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ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AND HABITUAL RECYCLING BEHAVIOR BY CHRISTOPHER E. CARR A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Charlene Callahan Sarasota, Florida May, 2010
ii Table of Contents TABLE OF CONTENTS ii LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES iii ABSTRACT iv INTRODUCTION 1 ATTITUDES AND COGNITIVE CONSISTENCY 4 DISSONANCE REVISITED 7 MEASURES OF IMPLICIT ATTITUDES 9 RELATING ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 13 THE PRESENT STUDY 15 METHOD 16 RESULTS 17 DISCUSSION 18 REFERENCES 22 TABLES 27 FIGURES 29 APPENDICES Appendix A 31 Appendix B 32
iii List of Tables and Figures TABLE 1: Categorical and Focal Stimuli Used in BIAT TABLE 2: Attitude Measure Scores as a Function of Gender FIGURE 1: Schematic Description and Illustration of the IAT FIGURE 2: Test Sequences for the IAT and BIAT
iv ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AND HABITUAL RECYCLING BEHAVIOR C hri stopher E. Carr New College of Florida, 2010 Abstract Although behavior can be consciously controlled, m ost of the activities in which people engage on a daily basis are executed outside of conscious awareness and become habitual as the behaviors ar e repeated. However, the attitudes individuals associate with the se activities can be (1) formed though various sources (e.g., past behaviors, affective information), (2) can exist with contradictory attitudes formed using different sources, (3) may be ( but are not necessarily) accessed each time the behaviors are performed and (4) are changed only when the need for change exists Additionally, self reported attitudes, which require deliberate evaluation, have been found to differ from implicit attitude s, which measures implicit associations with a stimulus, and may also exist with contradictory attitudes derived from the other source The present study sought to determine whether individual s attitudes toward the natural environment are related to the degree to which they habitually recycle. It was hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between attitudes toward the natural environment and habitual recycling behaviors. Participants completed a 28 item questionnaire that assessed self reported attitudes toward the natural environment and habitual recycling behaviors. In addition, participants completed a response latency task designed to infer implicit preferences for natural or built environments. Implicit attitudes were not signific antly
v related to self reported attitudes or habitual recycling behaviors. There was a positive relationship between self reported attitudes toward the natural environment and habitual recycling behaviors These results suggest that a relationship may exi st connection with nature and his or her unconscious, environmentally friendly behaviors. Dr. Charlene Callahan Division of Social Sciences
1 Imagine that you have just moved into a new house across the country and have just finished se ttling in. The next morning, you wake up early, make coffee, eat breakfast, take out the recycling and head off to work. As the week progresses and you completely awake to do all of the things that you need to do before you leave for work. In fact, you soon find yourself going through these motions without even thinking about them; eventually finding yourself in front of your house with a large blue bin. So what happen choices but by mental processes that are put into motion by features of the environment and 1999). This process of becoming less and less attentive to external stimuli can be explained in part by a dual process theory of human behavior One of the earliest dual proce ss theories, t he elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) was developed to describe attitude formation and change. According to the ELM, m ental processes exist on a continuum ranging from high elaboration to low elaboration. The two att itudinal processing routes of this model are (1) the central route, which are processes that require a great deal of thought, and (2) the peripheral route, which do es not involve evaluation but relies primarily on cues from the environment. The moderate e laboration route employs a mixture of both central and peripheral route processes. In general, dual processing theories make a distinction between processes that are unconscious, automatic, and rapid, and those that are conscious, deliberative, and slow
