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STATES, IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT: A POLITICAL SCIENCE PORTFOLIO BY ALEJANDRO CASTANO A Thesis Submitted to the Division of Social Sciences New College of Florida in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Bachelor of Arts Under the sponsorship of Dr. Frank Alcock Sarasota, Florida May, 2009
ii For Angie Castano You've always been there.
iii Acknowledgments Compiling a portfolio was a surprising ly demanding endeavor. It turns out that barely a year after having written these papers originally, New College had imparted me with enough new knowledge that the revision process felt like a complete rewriting. Nevertheless, here are some people who were instrumental to my achieving this task. My sister, to whom I've dedicated this project, has always been so supportive and helped guide me through life. I also need to thank my parents for their unconditional support. I don't think I would be anywhere near here if it weren't for their ability to inspire me towards being as ambitious as possible. I also need to thank fellow student Laura Mohai, for feeding me whenever I was either too stressed or too far behind schedule to cook my own meals, as well as putti ng up with my thesis temper. Similarly, I want to thank Dr. Barbara Hicks, my academic sponsor at New College, for her encouragement and patience. Dr. Frank Alcock deserves my gratitude and my praise. Without his guidance over the last few years, this port folio would not have been possible.
iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements -------------------------------------------------iii Abstract ---------------------------------------------------------------v Introduction ----------------------------------------------------------1 Structural Constructivism in International Relations -----------11 Structural Constructivism and Sovereignty ---------------------59 Identity in Militarized Societies ----------------------------------84 Conclusion ---------------------------------------------------------121
v STATES, IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION, AND CONFLICT: A POLITICAL SCIENCE PORTFOLIO Alejandro Castano New College of Florida 2009 ABSTRACT Identity is instrumental in altering the circumstances underlyi ng a particular state behavior, and studying the social processes that form it essential for understanding the real nature of a state of affairs beyond its immediate characteristics. Identity is central because power, preference and the very meaning of sur vival is contingent on the normative foundations from which it is derived. In international relations, structural constructivism provides a valuable framework from which to explore a cultural conception of the international system. This theory examines way s in which the dissemination of normative values creates networks of role identities that become self enforcing cultures. On a domestic level, the concept of social capital provides a valuable conceptual foundation for understanding the consequences of div erging role identities when dealing with fragmentary identity affiliations. Concerning themselves with both of these perspectives, the following papers explore the possibilities of taking identity seriously in political science. Dr. Frank A lcock Division of Social Sciences
1 INTRODUCTION In 1985, a majority of countries in Western Europe signed the Schengen agreement that called for the removal of customs controls along their borders. The removal of borders in a region that had experienced two "world wars" in the preceding ce ntury is monumental and reveals an intellectual puzzle of high political relevance: What changed in Europe that allowed enmity and rivalry to develop into friendship? Similarly, it is difficult to predict what relationship countries will have based solely on their geopolitical position and economic relationship. Why is the relationship between France and Andorra so different from the one between Russia and Georgia, and under what conditions will the relationship between Georgia and Russia start to resemble it? Why do there seem to be different calculations taking place between China and Taiwan than there are between the US and Canada? What determines politics? Is it the distribution of power in a system, or is it the distribution of preferences in a state? T hese have been the traditional approaches of international relations research programs, but could it be that there is something more going on? Is it possible that what determines politics, on a more fundamental level, is how state actors (or states themsel ves, as corporate actors) understand themselves, and by extension, their responsibilities within a state structure towards each other and towards their constituencies? The social dynamics by which individuals construct their preferences is analytically pri or to the rational decisions they could potentially make. This is because values, and therefore both the understanding of power and ideal preferences, are constitutive of this socially constructed definition of "self."
2 Whether a state sees maritime suprema cy or the promulgation of humanitarian rights in its geopolitical area as a necessary condition for its survival, it is values that create this understanding of the relationship between self and others, and therefore the requirements of security. Identity is therefore instrumental in altering the circumstances underlying a particular state behavior, and studying the social processes that form identity is essential for understanding the real nature of a state of affairs beyond its immediate characteristics. For these reasons, the following collection of papers attempts to examine the interplay among identity construction, the international state system, and government policy. The three papers are similar in their approach. Rather than looking at a distribut ion of power or preferences in order to understand outcomes, they look at the distribution of normative values, and the roles the actors take relative to each other. The goal of this method is to understand the underlying distribution of expectations in wh ich actors are making their decisions. The papers also look at different ways institutions not only change the potential outcomes that states and actors perceive from a situation by making reputational costs more salient, 1 but also change the actors themse lves through the normative implications of their participation. Though the first paper in this collection will look at some of these normative implications of participation in greater depth, the argument is that a recurring shift towards engaging in cooper ative behavior, as encouraged by institutions, will result in an increased preference for the use of the institutions as an ideal in itself, independent of the potential benefits. This is the optimistic side of a two sided argument, however, since 1 This is well described by the "Institutionalist" IR research program.
3 the norm ative implications of internalizing norms encouraging distrust and animosity are just as readily available in the absence of strong institutions. Participation in a culture of enmity will have strong normative effects on the societies involved. The first p aper is an exploration of Alexander Wendt's application of social constructivism to international systems theory. It outlines how culture can shape the identity of a state, and therefore a state's preferences and understanding of power. It also places this emphasis on normative inquiry in context of other theories in IR. Alexander Wendt's theories are a direct and conscious challenge to Kenneth Waltz's. 2 They are a constructivist look at the highest level of abstraction, the first level of analysis: the int ernational system. Wendt presupposes and sees as his focal point of inquiry the "top down" dynamics that the international structure will have on domestic societies. He looks at the system of states and understands it in terms of corporate actors, rather t han monolithic states with fixed interests. Wendt posits a theory by which the experience of states in dealing with other states creates specific cultures and role identities from which states (and their constituent societies) base their understandings of what is necessary for their survival, expansion, or fulfillment. If a state finds itself in a culture of "enmity" where it considers all of its neighbors as threats, its society will reflect that culture by encouraging the expansion of the military, for ex ample. In order to do this, Wendt establishes some basic assumptions, the foundations of his research program, which include some epistemic 2 Waltz is a very influential figure in IR, founder of "Neorealism." This is a research program that stipulates that the only thing important in understanding international politics is the distribution of power in the international system. I will elaborate in the first paper. See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Poli tics (MacGraw Hill, Inc:1979)
4 considerations (that the unobservable state can be inferred from the dynamics by which its effects are asserted 3 ), s ome ontological (that the unobservable state is not only an instrumental construct for understanding the behavior of social actors but a real entity mutually constitutive with the society that instantiates it 4 ), and some pragmatic (that a mature theory nee ds to pertain to the real and autonomous world, requiring some empirical standards to be of analytical value). Wendt also establishes some variables by which role identities are altered and lead to different cultures and behavioral expectations and cultura l ideals (such as a culture of animosity, instantiated by the role identity of enmity, cultures of rivalry and friendship) to develop his theoretical model. These assumptions on which his model is based, as well as what he sees as its analytic consequences are at the center of the paper. Also explored is the relationship between Wendt's perspective and traditional international relations perspectives in order to understand the contributions of his approach to the already established literature. The second paper attempts to illustrate the efficacy and limitations of constructivist theory's analytical position as a tool for understanding real world events. It should not be read as an argument for the validity of Wendt's perspective. It is an attempt at using the perspective to understand a perceived and unexplained empirical variance. Examining the military excursion by the Colombian armed forces into Ecuador in early 2008, the paper tries to contribute to traditional IR explanations 3 The sentence "Russia invades Georgia" does not actually involve anything called "Russia" but rather the Russian armed forces acting as manifestations of "Russia." 4 "America" as a state is not just a government; it is also t he citizens that accept the government's legitimacy as their representation on the international system. However, "America" exists.
5 by highlighting the possib ility for systemic change illustrated by the situation. The incident highlighted an inherent tension between the normative pillars of a society of states built around cooperation and mutual improvement and those of a society built on rivalry and relative g ains. The tension rests on the fact that sovereignty is not compatible with the pursuit of "universal human rights" which requires of states the willingness to fight injustice whenever and wherever it occurs. Whereas Venezuela and Ecuador expected Colombia to respect sovereignty above all else, as would be expected in a culture where states see themselves as rivals, Colombia behaved as if it expected cooperation from its neighbors. This paper tries to look at the possible motivations and explanations around Colombia's emphasis on human rights, how the contrast of their emphasis with Ecuador and Venezuela's norms of sovereignty were the foundations for the diplomatic row, and how this difference in normative understanding illustrates an opening for systemic c hange. The paper looks at alternative explanations, such as the reaction being a means of preventing a challenge to the balance of power in the region, or the reaction being the aggregate preference of diverse domestic forces in the different countries, an d tries to frame constructivism as a possible contribution to these perspectives by highlighting where they either fall short or overemphasize particular events or suppositions and the expense of others. The third paper, a comparative paper, deals with ide ntity affiliation, 5 through the examination of ways by which institutions can change role identities to influence the normative foundations of these identity affiliations. The paper does this by looking at the measure of social trust present in a society, called "social capital," and 5 An identity affiliation is something like an "ethnic" or "national" group.
6 ways by which a government can encourage "bridging" or "bonding" social capital. These concepts refer to the ability of people to trust strangers across social cleavages or within them respectively. The paper also explores how social capital can contribute to their understanding of strangers in terms of role identities (such as "enemy," "rival," or "friend"). 6 In order to analyze interaction between identity affiliations and role identities, the paper looks at the ability of mem bers in society to trust strangers across social cleavages and the government policies that can encourage this trust. The third paper explores possible policies that governments can engage in to assuage or dissuade the growth of bonding social capital at t he expense of bridging social capital in the context of states having experienced violence along ethnic lines. It consists of three historical analyses that explore the interactions between government policy in fractured societies and its consequences. The three countries chosen, with the purpose of seeing similarities and dissimilarities in mind, were Yugoslavia, South Africa and Kenya. The argument behind this choice was that they shared experiences with civil conflict along ethnic lines but were conclude d differently. Whereas South Africa had gone through apartheid, civic unrest and come out a more unified state, Yugoslavia had disintegrated violently. This paper tried to look at what possible factors might have contributed to these divergences, particula rly for a country that at the time was experiencing a flurry of ethnic violence in response to electoral results, Kenya. The range of politics analyzed tends to be limited to the governmental responses to the strife, such as Yugoslavia's decision to grant greater autonomy to its ethnic federations and South Africa's decision to increase political 6 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of Internation al Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999)
7 participation through consociational policies, rather than trying to analyze the role of other aspects of governance in either exacerbating or abating political pr essures. 7 The three papers can thus be understood in terms of political considerations within an intellectual inquiry presented in one broad arc. The first stakes out a position within the discourse, establishing "constructivism," as this particular resea rch program is known in IR, as a "missing link" between traditional international relations research programs. The second attempts to subject this discursive position to empirical examination. The third analyzes precedents of taking identity seriously in t he formation of policy. Though the individual papers were not written in order to be read as different elements of a single argument the chronological proximity in which they were written allows them to serve as a manifestation of my changing understandin g of the subject through my scholarship. The papers will, after all, be placed in the order they were written. It should be noted that the first and second paper are IR papers whereas the third is comparative. This is the reason much of the "research progr am" discussions will not be applicable to the third. However, the role of identity in both international and domestic politics has traditionally been neglected, at least until the end of the Cold War, by the field's enthusiastic strive for the elegance of economics. Scholars of political science have generally endeavored to predict and explain outcomes based on a set of given preferences and capacity distributions, rather than to explain the processes by which 7 It could be argued that important actors such as Mandela and Milosevic had a lot to do with the outcomes, but this is beyond the scope of the paper, which tries to concentrate on the policies involved.
8 these are given importance. 8 This context makes this cultural approach both an interesting and innovative area of inquiry, as well as a contemporary and pertinent one in the age of globalization. The questions become what, why and how with respect to the selection of papers for this portfolio. The "what" is three term papers from three different classes that look at three instantiations of similar processes. One is entirely theoretical, another is descriptive, and the third is comparative. The "why" are their commonalities: their emphasis on identit y and their common perspective on what the role and mechanisms of identity are. Though not meant as different elements in an individual argument, the papers' intellectual proximity to each other should allow for either easy reading or a general understandi ng of the commonalities for the reader. The "why" can also be understood in terms of political implications, though these are more pertinent to the individual papers themselves, rather than the portfolio as a whole. Even the international notion of "system ic change" could be comparable to the growth of a civic culture in a domestic environment, however. The "how" consists mainly of qualitative inferring in the tradition of International Relations scholars. The first paper consists of an exploratory discussi on, with most of the evidence either in the footnotes or in the arguments. The second and third papers have a stronger empirical emphasis so they try to use available information about the situations to determine an argument. An overarching theme of these three papers is the cultural theories on which they are based, which are never directly explored or addressed outside of Wendt's argument as to their applicability to the international structure. Although this 8 Tho ugh again, this is more true to IR than Comparative Political Science.
9 reluctance no doubt constitutes a disregard on my behalf towards worthwhile debates, the theories I used seem consistent through political science and sociological work. For this reason, and the fact that this is a portfolio for political science rather than social psychology, I am hoping that the pro ject is complete without them. Nevertheless, I hope that it will serve as confirmation for a cultural perspective on political dynamics, which both in international relations and comparative politics have served as a foundation to different research progra ms but never really as the subject of their focus.
10 BIBLIOGRAPHY Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics MacGraw Hill, Inc, 1979 Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge University Press, 1999
11 STRUCTURAL CONSTRUC TIVISM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Introduction The intention of this paper is to give a concise but thorough representation of how the social theory of constructivism can and has been applied to the study of International Relations, with an emphasis on a structural understanding of state dynamics. I will do this in two different ways, by explaining the logic of structural constructivism as carefully delineated in Alexander Wendt's Social Theory of International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 199 9), and by comparing it to interest based schools of thought, and other norm based schools of thought including other constructivist traditions. To finish this paper I will try to expand on Wendt's theories of the causal effects of identity in order to a dvance possibilities for structural change. In the first section (p. 12), I will describe the different interest based schools of thought. The basis for this section will be the response paper submitted as part of the International Law and Politics Semina r. In the second section (p. 22), I will describe the underlying assumptions of constructivism in order to understand the internal cohesion of the theory. In the third (p. 33), I will take a look at the predictions that Wendt derives from these assumptions and the contributions constructivism makes to the better established international relations theories, as well as how his predictions can be differentiated from other constructivist theories. This includes exploring the different cultures of anarchy and h ow they illustrate the situations the traditional approaches discussed, as well as whether materialism can be invoked in an idealist perspective. In the fourth and last section (p. 44), I will try to expand on the
12 possibilities of structural change and the "causal mechanisms" of Wendt's theory by taking a look at Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communitie s (Verso, 1983) and trying to establish whether it is possible to apply the lessons it provides to a society of states. The conclusion begins on p. 53. First Section The Interest Based Theories Realism, institutionalism and liberalism are understood as the "interest based" schools of IR theory. This is because despite the differences between and among them, they are all based on the principle that actors wil l engage in rational choice calculations aimed at maximizing utility in the world around them. In other words, the three schools of thought see the position of the state in a state of scarcity as fundamental to its rational decision making, but differ in t heir predictions of what the rational calculations will make the state's ensuing actions with regards to the considerations that come into play. First, I will try to see how the different schools relate to each other, and then I will briefly describe their logic. I will also provide commentary along the way about the implications of their assumptions. Realists are primarily concerned with the strictly self interested achievement of a rise in power (particularly hard power); neorealists are primarily concer ned with the structure of the state system, the balance of power therein and the preservation of a state's relative position within that system. Contrastingly, liberal theory acknowledges the material root of international actors' considerations but argues against the unitary actor principle of the realist schools (which claims that domestic policy and ideology are irrelevant) in part by asserting that the influences of non state
13 actors can contribute to changes in perception of the state and therefore cont ribute changes in the decision making processes of the state, making ideology and domestic dynamics the focus of their literature. Moravcsik's formulation of liberal theory does this by emphasizing the role of preference in determining behavior. Institutio nalists seem to agree with realists with respect to the possibility of a theoretical assumption that States behave as singular unitary actors and is more concerned with addressing a different criticism of the school: its claim that international laws and i nstitutions are epiphenomenal. Although this might be based not on their belief with respect to the importance of domestic politics in creating the state actors, the emphasis is arguing against neorealist conclusions despite the adoption of their fundament al assumptions. Realists argue that international regimes are simply formal renderings of a status quo, that they are manifestations of a balance of power whereas institutionalists assert their causal importance on the decision making process of a country. They do this, in part, by acknowledging and quantifying the reputational costs of an entirely self interested approach, which would have a country "defect" whenever it sees itself in danger of losing power or structural ground, actually change the costs o f doing so and make "complying" with agreements a much more viable alternative. They would also argue that institutions can be understood as singular actors as well which won't be born and die out, as Realist anticipate with every change in the balance of power, but change their purpose and processes in order to survive a change in their environment (and expand where possible). The main commonality between liberal theory and institutionalism is the concern with transnational regimes and how these affect, co ntrary to realist doctrine, in a very causal manner the decisions of states and state
14 actors. However, I would agree that institutionalism as a paradigm shares more foundational assumptions with realism than with liberal theory, despite its ubiquitous desc ription as a "neoliberal" tradition. 9 The traditional formulation of realism, which finds its roots in Machiavelli and Hobbes, deals with the fiercely independent and egoistic nature of actors in a state of anarchy (the absence of governing body that super sedes said actors). It was formally formulated after the Second World War as a response to the prevailing "utopianism" that had developed following Woodrow Wilson's attempt to create world peace through the popularization of the "nation state" ideal. Its c entral claims were that countries could be understood as singular actors in the international realm, and that domestic policy and ideology was irrelevant in the face of primary and universal concerns for survival and empowerment. E.H. Carr, an early realis t mentions in The Twenty Years' Crisis through a Bertrand Russell quote, that ethical notions "are very seldom a cause, but almost always an effect, a means of claiming universal legislative authority for our own preference, not, as we fondly imagine, the actual ground of those preferences. 10 Carr argues that this does not lack examples, and that the egoist behavior of states can therefore be understood as a given, despite the later justification of the policies as being "principles of mankind [that] must p revail." 2 9 Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization Vol.51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997) 10 Carr in Oona Hathaway and Haro ld Hongju Koh ed, Foundations of International Law and Politics (Foundation Press, 2005) 29
15 The classical realist school can also be described by its concern with power, and the balance of power. In Politics Among Nations H.J. Morgenthau explores some of these ideas, asserting that "international politics, like all politics, is a strug gle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." 11 Morgenthau differentiates international politics as only one of many possible interactions a state can have with other countries, which seems inconsis tent with realist doctrine, however. Whereas his formulation of politics as such is entirely consistent with realism, his acknowledgement of state interaction and a state's ability to choose what type of interaction will occur is not. It restricts realism' s predictions to a particular "logic of anarchy" and demonstrates how some of the predictions of realism are not inconsistent to a constructivist approach. With regards to realism as a school of thought, however, Morgenthau is entirely characteristic when he asserts that "the tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the state." 12 The argument that power dynamics are unive rsal can also be understood with the pseudo evolutionary claim that state who refrain from participating are eradicated by the states that do. This necessary struggle for survival will lead to balance of power dynamics including bandwagoning and balancing behavior, and a status quo rendered legitimate through epiphenomenal laws and institutions. 13 11 in Hathaway and Koh, 2005:32 12 in Hathaway and Koh, 2005:35 13 The Treaty of Versailles and League of Nations seem apt examples.
