ERROR LOADING HTML FROM SOURCE (http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu//design/skins/UFDC/html/header_item.html)

Transitions from Civil Conflict

Permanent Link: http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu/NCFE004313/00001

Material Information

Title: Transitions from Civil Conflict Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and the Role of Justice in Creating Sustainable Peace
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Reed, Michelle Chandler
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2010
Publication Date: 2010

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Conflict
Economic Development
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Transitional judicial mechanisms have the capacity to address underlying causes of tension and conflict during periods of instability. When used appropriately, and allowed to carry out their designated functions, transitional justice is able to facilitate not only a reassurance that there is a �rule of law,� but also enables the realization of economic recovery and reconciliation. Transitional justice is also particularly suited to handle questions involving patterns of exclusion and entrenched inequality, where conflict may be repetitive and there may be limited commitments to sustainable peace, transparency or accountability. By exploring theoretical background on deprivation, inequity, conflict dynamics and conventional post-conflict policies, we are then able to apply the same ideas to a specific case study (Rwanda), where different transitional outcomes have been witnessed with similar reconstructive and rehabilitative goals.
Statement of Responsibility: by Michelle Chandler Reed
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2010
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Coe, Richard

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2010 R3
System ID: NCFE004313:00001

Permanent Link: http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu/NCFE004313/00001

Material Information

Title: Transitions from Civil Conflict Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and the Role of Justice in Creating Sustainable Peace
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Reed, Michelle Chandler
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2010
Publication Date: 2010

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Conflict
Economic Development
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Transitional judicial mechanisms have the capacity to address underlying causes of tension and conflict during periods of instability. When used appropriately, and allowed to carry out their designated functions, transitional justice is able to facilitate not only a reassurance that there is a �rule of law,� but also enables the realization of economic recovery and reconciliation. Transitional justice is also particularly suited to handle questions involving patterns of exclusion and entrenched inequality, where conflict may be repetitive and there may be limited commitments to sustainable peace, transparency or accountability. By exploring theoretical background on deprivation, inequity, conflict dynamics and conventional post-conflict policies, we are then able to apply the same ideas to a specific case study (Rwanda), where different transitional outcomes have been witnessed with similar reconstructive and rehabilitative goals.
Statement of Responsibility: by Michelle Chandler Reed
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2010
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Coe, Richard

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2010 R3
System ID: NCFE004313:00001


This item is only available as the following downloads:


Full Text

PAGE 1

TRANSITIONS FROM CIVIL CONFLICT: RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND THE ROLE OF JUSTICE IN CREATING SUSTAINABLE PEACE BY MICHELLE CHANDLER REED A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Economics/ International and Area Studies New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Professor Richard Coe Sarasota, Florida May, 2010

PAGE 2

Table of Contents Page Number i. Table of Contents ii ii. List of Tables iii iii. Abstract iv I. Introduction 1 II. Identity Construction, Adoption, and Civil Conflict Onset 3 III. Identity-Conflict Dynamics and Post Conflict Policy 31 IV. Transitional Justice Mechanisms and the Rule of Law 58 V. Case Study: Rwanda 76 VI. Concluding Remarks 103 VII. Additional Notes on Case Study 104 VIII. References 109 ii

PAGE 3

List of Tables Page Number 2.1 Citizenship, Nationality, and Ethno-Linguistic Classification 6 2.2 Group Type and Policies to Encourage Equity 12 2.3 Poverty, Inequality and Exclusion 17 3.1 The United Nations, World Bank and International Monetary Fund: Policy and Capacity 36 3.2 Support for Assembly, Discharge, Reinsertion and Reintegration 46 3.3 Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Policies in Transition 51 3.4 Capital Stocks After Conflict 53 3.5 Informal Economies: Conflict, Shadow and Coping 55 4.1 Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Transitional Justice 59 4.2 Transitional Justice: International, National and Local Mechanisms 63 4.3 Reparations, Transfers and Micro-level Effects 69 4.4 Capital Stocks and Transitional Justice 74 5.1 Arusha Accords: 1993 and 1994 77 5.2 (a) Transitional Justice During Period I 93 5.2 (b) Transitional Justice During Period II 94 5.3 Transitional Justice Post-Genocide 95 iii

PAGE 4

TRANSITIONS FROM CIVIL CONFLICT: RECONSTRUCTION, REHABILITATION AND THE ROLE OF JUSTICE IN CREATING SUSTAINABLE PEACE Michelle Chandler Reed New College of Florida, 2010 ABSTRACT Transitional judicial mechanisms have the capacity to address underlying causes of tension and conflict during periods of instability. When used appropriately, and allowed to carry out their designated functions, transitional justice is able to facilitate not only a reassurance that there is a rule of law,' but also enables the realization of economic recovery and reconciliation. Transitional justice is also particularly suited to handle questions involving patterns of exclusion and entrenched inequality, where conflict may be repetitive and there may be limited commitments to sustainable peace, transparency or accountability. By exploring theoretical background on deprivation, inequity, conflict dynamics and conventional post-conflict policies, we are then able to apply the same ideas to a specific case study (Rwanda), where different transitional outcomes have been witnessed with similar reconstructive and rehabilitative goals. Dr. Richard D. Coe Department of Economics iv

PAGE 5

Chapter 1: Introduction This thesis undertakes a large task in seeking to disentangle fragments of transitional policy and the necessary steps that must be taken in order to enable sustainable peace. In particular, the thesis seeks to understand the possible roles transitional justice mechanisms can play in facilitating social, political and economic recovery and reconciliation. More formally, policy decisions made after a conflict are seen as being either reconstructive or rehabilitative in a social, political or economic realm. While these processes are underway, judicial mechanisms may be able to act so as to alleviate underlying causes of conflict, specifically perceptions of deprivation, exclusion and inequity. Before exploring this idea more thoroughly in chapter 4, chapter 2 discusses tenants of identity creation and adoption, and explores how these considerations alter assumptions of homogeneity and rationality. Chapter 2 also considers the relationship between how one sees oneself in relation to their environment, and how group membership can serve as a powerful tool of exploitation by predatory elites. Chapter 3 introduces the dual policy tracks of reconstruction and rehabilitation, giving a broad overview of the different goals and programs enacted by various parties after conflict. Once these ideas have been discussed, chapter 4 moves forward to our main question: how does transitional justice operate during a post conflict transition? Other than restoring a rule of law,' we are interested in the real effects that such mechanisms may exert on other policy decisions and results. Chapter 5 presents a specific case study of the Sub-Saharan state of Rwanda, and compares two periods of attempted transition embarked upon by formal signing of peace arrangements. In spite of their similarities, the two transitional periods had widely divergent results, which we believe can be explained through the operation of judicial actions. Judicial action was not taken in 1993, and the state fell back into conflict with the 1994 genocide; however, actions were taken in 1994, during the second transitional period. Chapter 5 will compare both reconstruction and rehabilitation strategy as well as the different sequences and forms of accountability initiated during each episode. 1

PAGE 6

The final chapter of the thesis is a brief set of concluding remarks on the depth of literature reviewed, and what findings appear to be most significant from academic observation. Most importantly, transitional justice does appear to have positive effects on other post conflict processes. These effects are magnified where sequencing is taken into consideration appropriately, and where the scope of programs taken on by transitional regimes is feasible, in terms of both political willpower and financial resources. 2

PAGE 7

Chapter 2: Identities, Inequality and Risk of Civil Conflict Both reality and perception influence the way an individual will respond to an external shock, regardless of the shock's own qualities. How one identifies oneself both individually and as a member of different social groups may give some indication of how one interprets their incentives and costs of any decision, and how that person will cope with changes in their environment. Existing thories of inequity often operate on the basis of homogeneity, or the assumption that each individual will respond identically, facing similar preferences and constraints. By accepting that different individuals do not necessarily perceive similar circumstances in the same way as a result of either some self-identified idea or commonly held identity, we may develop a more effective understanding of situations where differences in wealth or power may become more volatile and, subsequently, threats to state stability. Identity Creation and Adoption For our interests we adopt the definition of self as a composition of "one's values, motives, emotions, feelings, attitudes, thoughts, goals and aspirations," coexistent with "one's group memberships, social influence and roles" (tsby, 2007, 23). Groups are self-defined collectives, where members possess a shared sense of "enduring characteristics and basic values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, its past history, current purposes and future prospects" (tsby, 2007, 24). We concur with constructivist theories that imply that some parts of identity are inherited and beyond an actor's control, while others are learned through social norms and interactions. Constructivism also provides six conditions to keep in mind with regard to the adoption of a particular individual identity or group membership: 1)identity is not static, and individuals may move with differing degrees of permeability among multiple different definitions; (2) an individual may have multiple identities which co-exist simultaneously; (3) political, social and economic incentives are relevant to identity adoption; (4) social interactions influence identity choices; (5) identity prevalence may be disproportionately shaped; and (6) actors and structures 3

PAGE 8

are mutually constituted (Rousseau and van der Veen, 2005). The final four conditions are most central to this study, though the first two are also important. Incentive structures influence what types of definition or membership an individual will seek. Positions of social or political power may be more easily attained by one group than another, or economic benefits may be unevenly distributed and concentrated among a particular group. If this is true and identities are mobile, an individual is more likely to seek membership in the group which faces more preferable outcomes. Those who already have group membership in these circumstances are likely to support those conditions which favor them, and over time may move towards making membership more difficult to attain. Social interactions are important to how individuals identify themselves and to how important they view certain group memberships as being. The exchanges between individuals on an inter-personal level dictate how they see their own potential or opportunities for personal advancement. Where social norms dictate that a certain group is continually marginalized, the victimized collective will face more difficulties in attaining education, accessing social services, or more fully engaging in productive and consumption-based economic activity. Identity prevalence is also not necessarily an accurate representation of reality. This is particularly true in the presence of political entrepreneurs,' who exploit identity cleavages by reinforcing notions of difference in order to gain an advantage within the state structure, or to rationalize the continued marginalization of one group from advancing within it. These actors or elites who emerge as leaders and voices for identity groups draw on inequality viewed as questions of exclusion. If they can successfully mobilize groups who feel that they have been excluded from reaching their full potential within a community, they create distorted saliences among a population. To this degree, they draw on the relational quality of identity; in its most simplistic sense, they encourage a them' versus us' attitude, which can threaten security. The final condition is important for integrating many of the interdisciplinary themes in this study. Mutual constitution of actors and structures implies that the structures which exist within the state are reflective of its population's ideals and values. Most significant for our analysis is the degree to which capture of bias can be seen, through formalized recognition of identities within a society and their places in it. This bias may be seen, for example, in the demanding that all 4

PAGE 9

administrative or military leadership postings be filled by one identity, or creating restrictions making discrimination acceptable and legitimate. Group Mobility, Salience and Social Capital Group mobility is reflective of the ease with which individuals are able to alter their membership within a collective. Some types of identity are inherently more difficult to separate oneself from, as a result of historical practice and international acceptance. An example is ethnolinguistic classification, made up of six parts: i. race; ii. color; iii. culture; iv. language; v. origin; and vi. nationality. Color and origin are inherited; once born, an individual has no ability to alter them. The other four parts are learned. Mobility is important because, as tsby notes, "if people can easily move between groups, then groups matter much less for people's well-being" (2005, 21) Race is how an individual views themselves on a broader, more regional level, and is accompanied by certain expectations and incentives, and has been the target of study especially in the United States following the end of slavery. African-Americans, seen as a distinct racial grouping different from other White Americans, were historically seen as non-human with an assigned monetary value indicative of their potential productivity. Even once this inhumane system had been eliminated, African-Americans continued to be discriminated against and the targets of racial violence, and were unable to access equal state supports and safety nets. As late as the 1950s this remained the norm, before a complex system of affirmative action quotas were enacted, and court decisions forced integration and acceptance. In spite of these legislative and judicial actions, African-Americans are still more likely to be impoverished than White Americans, less likely to achieve higher education, and continue to view themselves as distinct racial categories identified mostly on color. Psychological studies cited by tsby (2005) have "documented effects of racial discrimination on the general mental health of the African-American population, finding that perceptions of discrimination are linked to lower levels of well-being" (21). Culture and language are closely linked and begin before an individual possesses autonomy over identity decisions. They are passed inter-generationally, and are thought of as the rituals and practices a particular group performs and believes in. They may be learnt later in life; 5

PAGE 10

for example, many individuals convert to a new religion once they have reached adulthood. Cultures vary on the extent to which they encourage new members, and the extent to which these converts are accepted within the core group. Nationality is similar in a broad sense to citizenship, which is obtained through one of three actions. An individual may be born within a state's borders or given the same nationality as their parents (passage through blood). An actor may also request citizenship, which may then be granted by the appropriate state body. Citizenship is a formal recognition that an individual is a member of an individual state, which we think of as an "organization which controls the population occupying a definite territory [so far as] (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; (2) it is autonomous [and] (3) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another" (Linz and Stepan, 17). The chart below compares the labels of citizen, national and ethno-linguistic membership by considering how it is transferred, recognized, obtained and documented. Citizen National Ethno-Linguistic recognition sovereign states international groups State majority or minority status set of specific behavioral characteristics minority status (not always the case) self-identification transfer by blood by location of birth dictated by powerful elites who are able to shape ideas of nation common linguistic or cultural history obtainment voluntary request and granting by state body varies, dictated by regime in power and cultural legacies requirements dictated by administrative structures documentation administrative documents (passports, birth certificates) state documents census collection census collection Table 2.1 Citizenship, Nationality and Ethno-linguistic Classifications Nationality is not synonymous with citizenship and is more appropriately thought of as a cultural construct, usually stemming from ethno-linguistic history. Nationality in itself does not imply recognized territorial boundaries. We may conceptualize it from a psychological perspective as a type of "national ethos." The ethos is comprised of how one views the following: the justness 6

PAGE 11

of one's own actions, personal security, positive self-image, one's own victimization, the delegitimizing of opponents, patriotism, unity and peace (Bar-Tal, 2000). All groups possess some semblance of an ethos, with varying degrees of salience. Where groups live in insecurity, their ethos are predicted to be increasingly divergent and their commonalities de-emphasized. The ethos of a nation is context-specific and is non-stationary to the extent that is constantly evolving as a result of interpersonal interactions that change how citizens within a territory see themselves as components of the national consciousness (Bar-Tal, 2000). This ethos approach is similar to considering a group's resiliency, or their ability to respond as a collective positively to adversity such that it "allows positive patterns of development and social, political or economic interaction to thrive" (Ki-Moon, 2009, 10). Rather than being comprised of common behaviors, the Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations lists factors of resilience, including respect for a rule of law, family and social cohesion, institution cohesion, participation and available social services, which "have a critical function in enabling households and communities to avoid or overcome armed violence" (Ki-Moon, 2009, 10). Salience is the importance an individual attaches to a particular identity. Because an individual actor may have multiple identities, they may not all be relevant in national or international discourse. Moreover, the importance of different groups can change over time naturally or as the consequence of state-directed policies. Democratic policies that seek to expand the scope of citizenship can be much less problematic than those that advocate nationbuilding. Policies that further entwine national and citizen identities risk pursuing routes to cultural homogeneity, and may in the process exclude smaller groups which deviate from the norm (Bahvnani and Miodownik, 2009). While it is generally accepted that cultural homogeneity of a nation-state is not possible, there are historical instances where they have been successful. The French state, is the most commonly cited example. By overhauling both his administration and education systems, Napoleon was able to control the means of promotion within the state and expand its control of private enterprises, and to control the way in which information was delivered to the general population. The structures created are still largely present in modern France, particularly observable in the maintained state control over education and teaching. Napoleon's policies also allowed him to ease certain social tensions existing between Paris and 7

PAGE 12

the provinces of the French state, by emphasizing the salience of French national identity over more local or regionalized identities (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 30). A more contemporary exploration of identity salience is undertaken by reviewing answers to survey data which has been collected in different regions. The Afrobarometer Surveys asked the following question: "We have spoken to many [citizens of country name] and they have described themselves in different ways. Some people describe themselves in terms of their language, ethnic group, religion or gender, and others describe themselves in economic terms, such as working class, middle class or a farmer. Besides being [nationality], which specific group do you feel you belong to first and foremost?" The results of their data during their first and second round of collection are summarized below: This table shows that during the first round of surveying, ethnic salience was reported at almost double the levels during the second collection. This could be representative of changes regarding the incentives to adopt different ethnic identities through inclusive or exclusionary policies undertaken by the government regime, or differences in wording and delivery. This range of possible rationales for the different values collected is illustrative of the difficulties in acquiring accurate data regarding co-existing group membership beyond the notion of citizenship (Bhavnani and Miodownik, 2009) Central to the concept of social capital is the presence of trust. Fukuyama expresses trust as a condition where "a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of reciprocity and honest behavior" (Colletta et al., 2000, 7). Uphoff's work incorporates cohesion into its definition of social capital by decomposing it into two parts, structural and cognitive. Structural social capital encompasses the networks, relationships, other informal and formal institutions that link members of a group; cognitive social capital is the motivation behind these structures, including norms, values, expectations of reciprocity and civic responsibility, and other influences on the level of trust that exists among groups. Cohesion among groups is most likely when the level of trust is highest and social bonds stronger, and without more latent polarization between other identities (Colletta et al., 2000). Polarization occurs where a small number of groups, usually two or three, actively engage the population with extremist rhetoric, which is generally oppositional (Bhavnani and 8

PAGE 13

Miodownik, 2009). A small group within the demographic begins forcing identification on an widening scale, and simultaneously begins to solidify those groups. These elites tend to force either-or decisions, and be observed where state governments become dominated by political leaders or parties who advocate distributing benefits exclusively towards their own collective. Under certain conditions, regimes or militias may even enact such radically exclusive policies that they constitute genocide, or the attempt to eliminate an entire group of individuals identified as part of the other. Exclusionary groups of elites often distort citizenship and nationality to justify these programs pursuant to achieving national homogeneity. Group Recognition Within a state, certain types of differentiation among the population are recognized through minority status (Baldwin, 2007). Like other identity groups, minorities vary in their relevance and the barriers they face to political, social and economic activity. Under certain circumstances, policies may be targeted towards this group to mitigate inequalities between minorities and the recognized majority, for example affirmative action programs. Most often, minorities are identified on the basis of ethnicity, race, or indigenous status. Groups do not have to have minority status to exist, however. Policies were enacted to pursue gender equity through suffrage and wage legislation, even though women may not be seen as belonging to the same set of criteria for minority consideration. Conversely, policies can also promote continued marginalization, and literature about minorities has shown that those belonging to the minority are less likely to receive the same level of education, access to healthcare, or access to skilled labor markets (Dertwinkel, 2008, 4). These exclusive trends may continue, and in extreme cases may lead to a complete denial of basic human rights of certain groups. Some authors use vertical and horizontal inequity to label these patterns. Vertically, the policy consideration is among individuals within the population, whereas horizontally, inequities are concerned with how different groups of individuals are considered. Horizontal inequity can be captured politically, socially and culturally, in addition to economically. Politically, inequity among groups may be seen in the distribution of power and opportunities for public employment and promotion. It may also appear as a dominance in the control of national assemblies, police, armed forces or other institutional structures. Socially, 9

PAGE 14

access to public goods and services may be denied to certain groups, and different wealth or educational outcomes may imply inequity in human capital investment. Culturally, caste systems may operate openly, creating a hierarchy among coexisting groups or refusal to recognize some groups or their traditions as legitimate (Stewart, 2006). In terms of economic horizontal inequity, we should expect to observe differences in asset ownership among groups, collectively and individually. The overall macroeconomic condition of the state's market will also reflect inequity in access to resources beyond income and opportunities for human capital investment, with there be condensation of growth benefits where there are positive indicators of development. Growth is conceptualized in classical economics as being distribution neutral, but this is not realistic or supported by contemporary empirical evidence. Benefits from growth and liberalization are usually secured more easily by middle or higher income groups, who are able to access wider capital bases to generate profit and invest in their restocking. This tends to widen the gap between the richest and poorest parts of a population, and is portrayed as being indicative of a J-curve function, where inequity first increases before bottoming out and beginning a longer-term upward trend of mitigation. Where this inequity is aligned with a social cleavage or identity groups in the population, however, this condensation can provide a powerful incentive for political entrepreneurs to mobilize identity-extremist agendas. These entrepreneurs represent all relevant groups, and force individuals to make decisions, creating "dichotomies where none existed before" (Stewart et al., YEAR, 33). Where identities become the basis of political platforms and association, they may be referred to as being structurally embedded. Once embedding has occurred, state homogeneity is compromised, and there are limited potential outcomes. One is continuance of the inequitable status quo. Beyond this option, there may be voluntary state redefinition of a new homogeneity, voluntary or forced exile of the group(s) opposed to the dominant structural group, or creation of new territorial boundaries violently or non-violently. To facilitate nonviolent resolution, political identity should be envisioned as socially constructed and extremely volatile relative to other group identities, guided prominently by hysteria and extremism encouraged by entrepreneurs (Linz and Stepan, 1996, 30). 10

PAGE 15

Even where the disparity in access is no longer true but may have been a historical legacy, groups re-solidify their status through feedback effects. Not only are marginalized groups under-financed in their pursuance of human capital (for example, South African government spending during Apartheid on education conformed to a 14:1 ratio of white to black students (stby, 2005, 34)), but the extent to which they are structurally excluded limits their willingness to actively resist constraints on their activity. Wealth condensation insures "only entrepreneurs with sufficiently high levels of personal wealth will be able to finance their project" (Deininger and Olinto, 2000, 6-7). Powerful elites generally seek to reinforce the status quo, and have more incentive to encourage the continued subjugation of one identity relative to another to maintain their own power and benefits from distorted redistribution strategies. Over time, the smaller the group able to access the benefits from a regime, the more likely it will provoke social tension where it continues to divert benefits from the majority of the population. Minority status is usually reserved for ethnic or racial numerical minorities in population demographics. In most cases, these groups are indigenous and relatively less advanced in terms of technological innovation than others within the state. Their status as relationally inferior is reinforced by economic stagnation, reflective of the decreased access to investment and willingness to finance education or other training programs. We can apply the idea of minority status as a formal recognition that identity conflicts may occur during stability, and expect the observations concerning minority groups to be applicable to other identity-groups without more formal labeling (Baldwin et al., 2007; Dertwinkel, 2008). Table 2.2 notes types of groups that may exist in a given state, how their presence may be observed, and what types of policies are likely to be inclusive and imply positive approaches towards combatting inequality. The table also includes religion, which we have not explicitly mentioned, but which in certain theocratic systems may be significant. Identity groups that are socially constructed may act similarly to any one of these groups to a given degree. 11

PAGE 16

Types of Social Construct Associated Norms and Social Observation Recognition by Administrative Bodies Gender male tend to be dominant source of income male wages tend to be higher than female across employment sectors unskilled, low wage labor predominately female in lower income countries specic gender equity policies and gender mainstreaming sensitization programmes and initiatives gender quotas in administrative bodies Race white, caucasiod races tend to be favored through colonial expansion other racial types tend to be seen as inherently inferior racial quotas and afrmative action active movements towards desegregation may or may not be designated as minority Ethnicity dominant group tends to be favored structurally may or may not be granted minority status Religious theocracies tend to benet those of a certain religious afliation as opposed to alternative faiths freedom of association may or may not be tolerated Table 2.2 Group Types and Potential Policies to Encourage Equity Minority rights are categorized in one of four ways: right to existence, identity, discrimination, or participation (Baldwin et al., 2007). The first includes the inherent right of groups to exist and be recognized by the state. Identity rights pertain to freedoms of culture, language and religion. Minorities have the right to be free from unfair discrimination. They practice a right to participation to the extent they are able to influence the decisions that effect them. Whether and in what combination these rights exist vary by state and often by groups within the state. The securing of minority rights is seen as a key component of international conflict prevention, solidifying the idea that minority status is coincidental with patterns of exclusion and marginalization. In international discourse, there is subtle redefining of actors. Whereas on a domestic level, there exists micro-level and macro-level considerations concerning individuals and firms operating within a defined state; Globally there exists other states, and analyses tend to consider states as distinct individuals, acting in their own self-interest. If states are representative of their 12