2 ( Evans, 2008). As a routine behavior is continuously repeated (e.g. recycling aluminum cans), it requires fewer mental resources, leaving the processes involved to become less nal capacity (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). As these behaviors increase in automaticity they become what has been labeled as habitual. Aarts, Verplanken and van Knippenberg (1998) define habits as goal directed automatic behaviors that are mentally represen ted and result in actions that are automatically activated by environmental cues. The authors assert that habits have three major characteristics: (1) a goal must be achieved; (2) the behaviors are repeated w hen the outcome is satisfactory; and (3) the ha bitual responses are mediated by mental processes. The source of a habitual response is thought to be a cognitive structure in which something is learned, stored in and retrieved from memory Consequently, within similar context s individuals will perfor m a behavior using environmental cues rather than conscious ones. Returning to the morning recycling example, the automatic goal directed behavior ( i.e., recycling) was most likely a result of some external cue (e.g. Tuesday). Additionally, the sat isfactory outcome of recycling (i.e., ridding the household of the accumulated recyclables ) helps to ensure that the behavior will be repeated. In an effort to measure the strength of habitual behaviors Verplanken and Orbell (2003) developed a self report habit index (SRHI). The scale is designed to examine the history of repetition of behavior, lack of awareness, perceived efficacy, the reported difficulty of controlling behavior and an identity component (i.e. how habits are used to help ) In other words, the SRHI is a measure designed to assess the degree to which our behaviors are executed automatically as well
3 as variables associated with habitual behaviors In the first of four studies, which asked partic ipants about their use of bicycles for transportation, high test retest validity was established The next study asked participants to quickly choose among five different modes of transportation (i.e., bicycle, bus, cab, car, or walking) after given a tra vel distance and compared it to an SRHI about using the bus Habit strength was calculated as the number of times participants chose to take the bus A strong correlation between response frequency and scores on the SRHI attested to the convergent validi ty of the measure. Participants in the third study were asked to indicate the frequency with which they engage in 26 various behaviors Three behaviors that varied in the frequency with w hich individuals engage in them were chosen and presented in the fo rm of an SRHI. The measure was again substantially correlated with behavioral frequency, differentiated between behaviors that were thought to have different habit strength, and increased as a function of the level behavioral frequency. The final study a ssigned participants to either between varying levels of habit strength. Daily habits were found to have greater levels of habit strength than weekly habits, s uggesting that the SRHI is able to differentiate between daily and weekly habits. Based on these studies, this measure appears to be a reliable and valid tool for measuring habit strength. Of course, the existence of habit s alone does not fully explain r epeated behavior s Steg and Vlek (2009) sugges t that environmental behaviors are influenced by contextual and motivational factors as well as their habitual characteristics Contextual factors can facilitate or constrain environmental behavior as well as influence individual motivations. For example, a raging hurricane would most likely prevent an individual from going to
4 the closest recycling facility despite the habitualness of the behavior. Although this weather phenomenon might prevent the activity from occurring it would not be likely to impact the habitualness of that behavior in a significant way In addition, motivational factors also may impact environmental behavior. These factors include weighing the benefits and consequences of a behavior, comparing the behavior to moral values and affective response to the goal of the behavior being performed. In other words, about a behavior influence its likelihood of occurring T herefore, in order to further explore environmental behaviors, the relationship between attitudes and behavior needs to be reviewed Attitudes and Cognitive Consistency Historically the attitude affectiv e evaluation of a stimulus (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Fishbein, 1967; Zanna & Rempel, 1988 ). As with other social cognitions, they are considered to be cognitive representations used by individuals to guide social interactions (Pratkanis & Greenwald 1989) a nd can be triggered without accessing the specific cognitions which formed them (Zanna & Rempel, 1988). However, these assumptions are controversial and have been the subject of study and debate for many years in social psychology Early in the history o f attitude research, Fritz Heider (1946) introduced the idea of a balanced state of being to describe the relationships among congruent and disparate attitudes His balance theory assumed that individuals prefer balanced states of interpersonal relationsh ips. This model, known as the pox model, is used to relate a focal individual ( p ), an object, issue, or person ( o ), and another object or individual ( x ). These relationships are coded as either positive or negative and are then multiplied such that a