16 Neorealism as a different tradition from classical realism can be traced back to Kenneth Waltz. As mentioned earlier, the theoretical change is not with respect to the fundamental claims of realism, particularly not with respect to the singular unitary behavior of actors and their disregard for internal politics and transnational interaction institutions, but simply from a theoretical shift from an emphasis on the i ndividual motivations of state actions, to the near holistic emphasis on the structure of the state system in which the power dynamics take place. Neorealism's primary prescriptive method is not about the individual state's attempt to gain dominance but ab out its role within that state structure and its interaction with it. 14 An interesting example Waltz gives to illustrate balance of power dynamics and how system structure mandates the role, which states take regardless of their ideology or rhetorical inten sions, had to do with the Peloponnesian war. According to Waltz' rendition of Thucydides' recordings, "the lesser cities of ancient Greece cast the stronger city of Athens [despite its cultural emphasis for the arts, philosophy and "democracy"] as the tyra nt and the weaker Sparta as, their liberator" because "secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them." 15 It would be useful to add, undoubtedly, that Athens did behave in a tyrant man ner during the transgression of the war, when it sent an excursionary mission to Sicily (invasion?). This example concedes an additional point that Waltz would undoubtedly disagree with, however, which is that the state structure can only create behavioral outcomes as long as it also creates assumptions 14 Whether it will attempt to cha nge the status quo, for example, or simply retain its place and serve its function towards more powerful states. 15 in Hathaway and Koh, 2005: 45
17 and expectations with regards to how a state in a particular position should behave. Athens behaved as a "tyrant" because it thought it was perceived as such, and had a particular set of characteristics it a ssigned to the particular role. Institutionalism is a reaction to realism in that it is based on many of its assumptions, but disagrees with some of its conclusions: namely the irrelevance of international regimes, whether in the form of institutions or la ws. The issue of institutions is addressed by Robert Keohane, who asserts that institutions, despite being the progeny of power politics and state egoism in their desire to satisfy interest only available through limited cooperation, will "adapt quite easi ly to new purposes, within limits set by basic interests." He criticizes realism's concern with balance of power by mentioning that it is a consequence of their assumptions about the implications of anarchy, rather than a valid explanation of the possible interdependence cooperation can create. His best and most convincing example dealt with the European Community (which has since complied with his predictions by expanding, entrenching itself more thoroughly and changing its name the European Union). Wherea s realists expected the collapse of the Soviet Union to generate competition between Western states, with the eventual goal of balancing the US' dominance, no such competition has occurred. He predicted, however, that the existing regime, which was rooted in Franco German bandwaggoning under the umbrella protection of the U.S. could adapt to the absence of the Soviet threat and deter states from engaging in egoistic policies by being relevant in their rational calculations of possible actions. Institutional ists argue that by existing, international regimes and institutions change the nature of anarchy and allow States the ability to
18 cooperate and coordinate actions to achieve better outcomes than available in a self sufficient perspective 16 A similar approa ch 17 frames Andrew Guzman's inspection of the relevance of International Law. His central argument is that in a bad situation, where deference is the most viable alternative for states involved, reputation and the expansion of time horizons will inevitably affect the possible outcomes of the dilemma and possibly even make compliance preferable, despite the losses possible. He does this by quantifying perception, not only with respect to the reputational costs of deference on an agreement in the eyes of futur e investors, institutions and other states, but also with the opportunity costs lost as a consequence to a negative turn in reputational capital. His central critique of realism is rooted in that international law, being an active parameter in the rational calculations of state actors (Guzman does not seem to agree with the idea of states being unitary actors) is not only relevant but causal in its interaction with states, even if it is initially created in order to maintain a particular status quo. Joseph M. Grieco exposes a flaw in these theories of cooperation, however, which is that neorealism could also explain them as a source of state self interest which operates with respect to relative gains as well as absolute gains. This would be rooted in the nat ure of states as behaviorally determined by their position in the state structure. Realists could argue that cooperation and legality are possible as long as states do not think (as unitary actors do) they are empowering someone else more by their cooperat ion, than they are profiting, thereby framing the issue as having to do with relative gains and position rather than absolute gains and position, even if 16 Keohane in Hathaway and Koh, 2005 17 Gusman in Hathaway and Koh, 2005
19 the agreement is positive for all involved. It seems to me that an institutionalist, and in particular someone like Guzman might retort that such considerations are nevertheless affected by the reputational costs of deference in the calculation of "relative gain" so the distinction is irrelevant: international law is still causally effectual. Furthermore, since Guzman expands his definition of "international law" to incorporate what would otherwise be understood as international unwritten rules such as Customary International Laws, 18 the Neorealist concern about the disregard for systemic considerations is n ot entirely warranted: calculations of reputational costs would probably be affected in their quantitative manner by the assumed expectations on behalf of other states and actors. In other words, the reputational cost of defecting will be understood in ter ms of the expectations a state has with respect to the perceptions other states have of their country, rather than on a blank slate. However, any assertion that these assumptions of relative perception would be an institutionalist conceit to neorealism's c oncern with structural positioning would be premature. Relative perception and expectation do not necessitate structure and balance of power dynamics, and I do not feel comfortable putting words in Guzman's mouth. Liberal theories are mainly concerned with social preference and how it is manifested through institutions as state behavior. They are, however, the descendants of the "utopian theories" Carr initially reacted against. As a whole, they are considerably more ideationally based than realism and stau nchly refuse to accept the 18 in Hathaway and Koh, 2005: 70 CIL se em closer to accepted diplomatic expectations, from the example of "treatment of diplomats" than epiphenomenal institutions.
20 realist assumption that states behave as singular unitary actors, taking a "bottom up" 19 perspective of international dynamics. Whereas neorealism is holistic in its analysis of international politics, liberal theory is closer to traditional realism in its emphasis of the individual motivations of actors. The particularity of liberal theory is that it focuses on domestic politics and dynamics as the root of state behavior, taking on an internalistic view that contrasts with the ext ernalist view of realism. 20 In Moravcsik's version of liberal theory, three core assumptions tie liberal theories together, the primacy of societal actors (which are held as the fundamental actors of international politics), the representation of social gro ups as a mechanism for understanding state behavior, and the accessibility of interdependence and the international system to the social actors of a state's society. 21 These assumptions are important to expose because they all necessitate a conception of t he state as government, rather than as a conceptual tool constituting both a government and its constituency. However, liberal theory does take into account systemic structure, at least as Moravcsik formulates it, in that it takes into account where states stand relative to each other but refuses to see state interests as separate from the discourse happening within the state societies: social actors will be the ones affected by the relative positioning of the states, and thus incorporate strategic and stru ctural thinking into their considerations. Liberal theory is criticized as being descriptive rather than prescriptive and not a very causal in the variables it analyses. This criticism is popular because, knee deep in comparative politics, liberal theories fail to highlight any dynamics that originate at 19 Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously" 1997: 517 20 This also applies to Keohane's institutionalism. 21 Moravcsik, "Taking Prefe rences Seriously," 1997
21 the international level. 22 However, their research program aims for an understanding of international dynamics as understood through social actors, rather than an understanding of social dynamics as understo od through international actors, 23 which makes this criticism ineffectual. It is possible to argue that domestic politics, in particular the legalization of a state (how thoroughly legalized aspects of its social and economic life are) would be important to wards understanding a state's relation to another one, and additionally, why two liberal and developed societies would be more likely to cooperate than one that has a well developed institutional framework with one that does not. Theoretically, the percept ion of domestic actors about each other's societies would affect their expectations of each other with respect to possible benefits derived from their interactions, and thereby change the quantitative calculations of reputation, by changing the value assig ned to it. Those are the main interest based theories of international relations. Their commonalities, which I suppose might seem overshadowed by their differences by this point in the paper, are substantial. They are all based in the assumption that stat es and state actors are primarily and emphatically rational in a calculative manner and self interested in a state of anarchy and scarcity and therefore fundamentally unable to form foolproof expectations of other states, and therefore always weighing the cost benefit choices inherent to political prisoner's dilemmas. Although institutionalism and liberal Theory depart from this assumption to a certain degree, by emphasizing the role of reputation and the transcendence of institutions from balance 22 This is an intrinsic issue to liberal theory rooted in their "bottom up" perspective. 23 It will be my argument later in this paper that though the former describes liberal theories, Wendt's structural constructivism does, to a cer tain extent, the latter.
22 of power dynamics, they simply try to explain phenomena that realism seems to overlook 24 by acknowledging the contribution of ideas and domestic politics rather than challenge its assumptions about the universal egoism of states (or state actors) and importance of e ffects of appropriateness, norms, and culture in international interactions, and the possible research programs these entail. Whereas realism is concerned with power, it takes the actor's understanding of the resources constituting "power" for granted; whe reas institutionalism is concerned with information and expectations, it takes the interests of states for granted; and whereas liberal theories are concerned with preference, they take these as given and dedicate little research to how they are constructe d. There is a research program that ties these loose ends together by concerning itself with identity and the ways by which states and state actors construct their interests, their understandings of power, and their preferences. Second Section The Logic of Constructivism The main assumptions of structural constructivism are the following three: 1. There exist international system level dynamics that require the state to be interpreted as a singular and unitary actor 2. The level of anthropomorphization that ensues from states being considered singular and unitary actors should not be limited to enmity 3. That as relatives to corporate agents in domestic level systems, states can be understood to behave, interpret and learn from their interactions in or der to establish and follow cultures As such, constructivism rejects the mechanism of 24 One example is the survival and expansion of institutions like the European Union
23 rational theory 25 as the foremost dynamic affecting states in an international system, emphasizing instead the normative backgrounds that dominate how they formulate thei r understanding about their opportunities, interests, roles and positions. In other words, that constructivist theory is analytically prior to rationalist 26 theories because it defines the conditions under which their assumptions hold. The relationship with Moravcsik's liberal theory is a little different, considering his formulation is partially concerned with the dynamics governing the creation and mutability of preferences, but only in that constructivist theory goes further in this direction. Whereas his liberal theory contents itself with understanding how social dynamics alter a governments ability to form a preference, constructivist theory looks at how preference is constituted in the social actors themselves through the institutions in which they bas e their decisions. A necessary conclusion from this line of thinking is that ideas will be as consequential (if not more so) than the material foundation of rationalist theories. I will try to go through these assumptions and their reasoning in the rest of this section. Liberal theory, as discussed above, argues that domestic dynamics and politics cannot be separated from international politics, which means that international dynamics are a product of an assimilation of internal factors from the ground up. Realists disagree entirely and emphasize the historical dynamics of top down institutionalization where the internal makeup of a state has been affected by the international positioning of a country. Structural constructivism takes a middle stance, 25 What I mean is that constructivism is not primarily concerned with the instrumental rationality as discussed in Peter J. Katzenstein, Rober O. Ke ohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 645 685 26 By rationalist I mean interest based theories, as used by Wendt, 1999, and K. K. & K. 1998
24 declar ing that both approaches are consistent. Whereas a State, being an unobservable corporate agent, is internally constituted by domestic social forces and politics, there exist dynamics intrinsic to the macro structure of the state community that are interna lized from the top down. This is consistent with Waltz's levels of abstraction whereby domestic dynamics are relevant but not informative with respect to international level dynamics. It seems to be inconsistent with liberal theory, but is not. Liberal the ory sees international state behavior as an extension of the social processes that determine the weight of competing social groups on a government, which is inconsistent with realism's assertion that internal politics are epiphenomenal, but not with constr uctivism's assertion that state dynamics will affect how social groups construct their preferences. In other words, the inconsistency between liberal theory and realism is not with respect to the normative effect of the state structure, but with its relati ve importance. Since constructivism argues that the mechanisms are more complex than those espoused by realism, it allows liberal theory enough space to exist as a possible instantiation. This can be explained by Wendt's concept of supervenience 27 On the d omestic level, he argues, the processes of international dynamics manifest in a liberal manner, through pressure groups and institutions. The international dynamics will be manifested as domestic processes, the way realists would anticipate, in turn affect ing the international community in the way neoliberals describe. This is because these two levels of explanation, the domestic assimilation of interests and the state interest as a unitary decision, are mutually constitutive. The state being the corporate agent representative of the domestic society on the 27 W endt, 1999: 155
25 international perspective, the actions are the same. The problem arises with respect to causality then, which affects which in what order? The constructivist answer is that they affect each other but that the emphasis for the understanding of International Relations should be placed on the state, in order to understand the dynamics particular to the international state system. This is a conscious position rooted in the desire to create a research program t hat could contribute to a particular field of scientific knowledge. This is possible understanding that although state actions and reactions will be constituted by social movements or electoral results, the effects of the international system cannot be red uced to these any more than a social movement can be reduced to the rationalizations of the individual actors that constitute it. In other words, an action on the state level of analysis will be realizable in many ways on the domestic level and therefore s upervenient over the domestic processes, affecting the domestic constitution of the state and state system from the top down. The characteristic role playing that states are understood to engage in within a constructivist perspective, for example, can be u nderstood as being undertaken by the domestic elements (which constitute the state) because of the dynamics of the international structure, rather than the other way around. This is not the same as saying that the actualization of macro level dynamics will be top down in the sense that they will affect the government first and then the domestic arena at large, rather, the top down indication is simply regarding the causality of upper level dynamics (from the macro picture of state society) to the lower leve l of domestic politics. So, in
26 order to understand the state level dynamics that affect domestic society 28 it becomes a necessity to concede that states can be conceived as unitary singular actors. A particularity of Alexander Wendt that other constructivis ts do not necessarily accept or emphasize is how the singularity of actors leads to a systemic understanding of international relations rather than an individualistic one. 29 Classical realism can be understood as an individualistic approach whereas neoreali sm can be understood as a systemic approach, illustrating this divergence in the materialist perspective. Wendt argues, in a reminiscent manner to Hedley Bull in The Anarchical Society (2002), that states form a society through their interactions. This soc iety is in itself a structure that will affect the states themselves. Neorealism sees this structure as being one of different states attempting to balance each other out in order to increase stability. Constructivism does not make a prediction as to the c ontent of the system that it takes as given, describing instead how the interactions in a given structure will constitute what the effect of the system will be (as culture) on the state involved. 30 This emphasis on ideas allows for the interest of the state s to be either with respect to relative position as described by neorealism, or mutual benefit depending on the particular structure (culture) involved. Some of the predominant challenges for structural constructivist theory are on epistemological and ont ological grounds, particularly dealing with the treatment of 28 This is the purpose of an international relations research program, or so I assume in this paper. 29 He describes it in his book as systemic version of constructivist theory, but I have termed it "structural constructivism" through this pa per. 30 Individualistic constructivist approaches look at the language and use of symbols within different states and between different states as sources of understanding the interactions between states, rather than a state structure. I will look at this an d other differences between Wendt's and other versions of constructivism in section three.
27 states as "people." The criticisms are rooted in the constraints of anthropomorphization when dealing with the unobservable abstraction constituted by domestic processes that the state is underst ood as being. 31 This is a liberal critique that is often leveled at the realist traditions as well when they make assertions about the self interested nature of the state (a claim which implies the state has a "self" to be interested in). The problem rests in that the state is inherently unobservable, and as such seems not to exist unless it is simplified to be constituted simply of changing governments However, it cannot be said not to exist and anthropomorphic language as inconsistent with factual descrip tions of the world, simply because it works. On any given day, a state can be said to "do" things, such as invading another country or not invading another country which represents a "behavior." A behavior is an instance of anthropomorphization which is ma de necessary for the cohesive understanding of the world. Without such minute instances of it, much state action would seem too hard to understand, any political mobilization of domestic sectors rendered increasingly complex. Though this provides an argume nt for the agency of states, it is in utilitarian and instrumentalist terms. The liberal critique of anthropomorphization, being rooted in their criticism of the mechanisms involved is not entirely apt at refuting the necessity of the convention, particula rly in light of the necessary understanding of the state as a singular unitary actor described above. The problem, then, becomes of extent. Wendt argues that though this is useful, it is not 31 This is in contrast with Moravcsik who seems to limit "the state" to the governments controlling its institutions. Whereas he would see a speeding police car as a manifestation of the state, a constructivist would see the observer's attribution of authority to the police car as a manifestation of the state as well (and by extension the observer himself.)
28 sufficient; in order to form social c ultures states need to have agency in reality. 32 How far is anthropomorphization acceptable? Wendt's response would be that although states are unobservable, their factual reality made necessary for the explanation of macro level dynamics is no different from the existence of corporat e actors within domestic society. As such, states are simply a very large and abstract form of traditionally and accurately described actors in society. Two main requisites for this parallel to hold are that the members that constitute the state understand and acknowledge that they constitute the state in such a way that they internalize its decisions as their decisions and that there is a decision making structure that is perceived as legitimate that authorizes collective action (as a state). These conditi ons are met by internalized membership and social contracts that allow for the consistent attribution of state actions, behaviors and decisions to the constitutive societies, despite the internal dialogue that liberal theory emphasizes. This is also applic able to the conception of "state interests" and "state identities," which once convincingly attributed to a state, can be convincingly generalized to the self attributed constituents of the state. As events such as revolutions, independence and colored "di vorces" show, if these conditions are not met, the consistency of a state can be brought into question theoretically, as it is in practice. 33 On epistemological grounds, the existence of the state is easier to defend. It is not contrary to scientific perspe ctives and methodology, because despite being unobservable it is necessary for causal explanation. Time, for example, is taken as a 32 Wendt, 1999: 199 33 A similar argument can be made about non inclusive regimes with the caveat that very repressive regimes will in fact impose citizenship on their constituents.
29 given in scientific positivist endeavors, despite being neither observable nor directly understood (being understood by its effect on other processes, such as change, for example). The state, in such a manner can be taken as a given simply because of its utility and accuracy in describing the world. This does not solve the epistemic problem in favor of positivist (scientific) r ealism because, as empiricists have annunciated, it is impossible to be absolutely certain about the existence of the physical world at all. However, it is considerably counterproductive to deny the ability of approaching epistemic certainty through a posi tivist position. In other words, though we can't know that a state exists, we can't really be sure that anything outside of every individual consciousness does either but take it as a given ( a priori ) with great success on a daily basis. The success is qua ntified and represented by our ability to make accurate inductions and deductions as to the nature of the world, which due to the ability of humanity to survive as long as it has without going extinct should be considered great. 34 These constructivist assu mptions and understandings are common with the other systemic approaches, neorealism and institutionalism. They differ, however, when the idea of culture, learning and interaction are brought into the framework. Neorealists take the behavior of states to b e limited to "self interest" and its interests to be limited to "power" with the explicit goal of survival. 35 This was an attempt by Waltz to minimize the amount of human like agency inherent to his explanations of 34 These arguments were originally formulated for the natural sciences, but are applicable to the social sciences as well. What good is a research program that does not apply to the real world? Wendt calls this the "Ultimate Argument" for scientific realism. Wendt, 1999: 64 35 Waltz in Hathaway and Koh, 2005: 44
30 state level dynamics. Wendt expands on it, however, by remarking that this idea of "self" central to the idea of realist egoism requires exploration, its content being taken as an unchanging given. By extension, the idea of what constitutes an "interest" also requires a closer look. A contribution of constructivism here is to unmask Waltz's dehumanization of the State as an oversimplification of its corporate agency. If states are to have "selves," they must define themselves somehow, and if states are to have "interests" they must determine what t hey are, somehow, making these less than givens. For Waltz, the self is determined through the dangers of anarchy. Since the interactions between states will be limited to aggression and the ability to survive, its "self" will be limited to its constituenc y, and the "other" by which it forms its boundaries will be limited to a danger (the enemy or adversary). Constructivism takes into account that survival will not always be at stake and that the interactions between states are more varied than simply ones of enmity, danger and a struggle for survival. Structural constructivism asserts instead that the quality of these interactions will determine the logic of the structure, and therefore the sensible and actual dynamics within it. 36 This allows for different states of anarchy, which have been described by different instances of IR theory. How and why this has happened will be addressed in the followings section of this paper. A concern I will address before taking a look at the possible kinds of anarchies that are possible will be an examination of the way culture, in a society of states, can be said to affect anything at all. This is necessary simply because although a range of different relationships between states can be observed empirically, such as 36 Wendt, 1999: 141 discusses differences between Weber's version and Bull's versi on of this.
31 the rel ationship between the Bahamas and the United States compared with that of Russia and Georgia, a claim of causality inherent to the systemic interaction between states is only made necessary if and only if the different interactions are a consequence of the different histories of perceived intentions rather than physical distribution of resources or power, or strategic position in a regional power structure. In other words, a state has to be able to learn from its surroundings in order for a "culture" to dev elop, otherwise its behavior can be explained without recourse to ideas and perceptions. I will now explore what the logic of "social constructivism" is with regards to this process. The logic is one of appropriateness and norm formation. As states intera ct, expectations are shaped, and roles adopted according to what is either anticipated or understood as necessary. If a state expects enmity from its surroundings, it will adopt a Hobbesian framework of interaction, establishing power and survival as its v ital interests and therefore eliminate any opposition in order to increase its chances of survival. If it perceives other states' intentions not to be aggressive, or expansive, it might adopt a more cooperative role, such as one of rival towards its neighb ors, or of friendship. Naturally, perception is not a one way process, and wrong interpretations of other states intentions can lead to bad decisions. 37 Although this seems to indicate a bias towards individualistic state behaviors, because thinking that a state will restrain its violence towards you when it will not, it is not a necessary conclusion. Friendship is as much of a habit as enmity, and if egoistic behavior is rewarded in a "first encounter" situation such as the one hypothetical described, as hi story 37 A recurring example in Wendt, 1999, is that of Montezuma's misconception of Spaniards as Gods, rather than gold hungry religious expansionists.
