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BEDOUIN MODERNIZATION POLICIES IN ISRAEL AND JORDAN BY SAMANTHA SEMENTILLI A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorships of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida May 2012
ii Acknowledgements I owe many thanks to: My advisor, Dr. Barbara Hicks, for her guidance a nd support. Thank you for the long hours you spent reading and editing my thesis. I will never use Professor Uzi Baram for answering my questions on Bedouins, and being the professor I could talk to about the Middle East. My parents for always reminding me to never give up. Thank you for your endless love and encouragement. Andrea, Emily, Lizzy and Li z for keeping me sane.
iii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Life as a Bedouin 2 Study Design 4 Chapter 1: Theoretic al Perspectives on Modernization, Sedentarization, and State Formatio n 7 State Formation 7 Sedentarization Theory 9 Modernization Theory 12 Conclusion 16 Chapter 2: Colonial Legacy: Bedouin Policies of the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate 17 Ottoman Empire 17 The British Ma ndate 22 Bedouins Today Throughout the Middle East 25 Chapter 3: Case Study of Israel 30 Brief History of Israel 30 Bedouins in Israel 31 Modernization Laws 31 The Question of Citizenship 42 Economics 43 Israeli Government Interaction with Bedouins 46 Issues 49 Bedouin in Israel Today 51 Chapter 4: Case Study of Jordan 53 Background 53 Modernizing the Jordanian Bedouin 55 Methods of Implementation 62 Effec ts of Modernization 67 Chapter 5: Conclusion 7 1
iv Tables and Figures Figure 2.1: The Ottoman Empire at Its Peak page 18 Table 3.1: The Bedouin Urban Population in the Negev (1998) page 35 Table 3.2: page 44 Table 3.3: 2003 page 45
v BEDOUIN MODERNIZATION POLICIES IN JORDAN AND ISRAEL Samantha Sementilli New College of Florida, 2012 ABSTRACT Bedouins throughout the Middle East are facing numerous issues, including uncertain citizenship, violence, lack of livelihood, and difficulty fu nctioning inside the states Socioeconomic change and the development of modern states have challenged core ele ments of Bedouin identity to the point that outsiders question the distinction between Bedouins and related populations This study investigate s the effects of modernization on Bedouin s in Jordan and Israel. After reviewing modernization from the Ottoman Empir e through modern nation states, the study examines two case s Israel and Jordan, to explore the different avenues of modernization present in Bedouin lives. The case studies focus on legal status, social and civil serv ices, economic livelihood, and identity issues presented by modernization. A comparative analysis examine s the differences between modernization and outcomes for their Bedouin. Dr. Barbara Hicks Social Science
1 Introduction Traditionally Bedouins are nomadic pastoralists; they live in the deserts of the Middle East raising herds of sheep and camels. Originally Bedouins came from the Arabian Peninsula, then migrate d west across North Africa, up to Spain, as well as the East towards Iraq. The word Bedouin comes from the Arabic word badawiyin or singular badawi badiya The Bedouin s live in tribes, with a leader, sheik ab ide by tribal law, and value honor and generosity T oday, many people in the Middle East will either deny the existence of Bedouins or call them thieves. Why is this? Kay argues that the main reason for non recognition is edouin s] themselves are no longer particularly lorries or pick (Kay 1978, 128). Moreover the number of Bedouins in deserts is gradually drop ping in deserts throughout the Middle East. Governments across the Middle East have take n to settling Bedouins. These g overnments claim that settlement is necessary to address the poverty and hardship in the that leaves their stan dard of living far below that of settled people. However, governments enacted settlement policies not only for the good of the tribes but also for the good of the government particularly in order to control the Bedouin s
2 Settlement policies were designed to p revent Bedouin s from moving, at first, by giving them land and teaching them how to cultivate the land. Through settlement, governments also eased Bedouins into a modern lifestyle with modern clothes and mobility. The process of settlement and modernizat ion has followed B edouin s from the Ottoman Empire through to the present. Governments were and are able to work towards their goal of settlement and moder nity through different policies and methods of implementation Today, Bedouins face different situa tions. Bedouins in the Sin ai Peninsula have been deemed terrorists by the government of Egypt, due to acts of violence against the e being demolished. In Jordan, reports of malnourishment and hono r kil lings of women continue to emerge In Kuwait, Bedouins are facing difficulty in obtaining citizenship However, in the general region of Egypt, Israe l, and Jordan, Bedouins are also a tourist attraction ays for a price. Also in Jo rdan, Bedouins are living under the central government, while retaining a good portion of their tribal heritage, due to a lengthy process of bilateral communication These and many other situations could be considered the by pr oduct of modernity and settlement. Life as a Bedouin Bedouins are u nique in comparison to o ther group s of people in the Middle East. First and foremost, they are historically pastoral nomads, meaning Bedouins depend on livestock and gathering in a migratory setting as a su stainable way of life. Bedouin heritage is revered, at least in the abstract, because traditionally all Arabs in the Middle
3 East are desce ndent from Bedouins. A ll Bedouin tribes have a sheik and the tribes abide by tribal law, but they are known for raiding and tribal wars. Bedouins are also known fo r their generosity and hospitality. Hospitality has to be one of the defining characteri stics of Bedouins. When it received there, even if he is from an enemy tribe. His hosts must extend to him three When a guest c omes to a the guest is first received with a small glass of sweet tea, then coffee, and typically lamb, and rice. Traditionally, Bedouin s did not often eat meat, but when a guest arrived, the family would slaughter an animal in honor of the guest, even if the family had not eaten meat in months. The other two distinguishing features of Bedouins are sheiks and tribal law. Sheiks are tra ditionally chosen from the leading family of the tribe based on their ability, wisdom, and leadership. The sheik rules from the consent of the people, and if he cannot keep the consent of the people, then he can and will be overthrown. Today, a sheik mai to maintain power (Kay 1978, 80). Throughout time and modernity, sheiks are slowly growing apart from their tribesmen. Sheiks traditionally acte d as judges in cases o f dispute and in matter s of tribal law. However, today, tribal law has all but been superseded by the central government. uotes a Bedouin in and the bedu
4 occurred against an enemy tr ibe, but later they manifested as raids on towns. On a raid, the Bedouins would take camel herds, horses, and sheep Raiding was the traditional method of a dva ncement for Bedouin s part of the Bedouin economy ; however, during colonization, raiding was put to an end. Today, Bedouin s have changed dramatic ally. Most have settled and no longe r retain their nomadic lifestyle s, and rarely do Bedouin s still raise herds as their only mean of livelihood Instead, Bedouins are relying more on the gover nment for subsidies, or for training in different methods to make a living. However, tourists can still get a ta ste of Bedouin lifestyle, which includes Bedouin tea and a meal, a camel ride, and often a stay in a Bedouin tent. Study Design This study examines how state formation and various sedentarization and modernization policies have affec t ed the lives of Bedouins. Today, anyone who travels to the Middle East witnesses the current condition of the Bedouin s In fact, some scholars debate whether or not Bedouin s still exist, because the defining characteristics of Bedouins are no longer pre sent. T he changes in Bedouin both good and bad, are due to modernization and sedentarization policies adopted by a series of governments in the region. Three bodies of theory interrelate to help explain policies toward Bedouins and changes in Bedouin lives: sedentarization, modernization, and state formation. Sedentarization is the settling of nomadic peoples, moving from a nomadic lifestyle to a
5 sedentary lifestyle; modernization are the polici and state formation is defined as the interrelated processes leading to the centralization of political power with a monopoly of coercion (Tilly 1975 ). Stat e f ormation i n the Middle East s pecifically aims to move away from a tribal struct ure centralize power, and shift inhabitants away from traditional ways of life to modern sedentary ways of life. Two cases will be used for this study: Jordan and Israel. These two cases were chosen for three important re asons. First, the Bedouins in the Negev in Israel and i n Jordan are of the same tribe, Al Negab so there should be some comparability in lifestyle and identity Second, the countries of Jordan and Israe l are the only countries in the Middle East that have had active policies toward their Bedouin communities in all three facets of state formation. Final l y neither country has a large percentage of Bedouins in the population, but they form a significant m inority in both states. Bedouin s are estimated to be 10% of the population in Jordan (Ryan quoted in Angist 2010, 323) and 2.3% of the population in Israel (Israel Ministery of Foreign Affairs) A marked difference between the cases is that Jordan is an Arab country claiming its h eritage in Bedouin roots, while Israel is a Jewish state. Understanding the policies, their roots and intents, and their effects requires a review of the recent po litical history of the region -the Ottoman Empire, British rule and present governments. The bulk of this study examines mo dernization and sedentarization policies in Israel and Jordan as they regard Bedouins, how those policies were implement ed and the effects those policies have had on lifestyle and identity. A comparative analysis o f the cases sheds light on which modernization and settlement
6 policies have been more effective in achievi ng their goals, as well as the overall impact of modernization policies on various Bedouin communities. Israel and Jord an have both implemented modernization policies, albeit different ly Israel still uses land codes put into law by both the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, along with newer modernization laws. Bedouins in Israel have been modernized through inform al metho ds, such as healthcare and education, along with more formal methods such as designation of areas of residence Meanw hile Jordan has continued modernization policies created by the Bri tish Mandate, tried to subordinate tribal law to that of t he c entral government, and brought civil and social services to Bedouin tribes. However, due to intense disagreements between different peoples in Jordan, the government created a law that politically erased all ethnic divisions making target education polic ies more difficult Bedouins in both Israel and Jordan have modernized, but to different degrees. In Israel, Bedouins downplay the i mportance of tribal structure and tradition, have taken to wearin g modern Arab clothes, and use modern technology. Whil e in Jordan, Bedouins are using modern technology, occasionally wearing modern clothes, but keeping tribal traditions and structur e alive. In the end, modernization policies have affected Bedouins across national boundaries, but through different methods, and different results.
