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Assessing the European Security and Defence Policy: Motivations and Operational Efficacy in European Military Cooperation BY AMBAR VELAZQUEZ RIVERA A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree in Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Barbara Hicks Sarasota, Florida April, 2009
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS While it would have been nice to say I e ndured the thesis ye ar with grace and good humor, the truth is I found myself struggl ing academically this year more than any other time in my life. My succe ss, therefore, belongs to those who patiently endured my obnoxiously long absences, laughed with me even when I felt like crying, persistently pushed me to be better and work harder, s upported me in times of financial ineptitude, and never lost faith in my ability to complete a project of this magnitude. My thanks goes above all to God, w ithout whose reassuring presence and constant love I would never have made it th rough my four years at New College, much less this thesis. To Professor Barbara Hicks, I owe my d eepest and sincerest gratitude, for pushing me through the final stages of the thesis proc ess, never giving up on me, and for instilling in me the fear I needed to get this thesis done. It was an honor to be under her tutelage these four years, and an even greater privilege to be her thes is student. I doubt I will find anyone dedicated so completely to the success of their students ever again. Her invaluable input and constructive criticism made this thesis wh at it is. She is the part of New College I will miss most, and I am a better student (and hopefully person) for having been under her instruction. To my family: my parents, for always be ing there for me, even as I disappeared for weeks at a time, and for always loving me despite my numerous and oddly consistent failures this year; and to my brothers, Ivan and Michael, for being a welcome distraction, a good laugh, and a gruffly affectionate duo. I love you completely and will likely spend the rest of my days unsuccessfully trying to repay the countless favors you have done for me. To my friends, I owe more hugs and tha nk yous than will ever suffice: Serena Jones, for being the best friend a downtrodden thesis student could ever have hoped to have, and with whom I shared more laughs and venting sessions than were probably acceptable for a thesis year; Lensa Kwadjo and Emily Goldenberg, for being there when it counted and trading innocuous insults when necessary; Diana Ward, a great roommate and an even better friend, who patiently endured w eeks of dirty dishes without complaint; Ashley Sharko, for being a constant friend ev en as I disappeared completely; and to Monica and Anita Tambay, for being amazing the way only Cubindians can be (which is pretty incredible). I love all of you and to you I dedicate this thesisalthough not officially since this isnt the dedication page. ii
CONTENTS Acknowledgments..............................................................ii List of Contents.....iii List of Figures and Tablesiv List of Abbreviations.....................................................................v Abstract..vi Introduction....................................................................................................................1 Chapter 1 Literature Review: Conceptualizing the ESDP.. Chapter 2 Tracing the Historical Evolutio n of European Security and Defense Chapter 3 Operationalizing the ESDP: In stitutions, Mechanisms, and Missions..56 Chapter 4 Executing the ESDP: Case Studies of EU Military Operations......70 Chapter 5 Conclusion ........................................................................................127 Bibliography...................................................................131 iii
List of Figures and Tables Table 3.1 Ongoing and Completed Civili an and Military ESDP Missions.......59 Figure 3.2 Formal ESDP Structures.......64 Table 4.1 Summary: Factors Influential in Determining EU Military Engagement or Inaction..............74 Table 4.2 Evaluating Effectiveness of ESDP Military Missions.118 iv
List of Acronyms AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan AU African Union CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy Coreper Committee of Permanent Representatives CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability DG RELEX Directorate-General, External Relations ECJ European Court of Justice EDA European Defence Agency EDC European Defence Community EP European Parliament EPC European Political Cooperation ESDP European Security and Defence Policy ESS European Security Strategy EU European Union EUFOR European Forces EUMC EU Military Committee EUMS EU Military Staff EUSR EU Special Representative GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council HR CFSP High Representative for the CFSP ICISS International Commission on Inte rvention and State Sovereignty IFOR Implementation Force IGO International Governmental Organization MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization PSC Political and Security Committee R2P Responsibility to Protect SFOR Stabilization Force SitCen Situation Center TCE Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (also European Constitution) TEU Treaty on European Union (also Maastricht Treaty) UN United Nations UNDPKO United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations WEU Western European Union WG Working Group v
vi ASSESSING THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY: MOTIVATIONS AND OPERATIONAL EFFI CACY IN EUROPEAN MILITARY COOPERATION Ambar Velazquez Rivera New College of Florida, 2009 ABSTRACT With momentum on economic integration subs iding, the EU has endeavored since 1999 to foster a distinctly European military capability to be used toward autonomous Union action in crisis management operations. Howeve r, the broad mandate set for the ESDP in the European Security Strategy has left ma ny ambiguities as to the EUs role in international crisis management. Two central questions are importa nt for understanding the ESDP as an institution and its role in the wider international security framework. First, what factors influence whether the EU accepts or declines an opportunity to launch a military operation? And, second, is the ESDP capable of meeting the established mandate and goals of a military operation? This study reveals that three factors are pivotal in influencing the EUs decision to in tervene: salient member state interests; UN, NATO, or AU involvement; and the nature of the conflict in question. Gauging mission efficacy reveals a striking disjuncture betw een problems with internal mission coherence and external operational success. Although the ESDP adds value to the international security framework, particularly in speci alized small-force operations, the ESDPs tenuous legitimacy makes the EU hesitant to undertake risky or uncertain operations. Dr. Barbara Hicks Division of Social Sciences
Introduction In 2004, five years into his tenure as High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP), Javier Solana remarked on the paradox of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): [O]f all the prerogatives of states, security and defence policy is probably the one which le ast lends itself to a collective European approach; however, after the single currency, it is in this dimension that the Union has made the most rapid and spectacular progress over the last five years.1 Launched in 1999, the ESDP by then comprised a complex institutional framework whose keystone was the European Security Strategy. In spit e of the many misgivings and myriad false starts, the European Union (EU) is comm itted to the process of European military cooperation, not for European security or de fense per se, but for the projection of the EUs normative power. With momentum on eco nomic integration subsiding, the EU is striving to develop a foreign policy voice and a distinctly European military capability, the latter in order to be able to autonom ously undertake crisis management operations. The Union has asserted its desire to intercede in all crises with transnational security implications: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, state failure, and organized crime. Despite the grand aims the EU has for th e ESDP and the progress of the past ten years, the EU cannot (nor is it willing to) invo lve itself militarily in ev ery crisis. In recent years, the ESDPs expansive scope has been the object of critic ism. The European Security Strategy at once provides the flexibilit y required for the EU to engage in salient 1 1 Javier Solana, Preface, in EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) edited by Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institu te for Security Studies, 2004): 5.
international crises, while cultivating incertitude as to the EUs role or purpose in crisis management vis--vis other international secu rity organizations. With an ample purview and many crises requiring intervention, the EU is frequently accuse d of cherry-picking the crises in which it interven es, and so is denounced for onl y interceding if an operation furthers a broader EU agenda. A simplistic dichotomy often characterize s the discussion of the ESDP vis--vis other international security structures, namely the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Whereas the former institutions identify a crisis and then assemble forces and capabilities accordingly, the EU is faulted fo r selecting missions solely on the basis of procurable capabilities.2 The EUs military actions ar e portrayed as dependent on the means an operation would require rather than the gravity of the cris is in question, thereby propagating an image of the ESDP as a self -serving, opportunistic security institution. Reinforcing this pessimistic perception of th e ESDP is the rather contradictory tendency of certain EU member states to undertake militar y operations outside of the EU umbrella. Thus, an examination of the rationale spurring the EU to launch military missions in certain instances and not ot hers is critical. Several ques tions are not simply important to understanding the ESDP as an institution, but are also fundamental in establishing the role of the ESDP in the wider international security framework. What factors influence whether the EU accepts or declines an opport unity to launch a military operation? Are some factors more decisive in influencing th e EUs final verdict on a crisis management operation? Just as importantly, once the Counc il of the EU decides to launch a military 2 2 Michael Ryan, Defense Advisor (USEU), interv iew by the author, Brussels, BE, January 14,
operation and the mandate and objectives have been set, how effectively are mission goals met? Although the catalyzing factors in launching an ESDP operation may be magnanimous, motives are insufficient in explaining the ESDPs added value to the international community. Is the ESDP capable of meeting the established mandate and goals of a military operation? Despite EU rhetoric on the value of an autonomous European military capability, what do the operations the EU launches tell us about the EUs foreign policy and aims? Does the ESDP add to international security, or does it just duplicate structures already present in the UN and NATO? To answer these questions, a small-N qualitative case study approach is utilized. Two positive cases, instances in which the EU did intervene militarily, are contrasted against two negative cases, situations in which the EU might have engaged militarily but declined. Eight indicators are used to discer n the motivations driving the EU to mobilize the ESDP in each case. These indicators f it broadly into three categories: internal concerns, the external milieu, and crisis-sp ecific considerations. Another six indicators help to examine the internal and external efficacy of the ESDP missions conducted. Although a survey of all European military op erations conducted to date might provide an expansive perspective on the strategy underlying the ESDP, it would overlook many of the intricacies motivating the EU to action and a more detailed perspective of the trajectory of ESDP operations. Chapter 1 appraises the theoretical li terature on the conduc t of international relations, ranging from an overview of the foundational discourse on world politics to theory concerning the role a nd nature of international s ecurity alliances, along with 3 2009.
discussion on how European military cooperation is conceptualized. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive look at the historical roots of European military cooperation, beginning with the failed attempt to form the European Defence Community of the 1950s through to the present-day ESDP. Chapter 3 considers the st ructures and institutions constituting the ESDP, tying in the historical past to the present-day status of European military cooperation. Chapter 4, the heart of the thesis, investigates the motivations propelling the EU to engage militarily in crises through four case studies and gauges the efficacy of two ESDP military missions. The study finds that the EU is motivated to engage in a crisis militarily based in large part on three factors: salient me mber state interest s; UN, NATO, or AU involvement; and the nature of the conflict in question. Of these factors, the most prominent one, without a doubt, is the role of member state interests. Furthermore, the study ascertains that the logic of European military cooperation is inverted in the process of ESDP mission selection. Wh ere military cooperation was motivated by external considerations, the rationale of decision making on ESDP missions is founded on the interests of key member states, for largely financial reasons. Furthermore, gauging mission efficacy in the two positive cases reveals recurring issues of internal efficacy that seem to contradict the reality of external efficacy (success). The two foremost problems, institutional coherence and coordination, are rooted in the unwieldy and inefficient ESDP structures established through the treaties, making problems difficult to address. Ad hoc, on-the-ground solutions have become customary ways of handling problems. For now, the ESDPs nascence lends it little credibility or legitimacy in the international realm, necessitating a cautious strategy by 4
the EU. Only missions expected to succeed are chosen, and only if major EU member states feel committed. Unless and until the ESDP gains a measure of enduring credibility, the EU is unlikely to undertake risky or ambitious military operations. Although the military ESDP does add value to the internat ional security framework, particularly in specialized small-force operations, for now at least, that output remains largely in the realm of potential. 5
Chapter 1 Literature Review: Conceptualizing the ESDP High Representative Javier Solanas quote at the beginning of the Introduction conveys that the progress on the European S ecurity and Defence Policy in the past ten years is a paradox, something that according to the theoretical literature on international relations should not exist but does. The purpor tedly paradoxical nature of the ESDP has sometimes led some observers to assert that the ESDP heralds a new era in international relations. For such commentators, the ESDP illustrates the impending obsolescence of the conventional sovereign state, evidenced in that European nation-states appear to be relinquishing some of their secu rity prerogatives for the inte grationist European project. This perspective grossly overstates the reality of the ESDP. Nonetheless, it would be useful to examine how the theoretical literature on international relations explicates the existence of the EU. Foundational International Relations Theories For years, international relations scholars have argued that the birth of the modern state system occurred with the passage of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which established sovereignty as the primary or dering principle in the international arena.3 Although reality rarely reflects th e ideal, the state apparatus th eoretically retains complete discretion, or sovereign authority, over all affairs within its territories. Furthermore, the 6 3 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 5th ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 3.
international system lacks an entity above the level of the nation-state, a supranational or world government, to regulate interstate interactions. The implication is that the primary orderi ng principle of the in ternational system actually produces a state of anarchy, wherein states are left to fend for themselves in a self-help context.4 In this self-help system, nation-stat es must rely on their own resources to advance their goals, as they are unable to depend on a supranational authority to safeguard their respective interests. Therefore, states retain soverei gn authority over their domestic affairs, but remain vulnerable to interference, invasion, or attack by fellow members of the international system. The noti ons of anarchy and stat e sovereignty retain a primacy in international relations discourse generall y unchallenged and accepted as given. Neorealism, the Neoliberal Challe nge, and Constructivist Fram eworks Since the end of the Second World War, the predominant paradigmatic debate within international re lations has been that of realism versus liberalism. Although realism predates liberalism, and despite the significan tly dissimilar discussions about the nature of interstate interaction each theory engenders, both theories nonetheless begin with similar points of departure. Nonetheless, both theoretical lines of i nquiry are faulted with being insufficient in explicating the proce sses of European integration and military cooperation. Classical realism provides the foundation for much of neorealist discourse, and is typically represented in the writings of Hans J. Morg enthau, who posited the six 4 Ibid. 7
principles of political realism.5 Morgenthau argued for the conceptualization of the system of states in terms of the pursuit power, asserting that power is the foremost preoccupation of states.6 Therefore, for realists in ge neral, the tension between state sovereignty and state vulnerability in the anarchical international system begets the perennial security problem that primarily shapes interstate interaction. States, vulnerable to predation by fello w nation-states, are essentially compelled to focus their efforts toward the acquisition of power, even if it must be at the expense of other states welfare.7 However, classical realism was eventually found to be insufficient for its tendency to be too fuzzy, too slippery, t oo resistant to consistent operational formulation.8 Although classical realism was able to explicate the nature of the international system, it failed to achieve the theoretical sophistication necessary to predict or further refine its own constructs. Developed in order to ad dress classical realisms shortcomings, neorealism (or structural realism) emerged with comparatively increased theoretical potency and clarity. Neorealists still believe that secu rity and power maximization are the chief concerns in the anarchic international system.9 Unlike classical realism, however, neorealism acknowledges that states may have second-order concerns that do not necessarily revolve around power accumulati on. For neorealists, in terstate cooperation through institutions to address these secondorder concerns is possible. Even so, the 8 5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Six Principles of Political Realism, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues 7th ed., ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Longman, 2004), 7. 6 Ibid., 8. 7 Ibid., 9. 8 Richard Ashley, The Poverty of Neorealism, International Organization 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 230-2. 9 Adrian Hyde-Price, Normative Power Europe: A Realist Critique, Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 2 (March 2006): 222.
security problem is ultimately decisive in predicting state behavior. Neorealism considers institutions and alliances temporary arrangem ents that may be dissolved without notice. Neoliberal institutionalism developed as a reaction to both classical and structural realism. According to neoliberal theory, inst itutions are not just c onvenient but pivotal to the functioning of the international system. Stat es are able to mitigate the intensity of the security problem through the creation of in ternational institutions, both formal and informal. Furthermore, these institutions are not necessarily temporary arrangements.10 As Robert Keohane asserts, Institutions create the capability for states to cooperate in mutually beneficial ways by reducing the costs of making and enforc ing agreementsThey rarely engage in centralized enforcement of agreements, but they do reinforce practices of reciprocityEven powerful states have an interest, most of the time, in following the rules of well-established international institutions, since general conformity to rules makes the behavior of other states more predictable.11 Through involvement in international instituti ons, a certain amount of order is introduced into an unpredictable and anarchic intern ational system. Whereas neorealists treat institutions as finite arrange ments, neoliberals posit that involvement in institutions encourages the development of new patterns of interstate interaction over time. Although some institutions may be more effective or durable than others at promoting peace and cooperation, states become accustomed to p eaceful coexistence. Ev entually, barring the occasional aggressor, institutional mediation ceases to be taboo and becomes the preferred mode of interaction.12 Constructivist models challenge the foundations of neoreal ism and neoliberal institutionalism. Constructivist scholarsh ip aims to emphasize the importance of 9 10 Robert Keohane, International Institutions, in International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues 7th ed., ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Longman, 2004), 119. 11 Ibid., 121. 12 Ibid., 124.
international norms and culture on interstate behavior, and the need to account for actors other than states and inters tate organizations in the international system. Alexander Wendt represents such a position, positing a theory on the three cultures of anarchy which accounts for system change neorealist and neoliberal discourse do not.13 As Wendt theorizes, At some point, one of the aforementioned roles [enemy, rival, and friend] will come to dominate the system, giving rise to a particular culture of anarchy. Once that culture is in place, state behaviors and identities seem fair ly predictable and regularized.14 This regularity creates the impression that the international system is the result of a deterministic notion of anarc hy. Wendt postulates that [i]nnovation may give rise to a new role that may diffuse over ti me and after reaching a tipping point, a new culture may be produced, thus providi ng a mechanism for understanding system change.15 However, constructivist scholarship does not constitute a theory per se on international relations, but is instead provides a framework through which other theories can be better understood. The Neorealist/Neoliberal Paradigm and ESDP Neorealism and neoliberal institutio nalism account for the existence of international institutions to some extent, but do not suffice to explain European military cooperation. Both theories examine the r easons sovereign states choose to become involved in international institutions. For ne orealists, states will get involved only if it will increase their relative gains vis--vis othe r states. For neoliberals, institutions can be durable, as states need only possess the will for them to thrive, a condition generally 13 Cameron Thies, Are Two Theories Better Than One? A Constructivist Model of the Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate, International Political Science Review 25, no. 2 (April 2004): 161. 14 Ibid. 10
satisfied as long as states perceive they are deriving benefits from these institutions.16 Even so, the approaches of these th eories are severely lacking. Although neoliberalism can, through various processes, explain the reasons why disparate state interests become integrated, it cannot explai n how this process becomes catalyzed or propagates itself.17 For its part, neorealist scholarship refuses to even acknowledge the use of the words state integration within its discourse. The concept is dismissed as unattainable and absurd. For ne orealists, integration involve s far more than interstate cooperation in international in stitutions and denotes the su rrender of sovereignty to a supranational entity or other states. Therefor e, the concept is unattainable within the anarchic international system. Extensive c ooperation would only occur on the issues a state would stand to gain most relatively, and even then, such an arrangement would be highly vulnerable to collapse. Interestingly, one author offers a varia tion on the typical rea list explanation for EU military intervention. According to this acco unt, realists can be categorized as either maximal or minimal. Minimal realists see no gain in intervening in an impoverished country of little value, such as Congo. The EU, however, is a maximal realist and could likely intervene in a third state, but only if this increased the EUs international prestige, leadership, and power.18 Although innovative, this pe rspective remains a minority opinion within realist discourse on ESDP. Another academic develops a surprisingly useful explanation on how it is possible 11 15 Ibid. 16 Mowle, Thomas. Worldviews in Foreign Policy: Realism, Liberalism, and External Conflict. Political Psychology 24, no. 3 (September 2003): 568. 17 Ibid. 18 Catherine Gegout, Causes and Consequences of the EUs Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation, European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 3
to reconcile European military cooperation with the tenets of neorealism. As he states, the development of the ESDP is a function of systemic changes in the structural distribution of powerIn this context, the EU is used by its member states as a collective instrument for shaping its external milieu by a combination of hard and soft power.19 The author, however, concedes the limits of this pers pective, acknowledging that a complete understanding of European forei gn policy necessitates an examination of decision-making, interest articulatio n, as well as systemic factors.20 Thus, the author concedes that even with a dded theoretical soph istication, structural realism remains insufficient in completely explicating Eur opean military cooperation. Therefore, taking into account the shortcomings of the neolib eral and neorealist pe rspectives, it becomes necessary to turn to other theories to mo re fully comprehend the logic and process of European integration. Theories of Integration: Functionalism versus Liberal Intergovernmentalism More than fifty years after the process of integration was initiated, there is still not a definitive theory that explains the na ture of the EU. Until recently, neofunctionalism was the primary lens through which the EU was scrutinized, offering a cogent analysis of a process few could adequately capture. Howeve r, the past two decades have witnessed a sharp decline in the adhere nts to neofunctionalism, w ith many scholars dismissing neofunctionalism as a theory entirely a nd instead concentrating on the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. Indeed, even this viewpoint seems insufficient, as many continue to search for a thi rd way through which to contem plate European integration. 12 (Autumn 2005): 429. 19 Hyde-Price, 217. 20 Ibid., 219.