32 progresses and time horizons extend (reducing uncertainty with regards to possible actions and intentions) cooperation becomes, increasingly, a more valuable tool than autonomy. Let me explain: Egoism might be advantageous in a situation where, becau se of the inherent lack of norms through which to interpret the role another state has decided to take, another states' behavior cannot be understood; but a situation where norms of conduct have been established, intentions are clearer and aggressors more visible, which would tip the balance towards restraint (in the use of violence) and at least apparent (if not intended) cooperation, since states would attempt to minimize their own status in other state's conceptions of their surrounding as "the threat" t hey need to eradicate. Norms of conduct are themselves constitutive of the expectations of the states. This simply means that as states interact, they learn to expect behavior from each other, and realize what roles they are undertaking and what expectatio ns they hold of themselves and each other, creating a self fulfilling framework of roles and reciprocity. This network of roles, behaviors and expectations, this awareness over a society's norms and roles, is what is termed as a culture. It is important to point out that structural constructivism is a positivist rather than a post positivist approach to international relations, despite its ideational focus. Wendt's theory is not "ideas all the way down." 38 It is a theory that explores the importance of ideas to corporate agents that have established material differences, in their territory, resources and populations. These physical particularities are constitutive of the state, rather than causal on its behavior, however, since the large 38 Wendt, 1999: 110
33 deposits of gold that a state may have will not be significant until an idea is formed as to the value of this gold or its use to the state relative to itself. In other words, although structural constructivism is staunchly ideational in that it describes the function of ident ity formation in the behavior of a state, it does not negate that states will be different not only because of their norms and role identities, but also because of their material foundation. This foundation, however, like being a 4 of 6 foot tall person, i s meaningless outside of the value assigned to it (height in this example) by the culture of the system (which is to say by a state or person's expectation that the other members will make of it). This is very different from materialist approaches that say that the physical resources to which a state has access will inevitably be the source of its power, and therefore constitute its relative position in the state structure. As we will explore in the next section, this is not inconsistent with a particular m eaning that can be assigned to the material resources of a state, but not the necessary meaning of them. There is nothing intrinsic about a pile of gold that will make it valuable, and there is nothing about being a coastal state that makes it valuable eit her. Wendt's position is also very different from critical and postmodern constructivists who argue that, since the material grounding is given meaning by culture, they have no influence outside of it. This distinction will also be addressed in the followi ngs section. Third Section The Various Societies of Anarchy The different cultures of anarchy resulting from the shared knowledge created by the states' interactions, in ideal form, are identified by Wendt as: Hobbesian,
34 Lockean and Kantian. 39 These thre e represent different role relationships by which states guide their expectations, give meaning to their material attributes, and give meaning to each other's behaviors. The different roles possible are, in these ideal illustrations, those made possible by changing understandings of a state's "self" vis vis "other" states. Another influential factor will be the degree to which the particular norms of a culture have been internalized into how a state sees the world. In this section, I plan on exploring how these two factors, the definition of "self" against "other" and the level to which it has been internalized, can describe and predict a state's behavior in Wendt's structural constructivist perspective. Then, I will see how this contributes to the literat ure's understanding of socialization with regards to cooperation and how the more mainstream theories in turn contribute to the academic understanding of the particular combinations of culture and internalization. Lastly, I will discuss the similarities an d divergences between structural, critical and postmodern constructivism. First off, here are the particular cultures and their defining characteristics, as well as the levels of internalization and their effects on the logic of the culture's self enforcin g mechanisms. The Hobbesian state of anarchy is one defined by the role of "enemy;" the Lockean state of anarchy is define by the role of "rival," and the Kantian anarchy is defined through "friendship." The first level of internalization, similarly, can b e defined as one where the norms are enforced through coercion; the second will be a rationalist conception of self interest, and the third through 39 Wendt 1999: 43 & 251
35 legitimacy. 40 Additionally, it is important to note that although coercion and self interest are central to r ationalist perspectives, they are used differently here: they are not givens but arise in particular situations, and coercion is not necessarily a material power based phenomenon, but an acceptance of norms by the state in question, prior to this state's a greement or understanding of the norms. 41 The Hobbesian state of anarchy, 42 on which realism is based, is one where the absence of a central authority to install and regulate norms will cause all actors to have their survival in jeopardy. This describes a si tuation of war of all against all, where the only rational behavior is to accumulate power in order to guarantee one's survival in uncertainty. This understanding of anarchy is based on the definition of the Self 43 as a definite being which is much more imp ortant than the Other, and whose survival, therefore must be ensured. This definition of Self is also one which takes for granted the enmity of the Other, on which it bases its own aggressive lack of self restraint with regards to violence. Such a state of anarchy will be imposed on states at first. Any state attempting to undertake the role of "rival" or "friend" will be forced into enmity (coerced) by a more egoistic Other. This describes a first level of internalization. After a certain amount of failed attempts towards undertaking a different role than "enemy," a state will begin to see the utility of enforcing the norms. A state will begin to understand that the aggregation of power, hard and soft, 40 Wendt 1999: 250 41 This is not to throw away instrumen tal rationality, however, since the argument is that constructivism looks at the conditions under which rationalist assumptions will hold. In this case, how much a culture has been internalized by a state. 42 Wendt, 1999: 259 43 The capitalization of "self" and "other" is used to indicate this proper referent: the states' identity construct.
36 will allow it to survive with greater ease. It will beg in to weigh the costs of enforcing a norm against those of changing it, and see it as a rational outcome to internalize it further. A state will understand that by virtue of trying to cooperate with other states, it is getting taken advantage of and/or dim inishing its chances of surviving. This describes the second level of internalization. As the culture of enmity gets entrenched, the state will begin to see it as a legitimate conception of the international society, either through the domestic entrenchmen t of a militaristic culture or through the entrenchment of a construct of enmity in the conception of Self with respect to the other. 44 In other words, a state will begin to see the culture of enmity as legitimate since some elements of its domestic composi tion (a significant part of them, at least) will either need the culture to persevere for their survival (describing, as only one of many possible manifestations by which this could take place, a sizeable military industrial complex) or base its conception of who they are around the unquestionable and unquestioned opposition to their enemies' evil. An example of this could be the deeply entrenched enmity between the Soviet Union and the United States at the height of the Cold War. As described multiple time s above, this definition of Self and the difficulty of survival, based on the assumption of the Others' aggressive intentions, will necessitate a state's interests to be concerned with the aggregation of power and the rendering of the material foundation o f state into a strategic consideration and resource. This is not so in a Lockean state of Anarchy. 44 This is an example of the "supervenience" of international dynamics on domestic dynamics. Russia developing an industrial military complex vs. Iran seeing itself as an enemy of the west are both instantiations of perception of enmity.
37 In a state of affairs where states are self interested but do not perceive each other as threats to their survival, states will take on the role of "rivals. 45 Rather than a state of war of all against all, this culture is one where states will oppose each other, but refrain from eradicating each other completely. It is a possible ideal state defined by the establishment of norms which allow an Other to exist separate from the Self. A norm by which this ideal state of affairs can be made manifest, is through the use of a sovereignty principle. A first level of internalization would be one where a state is forced to respect another state's "right" to exist by th e other countries that hold the principle. These countries could be responding to overt aggression, which they could claim is threatening to destabilize a region. If the threat of coercion is high enough, a state will begin to see it as a rational course o f action, and only take into consideration its relative position in the state structure, rather than its absolute position, in order to maximize its ability to compete against its rival countries. This can take place as an attempt to maximize power in orde r to increase security, or a competitive advantage in order to maximize trade. This is a state of affairs best described by neorealism and neoliberals, which is not surprising considering Waltz' theories are based on westphalian culture, which is a culture with a somewhat internalized principle of sovereignty. 46 As interactions take place, the norm of mutual self restraint would be internalized and become perceived as legitimate. This is the most common state of affairs in the contemporary international syst em. When a norm such as "sovereignty" is so deeply internalized by states and their constitutive 45 Wendt 1999: 279 46 Waltz in Hathaway and Koh 2005: 42, makes endless references to realpolitik and the European concert prior to the great wars.
38 societies, it becomes constitutive, in turn, of their understandings of the statehood. In other words, because the norm of sovereignty has become (or did, if i t is in a process of erosion) so thoroughly internalized into the "rights" of states, then it becomes part of the definition of statehood, a constitutive parameter intrinsic to what it is. This creates the self enforcing mechanism by which the initial coer cion can take place for new states and small states, whereby they need to have an area over which to claim sovereignty in order to be accepted as "states." 47 The conflict necessitated by the need for humanitarian interventions in certain parts of the world highlights that there is a tension between norms of sovereignty and the moral imperative of ensuring good governance internationally, as well to the idea that sovereignty is not the only parameter constitutive of statehood. 48 Similarly, sovereignty is only one of the elements necessary for a state's autonomy. 49 However, as described previously, sovereignty is one of several possible and mutually reinforcing norms by which the definition of Self can be made to accept the existence, and after internalization ev en protect the existence, of an Other state. The last ideal culture described by Wendt is the Kantian culture. 50 This is a state of affairs where the definition of Self is expanded to include the Other, blurring the distinction between the two and turning violence into an inexcusable policy choice. Although named after the culture described in Perpetual Peace Wendt's understanding of a Kantian culture does not necessitate for member states to be 47 Taiwan's existence being a territorial dispute with China, represents such a case. 48 J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical Legal and Political Dilemmas Cambridge University Press, 2003, argue along these lines 49 Stephen Krasner in Organized Hypocrisy Prince ton University Press, 1999 50 Wendt,1999: 297
39 republican. The only requirement is that the states and their constitutive societies understand themselves not through their differences but through their similarities with each other, and with the rest of the human race. 51 Although republican versions of governance can be helpful in generating the bridging social ca pital by which these constructs of identity can become integral to a society, they are not the only ones. This culture can be implemented by coercion through the economic pressures that inclusion makes available, and how these can be suspended when a state shows that it is willing to use force in order to resolve disputes. As a Kantian culture develops it becomes increasingly costly, both because of reputational costs and because of the negative consequences ostracism from the society of cooperative states would create, to defy the norms of mutual help from being asserted. Eventually, cooperation becomes an issue of self interest, and zones of "collective security" develop. This can take place, again, through the rationalist calculation of the benefits of ec onomic interdependence. This self interest, with time becomes an issue of normative consensus. When the foundational extension of Self to include Others is thoroughly entrenched, it becomes legitimate. As was the case with the culture of rivalry described previously, this could take place in a variety of ways. A clear example seems to be an overwhelming concern for human rights in the developed world (which, incidentally, is exactly where this culture is most entrenched). As the norm of human rights gains p rominence in domestic discourse, 52 the international dynamic of a Kantian culture of anarchy is made manifest. The traditional conflict between the 51 This is a more vernacular way of defining the extension of Self to include Other. 52 Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, is all about changing international statutes to accommodate for this.
40 principle of Sovereignty and Human Rights can be understood in this light, representing two fundamentally dif ferent constitutive definitions of the responsibilities of a "state" and its relationship to its citizenry and the international community. When states reach this level of constitutive assimilation, where their interests are as interdependent as their choi ces, the relationship is defined by being a "preference over an outcome, not just a preference over a strategy." 53 The pressures that a Kantian norm (such as human rights) places on states need an emphasis however, because of their similarities with the par tition of the third world during the Cold War. A deeply internalized Kantian culture will be as brutally assertive as a Hobbesian one towards the states it is coercing. The traditional development of socialization in International Relations and "common se nse" seems to tend towards a Hobbesian state of anarchy representing a less socialized state of affairs, whereas a Kantian represents a thoroughly integrated one. This implied, in terms discussed above, that the natural progression of states was from a fir st level internalized Hobbesian culture, to a second level Lockean, to a third level Kantian. This conception is at the root of most versions of modernization theory, which argued that as societies developed economically, they would also "modernize" social ly, paralleling the historical development of the industrial north. The claim, of course, was that as economic interdependence grew and social regulations (laws) were put into practice, as well as the institutions necessary to maintain them, there would be a "spill over" effect into the civil affairs. The interdependence developed economically would translate to bridging social capital 53 Wendt, 1999: 304
41 among an emerging middle class which would press for economic reform, concluding in the transition of third world countries into developed countries. A theoretical parallel can drawn in International Relations to explain the inability of less developed states to coordinate in the same way that north Atlantic states had. 54 Unfortunately, this fails taking into consideration that the absence of cooperation can both require as well as be preserved by culture, as can be exemplified by traditions of bribery in some developing countries. 55 Similarly, the animosity described by a classical realist perspective of international relations would require a third level of internalization of a Hobbesian culture. The deeply entrenched animosity between The U.S. and the Soviet Union illustrate another instantiation where this perspective of systemic change is ineffective. For these reasons socia lization needs to be understood in terms of different cultures and in terms of internalization. This is an objection to "common sense" and traditional development theories that requires clarification because it explains the variation between neorealist and neoliberal theories that arrive at polar opposite conclusions despite their confluent assumptions. The "missing pieces" in a way are the normative context in which the interactions take place and the varying roles that states assume relative to each other and which both theories take for granted, rather than explore the formation of. The objection also serves the purpose of depriving any unnecessary claims of overbearing optimism that might plague this formulation of constructivism as an idealist perspecti ve, being that the processes by which cooperation can be created and sustained can also serve to perpetuate a culture 54 This is not the explicit position of any prominent rationalist research program but is explicit in their understandings of systemic change. 55 Of which Colombia is an unfortunate example.
42 opposed to cooperation on a constitutive level. This latter observation, to me at least, is as pessimistic, or more so, than the "violent, brutish and short" description of anarchy that Hobbes described. 56 So, rendered meaningless, any claims of humanistic optimism can be dismissed. One of the most popular criticisms of constructivism (not just Wendt's), as exemplified by our class discussio ns on the subject, are that like classical liberalism, it provides more of a framework of analysis than a positivist research program that can contribute to our agency through predictive strength. If the only contribution of constructivism were that the interactions that states have affect their future behavior by forming their expectations and understanding of the world around them, this would be true. Unfortunately, this would give a very short sighted understanding of what outcomes were possible until the underlying assumptions were brought to light: the prediction possibilities would be those of the states themselves, and annulled by the states' understanding that they could be wrong. 57 However, structural constructivism is more thorough than that, part icularly because of its compatibility with older traditions of International Relations. As demonstrated previously, in the sections explaining the different possible states of cultures of anarchy, there are corresponding theories that explain and predict, in a positivist manner, every possible ideal situation. Constructivism's most tangible contribution is providing the "missing link" between the theories and providing a set of 56 Seriously! It can make as much sense to be in a deeply internalized Hobb esian culture as a deeply internalized Kantian. Cultural dynamics are normatively indiscriminate. 57 K. K. & K. 1998: 677, describes how constructivism, with its ideational emphasis, sees political science as inevitably normative. It alters the subject that it studies.
43 circumstances in which they will be applicable. Although it is not the objective of this paper to formulate structural constructivism in such a way that it can be used as a research program by supplying a corresponding methodology, but to give a concise representation of Wendt's structural constructivism, a set of precise conditions a nd causal claims should be starting to form. They will be made explicit in the following section of this paper. The claim that the main contribution of constructivism is that it provides a perspective for understanding the other research programs 58 require s for me to explain the differences between different strains of constructivism. This is because unlike Wendt's structural constructivism, most sociological theories are individualistic, like liberalism, and take a "bottom up" perspective to not only inter national dynamics but domestic dynamics as well. The first thing to set straight is that constructivism is not a research program of International Relations, but a paradigmatic perspective by which a number of different fields can be approached. In politic al science, constructivism has developed in three strands: conventional, critical and postmodern. Conventional constructivism, of which Wendt's structural theory is an International Relations application, asserts that "understanding preferences requires an alyzing how norms evolve and identities are constituted." 59 As described earlier in this paper, for a conventional constructivist, a state is not "ideas all the way down" and engagement with an independent and autonomous reality is necessary for a research program to be worthwhile. Contrastingly, critical constructivists 58 K. K. & K. 1998: 679, also makes this claim. I do not think Wendt does so directly. 59 K. K. & K. 1998: 675
44 "emphasize the symbolic systems that govern actors' discourses." 60 Although willing to engage positivist research programs, the focus tends to be on interpretation and the normative qualities of discourse rather than understanding behavior as empirically observable, which places them as a middle ground between willing positivist constructivists and post positivism. Postmodern positivists argue that there is "no firm foundation for any knowledg e" and that their research program is "charged with un masking power relations" 61 This approach focuses on the normative effects of discourse and its hidden political power. It is squarely post positivist in that it rejects the necessity of empirical applic ability relying instead on the idea that reality is a creation of the analytical and ideological categories through which a theory perceives the world and in the name of which it exercises a coercive power that precludes the emergence of communicative rat ionality 62 Structural constructivism, as argued in section two above, seeks to be a tool for understanding international dynamics as they affect domestic societies. As such, it is by design a conventional constructivist approach, as well as by ontological position. 63 Fourth Section Systemic Change and Identity Formation It should be clear, by this point that Wendt's theory's main pivot point and differentiation from other IR research programs rests on its understanding of the creation whereby the other research program's assumptions will hold, and therefore 60 K. K. & K. 1998: 676 61 K. K. & K. 1998: 677 62 K. K. & K. 1998: 678 63 It tacitly presupposes the existence of an independent and aut onomous society of states it seeks to analyze when making the "Ultimate Argument" for scientific realism. This is a similarity with rationalist approaches
45 its ability to study systemic change. Although the description of the different cultures and the mechanisms by which they entrench themselves through internalization should be useful in relieving some tensions apparent to more stringent approaches, such as those of classical realism and westphalian neorealism, the approach has no additional positivist value unless it can be used in making causal predictions of its own that can be verified empirically. Its predictions deal with explaining systemic change, the change from one culture to another and the disruptions in cultural preservation mechanisms that this involves. This claim should be considered problematic because systemic change, and the change in role identity of which it consists, are theoretically counteracted by the preservationist pull of culture. "A s a self fulfilling prophecy culture has natural homeostatic tendencies, and the more deeply it is internalized by actors the s t ronger those tende nci es will be." 64 This means that if the cultural mechanisms described previously are correct, then all possible motion would be towards a more stringent separation between cultural ideals and their regional distributions, and systemic change nearly impossi ble. For example, if a Lockean culture has been internalized to the third level, by which it is perceived as legitimate and constitutive of the role relationships (and therefore state role identity), then changing the role identity would be changing the st ate itself, something that would be very difficult to achieve, and increasingly unlikely as internalization of the norms on which it is dependent deepens. A state would be defined by its ability to be sovereign over its territory, in a historical example, and the change away from this identity requirement, such as towards defining itself in terms of its mediation of 64 Wendt, 1999: 315
46 social forces, instead of territorial control, should seem difficult. However, systemic change is an empirical reality. The Europe at the dusk of WWII is not the same Europe of our contemporary epoch, 65 and the relationships and behaviors of the states involved cannot appropriately be understood without taking into account the difference and how it came about. Systemic change, in a structural con structivist perspective, involves the change of self other differentiation. This means that in order for there to be change from one culture to the next, certain variables have to increase or lessen in order for the perception of role relationships to vary If the perceived role relationship varies, then the shared knowledge would vary with it and constitute systemic change. But first, it is important to point out that with the mechanisms examined above, certain claims are necessary, such as a potential uni directionality to systemic change. If interaction is at the root of the development of cultures, then progressive interactions will extend the ability and confidence of states in making assumptions about the significance of other states' intentions from th eir behavior, particularly with respect to what the behavior signifies regarding the role identity undertaken by the state. This progressive inability to "get away" with organized and violent behavior will gradually coerce states into progressively coopera tive cultures. An obvious problem, of course, is that history disproves this: Europe was very economically integrated on the eve of the first World War, and the inability of the interdependence to prevent a violent outbreak seems to illustrate the inabilit y of a Lockean culture from preserving itself 65 Wendt, 1999: 297, makes explicit that the EU serves as his foundation for thinki ng of a Kantian culture, though his emphasis is on republican rule rather than humanitarian norms.