7 Chapter 1: Theoretical Perspectives on Modernization, Sedentarization, and State Formation their Bedouin populations are modernization and sedentarization theory. Both sedentarization and modernization theory arose to examine modern state formation, and policies regarding Bedouins did not change until the formation of modern countries in the Middle East, about the time of colonization. The policies most directly connected with modern state formation are obviously those examined by modernization theory, but sedentarization theory also relates to the centralization of the government. There are gaps in both bodies of theory. For example, sede ntarization theory is specific to nomadic peoples, and modernization theory lacks specificity to any group of people, besides the State Formation Daniel Bradburd (1996) de scribes academic work on pastoralists as falling into two categories: the relationship of pastoralists and states and description of specific pastoralists. He goes on to propose a third way of studying pastoralists, by beginning with the state, specifical ly the process of creating a modern nation state and then moving
8 on to the relationship of the modern nation state to pastoralists. The approach Bradburd proposes is the process used in this thesis, starting with modern state formation in the Middle East, and then determining the relationship between the modern state and pastoralists, or Bedouins. State formation can generally be defined as the interrelated processes leading to the centralization of political power with a monopoly of coercion (Tilly 197 5, 3 83 ). Tilly argues that a state will condense power and then has four functions: war making, state making, protection, extraction. The first three functions all require the fourth function or collecting revenue. For a state to centralize power, inst itutions and armed forces are needed, but revenue is needed to create both institutions and armed forces. The most common way for states to collect revenue is from taxes. Tilly describes the process of modern state formation as movement from tribute to tax, from indirect to direct rule, from subordination to assimilation, states generally worked to homogenize their population and break down their segmentation by imposing common languages, religions, currencies and legal systems, as well as promoting the construction of connected systems of trade, transportation, and communication. ( Tilly 1990, 100 ). Modern state formation creates new economic, political, and social policies. ast, focusing specifically movement away from a tribally structured state and how that change affects pastoralists. He argues that pastoralists in the Middle East have faced and are ec onomic, religious, or other definable groups during the construction of nation states in state formation in Europe were achieved through coercive measures to centrali ze power,
9 often leading to resistance from tribal people who were losing their autonomy. Bradburd made a distinct parallel between the process Tilly described and pastoralists in the Middle East, specifically in Iran. Modern state formation in the Middl e East produces common pressures from communal property and for the promotion of private property, for linguistic integration, for the reduction of independent ethni monetized and commoditized economic relations, for the reduction of alternative loci of rall, pressures on pastoralists result ing from modern state formation are major s modern state formation pastoralists are coerced to modify their traditional way of life to a sedentary and modern lifestyle These strong influences during the development of the modern nation state are captured by sedentarization and modernization theories. Sedentarization Theory Closely following modern state formation is sedentarization. The basic premise of sedentarization policy is to encourage settlement into a permanent lifestyle fr om a nomadic lifestyle. Sedentarization did not become an issue until the idea of agriculture as a means of economics. Settling and moder nizing Bedouins became popular between the 1950s and 1970s (bedouinheritageproject.org 2011). A visit by King Husai n of Jordan, during the period of the formation of Jordan as a modern state, marked the beginning of sedentarization of Bedouins in the Middle East. King Husain often visited Bedouin camps, due to the
10 image that Jordan is a country of Bedouins. During on e of the regular visits King Husain of help, Middle Eastern governments, including Jorda n, began a policy of encouraging the settlement of Bedouins. In the beginning, governments used a simple policy of welfare, assistance, agriculture projects, and housing. A few years after starting s ettlement efforts, governments began to realize that to successfully settle Bedouins, the government would have to funnel a substantial amount of welfare and aid to the Bedouin population. At first, the gap between the nomadic and sedentary populations wa s not large, so government thought they could reduce that small gap, but after oil was discovered, the gap between the nomadic and sedentary populations turned into a gulf. Governments then realized that to settle the Bedouins a substantial amount of mone y was needed. Yet disaffected, could provide a basis for infiltration from outside, not to mention a disturbing Continuing with the idea of settling the nomadic population in the Middle East, governments believed provision of land and encouragement of cultivation was the easiest way to achieve their ends. However since, agriculture in a desert is a very difficult task, other outlets for earning a living were more attractive. Agriculture in a desert requires back breaking work, reliance on water, wind barriers, and time; water is not a reliable source in these regions, wells often dry up, and time was not on the side of Bedou ins, when they had an entire village to feed. Moreover, Bedouins regarded agricultural work
11 as below the status of a noble Bedouin. A radical shift of opinion was necessary before Bedouins could settle. Yet even with all of the drawbacks, governments be lieved in and continued with their agriculture schemes (Kay 1979, 139 41). and heart shift Bedouins directly to an agricultural life, the cost of the shift would be overwhelming, and the Bedouins would probably avoid the agriculture work, leaving the government wi th a lot of money spent on the land and no tenants. As evidence Jarvis gave examples of the Wadi Natrun in Egypt and the Haradh project in Saudi Arabia. Both projects proved to be large expenses to the governments that did not draw Bedouins to settlement While Jarvis may have been right, small plots of individual land initially did draw in more Bedouins, but those Bedouins would often pack up their family and animals and leave. In the end, governments were not seeing result s from either policies of large scale agriculture or small plots of land. With few results, governments began to give up hope of settling Bedouins. Instead they started realizing that Bedouins could make more n about until economic modernization Although the government did not receive the direct brought about a massive exodus from the deserts during the pas 1979, 142). The Bedouins, however, did not settle the way the government wanted; they settled in their own way.
12 Bedouin families slowly started accumulating modern technology televisions, radios, vehicles, etc. and then the families found it easier to stay in one place rather than having to pack up all of their belongings and move. If settlement did not happen thro then Bedouins would begin to specialize in jobs, such as sheep r earing, and move less far and not as often. Then came the oil companies. start ed encroaching into the desert, wells would have to created, and the Bedouin would creation of a Bedouin village, such as with the creation of H4 1 i n Jordan. In the end, the sedentarization of Bedouins takes on two distinct forms, swift and final versus slow and gradual. Proponents of swift and final sedentarization call for one large movement from nomadic life to a settled life; while the proponents of slow and grad ual sedentarization call for a step by step process of transition into a settled life. A third theory of sedentarization is self sedentarization, or sed entarization by means of enticement such as the case of Bedouin settlement after a taste of modern lif e. Modernization Theory From the beginning of the twentieth century if not before, most g overnments around the world began the process of settling nomadic peoples. Often accompanying sedentarization is modernization. To settle nomadic peoples, the n omadic peoples have to be introduced to modern technology and a modern lifestyle; to modernize nomadic 1 H4 is a town that was created in Jordan, but has now been transformed into an airport.
13 people, a form of settlement has to occur. Modernization policy could then be defined as racteristics common to m Lerner 1968, 386). Four different interdependent facets of modernization promote sedentarization: techno economic modernization, political modernization, cultural modernization, and modernization of time ( Bassand 1981, 215 6) The end goals of modernization policies are to improve if not create, political participation, urbanization, economic growth, and cultural transformation. Modernization is thus not confined to any specific sphere of life, but is a c hange in all aspects of life. Nomadic peoples around the world are facing sedentarization through modernization policies, and the Bedouins of the Middle East are no exception. Progress is the basic premise of modernization theory. For nomadic people, and this break in tradition is signified by the adoption of rner 1968, 386 ). In si mple terms, nomadism represent a phase of deterioration which is no longer compatible with the actualities of modern life and therefore should be Zeid quoted in Abu Lughod 1988, 43). Modernization can take place as a holistic process, meaning that i t is happening throughout all aspects of society, or modernization can take place in specific areas. Michel Bassand outlines the four key facets of modernization:
14 Techno economic modernization: The prodigious thrust of science and technology that, when a pplied to the economy, alters the organization of production, distribution, and enterprise and augments the productivity of human labor. Political modernization : The development and the every increasing control of the political administrative apparatus over the rest of society. In addition, it means the differentiation, specialization, and centralization of the organs of state. In certain quarters political mod ernization is defined as the democratization of the political apparatus. Cultural modernization : The general spread of leisure, of mass culture, and of the mass communications media. More precisely, these ted from the moral, political, and religious conventions of traditional society. It is the emergence of the individual independent, proud, rational, in control of his destiny, capable of coming to grips with the entire world, and so on. Modernization of time : This signifies an end to the cyclical time of traditional societies. Modern time is chronometric, linear, and irreversible. In addition, this means that modern man is oriented much more toward the present and the future than toward the past. He d oes not acknowledge stepping backward: If forced to do so, he perceives it as accidental o r parenthetical to his history. (Bassand 1981, 215 6) economic, and politi cal mobilization facilitating the emergence of centralized stratification, increase assimilation, boost the economic sector, increase political participation, reduce independ personal lives (Singh 1981, 41) T he two specific facets of m odernization that produce the greatest changes in structures are techno economic modernization and political modernization. A developing society thus
15 culminates in a separat Limongi 1997, 55). One of the greatest debates in modernization theory is whether modernization can be imposed on people, or if people have to accept modernity before modernization. This debate is similar to the debate in sedentarization; Bedouins were not settling into large scale agricultural schemes, because Bedouins were not suited to that new lifestyle. new institutions of political, economic, and cultural behavior are to change in compatible ways, then inte rcoherence must be provided by the personality matrix which governs individual beha Lerner quoted in Singh 1981, 42 ). Can modernization take place if a modern community is not present, or will modern community ease the transition and developing society should first have modern men or first create modern institutions, especially when Inkeles and Smith assert that modern institution s must precede the modernization comes first, Inkeles and Smith (1974), Lerner (1968) Mc Clelland (1961) and Yogev and Mc Nall (1976) all assert that people have to accept the terms of modernization and make a conscious effort to modernize not only institutions, but also themselves. If people do not personally comply with modernization, then the newly created institutions and structures will not hold. While no modernization theory or model exists specifically for nomadic peoples, a look through history demonstrates basic patterns whereby governments have sought to modernize nomadic peoples. Governments can forcibly try to modernize people by des troying their old way of life making it impossible for nomadic peoples to occupy
16 certain land, closing wells to nomadic peoples, and forbidding citizenship to nomadic peoples until they settle. On the other hand, governments can provide incentives to modernize, such as subsidized ho using, amenities to ease into a modern lifestyle, medicine, education, water, and trucks. Then there is a greater likelihood of self modernization, is similar to self sedentarization. Self modernization is when the government tries to forcibly modernize nomadic peoples, fails, but inadvertently, creates an interest in the modern life. Conclusion Modernization, sedentarization, and state formation theories are all interconnected. To form a modern state, the government has to centralize its power, in part by settling nomadic peoples, and in order to settle nomadic people, the government has to modernize them. The countries of the Middle East have faced these intertwined challenged for a long time. A comparative analysis of t he approaches Jordan and Israel countries wit h large Bedouin minorities have taken should shed light on which policies both development and government policies have had on the lives of Bedouins.
17 Chapter 2: Colonial Legacy: Bedouin Policies of the Ottoman Empire and British Mandate An analysis of current government policies regarding Bedouins requires an understanding of past policies, specifically those of the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate. Policies created under the Ott oman Empire were used during the British Mandate, and some are still in use today, particularly in Israel and Egypt. Ottoman rule initiated attempts to settle the Bedouins, first through incentives then through coercion. Not coincidently, it was under th e Ottoman Empire that the Bedouins learned to operated independently within a government. Before Muhammad Ali, the Bedouins were a separate entity that the government viewed as disrupti ve, and the y still did not actually heed the state. Finally, Muhammad Ali created a modern Egypt that also created the framework for how government would work with Bedouin tribes. policies and then built upon them. It institutionalized the policie s seeking to integrate Bedouin s into the modern state, p olicies that challenged Bedouin ways of life, cultur e, and identity. S pecific sedentarization projects set up during the British Mandate still exist today. Ottoman Empire
18 The Ottoman Empire at Its Peak Photo Credit: Martin, Lucian The Ottoman lasted from 1299 to 1923. This empire was at its territorial peak during the sixteenth and seventieth cen turies, but was one of the largest and longest lasting empires in history. Policies cr eated during the Ottoman Empire have reverber ating effects through today. Some countries still adhere to certain Ottoman Empir e policies; this is true of Israel and Jordan Lasting effects of the Ottoman Empire derive from both their method of ruling and their polic ies. Due to the vastness of the Ottoman Empire, the sultan ruled through the aristocrats and through millets Millets were autonomous religious communities that had control over their own laws, schools, and welfare. Each millet had a communal leader who was the go between for the community and the sultan. During this time, Jr. 2008, 50). M illet s were religious communities. The Ottoman Empire valued the idea