Ernst Haas and the Neofunctionalist Revolution With the release of his seminal book entitled The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-57 Ernst Haas began a movement that came to dominate discourse on European integration. While the Cold War provided fuel for neorealist thought, the pr oliferation of intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the European Co mmunity, provided more than a few with enough fodder to begin thinking a new age in international relations had been heralded. Liberal and idealist notions of a new world order coming into be ing through institutions such as the EU are not new, as they can be traced back to Im manuel Kant. More specifically, the history of these ideas as they relate to European integr ation is best found in writings on political functionalism. Political functionalism is not as easily defined as other inte rnational relations theories, with very few constituent trends specifiable. According to Haas, As an ideology seeking to reform the form and s ubstance of internati onal life it has had a variety of spokesmen[who] are united onl y by asyndrome of co mmon attitudes and propositions.21 Haas concedes that the assumptions that constitute renewed functionalist thinking are hardly uniform. Several strands of thinking on European integration, or international politics in general, are ofte n characterized as functionalist. Many of functionalisms detractors base their ar guments on the non-falsifiable nature of functionalist theory, with Haas fully acknow ledging the deficiencies of neofunctionalism 13 21 Haas, Ernst. Beyond the Nation-State: Functi onalism and International Organization. Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1964, 8.
and admitting it has no predictive capacity.22 Even so, neofunctionalist thought as it relates to European integration is often treated as theory by academic scholars. Despite these declarations as to functionalisms theoretical weaknesses, it is nonetheless possible to derive some a ssumptions from Haass discussion. Haas enunciates political functionalisms most rudi mentary tenet: a pref erence for rule by the technocratic elite under the pres umption that they are inherently capable of governing better. According to functi onalist argumentation, although politicians are elected to positions of power from which they are s upposed to pursue the public good, the system does not encourage such behavior. Instead, po liticians primary con cern is reelection, so that pandering to constituent interests becomes their priority. Since constituents often have conflicting conceptions of what is meant by the public good, or can even have interests that directly contra vene the public good, politicians are not encouraged to strive toward congenial solutions.23 For political functionalists, technocra ts are immune to the pressures of particularistic elements of society. As they are not dire ctly elected by the populace, the technocratic elite are able to completely c oncern themselves with their mandate, tending to the public good.24 Although Haas fails to adumbrate exactly what this public good entails, observers assume utilitarian or Pareto-optimal outcomes are the ultimate goal, and that the policies chosen are those that benefit the highest numb er of people without diminishing the lot of others. Another assu mption is that the technocratic class is composed of people who are experts in their respective fields. Wher eas politicians might be elected for a multiplicity of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with expertise 14 22 Ibid., vii.
in public policy, technocrats are hired and ke pt on staff depending solely on performance and results.25 Thus, functionalists deduce that admi nistration by technocrats would be inherently superior to govern ment by elected officials. Crucially, political functi onalism does not limit the above conclusions to the national level. As Haas asserts, [w]he n mens loyalties are penned up within the territorial confines of thena tion-state, there is little hope of working for the general welfarethese loyalties, once freed from the shackles of national in security and allowed to identify with humanity at large, will achieve the true common good.26 Therefore, as a branch of thought, political functionalism chiefl y aspires to offer a theory regarding the future of the world order, in which intergovernmental cooperation through institutions ultimately leads to peace and prosperity. Neofunctionalism asserts that economic integration was furthered only because increased benefits became apparent with each step taken. For neofunctionalists, economic integration is not simply about reaping econom ic benefits, but is also about achieving a greater purpose, this being complete economic, political, and military integration. The conclusion rests on two claims posited by ne ofunctionalists: that the economic benefits reaped from integration encourage economic in terests to organize for more centralization; and that a spillover effect can result from economic and political integration, thereby pushing integration forward.27 Inductive reasoning leads ne ofunctionalists to conclude that although economic pressures may be respon sible for initial inte gration advances, in 15 23 Ibid., 9. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Andrew Moravcsik, The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy, Journal of European Public Policy 12, no. 2 (April 2005): 351-2.
the long-term, integration cannot be consider ed a product of the ambitions of scheming state leaders. Instead, inadvertent spillover eff ects actuate the entire process forth, as the technocratic elite, in their ad ministrative fervor, gradually extend the purviews of their mandate into other dominions. Neofunctionalism has more than a few critics, among these Andrew Moravcsiks own appraisal that neofunctionalism is not a theo ry, in the modern sense, but a framework comprising a series of unrelated claims.28 According to detractors, although ambitious, neofunctionalism fails to explain an integration process characterized more by stop-andgo processes than the fluid progression neofunctionalists assume. Empirically, ne ofunctionalism fails the test. With its lack of theoretical sophistication and its erratic empirical re cord, neofunctionalism has largely fallen out of favor with academics, allowing for the ascension of liberal intergovernmentalism. Liberal Intergovernmentalism and a Possible Third Way Emerging initially as backlash agains t neofunctionalism, lib eral intergovernmentalism posits that economic interests are key to moving the integration process forward, and that states, not Eurocrats, are the only significant actors in the integration process.29 Integration only proceeds if states cont inue to perceive it as a positive-sum game, in which perceived benefits far outweigh negative externalities from the process.30 As the statement implies, liberal intergovern mentalists deny neof unctionalist assertions 28 Ibid., 350. 29 Ibid., 350. 30 Moravcsik, Andrew. Negotiating the Sing le European Act: National Interests and 16 Co nventional Statecraft in the European Community. International Organization 45, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 56.
that states cede control over the scope or direction of integrat ion, and consider the contention that the integration process beco mes self-sustaining or self-regenerating empirically unfounded. For intergovernmentalists states, not supranational bureaucrats, have always been in full control of integration efforts. Even so, liberal intergovernmentalists do not deny the crucial ro le supranational institutions have had in facilitating and supporting state commitment s to integration. Liberal intergovernmentalists concede that institutions such as the European Commission have been vital to moving the process forward, by ensuring that states honor their commitments, and yet consider this function as more tangential to the integration process, not as propelling it forth.31 Furthermore, liberal intergovernmentalists have typically been more capable of providing the evidential burden of proof for their asserti ons. As Moravcsik proffers, [neofunctionalism is much like] the metaphor of the blind men and the elephant: different theories explain different aspects of the (elephantine) integration process. Neofunctionalism is only as valid as the individual theories that form the links in its chain of argumentany test of the neofunctionalist framework as a whole against the track record of integration will be at best imprecise and at worst inherently inconclusive particularly if, as we shall see is the case, the individual elements are underspecified.32 In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists ar e more than capable of demonstrating the validity of their hypotheses against the rea lity of the integration process thus far. Moravcsik utilizes the EUs history of s top-and-go integration as proof of the intergovernmental nature of the process, illustrating his argume nts through a thorough analysis of the passage process of treatie s such as the Single European Act and the apparent preeminence of state over bureaucrat ic interests in meetings of the European 17 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid., 355.
Council.33 Despite the explicative power of the intergovernmental framework, Moravcsik admits the theory has its limits, stating that [p]erhaps the most important, the intergovernmental approach demonstrates that even this explanation is incomplete, thus clearing the ground for further re search into the internationa l implications of European domestic politics.34 Clearly, Moravcsiks point is not to denigrate the findings of liberal intergovernmentalism, but to in vite a more diverse discussi on. There is recognition that the discourse has become so enmeshed in intergovernmentalism (as neofunctionalism has lost popularity), genuine academic debate on th e nature of integration has stalled. Moss readily recognizes the often overlooked shortcomings of the intergovernmental framework in affirming that the perspective neglects the unintended constraining effects of EC institutions, laws, policies and spillover, which were due in part to interaction with events that were not foreseen. It downplays geopolitical an d domestic political ideas, events and projects and is blind to class issues.35 Both Moravcsik and Moss, while upholding the theoretical utility of intergove rnmentalism, seek to encourage further development of the integration conversation. Theories of differentiated integratio n provide a departur e from characteristic discussions of integration. As de Neve argues, The nature of European integration is undergoing a piecemeal revolution. Slowly but surely, the processes of differentiated integration are replacing the er stwhile process of unified inte gration. This is not a silent 18 33 Moravcsik 1991, 55. 34 Ibid., 56. 35 Bernard Moss, The European Community as Monetarist Construction: A Critique of Moravcsik, Journal of European Area Studies 8, no. 2 (November 2000): 265.
revolution[but it has] gone largely unnoticed.36 The revolution is immensely important, as it demonstrates the ability of th e integration processes to vary and evolve over time. Differentiated integration reflects ove rall shifts in strategy wherein states ready to proceed with deeper integration continue leaving those states unwilling or unable to continue out of subsequent processes. De Neve traces the unexceptional beginni ngs of differentiated integration to the Treaty of Amsterdam, which according to his interpretation, allowed an opt-out for those states uncertain as to whether further integration was desirabl e, creating flexibility in integration processes that might otherwise stagnate.37 Whereas conventional approaches to discussing inte gration often overlook the ofte n heterogeneous processes of integration, perspectives discussing differe ntiated integration aim to account for the different motivations states have for conti nuing or discontinuing integration. As de Neve volunteers, The result of these new dynamics of integration will make the European Union increasingly resemble a multi-layered European OnionThe European Onion is a visualization of governance in Europe segmented not only by policy areas and levels of governments as has been the conventional wisdom but also by subgroups of European states.38 Thus, discussing European differentiated inte gration can be considered a third way of analyzing integration processes. The pro cesses of differentiated integration, though poorly understood, offer observers new ways of conceptualizing integration as more than a stagnating experiment. Treating the EU as a uniform entity, as has been customarily done, mars much that could otherwise be gleaned from the process regarding international relations, especially with respect to the limits and possibilities for European 19 36 Jan-Emmanuel de Neve, The European Onion? How Differentiated Integration is Reshaping the EU, Journal of European Integration 29, no. 4 (September 2007): 507. 37 Ibid., 505.
military integration. As becomes evident, neofunctionalisms overly chaotic and eclectic style allows for little to be discovered, and liberal inter governmentalism leaves much to be desired in terms of depth of discussion. A more nua nced discussion of European military integration, thus, will require more than an ex amination of the facts of the matter or how integration occurred historically. It will require an examination of how states currently position themselves vis--vis integration. Even so, such a discussion will have to wait until an evaluation of the role of sovereign states in security institutions and military alliances. Reconciling State Interests within Interstate Military Alliances Much contentious debate on military alliances has concentrated as much on defining what constitutes an alliance as it has on the purpose or function of military alliances. As history demonstrates, practically any arrangement between sovereign states with a military aspect can be considered a military alliance, complicating discussions of the role, nature, and significance of military al liances in the international realm. As one author affirms, [a]lliance is a widely and often imprecisely used termSome writers use it to cover any agreement to co-operate; others employ it much as a synonym for alignment[Even when the] predominan t usage is restricted to military mattersambiguity exists.39 Adopting Russetts definition, a lliances can be considered a formal agreement among a limited number of countries concerning the conditions 20 38 Ibid., 504. 39 Bruce Russett, An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances, Midwest Journal of Political Science 15, no. 2 (May 1971): 262.
under which they will or will not employ military force .40 Even this definition leaves much to be desired, as readers are left to speculate what can be considered a formal agreement, or how clearly the use of military force must be stated to be an alliance. Nonetheless, the definition remains useful, as it excludes both non-military alignments and informal or implicit military constellations.41 Therefore, it allows for some measure of specification in narrowing down a discussi on of interstate military alliances in international politics. 21 Complications also arise when attempts are made to identify a single, correct typology of military alliances. Russett readily con cedes that [c]ertainly there have been a number of efforts to disti nguish alliances by function, beha vior, degree of integration, or other criteria, and even goes on to ela borate on the multitude of typologies academics have suggested over the years to fu rther refine the study of alliances.42 Virtually any variety of factors can be used to examine and differentiate among alliances, among these: the relationship of the alliance to the inte rnational system (major power members, enumeration of specific threat, ratio of st ate populations to the world population); the overt purpose of the alliance (defense or neut rality pact, entente); the expected duration of the alliance; equality of relations among alliance members; and the nature of the prealliance bonds among members.43 Any examination of alliances, therefore, will require an equally rigorous analysis of the typology used. Despite this variety, Russett concludes his discussion by stating that a proper t ypology of military alli ances include four particular dimensions: dominance, duration, equality and voluntarism, and integrated 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid., 263. 42 Ibid., 264. 43 Ibid., 265.
22 rs. defense features.44 These features, as applied to Eur opean military cooperation, will be discussed in the following chapte Rationalizing Alliances Economically The economic theory of alliances is primarily preoccupied with the following themes: How are burdens shared within an al liance? To what extent will the actions of individual members result in benefits that are shared by all allies, and how will the availability of collective benefits affect the level of ef fort of individual members?45 Derived from collective goods theory, the economic theory of alliances dates from a seminal article written by Mancur Olson a nd Richard Zeckhauser in 1966, in which a new approach was developed to explicate diffe rent alliance structures. More than forty years later, the economic theory of alliances remains one of the predominant approaches to discussing interstate military alliances. In essence, the initial economic theory of alliances sought to address an issue which, until the publication of Olson a nd Zeckhausers article, was largely unacknowledged, with Sandler and Cauley a ffirming that [t]raditionally, the major portion of intellectual and financial resources that have been de voted to the study of alliances departs froma war pe rspective (e.g., logistics). He nce, much of the alliance research has been presented within the context of a relativel y limited viewpoint.46 The logic of the economic theory of alliances hinges crucially on the propositions of collective goods theory. According to collective goods theory, states are capable both domestically and 44 Ibid., 288. 45 Thies, 298. 46 Todd Sandler and Jon Cauley On the Economic Theory of Alliances, The Journal of Conflict
internationally, of investing in either public goods or private goods. Public goods are those which have benefits that are nonexcludable and nonrival. In other words, goods which the provider is unable to selectively mete out to be neficiaries (nonexcludability) and of which the consumption by some beneficiaries does not detract from the consumptive ability of othe r beneficiaries (nonrivalry).47 A governments decision to provide for the purification of polluted air can be considered a public good, as it cannot control who gets to consume the cleansed air or how much clean air beneficiaries are able to enjoy. In contrast, private goods exhibit both characteristic s of excludability or rivalry, as the state apparatus is fully able to provide the benefits of a good or service to some while denying it to others.48 Redistributive efforts unde rtaken by the government constitute this category, as the state can s ecure resources for certain sectors of the population, while denying this treatment to other segments. A third category, furthermore, is reflected in the existence of impure public goods, which display only one of the characteristics. The efficiency of resource allocation a nd achieving optimality are both central in discussions on the provision of public and private goods. As Sandler and Cauley note, Optimality is expressed in te rms of the marginal conditions that depict the additional benefits or costs associated w ith an additional unit of the good.49 A crucial assumption of public goods theory is that states purs ue Pareto-efficiency or optimality in the allocation of resources, endeavoring to satis fy as many recipients as possible with the given resources. The economic theory of alliances thus utilizes the tenets of public goods 23 Resolution 19, no. 2 (June 1975): 331. 47 Sandler, 448. 48 Ibid. 49 Sandler and Cauley, 332.
theory to offer a rationale for state behavi or within alliance stru ctures, assuming that states will always choose the arrangement wh ich guarantees the greatest benefits for all with the greatest efficiency in resource acquisition and allocation. The ambiguous nature of defense within collective goods theory, how ever, complicates the issue considerably, as distinctions are made between deterren ce, often considered a purely public good, and defense, which is generally considered impurely public. The difficulty in achieving Pareto-efficient outcomes in defensive alliance s can be inferred, with certain states in danger of being saddled with most of the al liances burden, and other states benefiting less from the alliance than would be possi ble in a more facilitative structure. For an interstate military apparatus such as ESDP, in which more than two dozen sovereign states are participants, the di fficulties become apparent. The notion of a congestion cost in military alliances is especi ally relevant, suggesting that increases in participants (users) ultimately decrease the quantity a nd quality of the good provided to each member of the alliance.50 Though defense can at times be considered a public good, when its provision is conducted at the supr anational level, equitable outcomes become more difficult to secure as alliance size incr eases. Free-riding, the oft-cited predicament associated with interstate military alliances, can become an especially pernicious problem if not counteracted. Sandler and Cauley sugge st a taxing scheme to mitigate free-riding concerns as well as congestion costs, with the expectation that the ability to exercise excludability permits the alliance members to charge a user fee to a new member based on the congestion costs that it creates.51 Whether a congestion cost w ould really ameliorate the effects of an increase in 24 50 Ibid., 348.
membership size is debatable. The economic th eory of alliances neglects to address the matter of power disparities between member st ates in an alliance. As payments to the alliance are based on available resources and ab ility to pay, larger states would tend to pay more and smaller states less in a taxing scheme, leading to possible power disparities within the alliance, a potential consequence which remains unacknowledged. Furthermore, the economic theory of alliances implicitly assumes that sovereign states will only ever become enmeshed in an alliance for defensive purposes. This makes it difficult to apply the strictures of the economic theory of alliances to ESDP, as all sources indicate that its mandate remains relega ted to crisis management operations. A reappraisal of the economic theo ry, however, reveals even more difficulties in utilizing it to examine interstate military alliances. Beyond the Economic Theory of Alliances Oppenheimer argues against the logic of the suboptimality theorem, in which states will rationally work toward the Pa reto-efficient outcome through taxing schemes. The optimal outcome may be easy enough to di scern in the case of the individual, it becomes much less apparent in the collective, and may even be impossible to discern in interstate military alliance s. As Oppenheimer proposes, Ifwe insisted on Pareto optimality and acyclicity, we would rule out most democratic procedures. Majoritarian rules violate both, and yet such rules virt ually have been universally adopted by committees and legislaturessuch ru les lead to cyclic majorities.52 Majoritarian mechanisms denied to a burgeoning EU, it b ecomes evident that a structure such as 51 Ibid. 25 52 Joe Oppenheimer, Collective Goods and Alliances: A Reassessment, Journal of Conflict Resolution 23, no. 3 (September 1979): 392.
ESDP will almost be forced to rely on bala nce of power logic in order to thrive, with major powers making most decisions. Whet her this supposition reflects the reality, however, will be discussed later. Still, military alliances do not only have to be examined from an economic vantage point, as this discussion suggests. Even this realist perspective on alliances obscures much that remains to be unders tood concerning interstate military alliance behavior. With international relations literature increasingl y moving away from realist politics, there is a desire to redefine the discourse to accommodate a new way of conceptualizing interstate military alliances. Thies concurs in stating that [u]nless the theoretical formulations of collective goods theorists are coupled with an understanding of the conditions that set-post-1945 alliances ap art from those of the pre-1945 era, there is a very real danger that their work willonly be an economic theory of NATO.53 Concluding Thoughts As the various theories discussed in this chapter demonstrate, supranational cooperation is a multi-faceted phenomenon, re quiring a multiplicity of methods to explain even single dimensions of the process. Therefore, it can only be expected that European military cooperation would require its own specific treatment, separate from its abstract representations w ithin the foundational interna tional relations theories, integration theories, and even within the discourse relating to interstate military alliances. With a discussion of state behavior as it relates to supranatio nal cooperation in the abstract complete, it is now possible to move on to a discussion more closely tailored to 26 53 Thies, 330.
how European military cooperation has historically occurred in comparison, how state interests are expressed, and th e significance of the ESDP to the international security framework. 27
Chapter 2 Tracing the Historical Evolution of European Security and Defense In an interview, Michael Ryan, Defens e Advisor to the US Mission to the EU (USEU), queried, If the EU were to work to ward the establishmen t of an independent ESDP, how would it do it? This might seem lik e a silly question, but its important. How would it do it? The same way it does everything Top-down, elite-driven. Slowly, haltingly, bit-by-bit. But in the end, it gets there.54 Interestingly, this statement was made at the beginning of 2009, ten years after European Security and Defence Policy was propelled from abstract idea to reality. Indeed, the High Representative (HR) for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, relates that one of th e ESDPs principal paradoxes is the immense progress it has made since 1999 vis--vis the othe r Maastricht pillars. The distinction is a paradox because of the many predictions that an ticipated that intractable differences over sovereignty and member state interests woul d undermine the entire process and render European defense moot. Instead, there has b een considerable progress on the ESDP in the past decade, especially since economic in tegration is believed to have reached its apex and justice and home affairs (JHA) remains in its preliminary stages. Which perspective is correct, then: is ESDP/CFSP a haltingly slow, elite-driven project that continues slogging toward an unknown destination? Or, does the former perspective underestimate the state of ESDP, diminishing a process that has yielded 28 54 Michael Ryan, Defense Advisor (USEU), interv iew by the author, Brussels, BE, January 14, 2009.
tangible results to the surprise and constern ation of skeptics? Both observations are on the mark. Progress on ESDP has been exceptionally halting at times; but when decisions are made, the entire process undergoes tremendous leaps forward. To fully understand the process of Europ ean military cooperation, it is essential to recognize that CFSP/ESDP has developed prim arily in reaction to external stimuli. Although member states of the EU have at ma ny points in time consider ed it propitious to construct some type of defens e or security framework, efforts toward this goal only began in earnest in 1999, seven years af ter the delineation of the sec ond pillar in the Treaty on EU. Progress on European military coopera tion has generally been catalyzed by international crises. Rather than pursuing m ilitary cooperation as a goal in itself, the EU approaches ESDP as a means to an end. In other words, the EU is not bolstering its military capacity for defensive purposes, but is instead doing so to increase the Unions influence on global politics. This dynamic has given the process the appearance of lacking overall direction or a foreseeable endpoint. Because progress on CFSP/ ESDP is contingent on the international enviro nment and hampered by complex internal processes, it is often characterized as bei ng on the verge of stagna tion and even failure.55 However, despite the sporadic declamations to this effect, the European Union is unlikely to discontinue the occasionally infuriatingl y halting process of military cooperation. Initiatives and Disappoin tments in European Military Cooperation, 1950-1991 The narrative describing the beginning of European security cooperation follows the same general line, regardless of source: after the Second World War, the devastation 29 55 Julian Lindley-French, "In the Shade of Locarno? Why European Defence is Failing," International Affairs 78, no. 4 (October 2002):789-811.
wrought by six years of fighting and the shifti ng international context compelled Western Europe to re-constitute itself with a new politics. Two consecutive world wars on the Continent had underlined the destructive pote ntial of the state system, and rising Cold War tensions demanded a modicum of unity among the states of Western Europe. The first effort toward defense cooperation was exemplified in the Anglo-French Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, in which both states pledged their mutual support in the event of a German resurgence.56 This treaty was followed in 1948 by the Treaty of Brussels, in which France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg pledged their unity against the communist threat (W est Germany and Italy would not join until 1954).57 However, the physical and economic destruction resulting from the Second World War meant that these treaties amounted to little more than declarations of political solidarity in an increasingly uncertain international system. Fears of a resurgent Germany and the l ooming Soviet threat necessitated a more concrete security guarantee in Western Eur ope, a security guarantee that was largely provided by the United States (with support fr om Canada) within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organi zation. The transatlantic barg ain, as the arrangement came to be known, committed the United States to Europes economic recovery through the Marshall Plan and to the reinforcement of European defense. In return, beneficiary countries agreed to utilize the funds toward economic recovery efficiently and bolster Americas efforts to guard against the Soviet threat.58 As Sloan relates, the signatories to 30 56 Allen G. Sens, The Changing Politics of European Security, in The Changing Politics of European Security: Europe Alone?, eds. Stefan G nzle and Allen G. Sens (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 7. 57 Ibid. 58 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 1.
the Brussels Treaty signaled to the United States their intent to structure postwar intraEuropean relations to encourage internal stab ility and defense agains t external threats. The treaty stated the basic Eur opean commitment to the bargain.59 The states of Western Eur ope signaled more than a simple rhetorical commitment to their own defense. The United States expe cted NATO to be a short-term arrangement, providing Europe with interim protection, as the states party to the Brussels Treaty constructed their own cooperative defense stru cture. The ultimate expectation, thus, was that Europe would provide for its own defens e. This assurance was especially important as the success of the transatlantic bargain was ultimately contingent on the acceptance of these arrangements by the United States Congress.60 Unfortunately, early attempts to f ound a European Defence Community (EDC) foreshadowed the failure to fulfill the goal of European self-defense throughout the Cold War period.61 Progress toward the creation of the EDC seemed to have been doomed to failure from the beginning, as the solidarity that Western Europe expressed in the Brussels Treaty hardly refl ected reality. There was no consensus on what the nature and purpose of the EDC should be: Frances foreign policy revolved around preventing German rearmament, while the United Kingdo m, the remaining significant European power player, still did not conceive of its fortunes as entwined with those of the Continent.62 31 59 Ibid., 2. 60 Sloan, 21. 61 Martin Trybus, The Vision of European Defence Community and a Common Defence for the European Union, in European Security Law eds. Martin Trybus and Nigel D. White (Oxford: Oxford University, 2007), 13. 62 Sloan, 17.