47 from an outbreak of Hobbesian dynamics. This would a mistake, however, considering that if the World Wars are understood contextually rather than episodically, they illustrate how systemic change takes place. E urope, after the Napoleonic wars, illustrates a Lockean culture continually being internalized. As would be expected, territorial wars still occur, but borders are increasingly solid and constitutive of what "statehood" is. Germany, on the eve of the Secon d World War, established itself as a revisionist state trying to revise those borders and the resulting "world wide" involvement illustrates the coercive capabilities of norms to counteract the negative downturn. As a result of the Second World War, the st ates realized that a Lockean culture, despite the self restraint it allows above a Hobbesian culture, wasn't sufficiently peaceful to sustain. 66 The result is the systemic change illustrated by their move towards a Kantian culture, and the slow dissolution of their borders. This brief narrative serves as an introduction to Alexander Wendt's "Master Variables" 67 that govern systemic change. These are the perceptions states have recourse to that contribute to a change in their shared knowledge and role identit ies. He isolates four main ones though others are possible (though restricted to perceptions affecting self other assumptions). The four he determines are: interdependence, common fate, homogenization and self restraint. 68 The first is a measure to which th e livelihood of a state is intertwined with that of another. If a state is not very dependent on another state, it is unlikely that the constituent societies of 66 The importance that nationalism gained with the entrenchment of the Lockean culture of Europe could be seen as a "rival" role identity being constituted do mestically. 67 Wendt 1999: 343 68 Wendt 1999: 344, 349, 353 and 357 respectively
48 the states will feel responsible for each other. Even in the case of hegemon countries and thei r client states, the knowledge of mutual need would allow for the extension of self to incorporate aspects of the other. The second is a measure by which external factors to both countries affect them equally. 69 The third is a measure of cultural similarity This variable would account for society's natural tendencies to distrust an obvious Other more than a similar one. Whether this is an effect of evolutionary necessity, or a remnant and deeply internalized norm established by history's abstention from Kan tian and humanistic norms, is an issue outside the scope of this paper. Whatever the cause of this apprehension towards diversity, the variable remains significant in determining the possibility of assimilation between two states. The fourth variable measu res the ability of states to refrain from using force against one another. The more this is perceived as a reality, the smaller the prisoner's dilemma will be with regards to war, and the greater the possibility for transparency. As suggested in my languag e, what matters with regards to these variables seems to be their perception by states rather than their factual being. In other words, as long as states perceive themselves as having a particular role relationship, the behavior necessary to sustain it wil l follow. Or as Wendt put it: "for egoistic states friendship might be nothing more than a hat they try on each morning for their own reasons, one that they will take off as soon as the costs outweigh the benefits, but until that they will be friends in fa ct even if not in principle." 70 This illustrates a key "idealist" 69 An easy example of two rival "states" forced into a more cooperative culture by a perceived common threat would be the Native American tribes facing extinction during the daw n of European colonization. 70 Wendt 1999: 305
49 contribution of constructivism, that the perception of intension is more relevant to decision making than the material situation a state finds itself in. How does structural change happen the n? As described in the European example, interaction between states creates role relationships between states, and these role relationships give meaning to their opportunities, interests and capabilities. As interdependence grows, it becomes increasingly p roblematic to justify violence as a rational or legitimate action; as common fate grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to turn a blind eye towards the Other, and to expect the Other to do the same; as homogeneity grows, it becomes increasingly counter intuitive to see the Other as an Other at all; and as self restraint increases, it becomes increasingly expensive to warrant protective priorities in the guns or butter trade off. As demonstrated by the European example, an increase in any single one of th ese variables is not sufficient to cause a systemic shift. The interdependence of European economies prior to the first War was probably undermined by the growing sentiment of nationalism (which stands in strong opposition to the perception of interdepende nce, as well as a perception of common fate and homogenization). Additionally, due to the Napoleonic wars, the Franco Prussian war and ongoing colonial disputes, the perception of mutual self restraint was probably close to inexistent. However, if all of t he variables increase, the foundation of the role identities is changed, changing the normative constructs through which the cultures are manifested. As discussed, sovereignty becomes untenable if the perception of the variables is high enough that the und ermining of stranger's rights elsewhere is constitutive of crimes against one's own constitutive society. In the European example, the experience of the World Wars
50 caused this shift and allowed the norms of human rights to take precedence over those of sov ereignty. 71 I described in my introduction that I would try to expand on Wendt's theories of the causal mechanisms by pulling precedent examples from Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities In order to achieve this, and with brevity in mind, I will quick ly summarize the book and the pertinent concepts he analyzes, and then apply them to the IR perspective. Anderson's book deals with nationalism and its development, starting in the "creole states" of the New World, through Europe to the rest of the world. In it, he attempts to trace back to social and technological inventions this sudden and very consequential identity construct. First and foremost, however, it should be worth pointing out that the author's view of nationalism is entirely modern. As the tit le of his book suggests, he asserts that nationalism is not a genetic property, or even a real cultural property (though this can get muddy), but a static imagination by which a group of diverse individuals can simultaneously remember shared experiences an d forget their animosities, extending these to "imagined" strangers expanding in the process their definition of Self to include them not only as similar, but as particulars in an exclusive community of equals. Some of the most interesting and relevant pr ocesses by which this imagination came about, according Anderson, are infrastructural limitations and language. A vast majority of the social controls that he examines prior to the development of societies to the injustices of the church's and dynasts' con trol were through the control of 71 I should point out that although Wendt uses Europe as a basis for his theoretical Kantian states, he does not work out the systemic change as I have in this paper.
51 language. Language, the semiotic vessel through which cognition is given meaning is undoubtedly one of the strongest socialization mechanisms. As such it is unsurprising that nationalism after Johann Gottfried Herder became an issue of linguist decent. Through the exploitation of this factor, the similarities were highlighted from the dissimilarities among Huguenot Frenchmen and Provencal Frenchmen in order to create a "French" to oppose the unifying "German" that was replac ing the Germanic mess situated between France and Russia, and dominated by Prussia and Austria. Sharing a language, in Wendt terminology, could be understood as a strong variable contributing to the perception of Homogenization. With respect to the unifica tion of the Germanic states, there was also a clear perception of "common fate" resulting from military and cultural oppressions by their western neighbor. The process I found the most interesting through his historical analysis, however, although he does not make it very explicit, is the effect of infrastructural limitations on identity creation. In his exploration of Creole nationalism, which he describes as the first real manifestation of this type of identity, he blames the inaccessibility of the mother land for colonists for being a strong foundation of their alienation and subsequent voluntary eradication. Similarly, he attributes the inability of African born functionaries to become important in the motherland, and thus establish themselves as the ruli ng class of a separate society altogether, which their shared experiences and knowledge allow them to imagine as a nation. The common experiences of the different classes across a colony create the circumstances necessary for the creation and sustenance of a common identity. In this way, Anderson describes two historical processes by which systemic change has occurred
52 in domestic societies, undermining the egoistic tendencies to which uncertainty is pertinent, and allowing diverse groups to assimilate as eq uals. The Wendt variables controlled by these infrastructural limitations are the perception of interdependence and common fate. This can be politically relevant. Understanding the underlying processes that regulate Wendt's "Master Variables" can be relev ant and useful. One way by which structural constructivism can be applied using Anderson's contribution would be by understanding how infrastructural limitations affect role creation and therefore seek to improve labor mobility across social borders as muc h as possible. However, my goal in this paper has been to apply the processes of identity formation to the international perspective of State relations. How can the issue of infrastructural limitation be removed in order for states not to consolidate their role identities away from cooperation and towards a limited self preservation? Ensuring that international institutions are both fair and transparent can only be a start. The resolution of these recommendations is also outside the scope of this paper, how ever, and will have to be addressed at another time. It raises an important question when considering the oppositional stance that Putin's Russia and the OPEC countries have taken against the West, however. Would economic inclusion (leading to interdepende nce), cultural miscegenation (leading to homogenization), and proofs of self restraint (such as diplomatic resolutions to conflicts being prioritized over "tactical strikes") be sufficient to allow the circumstances for a global shift away from violence an d towards cooperation to ensue? Will the threat of global warming contribute to a perception of common fate among states? A contemporary issue for the developed
53 world is to counteract the apparent interdependence and common fate perceived by the developing world against the developed world, which is allowing them to consolidate against it, rather than work together with it. The contemporary willingness to expand the G8 summit to include 12 developing countries also seems like a step in the right direction. The language issue can also be useful though it is more difficult to find parallels in an international society of states to the domestic process. However, the willingness of EU institutions to promote all of its constituent languages as official languag es (including Maltese) could serve as an example of how homogenization does not necessarily imply a loss of diversity, so long as it is interpreted as a sharing of values, rather than particular customs. This could serve as a criticism of my appropriation of Anderson, because after all, nationalism is an intrinsically exclusive identity construct. If the goal in establishing a Kantian culture is absolute inclusion, wouldn't integration be problematic? This assertion is only relevant on the topic of homogen ization, which as I described above, is one that leaves a bitter taste in my mouth. My response, however, is that homogenization is not necessarily an attempt to decrease diversity, although this might seem like the case. Rather, it should be understood as an attempt to create a homogenous understanding of shared beliefs, a decrease in the diversity of behavioral unknowns, rather than in identity constructs. In other words, the variable of homogenization should be understood as the perception of similarity between different groups, rather than the perception of dissimilarity. So long as the perception of similarity increases, cultural diversity could (and should) still exist. The resulting
54 state level "nationalism" would thus not be nationalism at all, but t he development of a civic culture based on bridging social capital, rather than bonding social capital, between their constituent societies. Conclusion The main question I want to address in order to conclude this paper is with regards to the value of the project undertaken. As I mentioned in the introduction, the main goal has been to describe how Wendt's social theory of constructivism has been applied to IR theory, which I believe I have done. However, this is a useless endeavor unless there is some var iance requiring explanation that warrants such a theoretical application. 72 The variance I have determined to require a structural constructivist perspective is the wide changes in reaction between similar illegal behaviors by different countries. Some exam ples would be the difference in the international community's reaction to the Turkish strikes against Kurdish rebels inside Iraq (which was very limited) and the intense political backlash against Colombia's incursion into Ecuador. Why was the illegality o f the action in one case tacitly supported whereas the illegality of the other berated despite their similarities? They were both attacks on domestic terrorists abroad. The variance in reaction can be explained by the difference in culture in which these i nfractions occurred. Though both regions can be considered to be in a Lockean state of affairs, the Middle East's can be understood as a not very internalized instantiation whereas the South American states, particularly 72 Unless the normative implications of the p erspective alter state behavior for the better, though it's successful establishment as a worthwhile research program seems a prerequisite.
55 those involved in the dispute, are entrenched in a deeply internalized system of mutual abstention. The value assigned to the sovereignty norm in the second example was therefore much stronger than it was in the former. In this situation, as described in the sections dealing with the overla p between Wendt's theory and Waltz's, some balance of power dynamics could be used to explain Venezuela's involvement in the second example, but not to explain the inaction surrounding Turkey. The variance in international relations in different regions, s uch as the relations between African states when compared with the relations amongst European states, can be explained through a structural constructivist perspective, giving use to this literature overview and creating possibilities for the development of a strong research program. However, every good theory needs enough criteria by which it can be disproved in order to have any intellectual value. If a theory is large enough to encompass every single conceivable and contradictory mechanism, then it cannot possibly be of positivist worth. This could be an issue, considering that I have presented structural constructivism as a theory able to incorporate the mechanisms of realism, neorealism, neoliberalism and liberalism, but it is not. Fortunately, the crite ria by which structural constructivism could be wrong are easy to delineate, which I did during the opening discussion of the second section, dealing with its internal logic. If states are not able to learn from their interactions, then structural construc tivism is simply impossible; if international dynamics simply have no effect on domestic societies, then constructivism is simply impossible. If states does not behave as corporate agents and the liberal theory critique against the unitary singular actor a pproach is correct, then constructivism does not have any value. One way by
56 which this could be demonstrated is by the regression from cooperative cultures towards egoistic and violent ones. Another way would be through a clear example where a state's role identity is negated by its domestic imperatives. For example, the animosity demonstrated by neighbors may not reciprocated because of an inability on the part of the constituent society to adapt and abandon its cultural passivity. The claims about systemi c change are also useful towards evaluating the value of the theory. If the positive move towards cooperation turns out to be a temporary situation, 73 then Wendt is wrong. Similarly, if the friction between sovereignty and human rights is political rather t han based on normative divergence between identity constructs in the developed and developing world, then constructivism would be wrong (though political maneuvering does not necessarily exclude normative considerations). Another important concern deals w ith causal direction. As discussed with respect to Moravcsik's liberal theory, the identity mechanisms by which preferences and interests are constructed can be understood from a "bottom up" perspective satisfactorily, which makes this "top down" perspecti ve unappealing. This is particularly true given that the instantiations would be visible domestically as the liberal "bottom up" dynamic. However, the explanatory power of institutionalism and neorealism has been rooted in its ability to explain "top down" causality (with precision in a number of cases). 74 This successful demonstration of a counterintuitive 73 This could become very plausible if the costs of transportation and communication increase in the recession, and a major empirical blow. 74 Though critical constructivists would claim any such successes to be the normative effects of the perspective applied coming to fruition.
57 "top down" dynamic implies that structural constructivism can be seen as a worthwhile research program alternative, without philosophical guilt. Some oth er criticisms are possible on ontological and epistemological grounds, but these have already been discussed. The more important criticism however, has to be with regards to the responsibility of anthropomophization, particularly when dealing with an abstr act agent such as the structural constructivist understanding of the State (as neither government nor social groups but both at the same time). It should be evident that there are a myriad components to structural constructivism which enable it to be victi m of empirical challenge. However, they also provide for a varied recourse of previously unavailable research questions. Now, for the sake of the brevity I unsuccessfully promised in this paper's introduction, I will now conclude with the main thesis of co nstructivism: "Anarchy is what states make of it." 75 75 Wendt in Hathaway and Koh, 2005: 127
58 BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities Verso, 1983, 2 nd ed 2006 Bull, Hedley. Hurrell, Andrew. and Hoffman, Stanley, The Anarchical Society Columbia University Press, 2002, 3 rd edit ion Hathaway, Oona. And Koh, Harold Hongju ed. Foundations of International Law and Politics Foundation Press 2005 Holzgriefe, J.L. and Keohane, Robert O. ed. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas Cambridge University Pres s, 2003 Katzenstein, Peter J. Keohane, Robert O. and Krasner, Stephen D. International Organization and the Study of World Politics," International Organization Vol. 52, No.4 (Autumn 1998), 645 685 Krasner, Stephen D. Organized Hypocrisy Princeton U niversity Press, 1999 Moravcsik, Andrew. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), 654 685 Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge University Press, 1999
59 STRUCTURAL CONSTRUCTIVISM AND SOVEREIGNTY Is sovereignty nothing more than a dream for weak states that stronger states use to absolve themselves of any responsibility they might otherwise have towards societies they otherwise open ly and frequently affect? Or is it, in fact, a normative principle that has guided policy makers and analysts since the Peace of Westphalia, the formative foundation of modern international society? Since its conception and increasingly in a rapidly global izing world, the principle of sovereignty has been and remains a problematic theoretical, pragmatic and empirical idea. Often used politically, and often breached politically, it has persisted through the centuries, but to what extent, and for what purpose ? On March 1 st 2008, Colombian helicopters shot across the Colombia Ecuador border, destroying a FARC encampment in Ecuador. Colombian military forces entered foreign territory in order to collect the bodies and conduct a search of the guerilla base which resulted in the finding of a laptop computer. The majority of the international community's reaction, aside from Colombia's main ally and trading partner, the US, condemned the breach of sovereignty. The governments of Venezuela and Nicaragua, led by the fiery Hugo Chavez and Daniel Ortega, joined the dispute by recalling their ambassadors and cutting off diplomatic relations. Chavez went so far as to mobilize troops to the border, and cut off economic ties (for a few days), in conjuncture with his counter part in Ecuador. This escalation of diplomatic tension, despite the absence of any real threat of war, as well as the international diplomatic backlash suffered by Colombia, should illustrate the salience of the principle of sovereignty and its thoroughly entrenched connection to the international system.
60 However, the Colombian transgression was a tactical strike, one that killed mainly Colombian citizens and only members of the Colombian insurgency group. This is problematic in a couple of ways because of the precedence of other states, and because of the narrowing of the definition of sovereignty that it entails. First of all, as long as the airspace of Ecuador was not violated, which the Colombian claims support, precedents exist that avoided internationa l condemnation. A couple of weeks after the Colombian incident, the United States tactically removed terrorist targets from Pakistan. A couple of weeks prior, the Turkish government had launched a massive retaliatory attack on the PKK across international borders. Neither were endorsed as humanitarian ideals, obviously, but neither were condemned in the same way that the Colombian excursion was, at least rhetorically. Additionally, the fact that neither the FARC organization, nor its members were Ecuadorian translates all complaints of sovereignty into issues of territorial responsibility, rather than institutional responsibility, capacity or autonomy. As such, it problematizes the issue of sovereignty and in particular the international community's response Through this example, and with a couple of other historical incursions brought in from time to time, I hope to explain the normative nature of the principle of sovereignty and how it does, in fact, explain the frequency of international breaches on it, despite asserting it as the main contemporary norm guiding international relations. Through the paper, I will attempt to take a structural constructivist approach to understand the events and developments. This could be construed as a response to Krasner's criticisms of ideational social theories' abilities to do so but is intended as a more general exploration than that particular intention would allow. The structure of
61 the paper will be as follows: I will begin with a brief historical narrative of the reg ion, exploring whatever historical tensions might exist between the main actors involved, and their relations with the international community. This part of the paper will be brief and lead up to the Colombian incursion. Following will be a discussion conc erning what conclusions can be derived from the circumstances into which these countries are imbedded, from a realist, liberal, neorealist and institutionalist perspective. This section will illustrate the tensions among the different emphases of the theor ies and provide a context for the event itself, and the constructivist analysis of its implications. Next will be a narrative reconstruction of the diplomatic backlash of the events, from the incident itself to the resolution in the Dominican Republic, whi ch will be coupled with a constructivist analysis of the events (to contrast with the previous theoretical expectations delineated). Last but not least will be a discussion of possible outcomes and policy procedures that could be applied to resolve the Col ombian Ecuadorian Venezuelan dispute, but that also try to place the principle of sovereignty (the central question of this paper) in a more coherent role by redefining it, or re contextualizing its significance in changing cultural systems. Histo biogra phical Considering that the conflict (or "escalation in diplomatic tensions") involves primarily three countries, I will not prioritize, paying attention to all three. I will, however, prioritize with respect to the events I describe, and concentrate on ev ents affecting their relationship.