PAGE 17

constituency, then this should not be totally problematic. For a state to enter into the international agenda, however, there are flexible limitations on this assumption, particularly in states with strategic interest for world powers or abundant natural resources and economic incentives in their entry. International analysis must also integrate the role of multi-national structures such as the United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and their regional counterparts. These bodies are generally charged with monitoring a state's fulfillment of a minimal level of respect for human rights and assisting less developed and poorer states in accelerating development and sustainability. The rights outlined in international treaties and charters are seen as applicable beyond territorial borders by the commonality of the human condition, and it is accepted that individuals have an inherent claim to basic goods and services and may demand additional measures and protections by the state where appropriate to protect and ensure these rights are realized. International law is heavily dominated by Western theorists and global economic powers, and thus propagate an idea of male privilege, private property rights, and capitalist undertones encouraging the formation of a business-based middle class to enhance macroeconomic growth. Exclusion, Relative Deprivation and Inequality Rather than inequality, identity theory seems more drawn to questions of social exclusion "understood as exclusion or marginalization of one group by another group in society because of different group identity" (Dertwinkel, 2008, 7). Observed as an inter-group measure, exclusion is assumed relational and continuous. It may only occur where one group is seen as privileged relative to others, and is not a single, isolated event but occurs over time. Social exclusion is really the result of political, cultural and economic behaviors of exclusion; economic being composed of both exclusion from consumption and productive activities. Consumption activity may be compromised by an inability to access livable income or an inability to access markets. There may also be limitations on a group's ability to invest or confidently hold capital in national financial institutions. Productive activity may be frustrated by occupation segregation or wage inequities which coincide with identity. Certain preconditions 13

PAGE 18

favor exclusion, including colonial history, stigmatization from past trauma, social hierarchy and stratification, involuntary minority status and geographical factors (Seckinelgin, 2009). Exclusion is related to, but not the same as, relative deprivation or a shared perception of shortage between expected needs and actual needs. Relative deprivation or how one views one's position as the member of a group against the positions of similar individuals who are members of alternative groups may be the result of real distributive problems, or merely the perception of distributive corruption at the expense of one identity-group. Where two identity groups are present in relatively equitable numerical form, conditions for conflict grievance and exploitation are more likely. Where a deficit in development was been felt astutely among one particular group, shortages were more likely to be seen or portrayed as the direct consequence of predatory behavior employed by other groups present. The actual existence of relative deprivation, to the degree that it is a political tactic that advocates redistributing growth and other transitional benefits to a favored group at the expense of a different group, may be less robust where the charges of deprivation are mobilized. This mobilization does not rely on the presumption of fact, but on the propagation of an idea among a population. Manipulation of these relationships may be viewed through the adoption and recreation of certain stereotypes which emphasize untrue social norms regarding behavior or capacity that exist in a state. To enable easier identity-exploitation and politicization, group membership is likely to become increasingly less porous, and its definitional properties increasingly oppositional, taking its position relative to an identified collective or individuals beyond its immediate membership. Relative deprivation "leads to a growing gap between the expected and the actual, which causes frustration and mobilized people to engage in conflict" (stby, 2005, 30). Alternatively we might consider Galtung's hypothesis of rank disequilibrium, where there is "a discrepancy between how one perceives oneself and the way one is treated by the others in the system...[that] will be perceived as frustrating, and can result in aggressive behavior" (stby, 2005, 31). Exclusion should also be differentiated from poverty. Poverty can be thought of as a distributional outcome which has left some significant part of the population unable to obtain basic provisions or achieve a minimal standard of well-being. Exclusion however, is a relational process 14

PAGE 19

which occurs over time. Seckinelgin (2009) notes three important facets of this process. First, there is declining participation of one group in national discourse; while participation falls, there is increasing solidarity among same-group members; and finally, access to power is limited to recognized, dominant groups who maintain control. When we consider inequality, the discipline or sphere of policy in which we are operating define what differences we are actually referring to. Economics, insisting on the superiority of quantitative data, usually references gini coefficients of either income or land. These measure the distribution of certain assets among individuals or states, although their application may be extended in individual research. Gini measures are not able to account for either how assets are distributed between groups, and are seen as a vertical measure. They also fail to capture the normative data of relative deprivation or exclusion (Sen, 1997). Social policy tends to rely on data relating to availability of government and non-government welfare programs, access to education, and indicators of public health. Indices like the Human Development Index are more recent attempts to compile comprehensive, cross-country data on population welfare. Politically, equity is seen as access to equal voting rights, free and fair elections, and state accountability. The former two measures, gini indices or development scores, tend to be more inclusive of identity-based groups existing within a society, and their policy measures are more likely to be seen as reflective of how that society views these collectives. They are also more likely to be targeted at specific groups, and recognize their existence in either a negative or positive manner. Furthermore, each of these indicators is discrete, and not continuous. Nelson summarizes the problem of capturing significant measures of identity-difference because of its decomposition across disciplines as the "economic-social divide," which acts to set "a firm line between the activities and choice of the presumedly autonomous adult, on the one hand, and the way in which that person is formed, is affected by need or illness, and acts on the basis of a group identity or adopted social role, on the other" (2001, 379). Table 2.3 highlights some of the broadest differences among poverty, inequality and exclusion. It also identifies policies that may counter these conditions, the actors relevant to their implementation, their microand macrolevel effects, and their interactions with growth. 15

PAGE 20

Poverty Inequality Exclusion Working Denition individual or collective which is unable to attain a minimum standard of living income and assets are largely held by a small portion of the population collective of individuals are excluded from normal economic, social and political activity relative to other groups within state Effect of Growth may alleviate poverty where properly directed may decrease inequity unless wealth is concentrated among higher income brackets negatively impacts exclusion where benets are seen to be distributed along group basis Microlevel effects households begin to erode asset bases, lacking ability to accrue income different income groups begin to experience divergent outcomes with regard to development relative deprivation internalization of otherness Macro-level effects decreased consumption activity increase in illicit markets decrease in national consumption and growth stagnation of growth and development corruption and patronage of political elites loyal to regime stagnation of growth increase in illicit economy and illegal exchange discrimination reproduced in state structures and civil society Policy economic revival positive growth investment in export economy redistributive policies with regard to land or other resources increased access to credit and nancing small business investment inclusive policies towards reconciling identity cleavages proliferation of common cultural legacies or historical experience Relevant Actors World Bank and IMF United Nations Humanitarian Organizations National Governments World Bank and IMF Minority Rights Groups National Governments Regional Organizations National Governments Regional Organizations Decentralized Government Bodies Judicial Bodies Table 2.3 Poverty, Inequality and Exclusion The internationalization of conflict and security issues have been bolstered by emphasis being placed on human rights monitoring indicators, which are more concerned with measuring the standard of living of a population, and how they see their welfare in relation to other things around them (Rosga and Satterthwaite, 2009). These indicators are usually based on an 16

PAGE 21

understanding of universal human rights as outlined in the United Nations Charter in 1948, which states are obliged to respect to their fullest ability in accordance with 1966 international treaties making the recognition of such rights the duty of the central regime. They are intended to be more comprehensive than other measurements of inequity, but data is difficult both to collect and interpret. The documents are more effective in outlining the basic obligations of a state towards its constituency, noting that they should pursue provisions to the best of their ability. In 2001, the United Nations explicitly defined basic human needs falling under state responsibility as maintaining a minimal level of food, shelter, water, and education. Where dedication of resources falls short of meeting these goals, the difference will presumably be made through humanitarian aid in the short term, and development assistance in the future. Rosga and Saterthwaite identify three types of these sorts of rights-based indicators: structural, process and outcome. Structural indicators "reflect the ratification and adoption of legal instruments and existence of basic institutional mechanisms deemed necessary for facilitating realization of a human right" (2009, 270) They are not necessarily quantified in any straightforward or simple manner, and are attuned to "the intent of the State in undertaking measures for the realization of the concerned human rights" (Rosga and Saterthwaite, 2009, 271). Most broadly, are there legal documents which recognize that all citizens are holders of human rights, which hold the state accountable where these rights are denied? Process indicators "mean to capture the cause element of a cause and effect relationship between the efforts of states and fulfillment of the right under examination" (Rosga and Saterthwaite, 2009, 271). They look for continuous trends implying that a state is actively seeking to recognize the rights of all individual citizens, especially where they are seen as the result of development programming. Outcome indicators are the most easy to quantify in discrete terms, and "aim to measure the actual enjoyment of the human rights under consideration by the relevant population" (Rosga and Saterthwaite, 2009, 271) If development policy has been positive in effect, this should be reflected in increased income per capita, decreased levels of poverty, lower unemployment and more efficient economic markets with more equitable distributive outcomes. 17

PAGE 22

The spheres of inequity are interrelated. The distribution of income and assets is going to be influenced by the ability to change earnings potentials through human capital investment, and also by the ability of a group to successfully pursue changes in the status quo through government accountability and political agency. If we hold that institutions and actors are mutually constituted, we imply that social welfare and differences in access to them will be reflected within government. This connection could be positive, if the government is relatively open to discussion and willing to encourage equality; or negative, as legacies of repression can document. Economic Theory Relevant to Identity Construction and Adoption From the vantage point of neoclassical economics, the presence of different identities threatens to undermine conditions of homogeneity. This condition implies that actors individually act the same under identical circumstances. Differences in access to resources and investment opportunities, however, change the constraints faced on individual actors within a market. If these constraints are a partial determinant of utility maximization insofar as they limit the range of preference bundles available to a particular actor or collectives, they violate homogeneity; all individuals within the market are not equal, do not act with the same information, and are not autonomous. Feminist economics explores this idea in more depth through gender-specific comparison of allocation of market time in the labor market. Classical theory holds that the labor market is similar to any other market. The good in demand is labor, which is supplied by workers and demanded by firms; an efficient wage rate will be reached over time, reflecting the productivity of the worker (Blau et al, 2006). Feminist economist, however, consider how differences in social norm construction of gender influence decisions individuals make about labor, and expands the scope of labor market economics to include human capital approaches. Feminist economics also provides useful categorization of discrimination within markets to enhance discourse. When deciding to enter the workforce and determining standing within it, individual agents are first constrained by time. The alternative to entering the labor market is to focus on activity classified as non-market.' In some models this decision is depicted as the trade-off between labor and leisure, placing an implicit value judgment such that any informal form of labor 18

PAGE 23

is classified as leisure. An individual's ultimate decision will be one maximizes his or her utility between the two, in a way that enables them to obtain their desired consumption bundle without exceeding budgetary constraint. In the presence of heterogeneity, the outcomes between individuals and groups will vary, as will their specific constraints and preferences. Feminist theory discusses the cult of domesticity' and the social implication that women should specialize on nonmarket activity, while men engage in labor markets (Blau et al., 2006). Emphasis on the expectations of women to fulfill roles as mothers and wives confined to the home thus made movement outside of this private sphere difficult where it was even possible, and women laborers faced significantly more barriers to promotion or entry. Gender is often discussed as a social construct, an identity based upon collective norms and ideas about how girls and boys are supposed to act in different ways. Gender is difficult to abandon as a means of group identification, and indoctrination begins at birth. Our ideas about the meaning of gender have been reflected worldwide. We assume households are heterosexual, monogamous, and comprised of a primary earner and primary caregiver. Men are seen as responsible for income generation in healthy households, while women traditionally are expected to oversee activities that do not generate meaningful income. Relative to men, women are relegated to a lower status and different sets of expectations. They are often expected to fill lower occupations where they do enter the labor force, such as secretarial, housekeeping or nursing fields, where they can productively use the skills their gender has characterized them as possessing (Feiner and Roberts, 1990). The constraints of social opinion can be seen in other identity-based groups active in labor markets, and generally manifest themselves through some variance of formal or informal discrimination. These behaviors are defined as categorical in feminist economics as tastes for discrimination, statistical discrimination, overcrowding, and dead-end professions (Blau et al., 2006). In tastes for discrimination, social norms influence the willingness of employers to hire certain groups, employees to work with other employees who belong to a certain group, or other aversion to exchange with an agent of one classification relative to another. Overcrowding and dead-end professions are also problematic if these types of employment are delegated based on identity. Feedback 19

PAGE 24

effects of all types of discrimination exist, and over time one group may become systematically denied access to higher, more skilled work through either a labor surplus or limitations in capital development. Under neoclassical theory, any differences in wages will reflect real differences in productivity of workers and will be limited in their sustainability under perfectly competitive conditions, where alternative employment for a higher wage level is relatively prevalent (Blau et al., 2006). Differences in wages between individuals may also be representative of delineations between skilled and unskilled labor. Skilled labor tends to attract higher equilibrium wage levels as it requires foregoing short-term horizon realizations for promises of long-run returns to productivity, and such positions are attainable only through legitimate human capital developments. Professions which need skilled labor require not only that such structures exist to facilitate human capital investment, but also that they are adequately engaged with global information systems, indicative of not only designation as a skilled laborer nationally, but also internationally. Occupational segregation is difficult to dislodge largely because it is strongly reinforced by social norms outside of an individual's control. It requires redefining roles that have been stereotyped inter-generationally, often under circumstances where there is a deficit in previous achievement by group members and resentment. Addressing this particular set of issues takes a large time and political commitment, and the recognition that "the impact of changing circumstances on people's behavior is important when these changes alter the existing institutional norms and values within which people are traditionally socialized" (Seckinelgin, 2009). Quotas are sometimes used to mitigate the discriminatory tendency to associate one group with certain inferior occupations (with lower wages and fewer advancement prospects), but, depending on their reception and portrayal, quotas may simply reinforce stereotypes and result in increased confinement of individuals from that group to certain income-generation activities. Occupational segregation may be reflected by discrete data, and fluctuations by time-series measurements, but the quality of reports often fail to include informal labor or bartering occurring, and is unlikely to be uniformly disaggregated. Disaggregation is problematic in all indicators, 20

PAGE 25

particularly where the state has refused to collect its own, transferring the responsibility to interested third-party actors who may or may not pursue their own biases. In attempts to utilize gini coefficients and other measures developed by less radical economists, we may refocus our attention on the potential underlying causes of income inequity. Where higher levels of distributive income inequality are registered by gini coefficients, there are six likely causes, summarized by Nafziger and Auvinen (2002): i) discriminatory legacies; ii) unequal distribution of land or productive assets; iii) discriminatory taxation codes and collection; iv) unequal distribution of the benefits from public expenditure; v) distorted economic competition; and vi) the existence of predatory rule, implying a lack of adequate oversight of markets. These causes may overlap with other indicators, including rising trends in unemployment, variances in health and other social services, periodic violence, prevalent propaganda, discriminatory institutional structure and practice, discriminatory labor markets, and rising extremism. In extreme cases of identity-discrimination, there is a significant risk of entrenchment both institutionally and socially, facilitated through economic discrimination. Roht-Arriaza and Orcolocsky note The group learns not to participate in society and others learn to exclude members of this group, and participator inequity becomes a part of the economic and societal equilibrium.' Therefore, because people evaluate how trustworthy or likely to succeed others may be in an economic endeavor based in part on the identity characteristics of the individual, marginalized group tend to stay marginalized and unable to break out of poverty. (2009, 178) Capital Development Capital development is also an area in which inequity can occur, usually associated with economic policies. When considering capital, we commonly identify seven types: 1) natural endowment, 2) State financial resources, 3) infrastructure, 4) institutional, 5) knowledge resources, 6) cultural capital, and 7) human capital (Fairbanks, YEAR, 7). Natural resources offer a potentially lucrative source of revenue to those in control of their extraction and sale, and may be a significant part of the potential financial capital of a state. A state's financial resources are usually quantified by their holdings of foreign currency, or as the inflation-adjusted amount of domestic currency in circulation. Measuring the money supply is more difficult where there is not a treasury or independent financial body overseeing its printing 21

PAGE 26

and monitoring price uniformity throughout the state. Infrastructure capital refers to the manmade, physical networks and places of exchange, as well as the means to access them. This includes roads and transportation networks, adequately staffed and maintained. Infrastructure also includes the pre-existing resources which have been invested in the means by which to extract natural endowments. Institutional capital addresses government regime characteristics and political exclusion. It embodies the unique institutions a society has developed as a means of governing its territory. We can consider cultural capital as particular customs or language, and relate to social exclusion. Human capital is an individual's potential for productivity. Higher education and access to on-job training are seen as investments to increase future productivity, and subsequently earnings potential. This is the basis of a simple human capital model. Welfare economists have been interested in human capital to the extent that it affects the range of opportunities available for an individual agent. Variation in the quality of investments, types of investments and availability can be conceptualized between identity-groups. Because investing in human capital means forgoing the alternative of joining the labor force sooner, individuals who begin with advantageous accessibility to activities like education tend to encourage investment inter-generationally. Without the ability to finance human capital, disadvantaged groups are trapped in lower skilled, low wage markets. Differences among groups in their ability to invest in education or other productivity enhancement imply multiple interpretations of opportunity cost. Particularly among groups in poverty, the opportunity cost of allowing a child to attend school daily is the amount of potential earnings forfeited by their attendance. "The need for child labor is the single most important reason for poor families not sending children to school in developing countries" (Lewis and Lockheed, 2009, 12) and policies to address these disparities in access "are usually thought of as social programmes, rather than as economic programmes designed to advance investment in human capital" (Nelson 2001, 373). Once a group is marginalized with regards to access to publicly provided services, it is increasingly difficult to break cycles of exclusionary practices. The longer the exclusionary trends have been allowed to develop, the more difficult and costly they are likely to be during reform and transitions (Dertwinkel, 2008). 22

PAGE 27

Sen's work has been instrumental in facilitating an alternative conceptualization of inequality. His definition is composed of three categories: i) income and other financial assets, ii) welfare, and iii) rights and liberties Sen, 1997). This approach seems to embrace the tri-spherical nature of differentiation we discussed earlier. Income and other financial assets as a proxy for economic, welfare a proxy for social, and rights and liberties a proxy for political (where rights and liberties are indicative of a responsive administrative with a respect for universal rights). Sen also articulates a coherent critique of classical theory, which sees markets as being decentralized, populated by self-interested actors, and guided by price signals. From chaos is supposed to emerge a natural equilibrium of Pareto efficiency, where collusion opportunities to redirect profits are impossible. These antiquated models are reasserted, as Sen explains, through revealed preference and rationality assumptions. Revealed preference theory states that an individual will maximize utility and make the choice leading to maximization. It assumes the choices are dichotomous, that one consumption bundle is preferable to one other consumption bundle, and there are no other choices. Rationality co-evolved with this theoretical movement, reconceptualizing all choices as explainable in terms of preference. Sen repositions the observer of choices, introducing the decomposition of preference into two parts, ethical and subjective. Developing on Sen's works, social exclusion is seen as marginalization of a group in social relations, which leads to economic exclusion. Economic exclusion is seen as being any combination of unemployment, access to any form of capital, or material deprivation. This secondary form of exclusion has four identified dimensions: health capital, physical capital, productive roles, and social capital. To address economic exclusion requires change in six key policy spheres, each of which should be considered in the specific national context under consideration. They include poverty, education, health, employment, housing and infrastructure, and social cohesion. Regardless of which is most pressing in any context, they should be handled from an economic perspective with an ultimate goal of assuring broader government aims to end exclusion. Key Points of Scholarship Consolidation Consolidating the wide array of scholarship on inequity and identity is difficult, but our brief discussion brings forth some key points. Differences in how individuals view themselves 23

PAGE 28

within a society will exert influence on the range of options they see as viable and the types of preference structures they face. As identities become engrained and recreated in institutional structures, they are increasingly problematic where they are simultaneously highly polarized and become the basis of political platforms. Identity groups are most likely to compromise domestic or regional security when they have more salience relative to citizenship, and when their membership is highly controlled. Alternatively, a state may develop a specific ethos that allows for no peaceful resolution of cultural heterogeneity, where citizenship is withheld in the presence of certain self-identified definitions within and beyond the control of individuals. Furthermore, the degree to which a group perceives its relative deprivation to be a result of other groups preferred standing within the state will influence the range of options it sees in pursuing non-violent challenges to the status quo. Where identity differences exist, they agitate inequities that are not necessarily captured by any particular measure, but are indicative of how individuals view themselves and their multiple group affiliations as operating within their domestic environment. Identities and the Onset of Conflict ...simple inequality between rich and poor is not enough to cause violent conflict. What is highly explosive [is]...horizontal' inequality: when power and resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other waysfor instance by race, religion, or language. So-called ethnic' conflicts occur between groups which are distinct in one or more of these ways, when one of them feels it is being discriminated against, or enjoys other privileges which it fears to lose. (Annan, 1999) Conflict raises its own unique questions across disciplines, and various theories of causation have been suggested and researched. For our analysis, we confine our interests to those most concerned with civil patterns of instability and violence. Political science has been influenced by theories of grievance and legacies of colonialism. Economics, however, has come to accept a different theory of conflict, one in which economic agents are given opportunities for profit through the use of conflict. Actors in a given set of circumstances are motivated to pursue these opportunities through disrupting the status quo violently. Grievances like those observed as significant in political science are more means to an end, and offer exploitation opportunities to further increase the gains pursued by different actors. In and of themselves, they are largely irrelevant. Collier and the World Bank have influenced this idea extensively. Publishing reports, 24

PAGE 29

articles and entire books detailing econometric evidence supporting their conclusions, they have had considerable power in crafting responses to conflict, advocating limitations of financing opportunities for rebel groups, and availability of alternatives to violence. Most disciplines have overlapped on issues they consider relevant to multiplying the risk of conflict, even if they have disagreed on their importance. The presence of working markets for arms, particularly in societies with weak institutional oversight of them, greatly increases the likelihood for violence. Continued patterns of exclusion or increasing oppressiveness can spark conflict and can additionally shape the nature of conflict (Stewart, 2006). Recognizing this, we may also seek to classify certain episodes of state violence as a form of civil war when directed against certain groups, such as in Rwanda or Bosnia. While these episodes may be much easier to define and delineate as completed, they also exhibit a particular form of policy that has led to the ultimate act of exclusion, through a systematic routine of victimization resulting in mass deaths. Galtung saw violence as constructed by three conditions: exclusion, inequality and indignity. This approach reinforces our notion that patterns of exclusion coexisting with inequality and trends towards increased marginalization are likely to promote social instability. Collier and the World Bank released findings that showed that this could not be the case. Forming their thesis of greed' as the basis for conflict, they ran econometric tests finding gini coefficients of land and income as insignificant, and both ethnic and religious differentiation also insignificant. To measure the latter variables, they used measures of fractionalization, the probability that two randomly selected individuals of the population belong to different groups. Their studies did not substitute any integrated measure of exclusion, or perceptions of deprivation, reinforcing the "general reluctance of economics to tread where normative issues are at stake" (Feiner and Roberts, 1990, 160). Collier's works are also inconsistent with other World Bank reports, which note explicitly that unequal land holdings and access to productive resources may provoke violent conflict. A 2003 document stated: "deprivation of land rights as a feature of more generalized inequality in access to economic opportunities and low economic growth have caused seemingly minor social or political conflicts to escalate into large-scale conflicts" (Huggins, 2009, 344). Presumably this 25

