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M AKING W AVES : W HY S OME C OUNTRIES T AKE THE L EAD I N R EGIONAL D EMOCRATIZATION M OVEMENTS B Y A NDREA G ABRIELLE B RODY B ARRE A Thesis S ubmitted to the Divisions of Political Science and International Area Studies New College of Florida I n partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida May, 2013
ii T o all those whose educations suffer at the hands of conflict, and for the students of Aleppo University who have paid too high a price for knowledge
iii A CKNOWLEDGEMENTS First and foremost I owe a tremendous debt to my advisor, Dr. Hicks. In addition to seeing me through all too frequent lapses in judgment and communication (and into faulty para llel structures) her unwavering support and extraordinary dedication have enabled me to pursue opportunities including but certainly not limited to this research. Her guidance in t h e academic realm and beyond has been indispensible and I simply cannot ima gine where I would be or what I would be studying without her. I am humbled by the opportunity I have had to work with such an inspiring figure. I must also thank the members of my committee, Dr. Alcock, whose Introductory World Politics course I have to t hank fo r setting me on the path towards these AOC s and to Dr. Colletta, who has given me incredible hope by demonstrating how my studies have critical practical applications beyond New College Furthermore, I am grateful for Dr. Cooper's good natured supp ort and endless patience as he helped me through the quantitative portion of this research. My gratitude also extends to Dr. Dulin whose passion for learning and teaching and total engagement with her subject matter and students have been instrumental both in the development of my analytical skills and in th e preservation of my well being. I am floored by how many professors have had such an enormous impact on me, but I suppose that is yet another facet of the New College experience that has proven so benef icial. I am extraordinarily grateful for my friends and family who have supported me throughout my years at New College and during the thesis process. I am particularly inde bted to EB, LH, ML, KO, SS, AK, SU and EM who I hold responsible for any and all s anity that I have maintained. This undertaking would have been impossible without their empathy, my incredible sisters encouragement and the leadership of my mother a woman who truly demonstrates how one can be simultaneously intellectually and emotiona lly engaged. Finally, I must sincerely thank Russ and Jeff, without whom I would not be here, much less written a thesis.
iv T ABLE OF C ONTENTS Acknowledgements iii Acronyms and Codes v Tables and Figures vii Abstract ix Introduction 1 Chapter 1 : Democr atization and Regional Leaders: Literature Review and Methodology 5 Chapter 2 : Quantitative Descriptions and Puzzles of Regional Leaders 32 Chapter 3 : The Surge: Latin American Transitions 82 Chapter 4 : The Crest: Democratization in Southeast As ia and Central and Eastern Europe 103 Southeast Asia 104 Central and Eastern Europe 116 Chapter 5 : Breakers or Ripples? Movements in the Middle East and North Afric a 132 Chapter 6 : Rocking the Boat: Tentative Characterizations of Leading States in Regional Democratization Movements of the Third Wave 150 Bibliography 162
v A CRONYMS AND C ODES Acronyms APSU All Parties Student Unity (Bangladesh) CCN Crusada Civilista Nacional (Panama) CFP Concentracin de Fuerzas Populares (Ecuador) CSG Consejo Supremo de Gobierno (Ecuador) FMLN FDR Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacin Nacional Frente Democrtico Revolucionario (El Salvador) FPN Frente Patritico Nacional (Nicaragua) FSLN Frente Sandinista Liberacin Nacional (Nicaragua) GDP gross domestic product GRFA Gobiero Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas (Peru) KOR Commi ttee for Workers' Defense (Poland) NEM New Economic Mechanism (Hungary) ORT Opposition Roundtable POS political opportunity structure SMO social movement organization USD United States dollars Country and Region Codes ALB Albania ALG Algeria ARG Argentina BHR Bahrain BLG Bulgaria BLV Bolivia BNG Bangladesh BRZ Brazil CEE Central and Eastern Europe CHL Chile CZC Czechoslovakia E_S El Salvador ECD Ecuador EGY Egypt FRG Federal Republic of Germany
vi GDR German Democratic Republic GTM Gua temala HND Honduras HNG Hungary IND Indonesia JRD Jordan KWT Kuwait LAM Latin America LBY Libya MENA Middle East and North Africa MRC Morocco MYN Myanmar NCR Nicaragua NPL Nepal OMN Oman PHL Philippines PLN Poland PNM Panama PRG Paraguay PRU Peru RMN Romania S_K South Korea SEA Southeast Asia SYR Syria THL Thailand TNS Tunisia TWN Taiwan URG Uruguay USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics YMN Yemen
vii T ABLES AND F IGURES List of Tables Table 2.1: GDP in constant USD (2000) 34 Table 2.2: GDP per capita in constant USD 36 Table 2.3: Annual percent change in GDP 39 Table 2.4: Annual percent change in GDP per capita 41 Table 2.5: Unemployment Rate 44 Table 2.6: Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agricultural Sector 47 T able 2.7: Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Service Sector 49 Table 2.8: Percentage of Population Ages 0 14 52 Table 2.9 : Adult Literacy Rate 54 Table 2.10: Telephone Lines per 100 People 57 Table 2.11: Internet Users per 100 People 59 Table 2.12: Freedom House Political Rights 61 Table 2.13: Freedom House Civil Liberties 63 Table 2.14: Total Index of Globalization 66 Table 2.15: Political Globalization 68 Table 2.16: Economic Globalization 70 Table 2.17: Social Globalization 72 Table 2.18: S ocial Globalization: Data on Personal Contact 74 Table 2.19: Social Globalization: Data on Cultural Proximity 76 Table 2.20: Social Globalization: Data on Information Flows 78 Table 6.1 Comparison of Leaders: Political Opportunity Structure 155 List of Figures Figure 1.1: Standard Box and Whisker Plot 29 Figure 2.1: GDP in constant USD (2000) 35 Figure 2.2: GDP per capita in constant USD 37 Figure 2.3: Annual percent change in GDP 40 Figure 2.4: Annual percent change in GDP per capita 42 Figure 2.5: Unemployment Rate 4 5
viii Figure 2.6: Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agricultural Sector 48 Figure 2.7: Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Service Sector 50 Figure 2.8: Percentage of Population Ages 0 14 53 Figure 2.9: Adult Literacy Rate 55 Figure 2.10: Telephone Lines per 100 People 58 Figure 2.11: Internet Users per 100 People 59 Figure 2.12: Freedom House Political Rights 62 Figure 2.13: Freedom House Civil Liberties 64 Figure 2.14: Total Index of Globalization 67 Figure 2.15: Politi cal Globalization 69 Figure 2.16: Economic Globalization 71 Figure 2.17: Social Globalization 73 Figure 2.18: Social Globalization: Data on Personal Contact 75 Figure 2.19: Social Globalization: Data on Cultural Proximity 77 Figure 2.20: Social Global ization: Data on Information Flows 79 Figure 6.1: Comparison of Leaders: Freedom House Political Rights 153 Figure 6.2: Comparison of Leaders: Freedom House Civil Liberties 153 Figure 6.3: Comparison of Leaders: Political Globalization 154 Figure 6.4: Comparison of Leaders: Total Globalization 157 Figure 6.5: Comparison of Leaders: Adult Literacy Rate 157 Figure 6.6: Comparison of Leaders: Telephone Lines per 100 People 157
ix M AKING W AVES : W HY S OME C OUNTRIES T AKE THE L EAD I N R EGIONAL D EMOCRATIZ ATION M OVEMENTS Andrea Brody Barre New College of Florida, 2013 A BSTRACT This project examines regional waves of democratiz ation by determining whether certain characteristics differentiate leading countries from their followers in the region While the presence of regional effects is robustly supported, there is no consensus as to why they transpire, and although numerous theories compete to explain democratization, few have been directly engaged to examine these regional phenomena. T his study evalua tes the explanatory power of three families of democratization theories modernization, political opportunity, and external influence and outlines several features of leaders of the democratizing trends in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Central and East ern Europe, and the Middle East and North Africa. E mploying a mixed methods approach, this project uses both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Economic data and social indicators serve as proxies for modernization, Freedom House political rights and c ivil liberties scores indicate opportunity, and the KOF Index of Globalization approximates exogenous factors in order to allow for inter and intra regional comparison. Then, historical case studies
x contextualize the numerical descriptions by delving into unquantifiable elements of political opportunity structures and regional dynamics. Although the findings support no single theoretical school, several patterns spanning the three families emerge. First, leaders may or may not have the largest economies in their respective region s but they do not have the smallest. Likewise, their regime types are not consistent (although none are among the most repressive), but they tend to possess stronger civil liberties than political rights. Indeed, all regional leade rs have legacies of civil society, even if those networks are ideologically diverse or not the most prevalent in the anti regime activity analyzed here. There is also divergence among regions in terms of leaders' levels of globalization, but all are more p olitically globalized than their respective regions. Finally, both leaders within a region possess similar political opportunity structures and paths towards transition, and violence in all leading cases, regardless of region, is limited. Dr. Barbar a Hicks Political Science
1 I NTRODUCTION The observation academic or casual of neighborhood effects has remained salient to political science for decades. Even before Huntington's mention of the "third wave of democracy" in the early 1990s regional categorization shaped the field of democratization studies Geographically proximate shifts in ideological orientation and regime naturally interest all those concerned with shifting power, from political leaders to political scientists. Journal ists and even informal onlookers observe political transitions in regional units, perhaps ignited by the spark of one or two nations whose ideas, demands, and even methods inspire the populations of surrounding polities. Many scholars have argued that such effects exist and are relevant, but Teorell's lament that
2 "neighbor diffusion is robustly related to democratization, but again without any observable causal mechanisms discovered" rings frustratingly true (2010, 99). As there is robust support for the ph enomenon of regional diffusion but little in the way of satisfactory explanation, there may be information to be gained by better understanding the beginnings of the patterns, or the leaders of the tides of regional upheaval. Thus, this study seeks to iden tify characteristics of the regional "instigators" to examine first whether they differ from their respective regions, and then, whether those differences are consistent among the leaders across regions. A better understanding of these differences and simi larities may provide insight into what exactly it is that makes regional patterns occur: if one can determine why or how a leader leads, one may then begin to address why followers choose to follow. At the very least, identifying these attributes may help describe what makes a country "more ripe" for revolution, if not regional leadership. This project seeks to consolidate and compare several competing explanations for mobilization, and, for the cases being examined, democratization. While drawing heavily f rom democratization literature, it is most important to reiterate that this study is not teleologically oriented (i.e. it does not assume that movements eventually lead to democracies). The dependence on democratization literature is first and foremost a function of theoretical relevance: it is natural that democratization theory should apply to movements toward democracy. Rather, it focuses on potential explanations for why democratic movements begin. To garner the insights from both quantitative and qual itative methods of analysis, this study employs a mixed methods approach, outlined in the methodology section.
3 While statistical methods provide data points for comparison across regions, case studies allow for a more complete understanding of context a nd unquantifiable elements, such as opposition groups and regime types. The methodology section also explains the somewhat unconventional method of thematically determined case study selection employed here and each case included in the Latin American, Ea st and Southeast Asian, Central and East European, and Middle Eastern and North African sets is introduced Three dominant theoretical families frame the analysis: modernization theory and economic factors, political opportunity, and external influences. E conomic development (coupled with related social development, such as education ) has long been correlated to more developed democracies but its role in instigating transitions to democracy remains ambiguous. Political will and opportunity is a likewise co mplicated but integral facet of democratization, and therefore its inception. While pre existing regime types may affect transitions and help to define what it takes to be an "instigator political attitudes and their expression through civil society or o pposition movements and the presence of fractured elites or charismatic opposition leaders are also crucial to democratization, as is the structure of opposition movements. The final theoretical thread woven into this study is the significance of external forces to the creation of anti establishment movements G lobalization and questions of security and the global balance of power may influence nascent democratization movements or declining authoritarians In considering external influences on instigators, this study does not necessarily seek to explain the lead countries' relationships in the global scheme or with other countries in their region but only how their experiences may have made them uniquely susceptible to democratizing
4 influences To be sure, the dynamics examined, both internal and external, may often overlap, but the emphasis will be on experience rather than influence Quantitative representations of each theoretical "family" are identified and analyzed using descriptive statistics to exami ne differences within and between regions. T o contextualize the findings of the quantitative assessment, I offer brief synopses of each democratizing movement in an attempt to both better understand statistical findings and explore unquantifiable facets of political life. Sets include Latin America (the first two cases, or "leaders," were Ecuador and Peru ), Southe ast Asia (led by the Philippines and South Korea), Central and Easter n Europe (leaders were Poland and Hungary), and the Middle East and North Afr ica (Tunisia and Egypt led). These sections contain historical background of the movements or revolutions in all country cases, not just leaders. Regions are intentionally treated discretely, as the goal of the area specific analysis is to identify the mos t important in region characteristics of leaders. I will conclude by examining c ross regional patterns and variations I argue that while no theoretical family provides a comprehensive image of a leader, each contributes valuable insight into what characte ristics leaders tend to posses s For example, modernization theory as a whole is not supported but leaders do not have the smallest economies in their region. Similarly, there is no ideal type of regime that promotes leadership, but leaders do posses s at least slightly better civil liberties than their regional averages and their regimes tend not to be the most repressive. Furthermore, leading states are likely to have opposition networks, even if they are not utilized in the specific revolutionary movemen ts examined here.
5 CHAPTER 1 Democratization and Regional Leaders: Literature Review and Methodology We can examine trends in an effort to answer the question "where are we going?" and that is what social scientists are often trying to do. In doi ng so, we are trying to study history rather than retreat into it, to pay attention to contemporary trends without being "merely journalistic," to gauge the future of these trends without being merely prophetic. All this is hard to do. C. Wright Mills 1 Modern academic enquiry into the nature of democratization began with the first democratic revolutions, developed through the so called "third wave" beginning in the mid 1970s, and matured well into the third wave's aftermath. Scholars have approached the fundamental questions of how, why, and under what conditions democracies develop from diverse theoretical foundations and methods. While the debate has provided fertile !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1959, 153 2 I also exclude post Soviet states for reasons explained in Chapter 4. 3 Following the Tunisian elections for its National Constituent Assembly, a popular Egyptian joke
6 ground for analysis and creativity, it has not generated much in the way of consensus. Likewise, the presence of regional contagion effects are well documented but poorly understood. Therefore, this thesis examines the intersection of general theories of democratization and observations of neighborhood effects in an attempt to use the former to better understand the latter. E XPLAINING D EMOCRATIZATION T hree general theoretical "families" encapsulate many of the competing explanations: the modernization school of thought emphasizes the role of economic factors and their corollary socio poli tical developments, the political opportunity category focuses on the political openings either allowed for by various anciens rgimes or created by opposition movements, and the external influences group highlights the importance of direct foreign interve ntion, globalization, or balance of power dynamics. To be sure, these "families" are not entirely discrete from each other and some arguments bleed from one to another, reflecting the fact that democratization, as a historical event, "has to be overdetermi ned theoretically" (Huntington 1991, 37). Despite the danger of overdetermination, embracing the wide range of theories allows for a rich, inclusive assessment of the different economic, political, and social factors that have an impact democratic movement s. Modernization Since Seymour Martin Lipset's seminal article in 1959, modernization theory and its critics have brought an economic understanding of democratization processes to the
7 fore. Lipset examines modernization as a process of interrelated event s "comprising industrialization, wealth, urbanization, and education" and relates that process to institutional legitimacy in order to evaluate factors that shape democratization ( 1959, 71). Indeed, he dismisses the importance of history and other social f actors, instead finding support for his claim that "the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is much higher fo r the more democratic countries (75). Furthermore, he argues that increasing wealth benefits the middle class who become the leaders of democracy by mediating the needs of the lower class and its extremists and the upper class's incentive to preserve its standing (72 83). He also finds support for democracy in societies in which "groups and individua ls have a number of cross cutting politically relevant affiliations" that are more prevalent in wealthier societies (97) ; however, Lipset stops short of determinism, noting that political will is necessary in addition to the structural preconditions in ord er for democratization to occur (97 103). Numerous studies have seized upon Lipset's economic measures, aggregating and disaggregating "modernization" to prove and disprove that economic development (or one or more of its components) is related to democra tic development. Although some still support the modernization thesis, current literature largely supports a single point on which several authors agree: that socioeconomic modernization aids consolidation, or more specifically "hinders backsliding toward authoritarianism" (Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Boix and Stokes 2003; Teorell 2010, 76). In other words, economic growth may not foretell increasing liberalization, but it can help to protect democratic gains should they occur. However, this research is ba sed on the teleological supposition
8 of eventual democratization; therefore, its relevance to movements (regardless of outcome) has yet to be tested. Additional views on this literature provide further paths of inquiry. For example, Teorell finds a robust and negative correlation between short term growth and democratization. That is, his study seems to support the argument that, as Central and Eastern European cases might be interpreted, the stability of authoritarian regimes is threatened by economic down turns (2010, 58 59). Intuitively, as authoritarians are less able to legitimize their rule through the provision of economic or political goods to not only the general population, but also the supporters who comprise their power base, they become more susc eptible to criticism and calls for regime change. Theories that advocate the importance of short term financial losses or experiences of shrinking opportunities are further elucidated by a related discussion of causes of conflict: that of relative depriva tion. Accordin g to Auvinen and Nafziger "Relative deprivation is the actors' perception of social injustice derived from a discrepancy between goods and conditions they expect and those they can get or keep. This deprivation spurs social discontent and so metimes anger, which provides motivation for potential collective violence," or in terms of democratization, anti establishment movements and perhaps revolutions ( 1999, 268). Political elites may attempt to maintain the status quo, but their ability to do so declines with available economic resources; they may, in fact, exacerbate the situation as conditions deteriorate if they choose to preserve their and their closest supporters' own interests above the populace's by fueling mass discontent through ex ploitation and corruption (269). Although they do not explicitly draw out the distinction, Auvinen and Nafziger lay the foundation for an argument that
9 poor long term economic performance may provide incentives for predatory state behavior, worsening absol ute deprivation, but that short term shocks (recalling Teorell's finding) trigger the perception of injustice and, perhaps, demands for change (287). Similarly, Auvinen and Nafziger note a correlation between income inequality and complex humanitarian cri ses ( 1999, 287). Taking a more general approach, they demonstrate the power of unequal distribution in contributing to social discontent and political instability: absolute deprivation may become relative in periods of economic growth if certain sectors of society do not receive the same economic benefits as elites or another favored group (270). That is, income inequality should lead to movement against an incumbent autocrat. Conversely, Boix and Stokes argue that economic equality "increases both the chan ces of a democratic transition and [its] stability" ( 2003, 543). Their argument is couched in terms of development and the median voter: through economic development, incomes increase and inequality decreases, meaning that the median voter has a greater in centive to protect his or her personal wealth through the shared protection that democracy would bring (Boix and Stokes 2003, 539). Yet another interpretation posits a nonlinear, inverted parabolic U curve correlation between democracy and income distribut ion (Burkhart 1997). In this model, income inequality initially increases with development as the middle class begins to grow (according to modernization theory); inequality then decreases as increasingly large segments of the poorer working classes "catch up" and also demand democratic representation (Burkhart 1997, 152, 161). Although the theories diverge in how they anticipate income inequality will interact with calls for democratization, their divergence indicates that further observation
10 is necessary. Perhaps narrowing the scope of the variable's influence to its role in inciting liberalizing movements regardless of their outcomes will establish more consistent results and contribute to the understanding of its role in the genes is of democratization. B rinton observes the consistent impact of deprivation, "usually not in the form of economic distress, but rather a feeling on the part of some of the chief enterprising groups that their opportunities for getting on in this world are unduly limited by polit ical arrangements" on creating revolutionary milieus, regardless of liberal or illiberal orientation ( 1965, 34). In the instances of the French, British, American, and Russian revolutions, it was not absolute economic hardship that spurred poor, hungry mob s of peasants into action, but frustration with limited or unequal opportunities that prompted rising upstarts to challenge the legitimacy of their country's floundering, increasingly demanding, and poorly funded leadership (29 36). While not all cases in this study underwent revolutions, or are therefore directly related to Brinton's findings, the role of inequality in a certain subset suggests possible explanatory power in other related groups. Political Opportunity Although there are theoretically as m any pre existing regime types as there are democratizing trends, authors have attempted to gain insight into the various types and methods of transition by categorizing the political structures that precede t hem. Since, as Linz and Stepan note, even a trip artite classification system (democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian) leaves too much ambiguity for specific and usable analysis, the question becomes how to effectively differentiate different regime types ( 1996, 38 42).
11 Linz and Stepan (1996) presen t a five part model for classifying systems as democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian, post totalitarian, or sultanistic. Because of the varying constraints and opportunities that each system affords potential advocates of democratization, the authors arg ue that different "paths" are available depending upon the regime type; furthermore, those characteristics will determine certain tasks that a democratic transition will have to undertake ( Linz and Stepan 1996, 55 65). Due to the opportunities for civil so ciety and opposition under an authoritarian regime, negotiated transitions either with the regime or following its defeat in war are possibilities. However, if a hierarchical military is responsible for the ouster of the authoritarian regime or an inte rim government takes power, liberal minded reforms face major challenges of being stymied by the new power holders (57 60). That is, while a military led authoritarian regime may cede de jure power through an election, it maintains a great deal of power by virtue of remaining in charge of the coercive capacity of the state and can make demands to reserve certain powers, hindering democratic consolidation; a non hierarchical military elite would find greater challenges to achieving these gains (66 68). Given the virtual absence of pluralism in a totalitarian regime, the main option for democratic transition comes with military defeat by and imposition of a democratic regime. The lack of organization of opposition and high degree of adherence to the party make other options unrealistic, although the regime may evolve into a post totalitarian one. Similarly, sultanistic regimes may undergo democratization if an external arbiter implements the new system or an interim government follows a military defeat. Effecti vely suppressed opposition in the military and society rules out pacted or military overthrow paths. Although early post totalitarian systems would likely resemble their
12 totalitarian ancestors closely, mature or "frozen" ones those whose structure has "s olidified" around a decaying or hollow ideology have the benefit of space for a "second" culture or economy and possible internal party fracturing. Social, political, or economic splinters may provide possibilities for a pacted transition or elections fo llowing a military defeat, although Linz and Stepan maintain that democratization via military coup is impossible due to the persistent (if waning) primacy of the party. Similar to the challenges of a post authoritarian transition, democratizing elements f ollowing post totalitarian regimes risk stagnation and backsliding if elections do not quickly follow the implementation of an interim government (Linz and Stepan 1996, 57 60). Civilian led regimes (largely authoritarian or post totalitarian) may be able t o capitalize on pacted transitions by seeing themselves as democratic winners in the long term, thereby allowing for short term democratic competition (68 70). The authors acknowledge that foreign influence (such as the introduction or removal of a super p ower patron) and splits within leadership also pose potential pathways towards democratization (57 60). Although Linz and Stepan offer a nuanced view of pre transition regimes and their impact on possibilities for transition, their typology is still debat ed. Several prevalent critiques persist. The "post totalitarian" category seems to apply distinctly to many of the Soviet states, limiting its utility as a broadly applicable theoretical construct. It also fails to consider the different levels of competit iveness that exist in different authoritarian sub types; indeed, it still ignores the great variation that remains in the "authoritarian" category despite the addition of the sultanism and post totalitarian categories (Hadenius and Teorell 2007, 143 144).
13 Hadenius and Teorell address some of these issues by improving upon Barbara Gedde s 's proposed typology. They start by disaggregating three methods of preserving and allocating political power: hereditary (monarchies), military, and electoral. Military reg imes may either be controlled by a state or rebel force and may govern either directly or indirectly. Electoral regimes may be further deconstructed into no party, one party (true one party and dominant party exist), and limited multiparty systems (Hadeniu s and Teorell 2007, 146 149). They find that the type of pre transition regime system not only matters, but that patterns relating regime type to path from authoritarianism emerge. Most notably, they find that "the majority of transitions from nondominant party (that is, more competitive) limited multiparty regimes result in democracy" (152). A degree of openness or competitiveness, such as opportunities for civil society, pluralism, and opposition in Linz and Stepan's terms, seems to facilitate further ope ning and competition, albeit gradually: movement towards democratic governance may not be immediate, but rather it may evolve from a dominant party system to a competitive limited multiparty system, and then to democracy. They also find that monarchies are the most resistant to democratic transitions. These observations complement the finding that relative stability or "staying power" exists at the poles of democratic quality (strong democracy or strong authoritarian regimes); it is the unstable middle grou nd that experiences the most transitions (152 154). To illustrate, Hadenius and Teorell find that nondominant limited multiparty, dominant limited multiparty, and military regimes are the three most fragile authoritarian regime types (150). In a similar f ashion, Bratton and van de Walle examine different shades of authoritarianism, focusing specifically on divisions within the neopatrimonial context
14 ( 1997, 61 62). They plot different regime types on axes of participation and competition: Plebiscitary one p arty systems roughly correspond to Hadenius and Teorell's true one party type, and exhibit high participation with low competition but enable the ruling autocrat to develop a wide patronage network between and in anticipation of elections (78 79). Competit ive one party systems mirror Hadenius and Teorell's dominant party construct and therefore contain a similar degree of inclusiveness but more competition than their plebiscitary/true one party counterparts (80 81). A military oligarchy (military regime) ex hibits relatively low competition and participation, and dissent is usually only tolerated within the ruling junta, if at all (79 80). Unsurprisingly, their multiparty regime is defined by relatively high participation and competition (81 82). They also in clude a settler oligarchy category, but it is more regionally than globally relevant (81). For all neopatrimonial regimes, Bratton and van de Walle posit that pressure on the regime, especially for its fundamental change, must come from outside the extensi ve patronage networks that the leaders construct. Therefore, mass protests are thought to be relatively effective in voicing political and economic demands, but the actual transition is often posed in terms of law and resource control, meaning that middle class and business leaders have an incentive to side with the opposition in order to oversee redistribution and construction of property rights in their favor (83 89). Although each of the authors art iculates different dimensions on which to compare pre t ransi tion regime types, their analyses become useful when thinking about how different structures might or might not respond to pressures for liberalization or democratization. To be sure, there is no consensus on a single "best" or "most useful" categoriz ation, but several similarities become apparent, among the different schemas.