19 of pe acefulness more than the need to extend its control to local affairs, so to keep peace among the tribes, each tribe was treated as a millet Each tribe had autonomous control over its own laws and welf are, with a communal leader who represented the tribe to the local governor This method of ruling, espec ially in regards to the Bedouin s, has had an impact in the Middle East for a long time. Governments after the Ottoman Empire valued the idea of peace as well so they continued to let the Bedouins autono mously rule themselves. The policy of the Ottoman Empire was similar to its method of ruling, maintaining peace. To sum up the policy of the Ottoman Empire, The Ottoman Emp ire was flexible in its policies towards local groups, placing a higher priority on internal stability than on homogeneity. A primary goal was to mitigate strife between clans and groups in order to keep the settled population at peace and the environment agriculturally productive. The Empire s policy was often haphazard and at times coercive. One common feature was an interest in settling the pastoral Bedouin tribes (Winter 2010, 113). Basically, policies focused on maintaining stability and the Empire would do whatever to achieve it. During the time of the Ottoman Empire, Bedoui n tribes were seen to be the main factor preventing that air of peacefulness, by being lawless, out of control, and a sore spot for the Empire, particularly in the Jordan Valley and the Negev desert. Sultan Abdlhamid II Sultan Abdlhamid II was sultan of the Ottom an Empire from 1876 1909 and is responsible for the changes and policies that had the greatest and longest lasting effects on Bedouin tribes. Two policies under the Ottoman Empire left the biggest impact: Bedouin settlement poli cies and the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, both enacted under
20 Sultan Abdlhamid II. Under those two policies, the government tried to forcibly settle the Bedouin population, especially along the Jordan River and in the Negev Desert, and rights to land. Settlement policy was developed under Sultan Abdlhamid II in response to claims that the Bedouins were not under state control, lawless, affecting government income, and responsible for desertification. After those claims, made by gov ernment officia ls, the Sultan tried to encourage Bedouin settlement in Transjordan and Palestine, with the peak of the settlement policies between 1870 and 1891. The Sultan would send agents to help establish settlements and would also place loyal Muslim immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus in Bedouin dominated areas. Yasemin Avci relates that and encourage the integration of th e Bedouin element in the empire ( quoted in Frantzman and Kark 2011, 5 ). However, the Bedouin population did not comply, so the Sultan tried a different approach, force. Reports from Ottoman Empire agents came back s revenue. This second set of reports led to the Ottoman Empire forcibly trying to settle the Bedouins, to very little avail. The second major policy that affected the Bedouins was the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. Under the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, Su ltan Abdlhamid II personally acquired 832,222 metric dunams (1 dunam=approximately 1000 sq. meters) of state owned land (Franzman and Kark 2011, 6) Most of the state owned land was reportedly considered marginal, thus, Bedouins frequented the land. With the newly acquired land, Sultan Abdlhamid II enacted the policy of settling non Bedouins on the land. The
21 the system of tax farming, and consolidated and restored the st After the law was issued almost all the land in Palestine, apart from private property in Franzman and Kark 2011 6). The Land Code of 1858 defined five categorie s of land: milk waqf miri matruk and mawat Milk can be defined as privately owned land, and waqf is religious land. Miri matruk and mawat are all state owned lands. Miri is state owned land that can be cultivated and matruk is state owned land that can be used. Mawat on the other hand is wasteland. The Land Code primarily dealt with miri matruk and mawat by trying to reassert state control over these lands (Franzman and Kark 2011, 6 8) Prior t o 1858, the Ottoman Empir e had a tax farming system, under the Tanzimat the reorganization of the Ottoman Empire starting in 1839 This tax farming system was put in place to improve state control and to abolish the feudal system. However, the tax farming system ended up hurtin g state revenues more than raising them In response to the ineffective tax farming system, the Ottoman Empire created the Land Code of 1858, Land Code was framed to be given effect to by setting up Here lay the problem, land registration. Peasants, and for that matter Bedouins, were semi literate to il literate and accustomed to a traditional way of life. In this traditional way of life, there was no need for paper to prove ownership of the land. In the case of Bedouins, many Bedouins believed that land was theirs, because they, along with
22 their ancest ors, returned to the land often. In peasant and Bedouin society, the oral tradition was enough. On top of the confusion of modernity versus tradition, Bedouins found specific incentives to not register their land. First and foremost, the Bedouins had a deep mistrust towards the government, and therefore, did not want to legitimize the government by registering land. Second, if Bedouins registered their land, they would have to pay a registration fee, and then the land would be taxed. Third, registering land gave the Ott oman Empire a way to conscript Bedouins to the military. In the end, Bedouins did not register their land for one reason or another. Their land, then became state land, and it remains state land to the present day or it was controlled by absentee landowners The British Mandate At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed, and a new era of colonization began. There w ere two major colonial regimes the British and the French. The British controlled land in what was called the British Mandate, including what is today Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and parts of Egypt. The British entered into colonization with an orientalist attitude, meaning that the British believed they were superior to the natives, knowing what was best for them. Their rule extensively changed the landscape of the territories within the Mandate. The British approached their Mandate with assumptions of the local area, peoples, cu stoms, or traditions. New policies were erected to create the perfect British colony. In regards to Bedouins, the British s hould have had a positive bias towards the Bedouins, due to their positive portrayal by Lawrence of Arabia and other British citize ns wh o had
23 worked under the Ottoman Empire. One such citizen, Claude R. Conder who lead the survey of Palestine, named the Bedouins as being far superior to the other Arabs in the area. T he British followed a similar path as the Ottoman Empire, but not nearly with as much precision. British Mandate policy towards Bedouins was simply made up as they went along. To plan the towns and villages and to centralize British rule in the Mandate, the British Empire conducted surveys and censuses. These studies w ere designed to allow them to under stand the local areas. In their surveys and censuses, the British Empire did not want to include the Bedouins, but in the end, they only included certain Bedouin tribes, or simply could not be bothered to include the Bed ouins. The sword of the British Mandate was double edged, the Bedouins did not fit into their administrative framework, therefore were not represented in surveys and censuses, which in turn led to Bedouins not The Be douin lost out in this system because they (Franzman and Kark 2011). Bedouins who were settled d u ring the Ottoman Empire and Bedouins who were not settled did not have proper representation as a village under the British Mandate. D ue to lack of representation and understanding, the Bedouins were once again seen as operating outside of the law. The British believed that the Bedouins needed to be coerced into settlement and operating under the state administration. In 1942, the Bedouin Control Ordinance (in Palestine) special powers of control of noma dic or semi nomadic tribes with the object of
24 (Falah 1945, 38 ). This ordinance empowered the government to classify who is considered nomadic, tell those nomads where they could reside by way of eviction, control illicit grazing, prevent Bedouin raiding, and give the Mandate a better sense of security. Franzman an d Kark (2011), spoke of two outcome s of the British Ma Bedouin policies On the one hand there was confusion, which also led to disp utes, court cases and the enactment of ordinances targeting the Bedouin as 15 ). Overall, the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate created a headache for the Bedouins. Settlement policies were initiated to centralize government power and later turned into coercive policies. The policies created under the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire left lasting sociopolitical effects on the Bedouin tribes in Jordan, Israel, an d Egypt. At the time, the policies created a frustration with the Bedouin s that then led to disputes. With all that was going on around them, Bedouins expressed themselves in the only means they had, poetry and songs. The poems and songs that the Bedoui ns recited were recorded by many anthropolo gists under the British Mandate and by government officials during the Ottoman Empire. These poems expressed their feelings regarding what was going on in the world around them. One poem, recited by a settled Be douin girl, tells he poem collect ed by Kay, expressed the changes the Bedouins were facing, but a poem
25 collected by Bailey expresses how the Bedouins feel about the change. Bailey collected poems that clearly express Negev Bedouin s sur 2002 359). Bedouins Today Throughout the Middle East Today, Bedouins are scattered throughout the Middle East, but have a high concentration in Sa udi Arabia and Jordan, even though exact population figures are unknown. Bedouins are also located in Libya, Egypt, Israel, Syria, North Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula, with populations respectively descending. Jordan is a state that identifies a s a Bedouin country with an Arab majority, while Israel is predominantly Jewish with Bedouins as a minority. Regarding the population of Bedouin s in the Middle p. 129). This statement although published in 1978 holds true throughout time. Researchers and government officials have attempted to count the Bedouins, but none have done so successfully, so there is always speculation about the true number of Bedouins in the M iddle East. The population figures we have are approximations that researchers or government officials have agreed upon. Kay provid es an overview from the 1960s: there were estimated to be about a quarter of a million Bedouin in Iraq, slightly more i n Syria, and about 100,000 in Jordan. In Egypt and the Sahara the numbers now are relatively low, estimated in the 1960s at a quarter of a million in the Maghreb, a little less than that in Libya, and under 70,000 in the Western Desert tate where there were thought to be large numbers of Bedo uin is Saudi Arabia (1978, 130). Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula
26 Bedouins have had a large role in the Arabian Peninsula. According to Kay (1978) Bedouins originated from the Arabian Peni nsula, or more specifically, present da y Saudi Arabia. Today, they still inhabit the Arabian Peninsula, with a large population in Saudi Arabia. Present day Saudi Arabia was created wit h the help of Bedouins; they had a large presence in the Saudi Arab ia n military that unified Saudi Arabia from the 1920s to the 1930s, and they continue to have a strong presence in the Saudi Arabian military, despite comprising only about 4% of the population (Nahedh 1989) Bedouins in Saudi Arabia have primarily settled down due to increased economic opportunities (oil, military, unskilled labour) and drought during the 1950s and 1960s. From the start of the modern Saudi state, Bedouins have led a primarily settled lifestyle, but maintain strong tribal roots, similarly t o the rest o f the citizens in Saudi Arabia (Nahedh 1989). Today, Bedouins continue to live throughout all the countries in the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia has the largest presence of Bedouin s in the Peninsula, and in the Middle East. The rest of the c ountries in the Peninsula reportedly have some of the lowest populations of Bedouins. Kuwait is the only other country in the Peninsula, besides Saudi Arabia, with information and news on Bedouins. In February of 2011, reportedly more than 1,000 Bedoui ns took to the streets of Kuwait, empowered by protests in Tunisia and Egypt, demanding citizenship. Kuwait with at population of 2.8 million is estimated to have between 100,000 and 120,000 Bedouins without citizenship. The issue of Bedouin citizenship arose in 1959 when Bedouins did not apply for citizenship after Kuwait passed a citizenship law. Descendents of Bedouins who did not apply for citizenship in 1959 do not have citizenship as well, meaning they are denied
27 basic necessities. The Kuwaiti gov ernment argues that the majority of the Bedouins are not Kuwaiti and are coming or came from Iraq, Syria, or Saudi Arabia, but that the Bedouins in Kuwait enjoy the same rights are regular Kuwaitis except the right to vote ( Miller 2011 ). Syria Currently, the number of Bedouins in Syria is unknown; however, scholars believe that the current population of Bedouins is significantl y lower than previous estimates from the 1960s, due in part to previous and current political unrest. Bedouins have an important historical root in Syria. It is thought that Bedouins originated from Saudi Arabia and migrated to Syria, causing both countries to be the primary and second ary location of Bedouins and Arabs. Syria was also the first country to create Hima cooperatives in the 1960s which are like most Middle Eastern countries with a Bedouin population, has systematically been taking Bedouin land in the name of the state (Shoup 2010). Egypt The Bedouin situation in Egypt is more precarious than other countries. Bedouins are primarily located in the Sinai, but once again the population is unknown. Muhammad Ali and Nasser both of whom are known are great modernizers, had the greatest impact on Bedouins in Egypt. Muhammad Ali and Nasir al Din Shah were the last rulers of Egypt under the Ottoma n Empire. They both realized that to resist European takeover, power had to lie within the state, or more importantly in the hands of the ruler. The E gyptian
28 headed by Nasir and Ali, led to Britain recognizing Egypt as an inde pendent country during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which prevented the whole of Egypt from being colonized by the British. Muhammad Ali lived from 1769 to 1849. He was the self declared ruler of Egypt, and is revered because of his drastic reforms to the military, economy, and culture. Under Muhammad Ali, Egypt started down the path of becoming an independent country and building a modern state. He single handedly moved Egypt from subsistence to market agriculture, making Egypt the first M iddle Eastern country to accomplish this shift In regards to Bedouins, Muhammad Ali made four major changes with lasting sociopolitical impacts, and most of these approaches are still used by countries in the Middle East when it comes to governing Bedo uins. All fou r policies balanced the Bedouin s sense of independence with the constraints of living within the state. These are the first steps of the state centralizing its power, by ever so slightly reaching into the lives of Bedouins. Cole and Altork i summarize the four major sociopolitical changes: The state appointed officials from among the Bedouin to represent different tribal segment to the state and vice nted them tax disputes and crimes perpetrat ed by Bedouin against each other. (Cole and Altorki 1998, 67) However, most of the work accomplished by Ali and or Nasir met challenges with the between Israel and Egypt, the number of Egyptian troops allowed in the Sinai is very small in comparison to the size of the area, resulting in lack of control. For multiple
29 reasons, the Bedouins in the Sinai have resorted to questionable methods of economic gain, such as smuggling, human trafficking, organ harvesting, and robbery. The Egyptian difficult at present, due to complications between Israel and Egypt, an overbearing and unhelpful Egyptian government, and lack of motivation on the part of the Bedouins.