With Frances and the UKs military budgets already overwhelmed,63 the US considered the Federal Republic of Germanys military involvement critical to a credible European military framework. Even so, France remained wary of Germanys role and expected, moreover, that the EDC would be a largely supranational defense force, tantamount to the merger of the armed for ces of the Member States into European Defence Forces, including newl y-created German divisions.64 These German divisions, according to the French design, were to be marg inal actors within the envisioned EDC, an untenable reality given the fina ncial constraints. The supran ational dimension the French envisaged for the EDC was another controvers ial matter, unpalatable to both the US and the UK. The US balked at anything that might undercut NATO, as it expected the EDC would be supportive of NATO rather than completely autonomous; the UK rejected outright the federal natu re of the organization.65 Therefore, alth ough member states signed a treaty establishing the EDC in 1952, i t was not universally admired in Europe or across the Atlantic.66 With negligible support from the US and the UK, the French parliaments rejection of the treaty in 1954 signaled the collapse of efforts toward European defense cooperation for the foreseeable future.67 There were a number of minor exped itions into foreign policy and defense cooperation throughout the Cold War. The esta blishment of the Western European Union (WEU), with the addition of West Germany and Italy to th e Brussels Treaty in 1954, was at best a modest attempt to promote so lidarity among member states who committed 32 63 Neither the British nor the French government could fit substantial troop increases into budgets already stretched thin by non-European military commitments--the French bogged down in Indochina, and the British struggling to keep their global role intact. Ibid., 29. 64 Trybus, 15. 65 Sens, 7. 66 Ibid.
themselves to mutual defense in the event of an armed attack on Europe.68 Although it set such lofty goals, the WEU remained definitively tied to NATO, which in counseling against the duplication of competencies, e ffectively subordinated the WEU structure to NATO prerogatives.69 With the 1960s came another atte mpt by the French government to foster a politically independent Europe thr ough their proposal of th e Fouchet Plan. This plan, however, was doomed from the beginning, for many of the same reasons as the EDC. The French government sought to make Europe a third force amidst the polarizing tensions of the Cold War, independent of both American and Soviet influence.70 The distinctly anti-NATO (and an ti-American) undertone was not lost on the US, which promptly expressed its opposition to the Fouchet Plan. The UK and Germany, tending toward pro-Atlanticist sen timents in the long run, duly followed suit, effectively suspending discussion on the issue in 1962.71 It was not until the 1970s that a structure remotely resembling the CFSP began to materialize in European Political Coopera tion (EPC). EPC, however, was hardly comparable to the CFSP of today and never reach ed the level of integr ation characteristic of the European Economic Community. Rather, in terms of organization and structure, Political Cooperation was more of a loose cons ultative arrangement than an efficient and functioning machinery for a Co mmon European Foreign Policy.72 European states never intended for the EPC to serve as a vehicle fo r European political integration, but simply 33 67 Sloan, 34. 68 Franz Kernic, European Security in Transition: The European Security Architecture since the End of the Second World War, in European Security in Transition eds. Gunther Hauser and Franz Kernic (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 9. 69 Kernic, 9. 70 Ibid., 11. 71 Sens, 8. 72 Kernic, 11.
used the EPC to confer with one another on po litical issues. Its inclusion into the Single European Act formalized the EPC consultation processes in treaty form, thus integrating a foreign policy component into formal European Community (EC) operation.73 Still, in the security sphere, the EPC -like EDC and the WEU before them -remained a largely symbolic action leading to few tangible outcomes. NATO remained the primary security organization for the Continent, acting as a force that concurrently ensured European security and hampered efforts toward European military autonomy. However, Europes failure to develop an independent military capability cannot be blamed entirely on NATO. Europes inability to overcome divisive state interests and organize a meaningful defe nse structure translated into the continued involvement of the United States through the e nd of the Cold War. Despite its success as the first cooperative defense structure in Europe, NATO was clearly not European and most of the burden of financing the endeavor was left to the United States, issues that continue to beleaguer the Atlantic Alliance today. It was only after the Cold War ended, when Americas presence on the Continent wa s no longer guaranteed, that the desire for autonomous military capability became truly sali ent to the EU. The EU had realized that despite being an economic behemoth, it remained impotent as a political force. The Genesis of Genuine European Military Cooperation, 1991-2003 By the end of 1991, the USSR had collapsed and the Cold War had ended after nearly half a century of polarization. In time, the EU began to comprehend the end of the Cold Wars implications for th e Atlantic Alliance. With its raison dtre officially 34 73 Kernic, 12.
defunct, NATO had no clear, definable security threat against which to position itself, and its very existence was in jeopardy. That the future of the Atlantic Alliance was no longer guaranteed left Europe in a conundr um with no easy solution: the momentary relief that followed the end of the Cold War was short-lived, as Eu rope realized that nearly fifty years under the American umbr ella of security had bred complacency, rendering the term European defense an oxymoron.74 Granted, the situation was not exactly fraught with danger. Ironically, Europe began to concern itself with th e state of its defense when external threats to the EU were minimal. The end of the Cold War meant that Europeans could finally experiment with their security and defense policy because almost all traditional security threats to their safety vanished along with the Iron Curtain. As a result, paradoxically, the European Unions security policy was born when threats to Europe were removed.75 Thus, the end of the Cold War and the ambiguity of Americas future role in Europe set in motion a new era in European military cooperation. However, the freedom to experiment in an environment free of overt security threats raised several fundamental issues. Without an overt threat, did Europe need a security and defense policy? What role would a European defense force have in in ternational conflicts with no identifiable aggressor? And, most importan tly, with no salient motivatio nal factor impelling them, would European states be able to overcom e the divisions that had negated military cooperation in the past? 35 74 Jean-Yves Haine, An Historical Perspective, in EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004), ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2004), 37. 75 Stephanie B. Anderson, Crafting EU Security Policy: In Pursuit of a European Identity
The Treaty on European Union: Pill ars of Intent without Strategy The passage of the Treaty on European Un ion (TEU, also Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 is generally regarded as having heralded a new era of integration on the European project, driving member stat es toward deeper economic and monetary cooperation and transforming the Community into a true Union.76 Undeniably, the TEU had a transformative impact: its ratification led to adoption of what is today known as the three pillar system, whic h specified the scope and bread th of Union action depending on policy area. The first pillar, economic and monetary affairs, was to be governed by the Community method for the most part, with th e European Commission having the right of policy initiation. The second and third pillars comprised the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs respectively. Both differed significantly from the first pillar in that action in these sphere s resided almost entirely with the European Council and the Council of the European Union.77 Whereas action in the first pillar was subject to the jurisdiction of all of the organs of the EU, including the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), action in the second and the th ird pillars remained principally with the intergove rnmental bodies of the EU. The pillarization of the CFSP meant that progress and cooperation on the CFSP was made especially vulnerabl e to the tides of member state interest and opinion. The European Commission retained only full asso ciation for purposes of coordination, and mention of any roles for the EP or the EC J was completely neglected. Progress on the (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2008), 6-7. 76 Robin Niblett, Europe Inside Out, The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 41. 36 77 Sir Brian Crowe, A Common Europe an Foreign Policy After Iraq? in Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years, 2nd ed., Martin Holland (New York: Continuum, 2004), 29.
CFSP, therefore, was left entirely to the di scretion of member stat es, with any and all decisions regarding the CFSP requiring the una nimity of member states in order to succeed.78 With twelve member states in 1992, th e stipulation of a unanimity rule was daunting enough for action in the CFSP; seventeen years and fifteen member states later, progress and action on the CFSP and ESDP has become correspondingly complicated. Although the separation of competencies was initially perceived as crucial to the European project, today, the impracticality of segregating foreign affairs is acknowledged as breeding incoherence and comp lexity in attempts to create an EU foreign policy.79 Still, the TEU was the harbinger of a fu ller, more robust CFSP in the future. The Maastricht Treaty was the first time interest in coordinating a Eu ropean defense policy had been expressed since the failure of the EDC, making it, by European standards, an accomplishment in its own right. However, for the near future, the pillarization of CFSP/ESDP was to the detriment of progre ss in this area. Member states had only declared a vague intention to develop a commo n foreign policy. No concrete plans, goals, or strategies were enumerat ed, and more importantly, EU organs specifically charged with the CFSP/ESDP were not created. Ma rtin Holland even goes so far as to characterize the marginalizing e ffect of the pillar system as the ghetto-ization of the CFSP/ESDP.80 Although member states interest in re taining more control over foreign and defense policy is comprehensible, the reality is that the TEUs restrictive criteria for the 37 78 Crowe, 28. 79 Javier Solana, Preface in EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999-2004) ed. Nicole Gnesotto (Paris: Institu te for Security Studies, 2004), 6. 80 Martin Holland, Introduction: The First Decade, in Common Foreign and Security Policy:
conduct of the second pillar stalled progre ss on the CFSP/ESDP for years. Granted, member state interests on CFSP/ESDP were divided enough that progress would have been difficult in any case. However, di fficult institutional architecture managed to discourage action toward reaching common polic ies. Over the years, the EU was only able to muster support in times of severe and unambiguous crisis; in the meantime, the EUs financial power was complemented by a fragmented and largely inconsequential foreign policy. Meandering Efforts and the Reanimation at St. Malo Although progress on the CFSP/ESDP stalle d following the ratification of the TEU, the reorganization of NATOs mandate meant that the European defense puzzle, even if neglected within the EU structur e, could not be igno red in the emerging international security order. In the early 1990s, the US was very much in favor of the development of an independent European defense capability. The US government anticipated that the end of th e Cold War had eased tensions in Western Europe enough so that the EU would be ready to embrace a larger share of NATOs cost burden.81 NATOs invitation to the EU, however, was no longer voluntary. Not for the first time, rumors circulated that the Atlant ic Alliance was in peril.82 Unfortunately, the US governments avid support was based on the assumption that European defense would develop within NATO through the abortive WEU structure: Washingtonsupported the strengthening of the CFSP because the process was expected to be confined to the formation of a European security and defence identity (ESDI) within The First Ten Years 2nd ed. Martin Holland (New York: Continuum, 2004), 1. 81 Sens, 14. 38 82 Maria Raquel Freire, The European Security and Defence Policy: History, Structures, and Capabilities, in European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective eds. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (N ew York: Routledge, 2008), 11.
NATO. The al liance agreed to give the WEU access to its capabilities should the EU decide to avail itself of the institution to carry out military operations in which NATO as a whole was not involved. It seemed at the time that the WEU would become the somewhat loosely attached defence arm of the Union and the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance.83 However, the WEU had played a largely insigni ficant role in fostering European defense, and for the most part, could really only be considered an armaments agency.84 These pressures nonetheless resulted in attempts to rehabilitate an organization that was unsuitable as a forum of concrete European military action, further diverting time and attention from the elaboration of the C FSP. The most significant outcome of these renewed efforts was the delineation of the Petersberg Tasks, which later became the underpinning of the ESDP: humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking.85 Although the Petersberg Tasks were later adopted into the EU structure, at the time of their adoption in June 1992, the words were little more than a hollow promise. At the very least, one glaring issue was finally resolved, even if only vaguely. Observers now knew to what ends a European security and defense would be used. The initial conundrum remained, however, as the ineffectual attempts at reviving the WEU failed to appease NATO and led to renewed demands for transformation of the European security system.86 The principal impetus for progress on developing European defense came not from NATO but from the cr ises in Croatia and Bosnia. The EUs inability to operationalize the Petersberg Ta sks into a credible peacemaking force left in 39 83 Ibid. 84 Sens, 8. 85 Michael E. Smith, Implementation: Making the EUs International Relations Work, in International Relations and the European Union eds. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford: Oxford University, 2005), 169. 86 Kernic, 13.
sharp relief Europes persisting inadequacy as a political and military actor.87 Until the crises in the Balkans, Europe had been c onfident that member state inaction resulted more from the absence of salient conflicts requiring international intervention. When the right crisis came along, the unspoken convict ion was that Europe would be able to gather the necessary coalit ion. With NATO reluctance to become involved, however, it was evident that a major restructuring of Eu ropean defense would be necessary to make the EU a credible military actor. Eventually, American demands for a fairer burdensharing arrangement and Europ ean frustration catalyzed the EU to begin action toward substantive military cooperation.88 The passage of the Treaty of Amsterda m in 1997 was emblematic of the EUs recommitment to the development of a Eur opean defense framework. The treaty included a plethora of innovations: the subsuming of th e Petersberg Tasks as the guiding force for the ESDP; the creation of the position of HR for the CFSP; the establishment of a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit; the instituti on of the constructive abstention, to circumvent the difficulties of the unanim ity rule; and the codification of Common Strategies as the primary channel through which the EU common position on any foreign policy issues would be enumerated.89 Especially important to note among these innovations was the creation of the HR post, an introduction that brought much needed coherence to the institutiona l architecture of the CFSP/ ESDP. As important as the creation of the position itself was the posts first incumbent, Javier Solana, who had served as Secretary-General of NATO from 1995 through 1999.90 Since he began his 40 87 Freire, 10. 88 Ibid., 11. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid.
tenure as HR in 1999, Solanas assertive attitude has been decisive in convincing the EU member states of the importance of mainta ining some measure of continuity between rotating EU presidencies. Moreover, the utility of the positio n to the enhancement of the EUs international prestige has also been palpable.91 Even more pivotal to the evolution of the CFSP/ESDP than the HR position is the institution of the Common St rategies and the constructiv e abstention. Each serves a clearly distinct purpose and yet they are mutually rein forcing. Although it may seem counterintuitive, until the in troduction of the Common Strategies approach, member states were relegated to issuing Joint Actions and Common Positions -essentially specific statements on very specific decisions or situations. Lacking any overarching strategy or strategic culture undercut work to ward European defense more than any other factor, as member states efforts became scattered and unfocused.92 Although it should be noted that the EU still lacked a strategic concep t, such as that of NA TO, at the very least the Common Strategies were a st ep in the right direction. The establishment of th e constructive abstention was also a boon to the furtherance of European defense cooperat ion. By 1997, with fifteen member countries, action on the CFSP/ESDP would lik ely have ossified completely without such a reform. Through the constructive abstenti on, member states unwilling to engage in a particular operation could abstain from participation wi thout preventing other states from doing so, thereby circumventing the unanimity rule.93 Scholars debate the wisdom of allowing a two-tier system of integration to devel op vis--vis the CFSP. According to their argumentation, the constructive abstention coul d develop into a larg er European onion, 41 91 Ibid.
with the states with power and resources oc cupying the center, to the exclusion of outer states.94 However, the constructive abstention sh ould be distinguished from the latter, more radical alternative. While there are proponents of a more radical stance on CFSP cooperation, the constructive ab stention maintains th e input of all states, even if not militarily involved, and does allow each member state a definitive veto. By some standards, it may have been too compromising.95 42 t Institutional innovation in 1997 was s oon accompanied in 1998 by a dramatic shift in the previously unbending member state positions on the ESDP. From the end of the Second World War, the United Kingdom was best characterized as having Atlanticist leanings, preferring to position itself with th e United States and NATO on security issues. This meant that, aside from largely symbo lic gestures, the UK preferred to forge a European defense structure under the NATO umbr ella and viewed efforts to construct a completely independent ESDP as redundant and wasteful.96 The Franco-British summit at St. Malo in December 1998 represented one of the most (if not the most) significan turnabouts in ESDP history, with the UK finally declaring itself amenable to cultivating a truly autonomous European military capability. As Freire remarks, For London, in particular, this series of even ts represented a major strategic reorientation. At the negotiations on the Amsterdam Treaty the British government had still vehemently opposed the idea of merging the WEU and the EU, fearing that an autonomous EU military capability would undermine NATO. Just over a year later, London saw in the militarization of the EU the most credible strategy to save NATO from obsolescence.97 Although Freires statement elucidates the motivating factor behind the UKs turnaround, it is also important to understand why the St Malo summit is considered so momentous. 92 Freire, 10. 93 Freire, 11. 94 De Neve, 503. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid.
The institutional dynamics established by the Maastricht Treaty were flawed in that they offered no incentives to cooperati on, with power politics ultimately driving the CFSP/ESDP to success.98 As might be expected, progr ess and action on the ESDP only occurs when three states in particular are at least partially committed: France, Germany, and the UK. Without the support or acquiescen ce of all three of th ese major EU powers, ESDP stood little chance of ever succeeding, even with the mo st facilitativ e institutions possible. Once again, however, an extern al element served to catalyze action on European defense.99 The Formal Establishment of the ESDP The momentum triggered by St. Malo r eceived further suppo rt in 1999 with the crisis in Kosovo, as Europe urge d action from a largely inert NATO.100 Yet again, Europe was acutely aware of its inability to act in the international arena. In this in however, it was not necessarily European di sunity that had prevented engagement. Instead, EU member states were confronted with the inadequacy of their military capabilities. Even with consen sus, action was made impracticable as EU member states did not have the capacity to conduct a military mission autonomously. Only with the military support of the United States was an effective intervention in Kosovo possible, support that came after significant he sitation from the United States. stance, 101 The EU, furthermore, found itself practically voiceless in the military action undertaken by the US through NATO. While EU member states in NAT O were critical of the American aerial 97 Freire, 12. 98 Kernic, 12. 99 Kerry Longhurst and Alister Miskimmon, Same Challenges, Diverging Responses: Germany, the Uk and European Security, German Politics 16, no. 1 (March 2007): 92. 100 Kernic, 16. 43
bombing campaign, many were left to provide the bulk of the ground troops.102 With the three major EU powers in agreement in the aftermath of Kosovo, the focus shifted to developing Europes military capabilities in synchrony. The first steps toward this effort came at the Cologne summit of the European Council in June 1999. During the summit, EU member states resolved to transfer all WEU assets to the EU, finally conferring upon the EU the resources it would need to begin the practical implementation of the ESDP.103 Javier Solana was also name d to the position of HR for the CFSP, two years after the Treaty of Amsterdam had provided for the posts creation. Most importantly, member states explicitly designated military sectors in which improvement was greatly needed, particularly in the areas of command and control, strategic airlift, and intelligence.104 Member states maintained momentum reconvening in December 1999 at the Helsinki European Council and outlining th e Helsinki Headline Goals, through which states established specific, achievable military targets for the ESDP.105 Ambitiously, member states pledged to construct a for ce of up to 60,000 troops ab le to deploy within sixty days and sustainable for up to one year, all in support of the Petersberg Tasks, by 2003.106 The commitment of these troops toward the support of the Pe tersberg Tasks was important, as the EU indirectly emphasized th at the ESDP would be utilized for foreign policy purposes, rather than defensively. A lthough the Treaty of Amsterdam explicitly adopted the Petersberg Tasks in its elaborat ion of the ESDP, ambiguity had remained as 44 101 Sens, 12-13. 102 Ibid. 103 Kernic, 16. 104 Sens, 13. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid.
to whether the EU intended the ESDP to have any defensive role within the Continent. As EU member states iterativel y stated, the EU did not aspi re toward the creation of a European army in the ESDP, despite conjecturing to that effect.107 In addition to adopting concrete capab ility goals, the European Council meeting in Helsinki established concrete institutions to execute strategic direction and guidance for CFSP/ESDP missions. Among th e institutions created were the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Committ ee (EUMC), and the EU Military Staff (EUMS).108 The exact roles and functions of these institutions will be explained in the following chapter. For now, it is sufficient to understand that the be ginning of the ESDP is traced back to 1999 since it was the year in which member states propelled the rhetoric of nearly a decade into real action. Since 1992, Europe had issued proclamations of its intention to create a collective hard power institution apart from NATO. Despite the inclusion of these vague pl ans in the EU treaties, almost nothing had been done to reinforce or substantiate these plans. At la st, with the enactment of both specific goals and substantive institutions, the ESDP was born. However, the ESDPs birth was not w ithout tension. Although ESDP institutions were largely modeled on NATOs structures, a certain degree of bureaucratic mismatch between the two organizations did little to facil itate cooperation.109 NATO had expressed its support for the European military coopera tion under the EU umbrella, but this support had been with the assumption that the C FSP/ESDP would actively avoid duplication of functions. To prevent duplication and the exacerbation of tensions, the EU and NATO 45 107 Anderson, 139. 108 Ibid., 147-171. 109 Gerd Fohrenbach, Security Through Engagement: The Worldview Underlying ESDP, in The EUs Search for a Strategic Role: ESDP and its Implications for Transatlantic Relations edited by Esther
had been attempting to establish a formal working relationship since St. Malo. The culmination of these efforts came in the Ber lin Plus arrangements through which NATO consummated its pledge of allowi ng the EU access to NATO resources.110 Although the specifics of the Berlin Plus arrangements remain somewhat equivocal, they served primarily to settle major antagonisms in the transatlantic partnership. It was agreed that NATO would retain the right of first refusal on any international conflict in which the EU was considering intervening.111 Although a certain amount of mistrust and other problems endured, fears that the EU end eavored to undercut NATO were assuaged through such cooperation. Toward Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap In the years following the summit, EU member states focused their efforts on meeting the Helsinki Headline Goals by 2003. Once again, however, the EU found that the resolution of one issue had necessarily cr eated a new problem, this time in the form of the capabilities-expectations gap.112 The capabilities-expectations gap refers to the persistent disconnect between ESDP rhetor ic and actions made toward accomplishing established goals. This disjuncture is hard ly an unfamiliar theme in the history of European military cooperation, which has alwa ys tended toward the lofty and indefinite, while faltering consistently on execution. Indeed, criticisms of the EU on this point are plenty. General Secretary [sic] George Robertson of NATO called the EU a military pygmy. Later he changed his mind, adding, I made a mistake when I called Europe a military Brimmer (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2002), 12. 110 Julie Kim, Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2006), 2. 111 Sens, 19. 112 Anderson, 147. 46
p ygmy. In fact, its not. Its a giant, but its a flabby giant with no muscle and unable to do anything when trouble comes upon it. As he put into plain words, many European states simply refuse to invest in the military hardware needed to project the EUs strength globally.113 Former Secretary-General Robertsons comm ent illustrates another of the paradoxes of the ESDP. Member states publicly affirm their desire to develop an EU military capacity, citing this as the next grand European pr oject, all the while undermining the ESDP through lack of funding. Why with as much public support as the ESDP enjoys and with member states at least rhetorically committed, does the process stall where real commitments begin? The reason for the gap in ESDP can be likened to Europes military capacity issues within NATO. The United States reli shes decrying EU contributions to NATO as imbalanced and insufficient, when compared to the US and taking in to consideration the EUs collective economic weight. However, th is denunciation overlooks the fact that the EU, as an entity, does not make a collective contribution to NATO. Individual states from Europe are responsible for cul tivating their own force commitments, which, especially in the case of the minor powers, produces a net result much smaller than the whole.114 Within the EU, the same dynamic is at work, as member states each work to develop their own forces, rather than contributing to a Community fund for a Union-wide defense force. This would be more efficient in the long run, as larger economies becoming cashstrapped would not have to bear a dispr oportionate amount of the cost. In such a framework, it would even become easier to streamline and modernize Europes capabilities. For this reason the US urged Eu ropean military cooperation at the end of the Second World War, and demanded it at the end of the Cold War. The US believes Europe 47 113 Ibid., 148.
will only ever be militarily proficient if it is united.115 Indeed, it was only in January 2009 th at legislation pertaining to the Europeanisation of Europes defense industr ies was passed in the European Parliament. Previously, member states had been able to block regulation of national defense industries from the European Commission on the basis that state subsidies to industries constituted a national security c oncern under Article 296 of the TEU.116 Aside from breeding inefficiency and stif ling innovation, state subsidie s discouraged convergence on a European standard for military gear and weap ons. For more than a decade, a pernicious cycle lingered that encouraged member stat es to patronize inefficient and obsolete national industries, ultimately resulting in ill-equipped and mismatched European defense forces.117 The problem of the capabilities-e xpectations gap has always been a predicament of coordina ting national interests. 48 es Even so, the EU remained hopeful on meeting the Helsinki Headline Goals in 1999. Only three months after Helsinki, in March 2000, the EU announced that it would be incorporating a civilian crisis management component into the ESDP.118 Civilian crisis management, however, was not expected to be quite as extensive as the EUs military operations. With a modest allotment of 5,000 police officers, the civilian forc were meant to facilitate exit from post-conflict scenarios, th rough the provision of 114 Sens, 20. 115 Ibid. 116 IHS, EC Proposes Legislation to Simplify Eu ropean Defence Industry, IHS, December 6, 2007, under Aero-Defence News, http://aero-defense.ihs.com/news/euen -defense-market-simplification12-07.htm (accessed February 12, 2009). 117 Ibid. 118 European Union, Civilian Crisis Manageme nt, Conflict Prevention, under External Relations: Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management, http://ec.europa.eu/external_ relations/cfsp/cpcm/cm.htm (accessed February 12, 2009).