15 First, they acknowledge a broad spectrum within the domain of authoritarianism, resting between the poles of democracy and totalitarianism. All note the different effects that le adership by the military has on the regime. Linz and Stepan (1996) posit that a hierarchical military might be relatively willing to take the first procedural steps to democratization, a hypothesis that resonates with Hadenius and Teorell's (2007) observat ion of their short life expectancies. If official dissent stays within the military rulers opposition must come from outside of the system, likely in the form of popular uprising. Degrees of competition within authoritarian systems are somewhat less straig htforward to predict or categorize. Linz and Stepan (1996) do allow for degrees of political, economic, and social pluralism in the authoritarian and post authoritarian regimes, others deal more directly with those variations. However, it is Hadenius and T eorell's (2007) finding that more competitive regimes are more likely to democratize that speaks directly to the manner in which available political space may lay the foundation for greater opportunities for dissent. In other words, opposition groups will take advantage of whatever autonomy or opportunities they are granted, which could ultimately pose challenges to the autocratic regime. At the same time, it is instructive to simultaneously consider Bratton and van de Walle's (1997) note on the importance of "outsiders" instigating change in more closed, clientelist systems. Although the two theories may speak to different agents of change (though not necessarily), they may not be incompatible, just applicable to distinct pre liberalization frameworks. Whi le different types of regimes may produce certain vulnerabilities for autocrats and opportunities for opposition, they do not create them alone. Rather, individuals,
16 groups, movements, and other structures also shape the political space. Scholars increasin gly suggest that comprehension of the formulation of movements and revolutions necessitates: (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting the movement [political opportunities]; (2) the forms of organization (informal as well a s formal), available to insurgents [mobilizing structures]; and (3) the collective processes of interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and action [framing processes] (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 2) In t he words of Rucht "opportunities are one of the major factors that shape a movement's structure; in turn, that structure has an impact on strategies, kinds and levels of mobilization, and eventually on movement outcomes" ( 1996, 191). He defines "movement structures" as "the organizational bases and mechanisms serving to collect and use the movement's resources" ( Rucht 1996, 186). McCarthy adds that structures also refer to the "tactical repertoires" in addition to the organizational formations themselves, from "micromobilization structural social locations that are not aimed primarily at movement mobilization, but where mobilization may be generated," such as family, friends, and associations, to more organized and goal oriented activist networks, social mo vement organizations (SMOs), m ovement schools, and the like ( 1996, 141, 144 145). In other words, movement structures can be both different organizations and the different tactics that they may use. They may be described according to their levels of organi zation or professionalization, relationships to society or goals (direct or indirect), and methods (McCarthy 1996, 145 146). SMOs may also be described according to the type, such as "instrumental," "subcultural," or "countercultural" (Kriesi 1996, 158), b ut this project is simply concerned with those of a systemic political nature. Regardless of a
17 movement's goal, varying politi cal opportunity structures (POS ) create opportunities or challenges for different mobilizing structures ( Kriesi 1996, 150). In re sponse to their goals and environments, mobilizing structures can take very different for ms. Kriesi describes four types of formal organizations differentiated by their levels of engagement and intended recipients of action ( 1996, 152). "Supportive organiz ations" and "movement associations" interact with the members of a movement, with supportive organizations "contribut[ing] to the social organization," such as by indirectly providing services, and movement associations building consensus among members, wh ile neither directly promotes or supports mobilization. Both SMOs and "political parties and interest groups" are politically oriented, but the former mobilizes members for collective action, whereas parties and interest groups employ specialized represent atives or resources to promote their interests, usually within "normal" political activity (Kriesi 1996, 152 153). The principal actors of political parties and interest groups are elites rather than constituencies, an important distinction that further se parates them from constituent dominated SMOs (Kriesi 1996, 153). Parties are, however, distinct from interest groups in that they operate through the "occupation of politica l offices" and rely upon voters, while interest groups rely upon individual represe ntatives operating in nongovernmental capacities to capitalize on "expertise, money, access to decision makers, [or] refusing to cooperate" (Rucht 1996, 187). To be sure, groups are rarely static over time, and SMOs, with their dual dependencies on both co nstituent mobilization and political engagement, may mature in four different ways: although much discussion has been dominated by the contrast between institutionalization (or when the SMO becomes more like a political party and often more conservative) a nd radicalization (or "the path to
18 reinvigorated mobilization"), it can also commercialize and become more like a service organization, or become more like a movement association (Kriesi 1996, 156 157). Furthermore, the organization of movements may be in fluenced by their respective political contexts. Rucht (1996) hypothesizes that the formality of structures will increase with greater acc ess to the decision making and implementing apparatus and with the number of both competitors and allies. If groups ha ve access to the bodies that implement policy, the organizations tend to develop formalized structures in order to effectively relate to the recipients of their demands and work with potential partners. Additionally, "strong executive power structures [tha t do not allow access to representative structures] in a given political system tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic an d hierarchical political forms, and that mistrust translates into informal networks and less professionalized formation s (Rucht 1996, 192) A dearth of allies forces movements to create professional structures for themselves; a plethora of competitors maximizes the utility of an effective, strategic, and organized system (192). Of course, the impact of the context that g ives rise to the various types of groups extends beyond the organizations themselves. A POS may be more or less favorable to m ovement formation, but McAdam argues that the presence of dramatic tension between cultural values and social practices, abrupt in creases in "imposed" hardships, heightened attention to "a system's vulnerability or illegitimacy," and a viable framework for expressing discontent and demands improve prospects for organization ( 1996, 25). Additionally, the "openness or closure of the in stitutionalized political system," the state's willingness and ability to deploy force effectively, and the presence or absence and alignment of elites dictate options that are available to would be political challeng ers
19 (McAdam 1996, 27). Tarrow notes a c urvilinear relationship between openness and peaceful protest, implying that opposition groups make use of the political "space" that they are afforded, be it more effective through formal or informal action ( 1996, 54). Similarly, division between elites e ncourages outsiders to take advantage of conflicts to increase their own power (Tarrow 1996, 56). The arguments of Tarrow and McAdam recall the emphasis that more traditional democratization scholars Hadenius and Teorell (2007) in particular have place d on (pre liberalization) regime types and precipitating events or factors. Brinton (1965) observes several consistencies among pre revolutionary societies, which McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald might call changes to the POS. While two are resource related e conomies tend to be expanding and new monied classes feel deprived or limited in comparison to the well established elites strengthened ideological leadership and cracks in the ruling regime are also relevant ( Brinton 1965, 250 251). Both the physical a nd human infrastructure of the challenged government has begun to crumble, often through new economic demands or uncertainty, and "the ruling class becomes politically inept," prompting clumsy and unpopular reactions to quell agitators or hopeful revolutio narie s (Brinton 1965, 252). Skocpol adds that "military breakdowns" are also integral to the decay that allows anti regime movements to take hold, although she cautions against broadly applying her conclusions ( 1985, 285, 288). Indeed, not all cases in thi s study traverse a "revolutionary" path, but the framework for radical regime change remains rel evant nonetheless. McAdam in fact, argues that differentiation between revolutions and other types of reform can only be made post hoc and that both types of m ovements utilize similar to ols and operate in analogous political opportunity
20 structure s ( 1996, 30 31). It is important to recall, however, that "no matter how momentous a change appears in retrospect, it only becomes an opportunity' when defined as such by a group of actors sufficiently well organized to act on this shared definition of the situation"; that is, the political context only becomes an opportunity when groups or individuals take advantage of the underlying dynamics to promote their desired ou tcomes (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 8). The foundations of political change let alone revolution are by no means a clear or easily decipherable process, but involve both contextual factors and willing actors. External Influences G lobalization, a s Plattner astutely observes, has become something of a "buzzword": terms for which "it is impossible to establish an exact, let alone consensual, meaning [that] are simply used and misused by too many different authors in too many different ways" ( 2002, 54). The phenomenon of an increasingly interconnected and "shrinking" world is not new, claiming roots in the early modern period as explorers crisscrossed continents and oceans, exporting political, economic, social, and even biological systems. As commu nication and transportation technologies improve, communities, states, and individuals can share and interact with greater ease, arguably making similarities more prevalent and boundaries less salient ( Plattner 2002, 55 56). However, if proper consideratio n is to be given to a range of external forces, it is imperative to look beyond the social, ideological, and economic linkages often associated with globalization to even more direct foreign policy initiatives and changing global and regional power dynamic s.
21 As the number of democracies has increased since the early 1970s, that system of governance has seemed more and more to be the only respectable game in town. Democracy has become a norm and even a requirement, although often the quality and methods of implementing the institutions are still debatable (Plattner 2002, 57 59). G lobalization acts not just on an institutional level, but on a social one as well. The increasing ease of transmitting people, ideas, and information across borders "undermine[s] au thoritarian regimes by exposing their peoples to interaction with and information about other ways of life," possibly helping the citizenry make new or greater demands of their nondemocratic leaders (59). Broad international relationships can undermine the authority of nondemocratic regimes by exposing citizens of repressive states to alternatives, perhaps accentuating the lack of political rights and civil liberties, and increasing opportunities to interface with and utilize existing pro democratic organiz ations. Belonging to or aspiring to join regional organizations can also enhance the prospects for democratizing movements. Besides supporting or imposing an ideological mandate, they can encourage liberalization by protecting the interests economic and otherwise of elites who might oppose a more democratic framework without such assurances. Membership (or the promise of it) might also represent opportunities for post transition growth, providing an incentive for organization against an autocratic regim e. Similarly, norms and values promoted or imposed by regional associations may help to make a state security sector more amenable to or supportive of liberalizing action, either by clarifying its role or guaranteeing its relevance in a post transition mil ieu (Peveh ouse 2002, 522 529). Tudoroiu posits that exogenous factors, connections to Western
22 initiatives and organizations in particular, were decisive in determining the various outcomes of different post Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe ( 2010, 81 83). The collapse of the communism left ideological and identity voids that democracy, ultra nationalism, and neo communism competed to fill ( Tudoroiu 2010, 85). He argues that methods of "socialization" through contact, expectations, and tangible rewards operated at different levels, enabling "faster," "slower," or effectively nonexistent tracks of democratization to respond to the institutional and normative vacuums (Tudoroiu 2010, 90 92, 105). In particular, the United States has pursued foreig n interventions with the explicit goal of the promotion of democracy; indeed, "national security of the United States" is the only rationale that has been proposed more frequently (Meernik 1996, 391 392). While it is impossible to discern true or complete motivations for military involvement, Meernik suggests that even though invasion does not necessarily ensure democratization, countries that undergo intervention are more likely to democratize than those that underwent international crises of a different s ort ( 1996, 396). Without supposing caus ation, Hermann and Kegley note that American intervention with the intention of promoting liberalization is correlated to an increase in level of democracy while interventions without such a goal are consistent with i ncreased levels of autocracy ( 1998, 97 98). However, they also conclude that the most effective interventions also "occurred in a time period when democracy was the political system of choice in the international arena," suggesting the impact of broader in ternational trends as well (Hermann and Kegley 1998, 109).
23 Results have not, however, been consistent, and the impact of external Western, specifically influences on democratization has been decidedly deb atable. Levitsky and Way posit that influence is not one single element that can be applied with different levels of enthusiasm for proportionate results, but that it operates on dimensions of "linkage and leverage" and that both must be present for effective promotion of democracy ( 2006, 379). Linkage, or the "density of ties and cross border flows," depends upon communication and relationships and is improved by geographic proximity. Strong linkages increase salience of an autocratic regime in the global community, spread knowledge of democratic norms and responsibilities, and improve citizens' opportunities to pressure their respective governments for democratizing measures. Effective linkage may not be acute, but it can bring domestic and international goals (i.e. democracy) closer together through soft power" mechanisms ( 383 3 86). Conversely, leverage is "incumbent governments' vulnerability to external pressure for democratization," or the ability to impose democratization based on some form of coercion, ranging from incentives and con ditionality t o diplomacy ( 382 383). The authors argue that one makes the other relevant and effective by making democracy important both for the democratize er and the democratize ee, and therefore more likely to consolidate (2006, 396). Combining linkage and leverage means integrating all facets of democratization, from the social to the political and economic. It acknowledges that influence may be boots on the ground or conditions for aid but may also be business contacts or access to foreign newspapers. Likewise, cro ss border networks particularly networks of activists, but also social or business connections may reinforce both internal and external
24 pressures by challenging the "government monopolies over information," though their effects may be more keenly felt in more recent cases due to improved communication and transportation facilities (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 199 200). External influence may be formal or informal, sub or supra national, imposed by states or prodded by shifting global norms, but its multiple forms consistently challenge internally domina ted theories of democratization. S TUDY D ESIGN AND M ETHODOLOGY While each theoretical family seeks to explain why democratization occurs, they do not consider t he regional effects noted by Starr ( 1991), Starr and Lindborg (2003), O'Loughlin et al. (2004), Brinks and Coppedge (2006) When theoretical explanations for democratization are discussed in the context of neighborhood effects it is usually only to n ote confusion (Teorell 2010, 99 ). However, if the two strands of literature can engage with one another, drawing from different theories of democratization may help scholars to understand regional contagions, just as better comprehension of regional forces may contribute to evaluating the utility of differen t explanations for democratization. While there are many ways to approach the intersection, examining countries that lead those regional shifts is especially useful because it isolates cases from the examples that they may be following. Focusing on leaders eliminates yet another possible explanation for democratizing movements as well as offering a path for future research to address why followers follow. In this study I attempt to reconcile several competing methods of comparison. First, I wish to ground my study in its history, acknowledging the cases' idiosyncrasies
25 and giving voice to processes that may not represent themselves well in a quantitative analysis. Specifically, analysis of each case's political opportunity structure (POS) and opposition mo vements necessitate narrative, contextual evaluation. I will also return to qualitative methods to aid in the explanation of statistical observations. Here, I am following the example of Teorell's comprehensive analysis of the determinants of democratizati on. I similarly wish to emulate the considerations he makes when attempting to determine "pathways," although such comprehensive statistical analysis constitutes the scope of another project ( Teorell 2010, 4 5). I additionally draw upon Ahram's recommenda tions to operationalize regional studies by using a thematically relevant definition strategy (2011, 82 84). That is, I will base my sets of regional cases not only on geographic proximity (although it will, of course, be highly pertinent), but also on the matic and temporal relevance. My regional sets will include the Latin American (LAM) movements of the 1970s and early 1980s, the Southeast Asian (SEA) transitions that took place in the mid 1980s into the 1990s, the Central and Eastern European (CEE) revol utions of 1989 (and the early 1990s), and the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) moveme nts of 2010 into early 2011. Two regions 2 important to the third wave literature are notably missing: Southern Europe and Sub Saharan Africa. While Huntington argue s that the third wave began in Southern Europe, spreading from Portugal to Spain and Greece (1991, 21 22), the three cases constitute too small a set for my method of analysis (outlined below). The exclusion of Sub Saharan Africa is less a question of meth odological appropriateness than of prioritizing a broad temporal scope within the parameters of a manageable study Since I cannot include the Southern European cases, LAM provides an important look at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 I also exclude post Soviet states for reasons explained in Chapter 4.
26 beginning of the third wave, while the SEA and CEE cases represent the "crest" of the wave. Logically, the potential Sub Saharan cases, beginning with the national conference in Benin, occupy a similar temporal frame (Young 1996, 58). However, given the profusion of literature on the Asian model of democr atization and the importance of the CEE revolutions in terms of the global balance of power, those two regions demanded more immediate attention. While it would augment our understanding of leadership to compare SEA, CEE, and Sub Saharan regions, this stud y attempts to take a longer view and test the outer reaches of the third wave, therefore demanding the inclusion of the MENA set of cases. Of course, not every state in a region underwent transitions during those periods, and to be sure, not all movements were successful (and, very clearly, not all have "ended" nor have all "endings" stuck). Case selection is therefore challenging, but I include states in which organized, anti regime activity solicited a response from the established leadership, regardless of whether that activity led to full scale revolution or later consolidation. For example, my sets will include countries such as Bahrain (where pro democracy protestors failed in affecting regime change but succeeded in mounting a coherent anti regime mo vement) and Thailand (where a democratic government was established but later fell to a military coup), in addition to the less debatedly democratic regime of post revolutionary Poland. I wish to compare cases that experience "ripples" of regional "tides" rather than be bound to geographic definitions which may encompass cases that are irrelevant (i.e., geographically close but experienced no significant revolutionary activity) or exclude those which are relevant to the socio political region
27 even if not pe rfectly contiguous (i.e., on a region's geographic periphery but seemed to follow the region's pattern of political upheaval). The "leading" cases will be defined as the first two countries from each regional set to experience revolutionary movements. Lead ers do not necessarily have to have "complete" or have "successful" governmental turnovers, and if they do, they need not accomplish their goals first in the region; it is only necessary that their citizens lead the anti incumbent movement(s) in their regi ons. I decided against using a single example from each region in an attempt to avoid comparing discrete cases to one other; that is, I want to avoid comparing Ecuador, the Philippines, Poland, and Tunisia to each other and their respective regions in favo r of attempting to discern tendencies of leader cases more generally. Furthermore, it takes multiple cases to establish whether the first case is a leader or a regional anomaly. For those reasons, more than a single case is necessary. The decision to limit to two cases is more difficult to rationalize and somewhat arbitrary. However, it is defensible in that it will remain constant across regions (not vary with the number of individual cases that make up a set, as a proportional estimation would), even if r egions contain different numbers of cases. The first two countries, furthermore, retain their undisputed status as "leaders" rather than "followers" in a region, whereas including three or four cases would cast doubt upon the degree of their "leadership," especially in comparatively smaller regional sets. Definition of the leader cases is, however, relatively simple as it is dictated by historical events. Similarly, the quantitative element of this project will test whether regional findings are applicable as global generalizations. As such, it necessitates a two stage research process. Potential explanatory v ariab les must first be examined with respect to
28 their regional relevance, and then as descriptors of all leaders. A variable that "perfectly" describes unique leader behavior would differentiate a leader from its own region, but in a manner similar across all regions; that is, the value describing the leaders would be either well above or well below their respective regional average in all regions. This study will also be useful in the clarification of which factors appear to be relevant to some regions (or one region) or time periods but not others. Ideally, this study would utilize factor analysis in order to determine which theoretical "families," in a ddition to individual variables, hold the most explanatory power, and which components are the most useful across regions. Unfortunately, this method is incompatible with the data due to missing values. The considerably simpler ANOVA and Kruskal Wallis H t est are also not options due to lacking independence: leaders are necessarily part of their regions and cannot therefore be effectively compared to them. Given the constraints dictated by availability of data and set definition, this study is limited to th e use of descriptive rather than analytic statistics. The data will be visualized with box and whisker plots with additional markers representing particularly important values. As with all box and whisker plots, the lower whisker will extend to the min imum value and the upper will extend to the maximum. The lower box represents the second quartile; the upper box represents the third quartile; the line separating the two corresponds to the median score. The charts will also include markers denoting the m ean and one sample standard deviation above and one sample standard deviation below the mean in addition to symbols representing the two leader cases (see Figure 1.1). I use sample stand ard deviation to account for imperfections in data or case selection. Each region will have its own box and whisker plot, but plots illustrating the same variable
29 will be included on the same page for the purposes of cross regional comparison. After using box and whisker plots to visualize the distribution of in region data and to gain a sense of regional outliers, I will convert all data to standard scores in order to better evaluate differences or similarities between leading cases. Complications arise from the fact that statistics must be made comparable and consistent for useful comparison among regional leaders, especially in terms of time and level. To address the temporal issue, variables involving change over time will be determined in terms of proximity to upheaval, rather than by date (i.e., the growth in per cap ita GDP in the year previous to turmoil will be used for all cases rather than growth in per capita GDP in the years of 1988 1989 for all cases). However, the selection of the year itself is also a complicated issue, as transitions are rarely if ever discrete "moments." For the purposes of this examination, I will attempt to identify significant movements or events rather than the first whispers of d iscontent (which may not have e licited a concerted response from the regime) or first Figure 1.1 Standa rd Box and whisker plot
30 elections (which may have taken place long after the first movements towards liberalization or regime change). This survey uses the June 1 cutoff, so that if events occurred after June 1 of a given year, the data is gathered for that year; if they occurred before, the prev ious year's figures are used, so as to ensure that the data presented is most representative of the pre transition state of affairs, and excludes (to the extent possible) uncertainty or fluctuations due to the political turmoil that this study seeks to inv estigate. To further guard against possible issues of endogeneity and respect the observation that transitions' political movements are largely dynamic processes not confined to or understood within a period of twelve months, data will also include the yea r prior to the "movement" (as determined by the June 1 cutoff). The values presented in the diagrams will be the average of those two figures. While the tactic of evaluating the means may dilute the most immediate or proximate causes of uprisings, it is ne cessary to guard against confusing the causes and effects of political volatility. Sudden shocks that would compromise the utility of this method, significantly over or under valuing a given variable, will be discussed in the region's qualitative section. Furthermore, by taking a slightly longer view, this study hopes to examine more accurately the impact of each variable: measured characteristics of leaders must be consistent or more extreme to register as much different from their regional means, effecti vely increasing the demands for a variable to convey explanatory power. The issue of level is also somewhat complicated. Especially in the case of economic measures, values are bound to vary according to inflation and the absolute, rather than relative, o utput. That is, this study does not examine whether a certain Central European economy had higher output than a Latin American economy at the time of
31 revolution because not only does inflation change, but the histories of the various cases constrain the le vels of development and output mixes of the countries. That is not to say that history or economic systems are irrelevant; however, this project focuses on the countries' positions relative to their regions and to each other. In order to achieve comparabil ity, the study will utilize constant indicators in both economic and other measures. After reporting quantitative findings, I will turn to qualitative regional assessments. A brief historical overview of attempted transitions in the region will lay the fo undation for analysis intended to frame and contextualize the statistical findings (or lack thereof), including explanations of possibly circumstantially derived statistics. Importantly, the narrative sections will define each case's POS and examine the st ructure of its opposition movement(s), variables which cannot be meaningfully quantified. The regional chapters will parse out the most salient regional trends and enrich statistical findings by providing context and an explanation of consequences. I will conclude with a cross regional comparison of characteristics in order to propose broadly applicable description of leaders of regional democratizing movements.
32 CHAPTER 2 Quantitative Descriptions and Puzzles of Regional Leaders Not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts. Although the theoretical explanations for democratization include a combination of quantitative and qualitative elements, statistical analysis facilitates cross regional comparison. Dictated by appropriateness and availability, variables represent the three categories presented in the literature review (economic or modernization explanations, political opportunity, and external forces). Economic factors divided into short term economi c trends and long term economic features to gain a sense of the importance of both immediate responses and the structural elements modernization Proxies for political
33 systems and globalization are necessarily imperfect and incomplete, but still offer insi ght and highlight avenues for productive qualitative discussion and assessment Economic Factors Near term economic features include the GDP in constant USD (Table 2.1, Figure 2.1), annual change in GDP (Table 2.3, Figure 2.3), GDP per capita in constant USD (Table 2.2, Figure 2.2), annual change in GDP per capita, (Table 2.4, Figure 2.4), and unemployment rate (Table 2.5, Figure 2.5). Taken together, they suggest that leaders are not the poorest countries in their region and that changes in level of thes e factors matter more than absolute level, although two divergent patterns emerge. Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 demonstrate a difference between the sizes of the economies of the two leading cases, a similarity which bears out across regions. In each, one lea der (the first leader in all cases except for CEE) is located at or close to the median, and the other is located at least within the fourth quartile. In fact, the more affluent leader in each region is located at least one standard deviation above the mea n except for in LAM, which is skewed by Brazil's considerably larger economy. Leading countries may or may not be among the largest economies in their regions, but they are not among the smallest. GDP per capita does not display such consistency (see Tabl e 2.2 and 2.3). All but one leader scores in the second or third quartile; GDP per capita in the Philippines was in the fourth quartile, substantially higher relative to its region than any of the other leaders. As with GDP, none of the leaders is the poor est in their regions, but their relationships to regional medians vary considerably.