62 The three countries, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela have much common history. As can be discerned from their respective flags, and the similarities these entail, their origins as nations were an occurrence in common. Th ey were all Spanish colonies, to begin with, and suffered the same fate as such. They were united under this Spanish rule, as a province governed from Bogot though the future Ecuador and future Venezuela had their own institutional frameworks and infrastr uctures that allowed them to work under Bogot as independent and semi autonomous regions of their own. They were, in this way, part of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (future Colombia) of Spain, but in a subgroup all their own. This fact was increasingly highlighted with time. Initially, the entirety of the three future countries were administrative subsections of either future Mexico (then New Spain) or future Peru (then Peru), but as immigration grew into those regions, which was difficult to control or manage because of the difficulty intrinsic in efficiently communicating with either capital, New Grenada was created. This was not enough, however. Despite Bogot's central location, the rough alpine terrain made it near impossible to govern the entire pr ovince efficiently, so Caracas and Quito became sub capitals of their appropriate regions. These structural limitations and the absence of personal interchange or mobility between the regions is one of the factors that contributed to their developing separ ate national identities according to Benedict Anderson. The rift would not occur until after their revolutionary war and independence from Spain. The separation from Spain began during the Napoleonic wars and in particular the Napoleonic invasion of the I berian Peninsula. The difficulty of Spain to militarily survive in Europe alone strained its ability to support its colonial governments. This
63 absence of European hegemony led to the destabilization of royalist control by 1810, and a subsequent civil war b etween republicans and royalists, llaneros and creoles. Starting in Venezuela, this absence of real power led to a series of conflicts which quickly escalated into a full scale civil war. By 1815, the republicans were in control of Bogot, which prompted t he Spanish king to re invade northern south America and pacify the region. Bolivar was sent into exile to Jamaica but returned in 1816, finally defeating the royalists of New Granada at the battle of Boyaca in 1819. Later this year, the republic of Gran Co lombia ("greater" Colombia) was established with the liberator, Simon Bolivar, at its chief executive. His Vice President was Francisco de Paula Santander. Spain attempted to conquer its former colonies once Europe had settled, but was unsuccessful. Boli var was a military general, and he continued to fulfill this role after independence from Spain was achieved in the three states. He was fighting royalists in the south. The de facto commander of the new republic was his vice president, a fundamental repub lican. The distinctive approach of these two men can be somewhat characteristic of the contemporary conflicts between Colombia and its eastern neighbor. Similarly, in Venezuela, an old military officer of Bolivar's was leading a waxing secession movement. The new republic of Gran Colombia was ill fated by the politics of its regions and by the conflict that rose from its leaders once the liberator was finally satisfied with the liberation of both Peru and Bolivia. Upon his return to Bogot, a political divi sion was formed between his supporters and those of the republican government. To resolve the tensions, Bolivar declared himself the emperor of Gran Colombia,
64 which he forced through the Colombian congress despite poor public support. His ambitions and ide als were of creating and maintaining a single and unified Spanish speaking state, after all. This ideal had led him through his successive invasion of Spanish territories, chasing after royalists. The growing dissatisfaction in Venezuela and Colombia with a centralized structure (which was not consistent with their infrastructural limitation, as established under Spanish rule) eventually grew into a full scale elite opposition against Bolivar forming in all three territories. Santander, in future Colombia w as opposed to Bolivar's unconstitutional rule as well as his support for the inclusion of the military in public and civil affairs. Paez, the prominent leader of the secessionist forces in Venezuela simply disliked the idea of a unified Gran Colombia, cons idering nationality was a growing construct, and the other creoles were seen as foreigners even despite their common experiences. By the time Bolivar died on his way to exile in 1830, Venezuela and Quito (future Ecuador) were officially separating from Gra n Colombia. The latter was forced to undergo a fundamental restructuring, adopting several names and constitutions until finally settling on the Republic of Colombia in 1886. The historical legacies of this tumultuous beginning are numerous. Relating to th e relationship between the three states in question, it established in their short time as a single state, a set of common "national heroes" of which Bolivar is the most influential, and created the root role identities from which the different states have crafted their relationships. The immediate historical legacy was that Colombia, under the leadership of Santander was firmly entrenched in procedural politics, contributing to a culture of institutionalism (and of party politics related violence), whereas
65 Venezuela, under Paez and Bolivar's ghost, was plagued by a history of coups and "Caudillismo." Ecuador, on its own side, was plagued by similar dynamics as Venezuela, primarily Regionalism and Personalism. Colombia became entrenched in ongoing civil con flicts between the two dominant political parties, but its government was dominated through to the 1930s by a succession of conservative presidents. This period included a notable period of violence known as the "Thousand Day's War," which Theodore Rooseve lt's government managed to exploit in order to establish American control over the seceding region of Panama. 76 Conservative control was reversed from the 1930s through to 1946 by a string of liberal presidents who attempted to alienate the opposition party as retribution for perceived imbalances of the previous years. The ongoing rivalry exploded into vivid animosity on April 9 th of 1948 when a prominent leader of the liberal party, Jose Eliecer Gaitan, was assassinated in Bogot setting off a period known as "La Violencia" (The Violence). This period, which saw the creation of major terrorist guerillas in both the country side and urban environments was finally ended by the forceful implementation of military rule by the general Rojas Pinilla, which forced a "National Front" agreement between both parties to be implemented starting 1956. The pact would force the alternation of the presidency between the two parties, institutionally removing any possible influence of a third party or legitimate multi party co mpetition from Colombian politics (since every election the new presidency would undo the changes brought forward by the previous administration.) 76 Federico Gil, Latin American and US Relations (Harco urt Brace Janovich: 1971)
66 From these legitimate political grievances, a growing international market for narcotics and a history of vio lence most deeply internalized by rural guerillas (appropriated by the new guerillas), the contemporary civil conflict grew. Marxist and revolutionary movements formed and quickly abandoned their ideals in the luxury of the drug trade, but can be easily re cognized as the ELN and FARC guerilla forces. Reactionary right wing forces also formed (and dipped their hands into the drug trade) most prominently as the AUC. Although initially holding a strong urban element, all of these organizations quickly localize d to the rural areas. Subsequent attempts at peace negotiations have taken place over different the course of different presidencies but aside from the progressive disarmament of the AUC under current president Uribe's policies, no progress has been made w ith either the ELN or FARC. Most of these attempts were undertaken after the constitutional and economic reforms of Gaviria's 1991 government though the "National Front" agreement had expired by 1974's election of Alfonso Lopez Michelsen. Venezuela was te rrorized by the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez from 1909 to 1935, which permitted no participation in the political process. Venezuela began its oil dependency during this time period, however. In the early 1920s, oil exports began to increase as forei gn firms invested into extracting the resource from the country. After Gomez died, a couple of other military dictators followed him, each serving about five years. In 1945, there was a democratic turn in Venezeula as a coup enabled a student alliance (the Democratic Action or "DA") to form a government. The head of it, Romulo Betancourt, implemented a series of liberalizing reforms which set the government against the conservative Catholic Church, Marxist
67 party, and military leaders. After the election of 1948, which the DA won by a significant margin, military dictatorship was resumed under the premise of necessary anti communist measures. The latter ruler of this particular regime, the Colonel Marcos Perez Jimenez was supported in part by the Nixon admini stration but forced into exile through domestic pressures in 1958. The sixties saw a return of Betancourt and AD control over Venezuela which was not thoroughly bothered by the Communist pressures of revolutionary Cuba. It also saw the continuation of eco nomic growth guided by increasing petroleum exports and Venezuelan participation in the OPEC organization. This dependence on oil made the international conflicts of the 70s and 80s problematic for the Venezuelan economy, leading to renewed pressures for m ilitary intervention, culminating in coup attempts in 1992 by then future, and now current president Hugo Chavez. Ecuador was isolated through the majority of its history. While its early history was plagued by corrupt politics and the overwhelming control of the conservative party, which culminated in the unprecedented control of the Catholic Church over many aspects of Ecuadorian society, civil war never reached the magnitude of either Colombia or Venezuela. Because it was very poor, scarcely populated an d small, it lost the majority of its territory to neighboring countries (most notably Peru). Economic development has also been very difficult, and slow, without the geographic position of Colombia or the oil resources of Venezuela, this country has lagged behind both through "Modernization" attempts, and later through more general developmental aims. Through the twentieth century, Ecuador's luck remained unchanged and includes a period of attempted "dollarization" which contributed to
68 the low economic stat us of the state (and probably to the popular support for Correa and his support for the political "New Left" of Latin America). There is only one outstanding militarized dispute between any of these countries, which is between Colombia and Venezuela and in volves oil rich waters north of their border in the Caribbean Sea. This is how the different countries entered the 21 st century, and the situation in which the main actors of the diplomatic crisis enter. The main actors seem to be the Presidents of the pa rticular countries, President Uribe of Colombia, President Correa or Ecuador, and President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela. Correa was elected in a runoff election in 2006, as the result of a new political movement aimed at giving the indigenous lower classes a political voice, and being the head of his own party coalition. As a product of such a movement, and despite being US educated, Mr. Correa is a close political ally of the other populist leaders, parties and movements of Latin America, a coalition that inc ludes the governments of Nicaragua, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela. Mr. Uribe (on the other corner of the ring) stands as a rightist supporter of trade liberalization and further involvement with the United States. He was elected into office in 2002 and popular enough to change the constitution through referendum in order to be reelected for a second term (serving two consecutive terms was unconstitutional heretofore). Mr. Chavez, although having failed his forceful takeovers of the Venezuelan g overnment through coups (partially because of his low rank in the military, and how this limited his resources and capacity), was legitimately elected in 1999 but has subsequently been deposed and reinstated. As a vocal leftist, he is a vehement opponent o f US involvement in South
69 American politics, and the liberalization of trade. His government policies have also been characteristic of a return towards ISI developmental strategies. His vocal opposition the US and apparent credibility as a socialist minded politician, he has made himself somewhat of a spokesperson for Latin America's "New Left," probably to the chagrin of the more developed countries with more moderate leaders. However, the ideological opposition between Colombia and Venezuela should be app arent. From the historical analysis and the presidential comparison, it should be clear that the countries were on opposite and opposing ends of the discursive spectrum, as were their respective leaders. They are also particularly representative of their h istorical baggage, and flag bearers of their historical relationship as the classic realist duality of a militaristic but social minded society and a trade oriented but procedurally democratic and legality minded society. Although the civil conflict within Colombia has, with only a couple of exceptions remained an issue foreign to Venezuelan involvement, Hugo Chavez became involved as a mediator between Uribe's government and the militant guerillas for a very short period in 2007. This was, in part, a resul t of international pressure to find a peaceful alternative to the militarization emphasized by the Colombian government. Uribe's support for his role was relieved when Chavez broke international protocol (the norms of international involvement) by undermin ing the diplomatic channels intended to for his communication with Colombian military institutions. Theoretical Analysis through realist and liberal perspectives
70 What can be expected of countries in this situation? Are these countries locked in a balance of power dynamic that create and maintain the stability of the northern South American region? Are they, instead, through their persistent rivalry only manifesting the in appropriate pejoratives of the corrupt upper classes that control the government (wh ile the domestic societies are increasingly integrated)? Are they actually out to destroy each other in order to dominate the region, increasing their chances of survival in the international realm? Are they actually integrating at a faster pace than their politicians' rhetoric would describe, due to the spillover of economic integration and the numerous international institutions that bind them? All of these claims have some merit, and provide a theoretical set of expectations at the root of why the breach against a norm of sovereignty was so significant. Classical realism requires that states act as unitary and singular actors; it is one of its particular assumptions, though one which is contestable through the limits it places on what constitutes "politic s." 77 This assumption aside, for the sake of this segment of the discussion, the singular actors that constitute states (their governments and the policy choices they make in realist discourse), struggle for power seeking to continually increase it in order to increase their ability to survive. This eternal competition, by which every state attempts to dominate every other, is the perspective of Realism. The relationship between the three Andean countries, if analyzed through a realist perspective would be o ne where Colombia, the dominant power has continually attempted to assert itself on its two neighbors. In order to avoid this, 77 H.J. Morgenthau in Oona A. Hathaway and Harold Hongju Koh, Foundations of International Law and Politics (Foundation Press, 2005), 23.
71 Venezuela and Ecuador have continually had to rely on foreign aid and petroleum, keeping Colombia at bay. They have managed to do so, as is perceivable from their survival as states (despite Ecuador's historical reduction in size), but have not been able to impose themselves on Colombia because of their own lack of power. As it stands, classical realism would expect, the internal co nflicts of Colombia have impeded it from trying to impose itself on its neighbors and subjugate them, which could change if the civil war were to subside. Neorealism, which could also be understood as Structural Realism (though I've never seen it referred as such in the literature) also maintains the singularity of state action, but places it in a hierarchical structure. This changes the possibility of state behavior from being concerned with absolute domination, to a relative increase in importance. This relative concern with hierarchical position with regards to neighboring states, as defined by power (be it hard or soft) is the perspective of neorealism. The relationship between the three Andean countries, if analyzed through this particular perspective would be similar to the previous, except that rather than being concerned with dominating the region, Colombia and Venezuela would be expected to simply increase their potential relative to each other in order to wield the greatest influence in the region. This is fundamentally different because it minimizes the potentiality of interference being a behavioral choice. However, the intentions of the states would be the same, gaining the upper hand in negotiations and the resolution of disputes. Their relation ship could be interpreted as one involving a balance of power dynamic whereby the hegemon friendly Colombia is opposed by the anti
72 globalization "new left" of Venezuela (and its OPEC and socialist allies). This could be supported by the Neorealist assertio n that a bi polar system is intrinsically stable, and that US hegemony will be balanced, sooner than later, by new emerging powers. Liberal theory is entirely different from the realist traditions in that it negates the unitary nature of state action as r epresentative of the causal mechanisms that govern international relations. The emphasis, thus, is placed on domestic societies and their interactions and gradual integrations through trade liberalizations and technological innovations (particularly in tel ecommunications). It also places an emphasis on internal dynamics as a root of external behavior by emphasizing the role of social actor's preferences and capabilities. In this perspective, the rivalry of political parties can be seen as a possible explana tion for a state's behavior internationally. This theory, thus, removes the emphasis from power accumulation by the state and places the entirety of the analytical criteria on the interests of the different bodies within society that affect government deci sions, such as the elites that may or may not control the governments. The relationship between the Andean countries is therefore considerably less conflict driven from this perspective, considering the progressive liberalization of markets undergone by t hese countries since liberalization became a prominent phenomenon in the late 80s and early 90s. The importance of economic investment in Ecuador, for example, would undermine the claims that conflict would be a rational policy procedure between these co untries. So too would the reliance on Colombian exports (food, primarily) in Venezuela. However, the emergence of Hugo Chavez as a popular and revisionist leader in the latter country signifies a change in
73 relations. Being an avid rhetorical socialist, som e of his government policies include the nationalization of industry, which makes foreign investment and economic integration difficult, and the spillover effect that makes cooperation rational, less likely. From this perspective, the expectation would be for Hugo Chavez' protectionist measures to be self defeating and temporary, and for the countries to gradually increase their economic interdependence and integration. Additionally, conflict would be very unlikely, considering its negative relationship wit h liberal economics (which are favored by domestic societies). Institutionalism does not disagree with Liberal theory. It does, however, take a unitary actor perspective in order to understand the relationship of states with each other in the internationa l context of transnational institutions. Its main assertions are that in an increasingly interdependent world, cooperation is becoming progressively rational as a policy choice. This allows for Institutions to mediate outstanding disputes and create the en vironment for the integration itself to take place. The relationship between the Andean countries from this perspective is one of considerable integration, which allows for this perspective to restate the cooperative progression of liberal theory. From th is perspective, and new disputes of growing conflict would be handled by the international institutions to which they belong reinforcing in the process the applicability of the institutions, their relevance, legitimacy, and the interdependence between the countries. One such organization is the OAS, and another would be the Rio Group. Although integration and the extent to which these institutions are relevant to international politics is nowhere near the level it has attained in north Atlantic relations, i t is never the less present and relevant.
74 It should be very clear that the expectations are not entirely consistent. Whereas realists expect conflict to be a policy choice considering the historical and actual rivalry between the north Andean countries (a s exemplified by the Colombo Venezuelan water dispute), liberals expect these issues to be increasingly irrelevant as trade continues to create cross national relations between the respective domestic societies, and as the international institutions that b ind them become increasingly adept at mediating their conflicts. Realists expect sovereignty to be a continuing issue, because of its relevance to hard power and the constitutive relationship it holds with the ability of a state to survive. This stands in strong tension with the liberal concern with human development and how interdependence increasingly removes the applicability of sovereignty. 78 This different interpretation regarding the importance of sovereignty as both an analytical reference point and a state interest is at the root of the diplomatic crisis around which this paper is based. The Incursion and its Meaning One of the pillars of Colombian president Alvaro Uribe's domestic policies has been the military repression of the guerilla forces. Co ntrary to his predecessor's attempts at finding a diplomatic solution through negotiation, he has actively attempted to pressure the FARC and ELN into disbanding by creating a military presence in every department, and increasing cooperation with Pentagon intelligence. This policy, coupled with the implementation of disarmament and reinsertion programs has contributed to a growing desertion rate and increasing isolation in the 78 Stephen D. Krasner. "Compromising Westphalia," ( International Security Vol. 20 No. 3, 19 95) serves as an argument against it.
75 guerilla groups. These successes have shifted the military operations from being ones of strict anti narcotic nature, and the re imposition of government control over areas into ones of dismantling the militant organizations' leadership. The incursion in question was one such operation. According to the Colombian government's press re lease, as quoted in El Tiempo newspaper, a call made by Hugo Chavez to the FARC's secretary of public relations, Raul Reyes, was intercepted and traced to a location near the Colombian Ecuadorian border. The operation that resulted from this information wa s aimed at finding this location and neutralizing the guerillas found, in the process either capturing or neutralizing, for the first time in the long engagement, a member of the FARC leadership. According to the Colombian government, once the military ar rived on location, they were attacked from across the border, from the Ecuadorian side. The Colombian helicopters responded by firing from the Colombian side, across the border, destroying the encampment. Ground troops then penetrated the territory of Ecua dor, secured the area, retrieved the bodies of the militants, and maintained the area secure until Ecuadorian police arrived on location. If this description is correct, the airspace was not violated, and no Ecuadorian citizens or Ecuadorian economic inter ests were disrespected. According to Correa's press releases, which are complimented by Chavez', the airspace was, in fact violated by weapons of advanced technology, which attacked the guerillas from the south, forcing them north, where the Colombian mili tary
76 massacred them in their pajamas. Additionally, the Venezuelan president claims that one of the murdered was in fact an Ecuadorian citizen. The event was not revealed to the international community until Uribe's first press released, which occurred a c ouple of hours after the operation concluded. Correa quickly responded and determined the tone of the international community's response to the events by whole heartedly condemning it. He recalled his ambassador and cut diplomatic relations. Chavez, who's country was entirely uninvolved in the event, threw his support behind Correa, recalled his ambassador and sent troops to the border, threatening war if his country's sovereignty were to be violated. The Colombian government responded by attacking Ecuador for harboring the terrorist organizations, as well as revealing that a computer taken from the encampment revealed links between the militant organization and both the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments. Ecuador mobilized troops to its northern border, paralleling Chavez' "saber rattling." Finally, the Colombian government revealed its intention to bring the Venezuelan government to the ICC under charges of crimes against humanity (in particular Genocide), and that it had avoided asking the Ecuadorian go vernment for permission prior to the incursion because of the suspected (and then confirmed) suspicion that Correa's government would undermine the military's efforts. The international community's response was to condemn the incursion, though never offic ially. The "New Left" governments asked Uribe to issue a more serious apology considering his press release to be insufficient. These governments included Brazil, Peru, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba, Mexico and Nicaragua. The governments
77 of Peru, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua were the most vocal in their support of Ecuador (Nicaragua also recalled its ambassador, probably influenced by its own water sovereignty disputes with Colombia) while Uruguay and Argentina urged for a quick normalization of diplomatic relations. The latter convened an emergency meeting of the OAS to mediate the matter. The United States was steadfast in its support of the Colombian effort, while the EU and its member countries urged calm from all sides and a diplomatic resolution to the dispute. The international institutions involved, the OAS, the UN and the Rio Group almost unanimously criticized the Colombian policy. The emergency summit of the OAS called for a renewed apology from the Colombian government, declaring that the incursion was, in fact, a violation of sovereignty. The United Nations did not convene the Security Council, considering that the US pentagon's declaration that there was no real threat of militarized conflict, but did criticize the incursion. The parties involved reached a resolution when Uribe shook hands with both Correa and Chavez (and Ortega) on international news channels at a Rio Group summit (which had been scheduled prior to the crisis). What this sequence of events should illustrate, mainly, is that although Colo mbia was fighting a domestic threat, the international community came to the defense of Ecuador, a country that was harboring the terrorist organization. Similarly, Venezuela was not reprimanded for its involvement with the organization and its financial t ies to it. Why is it that? Why was Colombia's incursion criticized rather than the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan polities that made the operation necessary from the Colombian government's perspective?