5 pos itive overall relationship is considered balanced and a negative overall relationship is considered unbalanced. I n describing the potential for attitude change, Heider asserted that i ncreased pressure or tension resulting from an unbalanced state is likel y to elicit change s in sentiment aimed at restoring balance. The idea of a balanced state was echoed in congruity theory which increased congruity with the e According to congruity theory, t he evaluation of a person or object can be p ositive, negative, or neutral. In addition, varying attitudes can exist without any experienced incongruity or pressure for attitude change a s long as no association is made between them. Polar attitudes (positive or negative) can be seen as congruent if both are positive or negative, but as incongruent if one is positive and one is negative. However, when one of the objects being evaluated e licits a neutral attitude and the other elicits a polarized attitude, pressure to change an attitude mounts and generally leads to the neu t ral attitude to be changed in the direction of the associated polarized attitude. Two years later, Festinger (1957) expanded on this idea and introduced the concept of cognitive dissonance, which he described as an everyday experience that occurs when the relations among cognitions are in conflict. The theory is based on the assumptions that (1) humans are sensitive to inconsistencies among their actions and beliefs, and (2) the recognition of these inconsistencies elicits dissonance, which (3) is aversive, and (4) can be resolved by changing the beliefs, actions, or perceptions of actions within an indi vidual. For example, if an environmentalist who believes that recycling is vital to the protection of the natural environment chooses to
6 throw an aluminum can in the trash, the conflicting attitude and behavior arouse dissonance. According to the theory, t his dissonance can be alleviated by reducing the degree to which the person cares about the environment, recycling the can in the first place, or by comin g to a conclusion in which recycling and environmental protection are unrelated Interestingly, Kat z (1960) also suggested that attitudes can only be changed if a need for change exists Expanding on the notions of balance, congruity, and dissonance Zanna and Rempel (1988) claimed that attitudes are actually derived from three sources: cognitive info rmation, affective information, and information from past behavioral experiences. Attitudes, t hey argued can be formed and changed using these sources However, these attitudes do not have to be consistent with one another since an attitude can be acces sed without having to consult the specific beliefs that were used to form it. For example, an environmentalist can believe that recycling is an environmentally friendly activity nt (cognitive information). Though, when questioned about his or her attitudes toward the environment, attitudinally congruent information will be recalled more quickly. Following Festinger (1957), they also claim ed that dissonance is aroused when i ncons istent attitudes and/or behaviors exist and that dissonance can be reduced by eliminating those inconsistencies. These attitude models share several assumptions: (1) there are several ways in which attitudes can be formed and changed, (2) conflicting atti tudes (and/or behaviors) may co exist, but (3) can (and should) be aligned in order to reduce the dissonance these conflicts elicit.
7 Dissonance Revisited In addition to being caused by conflicting attitudes and behaviors, researchers have proposed that di ssonance is also aroused when self reported and implicit attitudes are in conflict ( Rydell, McConnell, & Mackie, 2008 ) Self reported attitudes are more cognitively controlled and are formed using a rule based system relying on logic and symbolic represen tations at a higher order level of cognitive processing (McConnell, Rydell, Strain, & Mackie, 2008; Rudman, 2004), and can be thought of as more or less deliberate and controlled. In other words, self conscious a nd presumed thoughtful evaluation of a stimulus. Implicit attitudes, on the other hand, are rooted in automatic emotional reactions to stimuli and rely on an associative system which operates based on similarity and contiguity. Consequently, implicit att itudes can be thought of as more automatic and less controlled In other words a stimulus. Returning to the dual processing theories, the formation of self reported att itudes should require relatively more conscious thought, while the formation of implicit attitudes relies more heavily on environmental cues. Although social psychologists have been attracted to the idea of implicit attitudes til the late 1980s and early 1990s that new measures from social cognition research were introduced which gave them access to that was not reached by self Based on findings that particip ants are able to report their positive and negative evaluations of subliminal stimuli Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) introduced a sequential evaluative priming paradigm to measure the effects of priming on the