30 Chapter 3: Case Study of Israel Brief Histor y of Israel Before the British Mandate, the land that is currently known as Israel, was under control of the Ottoman Empire. This section of land was largely po pulated by Muslim Arabs. A fter the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations grant ed G reat Britain political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the The Mandate for Palestine 1922, Article 2 ). Tensions began to arise between Great Britain and the Jewish population in 1945, eventually leading to the withdrawal of Great B ritain from the Mandate in 1947 and the creation of the Jewish state of Israel. The end of World War II marks the end of B ritish rule of the Palestinian Mandate and the UN Partition Plan of the Palestinian Mandate into the Jewish state of Israel and the Arab state of Palestine. Israel officially became a state on 14 May 1948; however, the Arab world did not accept the creati on of the Jewish state, leading to six decades of tensions, wars, and bloodshed. Through wars with Arab neighbors the land around the state of Israel has changed hands many times, including the Palestinian territories, the Sinai Peninsula, and southern Lebanon. Israel officially withdrew from Sinai in April of 1982, as per the 1979 Israel Egypt Peace Treaty and withdrew from southern Lebanon in
31 May of 2000. Israel also drew up a peace accord with Jordan in October of 1994, which led to definitive boun daries between Israel and Jordan. ( Angrist 2010, 285 310 ). The creation of Israel and the subsequent conflicts and border changes have had strong impacts on the various peoples of Israel, including the Bedouin population. Bedouins in Israel Israel has a population of 6.5 million people; of those 6.5 million, 170,000 are Bedouin. Of those 170,000 Bedouins, 110,000 Bedouins live in the Negev, the southernmost region of Israel, which accounts for over fifty percent of Israeli territory. A smal ler group of 10,000 Bedouins live s in the central region, the area in and around Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and 50,000 Bedouins live in the north a bove Tel Aviv and Jerusalem ( Jewish Virtual Library; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs ) Bedouin h istory on the land in Israel date s back between 4,000 and 7,000 years. The Bedouin s in the Negev can be traced back to the Bedouins traditionally living in the Sinai, who migrated to the Negev. Although the Bedouins did not permanently settle anywhere, relics wer e discovered of open air mosques, seasonal dwellings, and ceme teries, helping to prove their early existence on the land. Records of the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate also included Bedouins living along the Jordan River. Modernization Laws Israel began to implement laws modeled after modernization theory as soon as the Jewish state was established. The idea of modernization was not new to the area, but the Israel i government and the Bedouins had and have differing ideas as to why Israel is
32 modernizing. On one side, the Israeli government says that modernization is for the benefit of the Bedouin population and for the benefit of Israel; on the other side, the Bedouins believe that Israel is trying to take thei r land (K ishony 2008, 396 7). A quote towards the Bedouins: The Bedouin must be made municipal workers in industry, services, construction, and agriculture. Eighty eight percent of Israeli residen ts do not work in agriculture. The Bedouin will be included among them. The transition will be sharp, however. It means that the Bedouin will not be on his land and with his herd; he will be a city dweller who comes home in the afternoon and puts on a pair of slippers. His children will get used to a father who wears pants, carries no dagger, and does not remove head lice in public. They will go to school with their hair combed and parted. It will be a revolution. How can this be organized within two genera tions? Not by force, but with governmental direction. This phenomenon called "Bedouin" will disappear. Moshe Dayan, M inister of A griculture, July 1963 (quoted in Kishony 2008, 396 97) The Israeli government believed that modernization and sedentarization would help to Adva (Kishony 2008, 396 7). So the Israeli government began to modernize the Bedouin through a long process that is still in the works today. Unrecognized Villages Today, Bedouins in Israel no longer retain the pastoral nomadic life, where they would travel with their herds and live in tents. They either live in a recognized town or an unrecognized village. This notion of a place of residence being recognized or un recognized is the center of grief, debate, destruction, livelihood, modernization, and legality in Israel. It is best to begin the examination of policies toward Bedouins with the
33 basic definitions, differences, and make up of unrecognized villages versus recognized cities and town s, then to proceed to the controversy. The definition provided by the International Work Group for Indig enous Affairs (IWGIA) is that unrecognized village not appear on Israeli maps, have no road signs indicating their existence, and are denied basic services and infrastructure, including (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2010). So the idea becomes quite simple, an unrecognized village is an illegal settlement and a recognized city is a legal settlement. Taking that definition one step further, a recognized city or town is an Israeli state planned sett lement, while an unrecognized village is not. What is the difference between an unrecognized village and a recognized town? However, a council created to represent the interests of resident s of unrecognized villages, the Regional Council of Unrecognize d Villages (RCUV) answers this question from the state such as water, electricity, sewage, or roads, and are deemed illegal settlements, and thus are constantly subject to Unrecognized Bedouin Villages 2008 ). RCUV paints a simple and widely accepted picture of an unrecognized village; they are unofficial and are void of any municipal or social services, It is estimated by the Adva Center, RCUV, and Kishony that approximately 76,000 Bedouins are l iving in unrecognized villages: fifty percent or more of Bedouins in the Negev live outside of recognized cities and towns (Kishony 2008, 396). The actual number of Bedouins living in unrecognized vill ages is debated due to the fact that the
34 Israeli government does not include unrecognized villages in population surveys. Other organizations use their own methods for c oming to the number of Bedouins living in unrecognized villages, but once again there is a gap in the data. In the Negev of Israel there are approximately forty five unreco gnized villages, according to RCUV, but again this number of unrecognized villages is not concrete, because the Israeli government does not include unrecognized villages in population surveys ( Unrecognized Bedouin Villages 2008 ) Recognized Town ships In 1967 the Israeli government began the construction of recognized Bedouin township did not begin until the Bedouin themselves constructed building s once again this notion is debated by the Bedouin communities They claim that the governme nt began the establi shment of permanent townships simply to urbanize and concentrate the Bedouin in to a smaller, manageable area ( Ben David 1999 ). The first recognized Bedouin town was Tel Sheva created in 1967 or 196 8 (the exact year is debated). Tel S heva was not a good start to government townships, due to many problems. Most of the problems with Tel Sheva came from the unsuccessful combination of urbanization and tradition, such as social and living structures. The important thing is that Israeli o fficials learned from the mistakes of Tel Sheva when the y built the other six recognized B edouin townships in the Negev Tel Sheva, Rahat, Kuseife, Arara, Hora, Segev Shalom, and Laqye are the seven recognized Bedouin townships in the Negev ( Swirski and Hasson 2006 ) Approximately 85,000 Bedouins
35 live in the townships planned and recognized by the government ( Human Rights Watch 2008 ) Again the number varies depending on source, but the majority of the Bedouins who initially settled and still today live in the recognized government planned townships have no claim to land, so they moved into the government planned townships in hopes of a better life. T able 3.1 shows the approximate populations of the seven government planned and recognized Bedouin townsh ips in 1998 Table 3.1 : The Bedouin Urban Population in the Negev (1998) Rahat 28,000 Tel Sheva 7,000 6,200 Keseifa 5,500 Segev Shalom 2,600 Hura 2,400 Lakiya 1,500 Total 53,200 Source: Ben David 1999 A number of issues plague recogniz ed Bedouin townships and put them at a dis a dva ntage to Jewish townships. The ADVA Center lists the issues as: Negev, which severely limits possibilities for development; st municipal budgets in Israel; existent or inadequate; no access to main arteries. All towns, with the exception of Rahat, have only one access road; limiting access to the labor market, to institutions of higher learning, to hospitals, to soc ial services and to financial and governmental services; lots or community centers; schools) operating in
36 temporary instead of permanent structures ( Swirski and Hasson 2006 26 65 ) These issues listed by the ADVA Center are confirmed by a number of other organizations, including Human Rights Watch, who claim t hat recognized townships have lower budget s than do Jewish townships, if they have a budget at all, and suffer from an increased rate of crime, insecurity, poverty, and overcrowd ing ( Human Rights Watch 2008 ). Along with the issues mentioned above, the Israeli government requires Bedouin s to renounce their claim to land if they wish to move into one of the government planned townships. When the Israeli government demolishes homes in unrecognized villages officials insist that it is okay because Bedouins can move into the government planned townships. However, the government planned townships are in no condition to handle an influx of Bedouins, due to poor infrastructure, high cr ime rates, and lack of available space and money. T he issues posed by gov ernment planned townships and a lack of money led the Israeli government to begin recognizing Bedouin villages that were unrecognized, placing these villages under Regional Councils The downfall is that these newly dragging, poor financing, and borders that do not provide sufficient agricultural land for llow the next generation to remain in the Human Rights Watch 2008 ). Modernization The Israeli government has claimed and continues to claim that modernization is the way to integrate Bedouins into Israeli society. Israeli officials believe this happens on
37 two levels the first beginning legally and the second informally via social stan dards. Legally, Israel is integrating Bedouins into Israeli society by making living conditions difficult outside of recognized, government planned towns. The government believes it can do this because Bedouin land belongs to the state of Israel. This statement is rationalized by the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. Under the Land Code, the Ottoman However many Bedouin s did not know land. Upon the creation of Israel, the Israeli government did not recognize the land that the Bedouin s were living on to be their own, because the Israeli government believe s the Bedouin land to be state land, as per the Land Code of 1858. Therefore, Bed ouin villages were deemed unrecognized, and continu e to be so today. A fter the creation of Israel, claims for land rights were supposed to be filed by April 1, 1952, and if they were not, then the state of Israel could claim the land as state land (Meir 2 009, 832 43 ) The Israeli government also informally integrates Bedouins into Israeli society via education and health care. The government oversees most of the legal and social integration of Bedouin, through different councils. The chief council working toward Bedouin integration is the Ministerial Committee for the Adva ncement of Bedouin Affairs. Legal Integration via Land In 1953, Israel passed the Land Acquisition Law which in essence transf erred all confiscated and unclaimed land in Israel to the state. A specific mention in this law was that if the owner did not register their land on April 1, 1952, then the land belonged to the
38 State. On the day April 1, 1952, th e state of Israel finishe d its temporary removal of of approximately 1,000 km 2 (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 2010; Human Rights Watch 2008) The Albeck Commission In 1975, the Israeli government established a commi ssion headed by Ms. Plia Albeck. The Albeck Commission submitted recommendations for the land settlement in the Siyag and the Negev. The government adopted thes e recommendations in under a year, and (Swirski 2008, 31) The Albeck Commission recommendation was ba sed on the Ottoman Land Code, claiming that all of the land area in question (that of the Siyag and the Negev) wer e mawat meaning they are state the Bedouins are unable to acquire any rights [in the Siyag area lands], not even by virtue of protracted possession and cultivation, and hence all of the lands are state lands" ( quote d in Swirski, 2008 31) The Albeck Commission also determined that the Supreme Court of Israel would not evict Bedouin s from their land without compensation, so they created a plan that went beyond the law of the Al b eck Commission to compensate the Bedouins. From this point, the Albeck Commission created three principles underlying state policy to this day: first, non recognition of any right of possession by the Bedouins to the lands inhabited by them compensation to the Bedouins for their land and third, conditioning compensation on abandoning the land and
39 moving to one of the local ities planned by the government. (Swirski 2008, 31) The Bedouins did not accept the Albeck Commi s Israel did. The Sharon Plan Two and a half decades after the Al beck Commission, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon launched a new development plan for the Negev, specifically aiming towards Bedouins, that was later authorized by the Ministerial Committee for Non Jewish Affairs year plan allo cated 1.1 billion New Israeli Shekels, and the main purpose of the Sharon Development Plan was the [of] the [Bedouin] population into seven planned concentration s and destruction of their home villages without any item in this budge that suggest The Goldberg Committee The Goldberg Committee met in 2007 and attempt ed to resolve outstanding issues between the Bedouin s and the state of Israel, specifically regarding land disputes. Article 3 of government resolution No. 2491 outlines the task set ou t for the Goldberg Committee, noting that the comittee ill submit its recommendations for forming a large, inclusive and feasible plan that will set the rules for arranging the Bedouin settlement in the Naqab, including compensation rate, arrangements for alternative land allocation, law enforcement and a timeline to executing the arrangements and, i f necessary, legislation bills (Amara 2008, 230 translated by the Amara ). The Goldberg Committee memorandum pro posed that the government dunams for solving the land claims. Of these, 25,000 dunams should be within the planning boundaries of the existing Bedouin settlement and those under planning. The
