode (2011) and Giuliano (2011) criticize this structural appro ach for considering ethnic masses as passive agents in the political process, assuming t hat they will respond predictably to specified circumstances. While certain structural c onditions are necessary to facilitate regional movements, popular support and thus popula r perceptions must be congruent with the platforms espoused by the movements. The central argument of Akturk’s (2011) work regard ing regime change efficiently frames the conditional relationship amo ng elites, their constituencies, and the

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19 presiding government. He argues that a change in th e ethnic power structure may only occur once counterelites (in this case titular elit es) emerge to represent constituencies with ethnic grievances, are armed with new discours e regarding ethnicity and nationhood, and can achieve a hegemonic majority on the politic al stage (Akturk 2011, 121). Although Akturk’s study is conducted on a national scale, this model can be applied to the regional context as well, with some modificatio n. Contrary to Goode’s (2011) and Giuliano’s (2011) arguments, there is still heavy i nfluence on the personal capacity of regional leaders. Akturk frames ethnic grievances a s unidirectional, emanating from the populace and being directed into political form by ethnic elites. Giuliano (2011) addresses this process more thoroughly, arguing tha t structural conditions form the context for individuals’ experiences and give rise to grievances, but elites’ political representation of ethnic grievances must remain con gruent to personal experiences to maintain popular support (2011, 13, 17). With this adjustment Akturk’s frame can accommodate the reciprocal relationship between eli tes and their constituencies, and will be useful in determining how certain language polic ies have been included or neglected in the discourse of political mobilization. Language Rights in Theory and Practice Little attention is paid to the topic of language p olicy in regionalist literature. Language policy is often subsumed in the discussion of cultural mobilization or regarded as implicit to the overarching theme of minority ri ghts, which downplays the complex dynamics of language within a community and within a state. Although Giuliano (2011)

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20 criticizes language-based mobilization as insuffici ent for the development of a significant constituency, prevailing international efforts to i mprove linguistic rights for minorities may provide a largely untapped (or unreachable) loc us of support. In order to discern whether language policy and its implementation are tools worth utilizing for regionalist movements, its institutional and political signific ance must be determined. Paulsten (1997) addresses the state of discussion r egarding language rights, criticizing the association of language rights with essential human rights. Vilfan defines language rights as “legal regulation of the use of languages in public life as part of the arrangements dealing with interethnic regulations i n a country with a mixed ethnic structure” (Vilfan 1993, quoted in Paulsten 1997, 7 5). This definition is useful as it addresses the effort to overcome the inherent hiera rchy of status in a multiethnic community and the accompanying power dynamics. Lang uage policy can be designed to affect language status (the public spheres and pres tige that a language is associated with), language corpus (the form of the language itself), or language acquisition (the use of language in education). This study will focus on st atus and acquisition planning, as they are most commonly used in regionalist movements and affect most significantly the future prospects of a language’s use and survival. Paulsten presents the critical theory and historical-structural approaches to language planni ng, which suggest that language policies are representative of the interests of eli tes to preserve socioeconomic conditions that foster their dominance, and that individuals c onsequently are withheld freedom of language choice due to a lack of structural control (1997, 78). She argues that this dynamic necessitates the consideration of language rights as derivative of specific, regionally based situations, rather than factors wi thin universal human rights (79). The

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21 political framing of language policy is tenuously d ependent on the social situation in which it arises, and is a factor that could contrib ute directly to the success or failure of a regionalist movement’s ability to shape such polici es. Social Dynamics and Linguistic Rights Wright’s (2004) work on language policy and languag e planning thoroughly reviews the global movement for linguistic rights. She emphasizes the influence of supranational organizations in the promotion of the se rights, arguing that the pressure exerted by international cultural standards, along with the catalyst of globalization and the consequent increase in transparency due to avai lable media, has allowed minority rights activism to be voiced and acknowledged by st ate actors. The political space that has thus emerged on the local level has encouraged a push for communitarian rights to form alongside trending liberalism forces, resultin g in a discourse that aligns both the right of the individual and the right of the group. However, an increase of minority language rights, such as improved bilingual educati on opportunities or greater linguistic representation in the legal system, imposes a great er cost on the individual while assuming popular alignment with minority revivalism It is therefore essential that language policy is formed in accordance with popula r support, keeping a check on overrepresentation of titular elites’ interests. To avoid the structural perpetuation of cultural assimilation, diglossia must be an establi shed condition in minority communities, in which personal bilingualism is supported by the use of two languages in a speech community. A normative state of diglossia, while et hically justified, can place social strain on the minority group, as special efforts ar e being made to accommodate a

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22 particular group, which is sometime perceived as cu mbersome or disadvantaging to other groups. The institutional support of regional gover nments and education systems must be formatted to standardize the incorporation of minor ity languages. Discussing the effects of linguistic heterogeneity on social relations, Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006) relate conformity and socia l capital theories to predictive participation in civil society. They find that ethn ic and linguistic heterogeneity “stimulates political discussion in less democratic societies” (which Russia is considered to be), encourages participation in voluntary assoc iative groups, and builds political discussion networks, though linguistic heterogeneit y reduces inter-group trust (2006, 793, 798). The authors continuously highlight the positi ve effects of associations that cross-cut social cleavages, promoting community interaction a nd socialization to new cultural norms. These findings demonstrate the importance bo th of framing language policy as socially constructive, and of analyzing regional de mographics to determine the ability of elites and organizations to achieve this framing. Language in the Policymaking System The official recognition of minority languages in R ussia has been limited de facto to one or two non-Russian languages per region. Thi s tendency has resulted in interregional and intraregional conflict arising fr om non-titular minorities seeking representation, or from ethnically titular citizens living in a region other than their eponymous republic. As this sort of underrepresenta tion due to fragmentation is typical of politically advantageous divisions constructed b y the federal government, it is worth addressing how the format of political institutions affects the structuring of linguistic

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23 environments. Liu (2011) writes of the institutiona l conditions that foster recognition and representation of minority linguistic rights. She c riticizes Lijphart’s (1968, 1999, 2002) assessment, that power sharing institutions will al low greater representation for minority parties and thus are more likely to secure recognit ion of minority languages, arguing that likelihood of recognition and level of recognition cannot be conflated (Liu 2011, 125). Liu emphasizes the power dynamic that official lang uage status creates, citing the fact that “more than one out of every two post-1945 civi l wars has involved language in some capacity,” and she introduces the dominant concepts of institutional engineering (Liu 2011, 126). “ Consensus via power-sharing institutions ” is an optimistic interpretation of the effects of federalism, proportional electoral r ules, and a parliamentary system, suggesting that these factors increase minority par ties’ veto ability and necessitate coalition building (Liu 2011, 126). “ Moderation via power-concentrating institutions ” emphasizes how electoral rules in a presidentialist system cause support to trend toward candidates representing stability and moderate part y affiliation, with centralization weakening regional identities and ethnic politiciza tion (2011, 126). Due to the semipresidential nature of the Russian federal gove rnment, the federal reforms under Putin, and the idiosyncratic variation among region al governments, it is difficult to apply these factors broadly to the Russian federal and re gional legislative systems, necessitating study on a case-by-case basis. Liu distinguishes between substantive and descripti ve representation, noting that the latter is not necessary for the former to occur (as in a deliberative society with sufficient public debate), and the latter is also n ot sufficient for the former to occur (2011, 127). The distribution of formal and informal power s determines the capacity of minority

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24 groups to influence policy decisions in spite of la tent inequalities within the government system and within the social structure. This phenom enon leads Liu to conclude that proportionally elected parliamentary governments ar e more likely to deny minority language recognition in the case of hyperpluralist gridlock, and they are more likely to grant higher levels of recognition if legislative g ridlock is overcome (2011, 135). Once recognition is achieved, minority parties can pursu e policies regarding government services, mass media, and education. An analysis of substantive minority representation in these public arenas should be effective in deter mining the political achievements of regionalist movements in the linguistic field. Conclusion Just as relative economic deprivation can spark con flict, the uneven distribution of political power across linguistic or ethnic lines c an provoke a mass response. The 1978 language protests in Georgia and the ongoing effort s in Lithuania to prevent the encroachment of the Russian language on its nation demonstrate the force with which a culture can respond when its identifying language i s threatened. Why then, have regionalist movements resorted to language mobiliza tion considerably less over the past decade? This study will examine four of Russia’s et hnic republics with varying demographics, political institutions, and histories of cultural mobilization, in order to determine how different approaches that regionalist movements have taken toward language policy, and how these approaches have affe cted the prospects for language survival in each region.

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25 Chapter 2 Tatarstan and Bashkortostan: Volga District, We Can! Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are perhaps the two mos t influential republics in the Russian Federation. Representing cultural centers o f the Muslim population of Russia and possessing immense natural resource reserves, the r epublics have the potential to command significant political clout. The ability to exercise this clout depends largely on republican officials’ talent for political maneuver ing within the ethnofederalist system. The capacity of the federal government shifted dras tically at the turn of the millenium, when Vladimir Putin came to power, which dramatical ly affected the role of the republican elites in the Russian Federation. Language as an institution of identity enjoyed thor ough support throughout the 1990s when nationalist movements were allowed to fl ourish. The cultural environment within Russia was altered by the wars in Chechnya a nd domestic terrorist activity, which resituated the Russian Muslim identity in a new con text of the global War on Terror. Islamic nationalism was no longer a benign expressi on of regional pride, but a threat to the nation’s security. The threat of pan-Islamicism and the need to modernize the Russian

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26 society are the main prerogatives that the federal government uses to justify intervening in republican affairs, and the organizations in sup port of minority language have suffered as a result. Case Study: Tatarstan The conditions in Tatarstan for the success and lon gevity of policies promoting the use of the Tatar language seem optimal. The rep ublic is wealthy, to the extent that Tatar authorities claimed sovereign statehood from the Russian Federation largely on the grounds that the republic could support itself fina ncially by trading its extensive natural resources directly with the international market. I ts history of ethnic revivalism is thorough and consistent, and the nationalist moveme nt has been closely linked with efforts to advance regional sovereignty. The abilit y of Tatar officials to negotiate with the federal government and to frame ethnic issues as ma tters of general public concern had established a context that ostensibly supported the promotion of Tatar language vitality, though federal reform under the Putin administratio n has changed this context. Tatar officials have distinguished the republic as one of the most boldly resistant to federal encroachment, leading the negotiation of bilateral agreements that established the asymmetrical nature of the Russian Federation. Its consistent position at the federal bargaining table has allowed Tatarstan to take a un ique stance regarding the survival of the Tatar nation, which is the second largest in Ru ssia behind ethnic Russians and constitute the majority in Tatarstan (see Figure 2. 1). Tatars also comprise significant minority populations throughout the Volga Federal D istrict, which extends the nation’s

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27 political and cultural influence, often causing internal issues to carry over into surrounding regions. In many regards the Tatar nation is capable of exerting influence over the future of its language. It has earned a position to negotiate the status of both its people and its language, widespread and multiethnic interest has been expressed in preserving the Tatar language, and the efforts of t he regionalist movement have established notable institutional improvements in p romoting the capacity to integrate the Tatar language with the global society. However, it seems as though federal and regional reform under the Putin administration has detracted from the political advantage created by regionalist movements of the late 1990s. Regional-Federal Relations and Script Reform The signing of the first bilateral treaty in 1994, which provided Tatarstan with legal agency over its natural resources and the abi lity to enter into legal and economic contracts with international actors, established th e asymmetrical nature of the Russian Federation. Similar legislation followed throughout the Federation, delimiting and altering the administrative capacity of almost a th ird of the subfederal regions. Tatarstan had previously claimed autonomous sovereignty over its territory (highlighted in Map 2.1) by refusing to sign the Federal Treaties of 19 93, although the approval of the 1994 Source: The Census of the Russian Federation, 2010