PAGE 30

inequity fails to be captured by gini coefficients, creating a discrepancy between the organization's separate, specialized departments. The structuring Galtung suggested fits more easily into political science oriented ideas of conflict, as motivated by social tensions and collective grievances.' While these theories recognize economic consequences and incentives for violent action, conflict is viewed as resulting from the action taken on these grievances. This view reflects the progression of grievance theory away from primordialist theories of conflict, which "stress the uniqueness and overriding importance of ethnic identity" (Cooper, 2005, 25). Moving closer to greed theories, instrumentalists envision ethnicity as "a set of symbolic ties that may be used for political and economic advantage...politicized ethnicity is not inherently different from other forms of political association, and [the] knowledge deduced from ethnic conflicts may also be applied to other kinds of conflicts" (Brown, 2001) In this way, norms of ethnic identity are able to be mobilized so as to compromise national security under certain circumstances. Greed and grievance theories overlap on some issues, including the significance of polarization within a population. Polarization is seen as most problematic when it indicates high levels of homogeneity within each group, and a high level of heterogeneity between groups where there are a small number of significantly sized collectives. Under these conditions, "inequalities in resource access and outcomes, coinciding with cultural differences, culture [becomes] a powerful mobilizing agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances" (Stewart, 2006, 21). Beyond this dynamic, large numbers of unemployed individuals who face discouraging barriers to employment are also easily mobilized, and widespread poverty tends to diminish general commitment to non-violent action. Collier and Gunning (2007) identify conditions under which a government is likely to maximize the welfare of a selected group at the expense of another. The group among which benefits are distributed must be relatively small, and there cannot exist incentives to promote more equitable growth rather than maintain superior recipient status. Profits from rents received by the state are transferred to the group in favor, while the costs of the distortions from the transfers is borne by others, outside of the elite collective. Where a state has undertaken these 26

PAGE 31

objectives over time, they may be viewed as sufficiently unrepresentative, and their own incentives to promote growth divergent from national incentives. These circumstances are often accompanied by increasing prevalence of predatory rule and looting. Corruption becomes increasingly rampant as patronage and marginalization continue, and autocracies face especially strong incentives to loot public assets, but also incentives to prioritize redistribution as opposed to growth. This is because autocracies tend to possess a higher ratio of potential lootable assets relative to society's average income, and the prioritization of redistribution increases as the group which benefits are redistributed towards gets smaller. Deininger and Olinto observe the potentially negative effects of redistributing assets, "undermining the functioning of markets, reducing incentives for investment, and increasing social tension and polarization, have probably done more harm than goodespecially since many of them did not strive to reduce the extent of market imperfections and facilitate sustainable asset accumulation by the poor" (2000, 18). Noting increases in predatory behavior, their article also asserts that "even temporary increases in inequality may be associated with increased levels of crime" ( Deininger and Olinto, 2000, 8). The international community has more recently taken a preventative approach to conflict, both by recognizing weak states and regional instability, but also through encouraging growth and economic liberalization as a way of mitigating the risk of civil violence. International mediators and foreign states have actively engaged in providing humanitarian aid for the immediate provision of basic goods and services where they are not being realized, and in encouraging lending agreements that make plans for structural readjustment. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund are external bodies who facilitate these agreements, and are complemented by regional structures with similar purposes and programs. The World Bank makes loans to developing low and middle income countries in exchange for their pursuance of expansionary macroeconomic policy, privatization and liberalization. The International Monetary Fund is concerned with controlling fluctuations in exchange rates, and expects its loans to be accompanied by opening markets and balancing the national budget. By the end of the 1990s, most of the countries that had entered into these arrangements had not made significant progress, and many were even more impoverished or controlled by repressive regimes than they had been previously (Collier and Gunning, 2007). The institutional response of these 27

PAGE 32

organizations to this has been to emphasize those areas which have witnessed the most success under the same programs, which differ largely in their initial starting point as more middle-income states with less risk of civil conflict from the outset. To this extent, pre-existing capital market imperfections explain divergent paths of development under similar policies. World Bank and IMF policy has been heavily critiqued and debated, and the general consensus among scholars across disciplines has been that they have been detrimental to encouraging development, and have only perpetuated poverty. Any gains they have shown have been created at the cost of the lowest income groups, who have seen significantly fewer benefits where they have seen them at all. Furthermore, privatization initiatives have been distorted by corruption and patronage both internally within poorer, more conflict-prone states and externally by dominant states in the organization who stand to benefit from policy adjustment. In the 1990s, for example, several agreements included provisions guaranteeing that water be privatized and sold to the population at cost by a non-state entity. This limited the already strained accessibility issues in states, and has not had a positive health or security impact domestically, regionally or globally. One critique suggests that as a total percentage of investment in developing countries, private sector contributions have been approximately 22%, with the public sector accounting for around 70%, and development aid the remaining 8% (Collier and Gunning, 2007, 140). While these figures suggest privatization has not been properly conducted, they fail to incorporate the influence of human rights arrangements. Recall that states were expected to provide basic goods and services needed to maintain a state of dignity of individuals to the extent that their resource base would allow. If the aggregate wealth of a state increases, then it is expected to provide these rights more extensively at its own cost, which would be integrated into government expenditures, and thus classified as public sector investment. Based on a lack of outcome indicators implying that this increased public investment has been realized and reflected in both decreased aid levels and quality of life for national populations, the figure seems incredibly inflated, and its actual usage unclear. Conclusions from Chapter 2 28

PAGE 33

This chapter offers insight into the array of disciplines this thesis hopes to integrate into a coherent set of ideas about how conflict and conflict resolution are conceptualized. Understanding that neoclassical economic assumptions of homogeneity are unreasonable because decisions are actually made on an individual actor's collection of identities and their relative importance to that actor. Identities are socially constructed, and reinforced on all levels of society to some degree. Equally important to the reality of an individual or collectives' condition is their common perception of their position relative to those around them. These perceived differences and inequities may become replicated and engrained within a state, and exclusionary trends can compromise state, regional and international security. We are able to benefit from integrating feminist and welfare economics into our discourse, as they offer insight into how heterogeneity may be incorporated into more common models. Only by approaching identity problems with a degree of complexity respective of their inherent nature can we harness them through policy reform and nonviolent means, and to create more successful development policies and practices. Separate measures of inequity each fail to address all aspects that may be relevant in distributional relationships within a population, and so we must embrace a somewhat more integrative approach to maintain efficacy in conflict prevention and as we consider transitions out of conflict. Chapter 3: 29

PAGE 34

Identity-Conflict Dynamics and Post-Conflict Processes Civil conflict may evolve as reaction to any number of causes, but the presence of divergent identity groups may influence the incentives and techniques adopted to carry out violence, and set the groundwork on which peace negotiations and transitions from conflict are formulated. Conflict is recognized as subverting formal economic activity into three types of markets and creating feedback effects decreasing the marginal cost of violence over time. Once an end has been mediated, dual post-conflict processes are initiated towards recovery and reconciliation socially, politically and economically. Both transformations involve the greater international community, and their successes are interdependent and rely on a common success in re-establishing a rule of law through transitional justice. This chapter will consider how conflict changes the way groups interact, and how best to conceptualize their approach to negotiated compromise or mediation to reach a resolution of conflict. It will then shift to post conflict processes, broadly overviewing different types of economic policy practiced towards successful transition to sustainable peace and whether they are rehabilitative or reconstructive. Recognizing the overlap between these two processes, we also make an important assumption with relation to our discussion of identity theory. We assume that in a conflict where polarization has occurred, and there is a single group majority opposed to a numerical minority by their membership in an oppositional group, that the burden of conflict is going to fall most heavily on the latter and benefits captured most densely by the former. We assume that this difference will be reflected through the ultimate damages suffered by different groups within the state, who will be implicitly identified by targeted humanitarian policy in the earliest stages of transition. These damages will be larger where membership is more rigid between groups, and where previous regimes have practiced exclusionary practices along these cleavages or politicized them. Peace Making and Ending Conflict 30

PAGE 35

It is convenient to consider conflict as a type of bargaining process in which violence is a means by which to achieve some goal (Cunningham, 2009, 3). To begin moving towards peace and the facilitation of reconstruction and recovery, it is necessary to identify first the parameters of each group involved. Their opportunities for financing, their geographic dispersion, and the state's ability to provide services to these groups as compared to one another define the limits to their functioning as a unit and their capacity to become veto actors in peace negotiations. Veto actors are those groups that have defined preferences diverging from the norm, indicating the presence of heterogeneity. Furthermore, these actors are internally cohesive collectives and must be able to continue their campaigns unilaterally. These last two factors are especially important in determining the weight each group will have during mediations. Peacemaking concerns one of three types of actor each of which may or may not exist as a veto power. Even if multilateral organizations are privy to negotiations, they have limited abilities to influence their outcome. They may be either internal (coming from within the state), external (international interveners) or governmental. Government actors can be further classified by regime type and strength, with differential outcomes among states with structured and functioning military wings and other institutions as opposed to those that may be weak or failing (Cunningham, 2009, 4-5). Because stronger states are more likely to capture a larger share of the declining marginal costs of conflict, they are more likely to compromise the viability of identity-based groups to form violent parties. Actors who are most relevant to resolving a conflict may be considered as those having a legitimate veto capacity. They must present a cohesive ideology and set of goals for their group, and possess the means by which to continue violent upheaval to the extent it disrupts state government. Defining these goals and their decision-making elites, is crucial when negotiating ceasefires and recognizing overlapping goals or acceptable compromise. The presence of veto actors creates a zero-sum' scenario, in which the only acceptable means by which to end violence is compromise or total victory (Cunningham, 2009). 31

PAGE 36

This implication is particularly relevant when considering how the presence of identity-groups interacts with the motives of upheaval. Territorially concentrated group identities may allow for agreements towards peaceful succession, overseen by international actors. This axiom holds less true in the presence of significant natural resource locations and their relevance to the dominant state. Ideological exploitation in the form of genocidal projects' against a specific identity-group drastically alters the range of acceptable agreements for the aggressor, who views total victory through eradication as the only means of stability and peace. Several actors may be involved in the effort to achieve a peace agreement. Regional actors may have certain biases towards groups involved in the conflict, which can facilitate some degree of negotiation, but may cause them to overlook underlying causes of the conflict. They may associate with certain groups inherently, or as a result of shared behaviors and membership criteria. This is especially likely with ethnic or cultural groups commonalities, particularly where they share language. Within the state, only veto actors are likely to garner a spot at the table during mediations, and even where others are represented, they have substantial deficits in their ability to effectively influence outcomes. All relevant parties must assemble in a safe location physically, and within an environment that encourages discussion, rather than simply dictating outcomes. Bordering states provide the most likely sites, both in terms of access and promptness of the decision being enforced. Since World War II, the United Nations has deployed peacekeeping forces to enable the transportation of parties and assure their safety during the time between a cease-fire and peace agreements. Discussions take place among elite figures in private, with a public announcement once an agreement has been reached, or an announcement that no agreement has been made, with concrete plans to re-group in the future. UN peacekeepers act with one of two chapter mandates in accordance with their founding charter, one of which prohibits the use of force unless defending oneself from imminent attack. The more expansive mandate allows for the use of force to prevent further attacks against non-combatants. Their mandates make their roles for actually 32

PAGE 37

enforcing peace limited, a critique that has been mentioned with each deployment that has occurred. The United Nations does not have a standing military force or army. Where they decide to deploy regiments, they are staffed by individuals volunteered by member states and then overseen by a commander from a designated neutral state. They are deployed in phases, with the arrival of peacekeepers and other personnel occurring over time, as security is more immediately realized. Beyond maintaining the terms of ceasefire during the disarming of militias, United Nations missions are also charged with monitoring the compliance of states with post-conflict policy and peace arrangements, but not with vetting or retraining security forces directly, except under certain arrangements. Regardless, they are unable to employ force in any circumstance where their lives are not threatened, and this becomes more true over time. Missions are enacted or sent by the United Nations into a conflict-prone state at the request of the member state or neighboring member states, with the approval of their mandate resting with the permanent and alternating states of the Security Council (UN Charter). Where they have the power to deploy these forces to promote stability, each member on the Council also has the power to veto a mission, which can prove problematic where strategic interests of those on the Council are not pressing and the political cost of agreeing to the mission overwhelms humanitarian concerns. Once they have decided to deploy peace-keepers or any other form of UN mission, member states in the General Assembly are requested to contribute soldiers, workers or other resources to its realization. The organization has its own operating budget borne mostly by the permanent members of the Security Council, but maintains no separate fund specifically for potentially volatile situations. Also present at peace negotiations and important during the transition out of conflict are the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, both created after the second World War to restore devastated economies in Europe. The International Monetary Fund is concerned primarily with monetary issues and currency exchange rates in the open market, while the Bank handles structural issues and macro-economic growth 33

PAGE 38

policy. Both are able to make loans and grants for specific initiatives, in exchange for certain agreements to carry out prescribed programs. Like the United Nations, these organizations are funded by the greater international community, but are dominated ideologically by their most significant donors. The International Monetary Fund is traditionally headed by a European national, and the World Bank an American national, although the majority of their operations now occur outside of Western Europe, in Africa, parts of Asia or Latin America, and in the Caribbean. The goals of each of these multi-national bodies are self-defined through consensus, but tend to overlap, encouraging integration and cooperation. Their broad policy practices are outlined in Table 3.1 below, along with their corresponding target issue. The table also distinguishes the dominant ideologies of each group, and the nature of their leadership and enforcement mechanisms. 34

PAGE 39

Table 3.1 Major International Organizations: Policies and Enactment Organization Leadership Enforcement Target Issues Policy Practice United Nations General Assembly overseen by SecretaryGeneral Security Council (7 permanent members) Development and Humanitarian missions specic embargos or resolutions Humanitarian Crises Poverty Reduction programs to provide basic goods and services monitoring and oversight of states World Bank dominant donors: United States and Europe overseen by American National loan conditionality policy assessments poverty reduction development and growth through macroeconomi c policy and structural reform DDR growth policy (accept short term trade-off between growth and peace) privatization and diversication opening of markets reform of nancial sector International Monetary Fund Dominant donors: United States and Europe overseen by European National loan conditionality policy assessments technical program assistance Balances of payments exible exchange rates responsible monetary policy primarily technical assistance structural readjustment generous loans and interest rates Any accord reached must directly engage with salient identity issues and relative deprivation that have been agitated before and during conflict. They are forced to recognize groups who see themselves as marginalized and pushed towards violent resolution of issues, and to provide reasonable assurances that they will not continue beyond the ceasefire. These assurances include drafting certain relevant social issues or inequity present which should be handled or approached by transitional regimes. During the accord process, however, there should also be the identification of other civil groups which do not determine membership or power by the problematic identity. Some of these groups may even be instrumental in accommodating negotiations, and have in the past included religious or faith-based structures, or similar local mechanisms which are inclusive in their membership beyond other social constructs present, like ethnicity or tribal affiliation. 35

PAGE 40

Opportunities for Peace During peace negotiations, groups are expected to present the conditions necessary for ending conflict. Their conditions should fall along a continuum, some of which are more open to compromise and those less malleable. Successful mediators then are able to identify which of these are complementary or coincident with those presented by other parties to the conflict. In order to be successful in ending conflict, these compromises must be recognized and enabled (Cunningham, 2009). The site of mediation is important to whether or not actors view both the negotiations and agreements as legitimate. This factor is important to whether or not representatives are seen as legitimate. Historically, international conflict has been overseen by the dominant victors of the episode. After both World War I and World War II the assets of the defeated nations were divided up among the allied forces. This included not only monetary payments and financing of rebuilding physical damage at the expense of the conquered, but also the division of their territorial holdings acquired during colonial expansion. States which had witnessed devastation were able to submit their claims, but whether or not the claim was fairly addressed or the decisions regarding it enforced remained mostly dependent on whether or not the state was able to exert its dominance during and after treaty drafting. Civil conflict, unlike international, is increasingly mediated by external third parties with multilateral backing, usually in a neighboring state. For their conclusions to be acceptable to the greater community, they must perpetuate a ceasefire and correspond with universal norms of human rights. Regional mediators are most likely to be concerned with questions of refugee presence and return, or eliminating enclaves within their territory. Increased confidence in the area should allow for regional economic prosperity across states, furthering their interests in mediating or overseeing the negotiation to end conflict. Agreements must not only fulfill the conditions of international and regional legitimacy, but be entered into and engage legitimate representative of those groups with 36

PAGE 41

the capacity to undermine stability. Peace negotiations must not only claim to represent groups involved in conflict, but also be credible spokespeople on their behalf. All relevant groups should be involved, and provide elites with the power to negotiate on their behalf. These elites must also be able to control their groups, to the extent that their signing of any documents results in quick, real ceasing of hostilities. They also must be recognized by the other actors privy to negotiations, especially veto actors. Their concerns should be taken seriously, and they must be willing and able to compromise to end conflict (Cunningham, 2009). One of the most problematic aspects of conflict resolution is a lack of cooperation or the existence of trust. In the previous chapter, trust was discussed in the context of social capital, and we adopt the same definition. Cooperation is best conceptualized through game theory, and the prisoner's dilemma. Unable to discuss options and fully coordinate actions, decisions resulting in pareto efficiency and ceasefire are a function of the trust that that it will be reciprocated. Furthermore, if the well-being of all actors is not ensured, there remains an incentive to hold off on negotiations to maximize utility. This strategy is most dominant in genocidal regimes, where disarmament of defensive militia creates an advantage for the oppressor (Cunningham, 2009). Where the actors have perfect information, and know the same deal is offered to the other, they will both choose to cooperate. If the information is asymmetric, the prisoners are likely to base their decision off the perception of their partner's access to information. Expectations during conflict and conflict resolution are reminiscent of a second game theory model, the hawk-dove game. Where hawkish actions are thought of as offensive and violent, dovish can be defined as peaceful cooperation. The hawk-dove game predicts that evolutionary stability exists, and while this may be true over a historical period, it fails during conflict. If one group ideologically opposes peaceful resolution, it is more likely to be perceived of as favoring hawkish behavior, and in the short run, this is unlikely to result in fostering more dove-like movements. Similarly to the game model, however, all parties acting dovishly will be most pareto efficient, while all parties practicing hawkish behavior will continue to impede peace (Cunningham, 2009). 37

PAGE 42

Formally Ending Conflict For a conflict to end, a monopoly on violence must be established, either through total defeat of all parties by an external force, unilateral defeat of militia groups, or through a voluntary disarmament orchestrated by an agreement to which all parties are signatories. External defeat is unlikely, and would require swift, coordinated military intervention and strategy superior to domestic forces currently operating. Defeat of one group over another establishes a dominant party; without international or regional mediation of reconstruction, the dominant party is likely to implement exclusionary policies that will increase the chances that the underlying causes of conflict are not likely to be adequately addressed. Any agreement would have to overlap as acceptable across all groups. This may be through succession and the recognition of a separate, autonomous state, or through the drafting of a power-sharing transitional regime. Unless all parties are able to access negotiations, the probability that reconstruction policies to initiate reconciliation and rehabilitation may marginalize significant groups in an already volatile situation, and their disarmament is less likely to succeed. As long as these groups maintain arms, they are considered a threat to the peace, and maintain the perception that their own arms constitute a significant advantage in the inevitable return to conflict. To this degree, agreements must be seen as soliciting commitment from all parties; and that mutual cooperation and not strategic advantage is the ultimate goal sought. The international community is an ideal arbitrator and monitor for such agreements, having both the perception of relative impartiality and the resources necessary to provide security to transitional states. Conflicts that have been organized along ideological group membership present particular challenges during peace agreements. An agreement's success hinges largely on the identification of shared goals and the diminishing of group-specific aspirations. If membership of a group is defined as oppositional to an other,' the search for agreements that will satisfy all mobilized populations will be difficult, as will be assuring an agreement will enforced within the state. Where these identities are more entrenched, the peace 38

PAGE 43

agreement will be implemented in a setting where exchange is dictated formally and informally in institutions and social norms. Peace agreements are limited in their ability to address these sorts of structural issues; humanitarian concern and the containment of violence continue to dominate international mediation agenda, while national agendas are likely to be dominated by re-creating the status quo. If the state is stronger, military intervention is much less likely (Langford, 1999). Instead, international organizations urge conflict-states to focus on restoring peace and ceasefire, while curbing access for rebel groups to finance their activities and recruitment policies (Collier et al., 2003). Even where strong administrative states are dominating minority groups identified by ethnicity or religion, and committing major war crimes and violations of human rights, intervention is not guaranteed on moral imperative alone. This is particularly evident in Bosnia during the genocidal regime Milosevic orchestrated during the 1990s (Power, 2002). Regardless of the amount of information involving rights violations and mass killings, intervention was fiercely debated, slowly implemented, and extremely restricted. In 2002, United States National Security Strategy found that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones," and, around 2 billion people worldwide are ( Newsweek 2005). This change in strategic interest is even more pronounced post 9-11, with the attribution of terrorism to unstable states implying a threat to security outside of a state's borders. States which have been designated as weak or failed are defined in relation to more successful, powerful states, who maintain territorial control over a population, diplomatic relationships, force monopolies and successful social good provision. Deviation from this norm is interpreted as being contrary to the preferred path of progress, which has been dominated in its definition by Western thought and experience (Langford, 1999). Failed states are those who have no ability to control their territory or monopolize force. A failed state cannot enter into legitimate agreements with third parties, or provide for the well-being of its populace. Weak states are those that possess some form of recognized government, but are also considered extremely likely to fall under any 39

PAGE 44

pressure ( Newsweek 2005). Episodic violence is common and may be coupled with intense regional influence or resource wealth, especially non-lootable resources. States which have failed or are failing also experience social concerns about their instability. Seeking to understand the conditions under which external intervention will occur, Patrick M. Regan tests this hypothesis (H3: When there are large social dislocations or concerns about an impending humanitarian crisis, the probability of an outside intervention increases) along with three additional theories: that the number of bordering states will be directly related to the probability of intervention, increased intensity of a conflict will decrease the likelihood of intervention, and interventions will be more likely during the Cold War years than post-Cold War. Regan found that perceptions of humanitarian crisis were likely to increase the probability of intervention, and confirmed two of his three remaining hypothesis. The direct relationship predicted between borderstates and likelihood was not supported, and the opposite was implied to be true. He lists possible explanations for these findings, but fails to find conclusive reasoning for the result. For his study, Reagan asserts that intervention will occur where the costs to the intervening party are equal to the expected utility from such action in the form of political support or humanitarian relief or obligation (1998). Conflict involving identity-based groups that define membership along ethnic or racial lines may also distort these results, where there may be sympathizers in neighboring states. During refugee flow, people and ideas are re-situated in new areas, placing strain on scarce resources in new ways, and the capacity to incite violence among the population accommodating those fleeing conflict. This not only affects the probability of intervention, but also the range of acceptable mediators available. While regional individuals and groups may be best equipped to handle the cultural sensitivity of conflict, and be endowed with a more intimate knowledge of it, they are less likely to be seen as objective by all parties to mediation. Perceptions of neutrality are crucial attributes of mediators, and loss of neutrality has devastating effects on outcome. Declarations of neutrality, formally drafted, are found by Bercovitch and Schneider to be less important or relevant in the presence of confidence (2000). Furthermore, regional 40