40 government also dedicates NIS 2.6 billion to solving the land claims, a sum that includes the value of the settled lands (1 237). The Israeli government has implemented its idea of legal integration thro ugh two main methods: 1) d enial of services, and 2) property destru ction. Both methods of implementation have captured the attention of citizens within Israel and international of Israel still uses the denial of basic municipal ser vices, such as water, electricity, access roads, health and education as a device to coerce the community to move from their historical villages into State planned townships, which Israeli plann ers refer to as ( rekuzim (Qupty 2004 2 ). The basi s of the denial of services depends on the legal status of Bedouin villages. If Bedouins live in unrecognized villages, then they have no services B ecause unrecognized villages are deemed illegal by the Israeli government any permanent structur es in u nrecognized villages are subject to demolition According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, p ermanent structures along with the grazing of animals in protected areas are against the law. Education The Israeli government believes education is the main contributor to Bedouin integration. Under such a belief, not just towards the Bedouins, but also in regards to Jewish Israeli citizens, the Israeli government has enacted the Compulsory Education Law. The Compulsory Education Law states that Ben David 1999). Israel
41 education as an economic and social mobility tool; the idleness of children and youngsters in the wake of moving to permanent settlements (they had been the main labor force tending the fields and the livestock); and the establishment of a relatively large number of schools in the scatte red location David 1999 ) Health Care Israel is a leading Middle Eastern country in health care, as is evident from its life expectancy rates, 79.1 for women and 75.3 for men. In January of 1995, the government provide health services for all resident [s] Ben David 19 99 ). Under the National Health Insurance Law (NHIL), registered residents of Israel are allocated a standardized basket of medical services within a reasonable amount of time and distance from re sidence. Health care services in the standardized basket in clude but are not limited to diagnosis, treatment, preventive treatments, hospitalization, transportation, surgery, and medication. However, the NHIL only provides Israel i residents with health insurance. The NHIL does not provide for the location of h ealth services, i.e. whether or not towns or cities have health services, such as doctors and hospitals. T his particular point does not directly differ between Bedouins and Jewish Israelis, but indirectly access to health care does differ between Bedoui ns and Jewish Israelis, even between Bedouins in recognized and unrecognized villag es. Between recognized Bedouin cities an d Israeli cities, the quality of health care also differ s meaning that Bedouins and Jewish citizens receive different services
42 A study conducted by the Negev Coexistence Forum found a number of issues facing the Bedouins. The study identifies several issues For one, Arabs i ce only residents of the unrecognized Noach Sheva Teruham, and Dimona. Second to discrimina tory reception hours. The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Equality found villages is 13 hours each week as opposed to 21 hours in the Jewish settlements (Noach 2 009, 33). On the other hand, the Israeli government, through the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs claims that if there is a difference between health services in the rest of the country verses in Bedouin towns, it is due rather to the physical domai n than to the Jewish Virtual Library 2012 ; Ben David 1999 ). The Question of Citizenship The question of citizenship regarding Bedouins in unrecognized villages is difficult to answer. Do Be douins in unrecognized villages have Israeli citizenship, or do only Bedouins who live in recognized cities have Israeli citizenship? Answers to those questions are controversial and the questions evoke different answers from different organizations. One certainty is that Bedouins l ivi ng outside of recognized cities and towns, i.e. living in unrecognized villages, do not and cannot have an official address. Due to the fact that Bedouins living in unrecognized villages do not have an official address, they
43 cannot vote in municipal el ections ( Qupty 2004 ). Not having a vote in municipal elections means that Bedouins living in unrecognized villages do not have a say in the Israeli government. Bedouins living in unrecognized villages also do not have municipal or social services, and th e NHIL and the Compulsory Education Law do not reach unrecognized villages, because the Israeli government does not believe those villages to be legal. The last certain part of information regarding citizenship is that Bedouins living in recognized cities and towns are Israeli citizens. Information regarding the citizenship of Bedouins in unrecognized villages is controversial. According to the ADVA Center, Bedouins living in unrecognized villages do not have Israeli citizenship, or any citizensh ip for that matter. The ADVA Center estimates that approximately 76,000 Bedouins live without citizenship ( Swirski and Hasson 2006 ). However, the RCUV believes that Bedouins living in unr ecognized villages are Israeli citizens, as do other international organizations, such as the Internally Displaced Monitoring Center (IDMC). What is clear is that Bedouins in unrecognized villages live in Israel, and the only thing between being allowed t o vote and not being allowed to vote, is where they live in the country. The confusion surrounding the citizenship status of Bedouins in unrecognized villages leave s them uncertain about their rights. Economics On a very basic level the Israeli Forei gn Minister has tried to give the percentage of Bedouins in the di fferent job markets they occupy: t hirty percent of Bedouins retain permanent jobs in factories and government services, while twenty five percent of
44 Bedouins retain jobs in agriculture. However, there is a gap in this data. The Israeli Foreign Ministe r did not specify from where they ministry ob tained this information, nor whether or not this information includes Bedouins in unrecognized villages ( Jewish Virtual Library). Table 3.2 : B edouin s gender characteristics, 2003 Percentages Total Bedouin s in Beersheba sub district excluding Bedouin Localities Men Women Men Women Total labour force 100 100 100 100 Not in the civilian labour force 36.0 86.6 40.0 48.1 In the civilian labour force 64.0 13.4 60.0 51.9 Total labour force 100 100 100 100 Employed 65.3 79.8 88.4 86.7 Unemployed 34.7 20.2 11.6 13.3 Source: Adva Center analysis of CBS Labor Force Survey, 2003 MUC file Overall, it is difficult to obtain an accurate survey of Bedouins. The only way to fully understand employment statistics is to use surveys conducted by the state, which almost always omit un recognized villages. T he closest thing researcher s have to economic statistics derives from a labor force survey conducted in 2003 which includes a random sampling of unrecognized villages The ADVA Center analyzed the se statistics and put the data i nto charts comparing Bedouins in recognized villages to the Jewish population living nearby, in the Beersheba sub district (s ee tables 3.2 and 3.3) The data includes men and women fifteen and older who are either in the labor force or self employed. H ow ever, the ADVA Center does warn that the figures from the random
45 sample of Bedouins in unrecognized villages might be statistica lly unreliable ( Swirski and Hasson 2006 95 9 7). According to the analysis of the Labor Force Survey of 2003 presented by th e ADVA Center, 64% of male Bedouins in recognized citi es were part of the work force either working or seeking work, whereas only 60% of male Jews in the Beersheba subdistrict were part of the work force. The unemployment rate for male Bedouins in recognize d cities was 34.7% compared to 11.6% for Jewish men in the Beersheba subdistrict ( Swirski and Hasson 2006, 95 7). Table 3.3 : Employed Bedouin s localities by occupation, 2003 Percentages Total Bedouin s in Bedouin s in villages Beersheba subdistrict Excluding Bedouin localities Academic, liberal and technical professions, managers 20.4 Figure might be statistically unreliable 32.5 Clerical employees, agents, sales and service personnel 15.3 Figure might be statistically unreliable 36.2 Agricultural laborers, skilled and unskilled 64.2 89.4 31.3 Total 100 100 100 Source: Adva Center analysis of CBS Labor Force Survey, 2003 MUC file ( Swirski 2008 p. 95 7). Table 3.3 compares the occupations of the Bedouin workforce in recognized and unrecognized localities and Jews of Beersheba. T he percentage of Bedouins in what could be called
46 substantially higher than that of Jews in Beersheba. Fully 64.2% of Bedouins in recognized towns work as agricultural laborers and 89.4% of Bedouins in unrecognized villages work as agricultural laborers whereas 31.3% of Jew s in the Beersheba district w ork as agricultural laborers. The only occupation category that has enough statistical reliability for a complete comparison is a gricultural laborers, skilled and unskilled. I sraeli Government Interaction with Bedouins Bedouin s in Israel have never been directly ruled by the Israeli government, but rather have been ruled from afar. The Israeli government has created special c ommittees whose primary roles are to govern the Bedouins. These committees have specific purposes such as education, deve lopment, settlement, water, whether the Bedouins live in are the only community in Israel for whom a sp e cial government body is in charge of Swirski 2008 39). This section is dedicated to exploring the different Bedouin councils and committees that are in existence today, what they are supposed to be doing, and what they are really doing. The Bedouin Education Authority was created in 1981 by the Educa tio n Ministry of Israel to implement the compulsory education law, primarily in unrecognized Bedouin villages, but also in recognized Bedouin townships. Officially the Education Ministry etting up, building and maintaining schools, assuring appropriate and adequate teaching personnel, taking care of furniture and equipment, supplying water, providing funding and teach [ing] ( Swirski 2008 43).
47 The Bedouin (Development or Adva ncement) Authority, or the Bedouin Authority submitted land title claims but the Bedouin Authority has become the primary government body dealing with all things Bedouin ( Swirski 2008 38). The responsibilities of the Bedouin Authority cover both recognized and unrecognized Bedouin localities and the Authority answer s primarily to the Israeli Land Ad ministration (ILA). The ILA 2003 Annual Report lists the responsibilities of the Bedouin Authority as: Planning and development in the seven government planned townships, through the Housing Ministry and management companies. Planning seven new townships pursuant to government resolutions Allocating land for farming on the basis of a seasonal lease. Giving approvals for mortgages, confirming ownership for building plans, transferring rights, registration in the Land Registry Office. Handling land compromises over Bedouin title claims. Making evacuation arrangements for Bedouin being relocated to Convening the Drinking chairman also acts as the Drin king Water Committee chairman. ( Swirski 2008 39) Legally the Bedouin Authority is under three organizations with no clear boundaries, the ILA, the Ministerial Committee for Coordi nating Policy and Activities in the Bedouin Sector, and the Infrastructure Ministry. Due to the lack of control provided from above, wh ether from confusion or conviction the Bedouin Authority has monopolized leadership over all things Bedouin. Recently members of the Bedouin and Jewish community, along with government officials, have taken notice and criticized the apparent monopoly, with many attempts to abolish the Bedouin Authority.
48 The I LA is an important agency; it controls about 93% and. It is the Th tempted) to allocate the land to more powerful groups, such as the army, Jewish settlers Marx 2000, 107 ). While the ILA conf iscates the land for p rogress and development, it does not always use the land for the sake of development, but rather for nature reserves T land is taken from them in the n ame of the state and progress by the ILA and therefore, land becomes scare fo r the Bedouin. An example is th e case of the Kishkhar Bedouin. The ILA expropriated their land, the Abde canyon, and turned the land into a nature reserve (Marx 2000, 107 08) Two smaller governing bodies are the Green Patrol and the Abu Basma R egional Council. On record the Green Patrol is a policing unit or the open areas supervision unit the land and to (Tabibi an Mizrahi quoted by Swirski 2008, 42). Technically the Green Patrol is under the Environmental Affairs Ministry but it also has a committee of directors general and receives funding from outside bodies, both of which (the director general and the funding) come primarily from the Israeli Defense Forces ( IDF ) and the ILA. In the end, the Green Patrol has faced numerous accusations from Bedouins of excessive force and brutality, acting outside of the law. The Abu Basma Regional Council was created in 2000 to serve Bedouin villages that were previously unrecognized, but that the Israeli government decided to reco gnize. The Abu Basma Regional Council has started to
49 undertake some of the tasks of the Bedouin Development Authority (Swirski 2008 42 3, 50) The Ministerial Committee for the Adva ncement o f Bedouin Affairs was created by the Goldberg Committee, to repl ace the Bedouin Adva ncement Authority. At the time, the Israeli government was facing pressure because the Bedouin Adva ncement Authority had taken too much control of all issues relating to Bedouins. The Ministerial Committee for the Adva ncement of Bed ouin Affairs was to oversee land claims and distribution, along with the level of education and health care and t he enforcement of Israeli laws regarding those two policy areas It is unclear whether the Bedouin Adva ncement Authority has cease d and the Mi nisterial Committee for the Adva ncement of Bedouin Affairs has begun its task s ( Ben David 1999) Water Committee, the Ministerial Committee for Coordinating Policy and Activities in the Bedouin Sector, and the Welfare Services Department for th e Bedouin Diaspora. With so many organizations represent ing the Bedouin and administering Bedouin affairs, it is evident that the Israeli government has seeped into every aspect of life for the Bedouins. Issues Bedouins in Israel face a number of issues, including but not limited to internal displacement, struggling with bureaucracies, underdevelopment, and human rights violations. These issues have affected their daily lives
50 The Internally Displaced Monitoring Center (IDMC) has recognized Bedouins as interna lly displaced persons in Israel; however, IDMC makes clear that neither nor the [Israel Internal Displacement Monitoring Center 2009 ). Reasons behind the clearly contradictory stance of the IDMC considering Bedouins as IDP s are due to concerns over lac k of livelihood, education, and basic social and civil services. Specific examples of such reasons were not given in the report from IDMC, but are clear from the sources cited in this chapter. One example is underdevelopment Recognized townships are facing many issues, such as a high crime rate, drug use, dilapidation, and lack of funds. Moreover, villa ges that were once unrecognized but now are recognized are facing also what could be best described as being forg otten. M u nicipal and social services promised by the government along with money, never reach the village, or come to the village in a slow trickle. Further, a 2003 study publi shed by Ben Gurion University observed that 71% of the Bedouin citizens in the south s uffer from hunger. In particular, among those supported by social services, 87% of children are in danger of hunger, 85% sought food assistance from other family members, and 75% of families sought other forms of charity Qupty 2004, 1) Along with underdevelopment an issue that has reached the attention of the international community is that of property destruction through demolition. Many international organizations and newspapers have run stories and condemn ed the demolition of Bedouin homes. Some of the organizations are Human Rights Watch, Internal ly Displaced Monitoring Center, and Habitat International Coalition.