49 ere to be delivered.122 nnova aty training for local police forces.119 Initial civilian crisis management efforts were initiated to prevent re-militarization in strife-ridden areas. The possibility of assembling a European Rapid Reaction Force, in the form of EU Battlegroups, was also introduced. Ideas for such a force, however, remain ed tentative and only loosely articulated.120 Months later, in June 2000, another summ it in Santa Maria de Feira, Portugal, concentrated on documenting the military capab ilities and forces needed to make the ESDP operational as soon as possible. From this summit, a capability catalogue was created, thereby placing the Helsi nki Headline Goals in perspective.121 In November 2000, the EU convened a Capabilities Commitment Conference, at which member states determined more specific targets, and settled issues such as how troops, ships, and planes w Iting the CFSP/ESDP: The European C onvention, the T CE, and the Lisbon Tre nces on one European military cooperation had at last gained momentum, and a rhythm to cooperation processes was established. No l onger did years lapse between confere the CFSP/ESDP; instead, only months separa ted major meetings that determined capabilities targets, with in formal, bimonthly meetings of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) managi ng the interim. In November 2001, just year after the Feira summit, EU member st ates staged the Capa bilities Improvement Conference in acknowledgment of anticipated shortf alls for the 2003 deadline. As a 123 119Ibid. 120 Fulvio Attina and Sarah Repucci, ESDP and the European Regional Security Partnership, in Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years 2nd ed. Martin Holland (New York: Continuum, 2004), 70. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid., 70.
result, member states enacted the European Capabilities Action Plan, in which fifteen 50 s were tasked with submitting practical recommendations to address the ituatio e in on, as ings; atters sses f e projec t group sn.124 Another breakthrough was achieved with th e passage of the Treaty of Nic February 2001, leading one scholar to decl are that Europe finally succeeded in establishing its own security and defence pol icy at least in the procedural sense.125 Although this remark may overstate the case, a reallocation of competencies did permit the Political and Security Committee to dir ect crisis management operations. The PSC ceased to be a purely advisory body, with its authority to oversee opera tions at a strategic and tactical level. Through Nice, the ESDP became a procedurally viable organizati the exclusively state-driven character of the CFSP/ESDP was somewhat diluted.126 Admittedly, the Council of the EU maintained formal responsibility for PSC proceed nonetheless, the PSC effectively became the decision-making body for CFSP/ESDP m, increasing focus on the security matters and thereby facilitating concerted action. Even more progress was to come, as abatement in economic integration proce translated into increased attention for the ESDP. In Decembe r 2001, two years after formal ESDP structures had been estab lished, the European Council congregated in Laeken, Belgium, in order to brainstorm on the EUs problems and future. The result o the conference was the historic Laeken Decl aration (officially the Declaration on th Future of the European Union), a docume nt that acknowledged many of the issues 124 Ibid. 125 Ramses Wessel, The State of Affairs in the EU Security and Defence Policy: The Breakthrough in th e Treaty of Nice. Journal of Conflict and Security Law 8, no. 2 (2003): 265. 126 Ibid.
51 [did] e the itution for Europe (TCE) iled t facing the EU and outlined plans for a future convention to draft an EU constitution.127 Although the CFSP/ESDP was not the focal point of the summit, a statement was released proclaiming the operational capabili ty of the ESDP, meaning that the EU was formally able to undertake minor missions.128 The announcement was, however, tempered by a statement reaffirming that the development of military capabilities not imply the creation of a European army.129 More importantly, the Laeken Declaration conveyed member states intention to s ponsor a serious over haul of CFSP/ESDP institutional structures at the upcoming convention. Encourag ingly, member states even highlighted some of the more burdensome aspects of the CFSP/ESDP institutions.130 In February 2002, the first meeting of the Convention on the Future of Europe was held, with the objective being the creation of a European Constitution. One observer in conveying the enormity of the event, decl ared that the Conventi on was the first tim in the history of the European Unionthere [had] been an open public debate about aims, organization and instruments the EU s hould have to increase its influence as a global actor, matters that, incredibly enough, never seemed to have been discussed theretofore.131 Convention delegates met in plen ary session once or twice a month, releasing their first draft articles in Febr uary 2003 and completing their work in July 2003.132 Ultimately, the resulting Treaty establis hing a Const fao pass in France and the Netherlands forcing a reconsideration of the entire 127 Attina and Repucci, 70. 128 European Union, Declaration on the Operation Capability of the Common European Security and Defey 2003. on Foreign and Security: The First Ten artin Holland (New York: Continuum, 2004), 5 5. nce Polic129 Ibid. 130 Fraser Cameron, The Convention and CFSP/ESDP, in Comm Years 2nd ed. M131 Cameron, 132 Ibid., 27.
52 sion of trends in first ead use and by s reflect state DP. Member states co ntinue to differentiate themselves on the CFSP/E endeavor and resulting in the amended Treaty of Lisbon.133 Many of the innovations of the CFSP/E SDP structures recapitulated in the Reform Treaty originated at the Convention. Ther efore, despite the illfated conclu the Conventions deliberations, it is instructive to discern some of the general member state opinions. Fraser Cameron pro ffers that a review of plenary session deliberations from the External Action and Defence Working Groups (WGs) differentiated member states into three broa d groups, regarding the CFSP/ESDP: the group favored greater EU institutional involvement in the CFSP and more widespr of QMV (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg); the second group also favored strengthening the CFSP/ESDP, but fully supported the institutions intergovernmental nature and the use of unanimity (UK, Spain, Greece, Portugal); and the final group was composed of neutral and non-ali gned states, united a rejection of the Euro-zone of defen ce (Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, Austria, and Finland).134 Since this survey of state interest s was taken, the EUs membership has expanded by twelve member states, and yet the same general division attitudes on the CFSP/ES SDP based on the dichotomy between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism. Even so, the persistence of these divi sions did not obstruct action during the Convention. Representatives to the Conventi on were not tasked with resolving these fundamental divisions, but with collectively identifyi ng enduring problems with the CFSP/ESDPs institutional structures. Although the modifications proposed by the 133 Ibid., 24.
53 nificant. on that f the ice Presiden t of the European Comm ission, and manage ion ber state. Nonetheless, the clauses articulation signaled a shift from l as External Action and Defence WGs were hard ly revolutionary, they were sig Among these modifications was the creation of the EU Foreign Minister, a positi would combine the posts of the current HR for the CFSP and the European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy. This innovation was particularly important, as co llaboration between the Council of the EU and the European Commission on the CFSP had become rather arduous. The role o HR was ambiguous, and as neither organ had a formal voice in the other branch, effective coordination was duly hampered.135 The EU Foreign Minister would be SecretaryGeneral of the Council, act as V the European Defence Agency (EDA), brin ging badly needed coordination to the administration of the CFSP.136 The Convention also provided the defunct TCE (and eventually the Treaty of Lisbon) the somewhat controversial mutual so lidarity clause, in which member states pledged that EU instruments could be used for the protection of the civilian populat and democratic institutions in th e event of a terrorist attack.137 This provision is still far from instituting NATOs Article V security guarantee, however, as member states vehemently oppose the suggestion that the EU is moving toward becoming a collective security organization.138 Such assistance, unlike NATOs Article V, would not be provided automatically, but inst ead would have to be explicitly requested by the civilian authorities of a mem previous intransigence on utilizing ESDP capabil ities for intra-European crises as wel 134 Ibid.. 10. 135 Ibid., 136 Ibid. 0. 137 Ibid., 2
54 e ile to articular m odification of decision-making om the y ates for he nce, and coordination.142 The suggestions made by onvention delegates were promptly integrat ed into the failed European Constitution and the uncertain Treaty of Lisbon. external conflicts. Even more significant were suggestions that a Euro defence mechanism b adopted, thereby allowing a majority states to go forward with a proposed mission, wh allowing disinclined states to abstain. Unlike the constructive abstention, the Euro defence mechanism would not allow abstaining states from participating in decisions relating to implementation, although they would be able to join at a later stage. Built in this system of enhanced cooperation, was an overt incentive to par ticipate early on, to avoid exclusion during initial stages. This p procedures was more controversial than othe r issues, especially with opposition fr non-aligned and neutral member states.139 Ultimately, the consensus among memb er states centered on maintaining institutional structures and bolstering coherence within the CFSP/ESDP. The only other significant structural innovati on was the introduction of the EDA, the armaments agenc the EU had intended to construct ever since the WEU had transferred all its functions to the EU. It was not until June 2004 that th e EDA was formally constituted however.140 Even before the Convention had closed, commen tators criticized EU member st not being more ambitious.141 Other issues remained unresolved, such as expanding t use of Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP/ESDP, and enduring problems with institutional cooperation, c ohere C 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid., 21. 140 Ibid. 141 Ibid., 23.
55 Moving Forw ard with European Military Cooperation This historical overview of the ESDP testifies to the resi lient, if halting, nature of European military cooperation. Oddly enough, after more than forty years of failed starts, the EU finally began work toward the construction of a European security structure, just as the Cold War was reaching its end. Ev en in the early nineties, however, ESDP remained little more than an agreement on paper, a hope that someday the major powers of the EU would accede to the notion of an autonomous, militarized Europe. The consecutive crises in the Balkans provided just the incentive member states needed to unite behind a militarily autonomous Eur ope in 1999, and ESDP was finally given substance and structure. Thus, ESDP is chiefly a reactive pro cess, progressing or stagnating depending on the s ecurity context external to the Union. Despite the occasional charge that the European defense policy is a failed project, its trajectory illustrates that European defense cooperation tends to occur in rapid spurts followed by prolonged lulls. Granted, ambiguities abound in European military cooperation, with an dependent unified doctrine and standa rd operating procedur es still lacking. onetheless, these problems are hardly deal breakers. in N P142P Ibid., 7
56 hapter 3 Operationalizing the ESDP: Nearly twenty years afte r its conception, the pillar structure introduced by the Treaty on European Union persists as th e chief organizing principle underlying the European Security and Defence Policy. Alt hough it satisfied its objective, ensuring the primacy of member state in terests in the ESDP, the pi llar system has nonetheless complicated the maturation of the ESDP The simplistic division drawn between supranational and intergovernmental EU institu tions in their involvement with ESDP did little more than foster confusion. In this chapter, a brief overview will be provided of the current institutions, mechanisms, and problem s of the ESDP, along w ith an overview of the some of the E ken since 2003. Europes Security Apparatus in Theater, 2003-2009 In March 2003, just as the EU prepared to assume control of its first military operation, the contentious Iraq War exposed in harsh relief the many fissures that remained in Europes common foreign polic y apparatus. Indeed, cleavages between member states on the Iraq operation became so divisive that observers began to question the future viability of the CFSP/ESDP. After y ears of work on the technical aspects of the ESDP, it became evident that the rudimentar y mechanisms for political consultation, generally consisting of modified holdovers fr om EPC, were insufficient to promote a C Institutions, Machinery and Missions SDPs institutional deve lopments and operations underta
57 n to r control over member states actions.144 The division ry the ources ial of Operation Concordia was therefore imm e diately followed by the launch of EUPOL political consensus. Although under the treati es EU member states were beholde marginal political consultation at the very least, they failed to meet even these modest guidelines, with many issuing unilate ral and often riva l declarations.143 The EU presidency incumbent, Greece, was not considered a major EU power, and found itself unable to exert effective influence o over Iraq, th erefore, quickly became a public spectacle and a debacle for the emerging common foreign policy apparatus. In this context, the EU prepared to u ndertake its first autonomous ESDP milita operation. It was a modest mission that entailed the transition of control in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) from NATOs Allied Harmony to EUs Operation Concordia. From March th rough December 2003, thirteen EU states and fourteen non-EU countries contributed a total of three hundred and fifty military personnel to accomplish the missions objective: maintaining stability and peace in the FYROM and facilitating implementati on of the August 2001 Ohrid Agreement.145 Although the operation remained autonomous, the EU made full use of NATO res available through the Berlin Plus arrangements. As suggested by the size of the military force, the security risk was not high, b ecause NATO had neutralized most of the belligerents. The EUs presence, while meant to reaffirm the international communitys commitment to security in th e FYROM, was also meant to be a practical exercise, cruc to discerning problems with the CFSP/ESDP operational procedures.146 The conclusion 143 Cameron, 9. 144 Ibid, 8. 145 European Union, EU Military Operation in FYROM/Concordia, Concordia/FYROM, http://uewPage.aspx?id=594&lang=en .eu.int/sho (accessed February 9, 2009).
58 g the of ions, ly, litical ith ides an overview of ngoing and completed civilian and military ESDP operations. Proxima, the EUs first civilian crisis ma nagement mission, which focused on trainin FYROMs local police forces and identifyi ng weak points in the civilian ESDP.147 The relative success of the missions once again sent a plain signal that the EU intended to persevere in building its autonomous military capacity. The reemergence the EU on the international security scene vali dated its role as a vi able actor after its failure to intervene in Yugos lavia and served as harbi nger of many future miss including: various civilian missions in the European neighborhood, in BosniaHerzegovina, Kosovo, and Georgia; a military mission in Bosnia; and most important Europes out-of-area operations, ranging from the Congo to Egypt to Indonesia. The military and civilian missions that succeeded Operation Concordia have generally been small scale, especially when compared to UN or NATO peacekeeping operations. The EU, however, is constrained by a combination of limited capabilities, a lack of po will, and institutional complexity. The EU s international image remains firmly connected to its performance in each mission, further reinfo rcing member states caution to act. NATOs right of first refusal on all international crises is also important in EU calculations. The small scale of the EU operations to date should not be taken as a sign of failure; on the contrary, the missions small scal e has allowed the EU to experiment w the CFSP/ESDP without endangering the pr oject. Table 3.1 prov o 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid.
59 Table 3.1 Ongoing and Completed Civili an and Military ESDP Missions148 Civilian Operations Military Operations Ongoing Missions EU Police Mission in BosniaHerzegonvina (EUPM) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) EU Police Mission in Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah (EUBAM Rafah) EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission in Iraq (Eujust Lex) EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) EU Mission, Security Sector Reform Guinea-Bissau (EU SSR Guinea-Bissau) EU Police Mission, DRC (EUPOL Congo) EU Mission, Security Sector Reform DRC (EUSEC RD Congo) EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine -EU Military Operation in Bosnia (EUFOR Althea) -EU Military Operation, Deterrence of Piracy, Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia) Completed Missions EU Police Advisory Team, FYROM (EUPAT) EU Police Mission, FYROM (Proxima) EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (Eujust Themis) Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) EU Support to AMIS (Darfur) EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) EU Military Operation, FYROM (Concordia) EUFOR Tchad/RCA EUFOR RD Congo EU Military Operation, DRC (Artemis) 148 European Union, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP): Ongoing and Completed Operations.
60 e EU any ely tituted, they were 151 ion, Although an exhaustive account of each mission will not be provided here, th has gleaned quite a lot fro m its actions on the ground. Complications deriving from institutional complexity began to mani fest rapidly. Vague mandates and ambiguous institutional relationships seemed adequate when the ESDP remained dormant, but soon after launching Operation Conc ordia, the EU became acutely cognizant of just how m difficulties lingered in the ESDPs mechanisms. The most glaring problem was the absence of an established strategic culture or even standard operating procedures.149 To put this in perspective, when NATO renovated its raison d tre at the end of the Cold War, the first product of this reorientati on was the NATO Strategic Concept, which is the authoritative statement of the Alliances objectives and provides the highest level of guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them. It remains the basis for the implementation of Alliance policy as a whole.150 A strategic concept, thus, underlines the purpose and goals of a security organization, a facet the ESDP was sor lacking from its inception. Although the Peters berg Tasks were ins nowhere near elaborate enough to provide meaningful guidance. Cognizant of the difficulties this created for ESDP and with HR Solanas urging, EU member states adopted the European Security Stra tegy (ESS) in December 2003. The ESS affirm ed the EUs dedication to th e establishment of a secure Europe in a better world.152 In order to strengthen the Unions neighborhood and multilateral act 149 Solana, Preface, 5. 150 NATO, NATO Handbook, 2005, 18. 151 European Union, European Security Strategy (Brussels: EU, 2003) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed January 19, 2009). 152 Ibid., 3-5.
61 53 The ESS thus captured many of the recurring themes ne p of ven to nine battlegroups by 2007, the co rnerstone of ESDP military operations.155 ecision re e the policy imperatives included more action on the EUs part; increased capabilities; more coherence in institutional design; and enhanced collaboration between the EU and partner security organizations.1surrounding the CFSP/ESDP. In June 2004, EU member states agr eed on the implementation of even more ambitious capability goals. Headline Go al 2010 expanded upon the Helsinki Headli Goals, and integrated less ons learned from the Concor dia and Proxima operations. Particular emphasis was placed on improving interoperability, deployability, and troo sustainability, as well as on refi ning and developing capabilities.154 The necessity of cultivating strategic lift ca pacity autonomous from NATO was among the foremost priorities, leading to the deci sion to make available a Eur opean aircraft carrier by 2008. Most importantly, member states committed themselves to the complete development se The Institutions of the ESDP The pillar sy stem delineated distinct institutional decision-making methods contingent on policy area, with the CFSP/ESDP relegated to the s econd pillar of d making. Decisions relating to the CFSP ar e therefore handled exclusively by the European Council and the Council of Minist ers, implying the sovereignty of state interests even within the EU structure over matters relating to foreign policy, security, and defense.156 In this construct, the European Co mmission and European Parliament a supposed to be little more than advisory bodi es and are not meant to exercise decisiv 153 European Security Strategy 11-13. 154 European Union, Headline Goal 2010 EU, June 17, 2004. 155 Ibid.
62 to eral arket, ugh the ditio n in ouncil concentrates on long-term visionary planning and structuring for the influence over the ESDP. However, reality is decidedly more complicated than this construct suggests. Although decisions relating to the ESDP are exclusively relegated the Council, the Commission exercises budgeta ry powers over the CFSP, the civilian ESDP, and a portion of the military ESDP through annual and seven-year financial framework allocations.157 It also has a tangible influen ce in civilian ESDP operations, especially in coordi nating action between member states through the Directorate-Gen for External Relations (DG RELEX). DG RE LEX also represents the Commission in international forums, such as the United Nations, the Organizati on for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the Council of Europe.158 The Commission was also crucial in the establishment of a defense regulatory framework and Union-level defense m both significant developments for the ES DP. Similarly, the European Parliament, although not given a formal role in C FSP/ESDP, can pass legislation thro tranal first pillar processes regarding defense market regulation.159 Nonetheless, progress on the ESDP has historically been driven by the Europea Council. Distinctly paralleling European ec onomic integration, military cooperations most significant advances have occurred at intergovernmental summits, exemplified the notable St. Malo and He lsinki conferences. Summits on ESDP resulted in Joint Actions, official declarations by the European Council creating ESDP institutions and establishing expansive capability goals. Fulfillin g its characteristic role in the Union, the European C on, 156. elations, EU, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/external_relations 156 Anders157 Ibid. 158 European Commission, External R /index_en.htm (accessed December 12, 2008). 6. 159 Anderson, 15
63 ESDP.1 ate rk beneath the pur e ch second bodies -the m ost important of these being the EU Military Staff, the Civilian Planning 60 The Council of the Ministers, and more specifically the General Affairs and External Relations Council, is charged with managing all ESDP specifics, from initiating and executing operations to ensuring that memb er states are meeti ng capability targets. However, the GAERC is comprised of one mi nisterial representati ve per member st and meets only once a month. Although meetin gs on General Affairs and External Relations have been held separately si nce June 2002, External Relations Council meetings address all areas of EU external action, whic h includes foreign trade policy and development cooperation in addition to the CFSP.161 Considering its infrequent meeting schedule and broad scope of action, the GAERC was never the de facto decision-making body for ESDP. Given the impracticality of making the GAERC the managerial body for ESDP, the European Council established a number of ESDP institutions to wo view of the GAERC with the launch of military cooperation 1999.162 ESDP institutions can be arranged into two groups. The first group encompasses the de facto decision-making bodies for the ESDP, which emanate hierarchically from th GAERC. Working from the bottom to the t op, there are diverse working groups, whi present reports to the EU Military Comm ittee. The EUMC advises the Political and Security Committee in conjunction with the Politico-Military Group.163 The grouping is the ESDP Secretariat, co mprising the HR for the CFSP (who is simultaneously Secretary-General of the C ouncil of Ministers) along with supporting 160 Ibid., 150. 161 European Union, About the General Affa irs and External Relations Council, EU, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/gac/index.htm (accessed October 12, 2009). sentative, EU Military Staff, intervie w by author, Brussels, BE, January 21, 2009. 162 Repre
and Conduct Capability (CPCC), and th e Joint Situation Centre (SitCen).164 Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of the ESDPs formative institutions. Figure 3.2 Formal ESDP Structures165 Unlike the advisory bodies that work beneath it, the PSC consists of ambassadorial-level political directors of member state fo reign ministries. Representatives in the PSC, although only mandated to help define policies, integrate supporting bodies recommendations toward the formula tion of policy, be this agreement on a common foreign policy position or the decision to initiate an operation.166 Thus, the PSC is the formative body in European military cooperation, as the first and often definitive forum for the discussion and resolution of Eur opean defense, security, and foreign policy 64 g an ESDP C 08. sentative (EUMS), inte rv iew by the author, Brusse ls, BE, January 21, 2009. 163 Ibid. 164 Annika Bjorkdahl and Maria Stromvik, The Decision-Making Process Behind Launchin risis Management Operation Brief, Danish Institute for International Studies, April 20165 Repre
concerns. This is not to say the bodies above it are inconsequen tial. The Permanent Representatives Committee (in this case, Coreper II) is composed of ambassadors who meet regularly to discuss economic, political, and commercial issues.167 When the PSC is unable to reach agreement on a contentious i ssue, it delivers its suggestions and opinions to Coreper II, thereby inviting these representati ves to come to a resolution if possible. If not, the issue is passed al ong with appended suggestions to the GAERC, which may or may not pursue the matter.168 Ultimately, the PSC is the body of first resort for international situations with a security dimension, meeting once and sometimes even twice a week to discuss deve loping security situations and review ongoing operations. The fact that an ESDP missions Operati on Commander reports directly to the PSC underscores the prominence the body holds for ESDP action.169 Nevertheless, the GAERC is formally re sponsible for the arrangements arrived at by lower bodies and only it has formal decision-making authority on substantive issues, such as when an ESDP operation is officially launched or concluded. Whereas the PSC is authorized to take decisions on the practic al management of a crisis, substantive decisions are ultimately approved by the GAERC.170 The Councils hierarchical ESDP structure might seem prone to deadlock, as each decision body must approve a proposal before it is pushed up to the next level. However, since the CFSP/ESDP occupies the second pillar of the Maastricht Treaty, a ll decision-making bodies function through 65 166 Ibid. 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid.
unanimity.171 Therefore, if an agreement is arrived at in the PSC, the chance is it will be ratified by the GAERC with very few alterations. In the ESDP Secretariat, the post of HR for the CFSP was established by the Treaty of Amsterdam in order to allow the Un ion to express itself w ith greater visibility and coherence on the international stage by giving it a more recognizable face and voice.172 The GAERC, although responsible for formulating common positions, admittedly falters in expressing these positions collectively on the international scene, especially in crisis situati ons. Thus, the HR is authorized to conduct political dialogue on behalf of the Council of Mini sters and at the behest of the Council Presidency. The HR for the CFSP is also charged with assisting the EU Presidency on all matters related to the CFSP, an admittedly broad and ambiguous mandate.173 The HR posts first and only incumbent, Javier Solana, has taken and expanded upon a broad mandate in unexpected and fortuit ous ways for the ESDP. Rather than work to reflect state interests, Solana and hi s personnel have been proactive in their involvement with the ESDP, catalyzing the a doption of the ESS and increasing the EUs visibility as a political actor.174 Indeed, Solana has been so influential as HR that concerns are expressed re garding the possible ramifi cations of his parting: Is there a risk that under a less skillful and visionary management the ESDP will lose its dynamism?Naturally, the political profile of his successor both within the EU and beyond it and the leadership style and qualities will be important determinants of her or his ability to influence the ESDP.175 Misgivings surrounding Javier Solanas departure may be exaggerated on this point. 66 171 Ibid. 172 European Union, High Representative for the CFSP, EU, http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/ high_representative_en.htm (accessed November 2, 2009). 173 Ibid. 174 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 202. 175 Ibid.