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bilateral treaty signified Tatarstan’s validation o f unity with the Federation (Cashaback 2008, 250). This treaty is re officials’ desire to maintain their distinct ethnic ity while increasing the power of their administration. Language policy is naturally suppor tive of the former, though it can provoke a response fro m opposition nationals or even Russian moderates if the policy is not crafted to benefit the general public. The resp onse to controversial policies regarding the choice of orthography that is to be used for of ficial printing of Tatar demonstrates the feder al response to a policy deemed inappropriate for so cial and political functioning. The script reform of 1999 changed the official scri pt of Tatar from Cyrillic to Latin. This change was from 1927 to 1939, in which the Latin script was us ed and the Tatar culture was flourishing (Cashaback 2008, 265). The shift was fu rther justified with the Latin script’s improved applicabilit y to the internet and technology, its ability to be tter represent the phonological structure of the language (which Cyril lic oversimplifies), and the increased bilateral treaty signified Tatarstan’s validation o f unity with the Federation (Cashaback 2008, 250). This treaty is re presentative of the tension that exists between the Tatar officials’ desire to maintain their distinct ethnic ity while increasing the power of their administration. Language policy is naturally suppor tive of the former, though it can m opposition nationals or even Russian moderates if the policy is not crafted to benefit the general public. The resp onse to controversial policies regarding the choice of orthography that is to be used for of ficial printing of Tatar demonstrates the al response to a policy deemed inappropriate for so cial and political functioning. Map 2.1: The Republic of TatarstanSource: Wikimedia Commons, 2013a The script reform of 1999 changed the official scri pt of Tatar from Cyrillic to made to associate the ongoing cultural revival with the period from 1927 to 1939, in which the Latin script was us ed and the Tatar culture was flourishing (Cashaback 2008, 265). The shift was fu rther justified with the Latin script’s y to the internet and technology, its ability to be tter represent the phonological structure of the language (which Cyril lic oversimplifies), and the increased 28 bilateral treaty signified Tatarstan’s validation o f unity with the Federation (Cashaback presentative of the tension that exists between the Tatar officials’ desire to maintain their distinct ethnic ity while increasing the power of their administration. Language policy is naturally suppor tive of the former, though it can m opposition nationals or even Russian moderates if the policy is not crafted to benefit the general public. The resp onse to controversial policies regarding the choice of orthography that is to be used for of ficial printing of Tatar demonstrates the al response to a policy deemed inappropriate for so cial and political functioning. The script reform of 1999 changed the official scri pt of Tatar from Cyrillic to made to associate the ongoing cultural revival with the period from 1927 to 1939, in which the Latin script was us ed and the Tatar culture was flourishing (Cashaback 2008, 265). The shift was fu rther justified with the Latin script’s y to the internet and technology, its ability to be tter represent the phonological structure of the language (which Cyril lic oversimplifies), and the increased

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29 distinction of Tatar from surrounding nationalities Public and official backlash argued that such measures would separate Tatarstan from co ntemporary society, even threatening the security of the Federation by expos ing Tatarstan to Turkish expansion (Cashaback 2008, 266). An amendment to the federal Law on Languages was si gned by President Putin in 2002, mandating the use of Cyrillic by all national languages, which was followed by the 2003 ruling of the Constitutional Court. The ruling stated that language was not solely within the domain of the republics, and, due to the expansiveness of the Tatar population, the use of a less integrated script could limit fre edom of Tatar citizens living outside their national republic to choose their language of commu nication (Cashaback 2008, 269). This ruling is arguably a part of Moscow’s effort t o maintain linguistic isomorphism between Russian and the national languages of Russi a, and to limit opportunities to align with foreign cultures. By framing the issue as a st ep towards separatism, federal officials officially declared that a change in script fell ou tside their boundaries of condoned ethnonationalist efforts. Although an orthographic shift may not necessarily signal the imminent disintegration of Russia’s geopolitical integrity, it does carry implications of pan-Turkic association. At a 2010 expert conference in Simfero pol, Ukraine, an international board of linguists determined that the adoption of a Lati n script by Crimean Tatars would help unite the international population of Tatars, the m ajority of whom live in Turkey (RFERL 2010). With the enforcement of the Cyrillic alphabe t, the Tatars of Russia are not being cut off from modern society as a whole; they are be ing cut off from the elements of

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30 modern society outside of Russia that federal offic ials have deemed potentially threatening in light of Russia’s experience with pa n-Islamism in the North Caucasus. The Tatar government did not abandon its pursuit of the Latin script immediately. After the 2003 federal ruling, experimental educati onal programs were implemented to determine the script’s benefit or detriment to the learning process of Tatar children. Not until December 2012 did the Tatar parliament vote t o cease usage of the Latin script in education and administrative affairs, though confid ence is not lost that globalization will revitalize the need for the more universal script ( Dzutsev 2013). Activist organizations such as the grassroots Latin Front that emerged aft er the 2002 presidential decree have sought to raise international awareness of the scri pt reform by appealing to supranational organizations such as UNESCO and the European Court of Human Rights. Although the appeals delineated specific violations of the Russi an Federal Constitution and Tatarstan’s right to self-determination, UNESCO has been unable to inspire a response from the Russian federal officials, and the ECHR, to date, h as yet to hear Tatarstan’s case (Suleymanova 2010). Activists have also cited the F ramework Convention for National Minorities (FCNM), ratified by Russia in 1998, whic h states that a citizen has the “right to use freely and without interference his or her m inority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing” (FCNM 1995). Even th ough the convention does not explicitly address the matter of orthography, a nat ional minority’s right to construct a linguistic environment that suits the needs of the group is essential to the document. Moscow has demonstrated that there is a limit to Ta tarstan’s state sovereignty, justifying its actions with the protection of the r ights of all Tatars. However, both the Tatar community and the international community hav e recognized that the Federation’s

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31 ruling is not in accordance with the needs of the n ation. An advisory committee on the FCNM addressed the script issue with the statement that “the federal authorities should refrain from imposing any artificial solutions” on the evolution of the Tatar linguistic environment (ACFCNM 2002). The World Congress of Ta tars, an organization with the purpose of linking the Tatar intelligentsia with th e Tatar community outside of Russia, announced a resolution in December 2012 to entrench the Tatar language as a mode of education and to adopt the Latin script once again (Goble 2012). These efforts indicate that the Tatar nationalist movement remains strongl y connected to the Tatarstan administration, a relationship that initially earne d Tatarstan the status of a “problematic” republic. If this relationship can remain mutually beneficial and sustain the support of the Tatar nation without provoking an opposition respon se, language policy will continue to be supported in the lawmaking sphere as a means of Tatar solidarity and resistance to federal control. Language policy nonetheless is nat urally dependent on the support and measurable efforts of the nation it targets, thus t he institutional implementation and the public response to policy measures must be assessed The Status of Tatar and Education Reform As the most important policy for ensuring a languag e’s transmission between generations while improving its usability and expos ure, education in one’s native language demands support by both policymakers and s peakers. Without consistent support from legislation, language programs are sus ceptible to being overturned by national educational policies, and without support from national language speakers, the

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32 source of a language’s demise is obvious. Curiously Tatar language education has had more support from the former than the latter. The Forces behind the Revival of Tatar The status and class associations of the Tatar lang uage play a significant role in the internal politics of the republic, essentially determining who receives schooling in Tatar and who advocates native language education f or the purpose of language revival. The Tatar language is most commonly spoken by the r ural Tatar population, carrying connotations of a traditional, pastoral life. The i ndustrialization and urbanization of such cities as Kazan, the republic’s capital, were resul ts of Soviet attempts of modernization, which were inherently Russifying in nature. As indu stry and bureaucracy developed in the republic, politically and economically ambitiou s Tatars were more inclined to move to urban areas and speak the language of the admini stration. The act of learning and using Tatar became associated with backwardness and ignor ance, whereas knowledge of Russian earned a place among civilized society. Des pite the extensive nationalist revival efforts throughout the 1990s, a stigma attached to speaking Russian with a Tatar accent has persevered (Garipov and Faller 2003, 173). The cultural revival movements of the Soviet Union began in the late 1980s, after the full freedom of cultural expression was restore d by glasnost’ What followed was the period referred to as the “Parade of Sovereignties, ” in which ethnic nations began to claim greater autonomy from the state based on thei r distinct identities. Mirroring the korenizatsiia policy of the 1920s, in which incentives were esta blished for titular nationalities to urbanize and participate in local administrations, Tatar officials in the

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33 early 1990s used their connections to the tradition al, rural population to augment their political standing on the local and federal level. Once established in the administration, Tatar elites held a unique position from which they could rely on their nationality as a bulwark against electoral defeat by outsiders, whil e mediating between the rural and urban populations (Giuliano 2000, 308). The class d istinction inherent to the language policies that attempt to augment the status of a na tionality while entrenching the titular elite places the language revival efforts largely i n a political (rather than anthropological or humanitarian) frame. Nonetheless, the origins of these efforts do not imply an inherent outcome for language policy implementation, as sign ificant advances in educational provision have been made, and real benefits for the Tatar language community have been observed. The Universal Language of Cat GIFs Assessing the institutional effects of language pol icies regarding education requires a look at the changes in the institutional capacity of the educational system, but determining the effects on the corpus of speakers b ecomes more complex. Interpretations of national language education data vary slightly a mong scholars, but it is clear that there is a steady decline in interest to study the Tatar language. While some legislators and officials persist in offering new methods to raise the Tatar language to a competitive level within the global community, recent federal actions may prove disastrous to the revival campaign. The supply-side advances in Tatar language educatio n provision are nothing short of impressive. Only one school in Kazan offered ins truction in Tatar in 1990; by 2003

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34 there were 1132 (Cashaback 2008, 260). During this period the percentage of students studying completely in Tatar rose from 24% to 49.3% and in 2001 99.1% of students were being taught Tatar in some capacity, an approa ch that maximizes language exposure and may prove most effective in the long term (Gore nburg 2005, 9, 11). Surveys in the 1990s indicated widespread multiethnic support for Tatar revival in schools, with 80% of Tatar parents, 70% of urban Russian parents, and 92 % of rural Russian parents indicating support for their children learning Tatar in school (Gorenburg 2005, 15-16). The 1994 State Programme on the Preservation, Study and Deve lopment of the Languages of the Peoples of Tatarstan aimed to improve the cultural infrastructure needed to support the Tatar language by creating the Academy of Sciences, the Language, Literature, and Art Institute (IYaLI), and publishing houses (Cashaback 2008, 257). Conditions for Tatar education have improved both in scope of exposure a nd attitudinal perceptions, though the progress has not been without complications. Despite advances made for primary and secondary sch ooling, officials have fallen short in encouraging the expansion of Tatar into th e sphere of higher education. Officials recognize that the prestige and utility of Tatar ar e dependent on its usability in academia, which is likely to result in greater usability in h igh-respect industry occupations. The 1992 Law on Language, in support of the equalizatio n of Russian and Tatar as state languages, ensures that university entrance exams a re offered in both Russian and Tatar, though students most often elect the Russian applic ation, assuming that it will boost their chances (Gorenburg 2005, 10). Although the Departme nt of Tatar Philology, History and Eastern Languages at Kazan State University has bee n continuously training a growing force of Tatar teachers, only 20-50 students are st udying the sciences in Tatar (Garipov

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35 and Faller 2003, 179). Officials have noted how ess ential the ability for Tatar to accommodate the demands of the information age is f or the language’s survival. Former deputy minister of education Ludmila Nugumanova had previously worked out a contract with Microsoft to develop an operating system fully in Tatar. When this contract expired in 2010, development began for an open-source opera ting system based on Linux that could be developed at no cost by Tatar programmers expressly for academic purposes (Ivanova 2009). This initiative improves computer l iteracy for students in schools, while encouraging students to interact with an accessible domestically developed introduction to computer sciences. Nonetheless, it is dubious wh ether the limited implementation of this initiative will have much effect on the 60% of young urban Tatars and 37% of young rural Tatars who reported that Russian should be th e primary language in post-secondary education (Garipov and Faller 2003). In response to a growing sentiment that the career opportunities of students were being hindered by th e mandatory teaching of Tatar, protests began to emerge in 2011, causing Nugumanov a to resign in 2012 (RFERL 2012). The opposition in protest was significant enough to provide federal officials with a public justification for intervening further in Tatar educ ation policy. You said your dog does not bite? Federal policy regarding Tatar education has been u nsupportive at best, while aggressively restrictive at times. The federal gove rnment supports the equality between Russians and Tatars in concept, though it chooses t o support the enforcement of this equality when convenient. Although the national cur riculum allocates 15-20% of class time to a “regional segment”, which is devoted to t he study of local language, history,