51 Through all of the issues mentioned, claims have emerged that human rights are being broken. Israel is bound by international human rights laws. Amara (2008) claims that Israel is breaking the international human rights of Bedouins regarding the right to adequate housing, limits on displacement and eviction, the right to culture, the right to e quality and non discrimination, and participation rights. The right to adequate housing is upheld by the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Right (ICESCR) through Article 11, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Righ ts (ICCPR) through Article 17. Limits on displacement and eviction are upheld by the ICCPR through Article 12, and the ICESCR through Ar ticle 11(1) (Amara 2008, 232 34) Bedouin s in Israel Today A vivid picture is emerging of what Bedouin s are today. Bedouin s are made to choose between their heritage through their land, culture, and tradition al living in an unrecognized city without services and questionable citizenship, and living in a government planned township, with se rvices, but witho ut their land and traditional practices. Slowly, Bedouins are changing and modernizing. They no longer are nomadic, and few retain their ancestral roots of pastoralism. More Bedouin s are attending school, retaining jobs, and moving away from the village When asked about the role of the sheik tribal leader, Bedouins in Israel claim the sheik no longer holds an important role in the tribe, if any. However, life is still hard. It is clear, that the Bedouins are a minority in Israel and treated as such, even though they were the traditional inhabitants. Through the accumulation of laws, Bedouins have been forced to sedentarize
52 and modernize, and these processes seem to be slowly stripping away fundamental parts of Bedouin identity.
53 Chapter 4: Case Study of Jordan The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a modern nation state ruled by the Hashemite Dynasty Before the Hashemite family, the British Empire ruled Jordan through a Mandate, and before the British, the Ottoman Empire ruled the territory Thro ughout the different periods of rule, Jordan was and still is inhabited by Bedouins. B ackground B efore World War I, the area currently known as Jordan was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. After the collapse of the Ottom an Empire, different groups ruled the area until 1921, when the British took control of their Mandate specifically the state of Transjordan T he British appointed an Amir, Abdullah, whose familial line continues to rule the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to this day. Immediately, the Briti sh started to create government structure s an army and a police force. The first constitution known as the Organic Law, was put into effect in 1928. The 1930s saw the consolidation of power in Transjordan, and the 1940s were war years. Then Transjord an gained independence from the British Mandate in 1946, adopting the name the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in 1950. Amir Abdullah ruled until his assassination in 1951, giving nough to take power in 1953.
54 U nder King Hussein, Jordan underwent gradual political liberalization W omen were given the right to vote (1974), parliamentary elections were reinstituted (1989), and a peace treaty was signed with Israel (1994). King Hussein the uprising of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the annex ation of the West Bank, and the 1970 Civil War between the Jordanian army and the Palest inian refugees, followed by Black September 2 After the war and bloodshed between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, Jordan still had discriminatory policies against Jordanian Palestinians, including less representation, lower employment, and fewer opportunities After the death of King Hussein in 1999, Abdallah II ascended to the throne as leader o f Jordan. King Abdallah II continued the political liberalization of Jordan and began aggressive economic reforms early in his rule that have continued throughout his rule Munici pal elections were held for the first time in 2007. The focus on socioeconomic reform was intensified in response to the Ara b Spring. Currently, Jordan is a member of the W orld Trade Organization (2000) and the Europea n Free Trade Association (2001) (Rya n quoted in Angrist 2010, 311 33). During the British Mandate, Jordan was enlarged twice, first in 1925, gaining territory to what is known as Aqaba, and then again between 1948 and 1950 to include part of Palestine. Before the 1925 territory change, Bedouins comprised nearly half of the population at 46%, or approximately 10 2,120 individuals. Then after 1925, but before the change of 1948, Bedouins made up 35.3% of the population, approximately 120,000 people (Massad 2001, 56). 2 Black September was a month when King Hussein tried to restore his rule over Jordan by crushing Palestinian militancy, which resulted in the deaths of thousands of people, mostly Palestinian s
55 A ccording to the Jordanian Department of Statistics, the current total population of Jordan is 6,278 ,070 ( Department of Statistics Jordan 2012 ) Official statistic s break the population down into Arabs, Circassians, and Armenians. Arabs comprise 98% of th e Jordanian population, approximately six million people Circassians and Armenians each constitute 1% of the J ordanian population approximately 20,000 people respectively. Ethnically, the population deemed Arab by the Jordanian government can be broken down into Bedouins and Palestinians, with no known definite numbers of division ; Jordan is also ho me to a large number of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, although the exact number is unknown (Jor danian Department of Statistics 2012; The Royal Hashemite Court 1998 ) Modernizing the Jordanian Bedouin Modernization in Jordan began during the Ottoman Empi re, continuing through the British Mandate of Transjordan, and until today under the Hashemite Kingdom of Jord an. Each of these ruling authorities have tried to settle the nomadic Bedouin s extend the rule of state law over tribal law, and Bedouins I n a word governments have tried to modernize Bedouins. Towards the end of the Ottoman Empire, the government sought to sett le the Bedouin s along the Jordan R iver through incentive programs, u ltimately failing and enacting the Land Code of 1858 that took most of the of the British Man date, the government started to create laws with the goal of settling Bedouin, first through the Law of Supervising Bedouins of 1929, then through different versions of this law. The British also tried to modernize the Bedouin s to government standards of living through education, agriculture, employment,
56 and law. T he government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan continued the work of the British by creating modern boundaries, leading to settlement, and by creating laws with the goal of modernization. Not only have specific governing bodies enacted laws in the hopes of sedentarizing or modern iz ing the Bedouin tribes of Jordan, but so have internationa l organizations, specifically the Arab League and UNESCO. These or ganizations met three times to discuss sedentarization and development of the Bedouin, ultimately creating a corps of Arab and European experts, whose specific aim was to develop the Bedoui n s modern citizen by Massad 2001, 63). Also a part of these initiatives was the Jordani an Cooperative Organization, which sought to created hima cooperatives between the Jordanian government and the Jordanian Bedouin s Laws During British rule of Jordan the first official attempts at sedentarization through modernization began with the Law of Supervising Bedouins in 1929. Under this law, a committee was created to be headed by three people: the head of the Arab Legion, Amir Shakir Bin Zayd (a cousin of the Amir Abdullah), and a third, non tribal, person to be chosen by the Amir. The purpose of the commit tee was to movements; to decide, when necessary, the place where the Bedouins should settle, with punishmen t meted out to those who resist ; to listen to grievances made by the Bedouins in accordance with the Law of Tribal Courts; to withdraw categorically, when it wishes, any case being de liberated before a tribal court ; and to investigate any security breaches and mete out punishments to the guilty parties, including the sequestering a nd co nfiscation of property. (Massad 2001, 57)
57 Supervising and implementing this law was the head of the Arab Legion, none other than the Transjordanian army under the command of Frederick Gerard Peake John Bagot Glubb was second in command, later su cceeding Peake. After some time, the British exacted some control over the Bedouins via military conscription, so the British, namely John Bagot Glubb, decided to supersede part of the Law of Supervising Bedouins from 1929 with a n ew law enacted in 1936 The 1936 law erased the three member committee, and ceded power and authority to the army chief, at the time Peake Pasha, or to who m ever the chief of the army delegated his authority, Glubb Pasha (John Bagot Glubb). Glubb Pasha, and by extension the Br itish, oversaw everything Bedouin. Two discrepancies arose with this new law. First, Glubb Pasha settled over 50% of the cases heard in the tribal court without sending word to Amman, as was customary and second, issues arose over which tribes were cons idered to be Bedouin, because the tribes listed as Bedouin in 1929 had changed. The law enacted in 1936 lasted until 1958. John Bagot Glubb was removed from separate the army and p olice from one another The law enacted in 1958 then separated the Transjordanian polic e from the Arab Legion. This new law specifically Article 2, gave the task of supervising Bedouins to public security, or the police. The status of Bedouins starte d to change juridically and nationally beginning in the 1960s. The year 1960 saw the first changes in electoral law regarding Bedouins, giving Bedouins the right to vote, unless they were in the military, which in f act was most of the Bedouin men. In pra ctice, therefore, the new law led to little change in the election rights of Bedouins Then the Council of Tribal Leaders was created in July of 1971 by a
58 royal decree from King Hussein. It is believed that the government only created the Council of Trib al Leaders i n response to the the Civil War and Black September in 1970 ( Massad 2001, 143) After the Civil War of 1970 and Black September, the Jordanian government decided on a plan of cohesion via nationalism and reinforcing Jordanian i dentity. King Hussein appointed Prince Muhammad (his brother) as head of the C ounc il; the C ouncil was also to have twelve to fifteen tribal leaders or a prominent tribal personality belonging to the tribe s enumerated in the law. This C ouncil was officially tasked to, elevate the living standards among the Bedouins, and to put into effect developmental, agricultural, health, and educational projects aiming at supporting the program of settling the people of the Badiyah [desert], and to provide them with a good living t o which they are entitled and which is the duty of the state to provide them with, in order that they can perform their role of pushing the wheel of progress and construc tion in this struggling country. (Massad 2001, 61) Right after the C ouncil was creat ed, it tried to unify tribal customs, traditions, and laws, only to find that the government canceled the Council of Tribal Leaders in May of 1973. Replacing the Council of Tribal Leaders was the Palace Convention ( Mahdar al Qasr ) in August of 1974. The Mahdar was designed differently from the rest of the laws member s from the Jordanian Government and many different tribal leaders and al laws and (Massad 2001, 61). This convention was called based on the royal desire to crystallize conventional tribal traditions among all the sectors of the esteemed Jordanian people, rendering them in a frame [characterized by] clear vision, those concerned in matters important to this dear family [i.e., the Jordanian p o study all the
59 important parts of tribal conventions and to decide which of them is good and beneficial for public welfare and amend w hat needs to be amended, and to look at what needs to be reviewed in order that tribal conventions be capable of catching up with the times and proceed accord ing to the needs of the present. (Massad 2001, 61 2) The Palace C onvention showed some of the fi rst signs of bilateral communication between the Jordanian government and the Bedouin tribes, along with maintaining the general policy of modernization. Then in 1976, the Jordanian governmen t created a law that effective canceled all laws that had to do with Bedouins. The government specifically removed distinctions between male and female Jordanians. This law was created as the last stage in the act of unifying the Jordanian population, an act of nationalization, which started receiving attentio n afte r the Civil War and the Black September Massacre in 1970. In essence this law made male Jordanians and femal e Jordanians equal However, t he fine print also canceled all laws pertaining to Bedouins as it erased legal distinctions between groups. The Palace Convention was not technically a law, so it remained in effect. A crucial p art of this law, was that it also voided all tribal law, upsetting many tribal leaders. In response to unrest after the 1976 law, King Hussein defended the decision by saying: We are Arabs and we shall not neglect our valuable traditions or our praise worthy traits, which we have inherited from our noble and gallant ancestors. We have canceled the Laws of Supervising the Bedouins in order to allow for future punishment of crimi nals before regular civil courts, which in turn will issue severe punishments and rulings wherein only the criminal will be punished for his crime, and not the group as a wh ole. And at any rate, the traditional conventions, which we hold dear and of which we are proud, will continue, and we shall remain beholden to them and shall not bypass them (Q uoted in Plascov 1981 37)
60 The ide a of a united Jordan and the idea of an Arabian nationality have continued through today. All official laws regarding Bedo uins wer e effectively abolished in 1976 Tribal law has been superseded by the central government, but tribal l aw has not been quelled; in fact, tribal law still plays a large role in the lives of Bedouins, just without final authority. Today, the sheik still plays a very traditional, although only symbolic role in the tribe. Hima Cooperatives Another distinct example of modernization led by the Jordanian government are hima cooperatives between the government and the Bedouins tribe. The basic premise of hima cooperatives is a unique combination of traditional Bedouin practice and government policy. H ima cooperatives in Jordan are largely based on hima cooperatives in Syria, where Dr. U mar Draz pioneered the idea (Shoup 1984) A fter extens ive research on the local area and inhabitants, a cooperative is formed between the government and the Bedouins. Each cooperative has an executive board that is and serves as the middle man betwe en the tribe and the government in charge of credit, the use o f its land, and mig ration (Shoup 1984). Coopera tives in Syria have been more successful than those in Jordan, because the Bedouin in Jordan are partially settled, whereas in Syria, they are not (Shoup 1984). T he first Jordanian hima cooperative was cre ated in 1963 at al Jafr, a primarily Bedouin region. However, this cooperative was not successf ul. Very few Bedouin joined this cooperative or other cooperatives that were created in the same area. With the failure of the Jordanian model of hima cooperatives, the Jordanian Cooperatives