8 evaluation of a target. Parti cipants in their experiment were exposed to a prime stimulus followed by an unrelated target stimulus, and were then asked to evaluate the valence of the target. Participants in this study were able to classify target objects paired with primes of a simil ar valence more easily than those with primes of a different valence. These results indicate that the stimuli presented were automatically evaluated and had an impact on subsequent evaluations of related and unrelated stimuli. In other words, unconscious processes appear to aid in the evaluation of various stimuli and formation of attitudes. Similar to the predictions of the congruity/balance/dissonance models, it is assumed that as the gap between self reported attitudes and implicit attitudes grows, th e degree of dissonance experienced also increases In a series of two experiments, Rydell et al. (2008) provided participants with information about Bob over a series of 50 trials. Prior to seeing the image of Bob, participants were primed with either a positive or negative word of which they were not consciously aware thereby inducing either a positive or negative attitude Behavioral information was presented and participants were asked to decide whether or not the information was characteristic of Bo b. For 25 trials the information had a positive valence and for 25 trials it had a negative valence. Explicit from 1 (very unlikeable) to 9 (very likeable), five add itional questions assessed how participants rated Bob on the dimensions of good, pleasant, agreeable, caring and kind. Implicit attitudes were assessed by having participants rate a picture of a Chinese character as either more or less pleasant than the average Chinese character, after being primed with either a picture of Bob on one half of the trials or of an unknown individual
9 on the remaining half. Finally, dissonance was calculated by having participants rate how uncomfortable, uneasy, and bothered they were after having the attitude induced. elf reported attitudes were found to reflect the valence of the behavioral information while implicit attitudes reflected the val ence of the subliminal prime. The v alence inconsistent primes and behaviors increased reported implicit dissonance. Participants also evidenced greater dissonance in response to the self reported/ implicit attitude discrepancies when they were unable to self affirm. As dissonance increased greater information proc essing of attitude objects was induced. These results suggest that the increase in information processing may be an effort to reduce dissonance. Measures of Implicit Attitudes According to the dissonance models, the most effective way for individuals to reduce their experience of dissonance is for them to change either their attitudes or behaviors ( Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946; Katz, 1960; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955 ) The recent recognition that there are important distinctions between explicit (self rep orted) and implicit attitudes raised the question: Is dissonance reduction differentially impacted by changes in explicit and implicit attitudes? A new wave of research aimed at assessing implicit social cognitions (Greenwald et al., 2002) inspired in pa rt by the weaknesses in self report measures, has produced a new attitude measurement paradigm The self report measures used in attitude research have been found to be dependent on complete the measure accurat ely, both of which are often compromised This has resulted in a reduction in the predictive ability of self reported attitudes. That is, measures of attitudes and behaviors are often weakly
10 correlated. In their attempts to address the lack of validity of self report based attitude measures, researchers contend that they are able to tap into a cognitive domain previously unexplored in attitude research using indirect measures ( Greenwald et al., 2002 ) It should be noted that the validity of these new st rategies for assessing attitudes also has been called into question by researchers who have found that measures of implicit attitudes similarly may be susceptible to motivational error and therefore may not accurately predict behavior (Blanton et al 2009 ). Thus, individual attitudes can either be measured using direct measures, such as self reports, or indirect measures, the most prevalent of which is one that relies on response latency task s Responses to direct attitude measures are assumed to reflect the deliberate evaluation of an attitude object, while indirect measures infer that an evaluation takes place at a less deliberate level of cognitive processing (Ranga nath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). However, it should be noted that direct measu res are not always used to assess self reported attitudes Certain s elf reports, for example, may be used to assess implicit attitudes by administering them in such a way that the participant does not have an adequate amount of time to deliberate his or h er feelings about the attitude object Perhaps the most studied implicit measure is Greenwald, McGhee and mplicit attitudes are inferred by the differences in the time it takes him or h er to respond to various stimuli. For example, s ubjects seated at a computer are asked to visually monitor the screen and are then presented with concepts (e.g., natural vs. built environments) and attributes (e.g., self vs. other). Concepts are presente d in the first block and attribute s are presented in