PAGE 45

actors may lack significant international support if their credibility cannot be recognized in global environments. If mediators are not legitimate in the eyes of the international community, their efforts may be seen as symbolic at best. Where parties to a conflict reflect highly divergent goals and face a narrowed set of acceptable compromises, mediator selection is even more tenuous (Bercovitch and Schneider, 2000). Similar ideology is desirable, but likely to unfairly favor one party and enable the entrenchment of a dominant ideology in reconstruction, thus limiting the success of recovery for the conflict-state. Peace Making and Post-Conflict Policies After a consensus on the conditions of a ceasefire, a transitional conflict state must promptly begin reconstruction and rehabilitation. Reconstruction is oriented towards achieving a status of recovery, from which development may begin; rehabilitation is concerned with achieving reconciliation. Both must be realized in order to be successful in preventing further episodes of conflict, and realization of one enhances realization of the other. Individually, each process is undertaken by a myriad of groups composed of international and national actors, with varying degrees of success and relevance to macro-stability. They are each decomposed into targeted policy areas employed by collectives which may be able to dedicate varying degrees of scarce resources to their realization. Reconstruction Reconstruction generally covers those policies which are most important to realizing in the short to intermediate time period, and which are able to enable the state to begin development and ensure security in the long run. They may include rebuilding physical infrastructure, providing public health and social services, and facilitating the return of displaced groups. They also include specific economic policies, designed to promote growth, foster confidence in markets and institutions, and re-integrating defined groups of combatants back into a peacetime society, as well as contributions to education and income-generating opportunities (The International Bank for Reconstruction and 41

PAGE 46

Development, 1998). Its success is realized through transference into a state of recovery, measurable by a per capita level of economic activity equal to or exceeding their levels before conflict, or the observance of patterns of consumption and investment which imply that they have returned to their previous states during peacetime (Flores and Nooruddin, 2009). Collier and the World Bank have compiled a list of seven costs witnessed after conflict: 1) inflated military expenditure; 2) capital flight; 3) loss of social capital; 4) social deterioration; 5) reduced freedom; 6) increased risk of conflict resurgence, and; 7) social health decay (Collier et al., 2003). The first two are easily quantified where documentation has been kept, and the final cost may be estimated numerically through their influence on lost productivity or income-opportunities as a result of physical or psychological damage. The loss of social capital and social deterioration are much more localized and the areas most affected are inter-personal and private natured. Reduction in freedom may be observable in reflected indices of political or economic mobility, but only where census data is collected and maintained by an objective monitoring body. During peace time, the average developing country dedicates approximately 2% of their Gross Domestic Product towards military maintenance, but it more than doubles during civil war, to somewhere around 5% (Collier et al., 2003). These costs include mobilizing infantry and financing stockpiles of arms, as well as a certain amount of corruption more than likely present. The activities may be either defensive or offensive in nature, and are financed by drastic reductions in government funded social programs for vulnerable groups. The reappropriation of expenditures away from public good provision further enflames downward trends in social capital and deterioration, and encourages capital flight out of the country. Capital withdrawals from the state are performed by international corporate entities, as well as those within the state who are able and choose to do so. They are less likely to be de-stabilizing for the entire state where they occur on a communal level as opposed to a national or regional. The World Bank accordingly draws up a list of specific focuses to be handled post-conflict to address these costs, each of which should be considered in its own 42

PAGE 47

context and with local input if it is to be seen as organic, and not imposed from the top downafter conflict (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998)). Each conflict may provide additional focuses to be addressed; however, these are likely to be shared at the conclusion of any violent period of instability. By incorporating these considerations, it may be presumed that the role of the body outlining them (the World Bank) has, to the best of its ability, enabled the conditions for recovery. The most important of these are discussed briefly in the following section. In the period immediately following peace agreement signing, it is of the utmost importance that the economy be revitalized, and its benefits as being ascribable to peacetime circumstances, as opposed to conflict (Ballentine and Nitzchke, 2005). Actors must be engaged in formal economic activity, and incentives should be present which encourage their movement from war economies or other illegal exchange which imply that formal activity is more profitable than the alternatives available (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). In the context of revealed preference theory, there must be conditions such that the utility bundled preferred by an individual is attainable only under conditions which assume a minimal level of security and oversight. The sooner a state is able to alleviate its reliance on external aid and lending arrangements, the sooner it is able to witness positive development which it is able to sustainably finance. To increase growth, there should be diversification, privatization, and emphasis on liberalized trade arrangements (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998). States are advised to encourage and invest in the development of export-markets and service industry to increase capital inflows, and to engage sectors of the population who may not normally have engaged in formal market activity, such as women. Incorporating these marginalized actors into the economy provides not only a means of generating income for consumption, but is particularly relevant where the conflict has altered the state demographics, and has left a legacy dominant in femaleheaded households or alternatively composed family units. Reintegrating combatants into peacetime economies is important to maintaining stability and encouraging recovery, and are carried out under a banner of Demobilization, 43

PAGE 48

Disarmament and Re-integration (Ball, 1997). Programmes which enable their rapid disarming are preferred, but the reluctance of groups to law down arms under circumstances with minimal social capital should be understood and addressed appropriately. Once they are no longer armed, combatants require means by which to return to their previous territory, as well as the means by which to generate their own income outside of conflict. Table 3.2 outlines potential aid to be provided at various stages during DDR programming and some notation on the trend of financing and oversight. 44

PAGE 49

Table 3.2 Potential Types of Assistance for Ex-Combatants during stages Reinsertion Reintegration Food Supplements Clothing & Personal Items Housing material Short-term medical care Basic Household goods Land Basic agricultural supplies (seeds/tools) Severance pay/other cash allowances Veteran/spouse information/ counseling Assistance to child soldiers Rehabilitation for physically/mentally disabled soldiers -funded by World Bank, international organizations, and public expenditure programs nanced by tax collection or other revenue stream distributed by national and local organizations, advocacy groups intermediate to long term horizon Job generation, including public works, community development, micro-enterprises, salary supplements to employers, cooperatives Job placement services Training, including apprenticeships, formal vocational trainging, managerial/administrative training Credit schemes Education Agricultural extension services Veteran/spouse information/ counseling Rehabilitation for physically/mentally disabled soldiers funded by World Bank, national government through public expenditure distributed by national and local organizations and advocacy groups long term horizons Assembly Discharge Basic Provisions for Food, Shelter and Clothing Sanitation Medical Exams Medical Care Basic Education Leisure Activities Orientation on adjusting to civilian life, including nancial counseling, health counseling, civic duties, income generation (for soldiers and spouses) Assistance to child soldiers Census Discharge Documentation funded by World Bank reconstruction (one of designated policy focuses post-conict); international aid and emergency assistance grants or loans distributed by humanitarian organizations and networks; regional and national actors immediate, short-term horizon Short Term Food Supplements Transport Orientation on conditions in district of residence First tranche of reinsertion benets -funded by World Bank and other international organizations distributed by national organizations which are able to collect and organize information on ex-combatants being demobilized, advocacy groups intermediate to long term horizon Some combatants may be integrated into a new armed forces of the state, but the majority are likely to be pressured to resume their professions which they held as non-combatants. Combatants must also be rehabilitated, especially where they have 45

PAGE 50

been recruited as children or been active in systematic human rights violations under the authority of a figurehead or elite group. Diasporas are problematic in that they enable continued financing of insurgent actors, but they can also compromise security situations in bordering states where they maintain a significant presence. Displaced individuals may be viewed as burdensome to other states because of their influence on scarce resources, or because they incite other problematic issues which compromise the stability of the state in which they reside outside of their citizenship (Collier et al., 2003). Post-conflict regimes should be designed with reference to previous regimes and norms, but should also promote democracy and universal human rights. Political advancement should be the result of public elections and free competition, as opposed to distributed corruptly among political supporters or elite groups. Where structural issues are not addressed post-conflict, they undermine the legitimacy and success of reconstruction by perpetuating inequities in access to political decision making. Aid is the inflow of capital to a post-conflict transitional regime to address humanitarian emergencies, but is also given to states likely to devolve into conflict or at risk of its resurgence. It is intended as a short-term mechanism to address the immediate concerns of the population, and is financed by international donation or trust funds (Kang and Meernik, 2004). Post-conflict aid has been identified as a type of emergency assistance by the International Monetary Fund formally since 1995, similar to that available in the wake of natural disaster or severe market shocks. It is characterized by quick dispersal, and limited, if any adherence criteria on which it relies, and attempts to reverse negative balance of payment accounts. As of January 2010, Rapid Credit Financing is granted with 0% interest, a 5 1/2 year grace period on payments, and maturity at 10 years. In addition to financial capital, the program provides technical assistance and expertise in macroeconomic policy, tax and revenue administration, monetary policy and exchange rates. This assistance amount to around 1/5 of the IMF's operating budget, and seeks to rebuild national capacity in fiscal, monetary and 46

PAGE 51

exchange institutions. Overall, IMF policies focus on reducing poverty, increasing transparency and promoting good governance. The presence of external military forces weakens perceptions of confidence within the state, both from outside of it and within. Where security cannot be guaranteed in its absence, the risks of conducting business in the post-conflict setting are astronomically high, and even the lucrative profit potentials may not be enough incentive for investment (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998). External actors also decrease the salience which a population attaches to the transitional regime's promises of sustainable peace. It is a visible reminder of conflict and violence, and is indicative that a monopoly on the use of force has not been achieved by the state. Immediate health issues are a global concern which obligates the international community to take an active role in post-conflict settings. Disease is likely prevalent throughout the affected population, most notably among refugees and internally displaced, who may transfer infection beyond state borders. Addressing health concerns is not only a focus from a disease and infection perspective, but also noted in development and literature not related directly to conflict. Access to potable water and sanitation is problematic and witnessed by the prevalence of deaths related to it, from preventable and treatable conditions such as dehydration (Annan, 2005). Groups independent of state control, such as Doctors Without Borders, may be instrumental in addressing the immediate health issues post-conflict, but there must be investment in more long-term services with adequately trained staff to serve the population during transition. Most basically, reconstruction may be conceptualized as those activities that rebuild the infrastructure of a state to enable its effective governance without aggressive uses of force. These include physical repair of infrastructure, increasing financial flows, and investing in human capital deficits which legitimately hinder activity within the state, whether they be social, political or economic in their nature. Rehabilitation 47

PAGE 52

Reconstruction policy and programming is similar to, although not the same as post-conflict rehabilitation. Rather than seeking a state of recovery, rehabilitation is concerned with achieving reconciliation, most simply defined as the re-establishment of cordial relations within a population. Rehabilitation policies tend to focus on accommodations for truth, mercy, justice and peace; or those which may positively mold a more inclusive national ethos than existed before conflict. Rehabilitation is seen as a more holistic process than reconstruction, promoting healing of the specific population which has endured civil conflict. It is realized from this perspective only where conditions of respect, information, connectivity and hope exist. These conditions are briefly considered below, with special attention paid on their potential to influence capital growth of any type (quantitative or quantitative) or national ideology. Respectful conditions are those which create a space for acknowledgement of past events, means of pursuing justice, meaningful atonement and victim-recognized forgiveness. They encourage accumulation of human capital through objectively discussing the past, and setting the conditions under which future institutional capital will be feasible. They alter ethos by questioning one's self-image and victimization, as well as the treatment of opponents, appropriate behaviors of patriotism, unity and justness of one's own actions, as well as the individual belief in security when confronting the past. Any individual within a state is likely to have their own, unique memory of conflict, but rehabilitation encourages the discovery of fact of what has happened, and more abstractly, why or how it has occurred to be adopted and shared among citizens. Collecting and analyzing information develops knowledge capital by identifying detrimental policies and the causes behind their consequences. They change perceptions of both one's own actions as well as other's, both opponents and allies. Connectivity within a state may be viewed as the nature of the relationships between groups as collectives, between individuals between groups, and between individuals within a group. Identifying commonalities can serve to diffuse group polarization which threatens stability, but may not be equally effective in the same form 48

PAGE 53

across a population. Most directly, connection would seem to be a subtle renaming of social capital, or trust among individuals, and the perceptions of their actions in relation to one's own. To the extent that the citizens of a state believe in the possibility of a new, more preferable future beyond conflict, they are seen to encompass hope in the transition to peace. Even where they are coming to terms with the events of war and those leading up to conflict onset, belief in a commonly shared future based on discussing and agreeing on the past may enable a state to overcome other factors likely to increase their instability. These ideas seem to clearly align themselves with the normative realm which mainstream economics avoids handling. However, post-conflict policy is increasingly accepted as needing to be representative of the population for which it is enacted, and avoid appearing imposed half-heartedly by external parties. In order for the population to influence policy creation and allow for appropriate program targeting or reform, they must possess some degree of civility in inter-personal interaction. To act in formal markets, they must be willing to interact individually with those around them, and willing to consume and provide goods for exchange in a non-discriminate fashion. Rehabilitation facilitates the conditions necessary for reconstruction to move beyond physical and structural rebuilding, and allows the population to engage in the post-conflict transition. As individuals feel more incorporated by transitional regimes, they reinforce legitimacy of the institutions and mechanisms which have been rebuilt, increasing stability and investor expectations for their markets. Confidence must be rebuilt to facilitate growth and investment publicly and privately during transitions. Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Overview Table 3.3 summarizes the main policy goals by sphere of both rehabilitation and reconstruction. The table also identifies the external groups considered relevant to each area of policy design and implementation. It is a convenient way by which we are able to 49

PAGE 54

see the overlapping and mutually supportive conditionality attached to either process and among different actors involved. Table 3.3 Reconstruction and Rehabilitation during Transition Transitional Policy Area Reconstruction Rehabilitation Relevant External Actors Political New Constitution Free and Fair Elections and political terms multi-party system Vetting and purging restoration of condence in the state International Peace Keeping Missions Regional Political Collectives Social provision of basic resources for a minimal standard of living facilitation of refugee return maintain condence in state ability to provide security maintain provision of basic goods for minimal standard of living interpersonal trust restoration United Nations Development Agencies Bilateral donors Humanitarian Groups Economic macroeconomic growth policy market diversication privatization opening of markets Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-Integration increase investor condence expand access to credit and capital markets encourage condence in longer-term forecasts and World Bank International Monetary Fund Bilateral lenders import and export partners Development and Poverty Reduction Development and poverty reduction are other areas of interest to international economics, even where their relevance to the particular context may or may not be apparent. These strategies are intended to allow for more equitable distribution from the benefits of growth, and to facilitate progress universally. The World Bank defines their poverty-orientation as addressing capacity building, infrastructure investment, financial system reform and monitoring, and elimination of corruption. The United Nations prefers to adopt themes for development and poverty reduction, defined for the period 2008-2012 as being economic growth, rural-focused development, social and civil sector 50

PAGE 55

development, and reform of governance where it fails to provide for the public good. By their estimation, a comprehensive program to address global poverty following these themes would be around US $369 million, of which 59% had yet to be mobilized at the report's publication. These funds would be distributed to member states following their formal requests, accompanied by a plan of implementation, at relatively low interest rates in exchange for structural adjustment within the borrowing state. These policies are relevant in that they coincide with many discussed as a part of integrative peacekeeping implementation, and are both oriented towards populations who are likely to have experienced significant asset erosion and creating opportunities for its reversal to improve standards of living during positive macroeconomic growth. These include not only employment opportunities, but also access to higher education or other social services provided by the state to expand these opportunities in the intermediate to long run. The figure below, published by the United Nations, shows the way they see themselves and other actors as being influential across time horizons post conflict, and responsible for certain tasks, even where this responsibility overlaps with other groups. We may also consider how conflict interacts with specific types of capital, referencing the seven we mentioned in the previous chapter. Table 3.4 lists each type of capital, their rehabilitation and reconstruction policies, the sphere in which policy is undertaken, and an example of each is given. Where the type of capital is denoted, there is also a notation regarding its status as private or public. 51

PAGE 56

Table 3.4 Capital Stocks After Conflict Capital Type Example Effects of Conict on Stock Post-Conict Reconstructio n Post-Conict Rehabilitation Policy Type Natural Endowment private, excludable Natural Resources lootable non-lootable rebel nancing state must devote time to defense, fortication immediateterm control over extraction and proliferation long-term sustainable agreements regarding exportation political State Financial private, excludable Currency Reserves inated military expenditure decreases reserves rebuild with international aid and emergency assistance encouragem ent of public savings in national nancial institutions economic Infrastructure public, nonexcludable, common use roadways railroads airports destruction of infrastructure land mines and environment al decay immediate restoration of damaged infrastructure land mine removal environment al policies economic social Institutional public during peacetime Administrative structures may or may not be permanently destroyed transitional regime and new state institutions condence in new regime political Knowledge Resources public, limited excludability educated elites in government competent human resource capital potentially extremely responsive to outcome of conict regional elites elites returning from exile diaspora elites encourage development of human resources through training and special programs social Cultural public, but may be excludable free exchange of ideas working civil organization s freedom of idea exchange compromise d civil society decreased re-establish space for civil society to begin reconstructin g insure freedom of press and ideas in public domain political social Human private, excludable opportunity to invest in productivity enhancemen t access to higher education, job-training human capital erodes during conict basic education for returning refugees expanded incomegeneration opportunities common education curriculum opportunities for higher education economic social 52

PAGE 57

Post-Conflict and development policy are both also focused on reincorporating informal economies into a single legitimate market. During conflict and transitions, incentives must be provided which sway individuals to operate formally for increased profits, and to cease the positive development of the combat, shadow or coping economies (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005). Each of these is self-sufficient, and may or may not exist in the presence of the other markets, although their actors are interconnected. Table 3.5 is adapted from their works to include the policy sphere it is addressed through, and the type of capital stocks which each economy has the capacity to erode or develop. 53

PAGE 58

Table 3.5 Informal Economies: Combat, Shadow and Coping The Combat Economy The Shadow Economy The Coping Economy Key Actors elite combatants weapons and arms suppliers conict entrepreneurs proteers in the transport sector businessmen drug and narcotics trafckers vulnerable households vulnerable collectives and communities Motivations and incentives for war and peace continue to fund combat peace not preferred as means of reaching increased standards of living; can lead to decreased power and wealth alternatives to combatants must be available and easily attained through DDR programming prot from instability caused by continued conict potential prot if investment returns are positive and quickly realized non-combat alternatives must be known and attainable to cope through achieving a minimal level of basic goods and services humanitarian concerns immediate, followed by development issues Key activities and commodities taxation or increased transfer costs arms and equipment from non-state sources economic blocking as strategy during conict looting manipulation of aid to further combatant aims smuggling natural resource extraction replacement of normal currency and exchange system embezzlement of aid by corrupt entities risk-reducing strategies increases in subsistence agriculture petty trade and barter systems shifts in wage labor and participation diaspora nancing labor migration and remittances humanitarian and development aid Transitional Policy Sphere Reconstruction (political, economic) DDR and Reintegration Reconstruction (Political, economic and social) Rehabilitation (condence in state and formal markets) reconstruction (political, social; refugee return, poverty reduction) rehabilitation (political, social and economic; faith in new regime to insure provision of public goods) Capital Stocks Affected infrastructure institutional knowledge human natural endowments state nancial infrastructure institutional human state nancial infrastructure institutional knowledge human 54

PAGE 59

Common Focus: Transitional Justice and Rule of Law Rehabilitation and reconstruction rely on the rule of law and good governance for their success. Where impunity continues, there are no real incentives to alter violent means of asset accumulation, and reconciliation is superficial where declared. Both tracks to peace are sequential, and influence asset bases in addition to national ethos, in a hopefully positive and more inclusive manner. Furthermore, both rehabilitation and reconstruction seem to rely on transitional justice to facilitate post-conflict transformative success to any significant degree. Transitional justice has broad objectives understood as establishing accountability, truth-finding, reparations and reconciliation. Where these are absent or unaddressed, underlying causes of conflict have likely not been adequately considered and are more likely to spark further periods of civil instability and deterioration rather than recovery or any other benchmark. The critical role of transitional justice in enabling successful regime transitions post-conflict forms the basis for the following chapter. When abstracted to the broadest level on analysis, we may conceptualize the pursuance of recovery through reconstruction and reconciliation through rehabilitation as interwoven policy decisions which reinforce and bolster one another to increase their chances of success. Reconstruction brings a commitment to rebuild the structures and formal channels through which capital in its various forms may be legally exchanged; rehabilitation contributes to restocking the various forms of capital which these structures seek to facilitate the exchange of. In order for investors to be willing to undertake projects after conflict, the risk of doing business must be significantly lower than the rate of return, which are seen as ludicrous during transitions to peace (The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998). This may be pursued through increasing confidence among the population and external bodies that investments will not be embezzled and will be adequately managed, which is going to be most effective where there exist legitimate bodies and avenues by which investment may be directed. Transitional justice policies and mechanisms would then be predicted to reinforce both 55

PAGE 60

processes and enable maximum potential for successful transition of a state from conflict and for addressing structural and legacy issues related to national history. 56

PAGE 61

Chapter 4: Transitional Justice Mechanisms and Rule of Law In the process of reaching a status of recovery and reconciliation, a post-conflict regime must come to terms with its history. The way in which it recreates that basic narrative will reflect dominant behavioral trends, and must be mediated to insure that the information it transmits is accurate and encourages inclusiveness where previous identity cleavages are presented. To this extent, the transitional regime must be committed to reforming ideas that have been propagated extensively, and willing to differentiate itself from those conditions of instability. Transitional justice mechanisms create a space for individuals and groups to bring legal claims relating to the conflict, but more importantly handle the most volatile underpinnings of both reconstruction and rehabilitation. Transitional justice promotes deviations from exclusionary norms under previous regimes, indicating a movement away from structural or cultural impunity. It recognizes the experiences of its population in the period leading up to and during conflict, and expands to recognizing post-conflict violations of legal codes. Transitional justice is also crucial in its enforcement of methods of atonement and compensation, and within both the private and pubic sphere creates the basic levels of communication and trust necessary for post-conflict transitional success. Table 4.1 supplements a table in chapter 3 on the differences between post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation processes, with the addition of another type of policy, that geared towards re-establishing a rule of law and encompassing transitional justice in a broad sense. The effect of these processes is disaggregated by political, social and economic conditions which it seeks to enable, which allow for the recognition of recovery and reconciliation. It also identifies the main actors which are expected to undertake these types of policy during the transitionary period. 57

PAGE 62

Table 4.1 Reconstruction, Rehabilitation and Transitional Policies Transitional Policy Area Reconstruction Rehabilitation Actors Political New Constitution Free and Fair Elections and political terms multi-party system Vetting and purging restoration of condence in the state International Peace Keeping Missions Regional Political Collectives Social provision of basic resources for a minimal standard of living facilitation of refugee return maintain condence in state ability to provide security maintain provision of basic goods for minimal standard of living interpersonal trust restoration United Nations Development Agencies Bilateral donors Humanitarian Groups Economic macroeconomic growth policy market diversication privatization opening of markets Demobilization, Disarmament and ReIntegration increase investor condence expand access to credit and capital markets encourage condence in longer-term forecasts and policies World Bank International Monetary Fund Bilateral lenders import and export partners Transitional Justice and Rule of Law political: accountability of previous, transitional and future regimes social: recognition and protection of vulnerable groups during return economic: inuence condence in doing business post-conict political: commitment to reversing norms of impunity social: consequences for failure to provide public goods, trust in state, communities and other individuals economic: encourage condence in state and markets, nancial oversight, ability to nance growth over long term United Nations Security Council (International Court of Justice) International Criminal Court Special Criminal Tribunals (international and/or regional) National judiciaries Local mediation boards Typology of Transitional Justice Bodies The forms transitional justice takes vary according to individual circumstances, but their design takes into account oversight, location, the length of its operation, how it will be accessed, the legal code it bases itself in and its range of potential outcomes. At each stage of creation, 58