34 Table 2.1 : GDP in constant USD (2000) in billions MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 32.68 PLN 285.80 PHL 50.39 ECD 8.74 EGY 156.34 HNG 46.53 S_K 180.63 PRU 35.26 ALG 77.90 CZC 179 .05 TWN 220.50 HND 3.33 JRD 15.42 RMN 48.03 THL 59.90 BLV 5.75 BHR 13.87 GDR 269.26 MYN 40.56 E_S 8.25 LBY 49.38 BLG 16.30 NPL 3.16 ARG 195.10 MRC 58.85 ALB 3.39 BNG 28.66 CHL 27.76 OMN 30.96 IND 175.60 URG 15.82 YMN 14.11 BRZ 406.80 KWT 62.22 NCR 4.55 SYR 30.71 GTM 11.20 PNM 7.53 PRG 5.27 Median 32.68 Median 48.03 Median 55.15 Median 8.74 Mean 49.31 Mean 121.19 Mean 94.92 Mean 56.57 SD 41.39 SD 121.23 SD 83.32 SD 117.13 +1SD 90.70 +1SD 242.4 2 +1SD 178.25 +1SD 173.70 1SD 7.92 1SD 0.03 1SD 11.60 1SD 60.57 Standard Scores TNS 0.40 PLN 1.36 PHL 0.53 ECD 0.41 EGY 2.59 HNG 0.62 S_K 1.03 PRU 0.18 ALG 0.69 CZC 0.48 TWN 1.51 HND 0.45 JRD 0.82 RMN 0.60 THL 0.42 BLV 0.43 BHR 0.86 GDR 1.22 MYN 0.65 E_S 0.41 LBY 0.00 BLG 0.87 NPL 1.10 ARG 1.18 MRC 0.23 ALB 0.97 BNG 0.80 CHL 0.25 OMN 0.44 IND 0.97 URG 0.35 YMN 0.85 BRZ 2.99 KWT 0.31 NCR 0.44 SYR 0.45 GTM 0.39 PNM 0.42 PRG 0.44 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; Maddison 2003; Maddison 1995
35 -1E+11 -5E+10 0 5E+10 1E+11 1.5E+11 2E+11 2.5E+11 3E+11 3.5E+11 MENA CEE SEA LAM In USD (2000) Region GDP Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.1 : GDP in constant USD (2000)
36 Table 2. 2 : GDP per capita in constant USD MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 3113.76 PLN 7559.71 PHL 945.71 ECD 1246.65 EGY 1943.76 HNG 4387.54 S_K 4 447.70 PRU 2296.80 ALG 2212.34 CZC 11516.83 TWN 11452.25 HND 1023.40 JRD 2578.43 RMN 2078.67 THL 1091.13 BLV 1136.84 BHR 11418.56 GDR 16287.78 MYN 1035.91 E_S 1758.64 LBY 7885.47 BLG 1825.57 NPL 171.66 ARG 6780.40 MRC 1820.88 ALB 1035.12 BNG 275.63 CH L 2428.48 OMN 11268.62 IND 862.10 URG 5375.86 YMN 595.61 BRZ 3154.86 KWT 23115.46 NCR 1277.23 SYR 1517.22 GTM 1460.43 PNM 3347.36 PRG 1328.09 Median 2578.43 Median 4387.54 Median 990.81 Median 1758 .64 Mean 6133.65 Mean 6384.46 Mean 2535.26 Mean 2508.85 SD 6863.10 SD 5740.57 SD 3845.64 SD 1777.00 +1SD 12996.75 +1SD 12125.02 +1SD 6380.90 +1SD 4285.85 1SD 729.45 1SD 643.89 1SD 1310.37 1SD 731.85 Standard Scores TNS 0.44 PLN 0.20 PHL 0.41 ECD 0.71 EGY 0.61 HNG 0.35 S_K 0.50 PRU 0.12 ALG 0.57 CZC 0.89 TWN 2.32 HND 0.84 JRD 0.52 RMN 0.75 THL 0.38 BLV 0.77 BHR 0.77 GDR 1.73 MYN 0.39 E_S 0.42 LBY 0.26 BLG 0.79 NPL 0.61 ARG 2.40 MRC 0.63 ALB 0.93 BNG 0.59 CHL 0.05 OMN 0. 75 IND 0.44 URG 1.61 YMN 0.81 BRZ 0.36 KWT 2.47 NCR 0.69 SYR 0.67 GTM 0.59 PNM 0.47 PRG 0.66 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; Maddison 2003; Maddison 1995
37 -5000 0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 MENA CEE SEA LAM In USD (2000) Region GDP per capita Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.2 : GDP per capita in constant USD
38 Annual changes in GDP (Table 2.3, Figure 2.3) and GDP per capita (Table 2.4, Figure 2.4) displayed two divergent patterns of leaders. In regions of little variation (CEE and MENA), the first leader's change was very close to the regional average, and the second leader experienced even more positive growth than the first, doing better than at least 75% of the rest of its region. In regions of greater variation LAM ranges from El Salvador's 11.11% growth to Honduras's 10.44% growth in GDP and SEA ranges f rom Myanmar's 7.68% growth to Thailand's 11.4% growth in GDP first leaders display those extremes, with locations more than one standard deviation away from the mean (in either the positive or negative direction). The second leaders in both cases are fa r more moderate, and both located in the third quartile. A similar pattern holds true in GDP per capita, but it is not quite as pronounced, as Tunisia is closer to the median than the mean. The insight that MENA, and to a lesser extent CEE, offers is more useful because they compare cases in the same or similar years. The cases in SEA and LAM span a greater number of years, so future analysis should examine cases' positions relative to their regions in a single year, rather than shifted to years of upheaval in order to better control for global economic trends that could be affecting cases within regional sets unevenly. That is, it may be instructive to consider whether the Philippines' growth in early 1986 (therefore coded as 1985) was comparable to, signif icantly greater than, or significantly less than its neighbors' growth in 1985, rather than the years in which they experienced challenges to the regime.
39 Table 2.3 : Annual Percent Change in GDP MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 3.05 PLN 0.42 PHL 7.32 ECD 7.99 EGY 4.92 HNG 1.99 S_K 7.45 PRU 2.68 ALG 2.85 CZC 1.53 TWN 9.39 HND 10.44 JRD 3.90 RMN 3.15 THL 11.40 BLV 3.51 BHR 3.80 GDR 1.12 MYN 7.68 E_S 11.11 LBY 2.10 BLG 3.83 NPL 6.01 ARG 5.32 MRC 4.22 ALB 0.13 BNG 4.28 CHL 2.79 OMN 2.55 IND 6.17 URG 4. 10 YMN 5.78 BRZ 1.41 KWT 0.87 NCR 1.52 SYR 4.60 GTM 1.04 PNM 0.88 PRG 5.34 Median 3.80 Median 1.12 Median 6.09 Median 0.88 Mean 3.35 Mean 0.84 Mean 3.71 Mean 0.51 SD 1.78 SD 2.14 SD 7.25 SD 5.77 + 1SD 5.13 +1SD 2.98 +1SD 10.97 +1SD 6.28 1SD 1.58 1SD 1.30 1SD 3.54 1SD 5.27 Standard Scores TNS 0.17 PLN 0.19 PHL 1.52 ECD 1.30 EGY 0.88 HNG 0.54 S_K 0.52 PRU 0.38 ALG 0.28 CZC 0.32 TWN 0.78 HND 1.72 JRD 0.30 RMN 1.87 THL 1.06 BLV 0.52 B HR 0.25 GDR 0.13 MYN 1.57 E_S 2.01 LBY 0.71 BLG 1.40 NPL 0.32 ARG 1.01 MRC 0.49 ALB 0.33 BNG 0.08 CHL 0.57 OMN 0.45 IND 0.34 URG 0.80 YMN 1.37 BRZ 0.33 KWT 2.38 NCR 0.18 SYR 0.70 GTM 0.27 PNM 0.06 PRG 0.84 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; Maddison 2003; Maddison 1995
40 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 MENA CEE SEA LAM Percent Change Region Annual Change in GDP Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.3 : Annual Percent Change in GDP
41 Table 2.4 : Annual Percent Change in GDP per capita MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 1.97 PLN 0.05 PHL 9.82 ECD 4.92 EGY 3.09 HNG 2.16 S_K 6.27 PRU 0.09 ALG 1.33 CZC 1.36 TWN 8.07 HND 7.08 JRD 1.64 RMN 3.59 THL 9.34 BLV 1.08 BHR 5.19 GDR 1.87 MYN 9.19 E_S 12.54 LBY 0.26 BLG 4.33 NPL 3.51 ARG 6.75 MRC 3.15 ALB 1.36 BNG 1.67 CHL 4.27 OMN 0.16 IND 4.69 URG 4.73 YMN 2.60 BRZ 3.66 KWT 4.33 NCR 1.07 SYR 2.51 GTM 3.44 PNM 1.19 PRG 2.45 Median 1.64 Median 1.36 Median 4.10 Median 1.19 Mean 0.62 Mean 0.67 Mean 1.82 Mean 1.71 SD 2.87 SD 2.59 SD 7.40 SD 5.12 +1SD 3.49 +1SD 3.2 7 +1SD 9.22 +1SD 3.41 1SD 2.25 1SD 1.92 1SD 5.58 1SD 6.83 Standard Scores TNS 0.47 PLN 0.28 PHL 1.57 ECD 1.29 EGY 0.86 HNG 0.57 S_K 0.60 PRU 0.32 ALG 0.25 CZC 0.27 TWN 0.84 HND 1.72 JRD 0.35 RMN 1.65 THL 1.02 BLV 0.55 BHR 2.02 GDR 0.46 M YN 1.49 E_S 2.11 LBY 0.13 BLG 1.41 NPL 0.23 ARG 0.99 MRC 0.88 ALB 0.78 BNG 0.02 CHL 0.50 OMN 0.27 IND 0.39 URG 0.59 YMN 0.69 BRZ 0.38 KWT 1.73 NCR 0.12 SYR 0.66 GTM 0.34 PNM 0.10 PRG 0 .81 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; Maddison 2003; Maddison 1995
42 85 90 95 100 105 110 115 MENA CEE SEA LAM Percent Change Region Annual Change in GDP per capita Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.4 : Annual Percent Change in GDP per capita
43 It is interesting to note how both GDP per capita and change in GDP per capita produced less robust patterns than their aggregate counterparts. However it is possible that per capita GDP is less representative in unequal or corrupt societies, both qualities that describe many if not all of the regimes included in this analysis. If a paternalistic or corrupt autocrat controls much of the economy, doling out punishments and rewards, per capita GDP and its changes from year to year may be very misrepresentative of the experience of the population. Ideally, these factors would also be compared to each country's GINI coefficient and index of corruption, but d ata is insufficient to contribute to this analysis. Measures of unemployment had similar constraints due to data (un)availability, and CEE is not even considered due to a lack of information and the fact that those countries had policies of subsidizing fu ll employment (Table 2.5, Figure 2.5). However, the remaining regions do not present a clear picture, either. All leaders have lower than average, but not median, unemployment rates than their regions, but even this finding is highly suspect given that Ban gladesh skews the SEA average high.
44 Table 2.5 : Unemployment Rate MENA SEA LAM TNS 14.0 PHL 6.5 ECD 5.3 EGY 8.7 S_K 3.9 PRU 5.1 ALG 10.8 TWN 2.0 HND JRD 12.9 THL 4.4 BLV 5.4 BHR 15.0 MYN E_S 13.2 LBY 30.0 NPL 5.0 ARG 4.7 MRC 10.0 BNG 30.0 CHL 15.5 OMN 15.0 IND 4.5 URG 9.1 YMN 35.0 BRZ 4.4 KWT 2.2 NCR 25.0 SYR 8.3 GTM 15.0 PNM 11.2 PRG 5.1 Median 12.9 Median 4.5 Median 7.3 Mean 14.7 Mean 8.1 Mean 9.9 SD 9.6 SD 9.8 SD 6.4 +1SD 24.3 +1SD 17.8 +1SD 16.3 1SD 5 .1 1SD 1.7 1SD 3.6 Standard Scores TNS 0.07 PHL 0.15 ECD 0.73 EGY 0.63 S_K 0.43 PRU 0.76 ALG 0.41 TWN 0.62 HND JRD 0.19 THL 0.37 BLV 0.71 BHR 0.03 MYN E_S 0.52 LBY 1.59 NPL 0.31 ARG 0.83 MRC 0.49 BNG 2.25 CHL 0.87 OMN 0.03 IND 0.36 URG 0.12 YMN 2.11 BRZ 0.87 KWT 1.30 NCR 2.38 SYR 0.67 GTM 0.80 PNM 0.20 PRG 0.76 Soureces: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; CIA World Factbook 2010; CIA World Factbook 2009; CIA World Factbool 1990; CIA World Factbook 1989; CIA World Factbook 1986; CIA World Factbook 1985; CIA World Factbook 1984; LABORSTA, International Labor Organization
45 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 MENA SEA LAM Percent Unemployed Region Unemployment Rate Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.5 : Unemployment Rate
46 Long term economic trends, intended to approximate modernization, include the percentage of the labor force employed in agriculture (Table 2.6, Figure 2.6) and services (Table 2.7, Figure 2.7), percentage of population under age 15 (Table 2.8, Figure 2.8), adult literacy rate (Table 2.9, Figure 2.9), and two measures of connectivity, phone lines per 100 people (Table 2.10, Figure 2.10) and internet users per 100 people (Table 2.11, Figure 2.11). The data do not confirm the modernization hypothesis, and if anything, roughly seem to show that, especially over time, backwards is a better description of a leader. First, any discussion of the structure of the economy must be prefaced with the note that the earliest data for LAM is unavailable, meaning that the following observations do not include Ecuador or Peru, or how they relate to LAM. As expected by the literature that grew out of the experience of the "Asian tigers," both SEA leaders had less than the median and average percentage of labor force employed in the agricultural sector and a higher concentration in the services sector. That, however, repr esents the end of straightforward support for the theory. First, it is interesting to note that every single first leader (for which there was data) had a greater proportion of its labor force dedicated to agriculture than did the second leader; every sing le second leader had a greater proportion of its labor force dedicated to services than the first leader. Upon examining the broader regional data, there is no indication that "followers" have consistently more agriculturally based economies than their pre decessors (see Tables 2.6 and 2.7).
47 Table 2.6 : Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agricultural Sector MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 55.00 PLN 26.95 PHL 49.85 ECD EGY 32.00 HNG 19.55 S_K 26.00 PRU ALG 14.00 CZC 12.30 TWN 19.50 HND JRD 2.50 RMN 28.15 THL 65.40 BLV BHR 1.00 GDR 10.80 MYN 65.20 E_S 37.50 LBY 17.00 BLG 19.00 NPL 93.00 ARG 0.10 MRC 44.60 ALB 60.00 BNG 64.90 CHL 15.85 OMN IND 42.60 URG 19.80 YMN BRZ 28.30 KWT NCR 42.00 SYR 15.05 GTM 53.30 PNM 27.65 PRG 2.70 Median 16.02 Median 19.55 Median 57.38 Median 27.65 Mean 22.64 Mean 25.25 Mean 53.31 Mean 25.24 SD 19.48 SD 16.67 SD 23.94 SD 17.65 +1SD 42.12 +1SD 41.92 +1SD 77.25 +1SD 42.89 1SD 3.17 1SD 8.58 1SD 29.36 1SD 7.6 0 Standard Scores TNS 1.66 PLN 0.10 PHL 0.14 ECD EGY 0.48 HNG 0.34 S_K 1.14 PRU ALG 0.44 CZC 0.78 TWN 1.41 HND JRD 1.03 RMN 0.17 THL 0.51 BLV BHR 1.11 GDR 0.87 MYN 0.50 E_S 0.69 LBY 0.29 BLG 0.37 NPL 1.66 ARG 1.42 MRC 1.13 ALB 2 .08 BNG 0.48 CHL 0.53 OMN IND 0.45 URG 0.31 YMN BRZ 0.17 KWT NCR 0.95 SYR 0.39 GTM 1.59 PNM 0.14 PRG 1.28 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators; CIA World Factbook 2009; CIA World F actbook 2010; CIA World Factbook 1990; CIA World Factbook 1989; CIA World Factbook 1986; CIA World Factbook 1985; CIA World Factbook 1984; CIA World Factbook 1982
48 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MENA CEE SEA LAM Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Agricultural Sector Region Employment in Agricultural Sector Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.6 : Percent age of Labor Force Employed in Agricultural Sector
49 Table 2.7 : Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Service Sector MENA CEE SEA LAM T NS 22.00 PLN 34.95 PHL 36.05 ECD EGY 51.00 HNG 39.70 S_K 43.25 PRU ALG CZC TWN 31.00 HND JRD 78.35 RMN 26.95 THL 23.00 BLV BHR 20.00 GDR 21.10 MYN 23.75 E_S 41.50 LBY 59.00 BLG 35.50 NPL 5.00 ARG 59.50 MRC 35.50 ALB BNG 14.80 CHL 63.05 OMN IND 38.85 URG 51.20 YMN BRZ 47.35 KWT NCR 23.00 SYR 52.55 GTM 14.30 PNM 53.00 PRG 71.75 Median 51.00 Median 34.95 Median 27.38 Median 51.20 Mean 45.49 Mean 31.64 Mean 26.96 Mean 47.18 S D 20.99 SD 7.48 SD 12.88 SD 18.56 +1SD 66.48 +1SD 39.12 +1SD 39.85 +1SD 65.74 1SD 24.49 1SD 24.16 1SD 14.08 1SD 28.62 Standard Scores TNS 1.12 PLN 0.44 PHL 0.71 ECD EGY 0.26 HNG 1.08 S_K 1.26 PRU ALG CZC TWN 0.31 HND JRD 1.57 RMN 0.6 3 THL 0.31 BLV BHR 1.21 GDR 1.41 MYN 0.25 E_S 0.31 LBY 0.64 BLG 0.52 NPL 1.70 ARG 0.66 MRC 0.48 ALB BNG 0.94 CHL 0.85 OMN IND 0.92 URG 0.22 YMN BRZ 0.01 KWT NCR 1.30 SYR 0.34 GTM 1.77 PNM 0.31 PRG 1.32 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; CIA World Factbook 2010; CIA World Factbook 2009; CIA World Factbook 1989; CIA World Factbook 1986; CIA World Factbook 1985; CIA World Factbook 1984; CIA World Factbook 1982
50 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 MENA CEE SEA LAM Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Services Sector Region Employment in Services Sector Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.7 : Percentage of Labor Force Employed in Service Sector
51 Furthermore, cross regional consistency exists. Rather, each regional wave contains progressively more agriculturally based leaders. While both the Philippines and South Korea employed less of their labor force in agriculture than the media n SEA country, Hungary's agricultural sector was at the median, Poland and Egypt above the mean, and Tunisia employed the greatest percentage of its labor in agriculture of the entire region. Likewise, the percentage of labor employed by leaders in service s relative to regions decreases from region to region over time, although planned economies in the European cases may complicate true comparability. However, if leaders were described as the most economically "modern," they should have the (or among the) l owest levels of agricultural employment and highest levels of service sector employment in their respective regions. Instead, the opposite seems to carry more truth over time. Modernization, however, encompasses more than the structure or size of the econ omy, but those other factors still do not seem to lend the theory much credence. There is no clear relationship between leaders and the age of their populations (Table 2.8, Figure 2.8), nor, perhaps more surprisingly, does there seem to be a relationship t o literacy (Table 2.9, Figure 2.9). While the two leaders exhibit similar levels of literacy to each other, even in regions with greater variation, they show no consistent relationship to the rest of their regions: Tunisia and Egypt are just below the regi onal average, Poland and Hungary slightly above it, and the Philippines and South Korea considerably so. Given the consistency with which a rural/urban divide is proposed in the literature, it would have been interesting to test both the rate of urbanizati on and literacy within urban centers, but this data is not available for the relevant years and locations.
52 Table 2.8 Percentage of Population Ages 0 14 MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 23.60 PLN 25.48 PHL 42.25 ECD 43.61 EGY 31.66 HNG 21.06 S_K 30.48 PRU 42.99 ALG 27.22 CZC TWN HND 47.30 JRD 37.59 RMN 23.99 THL 32.22 BLV 42.67 BHR 20.36 GDR MYN 37.25 E_S 45.01 LBY 30.36 BLG 20.71 NPL 42.37 ARG 30.71 MRC 28.21 ALB 32.89 BNG 42.70 CHL 32.15 OMN 27.42 IND 32.75 URG 26.85 YMN 44.39 BRZ 37.37 KWT 26.54 NCR 47.01 SYR 37.20 GTM 45.55 PNM 36.82 PRG 41.50 Median 28.21 Median 23.99 Median 37.25 Median 42.67 Mean 30.41 Mean 24.83 Mean 37.15 Mean 39.97 SD 6.94 SD 4.93 SD 5.36 SD 6.63 +1SD 37.35 +1SD 29.7 6 +1SD 42.50 +1SD 46.60 1SD 23.48 1SD 19.89 1SD 31.79 1SD 33.34 Standard Scores TNS 0.98 PLN 0.13 PHL 0.95 ECD 0.55 EGY 0.18 HNG 0.76 S_K 1.24 PRU 0.46 ALG 0.46 CZC TWN HND 1.11 JRD 1.03 RMN 0.17 THL 0.92 BLV 0.41 BHR 1.45 GDR MYN 0 .02 E_S 0.76 LBY 0.01 BLG 0.83 NPL 0.98 ARG 1.40 MRC 0.32 ALB 1.63 BNG 1.04 CHL 1.18 OMN 0.43 IND 0.82 URG 1.98 YMN 2.02 BRZ 0.39 KWT 0.56 NCR 1.06 SYR 0.98 GTM 0.84 PNM 0.47 PRG 0.23 Source: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank
53 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 MENA CEE SEA LAM Percent of Population Ages 0-14 Region Population Ages 0-14 Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.8 : Percentage of Population Ages 0 14
54 Table 2.9 : Adult Literacy Rate MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 74.3 PLN 98 PHL 88 ECD EGY 71.4 HNG 98.9 S_K 90 PRU ALG 69.9 CZC 99 TWN 91.85 HND JRD 89.9 RMN 98 THL 82 BLV BHR 86.5 GDR 99 MYN 78 E_S LBY 82.6 BLG 95 NPL 20 ARG 85 MRC 52.3 ALB 75 BNG 29 CHL 91.13 OMN 81.4 IND 83.8 URG 90.5 YMN 50.2 BRZ 83 KWT 93.3 NCR 66 SYR 79.6 GTM 50 PNM 90 PRG 81 Median 79.60 Median 98.00 Median 82.90 Median 84.00 Mea n 75.58 Mean 94.70 Mean 70.33 Mean 79.58 SD 14.05 SD 8.80 SD 28.74 SD 14.46 +1SD 89.64 +1SD 103.50 +1SD 99.07 +1SD 94.04 1SD 61.53 1SD 85.90 1SD 41.60 1SD 65.12 Standard Scores TNS 0.09 PLN 0.38 PHL 0.61 ECD EGY 0.30 HNG 0.48 S_K 0.68 PRU ALG 0.40 CZC 0.49 TWN 0.75 HND JRD 1.02 RMN 0.38 THL 0.41 BLV BHR 0.78 GDR 0.49 MYN 0.27 E_S LBY 0.50 BLG 0.03 NPL 1.75 ARG 0.37 MRC 1.66 ALB 2.24 BNG 1.44 CHL 0.80 OMN 0.41 IND 0.47 URG 0.76 YMN 1.81 BRZ 0.24 KWT 1.26 NCR 0.9 4 SYR 0.29 GTM 2.05 PNM 0.72 PRG 0.10 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank; CIA World Factbook 2010; CIA World Factbook 2009; CIA World Factbook 1997; CIA World Factbook 1996; CIA World Factbook 1990; CIA World Fa ctbook 1989; CIA World Factbook 1987; CIA World Factbook 1986; CIA World Factbook 1985; CIA World Factbook 1984
55 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 MENA CEE SEA LAM Percentage of Adults who are Literate Region Adult Literacy Rate Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.9 : Adult Literacy Rate
56 If modernization theory were supported, one would also expect to see more dense communication networks among citizens, but that does n ot appear to be the case. Although that describes South Korea quite well, all of the other leaders approximate or contain slightly less than the median number of telephone lines per 100 people in their respective regions (Table 2.10, Figure 2.10). For all of the excitement about the so called "Twitter Revolutions," internet connectivity in Tunisia was only slightly better than average, and Egypt was slightly worse (Table 2.11, Figure 2.11). Again, uneven urbanization may be cited as a factor that hinders ef fectively determining the impact of internet connection, and the discrepancy in geographic size may also play a role in differentiating the two leaders 3 Internet users per 100 urban citizens would be an ideal way to cancel out those differences, but sadly such data has not yet been collected or made available. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3 Following the Tunisian elections for its National Constituent Assembly, a popular Egyptian joke rationalized their later elections: "Tu nisia? It's barely the size of one voting district!"
57 Table 2.10 : Telephone Lines Per 100 People MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 12.32 PLN 7.59 PHL 0.95 ECD 2.43 EGY 12.40 HNG 8.00 S_K 15.05 PRU 1.61 ALG 7.81 CZC TWN HND 0.54 JRD 8.08 RMN 9.93 THL 1.74 BLV BHR 19.21 GDR MYN 0.18 E_S 1.51 LBY 18.15 BLG 21.81 NPL 0.23 ARG 7.92 MRC 11.42 ALB 1.20 BNG 0.20 CHL 3.46 OMN 10.53 IND 2.25 URG 7.80 YMN 4.31 BRZ 4.70 KWT 20.80 NCR 1.14 SYR 19.62 GTM 1.45 PNM 8.21 PRG 2.27 Median 12.32 Median 8.00 Median 0.95 Median 2.35 Mean 13.15 Mean 9.70 Mean 2.94 Mean 3.59 SD 5.53 SD 7.52 SD 5.40 SD 2.87 +1SD 18.68 +1SD 17.22 +1SD 8.34 +1SD 6.45 1SD 7.62 1SD 2.18 1SD 2.46 1SD 0.72 Standard Scores TNS 0 .00 PLN 0.04 PHL 0.00 ECD 0.02 EGY 0.01 HNG 0.00 S_K 4.79 PRU 0.21 ALG 0.34 CZC TWN HND 0.51 JRD 0.32 RMN 0.20 THL 0.27 BLV BHR 0.52 GDR MYN 0.26 E_S 0.23 LBY 0.44 BLG 1.42 NPL 0.25 ARG 1.55 MRC 0.07 ALB 0.70 BNG 0.26 CHL 0.31 OMN 0.14 IND 0.44 URG 1.52 YMN 0.61 BRZ 0.65 KWT 0.65 NCR 0.34 SYR 0.56 GTM 0.25 PNM 1.63 PRG 0.02 Sources: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank
58 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 MENA CEE SEA LAM Telephone Lines per 100 People Region Telephone Lines per 100 People Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.10 : Telephone Lines Per 100 People
59 Table 2. 11 : Internet Users per 100 people TNS 35.19 EGY 27.24 ALG 11.87 JRD 27.16 BHR 54.00 LBY 12.40 MRC 45.15 OMN 56.75 YMN 11.16 KWT 56.10 SYR 18.99 Median 27.24 Mean 32.36 SD 18.16 +1SD 50.53 1SD 14.20 Standard Scores TNS 0.16 EGY 0.28 ALG 1.13 JRD 0.29 BHR 1.19 LBY 1.10 MRC 0.70 OMN 1.34 YMN 1.17 KWT 1.31 SYR 0.74 Source: World Bank Development Indicators, The World Bank 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 MENA Internet Users per 100 People Region Internet Users per 100 people Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2. 11 : Internet Users per 100 people
60 Political Opportunity Political opportunity is best evaluated through individual case studies and is quite difficult to quantify. However, the Freedom House evaluations of Political Rights and Civil Liberties attempt to approximate conditions with scores on a seven point scale. Political Rights, according to the organization, include "the right to vote freely for distin ct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, joint political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate" (freedomhouse.org). However, there is no clear relationship between those rights and regional leadership (Table 2.12, Figure 2.12). Civil liberties, or those "that allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy w ithout interference from the state," are somewhat more telling (freedomhouse.org). While regions in total generally do better in terms of civil liberties than political rights, leaders also do at least as well in comparison to their respective regions: ind eed all leaders except for South Korea have better civil liberties than their regional medians or averages (Table 2.13, Figure 2.13).