78 As described in the previous section, a realist perspective might understand the Colombian excursion as a symptom of the ending civil war. As the military's efforts are increasingly revealed as string of successes that are undermining and gradually eliminating the FARC and ELN threat (while the AUC has mainly been disbanded through the government's demilitarization programs), the Colombian government is increasingly able to assert its military dominance in the region. This clear undermining of Ecuador's sovereignty is symptomatic of Colombia's increasing capability The international community's reaction, in turn, could easily be expected as an attempt to preserve the status quo from any disruptions, protecting stronger state's interests in the instability of the region (by continuing the rivalry between Colombia an d Venezuela). This perspective is problematic because the Colombian government's description of events attempts to minimize the extent of the breach of sovereignty. If this was an action that could illustrate a growing power's flexing of muscles, it would not have attempted to minimize its willingness to prosecute its enemies, wherever and however this might be. The neorealist perspective suffers similar shortcomings. Although it would correctly predict that Ecuador and Venezuela would band together to bal ance Colombia and its northern ally, the military and rhetorical nature of the crisis undermines this explanation. Together, the Venezuelan, Ecuadorian and guerilla forces only account for about half the size of the Colombian military (according to estimat es found El Tiempo and the CIA World Factbook). This undermines the credibility of Chavez' sincerity, if only because of the limitations this disparity would place on Venezuelan military capacity. This absence of hard power balancing is
79 reinforced by the P entagon's assertion. However, the political positioning of the states could be interpreted as a balance of power dynamic by which soft power is given prevalence. Additionally, the FARC and ELN's links to the Venezuelan government could be interpreted as th e latter's policy of undermining Colombian influence in the region. Chavez consistently uses high visibility to score ideological points, after all. There seems to be more depth to the different state reactions, however, as exemplified by the successes of the liberal theories in foreseeing the resolution of the conflict. The liberal perspective had presupposed that Chavez' political rhetoric was self defeating, and considering his country's dependence on Colombian investment, his short lived threat to natio nalize Colombian property was never instituted. Similarly, his closing of the border, interrupting trade relations met with considerable domestic opposition and probably contributed to the surprisingly rapid denouement of the tensions at the Rio Summit. T he institutionalist perspective reinforces this explanation by adequately predicting the recourse of the countries involved as well as the neighbors to the OAS, and the Rio Group summit. The reconciliation of these perspectives can be achieved through a co nstructivist analysis of the situation. Unlike the north Atlantic countries, trade liberalization in South America happened mainly around the end of the Cold War. This makes it clear that although historically related and more culturally homogenous than ot her areas of the world, because of Spain's colonization of the area, the probable culture of anarchy prevailing in the northern South American continent
80 would be a Lockean one, of "rivalry," rather than a Kantian one of "friendship." 79 This intuition is rei nforced by the entirety of the situation surrounding the diplomatic incident. The prevalence of the sovereignty principle's importance over the Colombian state's right to fight itself illustrates that the intellectual definition of self interest in the st ates has not extended to constitute common interest such as the pacification of the Colombian country side. Instead, the autonomy and territorial integrity and autonomy of the states is highlighted (even if the autonomy includes the direct sponsorship of t errorist organizations). This is consistent with the perceptive aspects of neorealism because it highlights not only the rationality behind the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan responses, but also by giving them a context within the issue of systemic change. The crisis illustrates a difference in perspectives between the government of Colombia and its neighbors regarding the importance of territorial sovereignty (particularly, as highlighted in the introduction, since this is only a territorial issue). For the Uri be government it was more important to prosecute the FARC commander whereas for the international community the protection of territorial sovereignty would have been preferable. This divergence can be explained by the Colombian government's more liberal ap proach to international relations, which includes trade liberalization. Whereas Colombia was moving towards a systemic shift towards a more Kantian culture, Venezuela and Ecuador coerced the Lockean culture back into the Colombian perspective. This should serve as a reminder that although trade liberalization is apt for creating norms of cooperation and friendship, the logic of 79 These are Wendt's "ideal cultures" from Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press 1999).
81 preservation within particular cultures is strong enough to negate it for extended periods of time. For this reason, aside from wit hin select groups of mainly developed countries, sovereignty norms remain a foundation towards understanding international politics. However, as both the institutionalists and constructivists would point out, the increasing levels of trade integration did lead to a swift political resolution through an international institution, which can only lead to an increasing rapprochement between the countries involved and the internalization of norms dissuading rivalry and enmity. Conclusions (and the future) Sove reignty can be understood as the responsibility of a government towards the society it is intended to represent on the international level and mediate on a domestic level. As such, and since Westphalia, territorial integrity has constantly constituted a me asure of its ability to preserve itself. However, territorial integrity has never been fully implemented or realistic. 80 I would respond that it is nevertheless the normative ideal from which state policy is conceived, and by which the international communi ty generally derives its reaction. It is simply a norm, however, and as such as permeable as Krasner asserts it to be (but still crucial). This norm, however, is important. It is the fundamental norm by which the Westphalian system was organized, and from which a Lockean culture developed in Europe and by colonial expansion, the world. The implications are that its importance will vary depending on the relationship between countries in any particular political region, from being 80 Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia" 1995
82 unimportant to being fundame ntal. The main distraction towards understanding its role in a changing world tends to do with its bundled definition, which Keohane attempts to change when addressing the issue of Humanitarian Intervention. The most general definition of sovereignty, whic h can also be used to explain the role of "sovereignty" through the Kantian cultures of anarchy, involves defining it through the relationship of a state to the society that constitutes it, rather than through the territorial boundaries aimed at convening where the society begins and ends. Structural constructivism posits that the longer states interact and the more likely states are to have to deal with each other frequently, the more likely they are to cooperate. This places a long term systemic bias tow ards the development of cooperation oriented cultures of anarchy. As such, encouraging endeavors that promote the creation of social capital among the societies of the three countries involved should be encouraged in order to discourage any further display s of war readiness. The involvement of the presidency of Venezuela in the mediation of negotiations with the FARC was one such move, contributing to the perception of common fate and interdependence, but was unfortunately made problematic by the personal p references of Hugo Chavez. In a way, the civil conflict in Colombia presents itself as an ideal situation for the development of a Kantian culture in the region, so long as the states are willing to cooperate on forcing its resolution. By cooperating or re solving the conflict, an understanding of the interdependence and deep connections among the different countries could develop, easily allowing them to shift their interests away from mutual rivalry and towards mutual benefit; away from an egoistic divisio n of responsibility and preservation and towards a more
83 globalized concern for human rights; away from historical differences and towards a common future.
84 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books: Anderson, Benedict Imagined Communities Verso, 1983, 2 nd ed, 2006 Gil, Federi co G. Latin American and US Relations Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971 Hathaway, Oona A. and Koh, Harold Hongju, ed. Foundations of International Law and Politics Foundation Press, 2005 Holzgrefe, J.L. and Keohane, Robert O. ed, Humanitarian Interventio n: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas Cambridge University Press, 2003 Shafer, Robert Jones A History of Latin America D.C. Heath, 1978 Wendt, Alexander Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge University Press, 1999 Articles: Krasner, S tephen D. "Compromising Westphalia" in International Security Vol. 20, No. 3, 1995 Newspapers and Websites: http://www.bbc.co.uk (from the UK) http://www.eltiempo.com (from Colom bia) http://www.el nacional.com (from Venezuela) http://www.eldiario.com.ec (from Ecuador)
85 IDENTITY IN MILITARIZED SOCIETIES This paper makes two claims, the first, w hich is discussed briefly, is that the concept of civil society often used in comparative politics can be understood in terms of identity dynamics. The second claim focuses on social capital as an illustration of identity dynamics. It argues that the polit ical mechanisms that help develop bridging social capital will also help develop identity in terms of normative values that cultivate cooperation and help develop civil society. This evolution moderates the possibility of a violent collapse along tradition al social cleavages. What is social capital, and what is the distinction between its bridging and bonding manifestations? Social capital is a theoretical concept advanced by Robert Putnam, 81 which seeks to describe the amount of trust in a society. In othe r words, it is the appropriation of an economic term ("capital") to describe a parameter of society that is difficult to quantify, but essential to understand civil dynamics: trust. The distinction between "bonding" and "bridging" social capital deals with the direction in which members of society extend their trust to strangers. "Bonding" social capital can be understood as the extension of trust by a member of society to members within his particular social group (regardless of whether this group is ethni c based or class based). In this case the "imaginary community" 82 to which a member of society responds favorably is determined by the social cleavages from which he or she determines his or her place in society. "Bridging" social capital is the extension o f 81 Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work (Princeton University Press1994), and Bowling Alone ( Simon & Schuster 2000) 82 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (Verso, 1983)
86 this trust across social cleavages, and results from, the interaction of people who would not ordinarily interact to use Putnam's own example, as they would in a bowling league. In this example, the imaginary community to which a member of society respon ds favorably is porous, due to its ability to extend beyond immediate affiliations. The idea that interaction will contribute to the internalization of a new imagined society is at the heart of Benedict Anderson's understanding of the origins of nationalis m in Latin America. As this overarching new community becomes internalized through the perpetuity of interaction across social cleavages, it becomes solidified as a new possible identity affiliation in itself. This new identity affiliation is therefore the expression of bridging social capital, whereas the pre existing identities affiliations were expressions of bonding social capital. 83 Identity is thus relevant to political dynamics. People can attribute multiple contradictory identities to themselves, wh ich means that the importance they attribute to one possible identity affiliation over another will be influential in how they will behave. If, for example, a member of the Yugoslav army saw himself as a Yugoslav first, and a Serb second, it would have mea nt that his extension of trust to strangers included the Croats and Bosniaks wanting to secede. That is to say, he would have thought twice about carrying out orders consisting ethnic cleansing if he would have felt himself aggressed as a member of greater Bosniak society in the Yugoslav community. So, the thesis of this paper is that an increase in government activities 83 I say "identity affiliation" to distinguish this specific understanding of "identity" from a more general use, which i s the normative construction of a person. The more general version of "identity" includes role relationship and therefore "role identity" which has nothing to do with the nominal categories of "identity affiliation" but everything to do with expectations a nd behavior between actors.
87 that reinforce the foundation of such overarching identity affiliations, bridging social capital, would contribute to the moderation of vi olence in the breakdown of society. The converse is that in a country in which bonding social capital is emphasized through government policies will exacerbate tensions along its social cleavages. The interactions between identity affiliation and role id entity are important to clarify. Whereas identity affiliations can be understood as the arrogation by a member of society of citizenship into a particular social group, role identity is limited to the expectations held by a member of a social group towards someone else. These role identities can include "enmity," "friendship," and "rivalry." 84 Whereas certain normative expectations will be prevalent between groups that see themselves as "friends," different expectations will be prevalent between groups that see themselves as "enemies." Regardless of what the content of identity affiliations are (class, religion or race), it is through role identities that identity affiliation is expanded to include people across social cleavages. This implies that bridging so cial capital is the normative expansion of identity affiliation through a shift in role identity (particularly away from a culture of enmity and towards a culture of friendship). Bridging social capital is a shift towards civic culture, and a change in the social expectations between separated affiliations. This paper examines three countries (Kenya, Yugoslavia and South Africa) in which ethnic divides have led to the militarization of society. I will then look at the governments' responses and try to deter mine whether they contributed towards either 84 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge University Press1999)
88 bridging or bonding social capital. Then, I will explore how this social capital contributed to the outcomes observed. The three countries chosen are very different, and their internal difficulties equally varie d in different ways. This would imply a subtle criticism which is that the conflicts have nothing to say about each other. Whereas the conflict of Yugoslavia was one of nationalism and, supposedly, the right to self determination as a "nation state," the c onflict in South Africa has been one of racial domination, rather than ethnic variation. Even the issue of comparing European nationalism with African ethnic identities is problematic, as discussed with respect to the situation in Kenya. However, regardles s of the complexity of the individual issues in the various states, the common thread of violence and reconciliation is present and entirely relatable to the politization of identity affiliations. As such, I find that the criticisms, despite their being ai med at clarifying the issues through a more thoroughly introspective approach, lose touch with the fundamentals at play. Whether citizenship into a particular affiliation is based on the color of the skin (as was the case in South Africa), on a combination of moral and economic parameters (as is the case in Kenya), or on cultural religious grounds (as was the case in Bosnia, of Yugoslavia), it is still fundamentally an issue of identity in the more general sense, which creates and sustains the possibilities of conflict, and therefore the possibilities of reconciliation. The differences underlying the criticism are important, as we will see, not in identifying the problems and the solutions, but in the policy possibilities by which the solutions can be implem ented in these very different cultural landscapes.
89 For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term "country" to indicate a society determined along its geographic boundaries. This will allow me to avoid using the term "nation" which carries connotatio ns of identity affiliations along ethnic lines. It would be useful if this distinction were more universal in political literature, as a means to distinguish between the bonding social capital at the heart of the "nation state," against the French and Amer ican conception of nationalism, which tend to be termed "patriotism" and contributes to a bridging social capital underpinning of citizenship. 85 This distinction can be helpful when dealing with countries in which citizenship is contested by ethnic identity affiliations. 86 I use the term "state" to mean the entirety of a society limited by the representational claims of its government. As such, a state is both a government and its domestic constituency. Country, in contrast, describes the purely analytical an d structural boundaries that define and limit a state. In other words, whereas a state is a government and its people, a country is the analytical abstraction to which they claim representation. By conception, the country cases split up like this: Yugosla via collapsed and should provide good examples of how identity affiliation can be manipulated to erode a state along its social cleavages (as defined in terms of nation ). South Africa survives and should provide good examples of how identity can be used to bring about reconciliation after a long period of overt animosity and forceful repression (as defined in terms of race ). Kenya has recently been seen as an oasis of democratic and 85 Carlo Caballero, "Patriotism or Nationalism?" ( Journal of the American Musicological Society Vol. 52, No. 3, Autumn 1999) is an exam ple or the utility of this distinction, as well as an exploration of its implications. 86 Stephen N. Ndegwa, "Citizenship and Ethnicity" ( The American Political Science Review Vol. 91, No 3, September 1997) explores some of these issues.
90 liberal stability in Africa, particularly following its 2002 presidential e lection. The country experienced a flare of ethnic violence against the Kikuyu majority, however, following the contested results of the 2007 presidential elections. It seems like some of the dynamics explored in South Africa and Yugoslavia should be visib le here, and therefore some possibilities for a positive recovery. Each country will be described independently, and then discussed. The discussion following the Kenyan description will also serve as a transition into a concluding section aimed at resolvin g theoretical issues and bringing the paper to a close. (Former) Yugoslavia First, a little bit of history. Yugoslavia was created twice, first after WWI in the vacuum of the fallen Austro Hungarian Empire, under the auspices of "South Slav" nationalism a imed at limiting the influence of the local power, Serbia. Internationally, the creation of such a state was supported by the perceived need to create a stable state in the area that had sparked the war, the Balkans. The first Kingdom of Yugoslavia, previo usly called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes" was officially created by Alexander I's establishment of personal dictatorship in 1929 and lasted until World War II. Aside from the undermining of political participation inherent in a personal dicta torship, Alexander I's rule had two important features to the purposes of this paper: the king's nationality and his attempts at eradicating nationalism from the infrastructural considerations of his government. The former is that he was Serb, which helped to initiate the Yugoslav association of "centralism" with "Serbian hegemony" under his exclusive rule. The
91 second was his attempts to redraw the territorial boundaries between the ethnic based oblasts to dissuade nationalism from reemerging. In the place of the 33 oblasts, Alexander I created 9 banovinas (technically principalities). This measure, which tried to force participation between national identity affiliations with the expressed intent of catalyzing their dissolution, was not the only one impleme nted. The king also extended suffrage to the entirety of male citizenry, and outlawed Communism. Elections were naturally limited to a legislature overseen and controlled by the King himself. Naturally, many saw these policies as attempts at cultural genoc ide, aimed at preserving a Serb hegemony by diluting or destroying the other nationalities. 87 During the Second World War, the foundations for the Second Yugoslavia were established. Ethnic rivalries were kept alive, despite the country's dissolution, throu gh their exploitation by the Nazis to divide the Yugoslav resistance along national boundaries. They allowed the Catholic Croats in the north to avenge the perceived injustices of Alexander's Serbian domination by systematically prosecuting Serbians (and G ypsies) as part of the Holocaust. During the War, two main resistance groups formed, the Royalists who were lead by a Serb (known as the Chetniks), and the Communists who were lead by Tito, a Croat. With the help of the Soviet Union's Red Army, the la tter group (since the first hadn't survived the war) expelled the Germans from Yugoslavia. Tito quickly rose to political dominance, as the Second Kingdom of Yugoslavia was 87 Istvan Deak, "Th e One and the Many" in The Black Book of Bosnia ed. By Nader Mousavizadeh (Basic Books, 1999) briefly discusses Alexander I's effect on Yugoslavia. The rest of the history is assimilated from Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (The Brookings Institution 1995 ) and RJ Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World War (Person Education Limited 2002).
92 created, in part as a reaction against the First's pro Serbian and anti Communist h istory. This second Kingdom was created to structurally mimic the Soviet Union, reestablishing the internal boundaries of the regions along ethno federal boundaries. These regions were those of: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia (with the semi autonomous regions of Vojvodina and K osovo ). Tito established single party rule in Yugoslavia, and placed himself at its head. The implemented national motto, adopted from the communist party, was that of "Brotherhood and Unity." This, in addition to establishing and perpetuating the myth of economic solidarity within Yugoslavia, was also a call to end national rivalries. Tito, despite heading a communist state, broke with the Soviet Union and started the "unaligned" movement. The Soviet response was economic isolation, which pushed Yugoslavia further towards the center of the Cold War dynamics, which in turn helped sustain the legitimacy of the communist government domestically. Power quickly amassed in Belgrade, and the associatio n of federal control with Serbian domination quickly reemerged. This led to the constitutional reforms of the sixth congress of 1952. Because of a central concern in Tito's circles with "self management" being a principle of Marxist theory, by which not on ly should factories be run by the workers, but states also able to run their affairs with some degree of autonomy, decentralization away from federal level control was a central tenet of the reforms. Rather than increasing social participation in politics through the liberalization of power, Tito's regime decentralized governance. Rather than increasing multi national participation at the federal level, they decreased the
93 ability of the center to influence its regions. This translated into the absence of ch ange as economic and political reform for ordinary citizens. Instead they saw a localization of power. After the 1952 reforms, the party bosses of the individual regions were not even required to reside in Belgrade. Which, considering the intransigence in the upper echelons of the party, meant that increasingly, young talent would be confined to the national regions, and owe their loyalties to them, rather than any bureaucratic superstructure. The imaginary community of Yugoslavia would lose any connection to reality. This, however, would not precipitate for a couple of decades. In the early 60s, Yugoslav policy began to liberalize somewhat, though only to a limited extent and in limited regions around the sea. This allowed some groups proposing greater lib eralization to grow and coalesce with de centralizers to push for political and economic reform. The marriage of political repression to the overarching identity of "Yugoslavia" contributed to the rejection by society of both concepts. 88 Increasingly, the a utonomy of the national identities and their relative isolations in the federal structure, coupled with the increasing economic disparities that unequal reform across states, enabled nationalism to re emerge as the communist socialist myth lost legitimacy. Whereas Slovenia and Croatia were developing economically and slowly liberalizing politically, Serbia and its autonomous regions were locked in economic disagreements and political rivalries. The last important Yugoslav constitutional reform was enacted in 1974. It attempted to readjust some of the inadequacies of the previous constitutions by adding layers of complexity to a system of single party control. Rather than liberalize 88 John R. Bowen, "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict" ( Journal of Democracy Vol. 7, No. 4, October 1996 ), page 2
94 economically or politically or minimize the bureaucracy in order to increase accessibility, it increased the number of legislative bodies in all levels of governance in an attempt to allow workers back into political discussions. A negative effect of these reforms was that all the federal and regional republics had veto power on f ederal authority, thereby eliminating any capacity of the federal level government to impose difficult measures on the regions. A positive aspect of these reforms were that they apparently provided a checks and balances mechanism by all the regions on each other, and that the ability of the autonomous regions within Serbia to carry as much authority in the federal level as the republics. This allowed the republics to protect their rights, rather than include their interests in policy making. Since the major ity of federal executives were still old communists, rather than young politicians from the republics, these measures further increased their autonomy from the centre, rather than their participation in the transnational Yugoslav institutions. This was the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. The 70s and 80s were the demise of the Federation. The reliance of many of the republics on the export of crude oil meant that the oil shocks of 74 and 79 sent the country into economic misery. Because of the mixed natu re of the Yugoslav economy, some regions were more harshly affected than others, which increased the disparity between national republics and aggravated the perceived imbalances inherent to the federal structure. Rather than restructuring their economy, wh ich would have undermined the communist myths that legitimized the political structure, the response of the Yugoslav government and its republics was to take out loans from the private western banks flooded with petro dollars. This only served to aggravate
95 the inefficient economic decisions made by the communist political machine. By the early 80s inflation was rampant, and shortages were ubiquitous. At the same time, the old guard of Yugoslavia was dying. The founding generations that had occupied the fede ral ranks of the communist party and government were dying and the new generations, whose loyalties were inevitably entrenched in their republics, didn't replace them. The communist ideals were running out of steam, de legitimized by the austerity necessar y for survival through western debts. By the time Markovic, a liberal and a reformer, came to power and managed to stabilize inflation, the loaning practices of the republics, and initiated an economic restructuring of Yugoslavia along "export led industri alization" principles, the general sentiment in the individual republics was that they should be independent states. This was particularly the case in the republics bordering the sea, which had adopted a more liberal economic procedure earlier on, and whic h saw the Danube based development strategies of Serbia and its poor regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina as a burden on their development. This was the scenario into which Milosevic, and the other nationalist leaders, arrived. The economic disparities fell al ong ethno federal lines, which exacerbated ethnic tensions. When Milosevic threatened to declare a state of emergency in order to end the Albanian protests in Kosovo, Slovenia (about the same size, population wise, as Kosovo) felt threatened and opposed hi m. Tutman, a nationalist Croat, rose to prominence in his own republic. Milosevic responded by packing the Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo seats of the federal executive council with his supporters by out maneuvering his enemies bureaucratically, in a Sta linist manner. This meant that
96 his interests could not be defeated on a federal level thereby turning the old fear that centralization meant Serbian hegemony, into a concrete reality. 89 The consequences are well known. Until NATO's 1991 removal of Serbian a rmed forces from Kosovo, the Federal republics of Yugoslavia emancipated themselves, one by one, from Belgrade. The Federal response, now imposed by Milosevic, despite Markovic's higher hierarchical position, was to forcefully try to retain them with the u se of the Yugoslav army, which in contrast with the republics' police forces (that served as their armies) were increasingly seen as a Serbian military tool. Markovic's would leave office in 1991, marking the end of Yugoslavia, but Milosevic would continue his Serbian pursuits in the name of Yugoslav unity through to 1999. Because of the leaders' nationalist rhetoric, which was given credence by the territoriality of the disputes, the conflict progressed from being wars of independence, to wars of ethnic cl eansing. This is the normative consequence of the framing presented by "ethno federalism." As might be apparent in my historical narrative above, the main reasons that I find for the failure of the communist party's attempts to eliminate nationalist identi ties for the "brotherhood and unity" of the federation is mainly their systematic inability to encourage participation across republican lines which is manifested in two monumental mistakes. The first was the lack of political participation in governance, particularly at the federal level, and the second was the assimilation of decentralization to a loosening federal structure. The single party structure made the former inevitable. The absence of political participation, when faced with the 89 Crampton, The Balkans since the Second World Wa r 2002, discusses this.