PAGE 63

different questions need to be addressed, and in most circumstances, multiple bodies with varying characteristics are established. In respect to oversight, there are three general categories of authority. Trials may be heard by international or regional courts or handled by competent national institutions. They may also be heard by more local legal bodies enacted on a communal level. Wherever they are heard, trials must be overseen by fair and independent judges with intimate association with the conflict and state history. World War II presented an international dilemma, where victor states were forced to handle those instrumental in carrying out Hitler's Final Solution and campaign of genocide against the Jewish and other minorities. It is important to not that this was not the first incidence of genocide, and as recently as the earlier hostilities of the first World War, Turkey had enacted a deliberate campaign to eradicate its Armenian minority. In order to address the war criminals of the Axis regime, a special court at Nuremberg was created. Having evolved from the Nuremberg Trials, more contemporary international hearings limit their scope to those most responsible for committing crimes against humanity during conflict, either by ordering them or personally carrying out wide-scale incidents of violence. They are overseen by members of the international community who possess cultural understanding, either by proximity or shared histories, and publish and disseminate their findings both in the transitional state and globally. In 2002 the International Criminal Court was established in the Hague, taking over from the International Court of Justice, which had been an instrument of the United Nations Security Council. The ICC operates under the Rome Statute, which enables it to hear cases involving war crimes, crimes against humanity, and allegations of genocide, but only where a state has invited and recognizes their authority. The ICJ usually created special tribunals where it did operate, like those in Cambodia, Kosovo and Rwanda. Where these bodies are still in operation, the ICC has tended to absorb their operation into its own workings, leaving the ICJ relatively defunct, though still mandated to hear claims between sovereign states under special circumstances where parties may not be signatory to the Rome Statute, or ignore its jurisdiction. 59

PAGE 64

Special national courts are also important during transitional justice, since they allow populations the ability to take power over their own judicial process and futures. They may only be enacted, however, where there are competent human and financial resources of the state to oversee them, and where both the rights of victims and rights of the accused are recognized and enforced. National courts in the long term can be significantly supported by local mediation mechanisms, with which they establish how claims against others will be handled and processed post-conflict, under the new regime. In order for transitional justice to have lasting effects, it must be embedded in national legal mechanisms to insure that conflict does not re-occur and compromise the movement towards a sustainable peace. Without proper national backing and support through judicial bodies independent of the international community, transitional justice may be seen as inorganic and non-indicative of meaningful commitments of the transitional regime. The location of judicial mechanisms is important to attaching importance to their decisions among a population, but must also take place under circumstances which enable their objectivity and fairness. While it may be preferable to begin the transitional justice outside of the borders of a conflict state, national initiatives and long-term judicial re-establishment must be organic to maximize their legitimacy, and so must at some point exist within the borders of the new or transitional regime. Most mechanisms dominated by external actors are undertaken with a pre-determined date by which they must complete their activity. It is unreasonable to expect that non-state actors will not finance transitional justice indefinitely, and it is unlikely that any transitioning state will possess the means or initiative to propagate them on their own. International tribunals frequently extend their mandate to insure that the collection of evidence is properly undertaken, while still meeting the conditions of adequate due process. Some national bodies may also have definitive expiry, to encourage claims are brought forth and handled by a set date as a means of preventing their potential for insecurity. They may be financed by a defined line in the national budget, through the creation of special trust funds, or through special aid and loan agreements. Conversely, some legal mechanisms are designed to exist beyond the transitional experience. After a conflict, institutional capital is, like the other forms, depleted, and part of 60

PAGE 65

transitional justice is re-establishing working judicial capacity of the new state. Once transitional laws or codes have been drafted, their enactment may be incorporated into the new constitution, and establish the new norms which will be the basis of law during development and peace. In this respect, they are seen as developing positive institutional capital which has been depleted during the course of the conflict and is necessary for sustainability beyond the transition. National Judiciaries must be developed to hear both criminal and civil claims brought before them beyond the conflict period as it is defined. They must be well equipped to objectively determine responsibility and allocate compensation or punishments for nationally defined violations of acceptable conduct, and be flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances and patterns of behavior which may not be the same as those which were active earlier during the transition. This may be accomplished by establishing dual systems, or alternatively by allowing judges or legal authorities to decide both criminal and civil aspects of a particular claim, by finding guilt or innocence and then awarding the appropriate reparations or damages as they see fit. Regardless of the duration they are to exist, transitional justice bodies must also define the statute of limitations for conflict-related claims. To avoid overwhelming weak judicial bodies with a plethora of cases, they must clearly define the period of conflict they are concerned with investigating, and the types of offenses they will hear. Where conflict has been inter-generational, or involved multiple episodes of displacement, this can aggravate social tension where it clearly favors one group over another by its definition, or purposely excludes certain incidents from consideration. These issues are most likely to be observed at the national level, if one side has dominated the terms of peace and wishes to avoid punishment for their own actions during conflict. Table 4.2 summarizes the levels at which transitional justice is undertaken, the codes with which it interacts, its construction, enforcement capacity and examples of each type of mechanism. Effective transitions within a state must engage pro-actively with local and national level mediation boards and programs, in order to establish legitimacy within the population. 61

PAGE 66

Table 4.2 Types of Judicial Mechanisms: International, Regional, National and Local International Regional National Local Oversight multilateral international organizations regional states criminal system civil system special courts military tribunal local mediation provincial and municipal structures Mandate International charter and agreements Universal human rights regional arrangements national constitution and legal codes local ordinances Construction Organizational resolutions standing and special courts group resolutions standing structure outlined in national constitution outlined in national law Enforcement international actors regional neighbors police and security sectors defense forces police forces Examples International Court of Justice International Criminal Court Special Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; the former Yugoslavia; Cambodia International Inter-American Court of Human Rights Federal Structures Municipal Structures No working justice system lacks a burden of proof requirement in reaching its decisions. This burden of proof is decided as worthy of a conviction during transitions by individuals or panels of judges. Evidence must be shared between parties, and each has their own right to legal counsel and representation. If a state has signed treaties or charters that the conflict has seen violated, there is not only a need for the regime to handle crimes, but also an international obligation of other signatories to hold it responsible for violation. These international agreements are the basis of international legal bodies. Regional bodies are more likely to be concerned with violations of economic or trading agreements which have hindered profits or revenue streams, than their international counterparts. 62

PAGE 67

The agreements under which a transitional regime operates may be adopted as law to prevent further incidents of violence or to deter predatory behavior. These rules may not be applied retroactively, but set the standard for what degree of accountability present in the state. Many of them are incorporated into final transition documents, and reflect interests beyond the state, including regional agreements on trade or institutional practice which must be respected to continue positive relationships with other entities. Some post-conflict states have relied on local or communal regulations in handling crimes during conflict. This can be helpful in restoring power and access to legal systems to populations affected by conflict, but can also serve to codify exclusionary norms or inequities that may have led to violence in the past. Most, but not all, transitional justice bodies are seen as determining guilt and assigning responsibility. The last decade of the 1990s has seen the development of alternative instruments which are more concerned with information-retrieval and establishing facts of the conflict. They possess similar characteristics as other mechanisms, but produce an end report for submission to the state regime and international community. They tend to favor apologies and are criticized on the prevalence of amnesty conditions attached to honest disclosures of burial sites or events in question, including identifying those in authority positions at the time of conflict. Most individuals convicted of crimes during and leading up to conflict are assigned periods of imprisonment to serve out in national jails or prisons. In certain cases, labor may be performed in lieu of, or to diminish prison sentences. Labor is mostly physical and may be used to repair infrastructure capital erosion, and is seen as a legitimate use of detained parts of the population where it is undertaken humanely, and while transitional justice bodies are effectively pursuing legal decisions in regards to the prisoners enrolled. The death penalty is not permitted in international courts. Nationally, each state is entitled to make their own decisions with respect to capital punishment as a condition of sovereignty, and may limit its employment criteria as they see fit. Pressure from external actors is generally significant enough in encouraging post-conflict regimes to avoid widespread instability, particularly where their stability is important to confidence in investments in multiple states. Where the death penalty is practiced, it is usually undertaken publicly, or recorded and distributed 63

PAGE 68

to those who request it. Because of this, it has the capacity to re-incite blood lust' and revengebased crimes, but has been practiced at historical turning points in all sovereign states. This makes its employment not necessarily contrary to international policies, although its practice is increasingly scrutinized as potentially violating universal human rights as outlined in international legal documents. Reparations, Compensation and Transitional Asset Transfers Transitional Justice is forced to deal with not only high-profile cases involving crimes against humanity or war crimes, but also in determining how individuals and collectives may be compensated for the damages they are forced to bear during conflict. Reparations are multidimensional, and despite their prevalence in legal scholarship, are still largely unexplored as tools of post-conflict transition. Reparations are most prevalent historically in instances of conflict between states, where "the breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make a reparation in adequate form" (United Nations, 5). Where State X damages State Y's property, State X is required to return to State Y an amount equal to that which they are responsible for destroying. The same United Nations produced report explains though, "the integration of human rights into State responsibility has brought about the basic premise that, in instances of breaches of international obligations, redress and reparation are due not only to States but also to the injured persons and groups themselves" (Rule of Law, 6). They are viewed as one of five types: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition. Restitution is the return of illegally seized assets to the owner who was deprived of them. Usually, it is discussed in refugee-oriented theory with respect to facilitation of return. Furthermore, it is usually understood to be primarily concerned with property rights and contracts as opposed to a criminal act of violence. It is the first of five categorizations of reparations given by the United Nations in the Basic Principles and Guidelines,' which member states are given. Restitution is generally most problematic in instances of entrenched conflict, where there are multiple episodes of refugee flight and property abandonment against the owner's will, and where transitional periods have produced mixed results, similar only in their limited successes. 64

PAGE 69

There are active attempts to mitigate this issue through clearly separating transitional justice and land redistribution and allocation, but where the transitional regime fails to enact the latter it will be increasingly brought before legal mechanisms for consideration. Compensation is the second category, and is similar to a counterbalancing attempt. Where individuals of groups have been deprived of their liberties and livelihood they are awarded compensation for the injuries they have sustained as a result. It is broadly defined as being "provided for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case" (Rule of Law, 7). Compensation not only restores individuals to where they would have been according to their documented losses, but also for the damages which lack discrete quantification, including physical or psychological disability and its negative impact on future earnings post-conflict. Compensation is mostly at the discretion of the specific court hearing a claim, but may be derived from international or regional precedent. It may be distributed to remaining family members or dependents of an individual where they bring forth the claim, and may be expanded to include others in similar circumstances or confined to the unique merits of the case at hand. The three other categories of reparation are rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition. Rehabilitation in this sense is a more generalized idea of the process described in the preceding chapter, and encompasses medical, legal and social services, including psychological. These services are not the same as compensatory, and are awarded to identified segments of the population who are seen to have borne the majority of the burden of conflict through broader programs which do not offer individual recognition of claims to the same degree as a trial may. Satisfaction is equally vague, and seen as measures a state takes to commemorate the past in a respectful manner, through truth commissions, dedications or other public rituals. These may include the designation of national remembrance days or events, naming of streets or publicly funded buildings or other infrastructure. Satisfaction is normative, and does not imply a set amount of payment required by any one party to another. Guarantees of non-repetition are the demonstrations a regime takes to insure that the state has confidence in the capacity of the transition to prevent future conflict or instability. These include supporting the prosecution of criminals active during conflict, and ensuring that amnesties are not granted to 65

PAGE 70

individuals on the basis of their positions during the conflict transition, and are most broadly seen as purging or vetting programs which seek to disentangle said individuals from transitional structures of the state and armed forces. Let us briefly re-conceptualize reparations from a more mainstream economic approach. Restitution and compensation are redistributive transfers. Adequate restitution and/or compensation should, in the presence of working lenders, be able to establish lines of credit. They are able to begin making consumption and production based decisions, which under proper economic reconstruction, should be formal and legal, overseen by the state. Rehabilitation services will likely be reflected as increased government expenditures, and transitional justice is able to target it to those most in need of restoring human capital. Satisfaction and non-repetition both bolster confidence in markets to promote increased investment, but also serve to reassert the basis for social capital and trust development. We accept the consensus that no transfer of goods, services or capital is unlikely to make a significant macroeconomic effect, in the short term, where it is mandated, regardless of its classification. However, this conclusion does not completely negate their influence within the economic realm, nor their relevance to post-conflict economic transition. Firstly, mandating reparations alone does not mean that any transfer has occurred. There must be working structural and financial capital available for dispersal, and a political willingness to follow through on their payment. There is also a horizon distortion, in that post-conflict policy and actions tend to have shortened outlooks, and so the definition of short term should be questioned. Because political costs are inflated during transitions, implementation plans should minimize or redistribute them. Transfers to individuals and collectives of either goods or services may not be realized immediately, such as health care or education, but do have longer term effects on productivity and income generation opportunities. If unaddressed, these deficits hinder sustainable peace. Social capital and trust is similarly realized. Lastly, while no macroeconomic effect may be positively seen immediately, reparations have the ability to affect individuals and communities at a micro-level which is crucial to complete transitions out of conflict. Gender theory has increasingly explored this idea, in the ability of international normative law and practice as possessing the capacity to promote equity among men and women, and to empower female headed households. 66

PAGE 71

In table 4.3, the five types of reparation are displayed with their respective bodies which are responsible for their allocation, potential beneficiaries, determinants of the amount awarded, and their potential micro-level effects with a focus on restoration of confidence and asset bases within a state. By considering reparations and their payments in this way, we are able to see the effects which may not be captured on a macro-scale, but which are nonetheless crucial to enabling post-conflict transitional success. 67

PAGE 72

Table 4.3 Reparations After Civil Conflict and Micro-level Implications Amount Awarding Body Beneciaries Micro-level Effect Restitution determined by documentation of assets owned before conict national judicial bodies international courts returning refugees individuals collectives allow for return of displaced allow for recuperation of asset base to pre-conict levels Compensation determined by projected income or earnings potential comparisons to public ofcials or employees active during same period in question national judicial bodies international courts local arbitration boards victims most disadvantaged by conict victims disproportionatel y affected by conict and transition widen credit base allow for return of individuals and collectives to status if conict had not occurred Rehabilitation non-discrete public expenditures directed towards fact-nding and memorialization national administrative bodies national judiciaries local mediation groups survivors or victim advocacy organizations general population through facilitation of reintegration international community of investors and nancial bodies encourage condence on economic actors increase realization of investment opportunities by state population Satisfaction non-discrete general condence in transitional and new regimes to reinforce certain norms and legal codes national administrative bodies national judiciaries international nancial and banking bodies independent civil society, free press and information, autonomous judiciary general population international community regional actors increase national condence in post-conict regime and economic markets increase external investors condence in doing business in post-conict state Non-repetition non-discrete condence that new regimes will differ from previous in policy, programmes and accountability transitional and new regime and government institutions international, national and local judiciaries general population vulnerable parts of population external and internal investory increase condence of all actors in relative security of investments to realize potential returns 68

PAGE 73

Transformation of Combat, Shadow and Coping Economies Even if we consider the transformation of combat, coping and shadow economies, then some transitional justice and reparations initiatives should inherently address those most marginalized by markets during conflict. We expect that this would especially be true of those in the coping economy who have witnessed quicker asset erosion and thus suffered more, who may be compensated for their losses and subjugation through legal processes. Predatory behavior across markets is limited by a rule of law, and actively discouraged where it is equitably applied in a designated territory. This kind of behavior may be punished by public works, which actively rebuild infrastructure capital as well as teaching actors previously in other markets skills which can be employed in formal economies. Challenges for Awarding Damages or Other Payments In demanding any form of transfer take place, the judicial body must not only recognize certain damages as having been incurred, but also in determining the proper amount necessary to adequately restore capital erosion. This is problematic in a number of ways, including in quantification, delivery, assignment and modality of compensation. Compensation should be paid for damages incurred during conflict, including those which are relatively simple to quantify, such as land or asset damages, but also those which are more difficult to describe, such as psychological or emotional damages. These types of damages can influence the decisions an individual makes within a society, and even though they are more difficult to assign a numerical value, they have a significant effect on how people will act within the social sphere, including the formal economy. The limits to who may bring claims before a given structure is set by the code to which it adheres, and may be brought either individually or on behalf of a group. They may bring cases against the state, other individuals, or corporate, organized entities over which the body hearing the claim has jurisdiction. Compensation may then be decided on a case by case basis, established at a set amount during a precedent case, or appropriated to different categories of individuals according to the degree of their loss. Beyond lump-sum or pension-like transfers of currency or other assets, most reparations programs offer an alternative where the government of 69

PAGE 74

the state creates programmes for groups affected most directly by conflict. The programmes may include income-generating training, special education attention, health care, or other type of service, but to fulfill the reparations condition rather than being simply another government social service it must be targeted and address the issue of reparations and compensation. The amount of restitution ordered by a judicial body is usually relatively straightforward, and is generally estimated by the claimant, reviewed, and then ordered based on the documented losses which are brought forward. Because restitution normally involves land, this documentation is usually a document declaring land ownership which has clearly been disrespected by another party, or evidence of inhabitance other than property contracts. Reparations and compensation are much more difficult to quantify, and tend to be calculated based on the estimated loss of earnings which has occurred as a result of the offense. Most international cases which have ordered reparations or compensation have used the salary of a civil servant as an approximation of possible income which was not realized, and ordered the corresponding amount be paid out to individuals or their families who have brought the claim. The goal of restitution is to return the injured party to the status quo, or where they were prior to the onset of conflict. Reparations are present in cases where returning an individual to the status quo is either impossible, or the abuses against human rights are to the degree that returning and individual to their status prior to onset is not possible. Reparations and compensatory payments do not easily restore to the status quo, and if the status quo has been problematic in the past, then its restoration is not necessarily the most effective means of moving out of conflict. The transitional or new regime is given the task of undertaking most reparations payments, and is expected to finance them by their own means. This may come from increasing tax revenues, where the bodies to collect taxes operate fairly and efficiently, or from dedicating a line in the annual budget for a set period of time. In some cases, governments have issued treasury bonds as compensatory payment, providing them more time before actually having to undertake any monetary transfer. The International Criminal Court and other multilateral judicial bodies active during postconflict transitions have contributed in interesting ways as they have evolved, particularly with 70

PAGE 75

respect to reparations and financing. The Rome Statute makes provisions for a Trust Fund to be used to pay victims of crimes against humanity or others claims heard before the court, but its design and implementation has yet to be fully explored. National trust funds may also be established to fund different payments, however their resources are limited both by external donors and potentially unpredictable policy results towards growth and development. The state may issue reparations payments as lump-sum amounts, or through a pension type program, where set amounts are distributed over a set time period. The latter minimizes individual choice, but may be preferable because of its assurance that the state intends to continue support over time. This is important in reassuring the population that the new regime does not intend to take up the same policies of the older, which led to the conflict. In this way, it serves as a means of guaranteeing non-repetition, satisfaction and positively contributing to rehabilitation over time. Payment may take the form of monetary exchange, or property redistribution. There may also be public apologies and commemoration performed as part of a reparations program, or the designation of days of remembrance. Where a state already has a program to address the types of claims brought before judicial authorities, then compensation or other reparations are not deemed necessary to address in most cases, and the individual or group is referred to the appropriate channels for enrollment. Reparations programs may feature preferential access to higher education or income-generating opportunities, specialized health care, re-integration training, small bundles of assets (including seeds or farming equipment, as well as property or monetary award), and are usually limited in their membership to those who are able to prove their post-conflict status through legitimate documentation or other evidence, and a demonstrated need for enrollment to successfully transition from conflict. These programs may or may not be interpreted as reparatory, and are most often critiqued as convoluting poverty reduction strategies through addressing impoverished populations as opposed to recognizing the violations of basic rights which have resulted in divergent outcomes for different parties during conflict. Not all transitional justice mechanisms are considered with assignment of guilt and innocence, or reparatory transfers. Some bodies are created by external or internal truth-telling and fact-finding organizations, which favor collecting testimonies and creating a shared narrative 71

PAGE 76

of conflict based on the objective observation of experiences reported by survivors. Following the relative success of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, similar structures have been created in Latin America, Asia, the Pacific and Africa during post-conflict transitions. They are mandated by national governments, who specify their methods of collecting testimony, preparing reports, mandated periods of investigation, and designation of oversight during the project. At their conclusion, reports are first made available to the national government, and are then to be distributed to the state's population and the greater international community. The commissions are usually able to make policy recommendations which tend to include remarks on reparations and compensation, but have almost no authority by which to see their advice followed through. In some states, Truth commissions have come under criticism for hindering other judicial processes by granting amnesties in return for cooperation, even where the disclosures implicate a deeper involvement in crimes than previously imagined. Commissions are further disadvantaged where they are seen to be dominated by one particular bias out of a conflict, and fail to adequately reflect the experience of the total population during their period of investigation. They also rely on a certain level of infrastructure, institutional and knowledge capital to allow for the collection of a legitimate amount of survey responses across the population, and must adequately engage with returning displaced populations or those who fear retribution as a result of their participation. Thus far, this chapter has provided an overview of the types of transitional justice mechanisms which may be observed, and broadly addressed their functions which enable reconstruction and rehabilitation. Again, recall the table shown earlier in this chapter and the preceding, which we have now updated to include the relevant transitional justice workings which enable both policy trends, and the function by which they achieve this enablement according to type of capital involved (Table 4.4). 72

PAGE 77

Table 4.4 Capital Stock and Transitional Justice Capital Type Example Role of Transitional Justice Correlated Function of Transitional Justice Post-Conict Reconstructio n Post-Conict Rehabilitation Natural Endowment private, excludable Natural Resources lootable non-lootable objectively adjudicate competing claims to revenue and operation check on public or private groups in control of resource exploitation and transfer restore rule of law combat culture of impunity immediateterm control over extraction and proliferation long-term sustainable agreements regarding exportation State Financial private, excludable Currency Reserves decrease risk of doing business; increase investor and consumer condence in state markets restore condence in state nancial institutions restore rule of law combat culture of impunity rebuild with international aid and emergency assistance encouragem ent of public savings in national nancial institutions Infrastructure public, nonexcludable, common use roadways railroads airports oversee shadow economy, provide check on potential proteers who may control limited transportatio n networks decrease costs of doing business restore rule of law combat culture of impunity immediate restoration of damaged infrastructure land mine removal environment al policies Institutional public during peacetime Administrative structures reverse conditions of impunity for transitional and new regime establish norms of state accountability in new regime restore rule of law combat impunity transitional regime and new state institutions condence in new regime Knowledge Resources public, limited excludability educated elites in government competent human resource capital encourage return of surviving elites restore condence of knowledge resources to actively engage postconict towards peace truth-telling rehabilitation of interpersonal relationships reverse impunity regional elites elites returning from exile diaspora elites encourage development of human resources through training and special programs Cultural public, but may be excludable free exchange of ideas working civil organization s insure free and fair press and cultural expression create common agreement on conict narrative truth-telling memorializati on reverse culture of impunity re-establish space for civil society to begin reconstructin g insure freedom of press and ideas in public domain Human private, excludable opportunity to invest in productivity enhancemen t access to higher education, job-training restore condence in returns on human capital investment identify areas or parts of population experiencing disproportion ate losses in human capital investment opportunities truth-telling restore rule of law basic education for returning refugees expanded incomegeneration opportunities common education curriculum opportunities for higher education 73

PAGE 78

Transitional Justice Theoretical Practice: Conclusion Transitional justice is, in its own right, a difficult and dense field of study. It is an intersection of multiple disciplines, overseen by the rhetoric of international law and agreements. Most importantly, transitional justice re-establishes a rule of law, enabling both recovery and reconciliation. Furthermore, because we assume during group conflicts that one group relative to another is likely to be victimized, reparations and compensation programs should serve to empower and reassure this group that it has a legitimate stake in the new regime, which also intends to recognize their own rights. Payments are not likely to have a macro-economic effect in the short term, but the empowerment potential and their symbolic importance should be reflected in increasing participation and enhanced reconstruction and rehabilitation programs, which enable individuals to reposition themselves in a formal economy to complete the transitions from conflict. Reparations and compensation are important not because they actually have the capacity to restore the status quo, but because they represent an acknowledgement of wrong, and outline its consequences, while also delineating between prior regimes and new ones. They challenge impunity, and are able to instill confidence in meaningful change towards a sustainable peacetime society, and their inclusion is crucial to the success of post-conflict transitions from civil conflict. 74