61 Table 2.12 Freedom House Political Rights MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 7 PLN 5 PHL 4 ECD 6.5 EGY 6 HNG 5 S_K 4.5 PRU 6 ALG 6 CZC 6.5 TWN 5 HND 6 JRD 6 RMN 7 THL 3 BLV 5.5 BHR 6 GDR 6.5 MYN 7 E_S 4.5 LBY 7 BLG 7 NPL 3.5 ARG 6 MRC 5 ALB 7 BNG 4.5 CHL 6 OMN 6 IND 7 URG 5 YMN 6 BRZ 3.5 KWT 4 NCR 5.5 SYR 7 GTM 5.5 PNM 5.5 PRG 5.5 Median 6.00 Median 6.50 Median 4.50 Median 5.50 Mean 6.00 Mean 6.29 Mean 4.81 Mean 5.46 SD 0.89 SD 0.91 SD 1.49 SD 0.78 +1SD 6.89 +1SD 7.19 +1SD 6.30 +1SD 6.24 1SD 5.11 1SD 5.38 1SD 3.33 1SD 4.69 Standard Scores TNS 1.12 PLN 1.42 PHL 0.55 ECD 1.34 EGY 0.00 HNG 1.42 S_K 0.21 PRU 0.69 ALG 0.00 CZC 0.24 TWN 0.13 HND 0.69 JRD 0.00 RMN 0.79 THL 1.22 BLV 0.05 BHR 0.00 GDR 0.24 MYN 1.47 E_S 1.24 LBY 1.12 BLG 0.79 NPL 0.88 ARG 0.69 MRC 1.12 ALB 0.79 BNG 0.21 CHL 0.69 OMN 0.00 IND 1.47 URG 0.59 YMN 0.00 BRZ 2.53 KWT 2.24 NCR 0.05 SYR 1.12 GTM 0.05 PNM 0.05 PRG 0.05 Source: Freedom House
62 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MENA CEE SEA LAM Political Rights Region Political Rights Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.12 : Freedom House Political Rights
63 Table 2. 13 : Freedom House Civil Liberties MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 5 PLN 5 PHL 3 .5 ECD 4 EGY 5 HNG 4 S_K 5 PRU 4 ALG 5 CZC 6 TWN 5 HND 3 JRD 5 RMN 7 THL 3 BLV 3.5 BHR 5 GDR 6 MYN 6.5 E_S 5 LBY 7 BLG 7 NPL 4.5 ARG 5 MRC 4 ALB 6.5 BNG 4.5 CHL 5 OMN 5 IND 5 URG 4.5 YMN 5 BRZ 3 KWT 4.5 NCR 5 SYR 6 GTM 6 PNM 4 PRG 6 Median 5.00 Median 6.00 Median 4.75 Median 4.50 Mean 5.14 Mean 5.93 Mean 4.63 Mean 4.46 SD 0.78 SD 1.10 SD 1.06 SD 0.99 +1SD 5.91 +1SD 7.03 +1SD 5.69 +1SD 5.45 1SD 4.36 1SD 4.83 1SD 3.56 1SD 3.47 Standard Scores TNS 0.18 PLN 0.85 PHL 1.06 ECD 0.47 EGY 0.18 HNG 1.76 S_K 0.35 PRU 0.47 ALG 0.18 CZC 0.07 TWN 0.35 HND 1.48 JRD 0.18 RMN 0.98 THL 1.53 BLV 0.97 BHR 0.18 GDR 0.07 MYN 1.77 E_S 0.54 LBY 2.40 BLG 0.98 NPL 0.12 ARG 0.54 MRC 1.46 AL B 0.52 BNG 0.12 CHL 0.54 OMN 0.18 IND 0.35 URG 0.04 YMN 0.18 BRZ 1.48 KWT 0.82 NCR 0.54 SYR 1.11 GTM 1.56 PNM 0.47 PRG 1.56 Source: Freedom House
64 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 MENA CEE SEA LAM Civil Liberties Region Civil Liberties Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.13 : Freedom House Civil Liberties
65 External Factors Different measures of globalization showed a surprising degree of variation. Leaders of each region demonstrated very similar levels of overall globalization (Table 2.14, Figure 2.14), although they diverge on other measures. The leaders' levels of globalization increase re lative to their regions from LAM to SEA and SEA to CEE, but MENA leaders do no continue the trend. While Egypt and Tunisia exhibit higher levels of globalization than Poland and Hungary in the late 1980s, they are just at the average and median of their re gion, unlike the CEE leaders, which were at the upper extreme of their region. Conversely, leaders' political globalization is high and increasingly so, barring South Korea relative to their regions (Table 2.15, Figure 2.15). Comparatively high politic al globalization, calculated based on in country embassies, membership in international organization, UNSC participation, and international treaties, appears to be a consistent descriptor of leaders, especially recently (Dreher 2008). On the other hand, t here appears to be no clear relationship between leadership and economic globalization (Table 2.16, Figure 2.16) or most of the measures of social globalization. Neither the aggregated index of social globalization (Table 2.17, Figure 2.17), data on person al contact (Table 2.18, Figure 2.18), nor data on cultural proximity (Table 2.19, Figure 2.19) seem to offer any consistency regarding leaders' relationships to their regions, to each other, or generally over time. 4 Data on information flows (Table 2.20, F igure 2.20) is also fairly indeterminate, but although there is no pattern that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 4 It should, of course, be noted that the analysis is limited by the methods of the index. For example, data on cultural proximity includes the number of McDonald's restaurants per capita and the number of Ikea per capita ( Dreher 2008 ), and until the revolution, there was a conscious policy decision to bar the restaurant chain from Tunisia (there is no Ikea, either). Therefore, the country's score on cultural proximity is strikingly low, despite its relia nce on international tourism.
66 describes the leaders relative to their regions, the first leaders in every case score better than the second. Table 2.14 : Total Index of Globalization MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 59.52 PLN 52.89 PHL 41.76 ECD 33.87 EGY 59.35 HNG 52.15 S_K 43.47 PRU 33.22 ALG 54.88 CZC TWN HND 33.55 JRD 70.48 RMN 34.46 THL 37.68 BLV 38.50 BHR 68.83 GDR MYN 18.02 E_S 40.28 LBY 52.50 BLG 42.42 NPL 23.15 ARG 46.62 MRC 60.99 ALB 24.84 BNG 21.90 CHL 52.40 OMN 61.80 IND 48.70 URG 47.63 YMN 46.66 BRZ 44.53 KWT 71.42 NCR 34.47 SYR 42.78 GTM 38.3 7 PNM 56.22 PRG 32.69 Median 59.52 Median 42.42 Median 37.68 Median 38.50 Mean 59.02 Mean 41.35 Mean 33.53 Mean 40.95 SD 9.33 SD 11.95 SD 12.23 SD 7.86 +1SD 68.34 +1SD 53 .30 +1SD 45.76 +1SD 48.81 1SD 49.69 1SD 29.40 1SD 21.29 1SD 33.09 Standard Scores TNS 0.05 PLN 0.97 PHL 0.67 ECD 0.90 EGY 0.04 HNG 0.90 S_K 0.81 PRU 0.98 ALG 0.44 CZC 3.46 TWN HND 0.94 JRD 1.23 RMN 0.58 THL 0.34 BLV 0.31 BHR 1.05 GDR MYN 1.27 E_S 0.09 LBY 0.70 BLG 0.09 NPL 0.85 ARG 0.72 MRC 0.21 ALB 1.38 BNG 0.95 CHL 1.46 OMN 0.30 IND 1.24 URG 0.85 YMN 1.33 BRZ 0.46 KWT 1.33 NCR 0.82 SYR 1.74 GTM 0.33 PNM 1 .94 PRG 1.05 Source: Dreher 2008
67 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 MENA CEE SEA LAM Index of Globalization Region Globalization (Total) Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.14 : Total Index of Globalization
68 Table 2.15 : Political Globalization MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 87.47 PLN 78.88 PHL 55.62 ECD 58.47 EGY 94.02 HNG 65.50 S_K 35.64 PRU 60.38 ALG 85.46 CZC TWN HND 43.61 JRD 87.33 RMN 52.09 THL 47.71 BLV 50.57 BHR 48.65 GDR MYN 20.54 E_S 49.71 LBY 76.61 BLG 52.66 NPL 50.74 ARG 78.36 MRC 89.51 ALB 24.21 BNG 56.51 CHL 73.72 OMN 46.52 IND 79.23 URG 67.30 YMN 67.95 BRZ 67.99 KWT 61.98 NCR 57.55 SYR 58.64 GTM 56.50 PNM 54.07 PRG 44.03 Median 76.61 Median 52.66 Median 50.74 Median 57.55 Mean 73.10 Mean 54.66 Mean 49.43 Mean 58.64 SD 17.16 SD 20.26 SD 18.28 SD 10.77 +1SD 90.26 +1SD 74.92 +1SD 67.71 +1SD 69.41 1SD 55.94 1SD 34.41 1SD 31.15 1SD 47.86 Standard Scores TNS 0.78 PLN 0.78 PHL 0.55 ECD 0.69 EGY 0.85 HNG 0.60 S_K 0.26 PRU 0.71 ALG 0.76 CZC TWN HND 0.47 JRD 0.78 RMN 0.42 THL 0.43 BLV 0.57 BHR 0.35 GDR MYN 0.03 E_S 0.56 LBY 0.66 BLG 0.43 NPL 0.48 ARG 0.97 MRC 0.80 ALB 0. 05 BNG 0.56 CHL 0.91 OMN 0.33 IND 0.90 URG 0.81 YMN 0.56 BRZ 0.82 KWT 0.50 NCR 0.67 SYR 0.46 GTM 0.66 PNM 0.62 PRG 0.48 Source: Dreher 2008
69 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MENA CEE SEA LAM Index of Political Globalization Region Political Globalization Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.15 : Political Globalization
70 Table 2.16 : Economic Globalization MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 59.76 PLN 42.27 PHL 44.21 ECD 25.98 EGY 48.80 HNG 46.15 S_K 21.65 PRU 27.03 ALG 52.36 CZC TWN HND 33.12 JRD 64.89 RMN 29.79 THL 37.58 BLV 42.63 BHR 88.96 GDR MYN 28.72 E_S 35.49 LBY BLG 45.50 NPL 14.73 ARG 41.83 MRC 50.46 ALB 23.83 BNG 10.38 CHL 56.48 OMN 76.32 IND 48.09 URG 46.84 YMN 51.86 BRZ 45.09 KWT 68.22 NCR 23.97 SYR 41.57 GTM 34.18 PNM 66.07 PRG 34.70 Median 56.06 Median 42.27 Median 28.72 Median 35.49 Mean 60.32 Mea n 37.51 Mean 29.34 Mean 39.49 SD 14.44 SD 10.10 SD 14.57 SD 12.19 +1SD 74.76 +1SD 47.61 +1SD 43.90 +1SD 51.68 1SD 45.88 1SD 27.41 1SD 14.77 1SD 27.31 Standard Scores TNS 0.04 PLN 0.47 PHL 1.02 ECD 1.11 EGY 0.80 HNG 0.86 S_K 0.53 PRU 1.02 AL G 0.55 CZC TWN HND 0.52 JRD 0.32 RMN 0.76 THL 0.57 BLV 0.26 BHR 1.98 GDR MYN 0.04 E_S 0.33 LBY BLG 0.79 NPL 1.00 ARG 0.19 MRC 0.68 ALB 1.35 BNG 1.30 CHL 1.39 OMN 1.11 IND 1.29 URG 0.60 YMN 0.59 BRZ 0.46 KWT 0.55 NCR 1.27 SYR 1.30 GTM 0.44 PNM 2.18 PRG 0.39 Source: Dreher 2008
71 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MENA CEE SEA LAM Index of Economic Globalization Region Economic Globalization Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.16 : Economic Globalization
72 Table 2.17 : Social Globalization MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 39.63 PLN 45.00 PHL 29.62 ECD 24.31 EGY 45.31 HNG 48.64 S_K 31.92 PRU 20.17 ALG 35.8 5 CZC TWN HND 26.91 JRD 64.09 RMN 26.63 THL 30.74 BLV 26.00 BHR 63.36 GDR MYN 5.80 E_S 38.34 LBY 35.57 BLG 32.22 NPL 11.98 ARG 29.01 MRC 51.24 ALB 26.27 BNG 8.82 CHL 33.45 OMN 58.35 IND 27.86 URG 34.59 YMN 26.63 BRZ 27.51 KWT 81.19 NCR 28.51 SYR 32.81 GTM 29.73 PNM 48.11 PRG 22.76 Median 45.31 Median 32.22 Median 27.86 Median 28.51 Mean 48.55 Mean 35.75 Mean 20.96 Mean 29.95 SD 16.67 SD 10.45 SD 11.52 SD 7.34 +1SD 65.21 +1SD 46.20 +1SD 32.48 +1SD 37.29 1SD 31.88 1SD 25.30 1SD 9.44 1SD 22.61 Standard Scores TNS 0.53 PLN 0.88 PHL 0.75 ECD 0.77 EGY 0.19 HNG 1.23 S_K 0.95 PRU 1.33 ALG 0.76 CZC TWN HND 0.41 JRD 0.93 RMN 0.87 THL 0.85 BLV 0.54 BHR 0.89 GDR MYN 1.32 E_ S 1.14 LBY 0.78 BLG 0.34 NPL 0.78 ARG 0.13 MRC 0.16 ALB 0.91 BNG 1.05 CHL 0.48 OMN 0.59 IND 0.60 URG 0.63 YMN 1.32 BRZ 0.33 KWT 1.96 NCR 0.20 SYR 0.94 GTM 0.03 PNM 2.47 PRG 0.98 Sourc e: Dreher 2008
73 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 MENA CEE SEA LAM Index of Social Globalization Region Social Globalization Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2. 17 : Social Globalization
74 Table 2.18 : Social Globalization: Data on Personal Contact MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 45.63 PLN 58.38 PHL 24.24 ECD 28.89 EGY 38.80 HNG 63.32 S_K 32.04 PRU 21.89 ALG 36.72 CZC TWN HND 35.85 JRD 69.05 RMN 33.78 THL 26.31 BLV 28.00 BHR 85.03 GDR MYN 4.15 E_S 37.29 LBY 51.86 BLG 35.90 NPL 20.43 ARG 35.11 MRC 45.28 ALB 29.50 BNG 13.94 CHL 35.71 OMN 76.19 IND 15.04 URG 55.75 YMN 38.80 BRZ 16.69 KWT 79.11 NCR 34.49 SYR 50.81 GTM 35.08 PN M 49.90 PRG 35.33 Median 50.81 Median 35.90 Median 20.43 Median 35.11 Mean 56.12 Mean 44.17 Mean 19.45 Mean 34.61 SD 17.85 SD 15.49 SD 9.25 SD 10.21 +1SD 73.96 +1SD 59.67 +1SD 28.70 +1SD 44.82 1SD 38.27 1SD 28.68 1SD 10.20 1SD 24.40 Standard Scores TNS 0.59 PLN 0.92 PHL 0.52 ECD 0.56 EGY 0.97 HNG 1.24 S_K 1.36 PRU 1.25 ALG 1.09 CZC TWN HND 0.12 JRD 0.72 RMN 0.67 THL 0.74 BLV 0.65 BHR 1.62 GDR MYN 1.65 E_S 0.26 LBY 0.24 BLG 0.53 NPL 0.11 ARG 0.05 MRC 0.61 ALB 0 .95 BNG 0.60 CHL 0.11 OMN 1.12 IND 0.48 URG 2.07 YMN 0.97 BRZ 1.76 KWT 1.29 NCR 0.01 SYR 0.30 GTM 0.05 PNM 1.50 PRG 0.07 Source: Dreher 2008
75 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 MENA CEE SEA LAM Social Globalization: Data on Personal Contact Region Social Globalization: Data on Personal Contact Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.18 : Social Globalization: Data on Personal Contact
76 Table 2.19 : Social Globalization: Data on Cultural Proximity MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 3.91 PLN 6.07 PHL 34.37 ECD 6.72 EGY 35.50 HNG 21.45 S_K 44.67 PRU 3.37 ALG 3.48 CZC TWN HND 6.83 JRD 42.69 RMN 2.40 THL 31.11 BLV 6.07 BHR 43.16 GDR MYN 1.00 E_S 38.40 LBY 1.00 BLG 3.91 NPL 4.56 ARG 2.9 4 MRC 36.80 ALB 4.13 BNG 1.32 CHL 5.75 OMN 38.32 IND 32.12 URG 1.00 YMN 1.43 BRZ 31.23 KWT 86.94 NCR 10.49 SYR 1.43 GTM 36.33 PNM 44.57 PRG 1.97 Median 35.50 Median 4.13 Median 31.11 Median 6.72 Mean 26.79 Mean 7.59 Mean 21.31 Mean 15.05 SD 27.32 SD 7.86 SD 18.36 SD 16.09 +1SD 54.11 +1SD 15.45 +1SD 39.66 +1SD 31.14 1SD 0.54 1SD 0.26 1SD 2.95 1SD 1.04 Standard Scores TNS 0.84 PLN 0.19 PHL 0.71 ECD 0.52 EGY 0.32 HNG 1.76 S_K 1.27 PRU 0.73 ALG 0.85 CZC TWN HND 0.51 JRD 0.58 RMN 0.66 THL 0.53 BLV 0.56 BHR 0.60 GDR MYN 1.11 E_S 1.45 LBY 0.94 BLG 0.47 NPL 0.91 ARG 0.75 MRC 0.37 ALB 0.44 BNG 1.09 CHL 0.58 OMN 0.42 IND 0.59 URG 0.87 YMN 0.93 BRZ 1.01 KWT 2.20 NCR 0.28 SYR 0.93 GTM 1.32 PNM 1.83 PRG 0.81 Source: Dreher 2008
77 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MENA CEE SEA LAM Social Globalization: Data on Cultural Proximity Region Social Globalization: Data on Cultural Proximity Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.19 : Social Globalization: Data on Cultural Proximity
78 Table 2.20 : Social Globalization: Data on Information Flows MENA CEE SEA LAM TNS 64.96 PLN 66.03 PHL 30.64 ECD 35.21 EGY 60.08 HNG 58.20 S_K 2.62 PRU 33.14 ALG 63.18 CZC TWN HND 35.81 JRD 77.96 RMN 40.87 THL 34.66 BLV 41.41 BHR 65.57 GDR MYN 12.86 E_S 39.30 LBY BLG 53.32 NPL 10.34 ARG 45.85 MRC 69.53 ALB 42.43 BNG 10.43 CHL 55.39 OMN 58.65 IND 36.46 URG 43. 52 YMN 39.92 BRZ 34.66 KWT 78.16 NCR 38.45 SYR 48.37 GTM 18.86 PNM 49.46 PRG 28.80 Median 64.07 Median 53.32 Median 12.86 Median 38.45 Mean 62.64 Mean 52.17 Mean 19.72 Mean 38.45 SD 11.92 SD 10.64 SD 13.76 SD 9.29 +1SD 74.56 +1SD 62.81 +1SD 33.48 +1SD 47.74 1SD 50.71 1SD 41.53 1SD 5.95 1SD 29.16 Standard Scores TNS 0.19 PLN 1.30 PHL 0.79 ECD 0.35 EGY 0.21 HNG 0.57 S_K 1.24 PRU 0.57 ALG 0.05 CZC TWN HND 0.28 JRD 1.28 RMN 1.06 THL 1. 09 BLV 0.32 BHR 0.25 GDR MYN 0.50 E_S 0.09 LBY BLG 0.11 NPL 0.68 ARG 0.80 MRC 0.58 ALB 0.92 BNG 0.67 CHL 1.82 OMN 0.33 IND 1.22 URG 0.55 YMN 1.91 BRZ 0.41 KWT 1.30 NCR 0.00 SYR 1.20 GTM 2.11 PNM 1.19 PRG 1.04 Source: Dreher 2008
79 ! ! ! ! 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 MENA CEE SEA LAM Social Globalization: Data on Information Flows Region Social Globalization: Data on Information Flows Mean 1 Stdev Above Mean 1 Stdev Below Mean Leader 1 Leader 2 Figure 2.20 : Social Globalization: Data on Information Flows
80 Conclusion Simple quantitative data does not present many clear descriptions of regional leaders of democratization movements, but it does present some note worthy trends and recommend several areas in which qualitative analysis may provide additional clarity. Regarding economic factors, leaders may or may not posses s the largest economics of their region, but they are not the smallest. Annual change in GDP an d GDP per capita indicate that there may be certain regional consistencies, and even perhaps that leaders first leaders in particular are exemplars of their regions (i.e., median in regions of little divergence or significantly different in regions of great divergence), although with only four cases it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions. Modernization theory as a whole is not supported, although SEA cases do, unsurprisingly, seem to be best described by the hypothesis. In addition to the leade rs' economic structure, literacy rates also support taking a regionally specific view of modernization. In other words, economic growth and the subsequent social or cultural developments might be best understood with a more nuanced, historically conscious approach than merely statistical analysis. It is similarly impossible to draw a complete sketch of the political opportunities available in a given country from a set of scores, no matter how credible. Nonetheless, the Freedom House political rights and c ivil liberties scores do offer some limited insight. There is no clear relationship between better or worse political rights and leadership, with more freedom being characteristic of SEA and CEE leaders and less describing LAM and MENA leaders. However, ci vil liberties were better than political rights across the board,
81 indicating that opportunities for expression may be more important to the beginnings of democratization movements than formal political structures. Proxies of globalization are also limited in their ability to express the whole range of possib le external influences, but the analysis here suggests that distinct regional patterns are important. That is, tightly coupled regional leaders indicate that while levels of globalization may not be con sistent across regions, leaders within regions exhibit similar tendencies. Again, the pairs of CEE and SEA display similar characteristics, although some of the more surprising findings of this analysis may be attributable to the idiosyncrasies of the inde x used rather than actual differences. Overall, however, political globalization seems to be consistently increasing in importance. While no single school of thought wholly describes leaders of regional waves of democratization movements, statistical data suggests several useful observations both through the presence and absence of consistency. Where definitive patterns remain elusive, quantitative irregularities indicate how qualitative and contextually rich descriptions may provide insight.
82 CHAPTE R 3 The Surge: Latin American Transitions We will not forgive, we will not forget. Campaign slogan of Jaime Rolds 5 Latin America's experience with democracy is long and varied, making it somewhat difficult to identify distinct patterns or waves. Smith, however, clarifies three "cycles": one of brief and emerging democracies in 1900 1939, an M shaped rise, decline, recovery, and near demise between 1940 and 1977, and an increase beginning in 1978 (Smith 2005, 26 28). This study will focus on tha t last period. The region holds additional interesting characteristics in its size and potential for sub regional variation, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5 Quoted in Rudolph 1989
83 geographic proximity to the United States, a regional and global hegemon, and extensive experience with transitions from explicitly military controlled regimes ( Brink 2005). Ecuador Ecuador's return to democracy in the late 1970s was facilitated by a military junta that had recognized its failure to manage the economy. Rodrguez Lara's regime intended to manage petroleum export in an attempt to reignite development and consolidate political leadership. Although initially successful, the regime's increasing demands, first on oil exporters and then on luxury importers, alienated virtually all economic interests and political support (Ru dolph 1989). General Ral Gonzlez Alvear, then the chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, led a coup attempt in September of 1975, but a second, bloodless coup the following January succeeded in replacing the Rodrguez Lara with another triumvirate of leaders fr om the armed services, or the Consejo Supremo de Gobierno (CSG). Although the junta's only expressed agenda item was to return the country to civilian rule, its initially speedy timetable stalled considerably as the leaders jockeyed for power, privilege, c ontrol over the electoral process and eligibility of specific candidates (Rudolph 1989). The three pronged transition began in earnest in late 1976 when three commissions (one to reform the constitution, one to draft a new one, and the third to establish e lectoral and party regulations) began to meet. Throughout the process and into the elections, many remained skeptical of the junta's intentions and respect for democratic institutions, particularly given its ability to force unacceptable candidates, such a s the populist Concentracin de Fuerzes Populares (CFP) leader Abdal Bucaram, out of the presidential race (Martz 1980, 67). The first round of the presidential elections
84 finally took place in July of 1978, leaving CFP's replacement candidate Jaime Rolds to face off against the rightist, government favored Sixto Durn Balln. There was a considerable lag time between the first and second rounds of the election, casting doubt upon the junta's practices and intentions, but Rolds claimed victory by a wide m argin in the April 1979 elections. Despite substantial reserved powers and with pressure from the Carter administration, Rolds did bring the era of military leadership to a close (Rudolph 1989). The oscillation between military and democratic rule in the 1970s is not unique in Ecuador's history; rather, far reaching structural causes such as a stratified and inequitable social structure, regional competition, and an under diversified economy have enabled the tug of war between civilian and military leaders who aim to gain control of the state apparatus rather than consolidate institutions (Hanratty 1989). Furthermore, the various parties and interest groups have been able to leverage support, alternatively as power brokers or opposition figures, often emplo ying populist or cuadillo techniques to take advantage of the political and economic landscape of the moment. The military was ideologically factionalized, so despite interventions, internal disagreements and competition meant that a military junta was not always tantamount to unified or even hegemonic control of the political space (Hudson 1989). Political parties have a long history in Ecuador, and despite their relative hibernation during dictatorship in the 1970s, democratic openings in the latter porti on of the decade restored a relatively familiar party system (Martz 1980, 67 68). Despite the persistence of parties, the driving force of democratization came not from the leftist groups that the military identified as more immediate threats, but from the "upper class organizations" wary of Lara's reformist
85 agenda (Conaghan 1987, 146 148). Interestingly, student movements were virtually nonexistent in this period of democratization, largely due to internal competition and the military's intervention follow ing vocal movements in the mid 1960s (Hudson 1989). Peru As opposed to many other military regimes in the region, Peruvian experience from 1968 to 1980 was one that Abugattas characterizes as "authoritarian populism" that stands in contrast to the more d emocratic populist or authoritarian antipopulist regimes (1987, 123). Rather than enjoying the support of a rightist upper class oligarchy, the military more accurately represented the demographic and socioeconomic makeup of the country. The first military leader, General Velasco, instituted programs (through the Gobierno Revolucionario de las Fuerzas Armadas, or GRFA) ranging from nationalization of major industries and heavier reliance on an import substitution model of industrialization to land redistrib ution and social protection measures that enjoyed popularity and moderate initial success. But as Velasco's regime became increasingly personalistic, bureaucratic, and plagued by rising debt and inflation, the military replaced him with General Francisco M orales Bermdez Cerrutti in 1975 (Klarn 1993). The new leader curtailed many of Velasco's reforms, cut tariffs, and concentrated on manufacturing exports (which did, in fact, see growth), but the labor force and underemployment grew as real wages declined (Sheahan 1993). With perennially high rates of poverty and inflation, the program of economic austerity was unpopular and the populace associated the military regime with bureaucratic and economic mismanagement (Klarn 1993).