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36 culture, and geography, the federal Ministry of Edu cation ordered Tatarstan to cease the use of federal educational funds for the teaching o f Tatar in 2001 (Cashaback 2008, 256, 261). Similarly, the 2004 State Programme for the D evelopment of Tatar was approved only after the budget was cut by 25%, redirecting t he costs of implementation to be incurred by the participating institutions and orga nizations (Cashaback 2008, 262). As noted earlier, federal officials had no qualms in c laiming selective portions of Tatar language policy under their domain, presumably conc luding that matters of orthography are more essential to the integrity of the Federati on than its peoples’ education. Taking the cue from the ongoing protests of previou s years, President Putin signed a law on education on December 31, 2012, in which “the right to an education in the languages of Russia’s ethnic minorities is offi cially recognized, but not completely guaranteed” (Khisamiev and Coalson 2012). The law w ill take effect September 2013, stating that classes in non-Russian languages “cann ot be conducted to the detriment of teaching in the Russian language” (Khisamiev and Co alson 2012). The law was met with protest in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Chuvashia, though it is not unique of intent. Amid election reform, controversy has come up surro unding the lack of the requirement for presidential candidates to speak both Tatar and Russian in the most recent draft bill (Khisamiev and Coalson 2012). A current draft of a new State Nationalities Policy contains such extreme measures as the potential res tructuring of ethnofederalist territories, the removal of ethnically identifying republic titles, which drafting commission head Vyacheslav Mikhailov claims is in t he interest of “strengthen[ing] a single identity for the entire country, [developing ] its ethnic diversity, and [strengthening] civic unity and interethnic harmony” (Khisamiev and Coalson 2012). Whether the

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37 severity of the measures is exaggerated due to the early stage of the drafting process, the ubiquity of these aggressively chauvinist sentiment s in current Russian policy has already begun to spark outrage among the ethnic republics. Case Study: Bashkortostan The sociopolitical makeup of Bashkortostan is similar to that of Tatarstan insofar as the majority religion is Islam, and extensive natural endowments of oil and gas have provided republican elites with the ability to develop extensively the economic capacity of Bashkortostan. The distinguishing factor between the two republics is the demographic composition: Bashk irs, the titular nationality, do not represent the majority of the population (see Figur e 2.2). This distribution creates a constrictive environment for Bashkir elites, as the interests of their people are flanked by the interests of the two most influential ethniciti es in the Russian Federation. Close association with Tatarstan offers connections to th e pan-Turkic community and the distinction of regional sovereignty, while potentia lly proving detrimental to relations with the Kremlin. The presence of a Russian plurality en sures that any policy regarding language education must fall within the accepted bo undaries of ‘public good’. Titular Source: The Census of the Russian Federation, 2010

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38 officials had, for over a decade, been content to f ocus the Bashkir language revival efforts on encouraging Bashkir parents to seek out native l anguage education for their children (Zamyatin 2012a, 96). Having recently adopted manda tory Bashkir education measures, the Bashkortostan government has been met with oppo sition protests decrying such policies as infringements on personal liberties (Gr aney 1999, 621). Since the Republic of Bashkortostan was formed in 1 919, the Bashkir people have experienced not only close cohabitation with two do minant cultures, but recurring cycles of identity restructuring. The notion of what it is to be Bashkir has been subject to manipulation from both the state and regional elite s, via such institutions as the census and workers’ unions (Ocharev and Osipov 2010, 216). The historical malleability of the Bashkir identity suggests a certain instability in the public perceptions of the culture, which has not gone unacknowledged by the Bashkir in telligentsia. Elements of regional educational programs have been devoted to reasserti ng the traditional legitimacy of the Bashkir culture through historical revisionism and an emphasis on the centrality of the Bashkir language within its community (Graney 1999, 621). Much focus has been directed on distinguishing the Bashkir language fro m Tatar, as the two Turkic languages lie very close on a dialect continuum, and in many areas are mutually intelligible (Yagmur and Kroon 2003, 324). The similarities of t he languages, along with variation of instrumental benefits for associating with one iden tity over another, have promoted the growth of Tatar-speaking Bashkir groups, which furt her complicate the internal politics of identity. As other groups that are in cultural o pposition to the Kremlin have experienced, the efforts of Bashkir officials to as sert their ethnic sovereignty more

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aggressively have been labe to heavily restrict Bashkir officials in their efforts to promote a nat ional identity. Resituating the Bashkir Identity The work of Gorenburg (1999) studies the various sh ifts that the Bashkir identi has undergone since the creation of the republic. H is research focuses on the role of the state in the redefinition of ethnic labels and the institutions that support these definitions. Language and the census are the most influential of these instituti opportunities for citizens to express their affilia tion with the identity they subscribe to in the formal public sphere, the public community, and in their private lives (Gorenburg 1999, 570). Gorenburg makes important distinctions certain identities for instrumental benefit and the maintenance of a private identity, as these separate spheres are affected differently by changes in political an d economic aggressively have been labe led as nationalist extremism, allowing the central government Bashkir officials in their efforts to promote a nat ional identity. Map 2.2: The Republic of BashkortostanSource: Wikimedia Commons, 2013b Resituating the Bashkir Identity The work of Gorenburg (1999) studies the various sh ifts that the Bashkir identi has undergone since the creation of the republic. H is research focuses on the role of the state in the redefinition of ethnic labels and the institutions that support these definitions. Language and the census are the most influential of these instituti ons, as they provide the opportunities for citizens to express their affilia tion with the identity they subscribe to in the formal public sphere, the public community, and in their private lives (Gorenburg 1999, 570). Gorenburg makes important distinctions between the public association with certain identities for instrumental benefit and the maintenance of a private identity, as are affected differently by changes in political an d economic 39 led as nationalist extremism, allowing the central government Bashkir officials in their efforts to promote a nat ional identity. The work of Gorenburg (1999) studies the various sh ifts that the Bashkir identi ty has undergone since the creation of the republic. H is research focuses on the role of the state in the redefinition of ethnic labels and the institutions that support these definitions. ons, as they provide the opportunities for citizens to express their affilia tion with the identity they subscribe to in the formal public sphere, the public community, and in their private lives (Gorenburg between the public association with certain identities for instrumental benefit and the maintenance of a private identity, as are affected differently by changes in political an d economic

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40 circumstances (572). He stresses that members of an ethnicity provide the final confirmation or rejection of adjusted labels, based on the perceived legitimacy and benefits of the new labels (556). The initial cultural boundary adjustment, the creat ion of Bashkortostan as an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) of the Soviet Union, distinguished a group of Tatars as Bashkirs based on territorial de lineations. To further entrench this distinction, a literary language separate from the Turko-Tatar variant most common in Russia, as well as business regulations emphasizing the use of Bashkir were developed (Gorenburg 1999, 566). These policies contributed g reatly to establishing Bashkir as a language of status, one that could be used as a sig nifier of the Bashkir people’s right to embody the nascent territory’s identity. Though geo graphic and cultural boundaries had been set, associations between the Bashkir and Tata r peoples remained fluid. The Bashkirs living in the northwest of the republic, t he area that borders on Tatarstan, began to identify as Bashkir while maintaining a dialect very closely related to Tatar (Graney 1999, 570). Shifts in the political context surrounding census polling methods caused Bashkir citizens to express their relationships with variou s language communities in different manners. During the process of the 1959 census, eth nic quotas were established, forcing locals to engage in campaigns to produce required l evels of nationalist sentiments (Gorenburg 1999, 570). This campaign was seemingly intended to reify the cultural hierarchy established by the ethnofederalist system while servicing the Soviet Union’s image as a peaceful arbiter of cultural pluralism. Along with the removal of ethnic quotas for the 1970 census, the change in national conscience brought upon by

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democratization in the late 1980s Figure 2.3) for citizens who had adjusted their eth nic identification based on instrumental benefits (570572). Gorenburg writes that “democratization and th e Gorbachev reform which emphasized individual merit, made ethnically (572). Although identity shift had reached a relati ve equilibrium by the time the language revival movements of the 1990s began, the cyclical readjustment of the Bashki largely prevented the Bashkirs from establishing an y particular cultural dominance over either the Russians or the Tatars in Bashkortostan (573). Thus it was necessary still to adopt policies of multiculturalism that, rather tha n catering to the cultures in the republic, served to pacify the Russ ian and Tatar groups that remain highly influential. This atmosphere sets the tone for all manifestations of Bashkir nationalism in the public sphere, especially in relation to t educational reform as thorough as the reform accomp lished in Tatarstan. Figure 2.3: Shifts in Bashkir and Tatar Ethnic Dis tribution in the in the late 1980s caused a reversion b ack to traditional identities (s Figure 2.3) for citizens who had adjusted their eth nic identification based on instrumental 572). Gorenburg writes that “democratization and th e Gorbachev reform which emphasized individual merit, made ethnically based privileges morally suspect” (572). Although identity shift had reached a relati ve equilibrium by the time the language revival movements of the 1990s began, the cyclical readjustment of the Bashki largely prevented the Bashkirs from establishing an y particular cultural dominance over either the Russians or the Tatars in Bashkortostan (573). Thus it was necessary still to adopt policies of multiculturalism that, rather tha n catering to the needs of the plurality of cultures in the republic, served to pacify the Russ ian and Tatar groups that remain highly influential. This atmosphere sets the tone for all manifestations of Bashkir nationalism in the public sphere, especially in relation to t he Bashkir officials’ ability to establish educational reform as thorough as the reform accomp lished in Tatarstan. Figure 2.3: Shifts in Bashkir and Tatar Ethnic Dis tribution in the Baltachevsky District Source: Reproduced from Gorenburg (1999, 569) 41 ack to traditional identities (s ee Figure 2.3) for citizens who had adjusted their eth nic identification based on instrumental 572). Gorenburg writes that “democratization and th e Gorbachev reform s, based privileges morally suspect” (572). Although identity shift had reached a relati ve equilibrium by the time the language revival movements of the 1990s began, the cyclical readjustment of the Bashki r identity largely prevented the Bashkirs from establishing an y particular cultural dominance over either the Russians or the Tatars in Bashkortostan (573). Thus it was necessary still to needs of the plurality of cultures in the republic, served to pacify the Russ ian and Tatar groups that remain highly influential. This atmosphere sets the tone for all manifestations of Bashkir nationalism in he Bashkir officials’ ability to establish Figure 2.3: Shifts in Bashkir and Tatar Ethnic Dis tribution in the

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42 Language Revival and Education Reform in Bashkortos tan The Soviets sought to encourage a rift between the Tatars and Bashkirs to prevent the two groups from becoming an even more powerful unified minority (Yagmur and Kroon 2003, 325). These efforts have not proven fru itless, as Tatars occasionally side with ethnic Russians in the resisting reforms that specifically favor Bashkirs, namely in the education sphere (Gorenburg 1999, 558). Bashkir officials have, in a converse manner, sought to augment their claims to sovereign ty over their eponymous territory by expanding legislative support for language revival programs, with an emphasis on multiculturality. Graney describes these efforts as “sovereignty projects,” in which elites seek to “[fulfill] their declarations of sovereign statehood by investing them with empirical and discursive meaning” (1999, 611). Thes e projects are specifically addressed to the actors whose approbation is necessary to leg itimize the Bashkortostan government’s sovereignty, the federal government, a nd the republican government’s constituency. Burnt by the Positive Vibe Emanator Bashkir officials were quick to reassert their cult ural value as the Soviet Union began collapsing, establishing the Academy of Scien ces of the Republic of Bashkortostan (ANRB) by presidential decree in 1990. The Ministry of Education, headed by specialist in Bashkir philology Firdaus Khisamitdinova, instit uted a program in 1997 to relocate the production capacity of textbooks away from Moscow a nd into the republic, so that greater control could be exerted over the represent ation of Bashkortostan in scholastic settings (Graney 1999, 613-615; Yagmur and Kroon 20 03, 327). These two events are