PAGE 79

Chapter 5: Case-Study of Rwanda For our case study, we confine the two periods of post-conflict transition we wish to compare to the two most recent episodes in Rwanda. The first period is identified as beginning with the invasion led by RPF forces out of Rwanda, and entering the post-conflict period with the signing of the first Arusha Peace Accords in 1993. This transition was not successful in realizing recovery or reconciliation, and enabled the realization of a second period of violence in 1994. The three month genocide is recognized as ending formally with the signing of a second Arusha Peace Accords. These two episodes are chosen for comparison to demonstrate the critical role of transitional justice in enabling successful transitions. A transition is designated as successful once reconstruction policy has enabled recovery for positive development and growth, as well as rehabilitative policies having enabled more generalized reconciliatory goals. Both post-conflict transitions were undertaken with similar goals in terms of political, social and economic design; however, only the second episode witnessed transitional justice in a legitimate fashion. To understand the potential relationship dynamics present, we can first summarize the goals of reconstruction and rehabilitation, decomposed to their respective processes. We may then explore how transitional justice enabled more sustainable peaceful outcomes during each period. This specific case study also enables us to employ other ideas briefly discussed in earlier chapters with relation to group mobilization and patterns of exclusion in conflict onset. Certain identities recognized as having been manipulated and altered before, during and after conflict may offer us insight into how alternative social constructions may be addressed where they are not adequately encompassed using mainstream theories of conflict resolution. Rwandan conflict allows us to view the divergent interests of groups, and how they may be united through common 75

PAGE 80

narrative arrived at through truth-telling and judicial procedures necessary to restore the rule of law. We consider these issues tangent to our main thesis, and validate our limited consideration of them by this assumption. Periods of Transition I and II The broad goals of both reconstruction and reconciliation during both periods of postconflict (I and II) are integrated and shown in table 5.1 below. Using this format, it is much easier to see the relative similarity of policy decisions during both periods under consideration. Post-Conict Transition I Post Conict Transition II Terms of Mediation signed August 4, 1993 organized by United States, France and Organization of African Unity held in Arusha, Tanzania Political Reconstruction broad based transitional government inclusive of different parties plan drafting of new constitution contingent on popular referendum transitional regime should be inclusive of different parties drafting of new constitution Political Rehabilitation agreements for purging not explicit condence in state not enhanced active challenge of state authority and institutional impunity commitments to inspire condence in new regime as different from previous regimes Social Reconstruction restore minimal standards of living and basic provision of public goods for survival begin process of refugee return restore minimal standards of living and basic provision of public goods for survival facilitate return of different groups of displaced population and refugees Social Rehabilitation minimal security to be enforced by UNAMIR peacekeeping force minimal security enforced by maintaing monopoly on legitimate use of force human and social capital development need to improve inter-personal trust 76

PAGE 81

Post-Conict Transition I Post Conict Transition II Economic Reconstruction combatants to be integrated into formal state armed forces macro-economic policies for growth market diversication privatization opening of state markets to external actors combatants to be re-integrated in different roles within formal sector macro-economic policies for growth market diversication privatization opening of markets to external actors Economic Rehabilitation investor condence should be encouraged by balancing budget investor condence encouraged by transparency, good governance and increased observance of positive returns on investment access to credit and asset accumulation should be expanded to general population expectations must be seen as promoting non-violence as a means of success, cooperation for mutual gain Outcomes: failure to transition from conict succesfully nullied by the genocidal regime following the assassination of the Presidents of Rwanda and Burndi seen as successful instance of transition out of conict post-conict regime maintains control and demonstrates further capacity for increased development emphasis on unity and cooperation as opposed to competitive and predatory Reconstruction At the end of conflict, Rwanda has pursued similar reconstructive policy in alternative environments. Below is a summary of these goals, categorized by their wider sphere of operation as either political, social or economic. Each goal is also denoted by the authority mandated with undertaking the transition out of conflict. They have been outlined in numerous international resolutions as well as national legislation and codification. A list of these is included in the appendix. Where the transitional regime is responsible for meeting specific goals, their outline has been incorporated into the respective Arusha Accord for either period. Political: 77

PAGE 82

i. draft new constitution which outlines how power will be distributed within a new state structure transitional regime ii. establish free and fair elections, to be held at regular intervals transitional regime iii. allow for multiple parties and diverse voices in political dialogue transitional regime Social: i. insure a minimum standard of living is attained to prevent the risk of health crises and potential threats to security humanitarian and aid agencies ii. provide public goods to enable the reaching of development benchmarks among the population, including progressing away from poverty and avoiding a poverty-conflict traphumanitarian and peace-keeping groups iii. limit ethnic dominance or relevant social cleavage transitional regime, monitoring bodies Economic: i. Macroeconomic growth World Bank, IMF, foreign lenders ii. Economic Diversification World Bank iii. Privatization of state operated enterprise International Monetary Fund iv. Trade liberalization and opening of markets world bank and international monetary fund v. DDR and combatant re-integration world bank, UN peacekeepers I. Period I (1993) Reconstruction failed politically after the first Arusha Peace Accords to reasonably meet any of its policy goals before a resurgence of conflict. The agreements made provisions for power-sharing during a transitionary period, which was actively discouraged by the dominant political party who favored Hutu extremist ideals. Hutu power advocates continued to control information and how it was conveyed to the general public, mostly through the maintenance of a national radio service and oversight of news publications. No constitution was drafted or agreement reached towards a new peaceful regime before the 1994 genocide. Socially, exclusionary trends persisted and in some instances intensified post-conflict. Poverty trends showed a growing number of the population holding less wealth, and gains from positive growth were concentrated among those who were relatively well off at the onset of the 78

PAGE 83

civil war. Discrimination in education continued, with Tutsi routinely blocked from accessing opportunities for higher level advancement, and increasingly divisive rhetoric was incorporated into popular culture. This included the printing of the Hutu Ten Commandments' in the national magazine created during the conflict, which explicitly required Hutu solidarity against ethnic Tutsi and their sympathizers. Where positive growth or economic development was realized, its benefits were distributed according to political loyalty as opposed to reflecting real productivity. Privatization agreements also favored loyal elites, and served as a means to transfer assets and wealth to a smaller group of the population. Markets were largely unmonitored, and much activity continued to be informal and not captured by formal indicators. Armed militias became increasingly prevalent leading up to the failure of reconstruction, and agreements to integrate combatants into the formal defense sector were not followed through. These groups were encouraged to increase their violent behavior and predation by the provision of arms by the state, and training of civilian regiments by national and international experts (NURC). II. Period II (1994) During the second attempt at post-conflict reconstruction, political, social and economic policy were relatively successful and mutually supportive. Local elections were held prior to the ratification of a formal constitution in 1999, and general elections under the new legal code first took place in 2003. The outcome of popular vote put Paul Kagame in the presidency, and his party (Party of Unity and Reconciliation) in a position of dominance. The transitional regime, and later on the elected regime reinforced dedication to free information and transmission of ideas during the political process, but hedged this with the outlawing of any political affiliation along ethnic definitions. As of 2006, Freedom House measures of political rights within Rwanda were seen as relatively un-free (scoring a 6 out of a possible 7 on a scale of repression); however, the government maintains popular support and confidence. Socially, the second Arusha Accords were much more successful in reaching minimal standards of welfare for the population. Refugee return has been more actively undertaken, and is consistently re-evaluated and updated to changing circumstances. In 1997, the government 79

PAGE 84

changed its policy regarding return to one of village-ization,' under which returning households are placed into camps referred to as imidugudo.' From these camps, they are then assigned plots of land which have been made available through either deforestation or remain unclaimed without contest. Individuals who have participated in the program have seen positive asset effects, in that they are routinely given more property than had they not participated or returned on their own; however, they tend to see relatively less returns on inputs to the land. This may be understood as reflecting a relative deficit in productivity not related to physical assets, and indicative of human capital erosion. Arguably eclipsing the success in these two fields is the economic success Rwanda has witnessed following the genocide. Growth was restored rapidly and maintained through public expenditure and aid contributions early on in the transition, but has also proved resilient to external shocks and avoided potential grievances. Between 2001 and 2008, real GDP growth has increased from 8.5% to 11.2%. In 2007, Gross Domestic Product was reported at US$8.44 billion, which continues to rely heavily on aid payments from external actors. Debt has been managed reasonably well, and the post-conflict regime has benefited from relief programs and forgiveness from the IMF and World Bank, among others (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). During the second period of post-conflict reconstruction, the International Monetary Fund approved Emergency Assistance Loans (EAL) for Rwanda in 1995, in addition to qualifying for Rapid Credit Facility Agreements (RCFA) during the same time. The primary objective of EAL was to enable capital flows into the state by creating the capacity to attract investment, through a series of policies to rebuild capacity of fiscal, monetary and exchange institutions throughout the state. Once this objective began to be realized, RCFA provided assistance intended to open up investment opportunities for the general population and foreign entities and encouraging privatization through facilitating the sale of publicly held assets (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). During intermediate stages of conflict transition, the temporary regime issued treasury bonds, which it has repeated once since the initial sale. As of April 15, 2010 proceedings are underway for a third sale. The bonds allow the Rwandan financial sector to increase capital available for lending, while encouraging public saving and investment in the post-conflict state. 80

PAGE 85

This proposed sale is advocated as being effective in taking advantage of low interest rates following the global credit crisis which has affected higher income states much more than Rwanda and some other developing nations. By increasing the robustness of capital markets, floating of the exchange rate may be advantageous to improving the value of the Rwandan Franc and enabling foreign reserve accumulation. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is considered in terms of investment flows into the state, and the converse, flows outwards from the state. Between 2007 and 2008 the former increased from US$ 67 million to US$ 103 million; and outflows from US$13 million to US$ 14 million (Grohmann, 2009). This is reflective of the general trend which has been seen during transition and reconstruction. The economy has been diversified to an acceptable extent by investing in service industry, especially tourism, and encouragement away from subsistence agriculture. The state has also been active in rebuilding infrastructure to facilitate trade both domestically and with external actors, both for exporting goods and importing them. This has enabled not only a more responsive addressing of humanitarian issues, but also created transportation networks which encourage further investment in economic activity. The economy has been successfully monitored nationally and in compliance with international regulations and standards. The central bank of Rwanda has received awards for Best Emerging Market Bank in 2008, 2009 and again in 2010 ( The New Times ). The state has met and updated its own benchmarks since the conflict, and continues to promote counterpoverty measures within its formal markets. Successful oversight may also be inferred by the decreasing levels of inflation, which continues to be a regional concern in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even where international crises and uncertainty have applied upward pressure (for example in 2008, where inflation was measured at 15.4%), national response has been swift and effective in limiting its destruction (inflation measured at 11.5% in 2009) ( The New Times ). Furthermore, certain shocks which may have had adverse effects on Rwandan markets have proven potential avenues for further development. As of April 2010, the state released a press report outlining its decision to seek a treasury bond with 81

PAGE 86

the potential to create more government revenue while taking advantage of low interest rates as an ideal time to liberalize exchange rates (T he New Times ). Privatization has been undertaken over time during the post-conflict transition, and continues to be a point of contention between the state government and international actors. Private capital formulation has stayed relatively constant since 1997, while public formation has consistently grown. The opposite is true of consumption composition. Rwanda has remained import-dependent, and seen limited expansion of export activity; however, this is largely the result of land scarcity and the need to provide provisions for humanitarian relief following the genocide (Grohmann, 2009). Rwanda has been recognized internationally and regionally as a post-conflict transitional success, which has been cemented by their appointment to the chair position on the East African Securities Regulation Authority in April of 2010. They will serve in the position for a two year term, with priorities to integrate regional state markets and to reach agreement on disclosure requirements and transparency. Poverty continues to be a policy issue more than 15 years after the second Arusha Accords were signed. Estimates indicate that between 85 and 90% of the population live on less than $2 a day, and the national poverty rate is currently higher overall than prior to the genocide. Additionally, surveys have indicated that proportion of the population who self-identifies as being impoverished has increased to 59% in 2006, but is predicted to remain relatively constant for the time being (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). The Rwandan state continues to work with international groups for development and poverty reduction through policy action to address the issue. Rwanda has become a more active international trading entity since the genocide. Exports, while a small percentage of GDP, were valued at US$219 million in 2008 (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). Revenue was earned through the cultivation and sale of coffee, tea and iron ore, sold mostly to China, Germany, the United States and Hong Kong. Total imports for the same time period were estimated at US$759 million, more than three times the value of exports. Rwanda continues to import food, machinery, steel, oil and construction materials, from Kenya, Uganda, Germany, Belgium and China (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). 82

PAGE 87

They continue to be classified as a low-income country, and receive grant and development assistance from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, United Nations, and other organizations. Rehabilitation Like reconstruction policy, rehabilitation was outlined in similar ways during both postconflict periods. They are summarized as follows, and take the same compositional form as reconstruction policies: Political: i. vetting and purging transitional regime ii. confidence in the state transitional regime iii. information transitional regime iv. decentralization transitional regime Social: i. security peacekeepers, police and armed forces ii. public good provision transitional regime, international aid groups, humanitarian groups iii. trust and forgiveness transitional regime Economic: i. investor confidence International Monetary Fund ii. access to credit International Monetary Fund iii. expectations and confidence in the future International Monetary Fund, transitional regime I. Period I (1993) Once the first Arusha Accords were signed, the transitional regime made little effort to address the concerns of rebel groups with the institutional structure of the state. There were no initiatives to purge or vet structures, and even where superficial discourse was observed, the state continued to encourage militia activity by providing arms and support to extremist groups. Control was centralized in the capital of Kigali, which was demographically high in the number of extremist figureheads who were politically active and motivated. 83

PAGE 88

Social policy was overseen by international peacekeepers mandated by the United Nations and deployed shortly after the peace agreement was signed. Their failure is attributed to their limitations by virtue of their specific mandate and international reluctance in intervene, strengthened by the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia during the same time period (Power, 2002). They lacked both the capacity and resources to effectively enforce peace or stability within Rwanda. During the period following peace arrangements, episodic violence continued (rurally characterized by massacres, urban setting higher incidents of violent crime and assault) and was unaddressed by security forces. There were also higher incidences of violence observed around refugee populations and border areas. Random violent outbursts coincided with discriminatory provision of public goods including humanitarian aid. Deliveries were routinely diverted, and corruption was rampant across the state in light of the limited enforcement of law and growing sense of impunity. Interpersonal trust between groups had been historically eroded, but by 1993 it had reached new depths of inadequacy. Tutsi were portrayed as selfish and profit-driven as the expense of Hutu populations, and after the 1993 Arusha Accords this continued to be publicized and accepted. Civil society was discouraged from developing alternative identities which may enable cross-linking social capital, and ethnicity was increasingly politicized. Radio broadcasts were made more frequently listing the full names, addresses and license plate numbers of registered Tutsi and potentially sympathetic Hutu; these lists served to identify enemy targets during the genocide's early program stages (National Unity and Reconciliation Comission). Economic progress was indicative of increased aid flows and development assistance as opposed to sustainable growth, and was mostly beneficial to corrupt elites who were able to embezzle flows of goods and capital. Aid levels, even if they had been effectively implemented, also suffered from a reluctance to commit resources by the international community. While rebuilding offered potentially large rewards, there was insufficient confidence that positive rewards would be seen without assuming too much risk on the investment. This lack of confidence was also evident on a national level, where control of assets was volatile and predatory practices accepted as the norm. At the end of the conflict period, there was no success 84

PAGE 89

in transferring beyond short-term horizons, and actors continued to behave in ways which increased profits at the expense of the rest of the population. II. Period II (1994) Unlike the first set of agreements, the 1994 Arusha Accords were not a negotiated powersharing arrangement, and reflected the total victory of RPF forces over Hutu Genocidaires. As a result, the previous regime was de-legitimized, and their prominent elites prevented from entry into the new government. The post-genocide regime has inspired increasing confidence among the population, and survey data has shown that this is especially true among younger people in the state. Their mandate is seen as legitimate, although their civil liberties are ranked at 5 out of 7 on the Freedom House Scale of repression. The post-conflict regime has been proactive in declaring the prior regime's policies as ethnically discriminatory and marginalizing, and has gone so far as to outlaw political organization among any sort of ethnic line which may excite underlying tensions relevant to the episode of conflict. This has expanded into control over freedom of information and freedom of speech. Theoretically, an ideal state would operate with absolute perfect information which is freely discussed and debated in public and private forums. The Rwandan state has instead recognized that perfect information and communication are idealistic, and as such they have a political obligation to mediate how information may be manipulated and negative stereotypes and perceptions of relative deprivation may be disseminated. This has enabled a more successful transition, although it may have far reaching effects beyond the current regime's concerns (Longman, 2004). During the second period of transition, extremist newspapers and magazines were banned, and a more independent and objective press has been observed through the establishment of The New Times This continues to be the main source of news for the postconflict state, and publishes articles daily with weekly special sections including "The Children's Times" and "The Women's Times." Many of its stories emphasize rehabilitation in inter-personal relations. The paper is independent of political affiliation, and is restricted only in its ability to 85

PAGE 90

explicitly address ethnicity, which is against national legislation which has carried into the postconflict regime. "The Children's Times" is published every week, and publishes student-written articles and quotes. In their annual segment remembering the genocide, children are interviewed and asked about their ideas of broader rehabilitative processes such as forgiveness. They tend to recognize the need to request forgiveness and express condolence for their actions, but are reflective of certain biases which continue to be reproduced on a household level. The most significant of these is the interpretation of asking for forgiveness as a means by which to minimize the consequences of one's actions, which implies that there is still some social belief that forgiveness and rehabilitation has not been a complete success. The same 2010 issue of the Children's Times featured a piece titled The Gift of True Friendship' included the following tendency towards unity and forgiveness: "When your friend hurts you, learn to forgive them so that you can remain united. True friends forgive one another. Real friends freely exchange questions and answers about things they do not understand( The New Times )" Not only does this stress the need to practice forgiveness as a part of true friendship, but also provides the conditions which must be present to begin discussing and understanding the past for reconciliation. "The Women's Section" of The New Times is also published on a weekly basis, and serves to encourage incorporation of gender equity into policy as well as to diminish taboos surrounding certain issues specific to women in Rwanda. These have included sections featuring stories regarding menstruation from a variety of approaches. What is seen even in more developed states as not relevant to public discourse, is actually a significant obstacle to development. 18% of female students miss 3-4 days a month because they are unable to afford pads, which is stereotyped as dirty and worthy of social stigmatization among men and children as well as other women. By repealing the current 18% Value Added Tax which is currently charged on feminine hygiene products, more women and girls would be able to afford them. This could potentially minimize the disadvantage they face from missing days of class ( The New Times, April 6 2010 ). 86

PAGE 91

Menstruation is related to wider development policies including access to clean water and sanitation facilities. Where schools lack these resources, girls are more likely to miss class on a monthly basis over time. CARE, an international humanitarian group, published statistics which implied that of the total population, 59% do not have access to safe water ( The New Times ). Education policies should also incorporate hygiene education programs and sensitivity training of teachers and other staff. The government has undertaken a process of decentralization through a working representative parliamentary system, and has released administrative authority to regional and local systems. Decentralizing has enabled communities to respond more effectively to their specific needs and concerns, although their funding opportunities continue to be limited under the new regime. They have also encouraged the formulation and rehabilitation of social identities other than ethnicity, while propagating a unified but diverse idea of citizenship (NURC). Social success has been facilitated largely by the swift establishment of a monopoly on the use of force following the capture of Kigali in August of 1994. In the five years immediately following this event, violent incursions from border areas have decreased, and are no longer seen as common issues requiring attention. The United Nations did not have a significant role in establishing or supporting this monopoly on the use of force, their usual dominance curtailed by their failure to intervene during the genocide (NURC). Rwanda has become a leader in development following their transition from conflict. They have met and exceeded their initial benchmarks for development and public good provisions, and continue to update their goals to reflect their success. Healthcare is more widely available, and life expectancy has returned to 46 years. Child mortality has declined, and birth rates have returned to pre-conflict levels (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). Health issues continue to garner attention under the new Kagame regime, particularly HIV/AIDS and women's health. Education has been restored, and the state is on track to meet the conditions for universal primary enrollment during the next decade. There are multiple institutions of higher education, and admission is meritocratic, with special programs and assistance for attendance targeted at groups who suffered disproportionately during conflict. Training programs have been 87

PAGE 92

developed and undertaken for widows, ex-combatants and former child soldiers to encourage income-generating activities and increasing productivity levels. One of the most significant postconflict transition mechanisms created to further realization of reconciliation has been the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Divided into three departments (civic education; peace-building and conflict management; and administrative and financial monitoring), their goal is to reach a common narrative of the conflict. This narrative is distributed throughout state apparatus, including education sector. It encourages rehabilitation and Rwandan solidarity on the premise that the compromising of national identity and ethnic polarization is largely the final outcome of Western-dominated policy and colonial legacy (NURC). To this degree it is largely successful in uniting the population and transferring this idea inter-generationally, but at the expense of a decidedly anti-Western tone. A December 2008 report published survey responses which indicated that 97.5% of individuals felt confident in their safety within their own home. Similar numbers responded that they were confident in walking alone at night, or in staying by themselves overnight (Opinion Survey, 2008). These are representative of the trust which has been restored at communal levels, however, survey responses may not be reflective of the entire population. As noted earlier, confidence in the state increases among younger age groups, and trust in one's own security at home follows a similar trend. Other surveys collected after the genocide have implied that around 50% of the population has maintained that trusting in others is naive (data collected between 2005 and 2007), and is also dependent on regional experience during the conflict. Trust seems to be most lacking in the Western provinces, where French controlled safe-zones' allegedly allowed genocidal crimes to continue and perpetrators to escape and regroup within the Democratic Republic of Congo (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, 2008). Rwanda has shown exceptional growth and resiliency on a macro-economic level since 1994. Even where there have been shocks such as bad harvests or global credit concerns, they have yet to experience an adverse reaction to any shock which may have compromised stability. Rehabilitative economic policies have included extending access to credit and establishing legitimate financial institutions for borrowing, lending and saving. Micro-loans have 88

PAGE 93

been granted to those lacking collateral for loans, and have targeted female-headed households and returning refugees most extensively (IMF). Local funds have also been allocated and mobilized to respond to specific issues a given community faces. State financial resources have been developed through the accumulation of foreign reserves and investment activity. As of September 2009, the World Bank placed Rwanda's current international reserve level as being at US$725 million. To encourage public saving and more flexible exchange rates, the Kagame regime has also taken on two treasury bonds, with plans to adopt a third as of April 2010. The proposed bond will generate RWF 2.5 billion over three years, and will utilize low interest rates to the advantage of capital development. Following the genocide, the international community was welcomed through some reconstruction channels and not others, and United Nations was not given an opportunity for a second peacekeeping deployment. Instead, ex-combatants were addressed through actions to integrate some combatants into the security sector and armed forces, and those not integrated were targeted through two stages of demobilization programs and assistance. The first stage was 1997 through 2001, and the second between 2002 and 2008. During each stage, ex-combatants were offered opportunities to participate in a variety of policy environments, which provided skill accumulation for non-combatant income generation and access to vocational training, and specialized medical care. Of particular interest are the solidarity camps created by the transitional government, Igando (Longman, 2004). Igando consists of political re-education and paramilitary training. The basic curriculum reviews a historical account of Rwandan development, general financial planning and budgeting, sensitivity programming and conditions of citizenship. Paramilitary training enables the state to maintain national reserves and to identify candidates for integration. Attendance at Igando is set by transitional and post-conflict regimes, and is mandatory for former prisoners detained during transition, returning Hutu who fled the RPF at the end of the genocide, all students attending university or higher education, and all political representatives (National Unity and Reconciliation Commission). One of the most important parts of reaching economic reconciliation in the ability of both the regime in power and the population to expand their horizons beyond the immediate short89