Although Solana has been instrumental in fo stering member state cooperation, it is an overstatement to say that his exit would cause ESDP to come to a standstill, especially since European military cooperation can be ch aracterized as a path-dependent process characterized by inst itutional stickiness.176 Indeed, European military cooperation has evolved significantly in the pa st ten years, enough so that concerns about retrogression reflect overblown criticisms rather than re al danger. More worrisome than Solanas impending departure are continuing issues of coordination, coherence and consistency. The deliberate separation of the civilian a nd military aspects of the ESDP exemplifies such inefficiencies. The EU prides itself in employing multi-p ronged strategies to foster a lasting peace on conflict-ridden territories, generally beginning with military intervention and proceeding in many cases with a civilian mission. Ironically, within the EU structure, the military prerogative remains with states, m eaning that a firm divorce is maintained between military and civilian action. Thus, separate structur es exist to manage military missions and civilian operations, although GAERC remains the decision-making body for both. The distinction between civilian and military operations results in unnecessary duplication of effort, confusion of mandate, and ultimately inconsistency of EU foreign policy. Although observers have highlighted othe r institutional problems of coordination, this is the most pressing and prominent one and will not likely find imminent resolution. ESDP Machinery: Framework Nations and the ATHENA Mechanism The aforementioned institutions work to direct civilian and military operations from a political-strategic level. For the management of tactical operations (hierarchically, 67 176 Ibid.
the military-strategic followed by the operational level), the EU has an entirely separate structure. Whereas the ESDP decision-maki ng bodies and the Secretariat are located in Brussels, tactical operations are directed by an operational headquart ers, located in the designated framework nation, and the force h eadquarters, located in the conflict zone.177 The framework nation is the state willing to provide the headquarters and a large portion of the troops, capabilities, and expertise for a mission. Given the magnitude of the framework nations tasks, there are only a handf ul of states in the EU qualified to be framework nation: France, Germany, the UK, Greece, and (soon) Sweden.178 The framework nation generally hosts the operati onal headquarters in its home country. For example, with EUFOR RD Congo, the fram ework nation Germany hosted operational headquarters in Potsdam. Force headquarters ar e located at the conf lict site to manage troops on the ground. However, the costs associated with acting as the framework nation for a mission are staggering. Under the AT HENA mechanism, adopted in 2003 shortly after the conclusion to Operation Artemis, the co sts [of a mission] lie where they fall.179 In other words, each member state is responsible fo r covering the costs of transporting, lodging, and feeding the troops it supplies. The framew ork nation is twice burdened then, at once providing the operational headquarters, and at another pr oviding the bulk of the troops. The ATHENA mechanism is meant to cover co mmon costs, but it is estimated it only covers 10 percent of a bill in the tens of millions of euros.180 The implication of this arrangement will be discussed in the next chapter. 68 177 Major, 18. 178 Ibid. 179 Bjorkdahl and Stromvik, 3. 180 Merlingene and Ostrauskaite, 126.
From Structures and Institutions to Implementation Apart from the creation of the ESS and Headline Goal 2010, the past six years have seen little innovation in ESDP structures. This lag ha s stemmed from the difficulty of changing current institutions under the pillar system. Although the EU has conducted many civilian and military operations under current ESDP arrangements, the consensus is that more effective action can only come through ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.181 Thus, the ESDPs transition from the theore tical to the substantive realm has been paralleled by the inability to effect reform in institutional structures. 69 181 Trybus, 43.
Chapter 4 Executing the ESDP: Case Studies of EU Military Operations In the previous chapters, the focus has been on the academic litera tures approach to ESDP and on linking patterns of historical and institutional development in European military cooperation, so as to situate the ES DP in context. This chapter moves to an empirical study of two European military operations, as we ll as two cases in which Europe declined to initiate military action (non-engagement). While many analysts have examined the motivations driving the EU to forge an autonomous, distinctly European military capability, insufficient attention is devo ted in the ESDP literature to the criteria that influence EU involvement (o r non-involvement) in a crisis. What factors influence whether the EU accep ts or declines a military intervention? Are certain factors more decisive than othe rs in influencing the EUs final decision? What does this analysis indicate about the EUs foreign policy strategy? Furthermore, it is not enough to understand how the EU fits in the international s ecurity framework -it is just as important to know whether the ES DP adds substantive value in global crisis management. Therefore, is the EU effective in meeting the established mandate and goals of a security operation? Overa ll, what does this analysis te lls us about the ESDPs added value in international crisis management? Dissecting the Military ESDP: Study Design and Methodology To answer the questions posed, an empi rical investigation will be conducted of two military operations, both delineative of the ESDP in action: EUFOR (European 70
Force) Althea and EUFOR RD Congo. Oper ation Althea is an ongoing stabilization mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and was la unched toward the end of 2004. Significant as the largest ESDP military operation conduc ted to date, EUFOR Althea is also the longest and most comprehensive milita ry mission undertaken in the European neighborhood.182 Through Operation Althea, the EU has been able to rebuild a reputation shattered after its recurrent failures in the Balkans during the 1990s. Today, EUFOR Althea is a source of pride for the Union, an emblem of the EUs commitment to peace and stability in its neigh borhood, making it an ideal case study of the ESDP in the European region. EUFOR RD Congo highlights the EUs extra-regional aspirations for the ESDP. The Union strives to become a globally relevant military actor, and so avoids concentrating its external s ecurity policy to the Europ ean neighborhood. More than any other region in the world, Africa has become the focal point of the EUs extra-regional outreach efforts. Nowhere is this more eviden t than in DRC, which has been host to three civilian and two military missions since ES DP achieved operational capacity in 2003.183 Launched in 2006, EUFOR RD Congo is th e second military maneuver the EU has conducted in DRC. Although another military mission (Operati on Artemis in 2003) preceded EUFOR RD Congo, the latter has been chosen as case study because of its chronological distance from Operation Althea. By scru tinizing a later milita ry operation, it will be possible to gauge the ESDPs responsiveness to problems encountered in its fi rst missions. Initial 71 182 European Union, EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUFOR BiH, http://www.euforbih.org/eufor/index. php ?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 (accessed Janua ry 31, 2009). 183 Council of the European Union, European Security and Defence Polic y (ESDP): Ongoing and Completed Operations, EU Operations, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang
operations, conducted just after the ESDP achieved operational capacity in 2003, are expected to have revealed problems with th e EUs operational structure. By choosing a mission from 2004 and another from 2006, it will be possible to glean the EUs ability to learn from problematic arrangements. EUFO R RD Congo also serves as an example of an extra-regional EU military operation and demonstrates the ESDPs responsive capacity. In addition to these two cases, this study surveys two negative cas es, situations in which the EU was presented with an opport unity to conduct a military intervention and declined. These case studies will provide a mo re complete understanding of the rationale behind ESDP operations, as the factors used to consider why the EU chose to launch the two military operations should also elucidate why the EU chose not to launch operations in the two negative cases. Care ha s been taken to identify situa tions that might really have been viable ESDP military operations. In choosing these non-mission cases, situations were selected in which there was international pressure for the EU to launch a military mission, a certain urgency of action characte rized the crisis, and the EUs military capabilities would have been of particular use. A subjective assessment suggests two prom inent instances satisfy these criteria: the EUs implicit dismissal of military interven tion in the enduring conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan;184 and the EUs explicit abjurati on in December 2008 of a military mission in DRC.185 Both crises have been prominent in the media, garnering criticism 72 =EN (accessed January 31, 2009). 184 Human Rights Watch, Failing Darfur Five Years On: Timeline, HRW Darfur, http://www. hrw.org/sites/default/files/features/darfur/fiveyearson/timeline.html (accessed February 7, 2009). 185 Toby Vogel, EU Rejects UN Request for Congo Force, European Voice (Brussels), December 12, 2008, under Foreign Affairs, http://www.europeanvoice.com/ artic le/2008/12/eu-rejectsun-request-for-congo-force-/63419.aspx (accessed February 7, 2009).
toward the EU for possessing the requisit e military capacity and still refusing to intervene, and so are ideal test cases on EU inaction. Admittedly, the negative case studies engender a more subjective assessmen t than the positive case studies, as the former rely on extrapolation from news sour ces and official statements to deduce the reasons behind European inaction. Even so, th e results will be beneficial in further refining conclusions on the factors motivati ng (or dissuading) the Union to launch a military mission. Factors Explaining the Deci sion to Launch a Mission Two sets of questions are being posed in this chapter, which will be addressed in turn by examining a specific set of potential ex planatory factors for each set of questions. The first set of questions expl ores the factors that influen ce the EUs decision to launch an operation. Eight factors have been chos en and subdivided into three categories: internal (national or institutional) factors, external (international) elements, and crisisspecific considerations. Internal variables include the salienc e of member state interests (historical ties, strategic concerns); the infl uence of EU institutional interests; and the importance of constructing a pan-European identity versus the domestic (national) opinion on military intervention. Among the extern al factors to be considered are the presence and involvement of the UN, NATO, or the AU in crisis management and the weight given to international law, R2P, and th e pursuit of international prestige. The third category of factors, relating to issues of ESDP militar y capacity and the conflict in question, includes the scrutiny of the following: actual military capacity versus capacity required by potential mission; th e nature of the crisis; and geographic proximity. The ten factors are summarized in Table 4.1. 73
Table 4.1 Summary: Factors Influential in Determining EU Military Engagement or Inaction Internal Concerns (National/Institutional) External Concerns (Extra-regional/International) Military Capacity Concerns Salient member state interests (historical ties, strategic interests) Intra-EU institutional interests Pan-European identity construction and domestic opinion UN, NATO, or AU involvement International law, R2P, and international prestige Nature of the conflict/crisis Geography Military capacity These factors are derived from basic theo ries of internationa l relations discussed in the first chapter. Both interest-based theo ries and norm-based theories of state behavior are integrated, includi ng neorealist, neoliberal, and constr uctivist elements, as this study is premised on the idea that no one factor (o r framework) fully explicates the rationale driving EU military intervention. Rather, a co mbination of these factors does. The logic that internal and external f actors drove initial European military cooperation has been a consistent theme in previous chapters. This chapter further extends that logic, theorizing that the very same factors that drove EU member states to embark on military cooperation also prompt member states to launch military operations under the EU umbrella. However, whereas the catalyst for initiating military cooperation was rooted in the impact of external phenomena on member state interests, this study hypothesizes another dynamic. Pressures external to the EU are not decisive in determining military intervention, in contrast to their role in driving European military cooperation. Rather than external events (humiliations) driving EU to military cooperation, internal (largely national) interests determine military intervention. 74
Case Study Briefings: Context and Decision An overview of the politico-historical c ontext of the cases is necessary, as the information is pivotal in gr ounding a discussion of the factor s decisive in inducing or precluding EU military engagement. From NATO Operation to ESDP Mission : EUFOR Althea (2 Decem ber 2004 Ongoing) From 1992 to 1995, bitter ethnic conflict engulfed Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the violent dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia translated into humanitarian catastrophe. Only in 1995, after three years of war and 100,000 dead, was the fighting finally ended through the inte rvention of NATO forces.186 Thereafter, the tenuous peace enshrined in the Dayton Accords was enfo rced by NATO, initially through the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Given the instability of the post-conflict se tting, IFOR was composed of n early 60,000 troops and was tasked with ensuring compliance with the m ilitary aspects of the Dayton Accords.187 Fortunately, tensions eventually subsided in Bosnia-Herzegovina to an extent that permitted the transition to a smaller, NATO-le d Stabilization Force (SFOR) in December 1996. The initial NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina had not been sanctioned by the UN, and although tacitly accepted by states afterward, was nonetheless technically illegal according to international law. The subsequent IFOR and SFOR missions, however, were authorized by the UN, and therefore were considered both legal and 186 European Union, EUFOR History: Operation Althea, EUFOR BiH, http://www.euforbih.org/ eufor/index.php?op tio n=com_content&task=view&id=13&Itemid=29 (accessed February 10, 2009). 187 Julie Kim, Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Peacekeeping (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2006), 1. 75
legitimate in the international community.188 Over the years, with SFOR re-authorized by the UN on an annual basis, SFOR troops were gradually reduced from a peak of 32,000 troops in December 1996 to little more than 7,000 in late 2004.189 As the peace enforced in 1995 became more stable, NATOs troops were gradually drawn down until it was announced at the June 2004 Istanbul summ it that NATO would be concluding its involvement by the end of the year, to be followed up by an EU military operation.190 Interestingly, the EU had expressed willingness to assume control over the stabilization and monitoring mission in Bosn ia since early 2002, well before the ESDP was declared operationally capable.191 Reluctance and apparent differences in opinion between NATO and the EU had prevented serious discussion on a potential handover until December 2003. These differences stemme d largely from US skepticism regarding the motivations underlying Europes enthusiasm: U.S. officials may be wary of French and other European long-term aspirations to build up European military structures separate from NATO. Those with this perspective might be concerned that a successful EU mission in Bosnia could work to diminish NATOs primacy and possibly U.S. influence on European security matters.192 Eventually, trepidation on this particular point was assuaged, as NATO-EU discussions agreed early on that the ESDP mission w ould be undertaken under the Berlin Plus arrangements. Although the follow-up mission would be operationally autonomous from NATO, the EU was given recourse to NATO assets and planning capabilities.193 However, even after the specifics of th e mission had been settled between the EU and NATO, apprehension permeated EUFO R Altheas planning process. Operation 76 188 Paul D. Williams and Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur, Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005): 41. 189 Kim, 2. 190 Ibid., 4. 191 Ibid., 2. 192 Ibid., 4.
Althea would only be the EUs third military mission and its largest to date, with approximately 7,000 troops committed.194 Given Europes failur e in the Balkans during the 1990s, observers considered EUFOR Althea as the Unions baptism of fire. Success in Operation Althea would confer legitimacy on the nascent ESDP; conversely, failure would quash the EUs dwindling military credib ility and likely extinguish member states willingness to further promote an autonomous ESDP.195 These implications were not lost on EU member states. Misgivings regarding the EUs milita ry capacity may, however, have been overblown. With SFORs gradual drawdown over the years, the percentage of US troops had declined at a disproportionate rate as compared with European counterparts, under the US governments in together, out together policy.196 By 2004, nearly eighty percent of troops were provided by European states When the transfer from NATO to EU command was implemented, most SFOR troops only had to change insignia, trading their NATO/SFOR badges for those of the EU.197 Therefore, the EUs major operational challenges concerned replacing the 1,000 Amer ican troops and locating a framework nation for SFORs Task Force North. That NATO had elected to conclude SFOR was illustrative of another fact: Bosnia was stable enough for withdrawal. Granted conditions were delicate in 2004 and continue to be fi ve years later: 77 193 Ibid., 2. 194 European Union, EUFOR History: Operation Althea. 195 Frank Meeske, Baptism of Fire for the Euro pean Security and Defense Policy: Will the European Forces Successfully Impl ement the Dayton Accords? (maste rs thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 1. 196 Kim, 2. 197 Thomas Bertin, The EU Military Operation in Bosnia, in European Security and Defence Policy: An Implem entation Perspective eds. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (New York: Routledge, 2008): 64.
Bo snia remains deeply divided along ethnic lines and across the two entities which make up the country the Bosniak/Croat Federation and the Serbian Republika Srpska. The political scars of the war remain vivid as the public debates and the media demonstrate on an almost daily basis. Clearly, reconciliation has not been achieved and bitterness still prevails. The state of affairs probably makes Bosnia the most complex political construct in the Balkans and a long-term problem.198 Even so, the Bosnia of 2004 was certainly not that of 1995, no longer a humanitarian disaster. Although EUFOR Althea was to some extent a baptism of fire for the ESDP, the Union was taking command over a crisis that had largely stabili zed with troops that had long been in theater. EU-UN Cooperation: EUFOR RD Congo (27 April 2006-30 Nove mber 2006) A few years after the launch of Opera tion Althea, reservations regarding the utility of the ESDP were finally dissipati ng, so that by 2006 the ESDP was considered a practical alternative to UN and NATO peacek eeping. This was especially true with respect to small-scale operations, to the extent that some believed the EU [was] a victim of its own success.199 Election observation missions ha d inadvertently become the ESDPs specialty, with requests from nationa l governments eventually outstripping the EUs capacity.200 With time and the ESDPs increasing success, even the UN has come to perceive the EU as a valuable ad hoc pa rtner in international peacekeeping, if only t temporarily bolster beleaguered operations. o The DRC in particular has become a pivotal locus of EUUN cooperation. Since emerging from Belgian colonial rule in 1960, the DRC has been in an almost unremitting state of turmoil.201 Thirty years under the Mobutu regime and two regional and civil wars 198 Ibid., 62. 199 Marie V. Gibert, Monitoring a Region in Crisis: The European Union in West Africa (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2007), 34. 200 Ibid. 78 201 Global Policy Forum, Democratic Republic of Congo, Policy Making at the United Nations,
(1996-97 and 1998-2002) over the Congos natural re sources cultivated an atmosphere of chronic instability and violence in the D RC, its short history a testimony to massive human rights violations and weak to nonexistent governance.202 An estimated 3.9 million died in the civil war following the fall of the Mobutu regime, making it the most deadly conflict since World War II.203 For half a century, the Congo has been struggling toward a sustainable peace, a goal buttressed in 1999 with the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement.204 Even with the official conclusi on of DRCs civil war, rebel groups continue to wage war in Ea stern Congo. The violence has re sulted in massive internal displacement and has led to thousands of deaths every month from disease, famine, and exposure.205 Although history illustrated the agreem ents incapacity to prevent further violence, the Lusaka Ceasefire enabled the intervention of UN peacekeeping troops in the form of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC). Deployed as of November 1999, MONUC is mandated with monitoring the often violated ceasefire and has ranged from an in itial force strength of 5,537 to a present-day 22,145.206 Despite annual reauthorization by the UN Security Council, MONUC is plagued by persistent troop shortfalls. Forces are contributed by indi vidual nations on an as available basis, an arrangement that ha s often resulted in c ontributions far below 79 http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/kongidx.htm (accessed February 11, 2009). 202 European Union, ESDP in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Supporting Transition, ESDP Newsletter no. 2 (June 2006): 15. 203 Global Policy Forum, Democratic Republic of Congo. 204 Global Policy Forum, Democratic Republic of Congo. 205 Simon Robinson, The Deadliest War in the World, Time May 28, 2006, under World, http://www.time.com/time/magazine /article/0 ,9171,1198921,00.html (accessed February 11, 2009). 206 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, MONUC: Facts and Figures, UNDPKO, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/monuc/facts.html (accessed March 1, 2009).
requested levels.207 Therefore, the UN welcomed the ascendance of the ESDP as a valuable partner in international pea cekeeping operations. Although the ESDP is incapable of providing a force of 20,000 peacekeeping troops, the UN has taken advantage of the EUs de facto sp ecialization in small-scale missions.208 Hence, in December 2005, the UN appealed to the Union for military assistance in overseeing the DRCs first free presidential and parliamentary elections since independence.209 Although MONUC troops were statione d in DRC, years of civil war and corrupt governance threatened to undo these tentative steps toward democracy. In the earnest expectation of electoral violence, Secretary-General Kofi Annan petitioned the EU for a small military contingent, to bol ster overburdened MONUC troops and ensure peace in the run-up to the July 2006 elec tions. Interestingly, the UN request was communicated directly to the EU presid ency, thereby circumventing established consultation mechanisms.210 The action surprised the EU presidency and indicated a lack of confidence in the Council of the EUs admittedly onerous cooperation processes.211 To the public, the EUs authorization of EUFOR RD Congo seemed to be an extension of its economic development policy in the former Belgian colony, an almost reflexive action on the part of the EU. Cert ainly, the EU was pleased that the UN had once again requested an ESDP mission, as th e gesture validated th e ESDPs previous successes and inherent worth.212 In reality, however, EU memb er states were divided, at once acknowledging the necessity of military reinforcements in DRC and yet undecided 80 207 Ibid. 208 Claudia Major, EU-UN Cooperation in Military Crisis Management: The Experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2008), 11. 209 Ibid., 23. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid.
on whether to launch an operation.213 Even with the uncharacter istically direct request from the UN and a consensus on the gravity of the situation, the Council was unresolved for weeks on whether to launch a mission: two months of dithering and obviations in Brusselsended in two days of meetingsE U defense ministersco uld only decide to send EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana to Congo to discuss with the countrys leadership what, if any, sort of operation is both required and wanted.214 In March 2006, after much French and Belgian lobbying, the Council approved an option paper declaring the EUs s upport for MONUC. EUFOR RD Congo had not officially been launched in the option paper; instead, EU member states expressed their decision to begin the military-strategic pl anning process, which would determine the location of operational and force headquart ers and troop-contributing member states.215 Ironically, the process of identifying a fram ework nation and generating forces was the most cumbersome aspect of the mission, with none of the major EU military powers willing to take the helm. Not that there were many contenders to be framework nation -the only EU states considered were France, the UK, Germany, Italy, and Greece, since smaller EU member states such as Belgium, Spain, Poland, Sweden, and Portugal were not capable of supplying more than a couple dozen troops each.216 Much of what followed, therefore, was wrangling over which state would be stuck managing the mission. Both France and the UK asserted that their military budgets were 81 212 Ibid., 9. 213 EurActiv Network, EU Reluctant to Send Troops to Congo, EU Security, http://www.euractiv. com/en/security/eu-re luctan t-send-troopscongo/article-152902 (accessed March 1, 2009). 214 Marc Young, EU Congo Mission: Europes Heart of Darkness, Der Spiegel (Hamburg), March 8, 2006, under Under the Scope, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,404976,00.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 215 Major, 24. 216 Young, EU Congo Mission: Europes Heart of Darkness.
already stretched thin. France was managing m ilitary actions in the Ivory Coast, and the UK was occupied in Iraq and Afghanistan. France, furthermore, had acted as the framework nation for Operation Artemis, and so was averse to bearing the costs of another Congo operation.217 Italy and Greece declined the mission outright, without specifying any particular reason. The last ma jor EU military power, Germany, was also reluctant to undertake responsib ility, although this was due to heated public debate over the question of intervention.218 Pressure on Germany to become EUFO Rs framework nation was especially intense, since at the time, Germany was in charge of th e current battlegroup rotation. Therefore, if saddled with the mission, Germany would be expected to provide the bulk of the troops and manage the enti re operation, both colossal tasks.219 This created a crippling disincentive to acti on for the German government. Even so, criticism was rife in the EU over the German governments vacillatio ns. Germany, for its part, highly resented being censured, especially considering that France had been the main proponent of the operation. Eventually, a compromise was ag reed, in which Germany and France would each provide one third of the troops, with the other member states and external parties contributing the last third.220 Despite the EUs apparent reluctance to adopt the election observation mission and difficulties with force generation, Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP was approved April 27, 2006, a full four months after the UNs request. Clearly, convincing EU member states to undertake a mission in Congo had b een problematic, even with the UNs explicit 82 217 Ibid. 218 Ibid. 219 Major, 24. 220 Ibid., 25
support. Why, however, if there were so many disincentives to intervene, did the EU choose to do so? Unlike the relative stabil ity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Congos first free elections were not guaranteed to be devoid of violence, making the EUs success there all the more crucial and precarious. Declining Responsibility: Sudan Six Years Later Since the conflict began in 2003, the government-sponsored genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan has been the fo cus of international outrage. With over 400,000 people killed and millions more displaced,221 Darfur is a humanitarian crisis second only to DRC in proportions and with increasingly transnational implications, as refugee flows threaten to destabilize neighboring Chad. Un fortunately, international condemnation has not translated into meaningful interv ention nor has it obstructed the Sudanese governments actions. Although international ai d from the UN, EU, and individual states has been abundant, the Sudanese governme nt continues to massacre its Darfuri population, making it a supreme humanitarian emer gency according to the standards of the emerging sovereignty as responsibility norm.222 The notion of sovereignty as responsib ility first emerged in a report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) as a clarification on the duties of the internationa l community in cases of severe humanitarian crisis perpetrated by state governments.223 Although it is unden iably a weak and contested norm, the notion that a responsibilit y to protect (R2P) exists has gained some 221 Responsibility to Protect, Crisis in Darfur, R2P Engaging Civil Society, http://www. responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/pages/6 (accessed March 12, 2009). 222 Williams and Bellamy, 27. 83 223 Responsibility to Protect, An Introduction to R2P, R2P Engaging Civil Society, http://www. responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/pages/2 (accessed March 12, 2009).
traction since it was suggested in Decembe r 2001. The UN affirmed the validity of the concept in Resolution 1556, maintaining the S ecurity Councils comm itment to the idea in light of the successive humanitarian crises of the 1990s.224 In reality, the Security Councils allegiance to the R2P doctrine has no t been followed, a fact that is hardly stunning. What is surprising, however, is the EUs avowal of the con cept since it was first introduced, and its persistent lack of significant action in Darfur. Whereas power politics in the Security Council prevents the authorization of an intervention without Khartoums consent, the EU is not inhibited by such a constraint. To be sure, the EU places a premium on UN appr oval for the legitimacy it provides to an international action.225 Yet, as the NATO intervention in Kosovo illustrated, although an intervention without UN authori zation is technically illega l, it can still be seen as legitimate by the international community.226 Therefore, illegality does not preclude legitimacy. If the Security C ouncil becomes mired in disputes among the Permanent Five, the EU can launch a mission unilaterally, albeit illegally, with the hope that international legitimacy will follow. If the EU had never declared its suppor t for the R2P doctrine, the reality of EU non-intervention in Sudan would never have become an issue. Introduced less than a decade ago, the conception of sovereignty as responsibility is far too recent to merit designation as a norm of intern ational society. The idea that state sovereignty can impose certain imperatives upon government runs c ontrary to the curren t normative foundations of the international system, which posit s overeignty as freedom from interference.227 84 224 Williams and Bellamy, 27. 225 Major, 5. 226 Williams and Bellamy, 42. 227 Ibid., 28.