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43 wholly representative of the general approach taken by Bashkir cultural elites in the 1990s to revamp the status of the Bashkir republic: policy was aimed at improving the international prestige of the Bashkir culture while promoting a sense of Bashkir citizenship domestically. As this stance avoided mo re aggressive assertions of educational necessity, improvement in the field of education was gradual, relying on the attitudinal encouragement of Bashkir parents to cho ose native language education. The Bashkir language revival movement began earlier than most, increasing the percentage of students receiving native language ed ucation from 30% to 39.1% between 1988 and 1990 (Zamyatin 2012b, 91). Yagmur and Kroo n demonstrate that the attitudinal approach of Bashkir language revival had taken root in the 1990s, creating an environment of pride and “positive cultural vitalit y” (2003, 332). Their research focuses on assessing language vitality through a subjective survey and the measurement of demographic and institutional support. Interestingl y, the authors chose to provide the ethnolinguistic vitality survey (based on the quest ionnaire designed by Bourhis et al. in 1981) in Russian, out of fear that an insufficient number of young Bashkirs could respond adequately in their native tongue (Yagmur and Kroon 2003, 320). This alone is a statement on the relativity that is involved in pub lic identity expression. Much like with census data, it is impossible to distinguish from s ubjective ethnolinguistic survey data whether citizens are interpreting linguistic vitali ty as actual functionality of a language or a matter of nationalist pride. Nonetheless, the per ceived environment of positive cultural vitality that Yagmur and Kroon discovered is import ant to understanding the sociolinguistic milieu of the 1990s. The cultural s entiment that a language is both significant to a nation and valued by its users is an essential basis from which a native

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44 language can develop, and on which it can be mainta ined. The survey suggests at least a partial success of Bashkir officials’ “sovereignty project.” Although Zamyatin recorded only a 0.6% increase in students receiving native language education in Bashkortostan between 1990 an d 2000, he notes that the remarkable surge in native language students had oc curred between 1988 and 1990 (2012b, 85). This claim is consistent with the cens us data of 1989 and 2002, which report an increase in Bashkir speakers of approximately 20 ,000 individuals (RF Census 1989; RF Census 2002). It is significant as well that in 1997 upwards to 15% of non-Bashkir students were studying Bashkir in general middle sc hools, which indicates some success of the cultural awareness and citizenship campaigns propagated by Bashkir officials (Graney 1999, 617-618). While the gains achieved by the language revival programs were measurable, the gradual pace of the progress w as deemed unsatisfactory by some factions of the Bashkir elite (Graney 1999, 621). A lthough President Rakhimov drew a hard line against proposals for mandatory native la nguage education in the state language law of 1999, anti-nationalist policies enforced by the Putin administration would cause Bashkir officials to adjust the intensity of their platform, with somewhat ruinous results (Graney 1999, 617). Back in the Nu-SSR After the fall of the Soviet Union, the central gov ernment had neither the resources nor political leverage to set restriction s upon the expression of nationalism in the republics. This dynamic changed under the Putin administration, allowing recentralization and the reaffirmation of the power vertical to become both a possibility

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45 and a priority. With the outbreak of another Cheche n conflict and an anti-corruption fervor emanating from the central government, the K remlin earned itself significant political leeway in addressing nationalist extremis m, and developed a penchant for exploiting global sentiments regarding Islamic asso ciations. Aside from the modernization reforms targeting native language ins truction and the contentious Latin script issue, both experienced by Tatarstan as well Bashkortostan has been particularly susceptible to interference from the federal govern ment in internal politics. Amendments made to the federal Education Law in Dec ember 2007 severely restricted the republican ministries’ competency ov er regionally designed curricula (Zamyatin 2012a, 96). In Bashkortostan the regional selection of the curriculum, which had comprised upwards to 35% of total teaching hour s, was reduced until Russian language education outweighed native language hours After protests led by both Tatars and Russians inspired the elimination of all “regio nal and ethnic classes” on geography, history, and native languages in 2009, the percenta ge of students learning Bashkir dropped from 98.5% to 87% (Zamyatin 2012a, 97, RFER L 2009). Internal Politics and Institutionalized Anti-extrem ism Oracheva and Osipov, writing on the nature of asymm etrical ethnofederalism, focus on the republic of Bashkortostan for the bias ed representation of its titular population in government: “The existing disproporti ons may be better explained as arising from the authoritarian character of regiona l political regimes, the centralization of governance in Russia, and executive control over th e recruitment of civil servants, elections, higher education and business” (2010, 21 9-220). Although Bashkirs represent

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46 29.5% of the population, under the Rakhimov adminis tration 60% of the cabinet, 56% of the legislative body, and three out of the four top executive positions were occupied by Bashkirs. Similar to the Tatar government, the demo cratic elections in 1993 brought Rakhimov, the previous head of the ASSR’s Supreme S oviet, to power and allowed him to consolidate much of the government’s power in th e executive branch. As Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reports, Rakhimov’s regime rel ied on corruption and cronyism to stay in power from 1993 to 2010 (Coalson 2011). Nat ionalist groups were supported while he was in power, though the lack of developme nt of Bashkir civil society left nationalist organizations vulnerable to the Kremlin ’s anti-extremist directives. Rakhimov was persuaded to resign a year before his term was set to end in 2011, and was awarded quid pro quo the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, the highest award the Federation offers, by President Medvedev. The nationalist organizations of Bashkortostan have not fared so well. Amid protests against the elimination of republic-funded native language education and the 2002 script ruling, demonstrators have sent appeals to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). These appeals indicate th at the Russian federal government has not acted in accordance to the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages, which stipulates that minority groups mu st be guaranteed the right to middle and higher education in their native tongue. The la ck of any significant response from the PACE suggests that minority language rights are not a high priority in relations between the Council of Europe and Russia. Rustem Khamitov was appointed as Rakhimov’s replace ment in 2010, and continues to serve as head of Bashkortostan (the di stinction of republican “president” was

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47 removed in 2010, an obvious diminution of regional status). Within a year of coming to power, Khamitov, a Bashkir, had established a quest ionable relationship with groups supporting the Bashkir language. He has voiced supp ort for the study of Bashkir, while simultaneously refusing to intervene in a scenario in which journalists writing in Bashkir were fired, describing the Bashkir language as “old -fashioned” (RFERL 2011). The immediacy with which Khamitov was appointed after R akhimov’s resignation indicates that he certainly follows the United Russia party l ine, which suggests a dubious future for nationalist groups. In 2011 and 2012 a spike in hig hly publicized and sensationalized incidents involving Islamic terrorists in Bashkorto stan served as justification for the federal government to penetrate further into the re public’s internal affairs by recentralizing control of republican police forces (RFERL 2011). Nationalist groups have thus been forced to comply directly with the Kremli n’s implicit guidelines for proper behavior, which could prove restrictive for languag e revival efforts, and detrimental to the positive cultural value of the Bashkir language Conclusion: Imagined Immunities As Zamyatin’s research indicates, the improvement i n the number of students learning native languages in the Ural-Volga republi cs slowed to a near halt under the Putin administration (2012b, 94). This lack of back tracking is a considerable achievement, as many republics in which a Russian m ajority exists have experienced a complete reversal of this trend, as their schools b ecome “optimized” and fewer media

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48 outlets exist to support their native languages. Fi gures 2.4 and 2.5 illustrates the boom and bust cycle of cultural values over the last two decades, as well as the lack of sufficient data to represent an accurate image of e thnic demographics in the educational system. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have experienced simila r trajectories of cultural revival, and are currently experiencing similar sit uations: both republics have had their democratically elected presidents stripped of their title and replaced with officials sympathetic to the Kremlin, and both are being held accountable to anti-extremist sentiments. The linguistic rights of the titular an d minority groups have suffered accordingly, as competency over educational curricu la and language corpus planning has been reasserted by the federal government. Figure 2.4: Distribution of Native Language Learner s, Tatarstan Year 1989/1990 2000/2001 2009/2010 Students total 513,000 577,000 378,000 Students of titular origin ~ 248,800 ~ 305,200 ~ 201,1 00 Native instruction 65,074 150,632 85,515 Native instruction share ~ 26.6% 48% 48.4% Native language subject ~ 192,600 313,750 185,392 Native language share Titular students share ~ 78.6% 99.6% 100% Share in total Source: Zamyatin 2012b, p. 85

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49 Figure 2.5: Distribution of Native Language Learner s, Bashkortostan Year 1989/1990 2000/2001 2009/2010 Students total 579,000 672,000 438,000 Students of titular origin ~ 126,800 ~ 200,250 ~ 129,2 00 Native instruction 49,600 69,975 47,908 Native instruction share ~ 39.1% 39.7% 37.8% Native language subject 93,950 138,000 126,747 Native language share Titular students share 66.1% 78.3% 99.9% Share in total Source: Zamyatin 2012b, p. 85 The cultural elites of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan had adopted varying approaches, and the central government responded ac cordingly. The Tatar intelligentsia has focused on modernizing and expanding the intern ational role of the Tatar language, while effectively portraying native language educat ion as a public good with sweeping benefits. The federal government was able to redire ct public perceptions regarding language education by emphasizing the role of Tatar in pan-Turkic relations and the role of Russian as a global language of science and tech nology, forcing Tatar citizens to structure their priorities accordingly. By consecut ively cutting off federal funding for native language education and media, the federal go vernment forced Tatar officials to reconsider their priorities of using language reviv al as a tactic for asserting sovereignty. Although activist factions still pressure the centr al government to acknowledge the linguistic rights of minorities, the main proponent s of language revival have either

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50 resigned or been removed from power, while the pres sure to integrate with the global economy and community remain. The officials in Bashkortostan led a language campa ign less contrary to the will of the federal government, though the language revival movement retained the intention to supplement the sovereignty of the republican govern ment. Focusing on cooperative multiculturalism rather than titular language reviv al as a matter of public welfare, Bashkir officials designed less forceful policies and often implemented policy on a more gradual timeline than did their Tatar counterparts. Tatar o fficials took advantage of representing a majority population in this way, while Bashkir offi cials, representing only the politically dominant minority, were more inclined to appeal to broad public interests and to avoid policy that could be seen as an imposition on the T atar or Russian culture. Thus, Tatars were able to establish a solid basis of the more co ntentious policies, such as mandatory native language education, before Putin came to pow er, but the Bashkirs attempted to instituted milder terms of such policies while Puti n’s power vertical was well under construction. These late attempts of Bashkir-specif ic language revival were more quickly shut down and less effective as a result. Considering the latest amendments to the federal La w on Languages and the federal programs for the modernization of the Russi an language, it would appear that the ethnolinguistic conditions of the Russian republics are becoming more hostile for national language revivals. Appeals to the internat ional legal community have been fruitless, prompting domestic organizations to seek support from communities of which the federal government is wary – those that represe nt pan-Islamicism. Although the

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51 private sphere of the language community remains sa cred to the determined native speakers, it is not an area that is impervious to f ederal influence.

