Material Information |
| Title: |
The Propriety of Love An Exploration of Platonic Love Based on the Dialogue Lysis |
| Physical Description: |
Book |
| Language: |
English |
| Creator: |
Slemmens, Erin |
| Publisher: |
New College of Florida |
| Place of Publication: |
Sarasota, Fla. |
| Creation Date: |
2003 |
| Publication Date: |
2003 |
Subjects |
| Subjects / Keywords: |
Plato
Love
Friendship |
| Genre: |
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Notes |
| Abstract: |
In this thesis I outline and analyze the structure of the argument itself, describing the best sort of friendship (one that is good in and of itself) by evaluating the logic and examples of Socrates' claims and refutations. Trusting that Socrates guides us to the greater good when he chooses, beyond all other things, to possess a good friend, I look closely at what makes one a friend (and not a lover). I evaluate the process of defining a friend in order to determine what good a true friend provides. Maintaining faith in Socrates' persistent belief in a good independent from any opposite evil, I find a manner by which one can desire even if there is no lack or want. I discover that, if you are not deprived, then you may be satisfied. And then you may be privileged. You can desire privilege. Satisfaction of this desire requires the process of making more good. Yet first there must be a good present. From there, the good can only clone by birth or mirth, not dearth. I show how friendship, in a form completely unencumbered by injury, must be one of creation or education. I explain why Socrates chooses to logically deny this exemplar friendship in order to illuminate love that must be hurtful or foolish. Then, I compare the perfect friendship to the best sort of passion, which we may know by comparing the unrequited, solitary longings of both Hippothales and Socrates. Looking at these two forms of love, I answer the question, 'Is it foolish or even possible for one person to be a lover of another?' |
| Statement of Responsibility: |
by Erin Slemmens |
| Thesis: |
Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2003 |
| Electronic Access: |
RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE |
| Bibliography: |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Source of Description: |
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law. |
| Local: |
Faculty Sponsor: Moore, John |
Record Information |
| Source Institution: |
New College of Florida |
| Holding Location: |
New College of Florida |
| Rights Management: |
Applicable rights reserved. |
| Classification: |
local - S.T. 2003 S6 |
| System ID: |
NCFE003304:00001 |
|
Material Information |
| Title: |
The Propriety of Love An Exploration of Platonic Love Based on the Dialogue Lysis |
| Physical Description: |
Book |
| Language: |
English |
| Creator: |
Slemmens, Erin |
| Publisher: |
New College of Florida |
| Place of Publication: |
Sarasota, Fla. |
| Creation Date: |
2003 |
| Publication Date: |
2003 |
Subjects |
| Subjects / Keywords: |
Plato
Love
Friendship |
| Genre: |
bibliography ( marcgt )
theses ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent) ( marcgt )
born-digital ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
Notes |
| Abstract: |
In this thesis I outline and analyze the structure of the argument itself, describing the best sort of friendship (one that is good in and of itself) by evaluating the logic and examples of Socrates' claims and refutations. Trusting that Socrates guides us to the greater good when he chooses, beyond all other things, to possess a good friend, I look closely at what makes one a friend (and not a lover). I evaluate the process of defining a friend in order to determine what good a true friend provides. Maintaining faith in Socrates' persistent belief in a good independent from any opposite evil, I find a manner by which one can desire even if there is no lack or want. I discover that, if you are not deprived, then you may be satisfied. And then you may be privileged. You can desire privilege. Satisfaction of this desire requires the process of making more good. Yet first there must be a good present. From there, the good can only clone by birth or mirth, not dearth. I show how friendship, in a form completely unencumbered by injury, must be one of creation or education. I explain why Socrates chooses to logically deny this exemplar friendship in order to illuminate love that must be hurtful or foolish. Then, I compare the perfect friendship to the best sort of passion, which we may know by comparing the unrequited, solitary longings of both Hippothales and Socrates. Looking at these two forms of love, I answer the question, 'Is it foolish or even possible for one person to be a lover of another?' |
| Statement of Responsibility: |
by Erin Slemmens |
| Thesis: |
Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2003 |
| Electronic Access: |
RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE |
| Bibliography: |
Includes bibliographical references. |
| Source of Description: |
This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law. |
| Local: |
Faculty Sponsor: Moore, John |
Record Information |
| Source Institution: |
New College of Florida |
| Holding Location: |
New College of Florida |
| Rights Management: |
Applicable rights reserved. |
| Classification: |
local - S.T. 2003 S6 |
| System ID: |
NCFE003304:00001 |
|