61 Organization did not give up, and instead decided to try out the Syrian model of hima cooperatives. Four hima cooperatives were created in 1983, two near Madaba and two near Macan. None of these has been met with much success ( Shoup 1984 ). Political Representation The legislative powers of the Jordanian government are divi ded between the K ing and the Parliament. The Parliament is divided into the House of Notables, otherwise known as the Senate, and the House of Deputies, the house of lower parliament The Senators are appointed by the King, while the deputies are elected by the g eneral population. However, at any time, the King can dissolve either the House of Not ables or the House of Deputies ( The Office o f King Hussein I of Jordan 1998 ) In 1993, the Jordanian Parliament passed a new law called The Law Amending the Law of Election to the House of Deputies for the Year 1993 This law was not passed primarily for Bedouins, but for amending the previous voting system to a one person, one vote system. In addition to one for one, the 1993 law also divided the country into 20 electoral constituencies, with certain number s of seats for each in the Lower House of P arliament. T he Jordanian government also reserved pa rliamentary seats for groups, allocating a total of seventy one seats for Muslims, six for Bedouins, three each for Circa ssians and Chechens and nine seats for Christians ( The Office of King Hussein I o f Jordan 1998 ) This law did single out Bedouins and ot her ethnic groups going against the law passed in 1976 abolishing all laws to do with particular ethnic groups and specifically Bedouins. Under this 1993 law provisions were made for Bedouins and
62 o ther ethnic groups, excluding Palestinians, in the Lower House of Parliament, which is elected by popular vote. M ethods of I mplementation The country of Jordan, whether during the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, or rule of the Hashemite family, has tried to modernize Bedouins, more or less through legal standings. Although governments are trying to modernize Bedouins, how are they enforcin g their laws and modernization policies? During the Ottoman Empire, policies geared towards sedentarization were established with the Ottoman Land Code of 1858; however, the Ottoman Empire did not have additional consequences to help implement modernizati on policies. On the other hand, the British initiated a variety of methods for sedentarization and modernization, including the creation of a modern state, and policies contained in the variations of the 1929 Law of Supervising Bedouins. The British were able to implement modernization laws through penalties, incentives, and even bilateral communication, very similar to how the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has implemented and continues to implement their modernization policies The Otto man Empire mainly focused on peaceful sedenta rization as it encouraged Bedouin s to settle near the Jordan River, offering land for Bedouin s who chose to settle However, peaceful sedent arization did not exactly work; the Bedouin s did not see the need to s ettle down and give up their nomadic lifestyle. T he Ottoman Empire then began necessary
63 Obviously, when a government makes laws, whether or not regarding modernizatio n, punishment will usually ensu e if a citizen does not follow the law. W hen the British Mandate codified the Law of Supervising Bedouin in 1929 with the intention of settling the Bedouin s the law stipulated that the C ouncil overseeing the Bedouins was fines and imp risonment, the British also resorted to confiscating herds and cattle. It is odd that the British specifically made note, within the law, of punishment to those who resisted. In fact, some scholars call the time period that Bedouins were under the Law o f Supervising Bedouin from 1929 martial law, because the Bedouins were under the thumb of the Transj ordanian army; they also note that the under the British the Bedouin way of lifest ( Massad 2001, 56 8 ). Then, when the 1929 law was amended in 1958 by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to switch the supervisory committee from the army to the police, Massad describes the time under the law of police as a time when the Bedoui ns were watched liked criminals ( Ma ssad 2001, 56 8 ). Outside of negative methods of implementation codified into law, the British and the government under the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have used other methods, incentives, and bilateral communication. During the British rule of Jordan, the government was known to create co op s between tribal sheiks and government officials to officially help with agricultural endeavors. Then, when Jordan became an inde pendent asserted the intention to improve many a sp ects of the lives of Bedouins. As noted above, t he government sought to elevate the living standards among the Bedouins, and to put into effect developmental, agricultural, health, and educational projects aiming at
64 supporting the program of settling the people of the Badiyah [desert], and to provide them with a good living to which they are entitled (Massad 2001, 61) The government of the Hashemite King dom of Jordan has also engaged in bilateral communication with Bedouins. Bi lateral communication i s used to allow the government to better understand tribal customs and tradition current interests, for informed decision making. Kishony describes the different examples of bilateral communication between the Bedouins and the Jordan ian government as: (1) distinct voting districts and seats for Bedouins in the Jordanian parliament; (2) a desert police legion consisting entirely of Bedouins or semi nomadic tribesmen; (3) a ministerial level post of advisor to the king for tribal affair s; (4) recognition by the king of the rule of tribal shyukh ; and (5) co opting tribesmen into the Jordanian army and a ppreciating their contributions. (Kishony 2008, 406) Clearly, while the law forbids distinguishing between groups in the country, many Jordanian society. Social Services and the Army One of the biggest modernizers in Jordan was the Transjordanian and Jordanian army. The army provided a structure to implement modernization, while also giving Bedouins a job, education, and healthcare. Outside of the army and other formal methods of implementation, the Jordanian government als o provided services such as healthcare, education, and job training, in the hopes of modernizing the Jordanian Bedouins through social services.
65 During British rule education and job training were combined into one service, the military Glubb specifi cally took an interest in the education of Bedouins, creating an Army Education Branch. Through the Army Education Branch, thousands of Bedouin children were taught, and then upon graduation, almost all of the boys volunteered to join the Arab Legion, the the function it was to have: the need for the production of Arab officers cadets, apprentice tradesmen pursued two goals with one program education and job training. Today, many Bedouin s still s erve in the Jordanian military. The Jordanian military still plays a large role in modernizing Bedouins, pro viding health care, education, protection, and job tra ining. During British rule of Jordan, Bedouin s were a source for military conscription, constituting more than half of the Transjordanian Army. T oday, Bedouins still find satisfaction in the military lifestyle, with modern social services and a less harsh way of life. Also, the desert patrol is from outside p ersons and smugglers, a task for which Bedouins are g eared well suited due to their knowledge of the area and ability to survive in the deserts of Jordan. Today, t he Jordanian government still claims to still be providing education, job training, and health care to Bedouins. Technically Jordan does not h ave formal legislation of the right to health, but Jordan does have a legal entitlement to subsidized health care for all citizens. T here are three health care providers the Ministry of Health, the Royal Medical Services, and the United National Relief and Works Agency. The
66 United National Relief and Works Agency specifically works with Palestinians, not Jordanian Bedouins. The Jordanian Ministry of Health provides preventive and curative health care on three different levels comprehensive health cen ters, primary health centers, and village health centers. The Royal Medical Services provides secondary and tertiary care for military personnel and their families (Hundt et al. 2011, 36 43). However, the problem with both the Ministry of Health and the Royal Medical Services is their lack of availability in remote regions of Jordan. Quite a few Bedouin s live in remote areas of Jordan, such as the Badia Very little access to health care is a vailable in these regions Due to the problem of access to general services of the Ministry the Jordanian government extended the Royal Medical Serv ices to Bedo uins who are Jordanian citizens to remote areas of the Badia P rior to 2008 the services wer e only available for soldiers and their families (Hundt et al. 2011, 36 43). According to the National Institute of Health, Bedouin children have very poor nutritional health, health care is difficult to reach in rural villages, and Bedouins are at a gre ater risk for tuberculosis than other Jordanian citizens (Hundt et al. 2011, 36 43). Then in 2011, the Warwick Institute created a program, The Bedouin Health Projec t, to bring health care into the Jordanian Badia Now health care services are being provided by both the Jordanian government and the private sector, with special effort to reach remote areas of Jordan. After the British, education was taken over by the Jordanian government. In 1964, the Jordanian gover nment passed the Education Act which required nine years of schooling six in primary education, and three in preparatory education. Then in 1994, the Education Act was expanded to ten years of compulsory education and provided
67 comprehensive and applied secondar y education lasting two years ( World Data on Education 2011). However, the same issue of access to health care is present in access to school in remote regions of Jordan. Effects of Modernization What makes a Bedouin a Bedouin is a nomadic life style The Ottoma n Empire attempted to curb nomadic tendencies but failed in comparison to the British Mandate, which During the creation of th e modern nation state, Transj ordan was organized into governorates, districts, provinces, and cities, and the Bedouin s were forced to settle in specific locations, as per the Law of Supervising Bedouins of 1929. The 1929 law also limited the Bedouin s to national boundaries, therefore prohibiting the Bedouin to travel across c ountry lines to visit kin. S ettling the Bedouins into Western standards, i.e. boundaries, compelled the Bedouin s to redefine tradi tional tribal and familial ties Both the British and the Hashemite governments were legally able to and did translate Bedouin law. This point is two fold. Non Bedouins translating Bedouin law leads to misinterpretation and use of th e law for purposes of the translating organization However, the government is also able to better translate the Bedouin laws into the central government, opening up a type of bilateral communication depending on how the translation i s carried out many social disputes (es pecially deaths resulting from car accidents and intentional or 264).
68 Governments (whether the Ottoman Empire, the British, or the Hashemite family) hav e all tried to modernize and se den tarize Bedouin tribes in Jordan through laws, force, incentives, and other methods. With every action, there is a reaction, the Bedouin reaction to modernization has been to redefine tribal and familial boundaries in the modern state bo undaries of governorates, districts provinces, cities and change their pastoralist way of life. After the bloodshed from the civil war in 1970 and Black September Jordan made an extensive effort to erase political and ethnic boundaries among Jordanian s, Bedouins, and Palestinians. Jordan went on a nationalization campaign, particularly to create a new Jordanian identity to include everyone. Then the law in 1976 that de facto erased all laws pertaining to certain political group s re inforced the Jordan ian effort at nationalization. Due to the [successful] Jordanian efforts, Bedouins are no longer ( or at least not to the extent as before 1976) singled out in the Jordanian populati on. However, Palestinians to da y basis as second class citizens. They argue that in interactions with bureaucrats, police officers, soldiers, and other officials, they are treated diffe quoted in Angrist 2010, 325). Ryan explains that Transjordanians (Bedou ins ) dominate the political sphere; however, Palestinians dominate economically, with the poorest sections of Jordan, outside of Palestinian refugee camps, being in Transjordan. Today, Bedouins face the same issues as all other Jordanians. Bedouins who remain in the traditional lifestyle also face the other side of the abolition of group specific laws the reduction in targeted policies to address lags in services to specific groups. Still, the Jordani an government does not negatively sing le out the Bedouins. In fact, the Jordanian government has been
69 reasserting its tribal heritage: (2001, 264). The Jordanian government, which in the past promoted the settling of the Bedouin, re culture and heritage. Indeed, it has been said that they are the backbone of the Kingdom. The government continues to provide services such as education, housing and health clinics. However, some Bedouins pass these up in favor of the lifestyle which has served t hem so well over the centuries. ( The Office of King Hussein I of Jordan 1998 ) However, even after the Bedouization of the Jordanian identity, many Bedouins have given up their traditiona l lifestyle and moved to urban cities. Jordan has one of the largest urbanization rates in the Middle East, at nearly 80% Whether or not urbanization is due entirely to modernization efforts, or a combination of modernization and the harsh conditions of the desert, is unknown. Identity M ost Jordanians are fighting a crisis of identity, due to the recreation of what it after 1970, and then the Bedouinization of the people of Jordan. Today, there are still strong divisions be tween Palestinians, Bedouins, and Jordanians Tensions such as these were the cause of the 1970 civil war and massacre. The government tried to put all the tensions to rest by undergoing a nationalization campaign to unify all the ethnic divisions under one family, Jordanian. and West Bank Jordanians, Palestinians and Tranjordanians, Jordani ans and Bedouins (Ryan quoted in Angrist 2010, 326). Tensi ons are caused by various i ssues Within Jordan, Transjordanians dominate the political system, while West Bank Jordanians
70 yan quoted in Angrist 2010, 325). Some Transjordanians see Palestinians as visitors to the country, referring to themselves as true Jordanians, while the Palestinians are not true Jordanians. many Jordanians believing that the marriage between King Abdullah II (Hashimite) a nd Queen Rania (Palestinian) is a symbol of Jordani ans. Still tensions across the ethnic divisions are ever present today.