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52 Chapter 3 Sakha and Karelia: Modern Frontiers The Republics of Sakha and Karelia are distinguishe d by their geopolitical significance to the Russian Federation. Karelia is a frontierland in the literal sense, as it forms a border with a Eurozone nation, Russia’s lon gest. While Sakha is no longer the eastern frontier of an expanding Russia, it retains a frontier-like social economy, with Slavic workers from the urban West seeking temporar y employment in the industrialized hinterlands of Siberia. Sakha and Karelia, along wi th the northern republic of Komi, were the only three republics in 1988 with higher levels of wealth than the average in Russia (Hale and Taagepera 2002, 1107). The economic situa tions of these republics provided the opportunity for their governments to develop cu ltural policies with greater fiscal independence from the central government, though th e ethnic populations responded differently to the shifting economic structure of t he Russian Federation, yielding drastically varied results. In Sakha the native peoples comprise the majority, ensuring representation in government and a political plurality conducive to m ulticulturalism. The republic is not without inter-ethnic tensions, however, due to the cultural division of labor between rural

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53 and industrialized areas. The ethnic composition of Karelia is the inverse, with native populations comprising only 17.8% of the population which makes these peoples highly susceptible to cultural assimilation (RF 2011). Case Study: Sakha The republic of Sakha (Yakutia) is situated in the Far East of Russia, and is the largest subfederal unit, covering over 3.2 million square kilometers. This area comprises a multitude of indigenous peoples, of Turkic, Asiat ic, and Arctic origin, and would seemingly be of little interest to the federal gove rnment if not for the vast diamond and gold deposits under the surface of the territory. S akha officials have long expressed pride in their republic’s history of interethnic harmony and cooperation, though again what lies below the surface is of more interest. The industri alization of the Siberian territory has created a severe socioeconomic disparity between th e native Sakha population and temporary or newly settled Slavic workers, which de fines territorial and cultural boundaries across which interethnic relations are t ense. The Yakut (Sakha) population suffered a continuous reduction in number during th e Soviet era, falling to a low of 33.4% in 1989, and has experienced a resurgence in the following decades, rebounding to 49.9% of the total population (958,528) in 2010 (US SR 1990; RF 2011). Russians are the second largest ethnic group, at 37.8%, with other m inority groups, native or Slavic, comprising populations no greater than 3% each (see Figure 3.1). Native Sakha populations are generally condensed in the Northern agricultural areas, while the

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54 Southern urban areas are home to the Slavic populat ions, with significant Yakut populations especially in the capital city of Yakut sk. Macro-level language policy has been designed lar gely in congruence with the ostensible spirit of ethnic tolerance and coproduction, though implementation has manifested varying degrees of public-sector sup port and communal participation. Although cultural revival efforts have been broadly applied and exceptionally inclusive for all native populations, greater central control over republican budgeting has severely constrained the continued growth of cultural infrastructure in the recent decade (Balzer 2004, 233). Similar to the Volga republics, language revitalization has been s ubject under the Putin administration to recontextualization as an element of the nationa list agenda. While Yakut is a Northern Turkic language, the Sakha community has not garner ed as vigorous ties with the PanTurkic community as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan hav e (Balzer and Vinokurov 1996, 112). Instead Sakha official have attempted to orie nt cultural and linguistic programmes towards multicultural liberalism to avoid accusatio ns of nationalist incitement (Hicks 2011, 87). The fiscal and demographic crises of the 1990s have nonetheless exacerbated ethnic tensions to the point that popular perceptio n is no longer unified with the indelible outward optimism of the Sakha cultural intelligents ia. Source: The Census of the Russian Federation, 2010

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55 The Federal Government and Economic Tethering Mikhail Nikolaev, the first president of Sakha, sig ned the 1992 Federal Treaties with conditions that provided Sakha officials with what was deemed to be sufficient control over the republic’s budgeting and foreign t rade. The conciliatory nature of these agreements was emphasized with Nikolaev’s choice of nomenclature, ratifying the treaties as a representative of the Republic of Sak ha (Yakutia) (Balzer and Vinokurova 1996, 103). Sakha is the historically native name f or the territory, while Yakutia was a name imposed by the Russian government. A bilateral agreement signed in 1995 granted Sakha greater control over taxes, budgeting, and cu ltural matters including education (Sharafutdinova 2011, 17). These agreements were in tended to diminish Sakha’s economic dependence on the central government, as t he northern rural regions of Sakha rely heavily on food and energy subsidies, at times for basic survival. The intensity of this relationship was emphasized during the winter of 1998, when northern natives were forced to evacuate due to the federal government’s failure to deliver energy supplies after the crippling fiscal crisis (Balzer 2004, 244). Diamonds Are a Republic’s Best Friend Until They Ar en’t For a sustained cultural revival movement a native people must merge their cultural renewal with the ability to ability to suc cessfully meet the challenges of modern economic society. The highly publicized 1998 fiasco was used by the federal government as proof of just the opposite, evincing the need fo r the federal government to reclaim control over the lucrative diamond and gold mining industries. The history of the Almazy Rossii-Sakha mining company (Alrosa), which produce s up to 25% of the world’s raw

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diamond supply, indicates that the acti undermined the ability of Sakha the 1995 agreement that was intended to support the 2009). This behavior suggests that of the millenium were effective tools in the federa l government’s discrediting of revival movements’ validity as a part of the modern experie nce, as well as a mechanism for the simultaneous reclamation o Alrosa was created by presidential decree in 1992, with established profit divisions as 32% for the republican government, 32% for the federal go for municipal administrations (Sharafutdinova 2011, 11). President Nikolaev garnered political support by asserting himself as a moderat e leader focused on improving the republic’s control over its own resources, and reli ed on his longtime Yeltsin to negotiate the 1995 bilateral agreement ( Sharafutdinova 2011, 12). Attempts to diamond supply, indicates that the acti ons of the federal government have consistently undermined the ability of Sakha (indicated in Map 3.1) to modernize independently since the 1995 agreement that was intended to support the republic in this endeavor (Kramer 2009). This behavior suggests that the economic and demographic crises around the turn of the millenium were effective tools in the federa l government’s discrediting of revival movements’ validity as a part of the modern experie nce, as well as a mechanism for the simultaneous reclamation o f mining profits for federal use. Map 3.1: The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia)Source: Wikimedia Commons, 2013c Alrosa was created by presidential decree in 1992, with established profit divisions as 32% for the republican government, 32% for the federal go vernment, and 8% for municipal administrations (Sharafutdinova 2011, 11). President Nikolaev garnered political support by asserting himself as a moderat e leader focused on improving the republic’s control over its own resources, and reli ed on his longtime support of President Yeltsin to negotiate the 1995 bilateral agreement ( Sharafutdinova 2011, 12). Attempts to 56 ons of the federal government have consistently to modernize independently since republic in this endeavor (Kramer the economic and demographic crises around the turn of the millenium were effective tools in the federa l government’s discrediting of revival movements’ validity as a part of the modern experie nce, as well as a mechanism for the Alrosa was created by presidential decree in 1992, with established profit vernment, and 8% for municipal administrations (Sharafutdinova 2011, 11). President Nikolaev garnered political support by asserting himself as a moderat e leader focused on improving the support of President Yeltsin to negotiate the 1995 bilateral agreement ( Sharafutdinova 2011, 12). Attempts to

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57 develop the republic’s economy beyond the mining in dustry lost momentum as the 1990s progressed, and profits derived from Alrosa’s tax c ontributions became the lifeblood of local and regional administrations (Sharafutdinova 2011, 18). As Balzer notes, the minimal conditions under which indigenous populatio ns could sustain themselves, in “group ownership of land, including a portion of su bsurface wealth, local community self-rule, and control over cultural resources” wer e threatened by the looming privatization of Alrosa (2004, 250). In 2001 President Putin reneged on the 1995 bilater al treaty, making the potential to privatize Alrosa very real. The initial privatiz ation process was called into question, allowing the federal government to renegotiate its share of the closed joint-stock company to over 50% and reformat Alrosa as a public ly traded corporation in 2010 (Sharafutdinova 2011, 19, 21). This process continu ously diminished the republican share of taxed profits and control of territorial resourc es, as well as the funding available for the cultural prerogatives of the native populations. Sa kha thus followed a common pattern whereby the process of privatization in the context of neoliberal mutliculturalism serves to “naturalize indigenous poverty in terms of cultu ral difference,” while reinforcing ethnic hierarchies (Hicks 2011, 53). The inability of native populations to adapt to the rapid introduction of competition to the local econ omic structure, combined with a sudden removal of government support, has caused na tionalist sentiments to entrench even further, as cross-class resentment overshadows cultural revival.

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58 The Unbearable Lightness of Being a Nationalist In 1996 Balzer and Vinokurova wrote of Sakha as fal ling “roughly halfway on a scale of nationalist agitation,” due to the vigor o f revival movements and compromising tendencies of policy regarding ethnic and economic issues (1996, 95). As noted earlier, the general ethnic divisions, oriented along rural and urban as well as skilled and unskilled labor lines, became strained as economic conditions worsened during the 1998 financial crisis and after the privatization of Alr osa in 2001. Skilled Slavic workers (including small percentages of Belarusians and Ukr ainians) were seen less as providing welcomed contributions to the republican economy an d more as chauvinist opportunists with little respect for local culture and interests only in making a quick ruble (107). The relative economic and social mobility of Slavic wor kers increased resentment, as their lack of attachment to the republic allowed them to leave at will when the economy turned against their favor, leaving natives to struggle wi th both a troubled economy and an unstable labor market. These patterns of labor and ethnic-based migration applied not only to industry but to education as well, leading to what Ventsel d escribes as the “lumpenization of the Sakha language” (2011, 454). The term lumpenization refers to the process in which the socioeconomic status of laborers is diminished unde r the conditions of the free market, forcing the working class to occupy the lowest stra ta of society. Ventsel argues that lumpenization is in this case the result of non-nat ive teachers leaving rural areas due to the deterioration of wages, causing rural students to move en masse to urban areas, where they are labeled derogatorily as “villagers” by urb an Slavic citizens (2011, 454). This experience is indicative of the shift from the post -Soviet cultural revival movement to the

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59 categorical resurgence of nationalism within both n ative and Slavic populations. Clashes along urban and rural class lines can be highly det rimental to the status of national languages, as linguistic markers such as accents or relative language competency are quickly associated with ethnic antagonisms. Linguis tic markers are not easily adjusted, thus they can become long-standing signifiers of a class once a specific nation is associated with that class. Attempts to establish the institutional infrastruct ure upon which a healthy cultural environment can form have been thorough and persist ent, managing to avoid adopting a nationalist charge for the decade following the Sov iet collapse. The groups Sakha Keskile (Sakha Future) and Sakha Omuk (Sakha People) were f ormed in the early 1990s and served as a public forum for scholars, artists, pol iticians, activists, and any community members interested in participating in the the rene wal of the Sakha culture (Hicks 2011, 79-80). The Institute of the Problems of Northern M inorities, headquartered in Yakutsk, supported a network of social and legal resources f or indigenous populations with tenuous connections to emergency aid and cultural r ights advisement (Balzer 2004, 245246). The adaptability of native languages to local and regional administrative functions was improved by the implementation of native-langua ge dictionaries and teaching guides for the public sector, including specific aids for business rhetoric, legal and psychological terminology, and judicial proceedings (Zhirkova 200 8, 168-170). These institutions enjoyed the backing of the public and the multicult ural (though Yakut dominated) Sakha government, until the economic and administrative r ecentralization of Putin’s government caused ethnic scapegoating and nationali st controversy to flare up. Argounova-Low describes the “systemic accusations o f natsionalizm [sic]” as a

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60 mechanism used to “construct deviance” as a part of a general “deflection process,” in which factors, apparent or otherwise, causing stres s to interethnic tensions result in the categorical blaming or defamation of a group, so th at the source causes can be denied or ignored (Argounova-Low 2007, 43). Both the native a nd temporary populations of Sakha engage in this process, creating a cultural environ ment that actively derails the efforts of multicultural organizations to portray an outward a ppearance of interethnic harmony, as well as their ability to apply for assistance from the federal and regional governments. Following the trend of public sentiments, President Nikolaev began to exhibit an increasingly nationalist political platform, and fo r this reason was maneuvered out of office by the Putin administration in 2002 (Balzer 2004, 241). Nikolaev was replaced with the appointed Shtyrov, who, in order to demons trate loyalty to the Putin administration, consolidated presidential control a nd redirected regional funding away from Sakha cultural organizations and efforts (Peer s 2009, 76; Balzer 2004, 251). The political reorientation of the Sakha government and the gradual suppression of multiculturalism has forced cultural revival groups to seek support outside of the regional political structure, a tactic which has historicall y triggered aggressive responses from the central government. Sakha cultural groups have incr eased ties mostly to the international organizations UNESCO and the Northern Forum, an ass ociative network for polar communities, and some attention has been directed t oward the pan-Turkic community (Hicks 2011, 214). The Putin administration's conti nued resistance to foreign interaction with domestic organizations suggests that this cour se of action may prove to be more of a hindrance to the prerogatives of cultural elites th an a benefit.