11 the second block. The third block of trials maps a concept and attribute to one key and the other concept and attribute to the other. For example, participants may be asked to ds that belong to a prescribed set of concepts and attributes (e.g., self AND words that belong in another set (e.g., other AND built). The differences in response latencies among responses to the various attributes are then used to cr eate a measure of the indiv (implicit) preferences. Block 4 presents the concepts from block 1 a second time but with the concepts associated with the opp osite keys, while b lock 5 presents the concepts and attitudes from block 3, again m apped on to the opposite keys. Figure 1 shows an example of an IAT sequence. Sriram and Greenwald (2009) recently introduced a shortened version of the IAT called the Brief Implicit Association Test (BIAT) that uses two blocks of stimuli presentations in original five blocks (see Figure 2) In addition, the task focuses on just two of the four categories in each four category test block. Both concepts are presented over both trials, while only the attributes presented are self or posit ive. The results of a series of four experiments demonstrated strong internal reliability within those BIATs that had self or good as the focal category as well as a significant correlation between IAT and BIAT scores. The three main assumptions about i mplicit attitudes is that they (1) are able to assess unconscious representations of the attitude object, (2) reflect much more stable and well rooted representations of the attitude object and (3) are much less susceptible to the effects of social desira bility. However, recently Gawronski, LeBel, and Peters (2007) cautioned that assumptions about what implicit measures are actually measuring should be made with care. Low correlations between implicit measures and self reports are
12 often inferred as evide nce at titudes have been assessed at a nonconscious level. Ho wever, Gawronski (2002) reported that after correcting for measurement error and conceptual correspondence (what the scale is actually measuring) the correlation between the two meas ures become s quite substantial. Gawronski used two IATs designed to assess prejudice toward Turkish people and Asian people as well as an as cited in Gawronski, 2002 ) Blatant Prejudice Scale for each race. The convergent and di scriminant validity of the IAT was demonstrated by substantial correlations between each race IAT and its Blatant Prejudice Scale counterpart. The conceptual correspondence between the IAT and self report was maximized by targeting prejudiced attitudes to ward one ethnic group at a time. The assumption that indirect measures of attitudes reflect much more stable and well rooted representations of the attitude object may be countered by evidence that indirect measures are also highly sensitive to momentary differences in context (Gawronski et al., 2007) Some of these contextual factors include the relative salience of the social categories, anticipated social roles, food deprivation and mood states. Moreover, both conscious and non conscious priming has a lso been shown to play a substantial role in performance on indirect measures ( Gawronski et al., 2007; Rydell et al., 2008). Finally, t he assumption that social desirability does not influence implicit measures of attitudes also seems to be controversial Several studies have indicated that mental imagery or deliberate retrieval of information from memory can influence the scores obtained by these measures, suggesting that indirect measures are not immune to deliberate attempts to control responses. For example, Blair, Ma, and Lenton (2001)
13 asked participants in their study to imagine a stereotypical woman, a counter stereotypical woman, or a gender neutral topic. They then completed an indirect measure of gender stereotyping. The results showed a subst antial reduction in implicitly measured gender stereotyping in the counter stereotypical woman condition, suggesting that priming plays a significant role in the validity of implicit measures. Relating Attitudes and Behavior res, and Prestwich (2007) found that the power of an implicit measure of attitude to predict behavior was moderated by the habitualness of the behavior. Over a series of two experiments using sweet consumption as the attitude object participants complete d two measures of implicit attitudes (IAT and EAST), asked to maintain a food diary for one week and then completed the Self Reported Habit Index (SRHI) and need for cognition (NFC) after the week had passed. I mplicit and self report measures were not cor related nor were the implicit measures correlated However, the SRHI was found to moderate the relationship between the EAST and behavior such that increased habitualness of a behavior enhances the measures ability to predict behavior. In addition, NFC moderated the relationship between the self report measure of attitude and behavior such that increased thinking gives the measure greater power to predict behavior Recent studies have employed these measures to assess environmental attitudes and behavio rs among individuals. Schultz, Shriver, Tabanico and Khazian (2004) used ure and the built environment i n order to test the degree to which these implicit prefer ences wer e associated with self reported environmental values and behaviors The