86 Politically, however, the GR FA was relatively intolerant of participation by civil society and interest groups and effectively silenced political parties. Although it established a relationship with the labor movement, that latter's political abilities were sharply curtailed. Ironica lly, it was the GRFA's hegemony that ultimately led to its demise (Abugattas 1987, 125). While political expression was prohibited in civil society, it manifested within the military where competition between factions both curtailed the government's abilit y to manage impending economic issues and enabled some civilian groups to gain a foothold (126). By July of 1976, Morales Bermdez had effectively replaced Velasco and rooted out the more radical elements in the GRFA, but vocal opposition by the labor move ment and leftist organizations, waning legitimacy, and impending unpopular stabilization measures prompted the military to cede its leading position (129 130). Paradoxically, the GRFA simultaneously allowed for the expansion of civil society and political parties while working to entrench its own policies in the transition framework (131, 133). Unlike some of its neighbors, the Peruvian military did not aim to quash dissent and left many political organizations intact. Rather, the regime may have "encourage d the development of the largely Marxist left" as alternatives to its opponents (Palmer 1993). In June 1978, elections were held for a Constituent Assembly charged with rewriting the constitution and paving the way for presidential elections in May of 1980 ironically won by Belande, the man ousted by the military in 1968 (Klarn 1993). 6 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 Note that the 1978 and 1980 elections do not mark the end of military intervention in Peruvian politics, as evidenced by Fujimori's autogolpe, nor the democratic character its authority or methods in states of emergency, intended to protect and preserve the democracy. However, this paper is constrained to noting the democratizing trends of the period, regardless of their longevity or ultimate consolidation.
87 Honduras Honduras's transition to democracy was also a top down response to inept military management. Beginning in the 1950s, the Honduran armed forces were the ultima te authority in questions of political leadership and often intervened, replacing civilians with military leaders with variable success (Merrill 1995). Territorial disputes with El Salvador, diplomatic and refugee spillover from the conflict in Nicaragua, and charges of corruption and links to trafficking challenged Colonel Juan Alberto Melgar Castro's popularity and stability (Haggerty and Millet 1995), but the United States increasingly looked to Honduras as a friend in the region, especially as the situa tion in Nicaragua escalated (Sieder 1996, 21). By late 1978, Melgar lost the support of wealthy landowners, the right wing, and eventually the military, which replaced him with a three member junta charged with re establishing democratic rule (Haggerty and Millet 1995). First, however, Melgar laid the foundation for the transition with the implementation of a new electoral law in December of 1977. It demanded greater democratic accountability within political parties, but also lowered thresholds for registe ring new parties, and created the National Electoral Tribunal which became responsible for internal electoral law (Sieder 1996, 22). Despite setbacks to democratic consolidation from both internal and external forces, elections for a Congress that would cr aft an interim government and lay the groundwork for the forthcoming presidential contest were held in April of 1980 (Haggerty and Millet 1995). Although the US exerted significant pressure, it was "the exhaustion of military rule and, in the context of mo unting regional crisis,  a preemptive attempt by Honduran elites to stave off popular discontent," that ultimately pushed for constitutional
88 reforms (Sieder 1996, 21). Additionally noteworthy is the absence of leftist civil society groups or popular mob ilization; traditional political parties (each facing their own difficulties with internal democracy) and rightist business associations were far more active (Sieder 1996, 21 22). The fears of the business community were perhaps not unfounded given the hig h and rising unemployment rate (upwards of 20% of a growing labor force) and significant foreign aid and borrowing (Annis 1995; Flores 1995). Panama Advances towards democracy in Panama in the late 1970s and early 1980s cannot be considered anything mor e. Omar Torrijos, then commander of the National Guard, came to power by orchestrating the (third) ouster of President Arias in 1968 and consolidated executive power by eliminating competitors and drawing support from various historically antagonistic grou ps from across the ideological spectrum with a populist, nationalist stance (Black and Flores 1987). A tense but important relationship with the United States regarding the status and renegotiation of treaties pertinent to the Panama Canal proved a double edged sword: one the one hand, anti American sentiment unified supporters and silenced opposition. On the other, enforcement of the 1977 treaties was predicated on Panamanian "democratization" in a time when the public was far less than satisfied with the treaties that Torrijos signed (Millett 1989). In 1978, the Constitution was amended to re legalize political parties and increase the powers of the legislature at the expense of the (still dominant) executive (Millett 1989). Democratic gains, however, were only cosmetic, and power remained in the hands of appointees until Torrijos' death, when the former chief of intelligence, Manuel Antonio Noriega, became
89 the commander in chief and effectively eradicated competition in the 1984 elections (Caldern 1987, 3 31 333). Following a power struggle within the military, Noriega forced his chief of staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera into retirement. In retaliation, Herrera issued a statement in June of 1987 that confirmed Noriega's links to drug trafficking, politic al murders, and providing intelligence to Cuba, among other misuses of power (Millett 1989). Outrage regarding the abuses combined, frustration regarding the illusory democratization process, and economic stagnation rooted in Torrijos era programs led to m assive protest days coordinated by the Crusada Civilista Nacional (CCN) (Caldern 1987, 329, 331 340). Comprised of a broad range of civic, professional, and religious organizations and with the support of several parties, the CCN demanded "a basic realign ment between civilian society and the military," including the removal of Noriega, full democratization, and justice (Caldern 1987, 329 330). The government declared a state of emergency, suspended constitutional rights, instituted censorship, and respond ed to riots with force. Relations with the United States deteriorated even further as it halted military assistance and imposed sanctions (Millett 1989). The CCN continued to be an important player into the 1989 presidential elections that saw the end of N oriega's power but not of challenges to Panamanian governance (Furlong 1993). El Salvador El Salvador's gradual process of democratization was one embedded in and borne of conflict. Beginning in the early 1970s, leftist anti government groups planted th e seeds of what would become one of the deadliest conflicts in Latin America. Politically
90 motivated attacks from both sides escalated, and many leftist groups banded together in 1979 to form the Popular Forum (Foro Popular), later the joint Frente Farabund o Marti de Liberaction Nacional Frente Democr tic o Revolucionario (FMLN FDR). The guerrillas found support among middle and lower class workers, organizers, and thinkers, and from liberation theologists in the Roman Catholic Church, and provided rudimen tary services (such as medical assistance and education) in its largely rural zones of control (Helms 1990). The military consolidated power in order to counter the revolutionary challenge (Haggerty 1990), although growing divisions between ultraconservati ve and reformist camps challenged the regime politically and militarily (Karl 1985, 315). American administrations were caught between fear of a Communist takeover and disapproval of the dependent Salvadoran military's human rights record (Haggerty 1990). Elections were held in March of 1982 thanks to "decisive pressure from the Carter administration, rather than any subtle democratization' of the military," in order to legitimize U.S. support for the regime (Karl 1985, 314), but only three parties partic ipated, as the FMLN FDR did not due to concerns about its candidate's safety and overt United States involvement in the election (Haggerty 1990). 7 The success of conservative factions did not suit US interests, and the 1984 elections were held under simila r conditions, but their more moderate outcome led to a restructuring of the military and eventual negotiated settlement of the conflict and subsequent political, judicial, and military reforms (Karl 1985, 317 322; Call 2003). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 7 Clearly these elections were far from the f ree and fair model of democracy and here hampered (or created) by enormous levels of international pressure. However, they are still included because of the "democratic practice" that they provide, and the legitimacy even if co opted or skewed they aff ord to civil organizations.
91 Argentina In Argentina, democ ratic and military power lived an uneasy coexistence throughout the twentieth century. Levitsky notes some of the tensions that characterized the foundations of Argentinean democratization in the 1980s: The country possessed many of the structural conditi ons that are said to favor democracy, including high levels of wealth and education, a large middle class, and the absence of labor repressive agriculture. It also possessed a strong civil society and, after 1945, the foundation for a stable party system. Nevertheless, civilian regimes repeatedly broke down between 1930 and 1976. Beginning with the second government of Hiplito Yrigoyen (1928 1930), every government that came to power through elections  ended in a military coup." (2005, 66) Arguably, th e civilian systems struggled with a lack of inclusion as wealthy landowners tended to use their alliances to instigate major (military backed) changes, while labor unions were generally excluded from all non Peronist politics. Therefore, the party system m ay have grown strong, but without giving large and important groups a stake in a civilian controlled political process (66 68). As the Peronist legacy faltered in the mid 1970s, the military responded increasingly forcefully to anti government protestors, leftists, and guerrilla groups, finally taking power from Maria Estela "Isabel" Martnez de Pern on March 24, 1976. The new military junta, led by General Videla, Admiral Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Brigadier Orlando Ramn Agosti promptly dissolved Congre ss and began "El Proceso." The "Dirty War" justified as a fight against guerrilla Communists, Pernists, union leaders, youth organizers, thinkers, activists, and other dissidents led to thousands of permanent "disappearances" (estimates range from 6,0 00 to 20,000), not to mention the torture, kidnappings, and more blatant murders that wracked the country (Lewis 2001, 82 95). The military leadership legitimized its rule through economic growth that it claimed was due to the newly instituted liberal poli cies, but proved unable to deal with the
92 ramifications of the crash in 1980, and the government plunged into turmoil but would not democratize (Vacs 1987, 23 26). Popular discontent grew and reached a fever pitch with the general strike in late March of 19 82 (Vacs 1987, 28). Dissolution of the regime finally came from Argentina's claims to the British controlled Falkland Islands. Hoping to capitalize on a sense of nationalism and relegitimize the military's role, Argentina confronted Great Britain over the islands, temporarily minimizing criticism. Its ultimate defeat and surrender in June of 1982, however, prompted internal division, extinguished virtually all popular support for the regime, and sparked demonstrations against the military and its political role. Reynaldo Bignone became president with the purpose of transitioning to a civilian government and maintaining the economy until elected leaders could take power in 1983 (Vacs 1987, 29). Bolivia Bolivia's authoritarian history dates back to 1964, and the country had little democratic experience to draw upon during the late 1970s (Gamarra 1991). The military united to support Colonel Hugo Banzer Surez's coup on August 21, 1971 (Wagner 1991), and at first the economy grew, largely due to the increased production of natural resource exports, but issues returned as production and world prices fell and the government became increasingly dependent upon borrowing (Gamarra 1991). The regime was also characterized by an attempt to silence opposition groups, bu t shaky political support and several failed coup attempts threatened the security of Banzer's hold on power, and he staged an auto golpe in November of 1974 in hopes that more hegemonic leadership would mean better stability. However, the worsening econom ic situation,
93 division and competition within the military, increasingly vocal student, Roman Catholic, and peasant groups, and pressure from the United States pressed the dictator to call for elections in 1978 (Wagner 1991). By 1978, Bolivia was under the control of a patrimonialist system that pitted factions of the military against each other and against Banzer himself. The leader's call for elections in the latter part of that year was not only a response to external demands, but also a method for the f loundering autocrat to "reconstruct his hold on power and perhaps relegitimize his regime both nationally and internationally," but the plan backfired, heightening internal competition and reinvigorating traditional leftist opposition groups (Malloy and Ga marra 1987, 108 110). Despite piecemeal openings and the considerable weakening of the military, 1978 only marked the beginning of a fitful transition process towards more credibly democratic elections in 1982 (Mayorga 2005, 151). Brazil In 1964, the Braz ilian military seized power from populist, leftist leaning Joo Goulart, ushering in a decade of bureaucratic authoritarian rule disinterested in handing power back over to civilian leadership. General Ernest Geisel, a moderate, came to power in 1974, larg ely thanks to his connections to important individuals in the military and administration (McCann 1998). He aimed to implement gradual political liberalization (such as dismissing hardliners in the military and repealing the Fifth Institutional Act) and, m uch to the chagrin of the United States, diversified Brazil's economic and diplomatic relations. Geisel did, however, stop short of instituting full democratization,
94 instead creating an electoral college that would usher in General Joo Figueiredo when opp osition parties seemed to threaten his approval, but he continued the long march towards liberalization (McCann 1998). By the mid 1970s, a degree of ideological convergence, both within the regime and with leftist opposition, may have contributed to the mi litary's willingness to begin to negotiate an exit on its own terms (Baretta and Markoff 1987, 53 56). O'Donnell argues that the relative success, stability, and history of political infrastructure that the Brazilian authoritarian regime maintained created "paradoxes of success," leaving the military with a mantle of credibility and influence and the middle class less antagonistic (1988, 286 289). Coupled with fragmented, increasingly competitive social movements that the regime coopted in order to control, the difficulty of the democratization process in Brazil proved surprising to some (Mainwaring 1987). The major diretas j (campaign for a direct vote for president) protests began in December of 1983 in the largest opposition party, the Partido do Movimie nto Democrtico Brasileiro (PMDB). By allying itself with several other opposition groups, the diretas j campaign grew from its first demonstration on January 12, 1984 in number and in scope to showings of one million in Rio and So Paulo in April (Power 1987). Indeed, political involvement and organization had been growing throughout the 1970s and 1980s, due in large part to an expanding middle class (Sawyer 1998). However, the diretas j campaign fell just short of the necessary support, and the elector al college brought the Tancredo Neves Sarney ticket to power in January of 1985. Tancredy Neves fell ill and died the night before his inauguration, leaving Sarney as president, and
95 subsequent democratic consolidation was slower than anticipated due to the terms of the agreement with the military (Fleischer 199 8 ). Chile Although Chile saw a relatively long line of democratic leaders, the military under August Jos Ramn Pinochet Ugarte violently overthrew Salvador Allende's socialist regime on September 11 1973, amidst rising inflation and economic turmoil, increasingly vocal and active opposition from virtually all groups along the political spectrum, and waning American tolerance. The first goal of the junta, made up of the heads of the army, navy, air f orce, and police, was "rapid demobilization, depoliticization, and stabilization," which it achieved through violent repression. After consolidating power and forcing political parties underground, Pinochet's focus shifted to the economy, and he adopted a series of neoliberal reforms. The Chilean economy grew thanks to foreign loans and increasing exports, but unemployment remained high and discontent prompted the re emergence of labor unions. Pinochet institutionalized his rule with the plebiscitary approv al of the 1980 constitution, thereby granting himself the presidency until 1989 (Drake 1994). Despite institutional claims to power, economic distress in 1982 heralded the end of the authoritarian regime. Unemployment hovered above 20% and bailouts finance d by the Central Bank led to a deficit (Edwards and Edwards 1994). Fueled by frustration with repression and dire economic conditions, major protests began on the 11 th of May, 1983, drawing increasingly diverse participants and growing in size, intensity, and frequency until 1986 when a major nation wide strike renewed military repression. Political parties
96 also regained prominence and successfully negotiated for some concessions from the regime (Schneider 1995). By the time of the 1988 plebiscite, the part ies could mount a concerted campaign against Pinochet, who was already seen as a fossil among his newly democratized or democratizing neighbors (Drake 1994). The October 5, 1988 plebiscite awarded a grimly accepting Pinochet a 54.5% no vote. Highly negotia ted constitutional reforms passed in 1989 and the Concertacin de Partidos por la Democracia (CPD) leader Patricio Aylwin Azcar decisively won the December 14 th presidential elections, his party claiming the majority in both legislative bodies despite the government's complex formula designed to prevent such an outcome. Although the military remained entrenched in even the representative bodies, the civilian government did effectively control the country (Valenzuela 1994). Nicaragua Since 1936, Nicaragua had been ruled almost continuously by members or puppets of the Somoza family. Despite widespread discontent with his leadership, Anastasio Somoza Debayle extended his hold on the presidency and command of the National Guard from its rightful termination in 1971 through constitutional manipulation, political maneuvering, and sheer repression until he was forced out. Somoza's greed, intimidation tactics, and use of overt violence against the citizens provided fertile ground for discontent, and the Frente Sa ndinista de Liberacin Nacional (FSLN) formally organized in the 1960s and grew into the Frente Patritico Nacional (FPN). Having alienated virtually all international support and previous allies (including the United States) and facing economic crisis, ov erwhelming unpopularity, and a militarily capable
97 FPN that was winning territory from the National Guard, Somoza resigned on July 17, 1979, paving the way for the transfer of power to the five member junta that constituted the Sandinista government in exil e (Brs 1994). They took control of a country devastated by the civil war: roughly 50,000 had died, nearly double that figure were wounded, infrastructure was destroyed, damages to private and public property equaled hundreds of millions of US dollars, fo reign investment had all but evaporated, and GDP was shrinking dramatically. Furthermore, a significant portion of the Sandinista platform rested on economic restructuring and redistribution, goals at odds with future private investment and economic recove ry. The growth that the economy did see was effectively neutralized by natural disasters (Annis 1994). The new junta eradicated the former political system, dissolving the constitution, presidency, representative bodies, and courts and ruled exclusively b y decree until it created a consultative assembly, the Council of State (Brs 1994). Although the Council nominally drew its membership from representatives of different popular organizations, important decision making was top down, emanating from party le adership (Prevost 1995, 89 91). As the United States began to provide support to the Contras (contrarevolucionarios) against the Sandinistas (Brs 1994), the government looked to elections as a means to enhance its legitimacy to Western powers (Prevost 199 5, 92). Despite setbacks and dubious internal practices, a new constitution was drafted and the government held elections in early November of 1984 (Prevost 1995, 91 93). 8 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 8 These elections did not, of course, mark the end of the fighting or unconditional beginning of stability. The Contras and Sandinistas were forced negotiate when the United State's te rmination of aid created a mutually hurting stalemate. A cease fire agreement took hold in June 1988 and free, competitive elections were called for February of 1990. The regime also faced challenges in
98 Uruguay The Uruguayan military's rise to power did not take the form of an abrupt overthrow; rather, the military forces gradually increased their position from activist acting with a blank check against opposition to official "advisor" to the executive, and finally to a position of more total control of the political arena by forcing t he dissolution of the General Assembly and vocal opposition parties. It justified firing, kidnapping, torturing, exiling, and "disappearing" possible dissidents by claiming the universal threat of communism against the Western interests of the military gov ernment. With a tight hold on political life, the military attempted to improve the stagnant economy, leading to some short term gains (such as low inflation) and eventual losses (in the form of increasing debt and unemployment and decreasing GDP). The reg ime attempted to legitimize itself by drawing up a constitution that would create a military controlled plebiscitary state, but it was rejected in 1980 (Jacob and Weinstein 1992). Lieutenant General Gregorio Alvarez was named president after the failure o f the constitutional referendum, and he oversaw the very gradual transition to democracy. Some political parties excluding leftist ones were re legalized in 1982, and the combination of economic crisis and resurgent civil society led to major protests beginning in 1983. The Plenario Int ersindical de Trabajadores a labor group organized a demonstration on the 1 st of May, students followed with a march, and in November, all groups staged a rally to demand a full return to democracy. Strikes continued int o 1984, and the government made some moderate concessions and acquiesced to elections that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!! dealing with the military's human rights violations: a provision to halt investigations carried despite strong opposition from intellectuals, artists, and the growing population of urban youth (Hudson 1992).
99 included leftist political parties. Although certain candidates were barred or limited from the contest and certain elements of the military regime were understood t o be off limits (such as questions of the human rights record), Julio Mara Sanguinetti Coirolo won the election and oversaw the subsequent consolidation process (Jacob and Weinstein 1992). The overall resilience of political parties is not terribly surpri sing given Uruguay's historically strong, politically active, and well educated middle class. Although the military regime directly and indirectly undermined these characteristics, the legacy of relative egalitarianism distinguishes the country from other socioeconomic structures in the region (Gillespie 1992). Guatemala Guatemala's long process towards democracy is intertwined with the country's civil war and peace process. Following the US backed ouster of liberal Jacobo Arbenz, the reins of an increasi ngly autocratic military regime passed from the hands of Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas to General Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes. Discontented officers attempted to rebel in 1960, but were subdued and went underground, forming guerrilla groups that targeted econo mic and government centers. Following a powerful campaign by President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro in 1966, the movement temporarily receded, rebuilding and formulating a new strategy; the guerrilla organizations would formally unite in 1982 as the Guate malan National Revolutionary Unity, or URNG (state.gov). Subsequently, the war took on an increasingly ethnic dimension as fighting centered in the largely indigenous western portions of the country. Many of the indigenous communities provided the members of the guerrilla groups, serving as
100 justification for the governments "scorched earth" approach to eradicating dissent (Jonas 2000). Under General Efrain Rios Montt brought to power via military coup and governing as the head of a three person junta (un til he dismissed the others) the constitution, Congress, political parties, and elections were abolished and a counterinsurgency campaign centered on economic reforms and civilian defense patrols was instated. The supposedly voluntary patrols were concen trated in the guerrilla controlled territories, essentially forcing the (male) population to choose to ally with either the government or anti government forces. Montt's military operation was successful in regaining territory, but opposition forces remain ed to perpetuate low intensity attacks and the victory came at a tremendous human and economic cost (state.gov). Then defense minister General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores ousted Rios Montt in August of 1983 and oversaw the beginnings of the transition t o democracy, starting with elections (July 1, 1984) for a Constituent Assembly tasked with writing a new constitution (state.gov). Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo won the first competitive elections, held in May of 1985. His election, however, did not si gnal the end of the civil conflict or work to address the ethnic challenges that the war raised, nor was democracy assured (Seligson 2005, 202 205). 9 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 9 The victor of the 1991 elections, Jorge Serrano, attempted an autogolpe in 1993 and was replaced by the Congressionally appointed Ramiro de Leon Carpio. The first peace accords were signed in 1994, the final at the end of 1996. (Seligson 202 207) Social, economic, and bureaucratic challenges persist (state.gov).
101 Paraguay Although the Stroessner regime in Paraguay came to an end in February of 1989, it was replaced by another regime that drew power and legitimacy from the Colorado party and military rather than the populace. As the Colorado party split over the question of succession, Major General Andrs Rodrguez took leadership of the traditionalist faction and s taged a coup to prevent the militant wing's takeover (Abente Brun 1999, 93 94). Once in power, he did initiate several liberalizing measures such as re legalizing political parties (except the Communist party), relaxing mandates of Colorado party participa tion, easing censorship and opening the press, and calling elections for president (which he easily won) in 1989. However, reports of high level smuggling and corruption in addition to charges of significant fraud, tampering, and intimidation marred the ad ministration and the election. Although liberalizing steps were taken, they seem to be more in interest of protecting the status quo rather than actually changing the system of governance, but it laid the foundations for the considerably more democratic el ections in 1993 (Hanratty 1990; Beittel 2010). Conclusion The Latin American transitions share a great deal of commonalities, not the least of which is the fact that they are all from military dictatorships of various shades. Most countries had at least intermittent experiences with democracy, and many possessed civil society groups, if not entire party systems, that preceded or existed alongside military rule. Nongovernmental associations, however, were often categorized by regional divides, exacerbatin g tensions to the point of civil war in some cases. However, many
102 transitions including those of the two leading countries, Ecuador and Peru were largely peaceful, negotiated transfers of power instigated by economic concerns. Despite the militaries' angst in Ecuador and Peru, the leaders were not in dire economic straits, at least compared to the rest of the region. Recalling the data addressed in Chapter 2, GDP and GDP per capita growth rates were among the more positive (or less negative) of the reg ion, and unemployment was relatively low. Therefore, early mobilization seems to have less to do with the actual economic situation, and more to do with perceptions about the future and what rewards or constraints it might hold for the military, citizens, or certain interest groups. The leading cases in particular demonstrate the ideological diversity of groups most supportive of democracy: in Ecuador, business interests were instrumental in instigating the transitions, while in Peru, labor and leftist gro ups were more active. Ideology was especially important in light of the Cold War and the proximity of the United States. Indeed, many military regimes were able to maintain power due to their neighbor's concern regarding communist threats throughout the re gion, although American involvement did also contribute towards small (sometimes purely symbolic) steps away from authoritarianism. The leaders' transitions, however, were relatively devoid of international intervention, an interesting finding reflected in most of their globalization scores as well.