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61 Language Revival and Self-Determination The opinions and research presented at the 2008 UNE SCO conference on linguistic and cultural diversity in cyberspace, al ong with various official statements from Presidents Putin and Medvedev detail the layers of public perception regarding native languages in Sakha, as well as the exaggerated opti mism of some cultural elites. Expresident Nikolaev contributed to the opening state ments of the 2008 conference, describing a romanticized ideal of what the native languages of Sakha have to offer for the collective culture of humanity, through the lit erary and scientific value of the diversity found in Sakha (UNESCO 2008, 18-20). Whil e these laudatory words may have been pleasing to the linguist’s ear, the specialist s in various linguistic and administrative fields who spoke later in the conference presented severely less cheerful reports on the conditions of Sakha’s native languages. In 2009 President Medvedev gave a statement at the University of Pittsburgh advocating the advantages of federal budgeting in r educing preferential rights to specific groups, indirectly referencing the titular populati ons of Russia’s republics (RT 2009). His portrayal of the federal government’s role in resou rce redistribution ignores the cultural divisions of labor in Sakha that position the urban Slavic population as the recipient of preferential rights such as higher pay and better p ensions, while economic benefits to rural native populations have decreased under the f ederal government’s management (Hicks 2011, 152). Hicks criticizes Medvedev for th e shortsightedness of his portrayal of the Russian federal government as an “impartial and all-seeing state” which considers the heterogeneity of its republics’ needs accurately an d responds accordingly (2011, 89). This platform contrasts Putin’s early statements in 2001 that supported the republican

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62 right to self-determination, though Putin’s history of actions align perfectly with Medvedev’s statements (Balzer 2004, 233). Whether i mplicitly or explicitly stated, the agenda of the federal government since Yeltsin has wholly excluded the prerogatives of indigenous populations from consideration, leaving the question as to whether cultural elites have the access to sufficient political and economic resources necessary to sustain institutional development. Sixteen Different Words for Reindeer The central argument of the 2008 UNESCO conference contended that modernization and globalization are not inherently contradictory to the existence and needs of indigenous languages, but rather are compl ementary. The spread and advancement of technology does not diminish the wor th of localized dialects, but instead compels native language communities to adopt availa ble methods that allow for the increase in breadth of their cultural network (Gran in 2011, 347). Availability of educational materials, improved communication, and limitless storage capacity for the records of a people’s heritage are provided by the internet, as long as access is attainable, which the work of UNESCO seeks to ensure. Although specifics regarding budgeting and funding sources are not distinguished in the public records of the 2008 conference, the g roundwork for providing native Sakha populations with adequate technological capacity to promote their languages has been exhaustive. Experts in education, informatics, and linguistics reported on the feasibility of applying various approaches to supporting indigenou s languages by digitizing information resources to create a parallel language community transcendent of social and

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63 temporal boundaries (UNESCO 2008, 26). Despite the wealth of logistical knowledge presented, there remained the tacit doubt that rura l and nomadic populations would be willing and able to acquire the technological acces s necessary to support the online language effort, largely due to socioeconomic hurdl es of the reindeer-herding life (UNESCO 2008, 55). Yushkiavitshus, the former UNESCO Assistant Directo r-General for communication-related technologies, noted that rese arch and development was necessary foremost for the increase of multilingual capacity for operating systems, search engines, and browsers, while suggesting that the internet is the optimal resource to resist incursions of an authoritarian central government a nd to develop educational, economic, and social opportunities for underprivileged people s (UNESCO 2008, 44, 47). The primary significance of the 2008 conference is the reassertion that native languages are not limited to serving as historical relics recorde d for the sake of preserving an idealized memory of traditional, pastoral Siberian cultures. UNESCO continues to work in the area, hosting conferences on education, youth devel opment, and ethnic conflict as recently as 2011, bringing international support an d attention to a republic with diminishing access to political resources. The expe rtise and educational materials that UNESCO provides are invaluable, working contrary to the “optimization” and “modernization” programs of the Russian federal gov ernment, which have little to do with modernization and everything to do with assimi lation. The native language communities of Sakha have responded positively to t he international support effort, though actual participation has waned since the rev ival movements began (UNESCO 2008, 45).

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64 The Zone Wants to be Respected The development of language education policy follow ed closely the trends of multicultralism shifting to nationalism, as would b e expected due to the implications that public language education carries. The early 1990s saw in Sakha (Yakutia) allencompassing citizenship and language laws, providi ng all residents full citizenship and equal rights for ten years beginning in 1992, upon which voluntary native language programs were built (Balzer and Vinokurova 1996, 10 3). The 1995 federal law “On general principles to organize local self-governmen t” attributed the competency of municipal schooling organization to local governmen ts, while some minority groups with concentrated populations were allotted sub-regional territories to promote cultural integrity (Badmatsyrenova and Elivanova 2006, 216; Balzer 2004, 244). Between 1991 and 1997, over 700 community organizations with “na tional-cultural issues as their goals and the basis of their activities” were officially registered, and over half of them were associated with the Sakha culture (Balzer 2004, 241 ). The focus on voluntary native language education in preschools and the training o f native language teachers were top priorities in many of the policies designed in this time (Robbek 1998, 118). The educational field was unified in the movement to im prove availability and diversity of education, constructing a system of self-determinat ion from the bottom up. As long as sufficient funding from the industrial sector was a llocated to local administrations, educational programs flourished, taking root in sma ll indigenous populations throughout the republic (Balzer 2004, 245). Special care was t aken to emphasize the voluntary nature of native language teachings in early education, re lying on the spirit of communal productivity to motivate the policy implementation (Balzer and Vinokurova 1996, 115).

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65 Inoffensive and non-intrusive as these policies may have been, they were not so privileged as to avoid the blanket charges of natio nalism and resurgence of chauvinism that emerged in the early 2000s. The socioeconomic boundaries reified by localized language education may have been a contributing fac tor to the creation of an expedient context for interethnic conflict. As a 2002 survey detailed, the total number of Yakutlanguage institutions (356) outnumbered the total n umber or Russian-language institutions (239) by over 100, though the Yakut an d Russian institutions were highly concentrated in rural and urban areas, respectively (Badmatsyrenova and Elivanova 2006, 217). The out-migration of rural student to urban a reas was highly politicized and deeply strained nationalist tensions, compounded by a decr ease in republic-funded wages causing the skilled Slavic teachers once working in rural areas to seek more lucrative employment elsewhere. The urban school systems simp ly did not have the capacity to accommodate the influx of students, and the attribu table cause quickly became the ostensible ethnic divisions. Occasional street braw ls between rural youth and urban youth were sensationalized by local media as attacks driv en by nationalist animosity (Hicks 2011, 166). Chauvinist scholars and politicians took the opport unity to speak out in favor of a unified monolingual community, and political discou rse has since been oriented in this direction. The Ministry of the Peoples’ Affairs and Federal Relations that had instituted the “Assemblies of the Peoples of Sakha Republic” w as abolished by 2001 (Balzer 2004, 241). The Russian Federation symbolically abstained from voting on the UN “Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” i n 2007, though in the same year the number of pupils studying Yakut in primary and seco ndary education institutions rose by

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66 10,485 (Hicks 2011, 87; Gabysheva 2008, 55). The sh are in hours of Russian broadcasting on the national station has overtaken Yakut and other minorities as 55% of television and 60% of radio (Badmatsyrenova and Eli vanova 2006, 217). The encroachment of the Russian language on native spea king communities has been steady since the revival of the 1990s faced an opposing po litical atmosphere, and the executive branch of the republican government became tied to the federal government. Resistance to assimilating tendencies continues, succeeding at least to slow the deterioration of the minority languages of Sakha. Case Study: Karelia The periodic redrawing of the Russian-Finnish borde r throughout the history of the two nations has led to a fragmented concept of what physical and cultural space the Karelian nation occupies. The nation is currently b isected by state lines, a condition which, along with the inconstancy of territorial bo undaries, threatens the ability of the Karelian peoples to form a cohesive identity. As Af rican scholar Asiwaju describes, cultural groups that are divided by arbitrary terri torial boundaries are subject to the “integrative processes set in motion by the differe nt states” (quoted in Schrad 2004, 461). The titular population of the Republic of Karelia h as not proven to be immune to these forces, experiencing a steady decline in its popula tion since the republic’s creation in 1920, largely due to ethnic assimilation.

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67 The cultural revival efforts in Karelia have been e xceptionally weak, lacking a cohesive approach and consistent basis of support, which makes the Karelian language, a Finnic language, vulnerable to being swept away by the forces of modernization emanating from the central government. The Karelian people’s particularly diminutive population (see Figure 3.2), reaching an historic low in 2010 at 7.4% of the total population, and its inherent foreign associations h as made its language revival an easy target for federal initiatives to overcome with bud geting reform and passive neglect (RF 2011). Never Mind the Gap The recontextualization of the political arena in t he 1990s was characterized in Karelia (highlighted in map 3.2) by a focus on mark et reforms, leading to a de-emphasis of ethnonationalist priorities. The lack of interes t in establishing a strong ethnic platform in the republican government is largely attributabl e to the titular population only comprising 10% of the population in 1989 (USSR Cens us 1989). Ethnically based interest groups sought representation through democ ratic participation during the era of perestroika, which led to the negotiation of munici pal independence from federal influence on the matters of taxation and budgeting, including cultural matters such as Source: The Census of the Russian Federation, 2010

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education and language programs (Laine 2001, 60). T he the Soviet Union to federal integration was facilit ated smoothly by Head of the Government Stepanov, who was the previous Chairman of the Supreme Council of Karelia at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissoluti on, and did not that a challenge to the established elite network m ight have produced (Alexandrov 2001, 10). While the nascent government of Karelia did no t outright challenge the legitimacy or authority of the federal government, it did not p imperatives either, adapting to its position as the liminal space between Russian and European ideals. Amidst the development of a new market business networks sought expansion across territori al boundaries by strengthening ties with the Scandinavian Union and lobbying for less s tringent border regulations to improve capital flows. In 1992 the Karelian governm ent elect “shock therapy” policies advocated by deputy prime minister Gaidar, instead pursuing the education and language programs (Laine 2001, 60). T he transition from the collapse of the Soviet Union to federal integration was facilit ated smoothly by Head of the Government Stepanov, who was the previous Chairman of the Supreme Council of Karelia at the time of the Soviet Union’s dissoluti on, and did not face the political friction that a challenge to the established elite network m ight have produced (Alexandrov 2001, 10). While the nascent government of Karelia did no t outright challenge the legitimacy or authority of the federal government, it did not p assively abide to the early federal imperatives either, adapting to its position as the liminal space between Russian and Map 3.2: The Republic of KareliaSource: Wikimedia Commons, 2013d Amidst the development of a new market -oriented social structure, Karelian business networks sought expansion across territori al boundaries by strengthening ties with the Scandinavian Union and lobbying for less s tringent border regulations to improve capital flows. In 1992 the Karelian governm ent elect ed to forgo the disastrous “shock therapy” policies advocated by deputy prime minister Gaidar, instead pursuing the 68 transition from the collapse of the Soviet Union to federal integration was facilit ated smoothly by Head of the Government Stepanov, who was the previous Chairman of the Supreme Council of face the political friction that a challenge to the established elite network m ight have produced (Alexandrov 2001, 10). While the nascent government of Karelia did no t outright challenge the legitimacy or assively abide to the early federal imperatives either, adapting to its position as the liminal space between Russian and social structure, Karelian business networks sought expansion across territori al boundaries by strengthening ties with the Scandinavian Union and lobbying for less s tringent border regulations to ed to forgo the disastrous “shock therapy” policies advocated by deputy prime minister Gaidar, instead pursuing the