14 environmental motives scale (as cited in Schultz et al., 2004) was used to measure egoistic values (focused on self, and self oriented goals), altruistic values (focus on other people ) and biospheric values (focus on the well being of living things). Using the IAT and self reports, they found that the IAT and both egoistic and biospheric values correlated with their implicit preferences for either natural or built environments, sugges ting that the IAT is measuring, at least in part, the degree to which individuals prefer one environment over the other. However, the results also indicated that no relationship existed between the IAT and pro environmental behaviors. Additionally, pro e nvironmental behaviors were in fact positively related to the new environmental paradigm (NEP) and the inclusion of nature in self (INS) self report measures. Mayer and Frantz (2004) developed a connectedness to nature scale (CNS) to measure an individual studies, the CNS has shown to have internal reliability and validity. The scale has also been shown to significantly relate to other environmental scales such as the NEP and the INS m easures attitudes. The CNS was shown to be marginally (but not significantly) related to an envi ronmental adaptation of the IAT. T he scale ego istic and biospheric values as well as his or her ecological behavior Ojala (2008) used a survey to measure recycling behaviors, the distance to the nearest recycling facility, attitudes towards recycling and emotions towards recycling. Interestingly, t hey also found through a second qualitative study that those reluctant to recycle still viewed recycling as beneficial for the environment as well as a civic duty. Based on these results it seems that environmental attitudes are more strongly related to
15 t he act of recycling than attitudes towards recycling itself; a notion supported by Mosler, behaviors are more strongly influenced by affective asp ects of attitude as oppose d to conscious rational arguments environmental consequences suggests that recycling behaviors do not generalize to all recyclable materials and that the assumed environmental conse quences only have some impact on recycling behaviors. This study used structural equation modeling (SEM) to describe recycling behaviors, experienced social norms, personal norms and assumed consequences based on data collected using a mail survey. Altho ugh there was some impact of environmental consequences on recycling behaviors, the relationship is weak; suggesting that a less controlled process is playing a stronger role in the execution of the behaviors. The Present Study The present study is design ed to explore a possible relationship between habitual enviro nment. The first hypothesis is that there will be no relationship between implicit and self reported attitudes s ince t hese measures are thought to access differen t processing systems (McConnell et al., 2008; Ranganath et al., 2008, Rudman, 2004), and are not well correlated ( Conner et al., 2007 ; Gawronski et al., 2007 ). Although they both appear to make use of an u nconscious processing system, t he second hypothesis is that there will be no relationship between implicit attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors This is because i mplicit measures have been shown to be context dependent (Gawronski
16 et al., 2007) susc eptible to priming effects (Blair et al., 2001; Rydell et al., 2008), and are generally not good predictors of behavior (Blanton et al., 2009; Mayer & Frantz, 2004; Schultz et al., 2004). The final hypothesis is that there will be a positive relationship between self reported attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors. Self reported attitudes toward the environment and the number of ecological behaviors performed have been shown to be positively related to each other (Mayer & Frantz, 2004; Schultz et al., 2004). Therefore, the goal of this study is to determine whether a relationship exists between the degree to which people recycle habitually and their attitudes (implicit and self reported) toward the natural environment Method Participants Fifty colle ge students (20 men and 30 women) were recruited by the researcher in various settings and asked to complete a survey about environmental concerns among college students. There was no compensation for participation. Materials A 28 item questionnaire was used to measure both explicit environmental attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors. Environmental attitudes were measured using the connectedness to nature scale (CNS; Mayer & Frantz, 2004 ; see Appendix A ), while habitual recycling behaviors were meas ured using the self report habit index (SRHI; Verplanken & Orbell, 2003 ; see Appendix B ). Both measures consisted of likert scale questions ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and were scored by averaging the responses to the question s in each section.