PAGE 94

term. Rwanda has, post-genocide, successfully promoted ideas of sustainable peace and inspired confidence among its people in dedication to this condition. This has been accomplished in large part by the designation of state expenditure towards certain common goals of development as opposed to competitive goals and potential outcomes. Other Significant Differences between Transition I and Transition II We must acknowledge that re-establishing a rule of law is undertaken during a transition from conflict to peace amongst multiple other factors and conditions. There are three distinct differences between the two episodes that we should consider as potentially relevant to explaining their divergent outcomes. First, the conditions under which peace was negotiated were extremely different in 1993 than in 1994. These differences were largely the formal outcome of different monopolies on the use of force in each episode. The final difference we may wish to consider in further studies may be the limited international role played in the second transition, validated mainly on the international refusal to intervene during the genocide. The first and second Arusha Peace Accords were drafted under very different circumstances, and their similarities are largely confined to title and physical location. Both were negotiated in the capital of Tanzania; however, in the first round of peace making, opposing forces were brought in during a temporary ceasefire by international actors (mainly French). The mediators formally appeared to show a bias towards the RPF and Tutsi populations, while actually allowing for the Rwandan state to limit its commitment towards implementing positive transition reforms. Peacekeepers were deployed, however failed to secure the state. Parties were represented by elite groups able to act on behalf of their collectives, and agreement to integrate combatants encouraged disarming among some groups (NURC). The second round of peace-making was again overseen by international actors, but was spearheaded by the recently victorious RPF as a means of legitimizing their overthrow of Hutu extremists. Peacekeepers were not deployed directly to Rwanda and were instead confined to monitoring border areas and refugee flows. The RPF dominated negotiations, and elites from extremist groups responsible for the genocide were not represented, nor were their goals seen as contributing towards sustainable peace in any capacity. 90

PAGE 95

The relative strength of veto actors during both rounds of negotiation are indicative over perceptions on a monopoly over the use of force. In 1993, non-state militias were to disarm and begin the process of re-integrating either into the formal defense forces or non-combatant roles. State militias were able to maintain their arms while advocating stability; however, failure to enforce the agreement further enabled these groups to continue to amass arms and recruits simultaneous to DDR measures. In 1994, the regime in control prior to and during the conflict had lost its monopoly on the use of legitimate force. The RPF had physically forced the FAR and militias to retreat through French-controlled zones along the Eastern border, where they were able to regroup with some success, though not enough to compromise transition from conflict. Even today, the government continues to be dominated by former combatants affiliated with the Uganda-based insurgency, including president Paul Kagame, who were active during counter-attack in August of 1994 as part of the RPF. The former combatants belonging to the RPF have continued to maintain relative impunity with regard to allegations against them in light of the massive offenses committed by genocidaires. It is timidly considered how the different roles and influence of the international community may have affected the dual outcomes of transition in Rwanda. In 1993, external organizations were seen as mediating so as to find some level of compromise to enable peace. Most idealistically, these organizations were seen as being committed to pursuing recognition of human rights and devoting themselves to their protection. During the 1994 negotiations, the international community struggled to oversee the process in light of the fact that they had failed to intervene, and the one exception (Operation Turquoise) was viewed as a disaster. Not only had the zones controlled by French troops failed to intervene in continued genocidal regimes, they also enabled massive flights of individuals and elites who would be labeled war criminals and pursued accordingly to temporarily escape the consequences of their actions. Reluctant to recognize a failure to intervene even once its occurrence had been seen, the international community allowed the RPF post-conflict regime to dictate large parts of the second peace process. In 2008, the Kagame government published the Muyoco Commission's report 91

PAGE 96

finding France complicit in the genocide, and as having actively encouraged it during the first transitional period. The international community again avoided confronting the issue, and as of the beginning of 2010, the French and Rwandan state have restored diplomatic relations which had been terminated at the report's publication. Transitional Justice During Post-Conflict Policy The following tables (5.2(a) and 5.2(b)) provide a brief overview of the transitional justice mechanisms which were present during the first and second period of post-conflict policy action we have chosen to consume. It is noteworthy that the second period is much more comprehensive in its design and implementation of these bodes relative to the first. Refining the bodies we consider to those which operate along a more mainstream idea of judicial mechanisms, we may also wish to consider the various goals, compositions and outcomes of key bodies. Because of the failure of the first period and its general lack of transitional justice or legitimate efforts to establish a rule of law which would reverse standing patterns of impunity, table 5.3 confines its information to the main international, national and local mechanisms during the second period of transition. 92

PAGE 97

Type of Claims Mandate Legal Code Oversight and Enforcement Criticisms International UNAMIR does not hear claims responsible for insuring ceasere to enable transition Security Council Resolution limitations on the use of force Specic mandate United Nations Charter International treatises reviewed by UN Inquiry into the Genocide in Rwanda in 1999 (period between October 1993 and July 1994; when UNAMIR was deployed to insure reduced risk of conict recurrence) recognized as a failure of United Nations Peace Keeping Missions to meet primary objective National Independent Investigation Commission allegations of ethnically motivated violence allegations of crimes against humanity, genocide, against Rwandan State National mandate : 3 week observation period; 12 Commission members responsible for drafting nal report Universal Human Rights International Charter on the Prosecution of Genocide report nished and presented to appropriate authorities, but recommendati ons not carried out no enforcement ability Findings ignored by international committee, who allow Rwanda to assume alternate seat on Security Council throughout genocide Local None Specied Table 5.2 (a) Transitional Justice During Period I 93

PAGE 98

II. Period II (1994) Type of Claims Mandate Legal Code Oversight and Enforcement Criticisms International UNAMIR does not hear claims responsible for insuring ceasere to enable transition Security Council Resolution limitations on the use of force Specic mandate United Nations Charter International treatises reviewed by UN Inquiry into the Genocide in Rwanda in 1999 (period between October 1993 and July 1994; when UNAMIR was deployed to insure reduced risk of conict recurrence) recognized as a failure of United Nations Peace Keeping Missions to meet primary objective National Independent Investigation Commission allegations of ethnically motivated violence allegations of crimes against humanity, genocide, against Rwandan State National mandate : 3 week observation period; 12 Commission members responsible for drafting nal report Universal Human Rights International Charter on the Prosecution of Genocide report nished and presented to appropriate authorities, but recommendati ons not carried out no enforcement ability Findings ignored by international committee, who allow Rwanda to assume alternate seat on Security Council throughout genocide Local None Specied Table 5.2 (a) Transitional Justice During Period I 94

PAGE 99

Table 5.3 Transitional Justice Post-Genocide Composition Goals Outcomes International Criminal Tribunal 2 trial chambers, 1 appeals 16 judges President: Judge Charles Michael Dennis Byron Vice President: Judge Khalida Rachid Khan determine guilt of those alleged to be most responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes or genocide 29 accused convicted of crimes 21 trials completed (through appellate level) Estimated date of completion: December 2010 National Genocide Courts national supreme court highest level of appeals regional courts trial heavy ofce of the prosecutor, individuals or collectives able to bring claims before courts mandate only crimes having occurred between Jan 1 and Dec 31, 1994 determine guilt or responsibility for alleged crimes during genocide efciently and fairly address damages challenge culture of impunity promotion of transparency and good governance public execution of 24 convicted followed by outlawing of capital punishment difculties in achieving impartiality, objectiveness and due process increasing favoritism of plea agreements and community works in lieu of trial or imprisonment Gacaca Courts communal, public mediation and dialogue overseen by Inyangamugayo (people of integrity) who are elected to their position 8140 courts in operation across Rwanda able to adjudicate genocide defendants who were not planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors or wellknown murderers reconstruct what happened during the genocide alleviate case backlog reconciliation of all Rwandans and building of national unity eradicate culture of impunity encourage the selfcapacity of Rwandan state and provinces majority of population view as legitimate mechanism for handling claims limited mandate which does not provide for handling claims which predate the genocide dominated by relatively young actors as opposed to elders suggestion of using land holding of perpetrators as compensation or reparation The main thesis of our research has been that transitional justice is crucial to facilitating the success of reconstruction and rehabilitation post-conflict, which having established the structural bodies outlined above, we are now able to begin considering. Unfortunately, much of this is qualitative, and does not lend itself well to discrete measurement, especially in the 95

PAGE 100

Rwandan context. Instead, we focus our consideration on how transitional justice positively influences the theoretical underpinnings which enable recovery and reconciliation. For positive economic expansion and activity to occur, the entire population must be able to participate in legitimate exchange such that they are free to choose goods, and that they have the means by which to offer other goods or services to attain them. The emphasis on establishing legitimate monetary-based economies implies that the means by which to acquire goods is not barter-based, and that the goods available to a given individual are representative of that individual's income. For this to occur, not only must a formal market exist which is governed by rules followed by all actors and equally enforced, but also opportunities within the state to earn income. These opportunities include access to education, access to non-farm occupations, ability to access credit and the ability to enter the labor market without formal discrimination and potential for promotion on the basis of merit. After the genocide, transitional justice was most immediately concerned with those victims of Hutu extremism, the Tutsi. Those who had been killed had their assets seized, as did those refugees who successfully evaded the violence and escaped into neighboring countries. The transitional government seized ownership of these assets immediately, and marked it as being for the facilitating of return to Rwanda. This was carried out mostly through government initiatives, and were part of targeted directives at displaced peoples at the end of the conflict. These directives included specialized health care, education, provision of basic goods and services, and job-training for re-integration. Most of these were financed by humanitarian groups, and were envisioned as short-term responses to the immediate asset erosion caused by conflict, and its resulting humanitarian consequences. Since these programs were enacted, they have interacted with judicial mechanisms via their evolution into reparations programmes. They are considered material, but possessing reparatory qualities to the degree that they address those who have been impoverished or stripped of their assets as a result of the actions of the genocidal regime. In addition to these programs, both genocide courts and gacaca hearings have ordered reparatory payments be made to Tutsi victims of the genocide by either the state, as a result of their seizure of the assets at the end of 1994, or by individuals, in the form of transferring either property or cattle. 96

PAGE 101

Establishing a rule of law is a process, rather than an immediate result. Once a state has addressed extreme violations of human rights, its judicial system must have the capacity to handle everyday interactions and disagreement. The degree to which it is able to handle disagreements over simple and complex contracts and its willingness to enforce laws objectively establishes the transparency which is to be expected within the new economy. It performs this function on a number of levels, both micro and macro, and its outcome is primarily a function of the second variable of transparency, or enforcement. To the extent that transitional justice is able to adequately identify those who have benefited economically from their actions during conflict, it should be willing and able to hold them accountable for the crimes and their profits from them. Prior to the 1994 conflict, transitional justice mechanisms concerned themselves almost exclusively to violent offenses, and failed to extend their investigations into all allegations of corruption, particularly of political elites who benefited from capturing land from refugees or casualties, and preference in awarding of contracts under the guise of privatization. Rwanda's post-conflict transitional justice mechanisms have gradually expanded their considerations towards property and asset transfer during the genocide. It is agreed on in relevant literature that much of the motivation and incentive for participation during the genocide was the potential for material benefits made available through violence. The houses of victims were looted, and most of their cattle or small livestock were killed and the meat distributed. This dimension of the genocide is especially interesting when considered alongside mounting food insecurity leading up to its outbreak. While these immediately realized benefits were consumed by the mass perpetrators of violence, those in positions of power received further benefit by assuming authority over the land to which victim's held title. Rwanda's location as a land-locked country with historically large population density makes property a valuable commodity, of which holdings had been realized in increasingly inequitable ways up to 1994 (NURC). The Rwandan state has complex issues at stake with respect to land which pre-date the mandate of the genocidal framework of transitional justice, having witnessed illegal seizure of property under each regime documented and prior to the arrival of colonizing European missions. Over time, land ownership has essentially replaced cattle holdings as indicative of the potential wealth of a family or individual. This has been fostered through the emphasis on creating export97

PAGE 102

crops like tea and coffee, and the movement away from pastoralism and subsistence agriculture, and was accelerated by the massive depletion of cattle stock post-genocide. It is estimated that 80% of the cattle in Rwanda were killed in 1994, for the primary reasons of consumption and inciting fear or intimidation. Considered prone to liquidity, this was expected as an outcome of both structural food insecurity from poor crop realization and sharp income fluctuations; however, the scale of this liquidity was certainly influenced by the genocidal practice of slaughtering cattle on land seized. Not only did these practices offer food sources, but they also depleted the capital stock of those killed as well as their families (Longman, 2004). By 2000, the transitional government found that the average head of cattle owned by families in Rwanda had almost completely returned to the pre-conflict level, somewhere around 0.6 heads per household (Longman, 2004). In spite of this apparent recovery, it has had limited macroeconomic effects or indicated neither a progression from poverty nor a complete restoration of economic activity. Traditionally, cattle in Rwanda have served both a productive asset role and one of social prestige. Cattle provide not only a food source or good to exchange, but also provide fertilizer for farming, and have been used in value exchanges such as bride prices or dowries. They have also been used as a means of payment of taxes, or as compensation. Scarcity of land in Rwanda has made accumulation of cattle relatively difficult, and an abundance is associated not only with successful farming, but also more ownership of land. The success of the Rwandan state in achieving recovery implies that their judiciary inspires confidence for capital flows within the country and between itself and other regional and international investors. National and local gacaca courts have addressed damages which perpetrators of crimes committed have acquired to the detriment of victims, and have bolstered investor confidence that their capital will be spent in an environment of accountability. This environment implies that losses, where they have been witnessed as the result of crimes, may be sought through reparation and restitution in free and fair judicial arenas. That this has been performed post-conflict, we observe it solely post-1994. We see success in post-conflict and increased capital movement both post-1994 and during the Habiriyama regime, but the later is more reflective of high aid levels. While these same aid levels have been present post-1994, their 98

PAGE 103

gradual shrinking has not provoked the same level of social upset, and thus non-indicative of a successfully recovered economy. Both in the ways in which it is initiated and in the course it takes, transitional justice enables the realization of both reconciliation and reconstruction through a number of ways. Post-1994, the extent to which justice mechanisms were employed and their decisions considered valid created an environment in which political, social and economic recovery may be successful. The following is a brief list of some of the ways this has occurred in Rwanda: reversing norms of impunity through assigning responsibility and punishment Following the genocide, thousands of accused perpetrators have been tried before free and fair judicial bodies, at the international, national and local level. These perpetrators have been focused on according to their position within the genocidal regime, effectively ending the impunity ethnic extremist had enjoyed prior to 1994. Beyond establishing guilt or innocence, these courts have also dictated the punishments which they consider appropriate for the crimes committed, which have included a spectrum of consequences from execution to material compensation. reparations-based program initiation to improve access to equitable public services where it has been damaged the most The transitional justice processes have been successful in identifying victimized populations, and has allowed incorporation of previously humanitarian financed programs to be refashioned to act as a form of material reparations. By hearing accounts of crimes during the genocide, the government has been able to tailor their programmes to some extent, to at least offer specialized health care or counseling and support in seeking means by which to generate monetary income. establishes accountability to independent judiciary of new political regime In Rwanda, the government continues to promote a transparent and accountable regime; however, this is debated elsewhere. Many critics of the new regime argue that transitional justice has limited its scope so as to shift impunity onto RPF-affiliated elites, who have not been held accountable for any crimes they may have committed as part of recapturing the capital at the end 99

PAGE 104

of 1994. Cases are not brought against these individuals, and they are also frequently cited as increasingly authoritarian and controlling. agrees on a national identity through truth and fact-finding Post-genocide Rwanda has successfully created a common national identity and narrative of the genocide, as well as previous periods of civil instability. There is a common citizenship, and ethnicity is seen as non-related to an individual's status before the state. Critics have argued that this narrative is not completely unproblematic, and tends to minimize damage done by RPF forces both in the 1990-1993 period and in 1994. These critics also argue that the truth and facts uncovered during transitional justice programs has been limited to the extent that not only do victims not feel safe coming forward, but they continue to distrust that they will taken seriously if they do bring claims. cements property rights and title for both returning displaced citizens as well as those who remained in the state during the genocide, or were stripped of assets during the counter-attack led by the RPF Property rights have been increasingly assigned following the genocide. This has been sponsored mostly by the state, but has been upheld by national and local judiciaries, who hear property cases and are mandated to order the transfer of its title. Land lost during the counterattack continues to be the most problematic as a result of the systematic failure to incorporate these seizures into genocide discourse. ordering compensatory damages for destruction of assets Judicial bodies are uniquely able to assign compensatory damages post-conflict. In Rwanda post-1994, this has been witnessed at both the national and local level, and with less determination on an international. Transitional justice operations have ordered the restitution of property and assets seized or lost as a result of conflict, and has expanded the recognition of beneficiaries of such assets to immediate family members including spouses, children and parents. They have also recognized psychological damage and the need to provide compensation in both material and non-material ways to facilitate reconciliation. The Rwandan government has been proactive in programmes launched with reparatory characteristics, and 100

PAGE 105

non-material reparations such as designating national holidays and memorials, but have been more reluctant to actually pay damages on a large scale in material amounts, even where it has been ordered by the court deciding. opening new lines of credit and income-generating opportunities to create more growth and alleviate poverty Much of the benefit in ordering restitution or reparation lies in the ability of such actions to open new lines of credit and means by which generate income. In Rwanda, restoring property titles has allowed for increased borrowing and financing of entrepreneurial ventures or investment into human capital, and reparations have further opened access to micro-credit and previously lost capital. consolidates new legal code of regime The judiciary makes decisions which actively work to consolidate the legal codes of the new regime. In Rwanda, the courts have sought diligently to pursue justice and reconciliation, and have attempted to establish conditions conducive to economic activity in that they are both transparent and all actors are equally accountable. This has not only facilitated domestic confidence in the economy, but also international confidence. As a result, increased flows of capital into the country and within the country have increased, and growth has remained positive in the aftermath of genocide. Conclusion of Case Study Our case study of Rwanda and further research into its historical conflict legacy offers important insight into the significance of aligning policy aims and reinforcing them through working transitional justice bodies. It is a clear demonstration of how efficient transitional justice is able to facilitate economic recovery and success, by restoring the minimum assumptions necessary for the positive and equitable growth, and thus sustainable peace. Of particular importance from this study may be the idea of proper sequencing, which would be more universal rather than context specific. By addressing the main agitators during conflict, the international community is able to positively alleviate stress on stability. Where it fails 101

PAGE 106

to act, it is seen to condone the exclusionary trends of the regime, or to find the marginalization of those victimized relatively unimportant. They may therefore be most effective in the short term following peace arrangements. However, international groups should also actively encourage the reconstruction of national judicial institutions, without imposing their own ideas and models upon the state. The ICTR will have lasted more than 15 years after the genocide if it meets its completion date this year, but the majority of cases involving the genocide have been overseen by national bodies, mandated by the Organic Law of 1996 and subsequent revisions. The national courts have been crucial in facilitating recovery and reconciliation, but would not have been particularly legitimate or effective had they been pursued immediately following the conflict, or if they had been forced to handle those accused which were instead heard before the ICTR. Gacaca and other local mechanisms have also proven invaluable. Where there is sufficient resources both monetarily and human, they should be enacted during the latter stages of transition to the new regime. Gacaca has been invaluable, and its approval rating by the greater majority of the national population is indicative of its perceptions of legitimacy and authority in the rule of law. Rwanda continues to lead among developing nations, and provides a plethora of resources for identifying policy decisions which may enable similar successes in other cases of civil conflict transition world-wide. 102

PAGE 107

Chapter 6: Concluding Remarks Economics enables social scientists to observe broad trends within a population, and to take discrete measurements of progress and development. Unfortunately, it's reluctance to engage with non-discrete, non-material data and information greatly limits its utility. If economics is able to adapt to more contemporary theories and postulated arguments, it should be able to greatly expand its repertoire. More responsive and useful economic insight could help better understand not only how an individual's standing and access to credit influence their decisions, but also the way they view themselves and their environment may be influential. This thesis has led to some general conclusions regarding identity construction and adoption, and has researched the role of inequality and exclusion in conflict onset, duration, typology and outcome. By better understanding the conditions under which transitional justice is expected to work, it should be much easier to make responsive, swift policy decisions. Transitional justice is crucial, in some form, to the success of peace. Accepting that it operates outside of a domestic vacuum, we are able to assert that international organizations and actors should be among the first to initiate judicial proceedings, although their current operation appears costly and drawn out. In the intermediate term, national governments must take up active judicial movements towards combatting impunity to insure sustainable peace. On some level, in the longer term, local and regional communities must also have working mediation organs before which to bring claims, and claimants should enjoy their rights not only to due process and impartiality, but also to compensation and reparation for damages. Through these reparatory transfers, groups which have been systematically excluded should be able to regain their footing, and begin positive development and movement away from poverty. The case study of Rwanda showed two periods with similar policy goals, but divergent results. In spite of the possible reasons other than judicial mechanisms, it is transitional justice which appears drastically different across periods. The difference in judicial workings is a large part of the successful outcome of the second period as opposed to the first, although we recognize the difficulties in asserting this outright. 103

PAGE 108

104

PAGE 109

Additional Notes from Chapter 5 Case Study 1. Gender Gender-based analysis of post-conflict transition have been given a wealth of information and progressive actions undertaken, particularly during the second period of consideration. Formally, the ICTR has recognized the use of sexual and gender-based violence as its own crime against humanity, war crime, or component of genocidal policy. Traditionally, women have been characterized as wives and mothers responsible for maintaing households and domestic activities. Bride-prices and dowries were exchanged in the form of cattle prior to the first civil conflict, paid as an indication of acceptance of marriage. Intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi remained prevalent and continues to remain so into the present. Ethnicity has been historically passed through paternal lineage, and thus even during periods of ethnic-conflict they had enjoyed non-combatant status prior to civil conflict and genocide. This status, as well as norms with respect to group membership, was altered over time leading up to 1994. The perception of groups of women as being a threat to control and dominance was also manipulated to aid in the realization of genocide. Tutsi women were routinely dehumanized and assigned negative traits, which were solidified most directly by the Hutu Ten Commandments,' which explicitly differentiated between the ethnic groups on an individual level. Ethnicity membership as Tutsi or Hutu was transferred towards maternal lineage, making Tutsi women carriers of group identity and inherited traits, as well as those learned from birth. By manipulating these ideas, genocidal leaders were able to inflate the perceived risk of Tutsi women, and furthermore those Hutu who sympathized with Tutsi. Eradicating Tutsi ethnicity from Rwandan society, the genocide actively advised the massacre of all women belonging to the group, and practiced forced pregnancy of identified moderates. These forced pregnancies and sexual assaults were most prevalent among those women who had been married or involved in some way with Tutsi men. Where Hutu were married to Tutsi women, they were pressured to engage in over-zealous action against other Tutsi, to demonstrate their dedication and solidarity to their ethnic group. At the conclusion of the genocide in 1994, gender norms and constructs in the Rwandan state were forced to undergo rapid changes. 1996 estimates published by Human Rights Watch 105