71 Chapter 5: Conclusion Hundreds of t housands if not millions of Bedouins live throughout the Middle East. Traditionally, they are pastoral nomads raising herds of camels and sheep. Historically Bedouins originated from the Arabian peninsula but moved as far w est as Spain, across North Africa, back east through Ira q and as far south as Sudan to live alongside the Tuereg. Bedouins have been painted in all sorts of lights: T.E. Lawre nce idealized them the British wrote about Bedouins wi th what we now call orientalist attitudes, Saudi Ar abia has denied their existence ( therefore the rest of the Arabian peninsula has denied their existence ) Egypt ha s labeled them terrorists, and Jordan has tried to recreate them through bedouinization. Over the last 150 years governments have labeled Bedouins as needing to be brought up to current time and they have created policies to do so, specifically modernization and sedentarization policies. In that time period the Middle East has also undergone modern state building, specifically aiming at modernization, sedentariz ation, and centralization. Modern state formation can generally be defined as the interrelated processes leading to the centralization of political power with a monopoly of coercion (Till y 1975, 3 10) on for his own analysis of the Middle East. He noted that modern state formation i n the Middle East sought to move away from a tribal structure of state, centralize power, and shift inhabitants away from traditional ways of life to modern sedentary ways o f life.
72 Sedentarization is the basic policy of moving [nomadic] people to a settled lif estyle. Modernization theory studies the social change whereby less developed societies acquire characteristics common to more developed Lerner 1968, 386) There are four different types of modernization: techno economic modernization, political modernization, cultural modernization, and the modernization of time (Bassand 1981, 215 16) These three theories modern state building, modernization, and se dentarization explain processes starting with the Ottoman Empire, continuing through British and French colonial rule and still pursued by today modern governments. The Ottoman Empire had two policies with lasting effects for Bedouins: settlement pol icies and the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. At first, the Ottoman Empire peacefully tried to settle Bedouins along the Jordan River, but the Bedouins did not comply, so they began to use force. The n the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 defined landholdings and categories rights to state land. After the law was issued almost all the land in Palestine, apart from private property in the towns, was defined as state land of dif ( Franzman and Kark 2011 6). This policy gave Sultan Adbulhamid II vast amounts of land primarily frequented by Bedouins if not owned by Bedouins, and then settled non Bedouins on the land The British created policies to settle and m odernize Bedouin s in Jordan, specifically the Law of Supervising Bedouin enacted in 1929, which lasted in various forms until 1976 The y also created policies to settle and modernize the Bedouin s in the Palestinian Mandate, through land laws and the Bedou in Control Ordinance of 1942.
7 3 Modern governments have enacted many different forms of sedentarization and modernization policies. Israel started modernizing and set tling Bedouins as soon as it became an independent state. In fact, Moshe Dayan wanted to make the Bedouin lifestyle disappear. Israel tried settling Bedouin s in government planned towns with modern amenities and living conditions. When Bedouins did not willingly move, Israel made all other Bedouin settlements illegal. The Jordanian governm ent continued to use different variations of the British Mandate Law of Supe rvising Bedouins un til 1976. The goal of that law and its variations was to settle B edouins and to modernize them. T he governments of Israel and Jordan have both pursued moderniz ation and settlement policies with respect to their Bedouin population s I srael and Jordan are neighboring countries with rel atively the same Bedouin tribes, and the population of Bedouin s in Israel and Jordan are 2.3% and 10% respectively making them a small but noticeable minority [Jordan does not public ly record ethnic statistics, as per the law passed in 1976, meaning that the percentage of Bedouins is estimated out of it s primarily Arab population of 98%. ] I examined policies and laws that were passed by all the government s that governed Israel and Jordan the Ottoman Empire, British, and modern g overnments of Israel and Jordan and the effects of those policies and laws. Israel has tried to moderni ze Bedouins by settling them in government planned townships and providing social services, such as education, health care, and job opportunities. Different government agencies, such as the Bedouin Authority, regional councils, and the Be douin Education Authority, have oversee n Bedouin modernizat ion. Then there were attempts by the Israel government to rectify issues with Bedouins through the Albeck Commission and the Goldberg Committee. Although the Israeli
74 government has created many different programs, laws, and organizations to a dva nce the B edouin population, many issues are still present. Bedouin s are not allowed to live in settlem ents, or unrecognized villages; rather they are required to live in government planned townships. If the Bedouins refuse, and continue to live in settlements out side of government planned townships, their homes can be destroyed and their herds confiscated. Bedouins who live in unrecognized villages have an ever looming question of citizenship; all Bedouins have claims and questions about lan d rights Meanwhile, organizations such as IDMC and HRW have claimed that Israel is violating human righ ts when it comes to Bedouins or that Bedouins are displaced. Jordan has followed the path of modernization and settlement that was created by the British. With the combi nation of laws and the new boundari es created by the modern state i.e., governorates, di stricts, provinces, and cities the Jordanian government sought to settle Bedouin s by preventing them from moving around the country as they once did. Along with settlement, the Jordanian government sought to modernize the lives of Bedouins through health care, education, and different means of economic prosperity. The government trie d laws, councils, government communities, hima cooperatives, but none were as successful at modernizing as the army. Another method of incorporation involved emphasizing Bedouin roots in building Jordanian national identity. Bedouinization is a form of r everence but also control. Bedouins are able to live a completely modern life in the city fors aking their heritage or live as a traditional Bedouin s in tents and caves and with tradition al dress, but with the addition, where available, of a police force doctors, schools, and an amended version of tribal law. T he
75 reach of modernity is limited to areas of easy access, however, leaving Bedouin s in the Badia without easy access to doctors, schools, and resources. The policies and laws adopted in Israel have affected Bedouins in various ways, both good and bad. Bedouins have in fact changed. Tribal law is no longer seen as a valid system by both the Israeli government and Bedouins. Bedouins are no longer nomadic; the Green Patrol and modern state boundaries created by Israel restrict movement Pastor alism is no longer t he way of life for all Bedouins; and the few who choose to retain a pastoral way of life are generally settled Bedouins who no longer retain pastoralism are in the Israeli a rmy or different job sectors. Most Bedouins have a modern way of life, use modern technologies, and rarely keep herds or traditional dress. At the same time the Israeli government has also provided health care, education, and governance to those who set tle in recognized townships Bedouins who do not modernize or settle in the way the Israeli government wants are punished in various ways. Due to Israeli me thods of modernization, the Bed ouin population living in unrecognized villages question s whether o r not they even ha ve Israeli citizenship. Moreover, the modern services offered even in government planned townships are not equal to those of Jewish townships. The government planned townships are overcrowded and do not have services up to par with those supplied to other groups as reported by the ADVA Center and HRW. Therefore, Bedouins are caught between a non nomadic form of traditional life and a somewhat poor form of modern life. The policies and laws created and used in Jordan have a ffected Bedouins in various ways as well. Until 1976, Bedouins were essentially living under either martial law or criminal law. During that time the traditional nomadic tendencies and blood ties
76 were circumscribed due to tight rule of law and new modern state boundaries. Also during that time, tribal law underwent many changes in the process of trying to put tribal law into central government law or to erase tribal law all together A s of today, a form of tribal law is still present and respected in Be douin tribes but it is subordinated to central law Most Bedouins still keep some of their traditional practice s such as living in tribes, tents, caves, dress, herding mixed with cell phones, trucks, television, and computers. However, other Bedouins have moved away to c ities and no longer call themselves Bedouins. M ost Bedouins still herd camels and sheep, but they cannot live simply from keep ing herds. T hey also dabble in other business, such as tourism, while other Bedouins have joined the Jordan ian army. Modernization in Jordan has created a combination of tradition al Bedouin values and ways of life along with modernity T he Jordanian government has placed the Bedouins on a higher level than most other governments have by givi ng them more right s and legislative representation, and by recognizing Bedouin roots in Jordanian national identity. Comparatively, Jordan and Israel have both aimed for the same thing, modernization. They have both succeeded in settling Bedouins through the use of legal measure s force, and modern state boundaries. This is true even if Israel condemns unrecognized villages; unrecognized villages are still a type of settlement, just not the settlement that Israel wants. Both countries have also succeeded in modernizing Bedouins, just to different levels of modernization. Israel has given Bedouins health care, education, and jobs, but not to the same level as Jewish citizens. However, many Bedouins in Israel still resist the full spectrum of modernization, rather wantin g to live in unrecognized villages even though they lack municipal services, health care, and
77 education. Jordan has also given Bedouins the same services, but in their own villages. Bedouins welcome those services, bec ause they are not asked to resettle. Instead the Jordanian government has brought the services to their home, and has not forced the Bedouin s to give up how they live Jordan has succeeded in creating a modern tribal structure, where Israel has failed. In Israel, the Bedouins are in limbo trying to acclimate to the Israeli central government, but still keeping their traditions. Jordan and Israel have used differe nt methods to achieve modernization and settlement. Israel ruled from the top down without bilateral communication. They did not incorporate the Bedouin lifestyle or traditions into the laws, committee s, or terms; rather the Israeli government used modern incentiv es and harsh forms of punishment as their predominant method s In essence, Israel wanted the Bedouins to modernize the Israeli way, without room for negotiation. At first, Jordan used the same methods as Israel a lthough, even under the British, the gove rnment tried to settle Bedouins in areas to which they were accustomed Then, Jordan began a different method of modernization, bilateral communication, which gave the Bedouins a chance to negotiate, so as to incorporate traditional Bedouin values into a modern lifestyle, making the transition to modernity easier. However, after the abolition of group based laws in 1976, Jordan treated the Bedouins as any other citizen s instead of singl ing them out, which also made the transition easier Despite the lac k of le gal distinction, the Jordanian s tate has developed some accommodating policies (e.g. in healthcare) that allow some Bed ouins to maintain a traditional life in the desert and still have some access to services afforded all citizens
78 All the differ ent modernization, sedentarization, and state formation policies in Israel and Jordan, whether from the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, or modern governments, have affected the lives of Bedouins, but have the policies cha nged their identity? Some ev en as k whether Bedouins are still Bedouins if they are no longer nomadic pastoralists. Policies have taken the nomadic pastoralists of the Middle East, settled most of them in villages and cities, and given them modern amenities such as healthcare, education, job training, and rule of law through the central government Yet, policies have not changed what Bedouins believe, just some of their practices. Policies also limited tribal law. In Jordan, Bedouin s still retain a traditional tribal structure and many traditional practices and belief s, if they want to; in Israel, policies have left most Be douin without tribal structure or traditional practices. T o the q uestion of whether Bedouins are still Bedouins if they are no long er nomadic pastoralists, I do not believe nomadic pastorialism defines Bedouins. Bedouins are defined through a number of characteristics, including nomadic pastoralism customs of generosity, tribal structure, tribal law, dress, traditions. So, the question should be is being a Bedouin an identity beyond a way of life ? T his study has examined how basic state formation, sedentarization, and mode rnization policies have changed the lives of Bedouins in Israel and Jordan. On these grounds alone most Bedouins lives look more like those of surrounding citizens, but there are other forces affecting identity. Bedouinization of Jordanian natural identity affirms Bedouins identity and some traditions. Israeli policies meanwhile, undercut Bedouin identity and trad itions, but they that may reinforce Bedouin identity
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