With precepts that challenge the very foundati ons of the international system, the notion of sovereignty as responsibil ity is tenuous at best and is applicable only to those who acknowledge it. The EU, however, did declare its support for the R2P principle and was one of the foremost proponents of the ICISSs findings, th ereby making it a target of international reproach: The EUs inaction is doubly da mning considering that in 2005 all its membersaccepted a concept that, if pract iced, would prove the international communitys best defense against mass atrocity crimes.228 The EUs recognition of the dire humanitarian situation in Sudan can also be verified, for inst ance in HR Solanas acknowledgment that the long-su ffering people of Darfur need help -not next week, or next month, but today. The violence that ha s long terrorized the ci vilian population is persisting. Extreme human rights violati ons are continuingStanding by is not an option.229 Even so, the EUs actions have hardly matched its remonstrative rhetoric. Rather than launch its own military intervention, the EU has been content to defer to the UNs ineffective soft diplomacy and endorse African Union (AU) peacekeeping. This is not to say military intervention should have been the first course of action, but to acknowledge that Khartoums tendency has been to manipulate diplomatic proceedings as a delaying tactic.230 More than once, the Sudanese government has agreed to ceasefires and international involvement, only to immediately negate these ceasefires and obstruct the entry of internat ional forces. Without the threat of a credible military 85 228 Mark Burgess, Darfur and the EUs Resp onsibility to Protect, Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3994 (accessed March 11, 2009). 229 Nick Grono, Darfur: What Should the EU Do? (lecture, Co nference on Darfur, Landstingssalen, Copenhagen, Denmark, February 28, 2007), International Crisis Group, http://www.crisis group.org/home/index.cfm?id=4683&I=1 (accessed March 11, 2009).
intervention, Khartoum is unlikely to be swayed by economic or diplomatic sanctions.231 Nevertheless, the EU has avoided committing itself to military intervention, regardless of whether conditions in Darfur persist. Instead, the EUs policy has been to support African solutions to African problems,232 reflecting the EUs preference for deferring to regional peacekeeping framework s for conflict resolution and peacekeeping. Generally, this has meant acceding to AU control of crisis management in Darfur, and bolstering AU peacekeeping through technical and financial support rather than sending EU forces.233 While the idea of helping AU troops de velop their own crisis management capacity is commendable in theory, the EUs approach is inherently flawed. In the interest of giving the peacekeeping operation in Sudan a strong African character,234 the EU left a weak and unproven security st ructure to ensure peace in an extremely volatile region. From 2004 through 2007, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was predominantly responsible for security.235 However, at its peak strength, AMIS only had 9,000 troops in Darfur and was still insuffici ent, as rebels continued pillaging with impunity. The EU, for its part, supplied less than one hundred military and police advisers, but provided very generous financial support.236 The joint United Nations/African Uni on Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) succeeded the conclusion of AMIS, with a force of 15,114 currently in place.237 The EUs financial 86 230 Burgess, Darfur and the EUs Responsibility to Protect. 231 Ibid. 232 Williams and Bellamy, 35. 233 Grono, Darfur: What Should the EU DO? 234 Gerhard Pfanzelter, EU Presiden cy Statement -Security Council Public Meeting on Sudan, 30.06.2006, EU Statements in International Organizations, http://www.ue2006.at/en/News/Statements_in_ International_Organisations/UN/3006sudan.html?null (accessed March 11, 2009). 235 Grono, Darfur: What Should the EU Do? 236 The European Commission and member states were estimated to have given approximately 400 million Euros to AMIS, along with 360 million Euros in humanitarian aid. Ibid. 237 United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur, Darfur -UNAMID -Facts and Figures,
and technical contributions have remained fair ly stable since the transfer from AMIS to UNAMID. The EUs negligible level of military engagement also remains unchanged, despite recurring calls from observers fo r a more vigorous military intervention, especially given the recent increase of violence in Darfur. Given the EUs championing of the R2P doctrine in the common foreign policy, it will therefore be revealing to conduct a negative case study of EU non-interv ention in Darfur. Th ere is extensive speculation as to the EUs re asons for rejecting military intervention, and this study may not be able to provide a definitive answer However, this case should nonetheless be useful in further elucidating the motivations propelling the military ESDP. Rebuffing Post-EUFOR Congo Closely related to the question of EU in tervention in Congo in 2006 is the matter of non-engagement in late 2008, following a direct request from UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to HR Solana. Although the 2006 presidential and parl iamentary elections had been successful and free of fraud, Congol ese government continues to lack capacity. Instability has been furthe r exacerbated by ongoing guerrilla conflicts in Eastern Congo. Notwithstanding MONUCs abiding presence, famine, disease, and exposure continue killing an estimated 45,000 people a month, the highest death rate of any region in the world.238 In spite of efforts to arrange a sustai nable ceasefire, renewe d conflict in North Kivu once again reached crisis proportions in mid-2008, following the betrayal of the January Goma peace agreement by rebel leader Laurent Nkundas forces.239 By October, UNAMID, http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/facts.html (accessed March 11, 2009). 238 Lydia Polgreen, Congos Death Rate Unchanged Since War Ended, New York Times, January 23, 2008, under World: Africa, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/world/africa/23congo.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 87 239 Lydia Polgreen, Congo Agrees to Peace Deal With Rebels, New York Times January 22,
an estimated 200,000 people had joined the ranks of the more than one million internally displaced persons.240 With violence escalating and MONUC quickly becoming overwhelmed, Secretary-General Ban sent a letter to HR Solana in November 2008, appealing for an urgent bridging operation of approxima tely 3,000 troops to bolster MONUC until replacements could be located.241 In response, on November 12, the Council of the EU released a statement condemning the actions of Nkundas CNDP, but only guaranteeing that it would keep a close eye on the humanitari an and security situation in the east of the DRC so that it [could] reflect in greater detail on the different courses of action that may be envisaged in the light of circumstances.242 The Council also called for reinforcement of cooperation among the UN, the EU, and member states, a rather ambiguous statement that neither committed nor ruled out EU military intervention.243 Soon, even this nominal consensus in favor of further discussion dissolved, as EU member states asserted their opinions on a potential EU military intervention. French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner was the first to defect, declaring the state of affairs in DRC unacceptable and murderous and urging EU member states to launch an ESDP mission.244 The inflammatory statement had the effect of unveiling the disjointed 88 2008, under World: Africa, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/ world/africa/22congo.html (accessed March 1, 2009). 240 Xan Rice, Thousands Flee Heavy Fighting in Congo, The Guardian (London), October 28, 2008, under World News: Democratic Republic of Congo, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/oct/28/ goma-congo-fighting-rebels (accessed March 1, 2009). 241 Toby Vogel, Europe Must Back Up Words with Action in Congo, European Voice (Brussels), November 20, 2008, under Foreign Affairs, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/eu rop e-must-back-up-words-with-action-incongo/63117.aspx (accessed March 1, 2009). 242 Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2902nd General Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, Belgium, 2008. 243 Ibid. 244 Neil Campbell, Reinforcing What? The EUs Ro le in Eastern Congo, International Crisis
distribution of member state opinions on th e possibility of inte rvention in DRC: Kouchner was the first to call for EU military intervention in Congo. The EUs chief diplomat, Javier Solana, quickly rejected th e idea, the Belgians came out in support, and the British were skeptical. Meanwhile visits to the region by [EU Special Representative Roeland] van de Geer, commissioner Louis Michel, and Kouchner with UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband left no impression of a unified front. It is not clear if Milibands primary objective was conflict prevention or Commonwealth enlargement with Rwanda. And Solana was not even allowed on the plane.245 At this point, the CFSPs shortcomings becam e palpable, with member states and even EU institutional actors completely negati ng any semblance of a common EU approach. Belgium, as in EUFOR RD Congo, became the most vocal supporter of an EU bridging operation, while the UK and Germany emer ged as the most visible opponents.246 France, for its part, initially seemed to support the proposal for an operation, especially as observed thr ough foreign minister Kouchners exhortations. However, French President Sarkozys statements indicat ed otherwise, as he questioned the very necessity of an ESDP mission and challeng ed Secretary-General Bans assessment: On the question of the Congolet me say two th ingsThe first is that there are 17,000 UN soldiers in the DRCI wonde r if its necessary to send another 3,000 to add to the 17,000![second] wouldnt it be better firs t to call on regional forcesrather than European forces?247 Thus, Sarkozy revealed France to be more closely aligned with the UK and Germany than Belgium, in contrast to its previous stance in EUFOR RD Congo. Consequently, only a month after the UN Secretary-Generals appeal, EU member 89 Group, November 17, 2008, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5779 (accessed April 2, 2009). 245 Ibid. 246 Toby Vogel, Why Europe Is Split Over Troops for Congo, European Voice (Brussels), December 11, 2008, under For eign Affairs: Missions, http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ why-europe-is-split-over-troops-for-congo/63357.aspx (accessed March 1, 2009). 247 Nicolas Sarkozy, Press Conference (Brussels, Belgium, December 12, 2008), French Embassy, http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Preside n t-Sarkozy-s-joint-press,14155.html (accessed April 2, 2009).
states had rejected the possibility of a separate ESDP operation in Congo.248 The EU has not repudiated all involvement with crisis management in North Kivu, especially considering its increased aid contributions and enduring ro le in conflict negotiations. Still, the EU has made clear that it only endorses a Securi ty Council Resolution authorizing 3,000 additional UN peacekeeping tr oops to reinforce MONUC. EU member states have discarded the possibility of deploying a peacekeeping mission under the EU banner. 90 o Given the recency of these events, th e unfolding situation in DRC casts some measure of doubt on the EUs assertions that it will not launch an ESDP mission. However, to date, the EUs deportment remain s consistent with this policy, in spite of signs that North Kivu is only deteriorati ng further in the absence of significant international intervention.249 To address worsening conditions, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1856 in December 2008, extending MONUCs mandate through the end of 2009 and increasing force strength by 3,000.250 Troop reinforcements for MONUC have not materialized, and even more forebodingly, India has signaled its intention to withdraw its 4,400 troops.251 Unsurprisingly, the EUs refusal to launch an operation has drawn the ire of international human rights gr oups, including Oxfam, which observed that [a] rapid injection of Eur opean troopscould make a real difference t millions of Congolese and show the world that Europe is serious about living up to its 248 Vogel, EU Rejects UN Request for Congo Force. 249 Simon Tisdall, Violence in Congo Worsens as International Reinforcements Fail to Show Up, The Guardian (London), April 10, 2009, under World News: Democratic Republic of the Congo, http:// www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/apr/10/congo-united-nations-aid (accessed April 20, 2009). 250 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1856 6055th meeting, December 22, 2008, S/RES/1856 (2008). 251 Tisdall, Violence in Congo Worsens as International Reinforcements Fail to Show Up.
91 d to intervention. responsibility to protect.252 Regardless of international criticism and a spiraling humanitarian crisis, major EU member st ates, notably Germany, the UK, and France, remain steadfastly oppose Discerning the Factors Impellin g EU Military Intervention With Darfur and Congo spiraling furthe r into humanitarian crisis, questions persist as to why the EU, possessed of the capabilities to alter the conflicts dynamics significantly (if briefly), ha s opted not to intervene. Are the economic costs of intervention so great EU member states ar e truly unable to sust ain them? Or, did EU member states have the economic wherewith al but feel constrained by a dearth of political will? Given the Unions desire to establish the ESDPs credibility, to what extent did international criticism factor into the EUs decisions with respect to both the cases of intervention and the cases of non-intervention? Generall y, what factors are most influential in inducing or precluding EU milita ry intervention in a given crisis? In the following section, these issues will be addr essed case-by-case, integrating internal, external, and capacity-related concerns in order to construct a more complete picture of how these factors interacted and which ones were most influential in encouraging the EUs engagement. Internal Factors: National a nd Institutional Considerations The internal factors most salient to EU decision making on intervention are: key member state interests, intra-EU institutiona l interests, domestic reaction to (potential) 252 Juliette Prodhan, Oxfam Reaction to UN Security Council Resolution Authorizing Additional Troops for Congo, Oxfam Canada, November 20, 2008, under Pressroom, http://www.oxfam.ca/newsand-publications/pressroom/press-re leases/oxfam-reaction-to-un-security-council-resolution-authorizingadditional-troops-for-congo (accessed April 1, 2009).
military intervention, and fostering a pan-European identity. Key Member State Interests As the case study briefings conveyed, certain member states possess a good deal of power over decision-making processes. The fact that all decisions for the ESDP are made under the unanimity rule makes it appear as if all states enjoy de facto equality. Yet, the funding of ESDP operations thr ough the ATHENA mechanism encourages an entirely different dynamic. EU member stat es, though equal in vote, are not economically or militarily equivalent. Combining these di fferences with the fact that under the ATHENA mechanism, all but the most basic costs lie where they fall,253 the result becomes all too apparent. Those member states with the power of the purse and a well-developed military apparatus become the central actors in deci sion-making processes. The Council of the EU cannot compel member states to supply troops or furnish funds apart from those required through the ATHENA mechanism. Despite consid erable controversy ov er the impact the ATHENA mechanism has on ESDP decision making,254 three of the four case studies heavily underline this dynamic, wherein a few member states opinions are consistently overvalued and overemphasized. In the excep tional case of EUFOR Althea, one crucial distinction shifted the calculus so that key member states interests seem muted in comparison. EUFOR Althea is anomalous in large pa rt because of NATOs involvement and the smooth nature of the transition from SFOR to EUFOR command. A recurring theme from the case study briefings, directly related to issues of financing, is the matter of force 92 253 Nicoletta Pirozzi and Sammi Sandawi, Five Ye ars of ESDP in Action: Operations, Trends,
generation before a decision is made to launch a mission.255 Since member states contributing troops to a mission are responsib le for transporting, housing, and feeding furnished troops, the Council of the EU tends to seek out these resources before the official launch. This strategy aims to avoid the possibility of EU member states falling short in force strength after accepting a crisis management operation, an eventuality likely to prove ruinous to the credibility of the still-emergent ESDP. In the case of EUFOR Althea, nearly eighty percent of troops were Eur opean at the time of NATO withdrawal, essentially elimina ting the force generation process.256 In the end, the Council needed only to identify states w illing to supply the remaining 1,000 troops and the framework nation for the mission.257 Furthermore, the EU and NATO had jo intly decided early on in the planning process that EUFOR Althea would be conducte d through the Berlin Plus arrangements. These greatly relieved a significant portion of the framework nations expenditures by allowing the EU to take advantage of NATO planning, command, assets, and capabilities.258 With the framework nation chosen a nd force generation largely resolved, the lengthiest parts of the planning process had been resolved. Mili tary intervention in this case was not necessarily as controvers ial as involvement in other regions since Bosnia, being party to the Stabilization and Accession Agreements, is an area of unambiguous strategic in terest to the EU.259 93 Shortfalls, European Security Review no. 39 (July 2008): 2. 254 Ibid. 255 Major, 38. 256 Bertin, 64. 257 Ibid. 258 European Union, EU-NATO: The Framework for Permanent Relations and Berlin Plus (Background) EU (Brussels, 2003), http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/03-1111%20Berlin%20Plus%20press%20note%20BL.pdf (accessed December 12, 2008). 259 European Union, EUFOR History: Operation Althea.
The expression of member state interests was consequently muted in comparison with the other case studies, suggesting that member state interests tend to be most expressed on issues of financing or force procurement. Indeed, the other three case studies substantiate this asse rtion. In these cases, the EU did not have the luxury of a prior NATO framework from which to procee d and faced the prospect of assuming full operational costs. Once again, however, it is necessary to emphasize that the EU as a whole would not be shouldering the missi on costs. With the ATHENA mechanisms common costs covering only ten percent of ove rall operational expenses, the burden for launching an EU mission falls almost entirely on the framework nation.260 If the EU is presented with an opportunity to launch a m ilitary intervention, the first matter concerns identifying a state willing to bear mil lions in euros wort h of expenditures. Unlike in the planning stages for EUFOR Althea, in the other three case studies member state interests were notably prominen t in the decision to launch a mission. In two of the cases, EUFOR RD Congo and DRC 2008, in terests other than the routine concern for financing were expressed by both France and Belgium. Both states have played central roles in DRCs political affairs, Belg ium as the states former colonial power, and France through its role in the UN and the EU.261 Other states, notably the UK and Portugal (through its interest in Angola), also have strategi c interests in Congo. However, only France and Belgium agitated significantly for military intervention in 2006, finally succeeding in pressuring Germany to take charge of an ESDP operation.262 Whereas with 94 260 Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite, The Implementation of the ESDP: Issues and Tentative Generalizations, in European Security and Defence Poli cy: An Implementation Perspective eds. Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (New York: Routledge, 2008), 193. 261 Hans Hoebeke, Stphanie Carette, and Koen Vlassenroot, EU Support to the Democratic Republic of Congo Centre dAnalyse Stratgique (Brussels, 2007): 13. 262 Major, 24.
EUFOR RD Congo salient member state in terests catalyzed a mission, the DRC 2008 exemplifies how the absence of strategic inte rests from the major EU powers hinders the viability of an operation. Belgium, a lthough highly invested in a Congo mission, possessed neither the military nor economic capacity necessary for its opinion to carry weight. Through these examples, the role that certain key member state interests play in the decision making process of an operation b ecomes evident. Belgium, holding a vote but no leverage, found its strategic intere st unaddressed. In Sudan, the dynamic was similar, as none of the three major powers had salient strategic interests in the region. Compounding Sudans lack of strategic merit wa s the fact that the Sudanese government rejected the possibility of a military intervention. Although not observed in these case studies it is also important to acknowledge that the inverse scenario is al so possible: given the ESDPs unanimity rule, any state with a vested interest against intervention is easily able to veto the entire action. The fact that any state is capable of foiling an entire operation is cause for concern in the everexpanding Union. Currently, the EU is compri sed of twenty-seven member states, and second pillar arrangements mean there is no minimum economic or military capacity required for a member state to veto an opera tion. Given the inefficien cy and potential for gridlock in this framework, it is not surp rising that the ESDP is moving toward less equitable arrangements, with Qualified Majo rity Voting a possibility in the distant future.263 95 263 De Neve, 510.