103 CHAPTER 4 The Crest: Democratization in Southeast Asia and Central and Eastern Europe No more shall we be slaves! Demonstrators at the symbolic funeral of Imre Nagy 10 As the "third wave" g ained momentum spreading from Southern Europe to Latin America, its effects were soon felt in other regions assumed to be authoritarian strongholds. In Southeast Asia, monarchies and dictatorships attempted to legitimize their rule through growth and prosp erity, but citizens began to demand more from their governments, spurred by their own wealth or that of their neighbors. Perhaps even more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! "# Quoted in Ash 1990, 51
104 unthinkably, citizens of Soviet bloc nations threw off their communist party leadership, changing not only their own institutions, but the global balance of power as well. S OUTHEAST A SIA The period of democratic transition in East Asia to be examined in this chapter begins with the Philippines in 1986 and ends with Indonesia in 1998 but encompasses a wide range of p olitical processes and outcomes. In its entirety, Asia's political makeup ranges from one of the oldest non Western democracies in Japan to one of the most repressive remaining dictatorships in North Korea (Shin 2008, 96, 92). Then it is perhaps unsurprisi ng that the subset of East Asian states categorized as members of the third wave of democratization display a similar degree of variation, complete with stops, starts, progressions, and regressions (97 98). Although no regional organizations existed to pro pel East Asian democratization, Shin argues that external influences did have a role to play. Specifically, the Cold War dynamic allowed for US acquiescence or support for authoritarian rule in the face of the communist threat. Alternatively, it provided s upport for liberal opposition (including and perhaps especially in the cases of the Philippines and South Korea) in the period that followed. Additionally, both the Philippines and South Korea experienced economic growth and the rise of a middle class that seem related to the growth of civil society and liberal demands, apparent support for modernization theory (Shin 2008, 104 106).
105 The Philippines The Philippines led the East Asian cases with the removal of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. Corruption and politi cal violence characterized his 21 year rule (Shin 2008, 99), but this regime failed to provide the rapid economic growth that some of its neighbors experienced, casting doubt on the strict modernization hypothesis (Velasco 1997, 80 81). Although flawed and dominated by a cadre of powerful families, a democratic system prevailed in the Philippines under American occupation and after independence in 1945. Ferdinand Marcos who declared martial law in 1972 first gained the presidency by utilizing the oligop olistic tendencies of the system (Velasco 1997, 84). From 1972 until his removal in 1986, Marcos depended upon technocrats to procure loans from multilateral organizations and the military to maintain stability by silencing dissidents (Velasco 1997, 86 87 ). While the regime saw some initial growth in its early years, most sectors shrank and borrowing increased to compensate for (and exacerbated) protectionism, corruption, and tremendous inequality (Velasco 1997, 88 90), pushing the previously ambivalent mi ddle class towards the burgeoning opposition (Velasco 1997, 87). Marcos was forced to flee on his fourth "inauguration" (the election was not considered free in the slightest) by the "people power" revolution (Shin 2008, 99). The mass movement experienced support from a tremendous number of ordinary citizens "as well as a number of religious, political, and military leaders," suggesting a civil society driven but military supported regime change (Shin 2008, 99 101), less than somewhat unexpected given Marc os's unwillingness to engage even moderates (Thompson 2004, 18). The personalistic nature of the dictatorship translated into little
106 regard for other institutions (including the military) or interests beyond his own life and wealth, leaving few incentives for negotiation (Thompson 2004, 20 21). The communist armed forces swelled, the government was at war with Muslim secessionists in Mindanao, and the military itself was on the verge of staging a coup (Velasco 1997, 90 91; Thompson 2004, 23). Corazon Aquino mobilized middle class business interests and Catholics on moral grounds after the murder of her husband, Senator Benigno S. Aquino, the most visible opposition leader. She capitalized on cross cutting opposition to Marcos (Thompson 2004, 24). In response to Aquino's "stolen" (illegitimate) electoral victory in February of 1986, anti Marcos crowds assembled, and communists found themselves subsumed in the larger protests and leaders of the would be coup (upon discovery by leadership) also joined the civili ans (Thompson 2004, 26 27). Aquino's success was considerable, but the country has since seen instability caused by political opposition, citizens, and the military (Shin 2008, 104). Furthermore, corruption and vestiges of dominance by the economic elite p ersist, but democratic norms seem to prevail and, as Thompson argues, "Philippine people power' demonstrates that there is in fact a non violent, but insurrectionary, path to democracy" (2004, 30 34, 33). South Korea South Korea's transition followed in 1987, and illustrates a great deal of the modernization theory. The Democratic Justice Party's General Chun Doo Hwan came to power through a coup in 1979 following the assassination of longtime authoritarian leader General Park Chung Hee (Shin 2008, 101). Both Park and Chun employed a state implemented export oriented industrialization policy (Ahn 1997, 244). Although the
107 economic model resulted in the desired growth, it also bred social and political challenges: heavy dependence on the world economy pushe d the regime towards economic liberalization, making political control more difficult. Simultaneously, the state found it increasingly necessary to repress labor groups that organized in response to low wages, poor hours, and the imbalanced preferential tr eatment for the capitalist minority (Ahn 1997, 245 246). In Ahn's words, "Korea was highly developed economically, moderately developed socially, but underdeveloped politically," due to the ability of the middle and working classes to begin to form civil s ociety movements and make demands for political rights (1997, 246). In spite of government repression and political manipulation, Koreans participated in and voted for opposition and civil society groups (Cotton 1989, 250 251). The New Korea Democratic Pa rty challenged the regime in February of 1986 with demands for direct presidential elections, and Chun, facing rallies in support of the measure and noting the developments in the Philippines, agreed to compromise (Cotton 1989, 251). When talks stalled and the opposition groups fractured, Chun proceeded with his initial plans to (undemocratically) nominate Roh Tae woo for the presidency, but late spring 1987 brought even more forceful and cross cutting demands for democracy. Industrialists and religious org anizations joined the growing student protests that were gaining international support (Cotton 1989, 252). Protests turned violent and the country stood on the brink of civil war (Han 1988, 54). In addition to considering his own credentials as a president ial contender, the United States' preferences and upcoming Seoul Olympics likely figured into Roh's announcement of a series of liberalizing measures in June of 1987 (Cotton 1989, 252 253). Largely due to the Olympics, South Korea's diplomatic relationship s
108 diversified, but the impact of the United States remained dominant. Interestingly, Han argues that "the United States wished to counter what it perceived as rising anti American sentiment among some Koreans who held the United States responsible for hind ering the cause of democracy" (1988, 69 60). Facing a divided opposition, Roh won the presidential election in December of 1988, but his ties to authoritarians tried his legitimacy (Cotton 1989, 254, 257 258). With a more decisive victory and fewer conne ctions to the old regime, further democratic consolidation economic reforms occurred under Roh's successor, Kim Young Sam, elected in 1992 (Ahn 1997, 252 254). Taiwan After Taiwan's implementation of an export oriented industrialization model in the 1960 s, its bourgeoisie and private sector grew, creating increasingly politically active groups that demanded more freedom and national control of the government. The middle class grew in number and importance, both in the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) and in opposi tion (Hing 1997, 223 225). Although different elements of the middle class had different relationships with the KMT, those who were dissatisfied demonstrated their willingness and ability to take to the streets and demonstrate, largely due to conflicts wit h mainlanders, the influence of Western values, and level of frustration with the KMT (Hing 1997, 227 229), despite its long term democratic goals (Chou and Nathan 1987, 278). As Chou and Nathan argue, "the response of the KMT to the growth and increasing militance of the opposition was, until late 1985, a mix of selective repression
109 with institutional liberalization," yet "the reform undertaken in 1986 represents a fundamental change of course" (1987, 283). The first opposition political party was legaliz ed to ease potential conflict that could arise from Chiang Kai Shek's departure and Americans' displeasure with martial law, as well as to reap possible rewards for the KMT in upcoming elections (Chou and Nathan 1987, 284 285). The government de facto allo wed political parties, despite deeming them illegal, while legislation legalizing civil organizations continued apace. In October 1986, Chiang introduced measures that would end martial law and allow for the formation of new political parties, essentially recognizing the newly created Democratic Progressive Party (Chou and Nathan 1987, 288 289). Martial law was officially revoked in 1987, opposition movements grew, and free and fair elections for the National Assembly were held in 1992 (Shin 2008, 101 102). Thailand For much of its history, the Thai political sphere has been characterized by military coups supplanting both civilian and military regimes, but its first experiences with liberal democracy began in 1973, only to be dismantled in a violent crac kdown three years later (Neher 1995, 195 196). Supported by the military, party leaders, and the monarch, General Prem Tinsulanound served as prime minister from 1980 to 1988 (Neher 1995, 197). With a diminishing communist insurgent threat, disillusioned c apitalist class, and economic growth, Prem did oversee parliamentary stability and some liberalizing measures, but "tip[ped] the balance of power in favour of the military dominated state," offering political parties only minor roles and undermining the
110 de mocratic system by dissolving parliament to escape votes of no confidence (Maisrikrod 1997, 157 158). Distrusted by the middle class that grew under his leadership, Prem stepped down, paving the way for civilian competition in the July 1988 elections (Mai srikrod 1997, 159). Chatichai Choonhavan, leader of the Cart Thai Party, came to power, bringing optimism for Thai democratic consolidation (Neher 1992, 598). His success, however, was more thanks to anti Prem sentiment, and he rapidly alienated both the i ncreasingly demanding middle class and the military (Maisrikrod 1997, 158, 161). Despite the negligible communist threat, economic growth, and Chatichai's status as a former general, the military staged a coup in February of 1991 (Neher 1992, 598 599), an d the government has continued to oscillate between democracy and military leadership since then (Shin 2008, 102). Myanmar (Burma) The brief and chaotic lunge towards liberalization in 1988 did not pave the way for any long lasting democratic revolution in Myanmar, but it still represents a ripple of the Asian experience of the "third wave." An inauspicious beginning to post independence democratization allowed the military, led by Chairman General Ne Win's Revolutionary Council (RC), to take power in 19 62. The new regime created an ideological foundation guarded by the Leninist Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), which officially took control of the state in 1974 despite persistent military domination and no meaningful political opening (Than 1997, 1 74 183).
111 By 1987, economic hardship and visible inequality prompted ineffective, hasty, and ultimately insufficient policy changes and political shakeups within the BSPP (Than 1997, 183 184). Despite an official ban, student, worker, religious, and other civic groups began to organize in March of 1988, and by August, "initial calls for justice and retribution against recalcitrant officials turned into an all out condemnation of the regime and the political system," with a diverse span of groups increasingl y demanding democracy (Than 1997 185 186). However, relatively cohesive and peaceful civil disobedience devolved into looting, uncertainty, and factionalism. Then, after an initial retreat from state functions, the military instituted the State Law and Ord er Restoration Council (SLORC) in September of 1988, reinstating order with brutal means (Than 1997, 196 189). Through massive arrests, death sentences, and detention of opposition leaders, the SLORC stemmed the tide of civil society organizations (Guyot a nd Badgley 1990, 188 189), and although it prepared for and executed elections, it quickly became clear that the military would retain control of the state for years to come (Than 1997, 189 191). Attention returned to the country following the "Saffron Re volution" in 2007, but more meaningful reform seemed to come in 2010 and 2012 with more credible elections, the release of political prisoners (including Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest), and other reforms. Even with these improvements, disturbing ethni c violence and questions regarding the future and motives of the reforms persist (Bajoria 2012). Nepal Nepal's first brief and unsuccessful foray into democratic governance occurred in 1959, but the parliamentary system was quickly overturned in favor of one dominated by
112 the monarchy and devoid of dissent and meaningful political participation (Ganguly and Shoup 2005, 131 132; Bhatta 1999, 78 79). Despite a referendum supporting its continuation and reform in 1979, this panchayat system proved unable to address the economic concerns of the majority of the population, and corruption only appeared to grow (Bhatta 1999, 79). Small increases in political freedom encouraged calls for greater reforms (Ganguly and Shoup 2005, 133). The outlawed Nepali Congress joined with a number of Communist parties to form the United Left Front in 1990 (Timsina 2010, 139). In response to the well attended demonstrations in the first few months of 1990, presence of rapidly crumbling authoritarian regimes in Europe and Asia, a nd India's painful economic embargo, the monarchy caved to popular demands. A new constitution establishing a constitutional monarchy with a bicameral legislature, universal suffrage, and legal political parties was adopted in November of that year (Gangul y and Shoup 2005, 133; Bhatta 2008, 79 80). Unfortunately, the more representative political system proved unable to adequately address the tremendous economic challenges or incorporate the "incredible array of ethnic, religious, and language groups [tha t] increases the already difficult challenge of developing a viable party system that maintains clear links between elected officials and citizens" (Ganguly and Shoup 2005, 134). Fueled by discontent and alienation, an armed Maoist rebellion arose in 1996, and King Gyanedra reestablished autocratic rule, banning political parties in his attempt to control the "terrorists" (Timsina 2010, 140 141). The insurgency officially ended in 2006 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, although Maoists entered governm ent in exchange for the abolition of the monarchy in 2007 (BBC 2013).
113 Bangladesh Until 1990, Bangladesh had minimal experience with democracy. Except for its first election following independence from Pakistan in 1972, Bangladesh remained under military led authoritarian control throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Wilkinson 2000, 210 211). Genera Hussain Mohammad Ershad took power through a coup, and although he undertook several democratization projects on the local level, they were largely viewed as illegit imate and as a means to further entrench his patronage networks (Khan and Husain 1996, 321 323). Despite authoritarian dominance and ideological division, political parties The Awami League and Bangladesh National Party banded together in the early 1980s t o demand the replacement of military law with a democratic system and justice for abuses perpetrated by the regime (Wilkinson 2000, 212). The major offensive against the Ershad government began with the formation of the broad based All Parties Student Uni ty (APSU) in October 1990, created in response to the murder of a student activist. Political parties banded together with the young APSU to issue a document demanding political rights and democracy and organize a large strike in November. The movement spr ead beyond the capital and its demands became increasingly pointed, despite Ershad's persistent attempts to divide and intimidate the groups (Khan and Husain 1996, 324 325; Wilkinson 2000, 216). Furthermore, the number, breadth, and inclusion of civil soci ety groups in Bangladesh not only contributed to the old regime's ouster, but also to the consolidation of democracy during the transition (Wilkinson 2000, 217 218). Interestingly, Ershad would have preferred to maintain power by crushing opposition, but he was forced to resign when senior officers
114 refused to back him," stemming from the military's distrust of Ershad, and internal divisions, (Wilkinson 2000, 212 214). He resigned in December of 1990, ushering in a caretaker government that organized electi ons in early 1991 (Khan and Husain 1996, 325 326). Indonesia Supported by a broad coalition of civilian groups fearing the communist threat, Major General Suharto took control of the presidency in 1968, interestingly making no promises to support a transi tion to a democratic system (Malley 2000, 157 158). Suharto created the military dominated party Golkar and consolidated the opposition into two parties, effectively enhancing his ability to coopt them (Malley 2000, 158 160). Simultaneously, however, Suhar to did engineer tremendous economic growth, and Emmerson notes that "from 1975 to 1997, no country in the world that began that period with a low HDI improved more than Indonesia" (1999, 38). With less of the population able to remember the earlier years o f economic hardship, demands for political freedom intensified (Emmerson 1999, 40). Emmerson (1999) pegs the beginning of the regime's downfall with its violent attempt to oust Megawat Sukarnpputri, one of the former president's daughters, from leadership of the Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) in July of 1996. Suharto's plan, however, backfired, leading to instability and mounting unpopularity (Emmerson 1999, 40 42). Corruption, nepotism, and possible health issues led to economic mismanagement of the cris is of 1997, and increasing fuel and electricity costs sparked rioting which turned political in March of 1998 (Emmerson 1999, 42 43; Malley 2000, 166 167). Demonstrations
115 continued to spread, fueled by the death of student protesters, until Suharto resigne d in late May (Emmerson 1999, 42 43). In addition to the protests demanding his resignation, Suharto was abandoned by Golkar leadership who pledged to support Vice President Habibie, who became president on May 21, 1998 (Malley 2000, 168). The first electi ons brought Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency, and democracy, somewhat surprisingly, remained relatively stable since (Barton 2010, 473). Conclusion With regimes ranging from monarchies to military control and economies ranging from some of the most de veloped to the least, the countries and transitions of Southeast Asia display a striking degree of diversity. The region with arguably the best cases for modernization theory also contains counterexamples and instances of its failure indeed it was poor growth in the Philippines that spurred frustration, not the presence of growth that made it possible. Li kewise, popular mobilization le d to divergent outcomes of the establishment of democratic practices and war. Despite the variety between individual ca se s the order in which the transitions took place does present an interesting pattern. The fact that the Philippines, with an economy considerably smaller than those of South Korea and Taiwan, is the first case demonstrates an interesting challenge to mod ernization theory in that it was not the most developed country that democratized first. Rather, frustration with economic underperformance was a significant factor, and one that created the foundation of anti regime sentiment. Interestingly, though, it wa s the more "modernized" economies that
116 followed immediately after, not those where citizens had more cause for economic frustration The military response was also limited in the earlier transitions, although later ones saw mixed responses. Neither the re volution in the Philippines nor the one in South Korea were bloodless, but both stopped short of civil war, and the same cannot be said of all of the transitions that followed. C ENTRAL AND E ASTERN E UROPE The revolutions of 1989 revitalized questions ab out democratization and imbued them with a sense of optimism. As communist regimes began to make way for (more) democratic successors with increasing speed, the world saw changes both in the global balance of power and in the dominant form of government, w hich would set the standards for international legitimacy for years to come. Largely pressured by mass mobilization and not always in response to well organized opposition parties or movements, communist regimes negotiated their way from power or collapsed paving the way for the region's "return to Europe." The proximity to Europe not only contributed to the process of democratization in the post communist period (through incentives to join the European Union), but drove it as well. In the cultural sense, citizens under communist rule were able to listen to the radio of, sometimes watch the television of, or even visit some of their neighboring established democracies. Simultaneously, geopolitical tensions loosened thanks to Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika and
117 noninterference in the affairs of the Eastern Bloc countries (Wolchik and Curry 2011, 20 27). Given the expanse of the Eastern Bloc, it is important to note which countries are and are not covered in this analysis. I do not inc lude Yugoslavia for two reasons. First, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, it refused to be party to either Soviet or Western alliances or ideologies, creating, as Baskin and Pickering argue, a "third way" making it distinct from the other countries that underwent liberalizing reforms and revolutions in the late 1980s and early 1990s (2011, 277 280). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, former Yugoslavia did not experience a common shift towards democracy, but an overriding ideology of nationalism that precipitated a combination of democratization (in Slovenia) and breakdown into warring emergent states. Following Tito's death in 1980, untenable power sharing gave rise to territorial disintegration and mobilization along ethnic lines, enabling the c atastrophic bloodshed of the early 1990s (Baskin and Pickering 2011, 282 289). The case for the inclusion of the Baltic states is somewhat stronger given their opposition movements that took full advantage of glasnost and early competitive elections (Eglit is 2011, 235 236). While the liberalizing demands and exercises in democracy in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia influenced both the Soviet path and other countries in the Eastern Bloc, they were technically under Soviet occupation (i.e., part of the USSR, a nd not merely members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization). Although it would certainly be interesting to examine them as leaders of a set of post Soviet states, that is beyond the scope of this project, and they must therefore be excluded.