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69 development of an emergent economic track independe nt of the federal government, reliant on the foresting industry and the “open pol iticization of voluntary associations” (Alexandrov 2001, 20; Liikanen 2008, 30). Based on survey data collected in the late 1990s, the least amount of contention between ethni c Russians and the titular population of an ethnic republic was reported in Karelia (Hage ndoorn, Poppe, and Minescu 2008, 364). While the authors of the study conclude that this apparent lack of tension is an indication of positive and balanced inter-group rel ations, this lack can as well suggest a general antipathy of minority populations to mobili ze around potentially inflammatory matters, whether as a matter of garnering support o r due to popular cultural nihilism. Possibly the most significant episode of ethnic mob ilization in Karelia was the formation of the multicultural organization, the Po pular Front of Karelia in 1988, which was the first organization to publicly oppose the e conomic and political reforms of the contemporary communist leaders (Liikanen 2008, 30-3 1). This group failed to integrate into the new democratic system after the Soviet col lapse, breaking up into two competing factions that were overwhelmed by the resident Russ ian elites. Other ethnic organizations such as the Ingrian Association and the Karelian Un ion could not inspire sufficient mobilization to develop a consistent basis of suppo rt, though the Karelian Congress managed to sustain consistent organizational integr ity throughout the 1990s. As an indication of the degree of influence that the Kare lian Congress wields, at each of the five congressional meetings the demand for the Karelian language to be elevated to state status has been expressed, without legislative resp onse from the Karelian government (Klementyev, Kovaleva, and Zamyatin 2012, 5). Other efforts to develop cultural institutions culminated in the creation for a Natio nal Theater and National Library,

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70 though the performance of Karelian language plays a re exceedingly rare, and only 34 books were published in the Karelian language (in d ifferent dialects even) between 1990 and 2000 (Klementyev, Kovaleva, and Zamyatin 2012, 7). At the time when other ethnic republics were exploi ting the relative weakness of the central government to expand autonomy based on cultural distinctions, the Karelian government focused on developing a civic-minded eco nomic society. Directing attention toward the financial and trade elements of cross-bo rder cooperation and away from ethnic community ties prevented the creation of an environ ment conducive to cultural revival. Cultural institutions were weak; ethnic advocacy pl atforms in politics were broad and lacked coherent directives. As Schrad writes, the b asis of a common identity requires state support of a standardization of a population through “rites of citizenship,” in order to differentiate a minority population with a natio nal identity (2004, 457). The notable lack of explicit language policy and supporting ins titutions evinces the failure to establish a foundation for the Karelian people and other mino rities of Karelia to support themselves in the public sphere through legislation and advocacy. These populations have succumbed to devastatingly rapid cultural assimilat ion in the past two decades as a result. The main focus of Finnic Karelian and Russian Karel ian cooperation programs is commercial as well. Streamlining cross-border inter action with reduced visa qualifications and improved transportation infrastr ucture has been the major priority, with the 2000 World Congress of Finno-Ugrian People decl aring support for mutual language development as a formality (Alexandrov 2001, 21, 26 ). Cross-border linguistic initiatives have not found official support in the Republic of Karelia, minimizing the effectiveness of such efforts.

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71 Ignore the Third Rail Apart from the nation being cleaved by territorial reorganization, the absence of an established cultural revival movement has doomed the Karelian people and their language to an imminent extinction. Dmitrii Gusarov editor of a Karelian literary journal, noted during the final years of the Soviet Union, People suddenly realized what had happened several years ago when the world culture of Karelia found itself before the abyss, o ver which little bridges to the future must now urgently be thrown. Two generations have grown up who have not studied their native language (Kreindler 1993, 262). The regionalist movement of Karelia did not adopt a n ethnic inclination until the Putin administration's recentralization and moderni zation policies became an ostensible threat to the minority populations of Karelia. Even the most basic of language reforms, establishing the titular language as an official st ate language, never came to fruition, and the 2002 script reform inspired by Tatarstan discou raged officials even further from elevating Karelian status, as the language has hist orically used the Latin orthography (Chebankova 2007, 447). Karelian and the minority l anguages Veps and Finnish have instead been relegated to the category of “regional languages”, a status which offers little for the languages’ protection or promotion. A lack of standardization of the Karelian language itself has been an obstacle to uniting the common Karelian identity, as two major dialects currently exist. The Northwestern population speaks a dialect closely re lated and mutually intelligible to Finnish, while Southern communities speak a dialect that has been noticeably influenced by morphosyntactic structure of the Russian languag e (Laine 2001, 63; Klementyev, Kovaleva, and Zamyatin 2012, 9). Without the suppor t of cultural institutions to promote

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72 the standardization of the language and its further development of a standard literary tradition, there is no single entity that the Karel ian speech community can commonly defend. This failure of corpus planning indicates t hat the integrity of the language itself is not being maintained, causing the Karelian language to become more susceptible to cultural devaluation. Attempts to introduce the regional languages of Kar elia into the education system have been supported in part by the republican Law o n Education (1994) and the Law on Culture (1995), though provisions are only made for voluntary language education within the capacity of local budgets, and have produced at most one or two hours of Karelian language study per week (Klementyev, Kovaleva, and Zamyatin 2012, 4,10). The predominant use of Karelian is in-group communicati on among the elderly rural population, in private conversations or public situ ations in which information is considered private, and inter-generational transfer ence has ceased (Laine 2001, 64). This demographic phenomenon is an indicator of a low-sta tus language, and reflected among urban populations with the distinction of Karelian as a “backward” language, inferior to the “global” Russian language (Klementyev, Kovaleva and Zamyatin 2012, 6). The publishing house Periodica, established as a state enterprise, has made attempts to propagate various native-language newspapers, child ren’s magazines, and literary and art publications in Karelian, Vepsan, and Finnish, thou gh rural minority groups could not afford the high postage for the magazines to reach their communities (Barents Press 2010). As demonstrated by the other cases examined in this study, it is essential for networks of elite support to promote a native langu age; otherwise, the rural, “backwards” status will deliver the language to an incremental death. The minimal effort of the

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73 cultural intelligentsia of Karelia throughout the 1 990s and early 2000s has done little to improve the status of the minority languages of Kar elia or to even establish them as objects of cultural value. The target program “State Support of the Karelian, Veps and Finnish Languages in 2006-2010” is the most recent attempt by the rep ublican government to slow the demise of the Karelian national languages. The prog ram aims to adjust language rights implementation at the local level, where action ten ds to be less responsive to policy than symbolic legislation may suggest (Klementyev, Koval eva, and Zamyatin 2012, 4). Attention is primarily paid to fortifying native la nguage use in mass media by devoting specific time slots to native language broadcasting and to improve availability of books on the history and culture of Karelians, Veps, and Finns. Shortly after its approval in 2005, however, a flare-up in xenophobic, anti-minor ity behavior was witnessed in Karelia with the 2006 Kondopoga riots. After a bar fight be tween Russians and Chechens resulted in the death of four Russian Karelians, ri oting broke out as a demonstration against the Chechen nationality. While Chechens are a common target for chauvinist discrimination as a result of the terrorist activit y their nationality is associate with, the benign ethnic Karelian population experienced risin g xenophobia against its urban youth (Mikhailova 2011, 524). The forces undermining any opportunity of survival for the minorities of Karelia are persistent and burgeoning while the cultural infrastructure to buttress the national languages against assimilatio n is symbolic at best.

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74 Conclusion: The North is a Delicate Matter The case of Sakha is a prime counterargument to the wealth hypothesis. Relatively prosperous before becoming an autonomous republic of the Federation and possessing some of the most valuable natural resour ces in Russia, Sakha and its government had the potential to mobilize with signi ficant gravity against the federal government. Regionalist politics in Sakha instead m anifested a focus on multiculturalism and cooperation with the federal government, carefu lly negotiating financial independence during the 1990s. The efforts to impro ve conditions for native languages were concurrent with the overarching intent to crea te a harmonious, multiethnic society, and the programs implemented were thorough and well -received, proceeding along a course designed to cause the least political fricti on. Although economic independence and prosperity allow ed the Sakha cultural revival to thrive temporarily, the natural resource endowment of Sakha made it a prime target for the federal government’s budgetary recen tralization reform. Tactics used by the federal government (in Sakha and to a greater degre e in more ethnically polarized republics), involving a uniformly oppressive respon se to any expression of nationalism, suggest that a more aggressive sovereignty movement in Sakha would only have increased the severity of the federal government’s campaign to increase regional dependence on the center. By redirecting Sakha’s ec onomic jugular, the mining industry, to its own coffers, the federal government condemne d regional support of language revival in the public sphere to drop, and simultane ously exacerbated interethnic tensions. Consistent with Bahry’s analysis of cultural divisi ons of labor, the repossession of

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75 Sakha’s natural wealth and decreased reciprocity in federal support for native populations have provided elites with a cause for ethnic mobili zation, though at a time when the elites themselves have been stifled in their ability to ex press ethnic concerns. The native populations of Karelia never stood a cha nce to revive their national languages, though their situation seems to have bee n largely met with apathy. Caught in a liminal space of economic transmission between Russ ia and Finland, any attempts at cultural revival were overshadowed by the vigor of democratization and transition to a socially oriented market economy present in the rep ublic. A disorganized popular front failed to secure significant representation of indi genous peoples in government, leaving the native populations of Karelia without an econom ic or political avenue of influence. The major cultural movements in the republics of Ka relia and Sakha adopted an integrative, tolerant approach to forming new repub lican identities. As evidenced by the widespread communal cooperation in Sakha and the os tensibly positive Slavic-titular relations in Karelia, there was little indication i n the 1990s that intensive reassertion of federal oversight would be provoked or justified as necessary in these republics. Although cultural revival and preservation movement s in Sakha continue to find sources for funding and political support, the remnants of cultural rights efforts and the populations they hope to protect are quickly fading in Karelia, perhaps facing outright extinction in the next two to three generations.

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76 Chapter 4 Conclusion: A Discussion of Position and Momentum The regionalist movements of Russia have attempted to demonstrate their legitimacy and appropriacy to the needs of their co nstituents, largely by emphasizing the necessity to maintain discrete ethnic identities in the face of a burgeoning ethnic Russian chauvinism. These movements are hindrances to the e xpansion of federal power that has been a single-minded priority of the Putin administ ration over the past decade. To discredit and depower regionalist movements, the fe deral government has set its sights on the cultural institutions that can be used as engin es for ethnic mobilization, with national languages as a primary target. Through the reorgani zation of sub-federal administrative structures and recentralization of financial compet ency over key industries, Putin’s federal government has been able to influence the v iability of nationalist revival movements, and consequently has restricted the pote ntial for minority languages to survive.