PAGE 110

estimated that more than half of all households in existence were now headed by women, who as a gender also made up around 70% of the post-genocide population. Human Rights Watch also disseminated data indicating that approximately 400 000 women were now widows as a result of the genocide. The United Nations collected data implying that as of the end of 1994, 70% of the survivors of rape or sexual assault were infected with HIV/AIDS, and during the five years following the second Arusha Peace Accords, at least 25% of rape survivors had died as a result of injuries or infections related to the attack. To capture the potential of women to contribute to transitions towards recovery and reconciliation, the Rwandan state has enacted various policies encouraging gender equity and participation in policy development and implementation. These policies have not only sought to alleviate the pressures on women, but have also reaffirmed certain ideas of social normality regarding the role of women through their characterization of female leaders active in 1994. The transitional government during the second period of transition, begun in late 1994 mandated representation from women on all levels of policy design, and made the appropriate legislation requiring the maintenance of specific quotas and participatory benchmarks. The state quickly reached their benchmarks, and have become a global leader in gender equity in political participation, with more women present in government proportional to total population than any other state. In 2007 Rwanda's Gender Equity Index score was 84, which had evolved at a rate of 18% since 2004. When ranked against other states, Rwanda scored in the top three countries with regard to observing gender equity. Post-conflict policies have also encouraged public discussion of gender issues, of special importance given the prevalence of sexual violence occurring during civil conflict. Many of these are important to other areas of reconstruction and rehabilitation, including education, health and access to clean water and sanitation. The New Times reported in their weekly Women's section that 18% of female students missed multiple days of school each month due to inability to afford sanitary products, and much higher percentages missed school due to a lack in hygienic resources or fear of social marginalization as a result of their menstrual cycle. Articles included how to engage in discussions among families about menstrual issues, and sensitization initiatives for teachers and other staff who were able to lead acceptance and information programs. There 106

PAGE 111

have also been movements to deflate the price of pads, which are the most common form of personal hygiene product used, which currently have an 18% tax imposed by the Rwandan state on their sale. Discussion has also been forced to occur with regard to gender-specific violence through the actions of transitional judicial bodies on all levels, most directly through the mandate of gacaca courts and their national proliferation as of 2005. These courts have faced intense criticism for marginalizing victims of sexual-based violence, and for recreating norms which existed prior to conflict which are detrimental to a wider realization of sustainable peace. Advocacy groups continue to pressure the national government to address these norms, which reinforce ides regarding domesticity and confinement to private spheres of activity rather than public, income-generating activities. The way transitional justice bodies on all levels have handled female perpetrators accused of being instrumental in carrying out the 1994 genocide have also contributed to reaffirmation of these gender norms. They have continually characterized these women as being contrary to the nature of females, and labelled them monsters' and abominations.' By failing to accept the ability of females to act with the same capacity for genocidal intent and violence as their male counterparts, these characterizations define normal female activity as being biased towards non-violent measures, and their actions as being subservient to the wishes of men in positions of power. Not only has this been accelerated by transitional justice, but cultural creations stemming from the conflict period have been reproduced internationally, and have continued to construct norms of male domination and patriarchy, even where some degree of gender equity may be recognized or captured by set indicators. 2. Status of non-Tutsi victims of Genocide In discussing the outcome of the second period of transition, our case study has largely avoided a significant critique of its implementation which continues to be vocalized presently by advocacy groups and organizations. The majority of post-conflict policies have adopted the general definition of genocide victim as being those of Tutsi-descent, and perpetrators as being those of Hutu-descent. Realistically, this fails to capture those moderate Hutu who were seen as deficient in their dedication to Hutu solidarity or prone to sympathize with Tutsi in their community. 107

PAGE 112

After the presidential plane was shot down over Kigali in April, the genocidal elites immediately began massacring moderates, carrying on from political assassinations which had been observed throughout the first period of transition. Once the capital had been secured, the groups which radiated into the rural areas of the country continued to view their goals of eradication as being tangent to eliminating any perceived sympathizers. In addition, there is considerable evidence which suggests that wealth-holders or those with significant personal assets were targeted specifically, and the looting of their property undertaken immediately following the killing of its owners. Individuals who were found to be harboring any Tutsi, whether considered family through marriage or other communal tie, were equally likely to be punished with homicidal violence regardless of their ethnic affiliation. There are also allegations, which have mostly been declared illegitimate, that there was a counter-genocide experienced with the advancement of the RPF troops from Uganda. The transitional and post-conflict regimes have been dominated by former combatants affiliated with the RPF, and have not witnessed large-scale claims brought against them through judicial bodies. Collection of census and survey data have strengthened the notion that these allegations are relatively unfounded, and disproportionately exaggerated by those seeking to incite violence and instability during the transition, especially those groups active between 1994 and 1999 out of the Democratic Republic of Congo and French controlled safe zones.' The Commission for National Unity and Reconciliation have expanded the conceptualization of genocide victim-perpetrator identities for incorporation into secondary education and igando camps. They acknowledge the killings of moderate Hutu and those seen as sympathetic to Tutsi, however there have been no significant advancements towards judicial recognition or reparation comparable to those achieved by Tutsi victims. FARG attempted to redefine victims as survivors, and being made up of not only those who were victimized directly but those who were forced to flee or witnessed asset erosion as a result of the conflict; however this policy is heavily critiqued as minimizing the experience of genocide victims and addressing poverty rather than post-conflict legacy. 3. Return of refugees and nationals raised abroad 108

PAGE 113

Rwanda has been successful in addressing inter-generational issues which have arisen during its periods of post-conflict. Land has been created for cultivation and settlement through policies of deforestation and reclaiming of deserted property, although scarcity of available property continues to be problematic for development and poverty reduction. It should be noted that the realization of successful transition has been forced to deal with diasporas who have returned but were raised abroad in other states or as refugees displaced during the 1959 Hutu Social Revolution and 1973 Coup D'Etat, as well as those displaced between 1990 and 1993, or during the genocide in 1994. The facilitation of successful return was guaranteed primarily through the influence of the RPF, who were led by members of the above mentioned diasporas, who were able to achieve higher education and military training in other states during times of displacement and refugee flight. 4. Regional Instability and External Incidents of Civil Conflict During the course of both periods of post conflict transformation examined in this chapter, there were also episodes of civil conflict and episodic violence observed in external, sovereign states. These episodes of conflict both contributed to and witnessed the consequences of transition within Rwanda, and have experienced success and failure in undertaking their own reconstruction and rehabilitation policies. Incidences include instability in Uganda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Tanzania. There have also been instances of conflict beyond bordering states on the African continent, including those still underway in the Sudan, the ending of apartheid in South Africa and other incidents of civil and inter-state violence. 109

PAGE 114

References National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, 2002. Afitto, F. M. "Victimization, Survival and the Impunity of Forced Exile: A Case Study from the Rwandan Genocide." Crime, Law and Social Change 34, (2000) : pp. 77--97. Akresh, R. and D. de Walque. "Armed Conict and Schooling: Evidence from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide." Working Paper 4606. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank (2008). Annan, K.A. The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conict and Post-conict Societies New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, (2004). Annan, K.A. In Larger Freedom New York: United Nations Department of Public Information (2005) Arraiza, J. and M. Moratti. "Getting the Property Questions Right: Legal Policy Dilemmas in Post-Conict Property Restitution in Kosovo (1999-2009)." International Journal of Refugee Law 21, no. 3 (2009): pp. 421-452. Badgett, M. V. L. and N. Folbre. "Assigning care: Gender Norms and Economic outcomes." In Women, Gender and Work: What is Equality and How Do We Get There ., ed. M. F. Lout. Geneva: International Labor Organization (2001): pp. 327-346 Bagshaw, S. "Property Restitution and the Development of a Normative Framework for the Internally Displaced." Refugee Survey Quarterly 19, no.3 (2000): pp. 209-23. Baldwin, C. Five Essential Elements for a Long Term Solution in Kosovo London: Minority Rights Group International (2007) Baldwin, C., C. Chapman, and Z. Gray. Minority rights: The Key to Conflict Prevention London: Minority Rights Group International, (2007). Ballentine, K. and H. Nitzschke. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Policy Lessons form Studies in the Political Economy of Armed Conflict. New York: International Peace Academy, (2003). Ballentine, K. and H. Nitzschke. The Political Economy of Civil War and Transformation Berghof: Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 110

PAGE 115

Bangwanubusa, T. "Understanding the Polarization of Responses to Genocidal Violence in Rwanda." phd. diss, Gothenburg University School of Global Peace Studies and Development Research (2009). Barrow, K. "The role of NGOs in the establishment of the International Criminal Court." Dialogue 2, no. 1 (2004): pp. 11-22 Barsh, R.L. "Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and Purpose." Human Rights Quarterly 15, no. 1 (1993): pp. 87-121. Bar-Tal, D. "From Intractable Conict through Conict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis." Political Pyschology 21, no.2 (2000): pp. 351-365. Ball, N. "Demobilizing and Reintegrating soldiers: Lessons from Africa." in Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance ed. by Krishna Kumar. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers (1997) Barkan, E. "Genocides of Indigenous Peoples: Rhetoric of Human Rights." in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective. edited by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. New York: Cambridge University Press (2003): pp. 117-140 Bertovitch, J. and G. Schneider. "Who Mediates? The Political Economy of International Conflict Management." Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 2 (2000): pp. 145-165 Bhavnani, R. and D. Miodownik. "Ethnic Polarization, Ethnic Salience, and Civil War." Journal of Conict Resolution 53 (2009) : pp. 30. Blau, F. D., M.A. Ferber, and E. Winkler, eds. The economics of women, men and work 5th ed. New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall (2006). Borris, E.R. The Healing Power of Forgiveness Occassional Paper no 10. Arlington, VA: Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (2003) Boyce, J.K., and M. Pastor Jr. "Macroeconomic Policy and Peace Building in El Salvador." In Rebuilding Societies After Civil War edited by Krishna Kumar. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc (1997): pp. 287-314 111

PAGE 116

Brand, U. "Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a Hegemonic Discourse of International Politics." Review of International Political Economy 12, no.1 (2005): pp. 155-176 Brauer J. and W.G. Gissy, eds. Economics of Conflict and Peace Brookeld: Avebury (1997). Brooks, R.E. "Failed State or State as Failure?" The University of Chicago Law Review 72, no. 4 (2005): pp. 1159-1196 Brown, M. E. "Ethnic and Internal Conicts: Causes and Implications." In Turbulent Peace ., eds. C. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aal. Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace (2001). Brun, M. and Ferber, M. A. Determinants of women's status in society: An exploration Boston, MA. (2009) Chen, S., Loayza, N. and Reynal-Querol, M. "The Aftermath of Civil War" The World Bank Economic Review 22, no. 1 (2008): pp. 63-85 Cohen, H. G. "Can International Law Work? A Constructivist Expansion." Berekeley Journal of International Law 27, no. 2 (2009): pp. 636--673. Colletta, N., and M. L. Cullen. Violent conict and the transformation of social capital. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank (2000). Collier, P. and Hoefer, A. Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conict Societies. Working Paper 2902. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, (2002). Collier, P and A. Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 56, no.4 (2004): pp. 563-595 Collier, P., A. Hoefer, and N. Sambanis. "The Collier-Hoefer Model of Civil War Onset and the Case Study Project Research Design." In Understanding civil war: Volume 1 Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ The World Bank (2005). Collier, P. V. L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoefer, M. Reynal-Querol, and N.Sambanis, eds. Breaking the Conict Trap. World Bank Policy Research Report. Washington, DC: Oxford University Press (2003). 112

PAGE 117

Collier, P., and Gunning, J.W. "Sacrificing the Future: Intertemporal Strategies and their Implications for Growth" (2007) Colonomos, A. and A. Armstrong. German reparations to the Jews after world war II: A turning point in the history of reparations. Cooper, N. "Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conict Economies and the Implications for Policy." Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 (2005): pp. 463-78. Cunningham, D. E., K. S. Gleditsch, and I. Salehyan. "It takes two: A dyadic analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome." Journal of Conict Resolution 53, (2009): pp. 570. Cunningham, D. E. 2006. "Veto players and civil war duration." American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 4 (2006): pp. 875-892 de Grieff, P. ed. The handbook of reparations. Oxford University Press (2006). de Greiff, P. DDR and reparations: Establishing links between peace and justice instruments. Berlin: International Center for Transitional Justice, (2009). de Greiff, P. "Contributing to peace and justice" Paper presented at FriEnt Working Group on Development and Peace: Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Nuremberg (2007). Deininger, K. and Olinto, P. Asset distribution, inequality, and growth. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 2000 Deng, L.A. "The Challenges of Post-Conflict Economic Recovery and Reconstruction in the Sudan" Paper presented at the Woodrow Wilson Centre, Washington D.C. Sept. 4 (2004) Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis. An Inventory of Postconict Peace-building Activities New York: United Nations, (1996). Dertwinkel, T. Economic exclusion of ethnic minorities: On the importance of concept specication. Flensburg: European Center for Minority Issues, (2008): pp. 19. Dobbin, R. "Cultural Models of Organization: The Social Construction of Rational Organizing Principles." In The Sociology of Culture: Emerging Theoretical Perspectives ., ed. D. Crane, Wiley-Blackwell (1994): pp. 117-141 113

PAGE 118

Easterly, W. Can institutions resolve ethnic conict? Working Paper 2482 Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, (2000). Eide, E. B., A. T. Kaspersen, R. Kent, and K. von Hippel. Report on integrated missions: Practical perspectives and recommendations. New York: United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs, (2005) Elster, J. "Social Norms and Economic Theory." Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (1989): pp. 99--117. Fairbanks, M. Economic development in post conict society: A cluster-focused development plan. Feiner, S. F. and Roberts, B. B. "Hidden by the invisible hand: Neoclassical economic theory and the textbook treatment of race and gender." Gender and Society 4, no. 2 (1990): pp. 159--181. Finnemore, M. The purpose of intervention Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press (2004). Fitzpatrick, D. "Land Policy in Post-conict CIrcumstances: Some lessons from East Timor." The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (2001) Flores, T.E. "Democracy Under the Gun: Understanding Post Conflict Economic Recovery" Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no.1 (2009) Friedman, E. "A Dual Challenge for the Year of Equal Opportunities for All: Roms in the Western Balkans." Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 6, no. 1 (2007). Grohmann, M. Theory and practice of reconciliation in rwanda. Working Paper 6 Germany: Bayreuth African Studies (2009). Gurr, T. R. "Minorities and Nationalists: Managing Ethnopolitical Conict in the new Century." In Turbulent peace ., eds. C. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aal. Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace (2001): pp. Hogg, N. "Women's Participation in the Rwandan Genocide: Mothers or Monsters?" International Review of the Red Cross 92 (2010): pp.877 114

PAGE 119

Howard, M. "The Causes of War." In Turbulent peace ., eds. C. Crocker, F. O. Hampson and P. Aal. Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace (2001). Huggins, C. "Linking Broad Constellations of Ideas." In Transitional justice and development: Making connections ., eds. P. de Grieff, R. Duthie. New York: Social Sciences Research Council (2009): pp. 333-374 Humphreys, M. "International intervention, justice and national reconciliation: The role of the ICTY and ICTR in bosnia and rwanda." Journal of Human Rights 2, no. 4 (2003): pp. 495--505. Humphreys, M. Economics and Violent Conflict Boston: Harvard University, (2003) Ingelaere, B. "Changing lenses and contextualizing the rwandan (post-)genocide." L'Afrique Des Grands Lacs Annuaire (2006): pp. 389--414. Jones, A. "Gender and genocide in rwanda." Journal of Genocide Research 4, no. 1: pp. 65-94. Justino, P., and J. Litcheld. Economic exclusion and discrimination: The experience of minorities and indigenous peoples. London: Minority Rights Group International, (2003) Kang, S, and J. Meernik. "Determinants of post-conict economic assistance." Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 2 (2004): pp. 149-166. Ki-Moon, B. Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, (2009) Kennes, E. "The Democratic Republic of Congo: Structures of Greed, Networks of Need" in Rethinking the Economics of Wa r ed. by Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman. Maryland: John Hopkins University Press (2005): pp. 140-177 Langford, T. Things fall apart: State failure and the politics of intervention. International Studies Review 1, no. 1 (1999): pp.59-79 Laplante, L.J. and K. Theidon. Truth with consequences: Justice and reparations in post-truth commission Peru Human Rights Quarterly 29, (2007) : pp.. 228-250. Lennox, C. Minority and indigenous peoples' rights in the millennium development goals. London: Minority Rights Group International, (2003). 115

PAGE 120

Levmore, S. Changes, anticipations, and reparations. Columbia Law Review 99, no. 7 (1999): pp.1657-1700. Lewis, M. and Lockheed, M. Social exclusion and the gender gap in education. Working Paper 4562 Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, (2008) Linz, J.J. and Stepan, A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, (1996) Longman, T. Placing genocide in context: Research priorities for the rwandan genocide. Journal of Genocide Research 6, no. 1 (2004): pp. 29-45. Looney, R. Bean counting in baghdad: Debt, reparations, reconstruction and resources. Middle East Review of International Affairs 7, no. 3 (2003) Melson, R. Modern genocide in rwanda: Ideology, revolution, war, and mass murder in an african state. In The specter of genocide: Mass murder in historical perspective ., ed. Gellately, R. and Kieran, B.. New York: Cambridge University Press (2003): pp. 325-338 Minnow, M. Between Vengeance and Forgiveness Boston, MA: Beacon Press (1998) Moratti, M. and A. Sabic-El-Rayess. Transitional justice and DDR: The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina International Center for Transitional Justice, (2009) Morrison, R. J. Gulf war reparations: Iraq, OPEC, and the transfer problem. American Journal of Economics and Sociology 51, no.4 (1992.): pp..385-99. Murphy, S.D. Contemporary practice of the United States relating to international law. The American Journal of International Law 93, no. 3 (1999): pp.628-667. Nafziger, E.W. and Auvinen, J. Economic development, inequality, war, and state violence. World Development 30, no. 2 (2002): pp.153-163 Nantulya, P. Evaluation and impact assessment of the national unity and reconciliation commission. Kigali: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, (2005). 116

PAGE 121

National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. The Causes of Violence After the 1994 Genocide. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, (2008). National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. Social Cohesion in Rwanda: An Opinion Survey (Results 2005-2007). Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, (2008) National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. The Rwandan Conflict: Origin, Development, Exit Strategies. Kigali: Republic of Rwanda, (2002). Nelson, J.A. "Labor, Gender and the Economic Divide" in Women Gender and Work: What is Equality and How do we Get There? ed. by M.F. Loutfi. Geneva: International Labor Organization, (2001): pp. 369-384 Ofce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Rule-of-law tools for post conict states. New York: United Nations, (2008) stby, G. Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent conict. Journal of Peace Research 45, (2008): pp. 143. stby, G. "Horizontal Inequalities and Civil War: Do Ethnic Group Inequalities Influence the risk of Domestic Armed Conflict?" paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Quebec (2009) stby, G. Horizontal inequalities, political environment and civil conict: Evidence from 55 developing countries 1986-2003. Working Paper 4193. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, (2007) Power, S. "A Problem From Hell" America and the Age of Genocide New York: Basic Books (2002) Ravallion, M., E. Thorbecke, and L. Pritchett.Competing concepts of inequality in the globalization debate [with comments and discussion]. Brookings Trade Forum (2004): pp.1-38 Regan, P.M. "Choosing to intervene: Outside intervention in internal conflict" The Journal of Politics 60, no. 3 (1998): pp. 754-779 Roembouts, H. Gender and reparations in rwanda: Executive summary. New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, 117

PAGE 122

Roht-Arriaza, N., and K. Orvlovsky. A complementary relationship. In Transitional justice and development: Making connections ., eds. P. de Grieff, R. Duthie. New York: Social Sciences Research Council (2009): pp.171-213 Rosga, A. and M.L. Satterthwaite. The trust in indicators: Measuring human rights. Berekeley Journal of International Law 27, no. 2 (2009): pp.253-315. Rousseau, D. and A. Maurits van der Veen. The emergence of a shared identity: An agent-based computer simulation of idea diffusion. Journal of Conict Resolution 49, (2005) : pp.686. Salehyan, I. and Gleditsch, K.S. Refugees and the Spread of Civil War Schneider, F. and D.H. Enste. Shadow economies: Size, causes, and consequences. Journal of Economic Literature 38, no.1 (2000): pp.77-114. Seckinelgin, H. Global social policy and international organizations: Linking social exclusion to durable inequality. Global Social Policy 9, (2009) Semelin, J. "Analysis of a mass crime: Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia 1991-1999" in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective ed. by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. New York: Cambridge University Press (2003): pp.353-372) Sen, A. K. From income inequality to economic inequality. Southern Economic Journal 64, no. 2 (1997): pp.384-401. Sen, A.K. The political economy of targeting in Theory and Method, (1995) :pp.11-24 Sen, A.K. Rational fools: A critique of the behavioral foundations of economic theory. Philosophy and Public Affairs 6, no.4 (1977): pp. 317-344. Shaw, R. Rethinking truth and reconciliation commissions: Lessons from sierra leone. Washington D.C.: United States International Peace Academy (2005). Shelton, D. Righting wrongs: Reparations in the articles on state responsibility. The American Journal of International Law 96, no.4 (2002): pp. 833-856. Srinivasan, S. Minority rights, early warning and conict prevention: Lessons from Darfur. London: Minority Rights Group International, (2006) 118

PAGE 123

Stewart, F. Policies towards horizontal inequalities in post-conict reconstruction. Paper no. 149. Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (2006) Stewart, F., G. Brown, and A. Langer. Inequalities, conict and economic recovery. United Nations Development Programme, Stillwaggon, E. Race, sex, and the neglected risks for women and girls in sub-saharan Africa. Feminist Economics 14, no.4 (2008): pp. 67-86. Sugden, R. Review: Welfare, resources, and capabilities: A review of inequality reexamined by amartya sen. Journal of Economic Literature 31, no.4 (1993): pp. 1947--1962 The Failed States Index. Newsweek (2005): pp.56-65 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Post-conict reconstruction: The role of the World Bank Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, (1998) The teaching of history of Rwanda: A participatory approach Kigali: National Curriculum Development Center, (2006). Torpey, J. 2001. "Making whole what has been smashed": Reections on reparations. The Journal of Modern History 73, no.2 (2001): pp. 333-358. Tschirgi, N. Post-conict peacebuilding revisited: Achievements, limitations, challenges. Paper presented at WSP/IPA Peacebuilding Forum, New York (2004). Verpoorten, M. Household coping in warand peacetime: Cattle sales in Rwanda, 19912001. Journal of Development Economics 88, no.1 (2009): pp. 67-86. Verwimp, P. Testing the double-genocide thesis for central and southern Rwanda. Journal of Conict Resolution 47, (2003) : pp. 423. Waldorf, L. Transitional justice and DDR: The case of Rwanda. New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, (2009) Walker, G. The payment of reparations. Economica 32, (1931): pp. 213-236. 119

PAGE 124

Weitz, E.D. "The Modernity of Genocides: War, Race, and Revolution in the Twentieth Century" in The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective ed. by Robert Gellately and Ben Kiernan. New York: Cambridge University Press (2003): pp. 53-74 Wheatley, J. The economic status of national minorities in europe: A four-case study. Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 6, no.1 (2007). Wodon, Q. T. "Between Group Inequality and Targeted Transfers." The Review of Income and Wealth 45, no. 1 (1999): pp. 21-54 Woods, N. The Globalizers. New York: Cornell University Press (2006). Woodward, S. L. Economic priorities for peace implementation. New York: International Peace Academy, (2002). Zuckerman, E. and M. Greenberg. The gender dimensions of post-conict reconstruction: An analytical framework for policymakers. Gender and Development 12, no. 3 (2004): pp. 70-82 120


ERROR LOADING HTML FROM SOURCE (http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu//design/skins/UFDC/html/footer_item.html)