118 Poland Thanks t o a rich and well entrenched history of opposition and anti party activity, it is rather difficult to pinpoint a specific starting date for the mobilization that precipitated the Polish democratic revolution. Solidarity had long functioned as a trade union (both legally and underground), but its increasing demands for legalization and political pluralism forced the struggling communist part leadership into negotiations that resulted in elections installing the first non Communist government in the bloc (Sto kes 2012, 123 142). Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, student and worker groups began to come into conflict with party leadership, but their movements were relatively isolated and met with harsh repression until the magnitude of the revolts in December of 1 970 forced a political response in the form Edward Gierek's promotion to party secretary (Kaliski 2006, 120 121). By the mid 1970s, initial contentment with unsustainable but consumer pleasing economic initiatives gave way to protests against codifying com munist hegemony and rising food prices, and the resulting protests, crackdowns, and coping mechanisms not only challenged the party's representative role, but also gave rise to the organizations that would eventually defeat it: the Committee for Workers' D efense (KOR) brought attention to human rights abuses, its successor movement, the Committee for Social Self Defense also provided underground education and a venue for meeting through a "flying university," the Confederation of Independent Poland became the first opposition party, local trade unions which "had long been part of the system of power as a transmission belt' to the masses" began to follow KOR's example, and Catholic organization gained importance, both through (Catholic) farmers' self defens e committees and the election of
119 Karol Wojty!a to the papacy (Kaliski 2006, 122 124). In the summer of 1980, protests spread throughout the country, and even after factories' individual demands were met, they banded together under the leadership of Lech Wa !esa through a network of regional Inter f actory Strike Committees to support smaller enterprises' strikes and bargain for concessions and status for labor unions as independent organizations representing workers (Kaliski 2006, 125 126). With over one thi rd of the population claiming membership, Solidarity became a national movement increasingly adept at extracting concessions from the government, much to the chagrin of other nations in the Soviet bloc (Curry 2011, 164). Soon after the Gdansk agreement, S t anis!aw Kania became the head of the party, but Wojciech Jaruzelski replaced him not much more than a year later, thereby taking control of the party, the state, and the military. Facing increasingly dire economic trials and potential Soviet invasion, Jaru zelski established military rule on 13 December 1981, outlawing labor unions, making strikes and other activities (including publishing) illegal, incarcerating leaders and strikers, and violently suppressing opposition to the new measures (Kaliski 2006, 13 3). Even under his program of "normalization," Jaruzelski realized that he could not entirely cut Solidarity from the sociopolitical fabric and he tried to isolate, undermine, and delegitimize the group by granting "artfully timed concessions" that failed to address real economic issues (Stokes 2012, 124, 130). Instead of withering, however, Solidarity moved underground and continued to operate 11 but faced difficulty in maintaining unity and organizing strikes (Stokes 2012, 127 129). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 11 Stokes makes the interesting observation of how women played an integral role in maintaining communication and enabling publications to continue, in many cases relying on the highly conservative norms of Polish society: "The team's [Ladies Operational Unit] idea was t hat men like Bujak would remain the public face of underground Solidarity to retain the respect of
120 Despite his heavy hande dness and manipulation, Jaruzelski did gradually increase opportunities for pluralism by granting blanket amnesty and easing censorship, convincing Solidarity to bring at least some of its operations "above ground," even if they were not wholly legal (Stok es 2012, 135 136). However, following strikes against rising food prices brought on by continued economic mismanagement, Solidarity, despite internal tensions between the older leadership and more radical youth, agreed to talks about political organization with the government in August of 1988 (Stokes 2012, 142 143), even though it risked cooptation (Swain 2006, 141). When talks finally commenced in February of the following year, the communists hoped for a gradual process of moderate opening that would all ow them to deflect some of the blame for persistent crises on to Solidarity, the trade union wanted to be relegalized, and the Church acted as a guarantor and to preserve its own position; the political turnover resulting from the election formulas specifi cally designed to maintain the leadership of the party was completely unexpected (Curry 2011, 165 166; Stokes 2012, 145 146). Hungary In the words of Argentieri, "communist rule in Hungary swung back from relative liberalism to extreme repression and bac k again," leaving a rich collection of culturally salient figures and events for mobilizers to call upon (2011, 215 218). Although Jnos Kdr came to power with Soviet support in the wake of the aborted 1956 revolution and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!! Poland's patriarchal society, but the women would hide them and put out the paper. This proved so successful that they were able to publish 290 issues of the weekly and reach a circulation that hit a high of 80,000 copies. One reason they remained undetected was that it occurred to no one in Poland that women could conduct such a sophisticated underground operation. The team took full advantage of this cultura l blindness, often using old or stylishly dressed women to distribute the paper, or hiding clandestine materials in piles of diapers, which no self respecting Polish policeman would search." (2012, 127)
121 reestablished the single party s ystem through repression, he also introduced the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in 1968 after agricultural reforms in the early 1960s, allowing for some economic and social openness (Argentieri 2011, 216). Hungary stood apart from other bloc nations in how i t dealt with its economic challenges both externally by taking actions that allowed it to join the International Monetary Fund and World Ba nk in 1982 and internally through broad acceptance of the "second economy" and the autonomous economic activity that it encouraged (Stokes 2012, 98 102). Two distinct opposition tendencies, urbanists and populists, arose from two semi distinct economic communities, but both began to consider how best to mobilize anti regime sentiment in the late 1970s and into the 1980s (Stokes 2012, 106). Urbanists, including Jnos Kis, were responsible for publishing opposition journals and providing Hungary's own "flying universities" and focused more on human rights and civil society as the basis for democratization, while the more rural populists supported "a third way based on indigenous traditions" and sought to advocate for marginalized Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries (Stokes 2012, 105 106). In 1988, both groups gained increased popular recognition, the democra tic opposition by leveraging the environmental concerns regarding the construction of the Nagymaros dam and the populists by highlighting threats to Hungarian minorities in Ceausescu's Romania. Soon, however, the opposition's ability to mobilize thousands threatened the party when protests on nationally significant but officially unrecognized holidays (the day of Imre Nagy's execution in particular) drew attention to widespread discontent with the regime and its history of repression (Stokes 2012, 111 112). Formally, the more populist H ungarian Democratic Forum, established in 1987, was open to negotiation with the regime, but the
122 Alliance of Young Democrats and Network of Free Democratic Initiatives (later Alliance of Free Democra ts ), both established in 19 88, were less eager to interact with the state apparatus (Argentieri 2011, 219). Voices for reform came from within the party as well. Reformers Rezs" Nyers and Imre Pozsgay, both of whom saw the necessity of political reform and increased pluralism, began to climb the ranks of the party in the late 1970s and publish reports demanding drastic political and economic changes in 1986. Kroly Grsz, who still saw a leading role for the party, began to address economic issues by activating state structures hitherto wholly subordinated to the communist party structure and granting the le gislature increased responsibility (Stokes 2012, 107 109). When Grsz replaced the aging Kdr in May of 1988, press freedom increased significantly but control of the state remained firmly within the party, and following Gorbachev's encouragement and remo val of Soviet forces from Hungary, reforms continued (113, 115). Pozsgay continued to press for significant modifications to the political system, and with the legalization of political parties and withdrawal of the constitutional enshrinement of the party as the vanguard of the proletariat, the communists "seemed to have staked their future on the ability to control the emerging pluralism and to devise an electoral scheme that would permit them to retain power" (116). In the meantime, the opposition parti es and movements came together in the spring and summer of 1989 at the Opposition Roundtable (ORT) with the goal of organizing in anticipation of negotiations, and the roundtable discussions between the ORT and the regime (and the politically less signific ant trade unions) began in June of 1989 (Argentieri 2011, 219 220). Aware of its weaknesses and divisions, the ORT
123 limited its goals to free elections, leaving greater social and economic questions for the future representatives to decide (Swain 2006, 148) Although the ORT quickly fractured on the question of the order of parliamentary and presidential elections, the former Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party became the Hungarian Socialist Party and elections were held in early 1990 (Argentieri 2011, 221 22 1). German Democratic Republic (GDR) As Hungary progressed towards liberalization and was increasingly hospitable to refugees, East Germans began streaming into the country, encouraged by their ability to pass from the West German embassy in Budapest, th en Prague and Warsaw, on to Austria, and then into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The exodus, which reached its peak in September of 1989, illustrated West Germans' frustration and hopelessness with their outdated and repressive regime (Stokes 2012 162 163). Erich Honecker, in power since 1971, had employed tremendous surveillance, pursued a counterproductive command system of economics whose effects increasing subsidized social programs could not mask, disregarded human rights despite agreeing to the Helsinki Accord thereby fueling criticism of the hypocrisy of his regime and became politically and financially indebted to the FRG (Grieder 2006, 158 163). Furthermore, as Gorbachev allowed and then encouraged glasnost and perestroika famously wa rning Honecker of his impending irrelevance, the GDR continued to use its familiar repressive tactics, only changing to become more critical of the USSR (Grieder 2006, 165). The sham election in May of 1989 and the regime's vocal endorsement of the Chinese army's response to protesters in Tiananmen Square only underscored the disconnect between the
124 regime and the population. Small oppositions groups such as the New Forum formed, but no group mustered the membership, organization, or lofty goals of Solidarit y or even any of the Hungarian coalitions (Stokes 2012, 164 165). Although opposition groups and the ability to leave may have emboldened those dissatisfied with the regime, it was those who stayed who brought down the regime. Specifically, the protests t hat "grew out of a traditional peace service that had been held before small gatherings in the St. Nikolai Church in Leipzig on Monday afternoons" became increasingly political and well attended irrespective of arrests and police brutality (Stokes 2012, 16 5). When a potentially horrific confrontation was averted on October 9, protests spread across the country and drew incredible popular support. With no alternatives, Honecker ceded power to Egon Krenz who attempted to make concessions and reforms but could not stem the revolutionary fervor (Stokes 2012, 166). Confusion and miscommunication allowed for the breach of the Berlin Wall on November 9, and unification once again appeared to be a possibility (Stokes 2012, 167). Following the fall of the wall, the party quickly lost its leadership, first in the constitution, then by renaming itself, and finally with Krenz's resignation on December 3, and elections were held in March 1990 (Grieder 2006, 168). Czechoslovakia Despite experience with democracy in the inter war period, Czechoslovakia underwent a long period of Stalinization, and, following the Prague Spring reforms under Alexander Dub#ek, Soviet intervention, purges, and the heavy handed leadership of Gustv Husk (Linz and Stepan 1996, 316 318). Husk' s leadership lasted from 1968
125 until 1987, through a period of economic isolation but relatively decent standards of living; even slowing growth did not force his successor, Milo$ Jake$, to make substantial reforms (Stokes 2012, 174 175). Rather, Stokes obs erves that "it was not economic disappointments that pushed the Communists aside but massive gatherings of hundreds of thousands of citizens" (2012, 175) that forced an ideologically ambivalent regime from power (Linz and Stepan 1996, 320). The largest op position group was Charter 77, which formed in response to the opportunities presented by Czechoslovakia's support for the Helsinki Final Act (Linz and Stepan 1996, 318). Vclav Havel was the clear leader of the group, but it neither garnered broad members hip nor established clear central organization. Instead, it was comprised mainly of secular Czech intellectuals and focused on a message of "antipolitics." Although its leaders were frequently harassed, Charter 77 did not inspire popular mobilization. By c ontrast, the Catholic Church, with its predominantly Slovak following, was able to marshal broad support for political causes (Stokes 2012, 175 179). When the communist regime did collapse, it was not due to the systemic mobilization or bargaining of eith er organization. While Charter 77 articulated demands for pluralism, democracy, and human rights and was certainly involved in the revolution, student and workers groups bear much of the responsibility for coordinating strikes and demanding the removal of the Jake$ regime. Little more than a week following the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 17, 1989, a student organized commemorative march evolved into an anti regime series of protests and strikes, independent of Charter 77 (though Havel did become act ive). Although the Jake$ regime "issued various statements that they would resist further antisocialist actions by all possible means,'" the party was
126 undergoing massive defections, and both the police and the army declared that they would not threaten th e protests or protesters. A mere week after the first demonstrations, the Central Committee Secretariat, Politburo, and Jake$ himself resigned, followed by President Husk on December 4; Havel was elected president by parliament on December 29, 1989 (Linz and Stepan 1996, 324 327). Bulgaria In power since 1954, Todor Zhivkov oversaw "Moscow's closest and most loyal ally in the entire Soviet block" until his hardline approaches self destructed in the face of calls for true perestroika and Gorbachev's "Sinat ra doctrine" (Bugajski 2011, 252 253). Zhivkov made Bulgaria into an important Soviet ally with his emphasis on science and technology, but skillfully offered hollow economic and social reforms until empty promises could no longer hold off the economic dow nturn that came with rising oil prices (Stokes 2012, 168 169). He pursued divisive and purposefully alienating policies of assimilation or forced removal of ethnic Turks, which, in addition to disregarding their human rights, further compounded the country 's economic issues (Stokes 2012, 69 170). Although he managed to coopt much of the intelligentsia for the majority of his career, his unpopular ethnic policies, disdain for and repression of the vocal and growing environmentalist movements, and general dis regard of the Soviet Union's liberalizing directives led more intellectuals to begin openly criticizing the regime in 1989 (Stokes 2012, 172 173). Although the environmentalist group Ecoglasnost spurred demonstrations for democratic reforms, real regime c hange came from within the party, rather than from the
127 young opposition groups (Stokes 2012, 173; Linz and Stepan 1996, 337). Zhivkov's forced resignation was due to a Central Committee that had turned against him, preferring instead the liberalizing traje ctory that Petar Mladenov supported, especially given the USSR's commitment to non interference (Stokes 2012, 173 174). When Mladenov took power on November 10, 1989, he quickly worked to remove the party from the state apparatus and promote a pluralistic society. The Opposition Round Table that followed, however, afforded the reformed Communists a distinct advantage, a dynamic that played out again in the rushed first elections of June 1990 (Linz and Stepan 1996, 338 339). Power did not change hands from t he renamed communist party (now Bulgarian Socialist Party) until late 1991 (Bugajski 2011, 253 255). Romania With what eventually became arguably the most personalistic, brutal, and totalitarian regime in the bloc, Nicolae Ceau%escu became the Secretary General in 1965 with the assistance of party supporters interested in institutionalization, consolidated his p ower with nationalism, and, at least in the early years, maintained a precarious balance of both Soviet and Western support (Linz and Stepan 1996, 347 348). Over time, however, his regime grew increasingly sultanistic as his cult of personality ballooned t o proportions that would have been comedic, had it not contributed to the physical destruction of towns and buildings, the virtual destruction of an efficient state, any space for opposition or autonomous intellectual discourse, and the humiliation and abu se of his citizens (Linz and Stepan 1996, 350 353). The Securitate and controlled press doomed several workers' strikes by alienating or killing their leadership and preventing the
128 knowledge sharing that may have allowed for follow on opposition activities (Deletant 2006, 87 89). With regard to the economy, Ceau%escu went to "humiliating extremes" to limit the national debt, even as it eroded the dignity of workers, allowed infrastructure to rot, and created inhumane conditions for virtually all citizens (S tokes 2012, 184 185). Although several individuals such as Doina Cornea spoke out against the regime, they were brutalized, repressed, and largely cut off from society, even as their open letters were distributed through venues such as Radio Free Europe ( Deletant 2006, 93 94). But against the backdrop of the fallen Berlin Wall, Zhivkov's resignation in Bulgaria, and protests in Czechoslovakia, popular sentiment supported the cause of the minister Lszl Tks who had made himself an enemy of the regime by denouncing the systematization plan, which destroyed villages and further nationalized agriculture. The regime attempted to remove him from his post in Timi%oara, and he was able to resist until early December of 1989. When he was finally forced to reloca te on the 15 th what began as a small group of congregants expressing support and undisturbed by the Securitate blossomed into a persistent and restive thousand person protest. The army was called in to control the situation, and killed roughly one hundred protesters (though contemporary reports put the figure in the thousands) on the night of December 17. Instead of calming the situation, the bloodletting only inspired more protests across the country, and the army decided that it would no longer target pr otesters, allowing a Democratic Front Committee to take control of Timi%oara. Ceau%escu made vain appeals for calm in Bucharest, but he and his wife Elena were forced to flee by helicopter to escape surging crowds on December 22. The National Salvation Fro nt (FSN) took control, leading the fighting between the army and Securitate (though conspiracy theories
129 abound) and the quick trial and execution of the Ceau%escus on December 25 (Stokes 2012, 188 191). The neo Communist regime headed by Ion Iliescu that f ollowed, however, was still fairly undemocratic, owing largely, Linz and Stepan argue, to its ability "to take personal credit for eliminating the hydra headed monster [and for] eliminating many of the most egregious measures personally associated with the sultan," thereby justifying the continued repression and undermining of opposition (1996, 359 361). Power did not effectively change hands until the 1996 elections, which brought the Democratic Convention of Romania, running on a predominantly anti Iliesc u rather than comprehensive ideological platform, to power (Gledhill and King 2011, 319 320). Albania Enver Hoxha's leadership from 1944 until his death in 1985 corresponds to almost all of Albania's experience under Communist rule. The Stalinist maintai ned power through periodic purges and shifting alliances that capitalized on divisions between different communist states or associations (Biberaj 2011, 370 371). He eventually insisted upon a plan of self reliance that, while diversifying the economy, doo med it to stagnation in addition to earning the country the dubious achievement of being the poorest and most isolated in Europe (Pano 1997, 291, 296 297). When Ramiz Alia assumed power following Hoxha's death, he was well aware that he faced a failing eco nomic philo sophy, youth bulge, considerable apathy among workers, and discontent among the students and intelligentsia, but organized opposition remained minimal (Pano 1997, 299 300). However, the slow pace of reform coupled with the fall of the
130 Ceau%escus provided f odder for discontents who soon made use of the recently revised 1976 constitution which acknowledged political life beyond the party (Pano 1997, 302 304). The student strike at Tirana University on December 8, 1990 was the first death knell of the limping regime. As demands mounted, Alia made concessions, hoping that legalizing political parties would stave off confrontation, and the opposition Democratic Party (DP) was recognized on December 17. Despite attempts to keep protests at bay, demonstrations tur ned violent, and the DP called a rally to make demands of the government, including provisions to ensure the fairness of the promised election (Pano 1997, 304 307). By February of 1991, students' demands continued to expand and gain support throughout the country, and Alia was caught between offering the masses concessions (both for purposes of stability and his own political gain) and calming conflict between hardliners and protesters. Following a campaign period that granted the incumbent communists consi derable advantages, "results of the election confirmed the rural urban division of the Albanian electorate," with Alia claiming victory thanks to successes in the rural areas (Pano 1997, 308 311). However, Alia's presidency was brief, and he resigned in Ju ne, ceding to a non Communist coalition (Biberaj 2011, 371). Conclusion The Central and Eastern European countries considered here have a considerable shared heritage due to their experience as Soviet bloc nations and members of the Warsaw Pact. Even mor e than geographic proximity, they share a history of Soviet influence and in most cases, domination. In fact, all of the earlier democratizers bore
131 the memories of overt Soviet intervention and suppression. Likewise, they all have distinct pre and inter war but European legacies, albeit with varying degrees of experience with democratic governance. By the late 1980s, however, the regimes in Poland and Hungary had begun to liberalize, either by choice or by force, and acknowledged political actors outsid e of the party. Although the methods of expression and association differed, both Solidarity and the NEM granted citizens of the leaders opportunities to establish political space beyond the officially allowed authoritarian structures. Both Poland and Hung ary possessed the liberalizing regimes and the opposition organizations that enabled their peaceful, pacted transitions. The same cannot be said of others in the region, whose rigid old guard leaders were either forced out by the masses or new reformists i n the moments before their downfall (though, admittedly, the degree of "downfall" varies greatly from cases to case). Clearly, the two countries with better organized opposition groups were better able to capitalize on popular sentiment and weaknesses in t he regime, setting examples of negotiated, nonviolent movements from authoritarianism. Referring back to the data presented in Chapter 2, economic stagnation may have contributed to frustration in Poland and Hungary, but it was not considerably worse than their neighbors' experiences. Where they differed, however, were in terms of political rights and civil liberties, and leaders were more free than their followers on both measures. They were also, unsurprisingly, more globalized, confirming the importance of their European ties.
! 132 CHAPTER 5 Breakers or R ipples? Movements in the Middle East and North Africa Dgage! Tunisian protesters' chant The region of the Middle East and North Africa (sometimes categorized as Arab despite the problematic associational implications of the title) has long been considered a democratic laggard. The hitherto lack of liberalizing movements has stymied academics, most of whom even address the subject either explaining the deficit in terms of Muslim culture (now l argely discredited) or reliance on oil exports and the sociopolitical implications that follow from the dependence (Noland and Pack 2004; Teorell 2010; Ross
! 133 2001, etc.). However, the movements that followed the initial protests in December 2010 in Tunisia gained unprecedented prevalence in the region, bringing it back as a party to democratization literature. To be sure, many movements have been piecemeal or failed entirely, and even those that persist may not consolidate, but the fact of the liberal demand s of the protesters across the region is worth noting and the rationale for inclusion in this dataset. The following descriptions are necessarily constrained by the progress of events and cannot, therefore, speak to democratic consolidation. Tunisia Until the uprisings in late 2010, Tunisia had been ruled by autocratic regimes since its independence from French control in 1955 (Entelis 2010, 541 542). Habib Bourguiba led the independence movement at the front of the Neo Destour Party and capitalized on his domestic and international popularity to consolidate power. Although he briefly flirted with a competitive political system, he ultimately instituted a one party system and, in 1974, was declared President of the party and then the country for life (5 44 547). By the late 1980s, however, the regime was weakened by failed experiments with socialism, declining party infrastructure and popularity, increasingly vocal opposition from both liberals and Islamists, and Bourguiba's failing health (547 548). Zine al Abidine Ben Ali, who rose to the position of Prime Minister under Bourguiba, ousted the old leader on November 7, 1987 and immediately enacted several liberalizing reforms (Entelis 2010, 549 550). Ben Ali sought to create strong economic ties to the We st and actively pursued bilingual education, secularization, and women's rights programs, despite pushback from Islamists. However, his harsh dealings with
! 134 opposition groups at first the Islamist Ennahdha party, but eventually encompassing others across the spectrum and heavy reliance upon security agencies were part of a generally bleak record on respect for rights and liberties, only deteriorating further in 2004 with the revocation of term limits and declaration of immunity for all acts carried out a s President (Entelis 2010, 552 555). Ben Ali consolidated power under a faade of democracy, supported by his Const itutional Democratic Rally and selectively legalizing opposition parties in a manner that either coopted them or exacerbated divisions, using a "divide and conquer" strategy leaving parties unable to challenge his authority. Others groups, Ennahdha in particular, persisted despite their lack of legal recognition (Haugblle and Cavatorta 2011). Furthermore, the regime's pro Western stance enable d it to cloak its repression of conservatives and Islamists in the robe of the "war on terror" (Entelis 2010, 565). Unrest and vocalized dissatisfaction began to surface in the 1990s with greater access to international news and communication and economic stagnation (Entelis 2010, 562). Additionally, high unemployment (especially among the educated), rising food costs, and a drop in remittances from abroad due to the 2008 financial crisis made the rampant corruption of the regime an increasingly salient iss ue (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 6 9, 14). On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi, a fruit vendor, self immolated in response to his bleak economic situation and humiliation, inciting protests that spread from his local Sidi Bouzid to Tunis, aided by the ex isting professional, women's, human rights, and labor organizations (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 7, 13). In a series of televised addresses, Ben Ali struggled to make increasingly sweeping concessions to pacify the populace, but the protestors continued to demand his
! 135 removal (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 7). The desperate autocrat attempted to stifle the internet and personal communication devices that protesters were using and authorized the use of force against protestors, and an estimated three hundred we re killed and seven hundred wounded. Critically, the army refused to fire on the protestors, indicating that the regime had lost its monopoly of force (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 10 13). Ben Ali fled on the 14 th of January 2012, and a stable interim gover nment formed under the leadership of opposition veteran Bji Cad Essebsi (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 7, 15). Since his ouster, Ben Ali has been charged with embezzlement and smuggling, and 91 charges remain (Associated Press, 4 July 2011). Elections for the constituent assembly were held in late October of 2012, and Ennahdha emerged with a plurality, but considerable political, economic, and social challenges remain (Kirkpatrick 2011a; Guiffrida 2011). Egypt Hosni Mubarak became president in 1981 upon t he death of moderately liberalizing President Anwar Sadat, and maintained power through a combination of rigged elections and intimidating any potential opposition (only slightly moderated by U.S. pressure in 2005). He invoked "state of emergency" privile ges to disregard or negate judicial decisions and changed election codes at will, or at least to preserve his status. By manipulating electoral regulations and employing blunt intimidation tactics, he marginalized secular opposition and painted the Muslim Brotherhood as the only (dangerous) alternative, thereby severely constraining opportunities for opposition groups (Deeb 2010, 405 407). However, Dalacoura notes "an increasingly active civil society and labour activism in the 1990s and 2000s" that helped to establish a foundation for later
! 136 political activism (2012, 68). Despite his blatant disregard of democratic principles, Mubarak continued to secure major aid packages and military support from the United States (Deeb 2010, 418 419). As in Tunisia, demo nstrations against the government began after a man set himself on fire, this one in front of the parliament building; several followed suit (Jones 2011). Large scale, popular protests calling for democratic institutions (in addition to Mubarak's ouster) a nd an end to corruption began on January 25, and, though initially peaceful, experienced pockets of violence, particularly following the "Day of Rage" on January 28. The country quickly descended into a state of chaos, many accusing Mubarak of inciting ins tability in order to undermine support for protesters (Sharp 2011, 2 4). Despite encouragement from the United States to refrain from violence, Mubarak attempted to cling to power as security agents fought protesters and the internet was shut down in an at tempt to disrupt opposition organization (Lander 2011; Richtel 2011). As Mubarak's hold on power became increasingly tenuous, Deeb's observation proved prophetic: "As long as Mubarak continues to retain the all important confidence of the Egyptian military his regime is stable" (2010, 410). He attempted to mollify the masses first by replacing his cabinet, then by appointing (for the first time) a vice president, followed by announcing his willingness to step aside at the next election, but he refused to r esign (Sharp 2011, 3 10). However, when the military declared that it would no longer use force against the protesters on January 31, the tide shifted decisively against the autocrat (Kirkpatrick 2011b). The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) publi cly stated their support for the opposition on February 10, and Mubarak resigned the next day (Dalacoura 2012, 64 65).
! 137 The SCAF took control, selecting Essam Sharaf as the new prime minister; but struggled to define itself in the post Mubarak era (MacFarqu har 2011). Fears regarding the challenges facing a notably leaderless revolutionary movement (even including the Muslim Brotherhood) unfortunately proved themselves to be well founded as civil society groups struggled to find a place for themselves follow ing the SCAF's intervention (Fahim and El Naggar 2011). Furthermore, frustration with the slow pace of reforms and suspicion plagued the interim body until parliamentary elections were held in November of 2011, bringing the Freedom and Justice Party (the p olitical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood) to power and validating some of the fears of the more secular revolutionaries (Guirgis 2011; Johnson 2012). The election of Mohammed Mo rsi to the presidency in June of 2012 brought both hope for the realization of a democratic system of governance and fear that the Brotherhood would use its power to establish sharia law, undermining the very processes it used to come to power (Johnson 2012). Algeria Retired general Lamine Zeroual became President in 1995 following the violent repression and retaliation of Islamist groups, but dissatisfaction with the political and economic situation (both from his party and the opposition) forced him to resign before the end of his term. Abdelaziz Bouteflika, supported by the milita ry and several political parties, took power in April of 1999 despite claims of unfair electoral practices. He granted many former combatants amnesty, a move that, while probably integral to the cease fire, was highly controversial as it arguably pre empte d justice for individuals in both Islamist groups and the government. Furthermore, it is widely believed that many of
! 138 those pardoned joined an al Qaeda affiliate (Layachi 2010, 529 533). Despite its position as an energy exporter, socioeconomic issues and the military's political exploits loom large. And, despite the president's unpopularity, he has abolished term limits in a string of increasingly autocratic behavior (2010, 535). Riots began in early January of 2011, first over the increasing food prices, but as the revolution unfolded in Tunisia, protests including several self immolations, following the lead of Bouazizi took on a more overtly political tone (The Associated Press 2011; El Naggar 2011). By February 12, protesters demanded Bouteflika's ouster, voicing frustration with high unemployment and lacking opportunities. While reports of the number of protestors varied widely, the state deployed thousands of riot police to quell the protests across the country (Nossiter and Williams 2011). When a proposal to truncate the state of emergency (in effect for 19 years) failed to quell protests, government subsidies, wage increases, lowered food prices, and some relaxed regulations seemed to dampen the revolutionary activity (Mandraud 2011). Bahrain B ahrain has been ruled by the Al Khalifah family since the eighteeneth century, and has been plagued by sectarian issues for almost as long. The rulers are Sunni while at least 70% of the population is Shi'a, but still face discrimination and are virtually barred from higher positions especially in the government while the Sunni leadership is simultaneously pressured to maintain its patronage links (Crystal, 2010, 190 191). In 1999, King (the title changed from Emir in 2002) Shaykh Hamad bin Isa Al Khali fah began his reign with some liberalizing measures, but maintained his uncle a symbol of
! 139 oppression and discrimination against the Shi'a population as Prime Minister and soon enforced harsher censorship laws, curtailed the power of the newly formed Na tional Assembly, and removed virtually all restrictions on his own power (Crystal 2010, 193 195). Economically, Bahrain is less dependent than its neighbors on its relatively smaller oil reserves and has sought to diversify through enhancing its banking se ctor (Crystal 2010, 196). It is also home to the US Navy's Fifth Fleet and, according to the U.S. Department of State, "grant[s] US forces access to Bahraini facilities and ensure[s] the right to pre position material for future crises" (state.gov). The p rotests that began in Bahrain on February 14, 2011 differ from other regional movements in several respects (Slackman and Audi 2011). Although the protests started as a unified, secular, youth based movement, they have taken on a more sectarian tone. That is, focus has not been on the tension between Islamists and secularists as it has in many other regional cases, but between Sunni and Shi'a communities (Bronner 2011; Shadid and Kirkpatrick 2011a). Additionally, the path of protests and government repressi on has fallen into an ambiguous grey area, with the government using both force and reforms and protests diminishing but not disappearing, leading to ongoing lower level tension. As protest coalesced around Pearl Square, the King called for toleration of t he protestors, but also authorized the use of force against them (Slackman 2011). When promises of jobs and other benefits failed to mollify the crowds, the government brought in Saudi troops, declared a state of emergency, and destroyed the great sculptur e at Peal Square, hoping that the obliteration of the revolution's symbol would also demolish its strength (Fuller 2011; Bronner and Slackman 2011; Bronner 2011a; Bronner 2011b). The government officially ended its state of emergency on June 1, 2011 and al though protests
! 1 40 had generally dwindled, they have continued and those who remained experienced violence (Zoepf 2011; Ellick 2011). The regime has also continued to threaten opposition leaders by upholding the sentences of medics who provided aid to protest ers (Al Jazeera 2 October 2012). Libya Although Libya gained independence in 1950, Officer Muammar al Qaddafi dominated the political scene from the 1969 coup that unseated King Idris. His personalistic brand of "natural socialism" gained increasingly re ligious overtones but his political party never managed to establish genuine grassroots support, despite an attempted "cultural revolution." Although he attempted to marginalize threats from the military through purges and various restructuring activities, mutinies and opposition continued throughout the 1980s. Islamists also challenged the regime in the 1990, but other more liberal or unaffiliated individuals often received the same harassment, torture, and censorship (Deeb 2010, 429 433). Libyan oil and g as reserves have supported much of the economy and were nationalized under Qaddafi. The country struggled economically from the mid 1980s, largely due to anti US and hostile foreign policy approaches, including but not limited to involvement in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie. Liberalizing measures outside of intermittent and selective privatization were virtually absent (2012, 433 439). Protests against the regime began on February 16, 2011, and the response was quick and brutal, leavi ng hundreds dead within the first few days. Demonstrations quickly became militarized, with rebel groups forming militias that established control
! 141 over cities and towns. The Qaddafi regime responded in kind, and brutal fighting ensued, prompting global con demnation, support for his removal and referral to the International Criminal Court (Black 2011a). Despite instability and uncertainty within the loosely organized opposition, a no fly zone and international support for the rebels was decreed on March 17, 2011 (Watt et al. 2011). After months of heavy fighting and high civilian casualties, the rebels moved into liberated Tripoli, although questions regarding the National Transitional Council's legitimacy and effectiveness remain (Al Jazeera 2011). Qaddafi w as captured and executed on October 20, 2011. Although the dictator was deposed and elections are intended, the ultimate democratic future of Libya remains uncertain (Mikle 2011). It faces challenges ranging from creating a national identity, administering resources, and maintaining control of its borders to implementing effective transitional justice measures, changing the networks of patronage and corruption, and establishing a culture that protects civil rights and liberties, virtually the opposite of it s experience under Qaddafi (Vandewalle 2012). Yemen Strategically critical Yemen unified in 1990, and Ali Abdullah Saleh remained its President from that point until the uprisings in 2011. Economic instability, poverty, unemployment, and militant Islamis t groups and activity have proven to be even more resilient than the former leader. Although political opposition groups took root and cooperated to challenge Saleh in the 2006 elections (to no avail), violent groups, including but not limited to an increa singly active al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and uprisings marked the latter half of the decade. Secessionist movements in the south of the
! 142 country added to the political volatility already common throughout society. Although an array of civil society organizations and opposition movements existed, Saleh's party and its military support held real power in the state. "Power," however, is relative, given the state's inability to provide security and goods to its populace; it qualified as a failed state in 2009 (Burrowes 2010, 209 231). Protests and opposition to the Saleh regime were not new to Yemen when they intensified in late January of 2011 (Finn 2011a). However, feeling pressure from other regional movements, the president attempted to quell dissent through a series of concessions including vows to step down with the next election, all of which failed (Finn 2012b). Instead, protests intensified, as did the government's violent reaction to them; however, the violence prompted prominent commanders and other members of the elite to defect, either fleeing or joining the opposition movement (Stier 2011; Finn 2011c). Preexisting militant groups, secessionist movements, and other armed groups added an increasingly militarized element to the opposition. An as sassination attempt forced Saleh to seek medical attention in Saudi Arabia but did nothing to stem the tide of protests (Black 2011b). After making a recovery and returning to Yemen, Saleh finally transferred powers to his vice president in late November o f 2011, allowing for elections for a new government in 2012 (Finn 2011d). Jordan King Hussein, Jordan's second effective king since the end of British rule, died in 1999, passing power on to his son, King Abdallah II, who proved to be a relatively libera lizing force (Ryan 2010, 301, 303). He lowered the voting age and increased the
! 143 number of seats in parliament, in addition to encouraging political parties to participate (partially in response to liberal parties boycotting elections, affording more seats to Islamist groups). Tribal ties and dynamics remain influential both in the parliament and in the military. Furthermore, the Hashmite kingdom has enjoyed the support of the Christian and Circassian minorities. Women have slowly been entering further into the political arena, as exhibited by the 2007 election when Falak Jamaani won a parliamentary seat outside of the quotas. The Jordanian media does not censor journalists outright and there are a fair number of independent media sources, but ambiguous restr ictions lead to a high degree of self censorship. Civil society is more vibrant in Jordan than in many of its neighbors, but many groups are still supported by the state, arguably defeating the purpose of civil society (Ryan 2010, 311 313). Despite King Ab dullah's international importance and popularity, the country was also rocked by protests in early 2011, considered the "first serious challenge" to the monarchy (Shadid and Bronner 2011). However, protesters' demands largely focused on economic issues and dissatisfaction with corruption amongst political elites, rather than the King himself (Bloomfield 2011). Despite price subsidies and a cabinet reshuffle, demonstrations in Jordan merely paused until late 2012 when protesters returned with more strident d emands for far reaching political reform, even calling for the abdication of the King and a fundamentally new political system (Kirkpatrick 2012). Morocco Morocco's monarchies since independence in 1957 have had very varied responses to liberalization an d democracy, or democratic elements. King Muhammad VI
! 144 acceded to the throne in 1999 following the death of his father, King Hassan, and has been deemed more liberal than his predecessor. He was largely seen as "of the people" and both instituted reforms of the family code (giving women more rights) and opened an investigative commission to analyze and bring closure to the human rights violations of his father's reign. However, bombings in 2003 and 2004 prompted restrictions and an increasingly active and un accountable judicial system. Political culture is characterized by mistrust and corruption, and the regime has been consistently criticized for its restrictions on press. The party system is relatively well developed and fairly inclusive, although restrict ions ban parties based on religion, language, and ethnicity. Similarly, civil society organizations maintain a presence of relative strength in comparison to others in the region (White 2010 458 471). Demonstrations in Morocco began in late February of 20 11, with protesters demanding constitutional reform and an end to corruption (Tremlett 2011). The King made initial promises of judiciary reform and strengthening the role of the legislature and parties, but perceived inaction led to the continuation of pr otests (Karam 2011). Parliamentary elections in November of 2011 awarded seats to the Islamist Justice and Development Party but many remained skeptical of the effects that the King's proposed reforms would have. Advocates for democracy see the reinvigorat ion of liberalizing reforms as "window dressings" as the King attempts to solidify his position in uncertain times rather than sincere developments towards democracy (Mekhennet 2011).