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77 Temporal Position and National Relativity In analyzing language policy across two decades of post-Soviet Russia, one can trace a parabolic arc of regionalist momentum. The starting point is the collapse of the center, a process that occurred roughly from the 19 89 Parade of Nations until the 1991 Belavezha Accords. This point marks off where the e thnic republics of Russia almost universally began to campaign for increased soverei gnty, which was accompanied by varying degrees of politicized ethnic mobilization. The peak of the parabola lies around the 2000 ascendancy of Putin and stalls with the cr eation of federal districts, turning sharply downward at the 2004 Beslan crisis. The cur ve has continued to decline to the present situation, as Zamyatin (2012b) has noted, w here only the most politically resilient republics have been able to slow linguistic assimil ation to a halt. The current point on the parabola indicates a situa tion that increasingly resembles the ethnopolitical milieu directly preceding the 19 89 Parade of Sovereignties. Regionalist protests are not uncommon, though generally sporadi c and lacking in cohesion, often taking on more of a social rather than political ti nge. Only in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan are some remaining regionalist movements directly a ssociated with political organizations that continue to fortify the republic ’s claims to sovereignty through cultural means. The anti-extremist and xenophobic sentiments propagated by the Putin administration have succeeded in changing the terms of the federal-regional game to exclude revival nationalism as a viable platform fo r regional elites, while executive appointments of regional heads keep administrations deemed problematic in check. While the Sakha administration continues to activel y support cultural revival and

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78 reinforcement projects, the local socioeconomic cri sis of the past decade has transformed nation-wide perspectives of the republic’s cultural movements from benign anthropological interests into destructive class-ba sed struggles. The federal context for regionalist movements has c hanged, however. Whereas Gorbachev sought to breach the threshold of moderni ty with boisterous liberalization measures, Putin has advocated modernization via rec entralization and backhanded assimilation. Rather than a sovereignty grab-bag, the ethnic republics of Russia are faced with receding limits of cultural and political auth ority. This shift can be attributed to an adjustment of dominant ideologies of national ident ity over the past twenty-two years. Only the true Grail will bring you Life The regionalist movements in the four case studies examined have evinced three distinct approaches to language policy: authoritari an, multicultural, and market. Tatarstan’s authoritarian approach depended on the ability of titular elites to maintain control of the executive office and continue to ass ert mandatory Tatar education as a public good. The 1992 republican Law on Language an d its amendments, as well as the subsequent republican-funded programs for the devel opment of the Tatar culture, extensively promote the usage of Tatar in governmen t, the sciences, and education, leaving only the residual benefits of cultural inst itution-building to non-dominant minorities, such as the opportunity for rural minor ities to advocate for voluntary nativelanguage educational programs. The success of the T atar language in the educational sphere is largely attributed to the compulsory natu re of the programs. Although the Russian community in Tatarstan has demonstrated aga inst mandatory Tatar-language

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79 education throughout the past decade, a significant portion of the total population in Tatarstan has been at least introduced to the langu age, which is a step toward achieving relevance in the modern society and in turn maintai ning the Tatar language. The multicultural approach has proven less effectiv e in developing a stable language revival movement than the singularly focus ed authoritarian strategy. Providing access to educational materials and cultural resour ces for a broad range of ethnic groups requires high administrative and financial capacity hope for which has been crippled by the Putin administration. The regionalist movements in Bashkortostan and Sakha have taken this approach and have succeeded to some degr ee in founding local programs for native language promotion, such as in the Evenk ter ritory and rural Bashkortostan. These programs have been particularly susceptible to accu sations of “backwardness”, due to the emphasis they placed on communal cultural appreciat ion, which highlights demonstrations of the traditional elements of these cultures. The Sakha and Bashkir language revival movements have not been able to ma tch the advances made by the vigorous modernization tactics of the Tatar adminis tration. The timing of these approaches relative to the prev ailing national identity ideology of the center has proven crucial as well. Tatarstan’s authoritarian method of national development in the 1990s required the cont ext of political liberalization under Yeltsin to assert Tatar cultural and political domi nance in denial of the center’s authority. While Sakha officials rejected the supreme authorit y of the center in the early 1990s as well, by withholding federal taxes and symbolically protesting the Chechen War, the pace of the cultural revival agenda did not account for the late 1990s shift in the regionalism dialogue away from republican favor (Thumann 2001, 195). Accordingly, President

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80 Nikolaev’s political turn towards pro-Yakut nationa lism in 2002 brought about the end of his executive career, by will of the center (RFERL 2002). For republican politicians to successfully function within Putin’s power vertical expressions of nationalism must be tempered to match the center’s prerogatives. Similarly, popular advocacy throughout the 2000s fo r compulsory native language education in Bashkortostan has been unable to gain official recognition in a Kremlincontrolled republican government (Coalson 2011). By attending to a pluralism of ethnic interests, the multicultural approach did not lend the same expediency and consolidation of resources to cultural development as did the aut horitarian method. After the turn of the millennium, aggressive nationalism was no longer an option, and the republican language revival movements were left to work with the cultur al institutions that had been developed in the decade under Yeltsin. In the past decade, the rise in xenophobia and anti-extremism has disrupted the multicultural emph asis on coproduction, damaging some established cultural institutions, especially those concerning the expression of nationality in politics (Hicks 2011, 164). Leaving native language education support to be det ermined by market forces, the Karelian nation is allowing its culture to succumb to social Darwinism. Without state-led efforts to reinforce the local status of the Kareli an language, its speakers have been reduced to the elderly rural population. For the st ate to fully finance a compulsory revival program for such a small portion of the republic’s population would violate the principle of democracy, especially when the speech community itself no longer has the drive to continue the transmission of its language. Similar situations have developed in other republics that are comprised of a large ethnic Russ ian population and a non-dominant

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81 titular minority such as Buryatia and Khakassia, wh ich suggests that the federal government still has the option of gerrymandering ‘ problematic’ nations into political submission if the outright elimination of ethnic re publics is not feasible. Lost in the Machinery In February 2013 President Putin gave a speech to t he Presidential Council on Inter-Ethnic Relations detailing six main points of the latest nationality policy that is currently being drafted. The points are summarized as follows: The fundamental basis of a unified country is the R ussian language, which begets a common national, cultural, and educational space. ... [There should be] a single textbook for domestic history.. built on the framework of a single concept, the framework of one logic of uninterrupted Russian history ... [The policy should support the 989 regi stered] national-cultural autonomous organizations [that facilitate] intereth nic and cultural exchange ... It is necessary for citizens to know t he true story of the unity of our nation, of the Russian lands into one powerf ul, multi-ethnic state. ... Meeting demands to return confiscated cultural prop erty ... [seized by the Soviet government] would open Pandora’s box. ... Ru ssia will become a center for top sporting and political events ... [w hich are to be supported by the federal program for the] “Strengthening of t he unity of the Russian nation and ethno-cultural development of the people s of Russia.” (Odnako 2013, author’s translation) The aggressive devaluation of bilingual education a nd emphasis on the removal of ethnicity from administrative distinctions that thi s draft policy supports would devastate the national languages and regionalist movements of Russia. If the federal government continues to condense and reduce the number of ethn ic republics, as was achieved in 2005 under economic pretenses, local administration s will be less capable of promoting

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82 cultural revival organizations in an increasingly c entrist-oriented and ethnically diluted system. The reality of the matter is that official support for “national-cultural autonomous organizations” offers little in the way of augmenti ng national self-determination, instead providing a flimsy context under which the federal government can continue to redirect resources away from ethnopolitical bodies. The mann er in which the multicultural organizations of Sakha and Bashkortostan have been rendered powerless with the disruption of financial and political channels of s upport within the regions indicates how readily the federal government can manipulate offic ial cultural programs and NGOs alike. The appeals of cultural organizations in Sak ha to UNESCO and organizations in Bashkortostan to PACE have failed to establish effe ctive avenues of support, and, although these supranational organization may offer functional support, their generosity will be wasted if the cultural institutions cease t o function. Similarly, Putin has demonstrated that the appointment of Kremlin-vetted politicians to executive positions is highly effective in deterring nationalist politics from taking hold in ‘problematic’ administrations. The question remains whether ethni c groups will be forced to condone this political sleight, and to accept whatever nomi nal support is provided by the “ethnocultural development” programs, or whether an infla mmatory nationality policy will be the crystallizing event to cause a resurgence of re gionalist politics.

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83 Recentralization and Assimilation It is clear from the examined cases that the initia l optimism of this study is unfounded. In the early 1990s ethnic republics were offered a role in the formation of new political and social norms, a role that they ar e currently being forced out of. The republics that wagered to rely heavily on popular s upport, such as Bashkortostan and Sakha, were most vulnerable to the effects of Russi a’s shifting national identity ideology, with internal issues being more frequently blamed o n inter-ethnic tension or the prioritization of one ethnicity over another. Vocif erous protests have continued, though often by groups that enjoy external sources of vali dation, such as the World Tatar Council or the Pan-Turkic community. Connections to the Finnish Karelian community were never deliberately established by the Republic of Karelia, as the community chose to engage in vigorous democratization over consocia tional society-building. The minority populations of Karelia have willfully chosen to sac rifice cultural institution-building for extensive social-market based reform, and late effo rts to revitalize minority movements under the Putin administration failed to develop a support base in an already dwindling Karelian population. Considering the point to which the status of the Karelian language has deteriorated, only a massive and wide-reaching campaign to establish Karelian as a formal language with mandatory education, of which no group is currently capable, would begin to resuscitate the near-death language. The Tatarstan administrations in the 1990s and earl y 2000s focused on entrenching ethnic elites in the executive branch, a strategy that fell apart once the executive branch was reclaimed by the federal gover nment. The demographics to which

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84 this strategy appealed were narrow, as non-dominant minorities were still faced with benefits for siding with one of the region’s the do minant ethnicities, and Tatar revival was only supported in theory by urban Tatar populat ions. However, the Tatars have a failsafe to fall back on, as their ethnic identity is not contained solely within Russian borders, thus there is the possibility that the Tat ar nation in Russia may continue to survive long after the hypothetical adoption of the Russian language. Localized, nondominant minorities that do not have this luxury in stead remain tethered to the limits placed by the federal government on education and n ationalist organizations, and face extinction as a result. The View from atop Blueberry Hill Since 2000, the Putin administration has not develo ped a history of responsiveness to public sentiments, most recently exemplified by federal reactions to the Pussy Riot demonstrations and the protests followin g the 2012 election. Civil society has become increasingly constrained, limiting opportuni ties to defend language rights and ethnic identities based on government accountabilit y. Adapting Giulianno’s (2011) chart to include the federal dimension in Figure 4.1, the limitations on the advocacy of language policy can be illustrated. The federal government has proven capable of influe ncing all elements of the language policy development process. Top-down acqui sition planning in the form of educational modernization programs, federal directi on of curricula, and the denial of federal funding for regional language programs affe cts regional populations directly by affecting the availability of choices constituents can make to exercise self-determination.

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85 Republican politicians are less dependent upon popu lar support, which is the driver of regionalist movements, as governors are appointed b ased on ability to appease regional interest groups while maintaining the course determ ined by the central government. By reframing nationalist concerns as extremist values, the federal government has altered the context for language policy, associating language r ights protests with threats to state security. Figure 4.1 Political Dynamics of Language Policy The remaining arena that the federal government has the least influence on is the private sphere of a language community. It has been demonstrated, in Bashkortostan notably, that ethnic identities can survive in the private domain for extended periods, even in the case that external circumstances necess itate an alternate public expression of ethnicity. This survival still requires the mainten ance of language status and persistence of language transference, which requires extensive efforts on the part of the language community. Without the support of the state, the ef fort to maintain a language can quickly become too great for a minority group, and language status and functional usage can decline quickly, as evidenced in Karelia.

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86 What do we say to the god of Language Death With the limitations placed on the constituents’ ab ility to seek representation or audience in the republican and federal governments, expressing the need for language policy reform has become increasingly burdensome as well. A truly crystallizing event will be required to inspire the magnitude of mobili zation necessary to overcome the political barriers erected by the federal governmen t, which the forthcoming 2013 nationality and language policies may have the pote ntial to do. The Tatarstan parliament has already suggested that the ethnic republics for m a coalition in the event that the policies threaten the integrity of the national cul tures, confirming that language is still a catalytic topic, at least in regions that host a do minant and politically represented ethnic minority (Khisamiev and Coalson 2012). Speculation as to whether regional parliaments can accomplish anything in the current ethnofederal ist system, short of resorting back to the secessionist rhetoric of the early 1990s, is be yond the scope of this study, though republican reactions to the Putin administration’s choice to maintain or restructure the current ethnofederalist system have the potential t o constitute the largest political upheaval in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Uni on.

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