Intra-EU Institutional Interests Member states are not the only actors in fluencing internal ESDP decision-making processes. Intra-EU institutional interests also have an impact on whether or not a mission is undertaken, albeit in a more circui tous way. In official discourse, the Council of the EU is the ultimate decision-making body of the ESDP, with other institutions granted little more than consultation privileges. A lthough other ESDP-related EU institutions, such as the HR for the CFSP, might consider a partic ular mission propitious, the member states of the C ouncil are the final arbiters of the decision. The case studies debunk this notion, however, demonstrating th e relative importance of institutional interests in advocating for certain missions and furthering the development of the CFSP/ESDP. Rather than simply reflecting a co uple of member states salient interests, EU institutional interests reflect grander aspi rations for the maturation of the ESDP and the enhancement of the EUs international standing. Often, descriptions of EUFOR Althea em phasize Bosnias inherent value to the EU, with member states desire to bring Bosnia further into the EU fold as the chief reason it was chosen for the EUs first large-scale military operation.264 Indeed, as HR Javier Solana portrayed it, EUFOR Althea was simply the culmination of Europes years of economic and military involvement in Bo snia: EUFOR will me sh with the EUs substantial engagement in so many areas: a formidable economic commitment, a Police mission deployed, a solid political relationship. All this is part of the journey to the only possible direction: the EU institutions.265 Hence, HR Solana postulated that EUFOR Althea was simply a logical extension of EU involvement in the Balkan region. Does this 96 264 European Union, EUFOR History: Operation Althea.
argument, that EUFOR was just the logical end of former i nvolvement, suffice to explain the EUs two years of lobbying in NATO fo r a transition to an autonomous ESDP operation? To a great extent, regional and econo mic linkages were important for choosing Bosnia as the site for an ESDP operation, as was the minimal risk posed to EU forces. However, just as important was the role of ESDP institutions. Since the launch of the ESDP in 1999, EU member states had worked steadily to build an EU military capacity, and they found that Bosnia prov ided a perfect setting in whic h to further develop ESDP on an operational level, as well as compleme nt the broader EU in tegration strategy for Bosnia.266 Bosnia was not simply a logical extens ion of policies, but a strategic move on the part of EU institutional actors, to allow for the testing of the ESDP in a relatively stable environment.267 Other factors, clearly very importa nt to the EUs other institutional interests, were merely bonuses -EUFOR Altheas symbolic value as the EUs triumphant return to the Balkans, and Bo snias importance to the EU strategically.268 Thus, the EU institutional interests in EUFOR Althea are reflected in the not necessarily critical nature of the mission and the need to further develop ESDP institutions and mechanisms. With EUFOR RD Congo, institutional in terests in the decision to launch the mission are not immediately evident, since member state interests were primarily responsible for propelling the EU to action. However, the dyna mics are much the same as 97 265 Javier Solana, Launch of the EU Althea Op eration in Bosnia and Herzegovina, (speech, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 2, 2004). 266 Kim, 2. 267 Lucia Montanaro-Jankovski, T he Interconnection between the Eu ropean Security and Defence Policy and the Balkans, Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 7, no. 1 (March 2007): 141. 268 Kim, 6.
in EUFOR Althea, with the desire to test and challenge the ESDPs structures and institutions.269 In retrospect, EUFOR RD Congo was pr imarily an exercise in proving the added value and utility of the ESDP outside of the EU neighborhood: The Unionwelcomed the operation for internal political purposes. EUFOR afforded an opportunity to show the EU flag and to de monstrate the EUs m ilitary capabilities and autonomy by carrying out a mission without recourse to NATO assets.270 Clearly, the impulse to wave the EU banner is fully c onsistent with the que st for international prestige, a topic to be addre ssed later. However, the notion is also compatible with the concept of institutional interest, as institutiona l actors seek their own survival through an affirmation of their value.271 With the ESDP, affirmation is found through a demonstration of the EUs military capacity to both internal and external audiences, thereby validating the utility of European military cooperation. In the Sudan and DRC 2008 cases, the impor tance of EU institutional interests is exemplified in the fleeting but prominent ro le of HR for the CFSP Javier Solana. The post of HR is as much dependent on the person ality of the incumbent as it is on the tasks assigned to the post.272 More specifically, in cases of humanitarian crisis, HR Solana is sure to project the EUs moral voice by expres sing outrage in the cases here, at the violence in Darfur and DRC. Ultimately, Solanas words proved to be less than galvanizing, inviting worldwide criticism of the EUs empty rhetoric. Solana, however, remains a prominent figure, most recently in talks regarding DRC 2008. In trying to 98 269 Montanaro-Jankovski, 143. 270 Major, 16. 271 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work? in International Politics: Enduring Politics and Contemporary Issues 7th ed., eds. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005): 123. 272 Merlingen and Ostrauskaite, 201-202.
represent the Union, difficulty in developing a unified position on issues such as Congo is inevitable. However, Solanas great accomplis hment has been the visibility and influence he has garnered for the post of HR. At the very least, he has been able to garner member states attention for crises, thereby ensuri ng the targeted and concerted provision of technical and financial assist ance. His words may not be enough to catalyze support for intervention, but he has lent the EU much-n eeded credibility in terms of presenting the semblance of a unified front on humanitarian issues. Pan-European Identity and Domestic Reaction This section will examine whether an d how domestic reactions to potential intervention influenced the EUs decision to in itiate or reject a pot ential intervention. The utility of ESDP missions for shoring up dome stic approval for the ESDP is difficult to measure, as it is hard to know whether a surge or decline in general support for the EU is attributable to a military intervention. ES DP operations receive very little media attention, making it even more difficult to accurately gauge support for military intervention. A recent analysis of European attitudes indi cates that support for the notion of an autonomous European military capacity is extremely high, ev en if citizens know little about ongoing and completed operations.273 With the momentum on economic integration waning, one author contends that the ESDP bolst ers the European project by increasing citizen support of European integr ation and fostering a European identity.274 Of course, measuring these effects in the case studies is not possible, but it is interesting to note that in reality Eur opean citizens remain averse to spending on ESDP operations. 99 273 Stephanie B. Anderson, Crafting the EU Security Policy (London: Lynne Rienner, 2008):140.
This opposition seems to stem from the lack of commonality in ideas of what the ESDP should be: member state leaders over the decades have signed on to the idea of European values, and the need to promulgate them around the world. However, the member states have never been able to agree on how to promulgate them. Someare interventionist; others are loath to intervene; others are restra ined from intervention because of their constitutions. Some have little to contribute to a military expedition; almost all are unwilling to dedicate the money necessary to fund the ESDP adequately, very simply because their voters are unwilling. As Wolfga ng Wagner put it, This sympathy for the project of an ESDP does not necessa rily extend to an ESDP in practice. 275 The support for the idea of a militarily autonom ous Europe is high, and yet there is no consensus on its functions beyond the Europ ean neighborhood. Even within the European Union, a mutual assistance clause (which would commit member states to help one another in the event of an armed attack on one state) would only be introduced through the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.276 Clearly, the internal a nd external ro les of the European security and defense framework remain contentious topics. The broad strokes toward building a pa n-European identity, therefore, do not translate into tangible domestic support for European military cooperation, a dynamic especially evident in EUFOR RD Congo. Wh ereas in EUFOR Alth ea the novelty of an ESDP operation and Bosnias strategic value enabled sufficient mobilization of citizen support, domestic opinion over EUFOR RD Congo was sharply di vided among member states populations. Interestingl y, divergences in domestic op inion are ascribed to both historical causes and differe nces in political systems.277 100 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid., 140. 276 If a Member State is the victim of armed aggr ession on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Amendm ents to the Treaty on European Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, December 13, 2007, Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1, pt. 49: 35. 277 Major, 25.
In France, where the president is capable of authorizing a military deployment without parliamentary approva l, participation in EUFO R RD Congo never became an issue of public debate. Furthermore, from the time that EUFOR RD Congo was proposed, both the French president and parlia ment fully supported a military action.278 In contrast, Germanys constitution requires parliamentar y authorization for all military maneuvers, facilitating the further polit icization of Germanys involvement. Gradually, a schism within the government began to appear as th e Ministry of Defence and the armed forces lobbied against deployment, with only the Chancellor and the Minister of Cooperation and Development in support.279 Astonishingly, the Germ an governments decisionmaking processes were even more protracted than the Council of the EUs. Where the Council had resolved by late April to deploy, the German government and parliament did not approve the deployment until late May a nd early June respectively, even though they were expected to lead the operation! For th eir part, the UK, Greece, and Italy had bluntly declined managing the mission, preempting any public debate.280 Military engagement in Sudan was never seriously contemplated by the EU, and DRC 2008 was promptly rejected soon after its proposal. From these instances, it can be tentatively extrapolated that public opinions role in the decision varies in intensity depending on historical attit udes toward intervention, politic al system, and the expected extent of involvement of a member state (espec ially if there is pressure exerted on a state to become the framework nation). Although th e EU citizenry may support the notion of an autonomous European military capacity, domestic opinion generally varies by nation101 278 Ibid. 279 Ludger Schadomsky, Is Germany F it to Lead Peacekeepers in Congo, Deutsche Welle (Berlin), March 25, 2006, under German Reunification, http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,2144, 1944083,00.html (accessed March 12, 2009).
state along the same lines as governmental support for intervention, and becomes all the more contentious when a specific member state is saddled with a disp roportionate part of the burden. Although the issue will be addr essed in the discussion on operational efficacy, it is also important to note that a member states commitment to an operation can be severely impaired by negative domestic attitudes, so that although the mission is undertaken, overall mission e fficacy is jeopardized. External Factors: The Impact of the International Milieu Beyond the internal dynamics that influe nce the initiation of an ESDP operation, the international (external to the EU) cont ext can have an impact on a decision for or against engagement. Key external factors in clude involvement from NATO, the UN, and the African Union and concerns regarding in ternational law, R2P, and international prestige. UN, NATO, or AU Involvement In each of the case studies, three intergovernmental organizations figure prominently, often acting as th e point of first contact betw een the EU and the state in conflict. In three of the four cases, th e presence of the IGOs precedes the EUs involvement simply because the conflicts actually predate the establishment of the operational ESDP. Specifical ly, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has cultivated a role in the in ternational security framework as the primary responder in massive humanitarian crises,281 while NATO is known for more controversial and 280 Major, 25. 102 281 United Nations, United Nations Peacekeepi ng Operations: Prin ciples and Guidelines UN (New York, 2008), 20.
sporadic humanitarian interventions.282 For its part, the AU began fostering its own capability in 2001 to promote cooperation among African states and to take charge of conflict management on the African continent.283 Therefore, with an appreciation of the ESDPs relative novelty, the impact of thes e IGOs presence on the EUs decision to engage militarily should be explored. Overall, the UN, NATO, and AU have played facilitative roles between the EU and the state in question, welc oming and encouraging EU military involvement. A tentative conclusi on can be drawn that the EUs involvement is predicated to some extent on the earlier presence of an effective and stable security force. Whereas the installation of an ineffective security force seems to discourage EU intervention, an effective military pr esence may have the opposite effect. Certainly, the presence of the UN, NATO, and even the AU can have a positive impact on the EUs decision to intervene militarily. The European Security Strategy, which underpins the ESDP, explicitly affirms the EUs commitment to multilateralism in crisis management.284 Indeed, the ESS declares the EUs adherence to the UN in peacekeeping, stating that [t]he fundamental framework for internati onal relations is the United Nations CharterStrengthening the Un ited Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.285 The EU proclaims its place in the international security framewor k as coinciding neatly with the UNs mission. Given the EUs overtures, it comes as a surprise that the UN is the organization 103 282 Clara Portela, Humanitarian Intervention, NAT O, and International Law: Can the Institution of Humanitarian Intervention Justify Unauthorized Action? BITS Research Report no. 4 (Berlin: Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, 2000). 283 Flemming Mathiasen, The African Union and Conflict Management, USAWC Strategy Research Report (Carlisle, PA: USAWC Research Strategy Project, 2006): 1. 284 European Council, European Security Strategy 2003, http://www.consilium.europa.eu /uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed Ja nuary 19, 2009), 9. 285 Ibid.
constantly initiating cooperation discussions with the EU. The EU has rarely volunteered its capabilities without an explicit UN appeal despite the EUs professed commitment to the UN and the R2P doctrine. In two of the four cases, EUFOR RD Congo and DRC 2008, the UN Secretary-General deliberately bypassed established consultation mechanisms to appeal for EU military support for overwhelmed MONUC. In both cases, the EU was palpably reluctant to involve itself in DRC. EUFOR RD Congo was only accepted after months of negotiations, a fact that does not bode well for the EUs capacity to respond to UN requests. In DRC 2008, EU member states took less than two months to decide against a military operation in Congo, th is in spite of the massive humanitarian crisis unfolding and the EUs professed de dication to bolstering the UN and crisis management. Notwithstanding the EUs record on actually helping the UN, in three of these four cases it is clear the UN was willing to grant a Security C ouncil authorization to an EU military operation. EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RD Congo both received UN authorization; clearly, a mission in the DRC in 2008 would also have received authorization. Sudan was the only instance in which the lik elihood of UN authorization was slim to nonexistent, although the promis e of a UN authorization would likely have done little to spur the EU to action. Alt hough the EU values a UN authorization, the promise of one is not a highly motivati ng factor in the EUs final decision. Rather, a previous on-the-ground military presence seems to be more persuasive to EU action, although UN, NATO, or AU presence is not sufficien t to guarantee EU support. Instead, the evidence in dicates that the EUs motivation to participate increases if an IGOs military presence is effective in enforcing peace and stability. Given the limited case selection, this conclusion is par ticularly tentative. The EUs incentive to 104
participate is boosted through the military pres ence of these IGOs because of the reduced costs of involvement. EUFOR Althea be st represents this dynamic. Through collaboration with NATO, the EU gained ac cess to valuable intelligence on the security situation, not to mention the assets and capabilities made available through the Berlin Plus arrangements.286 Furthermore, NATOs decade-long SFOR operation had imposed a stable peace on Bosnia-Herzegovina, easing the EUs transition into the field. In contrast, the UN mission in Congo, also in field for more than ten years, has been plagued by charges of corruption and incapacity.287 Although it is the largest UN mission to date, MONUC is far from synonymous with peace a nd stability and its peacekeepers have even been accused of st anding by as civilians are massacred.288 Even with MONUCs presence, the situation in Congo remains highly unstable, dissuading EU action despite the possibility of burden-sharing arrangements. Considering EUFOR RD Congo was meant to be little more than elec tion observation, the c oncern expressed by member states that European troops were in sufficient for the magnitude of the mission is rather surprising.289 Conditions in Eastern Congo as of late 2008, when the SecretaryGeneral Ban made his initial appeal, were far worse than th ey were in 2006. If the EU was hesitant to intervene in 2006, the prospect of a 2008 DRC operation became that much less likely. The AU mission AMIS (now join t AU/UN mission UNAMID) mirrored MONUCs tremendous lack of capacity. Charac terized by a severe s hortage of funding, 105 286 Bertin, 65. 287 MONUC, SRSG Responds to Criticism of MO NUC by MSF, MONUC Press Releases 2009, February 6, 2009, http://monuc.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=1618 (accessed March 12, 2009). 288 Great Lakes Advocacy Network, MONUC in the DRC: Strengthen its Mandate, Denounce the Warmongers (Proposals from European NGOs on the Basis of a Field Survey) GLAN, June 2003, http:// www.grandslacs.net/doc/2773.pdf (accessed April 12, 2009).
supplies, and troops that had not been paid in months, AMIS was nearing collapse when UNAMIDs reinforcements finally arrived in December 2007.290 Considering that the EU is generally only willing to send a 3,000-strong battlegroup per crisis, the EUs sense of outrage at the atrocities was moderated by the enormity of the task. Thus, there was even less political will to sustain the 20,000-str ong UNAMID force, especially when faced with the Sudanese governments opposition to international intervention. The rationale behind the EUs preference for supporting African solutions to African problems in Darfur also becomes clearer. Although the presence of the UN, NATO, or the AU can act as inducements to EU involvement, the EUs incentive to intervene is drastically reduced in crises in which the international military force involved is less than proficient, as in EUFOR RD Congo and AMIS/UNAMID. The presence of other IGO military forces can act to relieve the pressure on the EU for involvement, since the EU can cast doubt on the va lue of an ESDP operation if other forces are already present. Instead, the EU can argue its involve ment would be better limited to technical and financial assistance. In Darf ur, this attitude has led to al legations that the EU is using its preference for a strong African presen ce in Darfur as a scapegoat for its own unwillingness to intervene. Similarly, French President Nicolas Sarkozys statement on a potential DRC mission implied that MONUCs substantial force strength absolved the EU from military particip ation. IGO military presence therefore can be both an inducement and a disincentive to interven tion decisions in the ESDP, depending on whether the military force involved is profic ient enough to have achieved a measure of 106 289 Young, Europes Heart of Darkness. 290 Colum Lynch, African Un ion Force Low on Money, Supplies and Morale, Washington Post May 13, 2007, under World: Africa, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dy n /content/article/2007/05/12/ AR2007051201567.html?hpid=moreheadlines (accessed March 9, 2009).
peace and stability. International Law, R2P, and International Prestige In what some observers consider to be a bid for legitimacy, the EU has in recent years come to market itself as the normativ e power in the internat ional system, dedicated to the promotion of values such as jus tice, peace, democracy, and the rule of law.291 The EU has enshrined these values in the ESS, stating: The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objectiveWe are committed to upholding and developing International Law.292 The only real exception to its comm itment to international law has been in the R2P doctrine. To date, the EU has yet to put the R2P doctrine into practice, limiting itself to diplomatic and economic sa nctions against devian t states. Diplomatic relations with the Sudanese government, for example, have been suspended since March 1990.293 Interestingly, an analysis of the case st udies indicates that the EUs inaction on R2P can be attributed to particular dynamics. The first apparent r eason is the presence of UN, NATO, or AU involvement. The presence of other IGO military forces mitigates the EUs responsibility to prot ect in a way, although the EU ma y value interna tional law and the notion of sovereignty. As long as the EU continues to contribute expertise and funds, concern for actual military intervention is allayed. Indeed, the EU highly values multilateral mechanisms of interven tion, as detailed in the ESS: 107 291 Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum, E urope in Search of Le gitimacy: Strategies of Legitimation Assessed, International Political Science Review 25, no. 4 (October 2004): 441. 292 European Security Strategy 9. 293 French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, The EU and Sudan: Relations with the European Union, France Diplomatie, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/sudan_248/theeu-and-sudan_6681/index.html (accessed February 12, 2009).
In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisisEconomic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The [EU] is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.294 Therefore, the EU places a premium on multilateral cooperation with partner IGOs in crisis management. If political will to launch a military intervention is lacking among member states, the EU perceives that it is simply specializing in another aspect of crisis management, not reneging on the R2P principle. The EU lends no credence to charges that its military crisis management record displays elemen ts of opportunism. While acknowledging that the EUs limited resources requi re it to be more strategic in the crises in which it intervenes, representatives note that the EU compensates by providing more comprehensive crisis management capacity.295 As one representative commented, those who disparage the ESDP overlook the fact that the ESDP was never meant to be a solely military endeavor.296 Whereas skeptical observers question whether the ESDP will ever be sufficiently developed to undertake large-scale military operations autonomously, the representative remarked that the EU had no intention of solely focusing on this, but sought to fully develop all the instruments at its disposal -after all, the benefit of twenty-seven member states functioning in synchrony on the global fiel d was that they would be able to tackle more complex scenarios better than a si mple military intervention would allow.297 Although problems regarding political will and efficiency exist among EU member 108 294 European Security Strategy 7. 295 Senior Security Policy Analyst, European Co mmission, interview by the author, Brussels: BE, January 16, 2009. 296 Ibid. 297 Head of Unit, DG for External Relations, European Commission, interview by the author,
states, the ESDPs image problem results from inaccurate and overly critical expectations for the ESDP rather than the institution itself. After all, the reality of the ESDP is that there are more people studying it than actually working on it.298 All of these concepts, the rule of inte rnational law, sovereignty, and R2P, are closely related to the image the EU seeks to project in the international arena, and hence its international prestige. The EU believes that its strength, its added value to the international security framework, lies in that which many often emphasize as its greatest weakness: the fact that it is composed of member states. Crisis-Specific Factors: Capacity Concerns and Conflict Assessm ent The crisis-specific factors relate to the actual dynamics of a crisis and how these affect the EUs decision to intervene or not. These include the natu re of the conflict, geography and its impact, the military capaci ty needed or requested, and how these compare to the EUs actual military capacity. Nature of the Conflict Since the EU perceives its role holistically, the nature of the conflict has a significant influence on whether the EU opts to pursue a military intervention. The EU must gauge a situation accurate ly. International attention to the ESDP is already intense, in anticipation of discerning whether the EU is capable of mounting an effective EU military cooperation framework. Therefore, th e ESDPs legitimacy and credibility is at stake in every military mission the EU unde rtakes, lest the European public lose confidence in the value or utility of a Eu ropean defense policy and agitate for its Brussels: BE, January 21, 2009. 298 Ibid. 109
cessation. Charges of opportunism often result from this concern, as EU member states need to be especially cautious in the missions chosen to implement under the EU banner. In the case studies, an assessment of the nature of the conflict is interrelated with the presence of UN, NATO, or EU forces. This has already b een discussed to an extent, but it must be understood that the EU a ppraises the risk posed to troops and the expectation of success in a mission before it ag rees to involve itself. In EUFOR Althea, risk posed to troops was minimal, as peace a nd stability had generally been achieved by the previous NATO operation, and the EUs high level of i nvolvement in SFOR also conveyed a high expectation of success. In EUFOR RD Congo, doubt about whether the EU should involve itself was high. Compounding the EUs dearth of political will, the UN practically guaranteed that election viol ence would occur -otherwise it would not have appealed to the EU to bolster its force strength.299 An inability to contain riots during the DRC election would have been a severe blow to th e EUs credibility, especially given the operations small size and mandate. These concerns prolonged the EUs decision process considerably. The negative case studies illustrate the sa me rationale, with the EU completely unwilling to get involved due to the risk pos ed to troops. Reports of violence have not abated since the arrival of UN and AU tr oops in Sudan, and instead, UN and AU troops are in constant danger, with a number of troops already killed at the hands of the rebels.300 Furthermore, MONUC and UNAMID mi ssions are not perceived positively, not simply for reasons of corruption, but also because of their inefficacy on the ground. 110 299 Major, 17. 300United Nations/African Union Mission in Da rfur, UNAMID Statement on Death of Peacekeeper, Featured Ne ws, December 29, 2008, http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ctl=
Accusations have plagued both operations that people were ma ssacred in the presence of UN and AU troops, who made no effort to protect or aid civilians.301 The EU has likely taken note of the extremely negative press each of these missions has garnered, and probably prefers the criticism of international NGOs for not getting involved to the possibility of having the ESDP exposed as weak or ineffective. Expectations of success, of imposing even a tenuous peace for an extended period time, were low as well. The UN has bargained and even pleaded with the belligerents in DRC to agree to ceasefires that have been promptly violated by the resumption of violence.302 The situation is somewhat similar in Su dan, except that the belligerent in this instance is a sovereign government entirely opposed to a humanitarian intervention. Given the EUs predilection for respecting in ternational law, and its unwillingness to unnecessarily expose European troops, the EUs rationale for prefer ring to funnel funds to the AU rather than launch its own mission is clear. Hence, with high risk to troops and low expectations of success in both instances the EU considered military operations in DRC and Sudan liabilities to the future of the ESDP. Assessing the nature of the conflict is th erefore prominent in the EUs decision to launch a military operation. The EU and its member states are likely to intervene in other ways, generally through the provision of skilled expertise and economic and humanitarian aid. Peripheral military operations and civilian operations (policing and judicial or security sector reform) are also becoming the EUs niche market in multilateral crisis management. This is especi ally evident in the high ratio of civilian 111 Details&tabid=898&mid=1062&ItemID=722 (accessed February 23, 2009). 301 MONUC, SRSG Responds to Criticism of MONUC by MSF. 302 Grono, What Should the EU Do?
operations to military missions.303 EUFOR Tchad/RCA, a completed military mission to provide AMIS with military expertise, exemplifies the EUs focus on undertaking less direct military operations in crisis management.304 From the cases studies, it can be concluded that high risk for troops and low expectation of success dissuade the EU from direct military intervention. Geography and Its Impact Given the narrow case selection, the importance of geography in the EUs decision to initiate a military operation b ecomes somewhat difficult to assess. Since embarking on European military cooperation, the EU has been adamant about not relegating the ESDP only to the European neighborhood.305 The EU has sought to make its capabilities available to regional crises worldwide, an objective based on the premise that in a globalized world, re gional conflicts eventually beco me global in their impact on peace and stability.306 Aside from this altruistic asse rtion, the EU has been intent on promoting itself as a unified political actor. The imbalance between the EUs economic weight and political insignifican ce propels the EU to seek missions that are not simply in the European neighborhood, so that the EU ha s to date launched missions in the Western Balkans, Southern Caucasus, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.307 Since the present case studies only concentrate in two of these three regions, the capacity of this study to reach definitive conclusions is limite d. Even so, some patterns are evident. 112 303 Council of the European Union, European Security and Defence Polic y (ESDP): Ongoing and Completed Operations. 304 International Crisis Group, The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet A Winning Combination Africa Report No. 99 (October 2005): 9-14. 305 European Security Strategy 6. 306 Ibid. 307 Council of the European Union, European Security and Defence Polic y (ESDP): Ongoing and Completed Operations.