97 austerity of the 70s and 80s, inevitably lost all of its proletarian legitimacy which forced the citizens of the republics to find alternative legitimizing factors. For the Slovenes and Croats, economic and political liberalization was a response to the inefficiencies of Belgrade communism, as was, to a certain extent, their nationalism. For Serbia, a similar dynamic played out, and nationalism quickly asserted itself as a convenient substitute to the communal identity of the defeated communism, despite the perseverance of single party rule in government. The loosening of the federal structure, which culminated in the virtual veto power of the republics on federal legislation, placed a structural constraint on the ability of citizens to relate across republican (and theref ore nationalist) boundaries. Because the emphasis of decentralization was to remove power (and therefore capacity) away from the central government and into the republic's hands, it only helped to de legitimize the communist bureaucracy that hovered over Y ugoslavia. It seems that the decentralization which would have continued the emergence of the "Yugoslav" identity of the 50s should have been one whereby power was removed from Belgrade but not the federal level, thus encouraging participation and solidari ty, rather than isolation and autonomy from the republics to the federal government. Of course, this would only have served as "lip stick on the pig" in the communist power structure, since the only viable way to achieve this would have been through politi cal liberalization, but might have assuaged some of the territorialization inherent to the development of nationalist movements. Political oppression diminished participation on the federal level by limiting the accessibility of its institutions. It also d iminished social participation, however, by
98 placing constraint on civil society. The inability of social groups to form and its diminutive effects on Yugoslav discourse outside of a political dimension also contributed to the collapse of Yugoslav identity serving any believable purpose. The cumulative effect of these instantiations of political oppression with the divisive structural nature of ethno federalism and the loosening structure of political control, were the collapse of bridging social capital and the growth of bonding social capital. South Africa (and Apartheid resolution) The identity differences between groups in South Africa are complex. Although the main issues, particularly concerning apartheid seemed to be simply racial in that the Whites w ere segregated from the Natives. Some dynamics can only be explained by the further ethnic distinctions within the racial categories, such as the distinction between English whites and Afrikaner whites and their historical rivalries, or between the Colored s and the Indians, which often occupied a space between the Whites and the Blacks, though were often discriminated against and assimilated into the Blacks. Similarly, the Natives category was an assimilation of Zulu and other ethnic minorities bound togeth er by the color of their skin, as well as their colonial marginalization. South Africa was initially a Dutch colony, but it passed into British hands in1803. Multiple civil wars between the British and Dutch (Boer) colonists ensued. In 1833, slavery was ab olished, but after the Second Boer war, which ended in 1902, non whites were revoked the right to vote. In 1910, South Africa was granted the autonomous state of "Dominion" by the British crown, which allowed the colonists to
99 impose greater restrictions on the non whites' ability to procure property. This trend of racial segregation and political marginalization culminated in 1948 when the Nationalist Party came into power and introduced a series of discriminatory laws which were commonly described as the A partheid. 90 Some of the conditions instrumental in the country's progressive shift away from plurality in governance were rooted in the aggravating economic disparities between the regions and people. Because there was segregation in place, non whites were increasingly marginalized with regards to opportunity structures as well, and were consequently unable to find education, and the employment opportunities it would offer. Concurrently, the political discussions remained and entrenched themselves as a Whit es only procedure. Even the Coloreds, by virtue of their lack of organization as a political opposition movement and poor voting strength, gradually stopped participating in the political process, there were no benefits that it allowed them. 91 Another was t he difference in participation between the Afrikaner unskilled laborers and the Black laborers. Considering they were in competition with each other for the same jobs, the Afrikaner's concerns, which were given political voice in the platform of the Nation alist Party, were partially intended to help the Afrikaner retain their "civilized" standard of living, and give them an artificial edge over the Blacks. These policies included the provision to retain the supremacy of Whites in government by encouraging t he development of Blacks separately, rather than attempting to equalize economic and political differentials, as some liberals proposed. 90 Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa (Donald L. Horowitz 1991) 91 Hermann Gilliomee and Lawrence Schlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building (Oxford University Press 1990), is the basis of this historical description.
100 The systematic oppression of the non White majority was always contested. From Satyagraha in the 50s to a growing mili tary resistance through the 70s and 80s, the oppressed majority expressed its discontent. 92 The ANC took a very active role in the framing of the struggle, from the formalization of the oppressed majority's demands into the Freedom Charter their mobilizati on of society through well organized campaigns. The turning point from peaceful protests to guerrilla warfare came on March 1960 with the violent police repression of protesters in what became known as the Sharpeville Massacre. This event made it clear tha t a political solution to apartheid was unlikely. Mass protests took place as a response to the unprecedented police brutality, which was met by the banning of the African National Congress and Pan African Congress organizations by the Nationalist Party. T his contributed to the founding of "Spear of the Nation," the military branch of the ANC Nelson Mandela quickly became an Idol of the struggle. In 1964, he was sentenced to a life in prison and his liberation became a rallying cry for the anti Apartheid m ovement. The growth of the movement was accompanied by the expansion of the understanding of "Black" to include the other oppressed minorities, the Indians, the Malays and the Coloreds. The system had been very profitable to the Whites, who'd experienced t he benefits of Industrialization, even as the country became independent in 1961, but the "trusteeship" by which the Nationalist Party legitimized its discrimination of non Whites was in practice their systematic abandonment. When the oil shocks of the 70s caused the exposition of economic tensions in South Africa, the 80s saw a new wave 92 Peter Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa (University of California Press 1971)
101 of opposition against the Apartheid. Mandela's strategy, through the ANC and the "Spear of the Nation" was to render South Africa ungovernable and to dissuade foreign inves tment. Renewed international pressure created by the end of the Cold War further complicated the Nationalist Party's isolation. The struggle was successful and culminated in South Africa's abandoning of Apartheid in the early 1990s. 93 Two main events marki ng the end of Apartheid are the government's emancipation of Mandela, and his subsequent election in 1994. Mandela, as well as the ANC that backed him, had to switch gears at this juncture and allow the mechanism they employed to include all oppressed grou ps within their conception of "South African" to also include the White minority. 94 This marks the beginning of the reconciliation. Mandela was not interested in creating a government whereby the Blacks would oppress the White minority as compensation for t he previous injustices. The bridging social capital that had enabled the pan African consciousness of "Black South African" in the 70s extended to incorporate all the racial groups of South Africa for Mandela. The concern then is, how did his government, a nd subsequently his former prime minister's (Mbeki), attempt to create government policies that would help this shift in social consciousness from enmity and rivalry to friendship and cooperation? The transitional government, whose stated goals were to tr ansition away from Apartheid, was known as the Government of National Unity. Mandela presided over the first and implemented a policy of inclusion and reconciliation denominated the 93 Gilliomee and Shlemmer, From Apartheid to Nation Building 1990 94 Anthony W. Marx, Making Race a Nation (Cambridge University Press 1998)
102 "Policy of Reconciliation." One of the pinnacle tenets of the policy inclu ded the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), aimed at uncovering the truth about the atrocities committed and either conceded reparations to the victims, or amnesty to the perpetrators. This created a discursive space from the commonality of Black an d White experiences, instrumental to the creation of a new identity affiliation, that of "South African" as a pan racial construct. 95 The TRC, was very actively designed by Desmond Tutu as means towards finding a "third way" between the Nuremberg trials, an d amnesty. He wanted to use the commission as a means for restoring the dignity of the individual lost during the violence, as well as create a framework by which citizenship could be re defined into the new identity of "South African." This can be observe d in the visibility that describes the TRC's methods (a portion of the hearings were on public TV and included both perpetrators and victims of all colors and backgrounds). 96 The success of the commission was not universal and spoilers on all sides of the c onflict either found its findings too lenient, or too severe, despite its apparent success in regards to the majority of South African citizens. The most difficult claims to contend with are those emphasizing the political nature of the "truth" uncovered i n favor of the commonality of experience, despite the disproportionate responsibility by the white minority. However, "all social memory is reconstructed and selective," 97 and the understanding of "truth" as a vehicle towards 95 Audrey Ch apman and Patrick Ball, "The Truth of Truth Commissions" (Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 1, 2001), demonstrate how this was a very active endeavor in their criticism as to the neglected "truth" of the TRC. 96 Chapman and Ball, "The Truth of Truth Com missions," 2001, 39 97 Chapman and Ball, 2001, 3
103 creating the perception of comm on fate and cultural homogeneity 98 can be seen as a successful government policy towards the creation of bridging social capital. It should seem clear that political exclusion was one of the fundamental circumstances that led to the implementation of Aparth eid, not only because of the unfair advantage it gave the Afrikaners against the Blacks to influence policy, but because it entrenched the circumstances from which the opposing groups legitimized their positions, such as the poor education of Blacks. Under standably, after Apartheid collapsed, the Government of National Unity's policies of inclusion, as well as the TRC's emphasis on reconciliation and forgiveness over justice and retribution removed the structural limitations by which citizens understood the ir roles relative to each other, and therefore the nature of their identity affiliations. Other examples of the policy of unity include the use of three different capital cities, which discourages centralization from being equated with regional hegemony, as in the Yugoslav case, as well as the diverse mottos of South Africa being a "rainbow nation" and "strong in diversity," rather than historical or eternal, as some brands of nationalism would necessitate. Reminiscent to Alexander I of Yugoslavia's attemp ts at the cultural genocide of nationalist minorities in his kingdom, South Africa has also attempted to develop a federal state that avoids division along ethnic 98 I take cultural homogeneity to mean the perception of diversity as an element of the greater and over arching culture defined by the limits of "South African" identity affiliation.
104 boundaries, emphasizing relations between groups in the re drawing of the South African polit ical landscape. 99 If the monumental mistakes of Yugoslavia were political oppression and autonomous ethno federalism, what were the monumental successes of South Africa? These can best be described by three particular government decisions. The first is the willingness of the NP, when it saw that its policies of Apartheid were no longer sustainable, to participate in elections in which the ANC was guaranteed a majority. This instantiation of inclusion, even if illustrating a defeat by the incumbent party und er intense internal and external pressure, created a framework by which the subsequent reconciliation could include the white minority (which would not have been possible under military defeat, for example). The second is the reconciliatory tone taken by t he GNU and the TRC. These policies simultaneously removed structural limitations to identity affiliation, and created the foundations for a historical narrative by which a new "South African" identity could be given resonance. In other words, their politic al formulations of social memory were designed and implemented in order to create new structures by which trust could develop across social cleavages. The third is the political reformulation of the federal structure away from an ethno federal structure. T his was necessary since large areas of South Africa, the "homelands" to which Blacks were legally restricted to, needed to be reintegrated into the political structure. For the GNU to have done so by assimilating them encourages participation on both the l ocal and federal levels. A last but important element to the 99 Richard Simeon and Chri stina Murray, "Multi Level Governance in South Africa" in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa ed. By Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh & Will Kymlicka (James Curry Ltd 2004)
105 relative success of the South African transition has been the implementation of a multi party proportional representation system, which tends to encourage political plurality and the mediation of ideologies towards the center, while encouraging association across social cleavages and political participation. Facing Kenya Kenya was a British Colony that settlers began occupying in the twentieth century. One of the most affected tribes was the Kiku yu, considering their agricultural mode of subsistence brought them into direct conflict with the settlers, who took their land and displaced them. As the century advanced, the colonists attempted to systematically protect their interests, which were under stood as their complete dominion in the area, by making it increasingly difficult for Natives to procure land. The latter were forced into working as tenets on what they saw as their ancestral lands. As they had done in other colonies, the British divided the conquered populations along ethnic lines, treating ethnicity as if it were nationality in Europe. This was problematic because of African ethnicity's porous structure heretofore, previously associated with modes of subsistence rather than moral and fam ilial relations. 100 The concentration of power into limited ethnic hierarchies entrenched a new conception of ethnicity that would become problematic after independence. The colony's first major movement towards independence took form as the Mau Mau of 1952 which lasted until 1960. This mainly Kikuyu movement, with no clear political intension or effective leadership, was mainly an outburst against the 100 John Longsdale "Moral and Political Arguments in Kenya" in Berman, Eyoh & Kymlicka, Ethn icity and Democracy in Africa 2004
106 oppressive colonial situation. Some fundamental concerns that they wanted addressed included property righ ts, and literacy rights. Although some of the concerns were addressed, opposition to colonialism remained, which coupled with Britain's dissolution of its empire, culminated in the Independence of Kenya in 1962. The shape that Kenya took at independence w as determined by a series of conferences in England in which the two main political groups, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) negotiated the future structures of their country. KANU was the dominant party and drew the bulk of its leadership, membership and support from the Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups, the two largest in Kenya. KADU, by contrast, was an agglomeration of minority groups arranged with the political intent of moderating Luo and Kikuyu hegemon y in the political discourse. One of the fundamental groups in KADU, the Kelenjin Political Alliance (KPA) was itself headed by Daniel arap Moi. Aside from the Kalenjin association, other prominent groups of the minority party included the Maasai United Fr ont and the Somalia National Association. These two groups had differing conceptions as to the nature of citizenship in a multi ethnic state, which manifested in a recurring discussion about the desirability of an ethno federal arrangement for the KADU, wh ich KANU opposed. In the end, threatening secession and the opposition to independence from Britain, KADU forced the KANU delegation to accept an ethno federal system that placed strong limits on the power of the center. 101 The distinction was as follows: wh ereas KANU, the majority and urban political association, emphasized a "liberal" conception of citizenship, taking the 101 Ndewga, "Citizenship and Ethnicity," 1997, 605
107 individual as the core unit of state management, KADU emphasized a substate "republican" conception of citizenship. Whereas liberal citiz enship into the Kenyan state was given freely and lacked the necessary capacity to extract obligation from its constituency, the subnational republican citizenship of ethnicity was very concrete through familial, political, and community relations. "Libera l" citizenship is defined in individualistic terms whereas "republican" citizenship is defined in communal terms. This ethnic citizenship was more capable of recruiting obligation for its constituency, in exchange for membership, often creating a tension w ith the liberal citizenship of the state. 102 For the minority ethnicities, this meant that under political dominion by the majority groups, "obligations to the larger political community were not adequately balanced by the benefits of inclusion." 103 This illu strates the relative strength of bonding social capital in tension with bridging social capital. Shortly after independence, the ethno federal constitution (named Majimbo locally), was undermined by the KANU prevalence in central government. Through poli tical manipulation (threatening a referendum which would undoubtedly have resulted in a census type outcome, guaranteeing KANU victory, as well as withholding funds from the regions), the center was able to assert its dominance. As the unitary state also b ecame increasingly autocratic, the KANU conceptions of liberal citizenship would increasingly be equated with the political repression of the system, and the identity resulting from bridging social capital in Kenya reduced to a rhetorical device of Kikuyu dominance in politics. 104 102 Ndegwa, 1997, 603 103 Ndegwa, 1997, 607 104 Ndegwa, 1997, 608 609
108 The first president of Kenya was instrumental in establishing the direction of future Kenyan politics. Kenyatta was primarily a great orator, and secondarily a politician. 105 As such he took changing political positions depending on the issues at hand. The main ones he favored were that of Capitalist (emphasizing a liberal conception of citizenship based around the idea of a Bill of Rights) and that of chief of the Kikuyu. In his orations, these positions were not contradictory at all since his priority, similar to Mandela's, was to create unity out of diversity. In practice, however, he fell short. He created a dictatorship that was often characterized as Kikuyu dominated, particularly after the defection of the majority of Luo suppo rters with former vice president Oginga Odinga. The political response, through his elongated death, was the rise of Moi. Daniel arap Moi was one of the founders of a Kalenjin association at the heart of KADU and had risen to power after KADU was absorbed into KANU to create a single party state. 106 He was selected as a vice president in order to emphasize the liberal conception of citizenship officially supported by the KANU presidency. His ethnic identity was emphasized in order to balance, in public percep tion, the real dominance of government and KANU by the Kikuyu ethnic group. Kenyatta died and Moi succeeded him, and replaced the network of support bellow him from being Kikuyu reliant, to being Kalenjin based through a process of "affirmative action." 107 H e remained in power through to the end of the Cold War. Ultimately, he failed to develop Kenya economically or politically. 105 Githu Muigai, "Jomo Kenyatta & the ride of the ethno nationalist state in Kenya" in Berman, Eyoh & Kymlic ka, 2004 106 It is note worthy that this single party state was supported by the United States during the Cold War as a "developmental dictatorship." 107 Ndewga, 1997
109 He further entrenched his state into political disunity, which was characterized by the use of ethnicity as a procedure of legitimac y, further eroding bridging social capital by destroying the porous nature of moral ethnicity. In 1992, with the Cold War's ending, Moi was forced into holding an election. At this time urban and middle class associations formed democratic coalitions whi ch returned to the independence discourse asking for a liberal conception of citizenship based on a "Bill of Rights" guaranteeing the rights and obligations of the individual. These groups were heavily reliant on Luo and Kikuyu supporters however, which co nsisted not only a majority of Kenyan society but was substantial majority of the urban and middle class groups Moi, now controlling KANU as a Kalenjin association, opposed the calls for a unitary state and asserted the need for "Majimbo" ethno federalism The following elections demonstrated the reliance of the incumbent dictator on bonding social capital for the pursuit of his particular conception of citizenship. This was the most visible in the 1992 and 1997 elections were through a mixture of violence and ethnic rhetoric, Moi managed to lead his party, the KANU to power. Some of the "new lexicon of difference and intimidation" used included the push for limiting the access of urban groups into regions where they comprised a minority, and the exclusion of individuals from their ethnic groups if they didn't act out in its defense against the threat of majority dominance. 108 When his term ended in 2002, he decided to retire rather than amend the constitution and run for a third consecutive term, which allowe d for a coalition of pro liberal politics and economic 108 Ndegwa, 1997, 610
110 parties to coalesce into the National Rainbow Coalition, the NARC. 109 In what was a considerably free and open election according to international observers, they won and placed Mwai Kibaki as president. Despite the latter's initial success, his attempts to change the constitution were met with opposition and used by rival political groups that coalesced into the Orange Democratic Movement. This coalition, using the referendum defeat of Kibaki's reforms, called for snap elections and supported its candidate Raila Odinga against Kibaki. After Kibaki won the 2007 election, violence broke out. Areas were Kikuyus were the minority, such as areas of intense political disputes over land redistribution in the Ri ft Valley, saw their prosecution by local majorities (state minorities). The electoral fraud to which the ODM attributed Kibaki's victory was represented as a return to Kikuyu hegemony despite the president's constitutional attempts at political and econom ic liberalization. The ODM was blamed for facilitating violence against the Kikuyu, and the central government, in turn, was blamed for allowing its police force to shoot rioters. In order to end the violence a power sharing deal was established whereby Ki baki would occupy the Presidency and Odinga the Prime Minister positions, and the parties would divide the governmental positions. 110 The question that stands is, if violence broke out after fair and contested elections, which saw the removal of a dictator from power, and the gradual liberalization of society, what can be done to keep it from happening again? Was it that Kibaki's government failed to address the political ethnicity entrenched into the system by the political repression of Daniel arap Moi and Kenyatta? And if so, what 109 Longsdale in Berman, Eyoh & Kymlicka, 2004 110 BBC (28 th Feburary 2008) h as details on the power sharing arrangement
