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I, Zombie? Why Zombie Knowledge is Fatal to Chalmers' Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness

Permanent Link: http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu/NCFE003232/00001

Material Information

Title: I, Zombie? Why Zombie Knowledge is Fatal to Chalmers' Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Hensel, Alden
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2003
Publication Date: 2003

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Philosophy
Consciousness
Qualia
Gettier
Chalmers
Zombies
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Much of the disagreement among philosophers as to how to explain consciousness concerns the nature of qualitative conscious states, or qualia. Chalmers contends that qualia are nonphysical mental states. Part of his motivation for thinking this stems from what is commonly referred to as the conceivability argument, perhaps better known as the zombie argument. Chalmers claims that the concept of zombies � physical isomorphs of us that nevertheless lack qualitative conscious states � is coherent and conceivable and that, therefore, physical mental states alone cannot explain our qualitative consciousness. It is my contention that the concept of such isomorphs is not coherent. I will offer a proof by contradiction by showing that if the concept of zombies is coherent then it follows that we cannot possess certain knowledge that we do in fact possess. Further, I will argue that if the concept of zombies is untenable, then so too is the idea that some of our conscious mental states are nonphysical in nature.
Statement of Responsibility: by Alden Hensel
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2003
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Edidin, Aron

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2003 H5
System ID: NCFE003232:00001

Permanent Link: http://ncf.sobek.ufl.edu/NCFE003232/00001

Material Information

Title: I, Zombie? Why Zombie Knowledge is Fatal to Chalmers' Theory of Phenomenal Consciousness
Physical Description: Book
Language: English
Creator: Hensel, Alden
Publisher: New College of Florida
Place of Publication: Sarasota, Fla.
Creation Date: 2003
Publication Date: 2003

Subjects

Subjects / Keywords: Philosophy
Consciousness
Qualia
Gettier
Chalmers
Zombies
Genre: bibliography   ( marcgt )
theses   ( marcgt )
government publication (state, provincial, terriorial, dependent)   ( marcgt )
born-digital   ( sobekcm )
Electronic Thesis or Dissertation

Notes

Abstract: Much of the disagreement among philosophers as to how to explain consciousness concerns the nature of qualitative conscious states, or qualia. Chalmers contends that qualia are nonphysical mental states. Part of his motivation for thinking this stems from what is commonly referred to as the conceivability argument, perhaps better known as the zombie argument. Chalmers claims that the concept of zombies � physical isomorphs of us that nevertheless lack qualitative conscious states � is coherent and conceivable and that, therefore, physical mental states alone cannot explain our qualitative consciousness. It is my contention that the concept of such isomorphs is not coherent. I will offer a proof by contradiction by showing that if the concept of zombies is coherent then it follows that we cannot possess certain knowledge that we do in fact possess. Further, I will argue that if the concept of zombies is untenable, then so too is the idea that some of our conscious mental states are nonphysical in nature.
Statement of Responsibility: by Alden Hensel
Thesis: Thesis (B.A.) -- New College of Florida, 2003
Electronic Access: RESTRICTED TO NCF STUDENTS, STAFF, FACULTY, AND ON-CAMPUS USE
Bibliography: Includes bibliographical references.
Source of Description: This bibliographic record is available under the Creative Commons CC0 public domain dedication. The New College of Florida, as creator of this bibliographic record, has waived all rights to it worldwide under copyright law, including all related and neighboring rights, to the extent allowed by law.
Local: Faculty Sponsor: Edidin, Aron

Record Information

Source Institution: New College of Florida
Holding Location: New College of Florida
Rights Management: Applicable rights reserved.
Classification: local - S.T. 2003 H5
System ID: NCFE003232:00001

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