Once again, the EUs rhetoric fails to m easure up to its grand objectives in an overview of the case studies. Although the EU would prefer to assert that geography is largely immaterial in the Councils deci sion on an EU operation, the opposite is demonstrated when one compares the d ecision making process for EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RD Congo. As noted, involvement in EUFOR Althea clearly constituted a strategic interest for the EU, in contrast to EUFOR RD Congo, in which only a select number of EU member states felt passiona te about intervening. However, decision making for EUFOR RD Congo was also marked by a substantively different discourse, with Germany divided over intervention because of certain geographic issues, in particular the prevalence of malaria and concerns over poor infrastructure.308 Although it seems trivial, Germany was slated to pr ovide the vast portion of troops, and these comments illustrated a fear in one of the mo st militarily capable countries that forces were not equipped or trained to withstand the conditions ou tside of Europe. Although it cannot be conclusively determined how decisive ly this affects a decision on intervention, concerns continue to be voi ced regarding the wisdom of launching missions in unfamiliar territory with untested troops. Military Capacity Ironically, the military capacity a mission requires does not seem to be particularly decisive in th e final decision on launching an operation. Although intuitively, it might seem to be one of the more important factors, it is not. A classic criticism of the ESDP is that EU member stat es select missions that match its capabilities rather than 113 308 Ludger Schadomsky, Is Germany Fit to Lead Peacekeepers in Congo.
tackling those missions truly in need of intervention.309 In contrast, the rationale underlying NATO operations is cr isis-determinant, in which the crisis determines the capabilities. Thus, the EU is criticized for inverting the l ogical progression of planning for crisis management operations, preferring instead to cherry-pick crises depending on which crises match the capabilities it has available. Although an interesting pers pective, this assessment di sregards the real problems underlying the mission planning for the ESDP The EU may not have the military capacity NATO does but this should not oversha dow that the real matter holding back EU action is key member state interests and the question of who will be providing capabilities, not whether capabi lities can be provided. In some instances, it has been said that some of the EU battlegroups only exist on paper,310 but the EU ensures that troops are actually available for immediate deploym ent in every battlegroup rotation. Since the member states that are providing battlegroup troops are the major military powers, there is not much concern that troops are completely unavailable. Moreover, the issue once again becomes a matter of how the EU perceive s ESDP versus how the rest of the world perceives it. EU battlegroups are small for ce contingents, averaging 3,000 troops each, used for bridging or monitoring operations -essentially, rapidly deployable interim troops for severe crises.311 Therefore, the EU has made it known that at the present time, it is incapable of taking on immense operat ions, which would generally go under of the purview of the UN in any case. 114 309 Michael Ryan, Defense Advisor (USEU), interv iew by the author, Brussels, BE, January 14, 2009. 310 Vogel, Why Europe Is Split Over Troops for Congo. 311 Major, 11.
The missions or operations that are offered to the EU (or those the EU independently considers engaging in) are therefore operations the EU knows it can undertake. The EUs current military capacity lim its the universe of crises in which it can involve itself, and in this sense, military cap acity is important. However, deliberations on potential military interventions are limited to those crises in which the EUs military capacity is useful, diminishing the importance of military capacity as a decisive indicator on engagement or non-engagement in a specific crisis. Critics may pan the ESDP for not having the capacity for larger operations, but given the ESDPs recency, this matter is largely irrelevant. As demonstrated in EUFOR RD Congo and DRC 2008, the UN tailored its request for EU military involvement specifically to what it knew the EU could handle. In EUFOR RD Congo, the UN appealed for an election observation mission of approximately 3,000 troops; in DRC 2008, the UN once again petitioned for a force of 3,000 troops, a bridging operation, to bolster M ONUC while the UN located extra troops. In Sudan, had the EU independently deci ded to launch a military operation, one may assume it could have sent as many or as fe w reinforcements as it desired depending on how ambitious it made its mandate, negating th e question of European military capacity. Assessing Motivations in European Milita ry Crisis Management Thus far, a total of eight factors have been evaluated in an attempt to discern, through an examination of two positive case studies and two negativ e case studies, those factors that are most influe ntial in determining whether the EU undertakes an ESDP mission. Taken together, three particular fact ors appear to be mo st influential in ascertaining whether the EU will choose to undertake a military operation: key member state interests; UN, NATO, or AU involvement in a crisis; an d the nature of the specific 115
crisis (risk to troops, expectation of success). Of course, within these indicators, there are certain dynamics at work that can definitively im pel a decision one way or the other. It is not enough for a key member state to be interested in an operation; it must also be willing to endorse its political support for an opera tion with military and economic support. As seen, unless a member state interest is pa rticularly salient, military and economic commitment do not generally follow. The pressure placed on Germany in EUFOR RD Congo was not decisive, since Germany could ju st as easily have declined managing the operation, and nearly did. Similarly, the launch of an IGO military mission for a particular crisis does not guarantee that the EU will follow. The military mission needs to have been somewhat effective at enforcing stability and peace for th e EU to be induced in to action. Finally, if a crisis presents little risk to troops and has a high expectation for success, the chances of the EU becoming involved increase greatly, but do not necessarily guarantee EU military involvement. These three indicators have been identified as crucial in predicting whether the EU will involve itself in an operation. The other five fact ors, while important, are not deal breakers and so are not significant e nough to completely ensure or negate EU military engagement. At the beginning of the chapter, it was hypot hesized that the hist orical process of European military cooperation differed s ubstantively from the actual practice of European military engagement. The findings of this portion of the study validate that hypothesis. Decision making for potential ESDP missions follows an inverse logic from that of the historical process of European military cooperation. Whereas the latter was driven by external stimuli (the international context), mission selection for the ESDP is 116
largely propelled by internal stimuli. Despite being an interstate security framework, ESDP mission adoption is driven to the greatest extent by me mber state interests, with IGO involvement and the specific nature of the conflict occasionally mitigating operational costs, thereby acting as an indu cement to action. However, EU member state interests are not only crucial to determini ng whether the EU initiates an operation. Member states interests are decisive in in fluencing the ultimate outcome of an ESDP operation, impacting external effi cacy depending on the coherence of internal interests. Gauging Overall Mission Efficacy To address the second set of questions, which concern the correspondence between internal and external efficacy of m ilitary missions once they are undertaken, a total of six indicators divided into two categories will be assessed. The first category includes factors relating to internal mission e fficacy -the internal c oherence of a mission in terms of coordination w ithin ESDP structures and cooperation with other IGO institutions. Within the category are two indicators of internal mission efficacy: the time lapse between when a mission was decide d upon and when troops reached the mission location (planning efficiency); and the time between the reco gnition of problems and the resolution of these issues (coordinative effi ciency). The second category of indicators gauge external mission efficacy, i.e. if a mission was actually executed as planned: whether the pledged numbers of troops were sent by member states ; whether capabilities and supplies committed were delivered; whethe r the EU was able to maintain troops in field as long as anticipated; and how effec tively the substantive goals of the mission were met. Table 4.2 summarizes these considerations. 117
Table 4.2 Evaluating Effectiveness of ESDP Military Missions Internal Mission Efficacy External Mission Efficacy Planning efficiency (lapse between when mission launched and feet on ground) Coordinative efficiency (recognition and resolution of identified problems) Pledged number of troops v. number sent Pledged capabilities/supplies v. number committed by member states Anticipated v. actual mission length Effectuation of substantive goals of mission (mandate-wise, e.g. peace and stabilization) Both internal and external mission effi cacy are invaluable to fully understanding EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RD Congos ove rall mission efficacy (success). An exploration of external effi cacy is fundamental, revealing whether the EU succeeded or failed in achieving its mandate. Just as impor tant, however, is an an alysis of internal efficacy, the real key to understanding th e underlying dynamics of the ESDP. Only examining external efficacy leaves us with an incomplete explanation of the ESDPs role in crisis management operations, given that a missions external efficacy is largely contingent on internal efficacy. The impli cations of internal inefficacy, although not immediately apparent, have extensive ramifications on a missions successful outcome.312 Therefore, the indicators will be assessed through an overview of the operational trajectory of case stud ies EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RD Congo. EUFOR Althea: Unclear Mandate s, Inadequate C oordination Approved in Council Joint Action 2004/ 570/CFSP in July 2004, EUFOR Althea was given the same mandate as the ex iting SFOR operation: enforcing the peace enshrined in the Dayton Accords. The pl an for a NATO handover of the peace and 312 Major, 23. 118
stabilization mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been in the works for nearly two years, and the forces left behind were largely Eur opean, thereby facilitating a transition to EU crisis management. However, even with the many advantages afforded to the EU through prior NATO management, operational effi cacy was far from perfect. Although an examination of external mission efficacy suggests that the EU mission only experienced minor problems regarding the ambiguity of its mandate, internally, mission coherence was severely lacking, with inefficiencies and contradictions evident in almost all aspects of coordination. All in all, these issues were not seve re enough to prevent EUFOR Altheas success. However, considering EUFOR Althea was the second military ESDP mission undertaken in the European neighborhoo d, the pervasive nature of these issues indicates deeper proble ms, wherein the ad hoc nature of ESDP operations contributes to a culture that undermines internal efficacy. Internal and external efficacy within a mission must be differentiated to better understand operational shortcomings. EUFOR Althea typifies the value of such a strategy, at once displaying nearly ideal extern al efficacy but charac terized internally by an incredible lack of cohere nce and coordination in action for the first couple of years following mission launch. A major source of this disjuncture in coherence and coordination was the vagueness of the manda te inherited by EUFOR. The mandate called for the monitoring the situation in Bosnia -Herzegovina and utilizi ng force under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if necessary to enforce the peace.313 Despite the guided handover from NATO, the EU struggled with reconciling this mandate and unwieldy ESDP institutions, as the br oad scope of the mandate allo wed the EU an apparently 119 313 European Union, Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP July 12, 2004.
unrestricted range of action. Problems began to manifest when General David Leakey, first commander of EUFOR Althea, decided to make the EU operation more distinctive than SFOR by using troops to combat organized crime.314 Considering the role of organized crime in destabilizing Bosnia, the ex ternalities from the decision could only be positive given EUFOR Altheas ultimate end. Yet, the fact is General Leakey made this decision almost unilaterally, independent of consultation either with memb er states in the PSC or even on-the-ground EU operations. In particular, EUPM, the EU police mission in Bosnia, was charged with training local police forces on eradicating organized crime.315 General Leakey utterly failed to collaborate or communicate with EU PM on the ground, resulting in the decision to completely subsume EUPMs designated role and mandate in Bosnia.316 Although meant to distinguish EUFOR Althea for its in itiative, the organized crime raids became a universal source of criticism. Rather than training Bosnian police forces to become competent in managing organized crime raid s, General Leakeys forces sometimes conducted raids without even info rming the local police authority.317 Although this strategy resulted in many arre sts, it defeated the purpos e of having civilian operation EUPM in action. Furthermore, member states were outrag ed that their military forces were being used in a way they believed contravened th e mission mandate, leading to the last-minute imposition of national caveats on the mi ssion. These caveats barred the commander from using certain national contingents in or ganized crime raids, or even relegated some 120 314 Bertin, 65. 315 Ibid., 71. 316 Ibid.
121 tative (EUSR) to Bosnia. to a specific geographical area.318 In response to the cont roversy, General Leakey decided to develop the rules of engagement for EUFOR Althea, in the form of the Common Operational Guidelines, in wh ich EUFOR Altheas observer role was affirmed.319 Organized crime raids, although eff ective, were stopped and greater collaboration was enacted between EU FOR Althea and EUPM and EU Special Represen Ultimately, however, EUFOR Altheas proble ms stemmed from severely deficient on-the-ground cooperation, ironically between a civilian and military ESDP operation. The EUSR, meant to act as liaison of the HR for the CFSP in the region, had no prescribed role to speak of when it cam e to encouraging collaboration between operations. EUFOR Altheas planning process ha d also clearly been delayed, with rules of engagement and Common Operational Gu idelines not developed until summer 2006, more than a year after mission launch.320 Externally speaking, barring substantiv e differences of opinion over the meaning of enforcing peace in Bosnia, EUFOR Althea has been an efficacious mission. Troop numbers, already present in the region befo re the mission launched thanks to SFOR, were steady until 2007, when the Council voted to reduce troop numbers to 2,500 given Bosnias increasingly steady situation.321 The Berlin Plus arrangements facilitated the provision of both capabilities a nd supplies, thus fulfilling th ese criteria of success. Finally, in a broad sense, EUFOR Althea ha s managed to prevent the recurrence of 317 Ibid., 67. 318 Ibid., 69. 319 Ibid., 71. 320 Ibid. 321 European Union, EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
violence, thus validating the external efficacy of the mission. Internally, both planning and coordina tive efficiency were severely lacking. Although troops had been on the ground far before the mission was declared effective in December 2004, the failure to articulate ru les of engagement or common operational guidelines indicated fundamental flaws. This gap encouraged the last-minute imposition of national caveats that could have se verely impaired the mission by promoting exceptionality as a rule. Coordi native efficiency was also a near utter failure, with cooperation between ESDP opera tions slow to start. EU FOR Altheas unintentional adoption of EUPMs mandate was a clear em barrassment to the EU, which after all, claimed the value of the ESDP lay in its multi-pronged efforts toward the solution of conflicts. Time between the recognition and re solution of identified problems was also problematic, with a full year and a half passi ng before the Council was able to adopt the Common Operational Guidelines, the very foundation of a mission. Local breakdowns in communication were not the only common theme -General Leakeys unilateral transformation of the EUFOR mandate al so indicated insufficient communication between the PSC (Brussels) and EUFOR comm and. Thus, external efficacy seemed to have resulted despite internal inefficacy. EUFOR RD Congo: Recurring Proble m s in a Volatile Context Unlike EUFOR Althea, the 2006 EU elec tion observation mission in Congo was highly expected to involve election violence, th ereby providing a real test for the military ESDP in action. Although a relatively sma ll force of 3,000 was provided by the EU, the mandate for the mission was expansive and challenging, committing the EU troops to 122
ensure there would not be rioting, to protect civilians in im minent danger, and to secure the Kinshasa airport for fleeing diplomats.322 Public opinion, furthermore, was not in the EUs favor. In EUFOR Althea, the EU had had to prove its credibility merely by reassuring the population of its presence and strength, more of a psychological exercise than anything.323 Extensive previous intervention in Congo had made citizens very aware of the negative implications of an international presence. While some resented the EUs small force, believing it meant the EU was onl y there to protect fleeing Westerners, other cynical observers were convinced the EU wa s funding and monitoring the entire election to ensure President Joseph Ka bila would be re-elected.324 From the beginning, therefore, the ESDP suffered from an image probl em and a dearth of credibility. Although bolstering MONUC, the reality was the EU only intended to station around five hundred troops in Kinshasa, with an over-the-horizon force reserved in Gabon and another emergency force stationed in Potsdam (the location of the operational headquarters).325 In the event that severe violence did break out, these forces would be emergency lifted to Kinshasa; otherwise, it was feared the presence of these forces would act to intimidate the local popul ation and increase tensions. Im portantly, all of the troops for EUFOR RD Congo were locate d in the capital Kinshasa. This decision was the direct result of a national caveat Germany had imposed on its troops, preventing them from interfering in electoral violence beyond Kinshasa city limits, a compromise brokered between the German government and the EU so that Germany would provide the bulk of 123 322 European Union, Council Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP, April 27, 2006. 323 Bertin, 67. 324 Jennifer Brea, DRC: As Elections Approach, the Congos Bloggers Discuss Recent Violence, Media Repression, and the Limits of Foreign Aid, Global Voices Online, entry posted July 26, 2006, http://global voices.online.org/ 2006/07/26/drc-as-elections-approach-the-congos-bloggers-discuss-recentviolence-media-repression-and-the-limita tions-of-the-international-community/ (accessed April 29, 2009).
the troops.326 Troops arrived in late June and remained through December 2006 to verify that the electoral process would not eventu ally lead to violence. Surprisingly, the elections went relatively smoothly with only three notable incidents. One in particular remains a point of pride for the EU in term s of demonstrating the utility of the ESDP: faced with an attempt on presidential candida te Jean-Pierre Bembas life the night before the elections, EUFOR troops were spurred to action quickly and were able to quell the situation before it spiraled out of control.327 Through this inci dent, EUFOR RD Congo earned the credibility and legitimacy it needed from the Congolese population. In December 2006, however, despite urgent reques ts that the EU extend EUFORs mandate, the mission was concluded, a success, but a hollo w one given the expectations for further violence and instability. In EUFOR RD Congo, the EU once again demonstrated its ability to portray external efficacy while muddling through internal inefficiencies. After all, externally, the mission was a success -the troops promised we re delivered, capabilities and supplies were not lacking, EUFOR was in field exactly as long as it had intended to be, and the mandate was fulfilled perfectly, with no casual ties. However, internally, the dynamic was once again one of ad hoc accommodation and problematic institutional coordination.328 Although in this case, the political-institutio nal level (Brussels and the UN) was more coordinated than previously, military-operational specifics had once again been neglected. While not as deplorable as coordination in EUFOR Althea, cooperation between EU-UN structures le ft both sides unsatisfied. 124 325 Major, 18. 326 Ibid. 327 Ibid, 29.
Resorting to ad hoc arrangements and difficulty with institutional coordination have become veritable motifs in military missions of the ESDP. Increasingly, some attribute the success of these missions to a mixture of institutional entrepreneurship and luck rather than to the actual competence of ESDP structures.329 While it would be easy to say these criticisms exaggerate the issue, th e fact is that there was a distinct likelihood the EU would not have been capable of overcoming electo ral violence of a greater magnitude. If the EU came out of EUFOR RD Congo unscathed, it was sheer luck given the constraints to rapid action they had imposed on their battlegroups. Another recurring issue of importance was th e use of the national caveat to ensure the interests of a specific member state. Although Germany truly experienced issues getting its government to approve a troop deployment, the question is whether the EU should allow for such arrangements. Aside fr om breeding confusion and more issues of coordination, the national caveat serves to detract from the real goal of the mission -if all major member states exclude their troops fr om entering real danger, then what are the chances any will ever be sent into the thick of the action? The national caveat allows for attention to be diverted from the actual cris is at hand, once again shifting the focus back on to major member states. Numerous app eals were made for the EU to extend the mandate of EUFOR RD Congo out of a genuine concern that EUFORs rapid exit would lead to a prompt deterioration of the p eace achieved. However, Germany vetoed the idea before it had even been considered, adamant its troops would not stay in field more than absolutely necessary. The issue then becomes whether the EU had the right mandate, given the needs of 125 328 Ibid.
the situation. Utilizing the current mandate, it appears the EU did a fantastic job, garnering excellence in external efficacy, with not a single casualty. However, all sources indicated that a prompt EU exit would resu lt in a purge of those opposed to Kabila, beginning with runner-up Bemba. Although some may argue the EU did great on the job for which it was commissioned, surely the EU ha d the obligation of at least attempting to stay? It is this type of sc enario that lends credence to arguments that the EU conducted nothing more than a cosmetic operation for its own aggrandizement.330 Evaluating the ESDPs Operational Efficacy A review of the EUFOR Althea and EU FOR RD Congo illustrates that efficacy within the ESDP is fundamentally hindered by its structural inefficiencies. Issues prominent in EUFOR Althea remained presen t in EUFOR RD Congo, demonstrating that organizational learning within the ESDP is c onstrained, largely because major structural change would require a treaty revision. To manage short-term coordination and coherence problems, ESDP actors have tended toward ad hoc solutions that ultimately base their success on the luck a nd personality. Particularly remarkable is the difficulty in coordination between the civil and military as pects of the ESDP, calling into question the EUs belief that its role differs fundament ally from other international security arrangements in its multi-pronged approach to crisis management. Even so, one of the greatest problems still plaguing effective crisis management is the prominence member state interests retain, even after mission pla nning, as exemplified in the national caveat. 126 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid., 21.
Chapter 5 Conclusion In the Introduction to this study, two questions are posed. The first question concerns the underlying motivations in the EUs decision to launch (or decline) a military intervention in a crisis. The second question considers whether the EU is capable of executing a successful military operation, examin ing both internal and external efficacy to determine whether internal efficiency translated to external success. Although the questions seem somewhat dispar ate, both are united by one persistent motif in this study: the centrality of member state interests. The centrality of member state intere sts to the ESDP cannot be overstated -salient member state interest s catapult a potential mission into reality; national caveats shortchange a missions mandate, imperiling mission success; ad hoc arrangements have become routine, largely because member stat es cannot come to an agreement on how best to reform the structure. Major member states interests not only impact whether or not a mission is launched, but conti nue to have a bearing on mi ssion execution, even as national forces remain under unified command control. Indeed, the ESDP is subject to member state interests to a greater extent than NATO peacekeeping operations, which are not subordinated to member state whims to the extent of ESDP missions. In the Introduction, critiques of the EU for che rry-picking its crises clearly overlooked the specialized, small-scale focus of ESDP operations, suggesting that criticism of the EU may be overstated on this point. However, give n the centrality of member state interests, the EU might instead be faulted for allowing fleeting member state concerns to obstruct a 127
mission mandate. To the extent that the purpos e of a crisis intervention, to save lives, becomes obscured by member state preferen ces over troop allocations a future crisis intervention could quickly become a disastr ous spectacle for the EU. That the EUs successful record thus far is attributed in la rge part to luck is an ominous indication. Rather than describing the EUs lopsid ed mission selection procedures as opportunistic, we should consider them state-centric. Indeed, state-centrism summarizes the various problems plaguing the ESDP. All of this studys findings, on the importance of IGO involvement and the nature of the conflict to the EU getting involved, and the disjuncture between inte rnal and external operational e fficacy, seem to find their source in the internal imbalance that favors cons ensus and equity-maintaining EU procedures over effective action. Of course, these institutions in themselv es are not the cause of the ESDPs Euro-centrism. After all, decisi on making also takes place by consensus at NATO, the standard against which the ESDP is often measured. Instead, the ESDPs state-centric orientation deri ves from a combination of the ESDPs decision making process and its funding mechanism. Thr ough the ATHENA mechanism, certain key member state interests achieve an undue am ount of the burden in crisis management operations, but also gain undue influen ce over mission planning and execution. The ATHENA mechanism thus exaggerates the in tergovernmental aspects of ESDP and weakens integrated approaches to military missions. As the case studies demonstrate, the focus placed on member states has the lamentable effect of eclipsing the gravity of the crisis in question. Crisis-specific factors were only important insofar as they had an impact on the safety or well-being of European troops, largely because of the EU s evident preference for non-military means 128
of intervention. When a crisis emerges, even if the EU is able to contribute a 3,000-strong battlegroup, discussion inevitably shifts to w ho will provide the troops and for the benefit of what strategic interest. The tenuous credibility and legitimacy of the ESDP compound this problem, making EU member states even more cautious in military crisis management. Yet again, this dynamic has the ef fect of overshadowing the seriousness of a humanitarian crisis. The EU will never ascend as a credible security actor on the world stage if it is unwilling to match its grand rhetoric with tangible action. Even if the EU has built a niche for itself specializing in smallscale missions, complacency means the EUs great hopes for the ESDP will go unfulfilled. Additional Avenues of Research Although attention was paid in this study to some economic concerns, mostly as they related to the ATHENA mechanism, the correspondence between the national finances in major EU member states and willingness to fund ESDP missions was not explored. However, evidence would suggest th at the state of national economies should have some impact on ESDP operations, given the costliness of ESDP operations vis--vis national GDPs. The impending pension crisis f acing the EU within the next twenty years might be considered a litmus test for the EUs dedication to the ESDP and whether operations will continue especially if current funding arrangements remain the same. The EUs commitment to an ESDP for the globa l crisis management in times of economic difficulty, and indeed the utility of the ESDP in such circumstances, would be a fascinating avenue of research. Although only time will tell the EUs reaction to its pension crisis or other econo mic hardships, a decline of ESDP activity during times of 129
recession would be an interesting matter to pursue. Another possible avenue of research would also include a side-by-side, qualitative comparison of civilian versus military ESDP operations, to discern whether the dynamics in these instances are significantly different. This particular avenue would also aid in a more comprehensive understanding of the motivations driving ES DP mission adoption and successful mission execution. 130
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