17 Implicit attitudes were measured using a modified version of th e BIA T (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), which included the stimuli used by Schultz et al. (2004 ; see Table 1 ). The BIATs were administered using Inquisit Version 220.127.116.11 (2009) to present the instructions and stimuli as well as record data ; which were scored at a later time using 003) revised scoring algorithm. Procedure Participants were approached by the researcher in a number of different conte xts and asked to complete a survey and a quick task (BIAT) about environmental concerns among college students. Both the survey and BIAT were administered on a laptop computer such that half of the participants took the BIAT first and the other half took the survey first. They were given as much time to complete the session as necessary and were assured that their responses will remain anonymous. After completing the measures and a demographic questionnaire participants were debriefed, thanked and dism issed. Results It was hypothesized that (1) there would be no relationship between implicit attitudes and self reported attitudes, (2) no relationship between implicit attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors, and (3) a positive relationship between sel f reported attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors. Three Pearson c orrelations were calculated to examine these relationships As expected, t here was no significant relationship between implicit attitudes and self reported attitudes, r (48) = .12 p = .40 1 In addition, no significant relationship was found between implicit attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors, r (48) = .0 9, p = .54 0 However, a significant ly positive relationship was
18 found between self reported attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors, r (48) = .34 p = .015 Scores on these measures did not vary as a function of gender (see Table 2). Several t tests were performed to determine whether order effects occurred. The responses of participants who completed the implicit measur es followed by the self report measures were compared with those who completed them in the reverse order No order effect was found between the two conditions for both the CNS, t (48) = 0.76, p = .450, and the SRHI, t (48) = 0.49, p = .628. However, t he an alysis revealed that those who completed the self report measures first ( M = 0.38 SD = 0.60 ) demonstrated significantly greater preferences for the natural environment than those who completed the BIAT first ( M = 0.21 SD = 0.46 ), t (48) = 3.93, p < .001 Discussion Participants who reported more positive attitudes toward the natural environment were more likely to exhibit increased habitual recycling behaviors. However, there was ycling behaviors I mplicit and self reported attitudes were not correlated These results provide support for each of the three hypotheses that were tested Based on the findings that implicit and self reported attitudes seem to access different process ing systems (McConnell et al., 2008; Ranganath et al., 2008, Rudman, 2004), and are not well correlated (Conner et al., 2007; Gawronski et al., 2007), t he first hypothesis posited that there would be no relationship between these attitudes. This hypothesi s was confirmed by the lack of a significant correlation betw een the BIAT and CNS measures. Interestingly, when testing the scale, Mayer and Frantz (2004) found
19 only a marginally significant relationship between their adaptatio n of the IAT and CNS, sugges ting that the scales may be measuring the same construct but were being af fected by some third variable. The lack of an observable relationship between implicit and self where no significant relationship between implicit and self reported attitudes towards sweets was found. However, their results indicated that self reported attitudes became more strongly related to behavior under conditions where the behavior is more con trolled (well thought out), but that implicit attitudes were better at predicting behavior when a behavior was more habitual. It was further hypothesized that implicit attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors would not be related since implicit measure s have been shown to be context dependent (Gawronski et al., 2007), susceptible to priming effects (Blair et al., 2001; Rydell et al., 2008), and are generally not good predictors of behavior (Blanton et al., 2009; Mayer & Frantz, 2004; Schultz et al., 200 4) Based on the lack of significant correlation between the BIAT and SRHI this hypothesis also was supported These findings are mirrored by S chultz et al. (2004) inability to find a significant relationship between pro environmental behaviors and im plicit environmental attitudes, as measured by an environmental adap tation of the IAT. Additional support for this finding can be found in report counterparts, susceptible to mot ivational error and are poor predictors of behavior. However, self reported attitudes toward the environment and the number of ecological behaviors performed have been shown to be positively related to each other (Mayer & Frantz, 2004; Schultz et al., 200 4). Therefore, a third hypothesis predicted that