111 else could be done that keeps ethnicity in consideration while ensuring the growth of bridging social capital in the form of a Kenyan identity capable of extracting obligations from its citizens, particularly those in government? From the previous examples of Yugoslavia and South Africa, it seems that systematic inclusion across ethnic boundaries is necessary. Some possible strategies by which the pressures of a politicized identity dynamic can be assuaged, all of which I will exp lain in due time, include: a "neutral" or "difference blind" state; a Jacobin republicanism; the strengthening of Civil society; a Federal decentralization; and a system of consociationalism. 111 In the case of Africa, the first four would not work. A "diffe rence blind" approach to governance is one where, rather than guarantee minority protections for particular segments of the population, a state ignores their existence. This can be illustrated by the "separation of church and state" in most contemporary li beral democracies. The "neutral" state has been the approach taken by Kibaki, which has been criticized as too Kikuyu (particularly concerning the referendum's articles on land reform, which they would benefit the most from because of their economic advant ages). This highlights the inability of "neutral" states to be neutral when deeply entrenched within ethnic and therefore mode of subsistence disparities. A Jacobin republicanism would be the equivalent of Alexander I of Yugoslavia's attempts at cultural genocide. Some techniques associated with this strategy include the reconfiguration of governing units, the forceful implementation of a particular conception of citizenship as defined according to linguistic and cultural 111 Berman Eyoh and Kymlicka "Ethnicity & Politics of Democratic Nation Building in Africa" in Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka, 2004
112 practices (such as imposing Parisi an French on all of France through the education system, or English in Louisiana). Aside from Human Rights abuses, an important criticism of this approach would relate to Kenya's insufficient government capacity to carry out such a monumental endeavor, as well as the resonance of such a strategy with the inefficiencies and political oppressions of the KANU dictatorships. The encouragement of Civil Society consists of enabling the promulgation of associations outside the political arena. This, on an entirel y theoretical level would be very instrumental in not only helping achieve a level of interaction in society from which bridging social capital can be constructed, but also help push for democratization. However, though the bottom up approach of civil soci ety is clearly useful, it does not proscribe any governmental policy options other than ensuring negative rights. This might be unwarrantedly optimistic since the ethnic polarization of Kenya, in the context of civil society, could contribute to the furthe r entrenchment of ethnicity based organization and therefore the normalization of subnational citizenship at the expense of statewide citizenship. Decentralization has been a main request of minority coalitions, though this claim has been married to ethni c autonomy, reinforcing bonding social capital at the expense of bridging identities. This normative implication at the heart of the Majimbo debate makes decentralization an unattractive option, particularly considering the history of forced displacement by members of minority groups of Kikuyu's from the Rift Valley region. This scenario is reminiscent of Yugoslavia. Taking identity as a fundamental issue, particularly considering the difference in role
113 identity exemplified by the disagreements on citizen ship between the Luo and Kikuyu coalitions and the rural coalitions, some additional systems are revealed. Electoral engineering is a practice whereby the democratic procedures of a system are arranged in order to encourage a particular outcome. A measure of electoral mechanisms can be employed that both respond to the reality of ethnic voting founded on ethnic citizenship and offer incentives to politicians to seek votes outside narrow communities of accountability. 112 If this is coupled with certain elemen ts of power sharing agreements, such as the use of a unity government as well as an element of federalism that purposely deconstructs ethno federal regionalism, a consociational mechanism is constructed. Consociationalism can be described as a process wher eby the time horizons of rival groups are extended through arrangements limiting the competition for governance, thus creating an incentive for the groups to validate the legitimacy of the consociational government. However, though "consociationalism is m ost appealing, it also falls short in that its overriding concern and justification is moderating or safely channeling electoral behavior and outcomes as opposed to resolving underlying citizenship dynamics or rights and obligations that propel such behavi or." 113 "Critics see [consociationalism] as rigidifying ethnic categories, and indeed as perpetuating and exacerbating the very problem of political tribalism it was meant to solve." 114 And indeed, despite this system's successes in Belgium and the Netherlands it also failed in Rwanda and Burundi. It is, however, the only system by 112 Ndegwa, 1997 113 Ndegwa, 1997, 614 114 Berman, Eyoh and Kymlicka, 2004, 20
114 which inclusion can be guaranteed, hopefully leading to the emergence of a civic culture and a strong civil society through bridging social capital. The important thing, it seems, i s to use certain consociational elements, taking the individual as the fundamental unit, in order to ensure inclusion while allowing identity affiliations to return to a porous state, through a shift in role identities. Consociationalism relies on constitu tional (or possibly transitory) measures by which representation must be assured for every segment of the population. These minority protection rights can take the shape of a proportional representation system ensuring the protection of minority political parties, as well as territorial proportionality requirements, such as requirements to obtain a percentage of votes in all territories to prevent urban parties to isolate rural parties in the legislature. 115 In the case of Kenya, it would force Kikuyu based g roups to obtain support from regions in which they are the minority therefore forcing party platforms towards a non ethnic center, and also increasing the legitimacy of the government (and concurrently its capacity). These kinds of measures, coupled with e lements of the other strategies from the previous paragraph could allow Kibaki's liberalizing government to continue its changes while simultaneously addressing the question of political ethnicity. The poor track record of the unity government, under the power sharing deal between the NARC and the ODM, illustrates a difficulty with consociationalism outside of the discourse of identity: the relative weakness of the judicial branch and the lack of political competition in the legislative and executive branc hes of 115 Such as the 25% rule in Kenya, though it was implemented by KANU and seen as a means towards preserving Kalenjin hegemony.
115 governance has lead to a complete stagnation of governance and reform. 116 Is this an illustration of the liberal state being systematically unable to extract obligation from its politicians particularly because of their entrenchment in an alternate et hnic citizenship network? Considering that the NARC ran on rhetoric of liberal citizenship rather than returning to Kenyatta's dual position as Kenyan and Kikuyu, I would argue that it is not. Rather, it's an instantiation of the lack of social capital and the absence of strong civil society associations manifesting as widespread and systemic corruption. What can we learn for Kenya from South Africa and Yugoslavia? The most immediate recommendation, which is visible in all the examples, is that the rhetori cal attempts at legitimizing a state identity over a substate identity in a system that limits political or economic participation will have a reverse effect. Tito's pursuit of a "Yugoslav" identity eroded more rapidly under his one party system than it wo uld have had it been created as a consequence of the end of the Cold War to highlight the similarities of the Yugoslav republics in the non aligned movement. In exactly the same manner, South African reconciliation would have been made problematic had the White minority refused to participate in open elections with the ANC. 117 Their oppression contributed to the creation of a Black identity, which became increasingly militarized until, through external and internal pressure, the NP negotiated into the only po ssible transitory political arrangement, a consociational system. The continual 116 BBC (3 March 2009) describes the situation in Kenya a year after the power sharing arrangement. 117 With the small concession to Maphai, 1996, th at the ANC changed its framing to appear non racial, unlike other parties in the election and that their subsequent victory illustrates a pre existing level of bridging social capital already in place.
116 entrenchment of ethnic citizenship as a viable identity affiliation can be traced back to the colonial structural divisions of Africa by the British Empire. However, their cont emporary political renditions can be contributed to the failure of the KANU party to come through with its liberal ideals and promises by establishing a single party system over a multi party one. Similarly, the democratic coalition that inherited governan ce after Moi's retirement was rhetorically salient in its pursuit of a multi party system, and its abandonment in the contemporary power sharing agreement a failure to come through with their promised reforms. Though the power sharing agreement might have been necessary, just as it was in South Africa, to prevent the promulgation of violence; the failure of previous governing actors to encourage bridging social capital, and a therefore a strong civil society, can be mentioned at least tacitly responsible fo r creating the framework of corruption in which Kenya finds itself now. Some additional recommendations, based on the issue of corruption, include encouraging the development of the judiciary, which would help sustain a strong civil society. The aforement ioned possibility that civil society will develop along social cleavages is reduced if the other consociational elements are maintained (such as a unity government and electoral engineering) and might in fact contribute to the normative development of civi l society into a positive discourse from which bridging social capital, and therefore a new pan Kenyan identity affiliation will take root. Another possible recommendation would be the creation of a truth commission, which would establish a framework for c ommon social memory, as it did in South Africa. Such a commission would restore a sense of dignity to those victimize by
117 acknowledging their suffering. The creation of this discursive space of a common Kenyan experience would have the additional benefit o f re creating the sense of legitimacy in governance. This restored sense of legitimacy could help the liberal citizenship of Kenya extract obligations from its politicians by creating what I referred to as "Patriotism" in the introduction. Conclusion The four main variables by which social constructivism plots out the possibilities for the assimilation between "self" and "other" are those of perceived "common fate," "mutual interdependence," "homogenization" and "mutual self restraint." 118 When these variabl es are increased, society tends towards cooperation rather than violence, towards understanding rather than apprehension, and towards the extension of time horizons through the dissolution of boundaries relating to identity affiliations. This change occurs because these variables that control identity affiliation through a shift in role identities constitute a shift in social capital from the bonding variety to the bridging variety. Constructivist variables, which are based on perception rather than actuali ty, 119 can only be created through interaction. Thus extended interaction makes it increasingly advantageous and legitimate to cooperate, rather than compete or exert violence. For this reason, interaction is an imperative for the creation of bridging social capital, and government policies that break down the institutional and structural barriers that infringe on the ability of society to interact 118 Wendt (1999) 119 This is though actuality has a very s trong bearing on perception.
118 should be pursued to ensure the mediation of violence during a breakdown of society along traditional social cle avages.
119 BIBLIOGRAPHY Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities Verso, 1983, 2 nd edition 2006 Berman, Bruce, Eyoh, Dickson, and Kymlicka, Will. "Ethnicity and Politics of Democratic Nation Building in Africa" in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa James Curry Limited, 2004 Bowen, John R. "The Myth of Global Ethnic Conflict," Journal of Democracy Vol. 7, No. 4, 1996 Caballero, Carlo. "Patriotism or Nationalism?" Journal of the American Musicological Society Vol. 52, No. 3 (Autumn 1999) Chapman, Audr ey R and Ball, Patrick. "The Truth of Truth Commissions: comparative lessons from Haiti, South Africa and Guatemala" Human Rights Quarterly Vol 23, No. 1, 2001. Crampton, RJ. The Balkans since the Second World War Pearson Education Limited, 2002 Deak, Istvan. "The One and the Many" in The Black Book of Bosnia ed. By Nader Mousavizadeh, Basic Books, 1999 Giliomee, Hermann and Schlemmer, Lawrence. From Apartheid to Nation Building Oxford University Press, 1990 Horowitz, Donald L. A Democratic South Af rica Donald L. Horowitz, 1991 Longsdale, John. "Moral and Political Arguments in Kenya" in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa James Curry Limited, 2004 Maphai, Vincent. "A Season for Power Sharing," Journal of Democracy Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996 Marx, Antho ny. Making Race a Nation Cambridge University Press, 1998
120 Muigai, Githu. "Jomo Kenyatta and the Rise of the Ethno Nationalist State in Kenya" in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa James Curry Limited, 2004 Ndegwa, Stephen N. "Citizenship and Ethnicity: An examination of Two Transition Moments in Kenyan Politics," The American Political Science Review Vol. 91, No 3 (September 1997) Putnam, Robert D. Making Democracy Work Princeton University Press, 1994 Bowling Alone Simon and Schuster, 2000 Simeon, Richard and Murray, Christina. "Multi Level Governance in South Africa" in Ethnicity and Democracy in Africa James Curry Limited, 2004 Walshe, Peter. The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa University of California Press, 1971 Wendt, Alexander Social Theory of International Politics Cambridge University Press, 1999 Woodward, Susan L. Balkan Tragedy The Brookings Institution, 1995
121 CONCLUSION I began the introduction by immediately suggesting the different reasons why I thought identity was a worthwhile field of inquiry for political science to approach. As such, the introductory paper of this portfolio consisted of a short description of the individual papers and justifications as to why they belong together. The concluding chapter will have the opposite purpose. Although I will briefly recapitulate the papers and their main arguments, the majority of this conclusion will be dedicated to everything that was wrong, badly made, and could have been done differently. Then, I will explain why this project still allows valuable room for further research in new perspectives. Summary The first paper is based on Alexander Wendt's structural constructivism. In it I recount how there is a possible cultural structure that states fit into from which their relationship with other states are determined, and therefore their behavior. This macro level theory, based on "top down" dynamics, goes counter to the majority of political science research programs, which emphasize the distribution of power and int erests over the distribution of norms in the international system. It does this without necessarily supplanting them, however, by creating a space in its possible instantiations in which their assumptions hold. The paper began with a summary of the standar d "rationalist" perspectives in IR. It follows this summary discussion with a depiction of the fundamental assumptions that demarcate structural constructivism, in order to describe the predictions that these assumptions generate. It concludes by
122 asking wh ether procedures could be put in the lower levels of analysis (the social or actor specific levels), that through symbolic nature, or framing, might affect the perception of inclusion among states and encourage the promulgation of "Kantian" norms. The seco nd paper dealt with issues of varying sovereignty norms and tried to describe them within the context of constructivism. It was based on a diplomatic scuffle between Colombia and the "new left" of South America that took place in early 2008. The paper desc ribes how the incident illustrated the tension between normative values that could be predicted by a structural constructivist perspective. It concluded by emphasizing how the tension was indicative of possibility for structural change from a culture of ri valry to a culture of friendship. The third paper explored the cases of Yugoslavia, South Africa and Kenya. It analyzed how identity is an issue of political relevance in comparative politics as deeply as it is in IR. The discussion over role identity and identity affiliations has been traditionally captured in the discussion over the different characteristics of bonding and bridging social capital, so the paper focuses on government strategies that affected society in those terms. It explores some ways by which a state can help diminish the damage incited by a violent turn in society by encouraging bridging social capital and some methods by which this can be done. Issues and Caveats The following are the issues with the first paper. Structural constructi vism is
123 an attractive research program, but by no means the only one, and its reliance on better established "rationalist" theories to explain behavior in some of its instantiations makes it difficult to find worthwhile. The point of a research program, ho wever, is to advance the scientific accumulation of knowledge, and the inability of constructivism to debunk other research programs allows for this purpose to be served. The prevalence of rational choice theory in political science discourse was making th e normative foundation of preference invisible. The ability of constructivism to contribute an additional perspective allows for a deeper understanding of what is actually "going on." The paper being based almost entirely on Alexander Wendt makes it a poo r illustration of constructivism as a whole. This is an issue in that it over represents a particular instantiation of a greater perspective that tends to under emphasize the normative consequences of symbolic language on identity formation. For this reaso ns I had to differentiate between Wendt's structural constructivism and the rest of constructivists in the paper, though a more thorough investigation would have been fruitful. However, since the perspective I was interested was that of the internal system and structural constructivism was a response to neorealism, placing an emphasis on this perspective was legitimate. The following are the issues with the second paper. The Colombian example was perhaps ill chosen. I tried to frame it as an exploration of the possibilities inherent to constructivism in the introduction. However, two issues make this problematic. The first is that South America is and remains entrenched in a culture of
124 mutual self abstention and rivalry, like a majority of the world. Conside ring I'd spent the previous 40 some pages arguing for the sincerity of the constructivist approach, using a case in which liberal and realist perspectives where brought into being by the normative culture of the system made for a weakened overall argument. Had I intended for these two papers to be chapters in a constructivist thesis, I would have chosen a more obvious example, such as the systemic change of the European Union. The paper still manages to find new possibilities inherent to the situation that were not apparent through the other research programs, such as the possibility of systemic change inherent to diplomatic friction. The bad case selection also reasserts the question: Why have enmity and rivalry been so historically prevalent over Kantian states of anarchy? This is an issue I tried to address by looking at the relationship between time horizons and expectations. Although I expect this to raise issues pertaining to the implied primacy of rational calculations, I would argue this criticism to be premature. Whether states engage in a role identity constituting friendship in order to maximize their perceived benefits in an extended time horizon or not, the mechanisms by which they will defend it after having internalize its normative makeup will never the less be rooted in laws of appropriateness. The third paper's issues are rooted in the negligent case selection. Having selected on the dependent variable, it was unlikely that I would not find evidence for my argument. Strong arguments can be m ade against consociationalism and for federalization as a way of successfully alleviating tensions between the regions and a
125 corrupt center. The failure of Yugoslavia, after all, was not based on its federal decentralization, but on its "ethno" federalized structure. This is something I would not have been able to extract from the paper alone without external readings (with better case selection). These were concerns that I tried to take into consideration when analyzing the countries during my revision pro cess. Thinking of South Africa's arrangement as a pacted transition in which the consociational measures constitute the pact was helpful in determining the possibility for its implementation in Kenya. It was also helpful in understanding the relationship b etween liberal citizenship as an identity affiliation rooted in bridging social capital, whereby underlying bonding social capital is made porous. This would not have been helped by strict and traditional consociational procedures, since the emphasis neces sary is clearly on the openness of identity affiliation. Selection on the dependent variable was a conscious decision constituting the limitations of the paper, though it indicates a clear bias: the paper was intended as a short historical description ai med at elucidating similarities and dissimilarities but the limited focus and case selection leaves many possible variables out of consideration. This should be taken into consideration when looking at the paper's conclusions, but fails to undermine the pr oject as a whole. Conclusion The three papers selected for this portfolio all dealt with the implications identity
126 and identity formation have on political dynamics. They did this by examining the different processes by which interaction among actors can affect their expectations. The internalization of norms established through continual interaction will inevitably lead to their self preservation as specific cultures with independent logics. They will also lead to different mechanisms by which their inst antiations take place. In IR, this implies that the way states interact is almost as important as the weight that their speeches carry. Or to use the popular Roosevelt dictum, that the loud ness of speech of government actors (and what they say) is as imp ortant as the big stick they might carry to back their rhetoric. In the paper that dealt with domestic policy, the importance of identity formation was made evident by the importance of bridging social capital in legitimating governance as well as creating the cultural situation necessary for the state to extract obligations from its politicians and citizens. Hopefully, this endeavor into the appropriateness and possibilities of identity formation as an analytical tool will contribute to a greater understan ding of the political dynamics taking place on both the domestic and international levels. With this endeavor in mind, there are a handful of directions in which this research program could develop. Whereas critical constructivists and postmodern construc tivists (as well as a majority of conventional constructivists) concern themselves with the dissemination of normative material through cultural and economic linkage, the external perspective of structural constructivism allows it a more ample field of inq uiry. The positioning of this program as an exploration of "top down" dynamics, whereby society's cultural makeup responds to a state's
127 positioning in the international system allows for the exploration of such diverse phenomena as the zeitgeist effect, as well as cultural contagion (for example in the diffusion of democratic values). However, the ability to create a comprehensible set of circumstances around which systemic change can take place remains the most important contribution of structural construc tivism. The relative strength in explaining this phenomenon is instrumental in political considerations, but also serves to highlight that constructivism's research objects are analytically prior to those of rationalist concerns. Interesting further resear ch would therefore deal with the implication of taking identity seriously on possible foreign policy strategies.