! 145 Oman Although it remains a sultanate, Oman's political structure has b een undergoing gradual liberalization since the early 1980s, at least on paper. A Consultative Assembly is nominated and has no legislative powers, but it is meant to provide a means of representation and conduit of information for citizens. The legislatur e consists of an appointed upper house and elected lower house. However, censorship is widely used, political parties are banned, and civil society is virtually nonexistent. Tribal power has declined but tribes remain among the major political players, wit h Sultan Qabus bin Said's (sultan for the past 40 years) family, advisers, and merchants. Although it draws on its dwindling oil wealth, the Omani economy has diversified in recent years (Crystal 2010, 198 203). Initially peaceful protests began on Februa ry 27, 2011 with demands for political reform and increased economic opportunities. Violence followed police efforts to disperse demonstrators. The Sultan promised a stipend to job seekers and ordered the creation of several thousand jobs (Bakri 2011). Oth er demands included an end to corruption, the trial of ministers, and improved living conditions, but demands for political change also gained traction (Reuters 2011). Official response focused mainly on job creation and decentralizing power (Nath 2011) Syria The Ba'ath Party came to power in 1963 and, despite ebbs and flows in radicalism, cooperation, and leadership, has remained in control of the country until the ongoing civil war. Enacted in 1962, Decree No. 51 declared an emergency state thereby
! 146 ena bling the government to violate the constitution, and it remained in place until April 21, 2011. Its revocation has not, however, stopped the President from using security forces against protesters (Lesch 2010, 273 274; Oweis 2011). The leadership of Hafiz al Asad (beginning in 1970) marked a less ideological approach, including a willingness to engage diplomatically and selective economic privatization, but he also maintained deeply entrenched clientelist networks supporting his authoritarian regime. Altho ugh the state remained a republic according to its constitution, it has operated as a single party authoritarian regime since the Ba'athists took control. When Hafiz al Asad died in 2000, his son, Bashar al Asad, was chosen as the next president. An ophtha lmologist trained in London, Bashar al Asad initially spoke of economic reform and modernization and began his rule with what was considered to be the "Damascus spring" an easing of censorship, release of some political prisoners, and allowance of discus sion and dissent. However, this thaw was soon followed by the "Damascus winter" wherein conservatives warned the new president of the dangers of opposition, and more repressive measures were reinstated. He failed to adapt to post 9/11 American policy, whic h viewed Syrian support for Hamas and Hizballah with great suspicion (Lesch 2010, 290 295). While Syria seemed to have escaped the wave of protests stemming from Tunisia and Egypt, protests first erupted in Deraa on the 18th of March 2011. Protestors deman d a reduction of corruption, recognition of rights and freedoms, an end to Decree No. 51, and increased opportunities, and the protests spread across the country. At first, the government responded with a mixture of concessions and heavy handedness: Bashar al Asad initially promised reforms and made concessions to protestors, even accepting the
! 147 resignation of his cabinet and rescinding Decree No. 51 on April 21st, 2011 (Oweis 2011). However, violent repression has been the response to the protests since the y began, and the President continues to claim to be fighting terrorist and militant Islamist groups. Due to the escalation, spread, and pervasiveness of military operations, the Red Cross declared the conflict a civil war in the summer of 2012 (Blomfield 2 012), and the UN has found both rebels and government forces responsible for war crimes (Abedine and Yan 2013). The situation differs from that of Egypt because al Asad has strong ties to the military (controlled by the Alawite minority, of which the Presi dent is a member) and enjoys the support select minorities and elite groups. Furthermore, despite recognition of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, rebel groups remain largely fragmented, and some, such as Jabhat al Nusra have been labeled terrorist groups by the United States. Despite tremendous death and displacement, UN action has been stymied by Russian and Chinese trepidation, and the United States response has been tepid at best (Masters 2013). Kuwait Kuwait's pol itical life is largely dominated by the Al Sabah family although well regarded elections in heavily gerrymandered districts take place for the legitimate but limited legislative assembly. 12 The oldest constitution in the Gulf governs the country, although t he Emir has periodically overstepped its bounds. Political parties are officially banned, but blocs organize along tribal, religious, or ideological cleavages and serve roughly similar functions. Press freedom is mixed, with state owned broadcast media and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 12 Oddly, "the assembly also includes fifteen cabinet ministers, one of whom must be elected" (Crystal 2010, 170).
! 148 publicly owned print sources. Demographics including religion, nationality, and age and lingering distrust of Iraq are defining and sometimes controversial features of the Kuwaiti political landscape. Comprehensive social security and employment for c itizens has become an increasing financial burden on the government, despite the country's oil wealth (Crystal 2010, 165 173). Following initially small protests in the beginning of 2011, discontent swelled later in the year when the prime minister became embroiled in a damaging corruption scandal. Protesters stormed the parliament building demanding resignations of top officials (Associated Press 2011). Although three ministers resigned, the emir granted security forces a blank check to "maintain public o rder" (The Guardian 2011). Since then, criticism of the regime has intensified, with opposition citizens and members of parliament even criticizing the emir and calling for effective democratic institutions in the fall of 2012 (Ulrichsen 2012). Protests ar e expressly political, orchestrated by opposition groups demanding rights and fair representation, but they have continued to be repressed by security forces (Ezzelarab 2012). Conclusion Although it is too early to tell which, if any, of the movements of the "Arab Spring" will consolidate, and if so to what degree, they do offer interesting insight into contemporary revolutionary models. No longer concerned with the threat of communism, suppression of opposition is legitimized through the war on terror, b ut even long held assumptions about the stability of the regimes in the Middle East and North Africa have not been immune. While the two leaders were indeed not big oil exporters, both Libya
! 149 and Yemen did undergo major changes while Jordan did not. Likewis e, Mubarak's close relationship with the United States did not ultimately ensure his protection, while Bahrain's rulers seem fairly secure despite ongoing turmoil. Therefore, it seems that while oil revenue and strategic relationships (both with global an d regional powers) can help to preserve authoritarians they cannot guarantee stability. All of these calls for liberalization were set in the aftermath of the globa l financial crisis of 2008, and, even though leaders' economic indicators may not have bee n objectively worse than the regional average, the case study evidence presented here suggests that such cross national comparison does not capture the entire national experience. This oversight is supported by the fact that it is not the oil rich sultanat es (able to provide amenities and work for their nationals) that led and began major transitions. Furthermore, all of the more dramatic changes or challenges occurred in countries with party systems (even if de facto single party systems) rather than monar chies, even if monarchies were not immune to widespread protests. Interestingly, the leaders were not freer than their followers, but they did both posse s s opposition groups and civil society networks, although they were illegal or heavily controlled. Eve n if the revolutionary movements themselves occurred outside of those structures, precedent existed for dissident organization. T he leaders did not seem to be considerably more globalized than their neighbors except in terms of political globalization, alt hough overall regional globalization has increased over time, perhaps making differentiation more difficult.
! 150 CHAPTER 6 Rocking the Boat: Tentative Characterizations of Leading States in Regional Democratization Movements of the Third Wave All rev olutions are impossible until they become inevitable. Attributed to Leon Trotsky As "overdetermined" as theories of democratization may be, there are not many characteristics that clearly determine leaders or differentiate them from their regions Neither economic formulations, clear categorizations of regime type, nor experiences of
! 151 globalization offer consistently accurate descriptions of leaders. However, elements of each do illuminate certain patterns that may be useful in determining leader q ualities. M UDDIED W ATERS No theoretical family is supported in its entirety. While leaders are not among the poorest in their respective regions, economic data supplies little additional clarity. T wo divergent paths of dealing with year to year chan ge in GDP and GDP per capita that the first leaders in regions of less variation are moderate but first leaders in areas of great variation exemplify the variety are intriguing an d may warrant additional study. However, these paths do not provide much information about th e leaders themselves, nor are they use ful in a forward looking sense because they necessitate full regional information and are unlikely to be of any predictive value because they demand post hoc statistics. Additionally, leaders were n ot consistently more or less "modernized" than their regions in terms of the structures of their economies or societal consequences that the theory suggests. Likewise, leaders did not share a consistent regime, opposition organization, or transition type. Although many anciens rgimes possessed what Linz and Stepan would term authoritarian qualities, not all could be categorized as authoritarian. Hungary, for example, displ ayed post totalitarian elements Hadenius and Teorell's typology also fails to prese nt a category that would encompass all of the leading cases, and not all leading cases correspond to Bratton and van de Walle's categories, which is understandable as not all were neopatrimonial in nature.
! 152 Finally, external factors paint an unsatisfyingly similar portrait. Leaders are not necessarily more or less connected with the global community than the rest of their regions. The impact of regional and global balances of power have different effects on the leaders in different time periods, and while i nternational political dynamics may have had a profound impact on some of the cases, that impact was neither consistent in its presence nor in its outcomes. External forces may be significant, but their importance varies with history, geography, superpower goals, power structures, and a host of other contingent and possibly unforeseeable factors. C ONTEXT AND O PPORTUNITY While leaders' pre transition regime types may not all be the same, they all represent elements of the uncertain middle ground that H adenius and Teorell and Linz and Stepan propose is more susceptible to democratic transitions. Of the three typologies examined, none of the leading cases exhibit the most extreme (i.e. most anti democratic) forms of government. Not one could be categoriz ed as totalitarian, monarchial, or plebiscitary one party systems. This diversity of regime types paired with consistent importance of political "openings" is further borne out in the analysis of leaders' political rights and civil liberties scores. Be it due to regime type, scoring methodology, or other factors, there appears to be little consistency in the relationship between leaders' political rights and
! 153 those of their regions (Figure 6.1). 13 The assessment of civil liberties, however, is more telling. Not only do most leaders have better civil liberties than political rights scores, but they are also concentrated within the first standard deviation below their regional averages, indicating slightly more freedom than their regional averages (Figure 7.2). Figure 6 .1 : Comparison of Leaders: Freedom House Political Rights Figure 6 .2 : Comparison of Leaders: Freedom House Civil Liberties !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 13 Figures in this section graph all of the leaders' standard scores on a bell curve to concisely demonstrate their similarities to and differences from each other and their respective regions. By determining regional standard deviation, all data can be converted to standard scores, or units for which average is zero and each integer represents a standard deviation from the average, allowing all scores to be visualized on a consistent, relative sca le. Recall that a lower Freedom House score, reflected by negative standard score, indicates more freedom. $%! $&! $'! $"! #! "! '! &! %! ()*+,+-! ./01(! 123-*4! 5)*/-60! 15+3+11+*.,! ,2)(57826.-! .9)-426! 1.6)! $%! $&! $'! $"! #! "! '! &! %! ()*+,+-! ./01(! 123-*4! 5)*/-60! 15+3+11+*.,! ,2)(57826.-! .9)-426! 1.6)!
! 154 In a similar vein, leaders are fairly consistent in terms of their poli tical globalization. Indeed, political global ization demonstrates the highest level of consistency of all of the measure d facets of globalization and indicates that all leaders are slightly more politically globalized than their regional average, though not overwhelmingly so (Figure 6 .3). Again, this finding echoes the importance of a fragile middle ground between isolation and openness in which sharing political ideas, practices, and relationships is possible; there is not so much openness, though, as to suggest that there is not much more to attain. Figure 6 .3 : Comparison of Leaders: Political Globalization Just as different regimes may have allowed for varying space for dissent, the leading cases all had a history of opposition activity, but just as none of the regime types were the same, neith er were the civil society groups. In Ecuador, there was a history of political parties and pro democratic pressure from economic elite organizations, while Peruvian political parties and movements including leftist and labor organizations were preserve d throughout Velasco's rule. The Philippines' people power was mobilized based on the structure of pre existing opposition networks, and it is widely argued that $%! $&! $'! $"! #! "! '! &! %! ()*+,+-! ./01(! 123-*4! 5)*/-60! 15+3+11+*.,! ,2)(57826.-! .9)-426! 1.6)!
! 155 the South Korea's prosperity enabled the blossoming of its civil society, which included labor religious, and student organizations. As a labor movement turned political organization, Solidarity was a tremendous force behind the Polish revolution, and the ability of the diverse Hungarian interests to come together, if even for a short time, was eq ually important. Political parties may not have had much of a role in either the Tunisian or Egyptian revolutions, but they existed along with other civil society organization, both legally and illegally. Less formalized associations enabled through social networking sites were also prevalent before the revolution. 14 In short, the leaders were not the Romanias or Omans of their regions, but rather countries in which anti establishment organizations were in place and able to capitalize on weakening or fractur ing elites or symbolic events. Table 6.1 summarizes the similarities and differences of leaders' POSs. Table 6.1 : Comparison of Leaders: Political Opportunity Structure Opposition indicates the types of political organizations present prior to transition. "Interest groups" refers broadly to traditional interest groups (business, labor, student organizations) as wel l as intellec tual groups and social mo vement s. Italics signify that those organizations were directly engaged in the anti regime activity examined in this project. Interestingly, there seems to be no relationship between ideological orientation and organization, indicating that it is perhaps the fact of a mobilizing network that is more important than its vision for post revolutionary society. Opposition groups may be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 14 See, for example, the organization of the Tunisie en Blanc protests of the summer of 2010 (Breuer 2012) or the Kefaya movement as early as 2004 (Li m 2012). Country Regime Authority Transition Opposition* Ecuador Authoritarian Military Negoti ated, pact Interest groups parties Peru Authoritarian Military Negotiated, pact Interest groups, parties Philippines Sultanistic Civilian Protest, rupture Interest groups, parties South Korea Authoritarian Military Protest, pact Interest groups, partie s Poland Authoritarian Party Negotiated, pact Interest groups Hungary Post totalitarian Party Negotiated, pact Interest groups Tunisia Sultanistic Civilian Protest, rupture Interest groups, parties Egypt Authoritarian Civilian Protest, rupture Interest groups, parties
! 156 rig ht leaning, left leaning, issue specific, parties, associations (even virtual), or labor unions, but their presence among t he leading cases is consistent. Therefore it seems that the fact of an established culture of opposition may be even more consistent and telling than the content of the opposition itself. B IRDS OF A F EATHER Leaders of regions are similar to each oth er within their regions in two interesting respects: opportunities for linkages and transition types. Even ignoring increasing globalization over time, leaders have consistent relationships to their regions in terms of overal l globalization levels (Figure 6 .4). That is, leaders' overall globalization scores are very similar to each other, especially relative to the rest of their region. While leaders in general are not necessarily more or less globalized than their regions, both Latin American leaders are s ignificantly less globalized than their regional counterparts MENA leaders are roughly average, Asian leaders are considerably higher than average, and European leaders even significantly so. A similar pattern of tightly coupled leading cases is true of a dult literacy, which often limits or presents opportunities for civil society and mobilization networks (Figure 6 .5). Additionally, nearly all leaders South Korea is the pronounced outlier are strikingly average in their number of telephone lines per 1 00 people (Figure 6 .6)
! 157 Figure 6 .4 : Comparison of Leaders: Total Index of Globalization Figure 6 .5 : Comparison of Leaders: Adult Literacy Rate Figure 6 .6 : Comparison of Leaders: Telephone Lines per 100 People $%! $&! $'! $"! #! "! '! &! %! ()*+,+-! ./01(! 123-*4! 5)*/-60! 15+3+11+*.,! ,2)(57826.-! .9)-426! 1.6)! $%! $&! $'! $"! #! "! '! &! %! ()*+,+-! ./01(! 123-*4! 5)*/-60! 15+3+11+*.,! ,2)(57826.-! $%! $&! $'! $"! #! "! '! &! %! :! ;! ()*+,+-! ./01(! 123-*4! 5)*/-60! 15+3+11+*.,! ,2)(57826.-! .9)-426! 1.6)!
! 158 Globalization, literacy, and phone lines all demonstrate different aspects of how individuals can establish contact, and therefore create networks with each other. The close similarity between leaders within a region combined with the simultaneous differences between leader pairs indicate s that the meaningfulness of this measure is dependent upon regional or tem poral specificities. Wi thin a certain region, leaders tend to have connectivity profiles similar to their partner, but not necessarily similar to leaders in other regions Likewise, while specifics vary greatly from case to case, the opportunities available to and mode s of transition of leaders seem to be consistent within regions. Specifically, all leaders within the Asian, European, and MENA regions had popular movements that led t o the beginning of democratic transitions. Ecuador and Peru both underwent pacted transitions following elite fears (of both economic and social ruin) and maneuvering rather than protests. No region's leaders reflected a mixture of types of movements Simi lar POSs and movement types copied similar POSs and movement types indicating there is more to the "wave" than mere geographic proximity. Although it is beyond the scope of this project, a cursory examination of the regional chronologies indicates a gradu al divergence from the core "leader" experiences stemming from increasingly divergent po litical opportunity structures. This pattern of slowly evolving divergence begins to address the question of why followers follow.
! 159 L IMITED V IOLENCE While leaders' transitions may not be entirely bloodless, no leader's democratizing movement was an inherently violent one, and violent responses to them were limited. South Korea teetered on the edge of civil war, but did not take the plunge; police fired on p rotesters in Tahrir Square, but the military refused. Leaders may have been involved in other conflicts and bloodletting, such as the Philippines struggle with Muslim secessionists in Mindanao, but these conflicts did not directly concern the demands for d emocracy. Protesters may have been killed but none of the leading cases devolved into long term bloodshed, chaos, or civil war. Although this observation is not a direct extension of any of democratization theory, it is still a characteristic of all of th e leaders that may ha ve a bearing on what makes the particular movements appeal to followers. The application of force factors greatly into the calculation of costs of pursuing or preventing democratizing movements to elites and dissidents alike. Pro demo cracy movements within the region could be inspired by the success and relatively low costs o f a peaceful or relatively blood less transition nearby, while the example of violence or chaos would make the cost of protesting appear much higher. Those in power may interpret transitions marked by limited violence in two ways: They may learn that a violent response is necessary to quell protesters, or they may interpret the lesson as the need to seek a method for preserving as much wealth as possible, even at the expense of power and avoiding violent retribution Both patterns are present in regional followers.
! 160 L IMITATIONS AND L ESSONS First and foremost, gaps in the data severely limit usable variables and meaningful conclusions. More information would allow more rigorous statistical analysis, which is impossible with missing data. All variables are limited by their authenticity, which is difficult if not impossible to determine, and accessibility, which depends both upon collection and distribution. Sadly, th ere are several measures including data on economic inequality and attitudes towards democracy, which would make for very interesting analysis that have simply not been recorded (or made accessible) for the pertinent countries or years. Th is analysis coul d be applied to other regions particularly Southern Europe, the former Soviet states, and Sub Saharan Africa. Similarly, results could be tested with different regional parameters, such as dividing Central and South America into two separate regions or us ing a more stringent set of rules for inclusion (successful multiparty elections, for example). While I consciously excluded teleological considerations from this study, it would be informative to see which of these variables are related to the successful establishment of democracy among leaders and their regions and if there is a relationship between order of transition impulse (i.e. leader, early follower, late follower) and consolidation. Furthermore, this type of analysis could be applied to other regional contagion patterns. By making use of this methodology (or an improved version of it), one might explore whether qualities associated with leaders in regional trends of democratizing
! 161 movements are indicative of leaders in general or if those qua lities have a unique relationship with liberalizing trends. Despite the limitations and opportunities for improvement and further exploration, I have identified several characteristics of leaders of regional democratizing movements. Leaders are not the po orest countries of their regions, and they have experiences with civil society and opposition movements. They are slightly more globalized than their regional average, but only moderately and consistently more politically globalized In general, their civ il liberties are stronger than their political rights, and opposition groups in various forms are able to take advantage of the shifting political opportunity structures as they arise. Specific regime types may differ, but they are not totalitiarian, refle cting the intermediate openness that characterizes most fragile regimes. Leaders' transitions do not devolve into chaotic violence, even if conflict is present in the greater milieu. Within each region, leaders tend to have similar opportunities (to each o ther, but not necessarily across regions) for creating networks and paths to transition. To be sure, these characteristics do not amount to a recipe for a leader, nor can they explain why others follow their lead. Context and rich description is still key to understanding democratic movements, but my analysis does suggest that several characteristics could be useful in identifying whether a certain country undergoing a democratically oriented upheaval has the potential to become a regional leader. More imp ortantly, however, many of these characteristics suggest new paths for pursuing answers to the crucial question of why regional effects exist and how they come about. By better understanding exactly what examples leaders set, I hope to have come closer to approaching what followers hope to emulate.
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