20 there would be a positive relationship between self reported attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors. This hypothesis was supported by the positive correlation be tween the CNS and SRHI measures These results are in line with other studies that used similar scales. While testing their new measure, Mayer and Frantz (2004) also found a positive relationship between behavior and self reported attitudes using the CNS. This finding was replicated by Schult between pro environmental behaviors and self reported attitudes. Previous research has suggested that the reasons people choose to recycle are generally based on affective information, as opposed to r ati onal bases (Bratt, 1999; Mosler et al.; 2008; Ojala, 2008). This finding would suggest that a relationship between implicit attitudes and habitual recycling behaviors should exist. However, Ranganath et al. (2008) warned that the type of measure (dire ct or indirect) should not be confused with they type of attitude (self reported or implicit. Therefore, i t is possible that the CNS was able to tap more unconscious associations than the BIAT also played a role in this study. Since it is elicited when conflicting attitudes and/or behaviors exist (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1946; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955 ; Zanna & Rempel, 1988 ) the existence of dissonance would explain, in part, the lack of rela tionship between implicit attitudes, self reported attitudes, and behaviors. Future research may want to report and implicit attitudes, and habitual behaviors. One of the maj or confounds in this study was the emergence of an order effect on the scores of the BIAT. Participants completing the self report measures first were found
21 to have significantly higher implicit attitudes toward the natural environment than those who took it first. One explanation for this order effect was hinted at in Blair (2001) finding that being exposed to a counter stereotypical woman before taking an implicit gender stereotyping measure caused their participants to make less stereotypical associations. Therefore it seems that priming participants in this study appears to have significantly altered their performance on the implicit measure. This priming effect was cted the valence of a subliminal prime. Similarly, Gawronski et al. (2007) warned that these implicit measures exhibit high context sensitivity measures Since the participants in the present study exhibited s ignificantly more favorable implicit attitudes toward the environment after taking the explicit measure, it is possible that priming moderated these results. Future research should incorporate other implicit and/or self report measures in an effort to red uce or eliminate order effects when attempting to measure attitudes. The findings of this study suggest that a positive relationship exists between the attitudes individuals claim to have toward the natural environment and their unconscious efforts to rec ycle
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27 Table 1 Categorical and Focal Stimuli Used in BIAT Natural Built Self Other Animals Building I It Birds Car Me Other Plants Ci ty Mine Their Whales Factory Myself Them Trees Street Self They
28 Table 2 Attitude Measure Scores as a Function of Gender Male Female Scale M SD M SD t p CNS 3.54 0.34 3.50 0.37 0.39 .696 SRHI 3.14 0.70 3.56 0.91 7.75 .090 BIAT 0.001 0.552 0.138 0.643 0.78 .440
29 Figure 1 Greenwald, D. E. McGhee, and J L. K. Schwartz, 1998, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 21 (6), p. 1465. Copyright 1998 by the American Psychological Association.
30 Figure 2 Test sequences for the IAT and BIAT.
31 Appendix A Connectedness to Nature Scale Items 1. I often feel a sense of oneness with the natural world around me. 2. I think of the natural world as a community to which I belong. 3. I recognize and appreciate the intelligence of other living organisms. 4. I often feel disconnected from nature. 5. When I think of my life, I imag ine myself to be part of a larger cyclical process of living. 6. I often feel a kinship with animals and plants. 7. I feel as though I belong to the Earth as equally as it belongs to me. 8. I have a deep understanding of how my actions affect the natural world. 9. I o ften feel part of the web of life. 10. 11. Like a tree can be part of a forest, I feel embedded within the broader natural world. 12. When I think of my place on Earth, I consider myself to be a top member of a hierarchy that exists in nature. 13. I often feel like I am only a small part of the natural world around me, and that I am no more important than the grass on the ground or the birds in the trees. 14. My personal welfare is independ ent of the welfare of the natural world.
32 Appendix B Self Report Habit Index Scale Items Please select the degree to which you agree with the following statements about: Recycling 1. I do frequently 2. I do automatically 3. I do without having to consciously rememb er 4. 5. I do without thinking 6. Would require effort not to do 7. Belongs to my weekly routine 8. 9. I would find hard not to do 10. I have no need to think about doing 11. 12. I have bee n doing for a long time.